{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0007-121343", "citation": "Res. 17472-2007 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Acceso a información sobre contratos de cogeneración eléctrica con el ICE", "title_en": "Access to information on ICE cogeneration contracts", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional analiza un recurso de amparo contra el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) por condicionar la entrega de información sobre contratos de cogeneración eléctrica a que la solicitante acreditara su interés público. Tras distinguir entre el derecho de petición (arts. 27 y 41 constitucionales) y el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa (art. 30 constitucional), la Sala concluye que no hubo violación al primero porque la respuesta se dio en plazo razonable. Sin embargo, declara con lugar el amparo por violación al derecho de acceso a la información. El tribunal determina que los datos solicitados —nombres de empresas contratistas, cantidades, precios de compra y venta de electricidad, y nombres de accionistas— son información de interés público no confidencial. Establece que el interés público es un requisito de la información, no de la persona solicitante, por lo que la administración no puede exigir al administrado demostrar su interés para acceder a datos de naturaleza pública. La sentencia constituye un precedente relevante sobre los límites y alcances del artículo 30 constitucional y la improcedencia de condicionar el acceso a la información administrativa a la acreditación de un interés personal.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber reviewed an amparo action against the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) for conditioning the release of information on electricity cogeneration contracts on the requester proving her public interest. The Chamber distinguished between the right to petition (Articles 27 and 41 of the Constitution) and the right of access to administrative information (Article 30). It found no violation of the right to petition, as ICE responded within a reasonable time. However, it granted the amparo for violation of access to information. The Court held that the requested data—names of contracting companies, quantities, purchase and sale prices of electricity, and shareholder names—constitute non-confidential information of public interest. It established that public interest is a requirement of the information itself, not of the person requesting it, so the administration cannot demand that individuals prove their interest to access public data. This ruling sets an important precedent on the scope and limits of Article 30 and the impropriety of conditioning access to administrative information on proving a personal interest.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "2007", "year": "2007", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "derecho de acceso a la información administrativa", "interés público", "artículo 30 constitucional", "ICE", "cogeneración eléctrica", "derecho de petición", "amparo" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 30", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 27", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 41", "law": "Constitución Política" } ], "keywords_es": [ "acceso a la información", "artículo 30 Constitución Política", "interés público", "información administrativa", "ICE", "cogeneración eléctrica", "derecho de petición", "derecho de acceso a la información", "amparo", "Sala Constitucional" ], "keywords_en": [ "access to information", "Article 30 Constitution", "public interest", "administrative information", "ICE", "electricity cogeneration", "right to petition", "right of access to information", "amparo", "Constitutional Chamber" ], "excerpt_es": "De esta forma se configuró una violación al derecho de acceso a la información administrativa cuando se le condicionó el acceso a tal información a la acreditación del interés público que le asiste a la recurrente, pues una cosa es que el artículo 30 Constitucional se refiera al acceso a la información administrativa de interés público y otra muy diferente exigirle al interesado demostrar su interés público, pues el interés público es un requisito de la información y no de la persona que lo solicita.", "excerpt_en": "Thus, a violation of the right of access to administrative information was established when access to such information was conditioned on the petitioner proving her public interest, because Article 30 of the Constitution refers to access to administrative information of public interest and it is a very different thing to require the interested party to prove her public interest, since public interest is a requirement of the information and not of the person requesting it.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Granted", "label_es": "Con lugar", "summary_en": "The Chamber granted the amparo solely regarding the violation of the right of access to administrative information, as the delivery of public information was illegitimately conditioned on proving a personal interest.", "summary_es": "La Sala declara con lugar el recurso de amparo únicamente en cuanto a la violación del derecho de acceso a la información administrativa, por haberse condicionado ilegítimamente la entrega de información pública a la acreditación de un interés personal." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "Public interest is a requirement of the information and not of the person requesting it.", "quote_es": "El interés público es un requisito de la información y no de la persona que lo solicita." }, { "context": "Considerando IV (cita de Voto 2004-05693)", "quote_en": "The right of access to administrative information is a control mechanism in the hands of citizens, since it allows them to exercise optimal control of the legality and timeliness, suitability or merit, and in general the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative function carried out by the various public entities.", "quote_es": "El derecho de acceso a la información administrativa es un mecanismo de control en manos de los administrados, puesto que, le permite a éstos, ejercer un control óptimo de la legalidad y de la oportunidad, conveniencia o mérito y, en general, de la eficacia y eficiencia de la función administrativa desplegada por los diversos entes públicos." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0007-121343", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-13231", "norm_num": "6227", "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978" }, { "doc_id": "norm-38533", "norm_num": "7135", "norm_name": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "11/10/1989" }, { "doc_id": "norm-871", "norm_num": "0", "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“I.-Objeto\r\ndel recurso.- La recurrente, quien realizó una solicitud de información al\r\nICE el 03 de setiembre del 2007, considera contrario\r\na lo dispuesto en el artículo 30 de la Constitución Política que se le condicione\r\nel acceso a información de carácter público, a que demuestre cuál es el interés\r\npúblico que tiene en acceder a esos datos, más aún cuando el sustento legal en\r\nque pretende fundamentar esa condición, no es aplicable al caso concreto. Considera\r\nque en aplicación de los principios de transparencia, de rendición de cuentas y\r\nevaluación de resultados, no sólo se encuentra legitimada para solicitar dicha\r\ninformación, sino que el recurrido está en la obligación de proporcionársela.”\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n“…III.- Sobre el fondo.- En este asunto corresponde analizar\r\nlos alcances y limitaciones de dos derechos fundamentales, a saber, el derecho\r\nde petición y pronta resolución (artículo 27 y 41 constitucional) y el derecho\r\nde acceso a la información administrativa (artículo 30 constitucional). Según\r\nse analiza a continuación, no se observa violación alguna al primero, pero si\r\nal segundo. A) Sobre el derecho de petición y pronta resolución.- El\r\nderecho de petición, establecido en el artículo 27 Constitucional, hace\r\nreferencia a la facultad que posee todo ciudadano para dirigirse por escrito a\r\ncualquier funcionario público o entidad oficial con el fin de exponer un asunto\r\nde su interés. Esta garantía se complementa con el derecho a obtener pronta\r\nrespuesta, aunque esto último no significa que el administrado deba recibir una\r\ncontestación favorable a sus intereses. En este punto deben diferenciarse las\r\npeticiones puras y simples de información, los reclamos administrativos, las\r\ndenuncias y otras solicitudes. En el primer caso, normalmente la\r\nrespuesta deberá darse dentro de los diez días siguientes a la recepción de la\r\npetición, como lo ordena el artículo 32 de la Ley de Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional. Excepcionalmente, si la contestación no puede brindarse dentro\r\nde ese término por razones justificadas, la Administración está obligada a\r\nexplicar, dentro del plazo exigido por la Ley, cuáles son los motivos por los\r\nque no puede atender la petición en ese momento -obviamente, en el entendido de\r\nque más adelante, cuando pueda hacerlo, deberá responder cabalmente la\r\npetición-. La explicación correspondiente deberá ser clara, profusa y\r\ndetallada, con el objeto de que el petente quede\r\ndebidamente informado y pueda ejercer las acciones legales que juzgue\r\napropiadas. En el segundo caso, cuando se trata de reclamos o\r\nrecursos -en que el particular pide la declaración o restitución de un derecho\r\nsubjetivo-, como lo ha señalado esta Sala, no es el artículo 27 Constitucional\r\nel aplicable, sino el 41: \"Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de\r\nencontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su\r\npersona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe\r\nhacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad\r\ncon las leyes\". Lo anterior, por cuanto los reclamos y recursos\r\nadministrativos, a diferencia de las peticiones puras, requieren un\r\nprocedimiento para verificar los hechos que han de servir de motivo al acto\r\nfinal, así como adoptar las medidas probatorias pertinentes (véase la sentencia\r\nN° 2002-03851 de las 14:56 horas del 30 de abril de\r\n2002). Usualmente, el término para resolver está dado por el artículo 261, párrafo\r\n1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que establece que el\r\nprocedimiento administrativo ordinario debe ser concluido, por acto final,\r\ndentro del plazo de dos meses posteriores a su iniciación (véase la\r\nsentencia número 759-93 de las 16:39 horas del 15 de febrero de 1993). En la\r\nhipótesis del procedimiento sumario, el artículo 325 de esa misma ley dispone\r\nun plazo de un mes -a partir de su inicio- para que la Administración concluya\r\nla tramitación. Además, en lo tocante a la fase recursiva o procedimiento de\r\nimpugnación, el numeral 261, párrafo 2° del mismo cuerpo legal fija también el\r\ntérmino de un mes para resolver. Lo anterior se afirma en el entendido de que,\r\nen virtud del principio del debido proceso que rige en la vía administrativa,\r\nla autoridad recurrida está obligada no sólo a resolver dentro del período\r\nconferido por la ley para tal efecto, sino también a notificar la resolución\r\nrespectiva dentro de ese mismo lapso de tiempo. En el tercer caso,\r\ncuando se trata de denuncias, la Sala ha reconocido y declarado que, como\r\ninstituto jurídico utilizado por los administrados para poner en conocimiento\r\nde la Administración hechos que el denunciante estima irregulares, ilegales o\r\ncontrarios al orden público, ésta deviene en un modo de participación en\r\nasuntos que conciernen al interés público, perfectamente compatible y, de\r\nhecho, fundamentada en el principio democrático, por lo que se ubica -al igual\r\nque las peticiones de información, los reclamos administrativos y las\r\nsolicitudes de otorgamiento de ciertos derechos-, dentro del concepto genérico\r\nde petición establecido en el artículo 27 constitucional, con su correlativo\r\nderecho de obtener resolución. Por esa razón, si bien el denunciante no es\r\nparte en el procedimiento y no existe un plazo legalmente establecido para\r\nresolver al efecto, esta Sala ha sostenido reiteradamente que aquel, si así lo\r\ndesea, tiene derecho a que se le comunique el resultado de su gestión en un\r\ntérmino razonable (véase la resolución Nº 2002-06543 de las 08:57 horas del 5\r\nde julio de 2002). Por último, entratándose\r\nde solicitudes para obtener autorizaciones, permisos y/o licencias, los\r\nartículos 330 y 331 de la Ley General de Administración Pública disponen que la\r\nAdministración cuenta con el plazo de un mes, contado a partir del momento en\r\nque recibe la solicitud, para resolver lo que en derecho corresponda (véase las\r\nresoluciones N° 171-89 de las nueve horas treinta\r\nminutos del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos ochenta y nueve y N° 3072-93 de las 16:00 horas del 30 de junio de 1993). En\r\ncaso de que la solicitud no reúna todos los requisitos necesarios, lo propio es\r\nque la Administración haga la prevención correspondiente, a fin de que los\r\ndefectos sean subsanados (sentencia N° 2001-01116 de\r\nlas 17:21 horas del 7 de febrero de 2001). Cuando un órgano o ente público se\r\nexcede en estos plazos, en tesis de principio, se produce un quebranto del\r\nderecho a una justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida establecido en el\r\nartículo 41 de la Constitución Política. No obstante, lo anterior en modo\r\nalguno implica una constitucionalización de los\r\nplazos legales, pues lo que se tutela es el derecho que toda persona tiene a\r\nque su causa se resuelva dentro de un plazo razonable; plazo que ha de ser\r\nestablecido en cada caso concreto, atendiendo a la complejidad técnica del\r\nasunto del que se trate, la amplitud de la prueba por evacuar, las\r\nconsecuencias para las partes de la demora o el grado de afectación a la\r\npersona o al ambiente del acto impugnado, la conducta de los litigantes y de\r\nlas autoridades involucradas, las pautas y márgenes ordinarios del tipo de\r\nprocedimiento en cuestión y el estándar medio para la resolución de asuntos\r\nsimilares por las autoridades de la misma materia (véanse las sentencias Nº\r\n2003-13640 de las 13:50 horas del 28 de noviembre del 2003). Por lo tanto, un\r\nincumplimiento de los términos legales, puede, a veces, no entrañar una\r\nviolación a los artículos 27 y 41 de la Constitución. Aplicando todo lo\r\nanterior al caso que plantea la recurrente se comprueba que ejerció su derecho\r\nde petición y que la respuesta solicitada se le otorgó dentro de un plazo\r\nrazonable, a saber, hizo la solicitud el 03 de setiembre\r\ndel 2007 y se le dio respuesta –aunque ciertamente no la que esperaba la\r\nrecurrente- el 19 de setiembre del 2007, razón por la\r\ncual, no se configura violación al derecho de petición y pronta resolución. Es\r\nevidente que se examinó el contenido de la solicitud en un plazo razonable y se\r\nle brindó respuesta aún cuando ésta no fue favorable a la pretensión de la\r\nrecurrente, lo cual en reiteradas ocasiones se ha admitido como válido por este\r\nTribunal pues lo que interesa es que se brinde respuesta a la gestión formulada\r\ny no necesariamente que se conceda el fondo de las pretensiones planteadas. Se\r\nanaliza a continuación el tratamiento que se le dio al derecho de acceso a la\r\ninformación administrativa. \n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- B) Sobre el derecho de acceso a la\r\ninformación administrativa.- El artículo 30 de la Constitución Política\r\ngarantiza el libre acceso a los “departamentos administrativos con\r\npropósitos de información sobre asuntos de interés público”, derecho\r\nfundamental que en la doctrina se ha denominado derecho de acceso a la\r\ninformación administrativa, y que emana del principio de publicidad que cubre a\r\nla actuación administrativa, en tanto objeto del interés público. Este Tribunal\r\nConstitucional, en varias oportunidades anteriores se ha referido al derecho\r\nfundamental derivado del artículo 30 de nuestra Carta Magna, denominado derecho\r\nde acceso a la información administrativa, indicándose lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n“IV.- EL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. El ordinal 30 de\r\nla Constitución Política garantiza el libre acceso a los “departamentos\r\nadministrativos con propósitos de información sobre asuntos de interés\r\npúblico”, derecho fundamental que en la doctrina se ha denominado derecho de\r\nacceso a los archivos y registros administrativos, sin embargo la denominación\r\nmás acertada debe ser la de derecho de acceso a la información administrativa,\r\npuesto que, el acceso a los soportes materiales o virtuales de las\r\nadministraciones públicas es el instrumento o mecanismo para alcanzar el fin\r\npropuesto que consiste en que los administrados se impongan de la información\r\nque detentan aquéllas. Es menester indicar que no siempre la información\r\nadministrativa de interés público que busca un administrado se encuentra en un\r\nexpediente, archivo o registro administrativo. El derecho de acceso a la\r\ninformación administrativa es un mecanismo de control en manos de los\r\nadministrados, puesto que, le permite a éstos, ejercer un control óptimo de la\r\nlegalidad y de la oportunidad, conveniencia o mérito y, en general, de la\r\neficacia y eficiencia de la función administrativa desplegada por los diversos\r\nentes públicos. Las administraciones públicas eficientes y eficaces son\r\naquellas que se someten al control y escrutinio público, pero no puede existir\r\nun control ciudadano sin una adecuada información. De este modo se puede\r\nestablecer un encadenamiento lógico entre acceso a la información\r\nadministrativa, conocimiento y manejo de ésta, control ciudadano efectivo\r\nu oportuno y administraciones públicas eficientes. El derecho de acceso a la\r\ninformación administrativa tiene un profundo asidero en una serie de principios\r\ny valores inherentes al Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, los cuales, al\r\npropio tiempo, actúa. Así la participación ciudadana efectiva y directa en la\r\ngestión y manejo de los asuntos públicos resulta inconcebible si no se cuenta\r\ncon un bagaje importante de información acerca de las competencias y servicios\r\nadministrativos, de la misma forma, el principio democrático se ve fortalecido\r\ncuando las diversas fuerzas y grupos sociales, económicos y políticos\r\nparticipan activa e informadamente en la formación y ejecución de la voluntad\r\npública. Finalmente, el derecho de acceso a la información administrativa es\r\nuna herramienta indispensable, como otras tantas, para la vigencia plena de los\r\nprincipios de transparencia y publicidad administrativas. El contenido del\r\nderecho de acceso a la información administrativa es verdaderamente amplio y se\r\ncompone de un haz de facultades en cabeza de la persona que lo ejerce tales\r\ncomo las siguientes: a) acceso a los departamentos, dependencias, oficinas y\r\nedificios públicos; b) acceso a los archivos, registros, expedientes y\r\ndocumentos físicos o automatizados —bases de datos ficheros—; c) facultad del\r\nadministrado de conocer los datos personales o nominativos almacenados que le\r\nafecten de alguna forma, d) facultad del administrado de rectificar o eliminar\r\nesos datos si son erróneos, incorrectos o falsos; e) derecho de conocer el\r\ncontenido de los documentos y expedientes físicos o virtuales y f) derecho de\r\nobtener, a su costo, certificaciones o copias de los mismos. \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- TIPOLOGIA DEL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN\r\nADMINISTRATIVA. Se puede distinguir con claridad meridiana entre el derecho\r\nde acceso a la información administrativa (a) ad extra –fuera- y (b) ad intra —dentro— de un procedimiento administrativo. El\r\nprimero se otorga a cualquier persona o administrado interesado en acceder una\r\ninformación administrativa determinada —uti universi— y el segundo, únicamente, a las partes\r\ninteresadas en un procedimiento administrativo concreto y específico —uti singuli—. Este derecho se\r\nencuentra normado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública en su Capítulo\r\nSexto intitulado “Del acceso al expediente y sus piezas”, Título Tercero del\r\nLibro Segundo en los artículos 272\r\n a 274. El numeral 30 de la Constitución Política,\r\nevidentemente, se refiere al derecho de acceso ad extra, puesto que, es\r\nabsolutamente independiente de la existencia de un procedimiento\r\nadministrativo. Este derecho no ha sido desarrollado legislativamente de forma\r\nsistemática y coherente, lo cual constituye una seria y grave laguna de nuestro\r\nordenamiento jurídico que se ha prolongado en el tiempo por más de cincuenta\r\naños desde la vigencia del texto constitucional. La regulación de este derecho\r\nha sido fragmentada y sectorial, así, a título de ejemplo, la Ley del Sistema\r\nNacional de Archivos No. 7202 del 24 de octubre de 1990, lo norma respecto de\r\nlos documentos con valor científico y cultural de los entes y órganos públicos\r\n—sujetos pasivos— que conforman el Sistema Nacional de Archivos (Poderes\r\nLegislativo, Judicial, Ejecutivo y demás entes públicos con personalidad\r\njurídica, así como los depositados en los archivos privados y particulares\r\nsometidos a las previsiones de ese cuerpo legal). \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- SUJETOS\r\nACTIVO Y PASIVO DEL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. El sujeto\r\nactivo del derecho consagrado en el artículo 30 de la Carta Magna lo es toda\r\npersona o todo administrado, por lo que el propósito del constituyente fue\r\nreducir a su mínima expresión el secreto administrativo y ampliar la transparencia\r\ny publicidad administrativas. Independientemente de lo anterior, el texto\r\nconstitucional prevé, también, un acceso institucional privilegiado a la\r\ninformación administrativa como, por ejemplo, del que gozan las comisiones de\r\ninvestigación de la Asamblea Legislativa (artículo 121, inciso 23, de la\r\nConstitución Política) para el ejercicio de su control político. Debe\r\nadvertirse que el acceso institucional privilegiado es regulado por el\r\nordenamiento legal o infraconstitucional para otras\r\nhipótesis tales como la Contraloría General de la República (artículos 13 de la\r\nLey Orgánica No. 7428 del 26 de agosto de 1994; 20, párrafo 2º, de la sobre el\r\nEnriquecimiento Ilícito de los Servidores Públicos, No. 6872 del 17 de junio de\r\n1983 y sus reformas), la Defensoría de los Habitantes (artículo 12, párrafo 2º,\r\nde la Ley No. 7319 del 17 de noviembre de 1992 y sus reformas), las comisiones\r\npara Promover la Competencia y Nacional del Consumidor (artículo 64 de la Ley\r\nNo. 7274 del 20 de diciembre de 1994), la administración tributaria (artículos\r\n105, 106, y 107 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), etc.. En lo\r\ntocante a los sujetos pasivos del derecho de acceso a la información\r\nadministrativa, debe tomarse en consideración que el numeral 30 de la Constitución\r\nPolítica garantiza el libre acceso a los “departamentos administrativos”, con\r\nlo que serán sujetos pasivos todos los entes públicos y sus órganos, tanto de\r\nla Administración Central —Estado o ente público mayor— como de la\r\nAdministración Descentralizada institucional o por servicios —la mayoría de las\r\ninstituciones autónomas—, territorial —municipalidades— y corporativa —colegios\r\nprofesionales, corporaciones productivas o industriales como la Liga\r\nAgroindustrial de la Caña de Azúcar, el Instituto del Café, la Junta del\r\nTabaco, la Corporación Arrocera, las Corporaciones Ganadera y Hortícola\r\nNacional, etc.—. El derecho de acceso debe hacerse extensivo, pasivamente, a\r\nlas empresas públicas que asuman formas de organización colectivas del\r\nderecho privado a través de las cuales alguna administración pública ejerce una\r\nactividad empresarial, industrial o comercial e interviene en la economía y el\r\nmercado, tales como la Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo Sociedad\r\nAnónima (RECOPE), la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y\r\nLuz Sociedad Anónima (CNFL), Radiográfica de Costa\r\nRica Sociedad Anónima (RACSA), Correos de Costa Rica\r\nSociedad Anónima, la Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia Sociedad Anónima\r\n(EPSH), etc., sobre todo, cuando poseen información\r\nde interés público. Por último, las personas privadas que ejercen de forma\r\npermanente o transitoria una potestad o competencia pública en virtud de\r\nhabilitación legal o contractual (munera pubblica), tales como los concesionarios de servicios u\r\nobras públicas, los gestores interesados, los notarios, contadores públicos,\r\ningenieros, arquitectos, topógrafos, etc. pueden, eventualmente, convertirse en\r\nsujetos pasivos cuando manejan o poseen información —documentos— de un claro\r\ninterés público. \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- OBJETO DEL DERECHO DE ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN\r\nADMINISTRATIVA. El texto constitucional en su numeral 30 se refiere\r\nal libre acceso a los “departamentos administrativos”, siendo que el acceso\r\nirrestricto a las instalaciones físicas de las dependencias u oficinas\r\nadministrativas sería inútil e insuficiente para lograr el fin de tener\r\nadministrados informados y conocedores de la gestión administrativa. Consecuentemente,\r\nuna hermenéutica finalista o axiológica de la norma constitucional, nos debe\r\nconducir a concluir que los administrados o las personas pueden acceder\r\ncualquier información en poder de los respectivos entes y órganos públicos,\r\nindependientemente, de su soporte, sea documental —expedientes, registros,\r\narchivos, ficheros—, electrónico o informático —bases de datos, expedientes\r\nelectrónicos, ficheros automatizados, diskettes,\r\ndiscos compactos—, audiovisual, magnetofónico, etc.. \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nVIII.- LÍMITES INTRÍNSECOS Y EXTRÍNSECOS DEL DERECHO DE ACCESO A\r\nLA INFORMACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. En lo relativo a los límites intrínsecos al\r\ncontenido esencial del derecho de acceso a la información administrativa,\r\ntenemos, los siguientes: 1) El fin del derecho que es la “información sobre\r\nasuntos de interés público”, de modo que cuando la información administrativa\r\nque se busca no versa sobre un extremo de tal naturaleza el derecho se ve\r\nenervado y no se puede acceder. 2) El segundo límite está constituido por lo\r\nestablecido en el párrafo 2º del ordinal 30 constitucional al estipularse\r\n“Quedan a salvo los secretos de Estado”. El secreto de Estado como un límite al\r\nderecho de acceso a la información administrativa es reserva de ley (artículo\r\n19, párrafo 1º, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), empero, han\r\ntranscurrido más de cincuenta años desde la vigencia de la Constitución y todavía\r\npersiste la omisión legislativa en el dictado de una ley de secretos de estado\r\ny materias clasificadas. Esta laguna legislativa, obviamente, ha provocado una\r\ngrave incertidumbre y ha propiciado la costumbre contra legem\r\ndel Poder Ejecutivo de calificar, por vía de decreto ejecutivo, de forma\r\npuntual y coyuntural, algunas materias como reservadas o clasificadas por\r\nconstituir, a su entender, secreto de estado. Tocante el ámbito, extensión y\r\nalcances del secreto de Estado, la doctrina es pacífica en aceptar que\r\ncomprende aspecto tales como la seguridad nacional (interna o externa), la\r\ndefensa nacional frente a las agresiones que atenten contra la soberanía e\r\nindependencia del Estado y las relaciones exteriores concertadas entre éste y\r\nel resto de los sujetos del Derecho Internacional Público (vid. artículo 284\r\ndel Código Penal, al tipificar el delito de “revelación de secretos”). No está\r\npor demás distinguir entre el secreto por razones objetivas y materiales (ratione materia), referido a los tres aspectos\r\nanteriormente indicados (seguridad, defensa nacionales y relaciones exteriores)\r\ny el secreto impuesto a los funcionarios o servidores públicos (ratione personae) quienes por\r\nmotivo del ejercicio de sus funciones conocen cierto tipo de información,\r\nrespecto de la cual deben guardar un deber de sigilo y reserva (vid. artículo\r\n337 del Código Penal al tipificar y sancionar el delito de “divulgación de\r\nsecretos). El secreto de estado se encuentra regulado en el bloque de legalidad\r\nde forma desarticulada, dispersa e imprecisa (v. gr. Ley General de Policía No.\r\n7410 del 26 de mayo de 1994, al calificar de confidenciales y, eventualmente,\r\ndeclarables secreto de Estado por el Presidente de la República los informes y\r\ndocumentos de la Dirección de Seguridad del Estado —artículo 16—; la Ley\r\nGeneral de Aviación Civil respecto de algunos acuerdos del Consejo Técnico de\r\nAviación Civil —artículo 303—, etc.). El secreto de Estado en cuanto constituye\r\nuna excepción a los principios o valores constitucionales de la transparencia y\r\nla publicidad de los poderes públicos y su gestión debe ser interpretado y\r\naplicado, en todo momento, de forma restrictiva. En lo concerniente a las\r\nlimitaciones o límites extrínsecos del derecho de acceso a la información\r\nadministrativa tenemos los siguientes: 1) El artículo 28 de la Constitución\r\nPolítica establece como límite extrínseco del cualquier derecho la moral y el\r\norden público tal y como han sido definidos sus contornos por esta Sala en los\r\nVotos números 1635-90 de las 17:00 horas del 14 de noviembre de 1990, 1420- 91\r\nde las 09:00 horas del 24 de julio de 1991, 3550–92 de las 16:00 horas del 24\r\nde noviembre de 1992, 3004-92 de las 14:30 horas del 9 de octubre de 1992,\r\n0138-93 de las 15:55 horas minutos del 12 de enero de 1993 y 3173-93 de las\r\n14:57 horas con del 6 de julio de 1993, entre otros. 2) El artículo 24 de\r\nla Constitución Política le garantiza a todas las personas una esfera de\r\nintimidad intangible para el resto de los sujetos de derecho, de tal forma que\r\naquellos datos íntimos, sensibles o nominativos que un ente u órgano público ha\r\nrecolectado, procesado y almacenado, por constar en sus archivos, registros y\r\nexpedientes físicos o automatizados, no pueden ser accedidos por ninguna\r\npersona por suponer ello una intromisión o injerencia externa e\r\ninconstitucional. Obviamente, lo anterior resulta de mayor aplicación cuando el\r\npropio administrado ha puesto en conocimiento de una administración pública\r\ninformación confidencial, por ser requerida, con el propósito de obtener un\r\nresultado determinado o beneficio. En realidad esta limitación está íntimamente\r\nligada al primer límite intrínseco indicado, puesto que, muy, probablemente, en\r\ntal supuesto la información pretendida no recae sobre asuntos de interés\r\npúblico sino privado. Íntimamente ligados a esta limitación se encuentran el\r\nsecreto bancario, entendido como el deber impuesto a toda entidad de\r\nintermediación financiera de no revelar la información y los datos que posea de\r\nsus clientes por cualquier operación bancaria o contrato bancario que haya\r\ncelebrado con éstos, sobre todo, en tratándose de las cuentas corrientes, ya\r\nque, el numeral 615 del Código de Comercio lo consagra expresamente para esa\r\nhipótesis, y el secreto industrial, comercial o económico de las empresas\r\nacerca de determinadas ideas, productos o procedimientos industriales y de sus\r\nestados financieros, crediticios y tributarios. Habrá situaciones en que la\r\ninformación de un particular que posea un ente u órgano público puede tener,\r\nsobre todo considerada en conjunto con la de otros particulares, tiene una\r\nclara dimensión y vocación pública, circunstancias que deben ser progresiva y\r\ncasuísticamente identificadas por este Tribunal Constitucional. 3) La\r\naveriguación de los delitos, cuando se trata de investigaciones criminales\r\nefectuadas por cuerpos policiales administrativos o el judicial, con el\r\npropósito de garantizar el acierto y éxito de la investigación y, ante todo,\r\npara respetar la presunción de inocencia, el honor y la intimidad de las\r\npersonas involucradas.” (resolución número 2004-05693\r\nde las quince horas con treinta y seis minutos del veintiséis de mayo del dos\r\nmil cuatro). \n\r\n\r\n\nDe esta forma se\r\nentiende que se trata de un derecho fundamental cuyo ejercicio no es irrestricto,\r\nsino que está sujeto a ciertos límites. Así por ejemplo, por un lado, cuando\r\nla información administrativa que se busca no versa sobre “información sobre\r\nasuntos de interés público” el derecho se ve enervado y no se puede acceder; y por\r\notro lado, se debe respetar en todo momento el derecho a la intimidad\r\nprotegiendo la información de carácter personal que conste. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nV.-\r\nSobre el caso concreto.- En el asunto bajo estudio de este Tribunal, se\r\nobserva que efectivamente la recurrente hizo una solicitud expresa a la Junta\r\nDirectiva del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad en la que requería cierta\r\ninformación relacionada con las empresas que tienen contratos para la venta de\r\ncogeneración eléctrica con el ICE; requerimiento que según se desprende de\r\nfolio 05 se presentó el 03 de setiembre del 2007. Según\r\nse desglosa del expediente tal gestión fue trasladada al Subgerente del Sector\r\nde Electricidad el 07 de setiembre del 2007, y este\r\nmediante oficio número 0510.1330.2007 del 19 de setiembre\r\ndel 2007 le indicó a la recurrente que de previo a atender la solicitud debía\r\nacreditar el interés público que le asiste para solicitar dicha información. Al\r\nrespecto, se comprueba que efectivamente la amparada solicita varia\r\ninformación, la cual no es de carácter confidencial, comprobándose la violación\r\nalegada, pues solicita, por un lado, el nombre de las empresas que\r\ntienen contratos de cogeneración eléctrica con el ICE, la cantidad y el precio\r\nde los kilovatios que se compra, y el precio que el ICE lo vende a los\r\nconsumidores; por otro lado, pregunta quiénes son los accionistas\r\ninscritos en cada una de las empresas. Al respecto, se observa que tal\r\ninformación (nombre de las empresas que tienen contratos de cogeneración\r\neléctrica con el ICE, la cantidad y el precio de los kilovatios que se compra,\r\nel precio que el ICE lo vende a los consumidores, y los nombres de los\r\naccionistas), no es de carácter confidencial sino claramente información de\r\ninterés público, por supuesto, en el entendido que cuando pregunta por los\r\naccionistas, lo único que se puede brindar de ellos es su nombre y no otros\r\ndatos de carácter privado como lo sería su dirección, teléfono u otros. De esta\r\nforma se configuró una violación al derecho de acceso a la información\r\nadministrativa cuando se le condicionó el acceso a tal información a la\r\nacreditación del interés público que le asiste a la recurrente, pues una cosa\r\nes que el artículo 30 Constitucional se refiera al acceso a la información\r\nadministrativa de interés público y otra muy diferente exigirle al interesado\r\ndemostrar su interés público, pues el interés público es un requisito de la\r\ninformación y no de la persona que lo solicita. Por lo tanto, dado que en el\r\ncaso que nos ocupa lo peticionado no es información de tipo confidencial o\r\nrevestida de un interés meramente privado, sino por el contrario, se trata de\r\nuna información relacionada directamente con la contratación de sujetos\r\nprivados para la prestación del servicio público de electricidad; dado que la\r\ninformación se condiciona, no porque comprometa secretos de Estado, o se trate\r\nde información confidencial de la contraparte o impliquen un beneficio indebido\r\no una oportunidad para dañar ilegítimamente a la Administración, a la\r\ncontraparte o incluso a terceros -que son los supuestos excepcionales que\r\npermite a la Administración que limite el acceso a la información\r\nadministrativa-, sino porque se le exige a la recurrente demostrar su interés\r\npúblico -requisito que no exige la normativa al administrado- se comprueba una\r\nviolación al derecho de acceso a la información administrativa, imponiéndose\r\ndeclarar con lugar el recurso, únicamente en cuanto a este aspecto, y con las\r\nconsecuencias que se detallan en la parte dispositiva de esta resolución.”", "body_en_text": "**I.- Subject matter of the appeal.-** The appellant, who submitted an information request to ICE on September 3, 2007, considers it contrary to the provisions of article 30 of the Political Constitution that her access to information of a public nature be conditioned on demonstrating what public interest she has in accessing such data, especially when the legal basis on which that condition is purported to be founded is not applicable to the specific case. She considers that in application of the principles of transparency, accountability, and evaluation of results, she is not only legitimized to request said information, but the respondent is obligated to provide it.\n\n**…III.- On the merits.-** In this matter, it is appropriate to analyze the scope and limitations of two fundamental rights, namely, the right of petition and prompt resolution (articles 27 and 41 of the Constitution) and the right of access to administrative information (article 30 of the Constitution). As analyzed below, no violation of the former is observed, but a violation of the latter is. **A) On the right of petition and prompt resolution.-** The right of petition, established in Article 27 of the Constitution, refers to the power every citizen possesses to address any public official or official entity in writing in order to present a matter of their interest. This guarantee is complemented by the right to obtain a prompt response, although the latter does not mean that the administered party must receive a response favorable to their interests. At this point, a distinction must be made between pure and simple requests for information, administrative claims, complaints, and other requests. In the first case, the response must normally be given within ten days following the receipt of the petition, as ordered by Article 32 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. Exceptionally, if the response cannot be provided within that term for justified reasons, the Administration is obligated to explain, within the period required by Law, the reasons why it cannot attend to the petition at that moment –obviously, on the understanding that later, when it can do so, it must fully respond to the petition–. The corresponding explanation must be clear, profuse, and detailed, so that the petitioner is duly informed and can exercise the legal actions deemed appropriate. In the second case, when dealing with claims or appeals –in which the individual seeks the declaration or restitution of a subjective right–, as this Chamber has indicated, it is not Article 27 of the Constitution that applies, but Article 41: \"Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, thorough justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws.\" The foregoing, because administrative claims and appeals, unlike pure petitions, require a procedure to verify the facts that will serve as the basis for the final act, as well as to adopt the pertinent evidentiary measures (see judgment No. 2002-03851 of 14:56 hours on April 30, 2002). Usually, the term for resolution is given by Article 261, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration, which establishes that the ordinary administrative procedure must be concluded, by final act, within a period of two months after its initiation (see judgment number 759-93 of 16:39 hours on February 15, 1993). In the hypothesis of the summary procedure, Article 325 of that same law provides a period of one month –from its initiation– for the Administration to conclude the processing. Furthermore, regarding the appellate phase or challenge procedure, numeral 261, paragraph 2 of the same legal body also sets the term of one month for resolution. The foregoing is stated on the understanding that, by virtue of the principle of due process that governs in the administrative venue, the appealed authority is obligated not only to resolve within the period conferred by law for such effect, but also to notify the respective resolution within that same period of time. In the third case, when dealing with complaints, the Chamber has recognized and declared that, as a legal institute used by administered parties to bring to the Administration's attention facts that the complainant deems irregular, illegal, or contrary to public order, this becomes a mode of participation in matters concerning the public interest, perfectly compatible with and, in fact, based on the democratic principle, for which reason it is located –like requests for information, administrative claims, and applications for the granting of certain rights– within the generic concept of petition established in Article 27 of the Constitution, with its correlative right to obtain resolution. For that reason, although the complainant is not a party to the procedure and there is no legally established period for resolution in that regard, this Chamber has repeatedly held that the former, if they so wish, has the right to be informed of the result of their action within a reasonable term (see resolution No. 2002-06543 of 08:57 hours on July 5, 2002). Finally, in the case of applications to obtain authorizations, permits, and/or licenses, Articles 330 and 331 of the General Law of Public Administration provide that the Administration has a period of one month, counted from the moment it receives the application, to resolve what is appropriate under the law (see resolutions No. 171-89 of nine hours thirty minutes on December fifteen, nineteen eighty-nine and No. 3072-93 of 16:00 hours on June 30, 1993). In the event that the application does not meet all the necessary requirements, the proper course is for the Administration to issue the corresponding warning, so that the defects may be corrected (judgment No. 2001-01116 of 17:21 hours on February 7, 2001). When a public body or entity exceeds these time limits, in principle, a violation of the right to prompt and thorough administrative justice established in Article 41 of the Political Constitution occurs. However, the foregoing in no way implies a constitutionalization of legal deadlines, since what is protected is the right every person has to have their case resolved within a reasonable time; a time limit that must be established in each specific case, considering the technical complexity of the matter in question, the breadth of the evidence to be gathered, the consequences of the delay for the parties or the degree of impact on the person or the environment of the challenged act, the conduct of the litigants and the authorities involved, the ordinary guidelines and margins of the type of procedure in question, and the average standard for the resolution of similar matters by the authorities of the same subject matter (see judgments No. 2003-13640 of 13:50 hours on November 28, 2003). Therefore, a breach of legal terms may sometimes not entail a violation of Articles 27 and 41 of the Constitution. Applying all of the foregoing to the case raised by the appellant, it is verified that she exercised her right of petition and that the requested response was granted to her within a reasonable time, namely, she made the request on September 3, 2007, and a response was given –although certainly not the one the appellant expected– on September 19, 2007, for which reason, no violation of the right of petition and prompt resolution is configured. It is evident that the content of the request was examined within a reasonable time and a response was provided even when it was not favorable to the appellant's claim, which on repeated occasions has been admitted as valid by this Tribunal, since what matters is that a response is given to the formulated action and not necessarily that the substance of the claims raised be granted. The treatment given to the right of access to administrative information is analyzed below.\n\n**IV.- B) On the right of access to administrative information.-** Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to \"administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest,\" a fundamental right that in doctrine has been called the right of access to administrative information, and that emanates from the principle of publicity that covers administrative action, as an object of public interest. This Constitutional Tribunal, on several previous occasions, has referred to the fundamental right derived from Article 30 of our Magna Carta, called the right of access to administrative information, stating the following:\n\n\"IV.- THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to 'administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest,' a fundamental right that in doctrine has been called the right of access to administrative archives and records; however, the most accurate designation must be the right of access to administrative information, since access to the material or virtual supports of public administrations is the instrument or mechanism to achieve the proposed end, which is for the administered parties to learn of the information held by those administrations. It is necessary to indicate that the administrative information of public interest sought by an administered party is not always found in an administrative file, archive, or record. The right of access to administrative information is a control mechanism in the hands of the administered parties, since it allows them to exercise optimal control over the legality and the opportunity, convenience, or merit and, in general, the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative function deployed by the various public entities. Efficient and effective public administrations are those that submit to public control and scrutiny, but citizen control cannot exist without adequate information. In this way, a logical chain can be established between access to administrative information, knowledge and handling thereof, effective or timely citizen control, and efficient public administrations. The right of access to administrative information has deep roots in a series of principles and values inherent to the Social and Democratic Rule of Law, which, at the same time, it serves. Thus, effective and direct citizen participation in the management and handling of public affairs is inconceivable without a significant body of information about administrative competencies and services; likewise, the democratic principle is strengthened when the various social, economic, and political forces and groups participate actively and informedly in the formation and execution of the public will. Finally, the right of access to administrative information is an indispensable tool, like so many others, for the full validity of the principles of administrative transparency and publicity. The content of the right of access to administrative information is truly broad and is composed of a bundle of powers vested in the person who exercises it, such as the following: a) access to public departments, dependencies, offices, and buildings; b) access to archives, records, files, and physical or automated documents —databases, files—; c) the power of the administered party to know the stored personal or nominative data that affect them in any way; d) the power of the administered party to rectify or eliminate such data if they are erroneous, incorrect, or false; e) the right to know the content of physical or virtual documents and files; and f) the right to obtain, at their cost, certifications or copies thereof.\n\nV.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. A clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra –outside– and (b) ad intra –within– an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or administered party interested in accessing specific administrative information –uti universi– and the latter, only to the interested parties in a specific and particular administrative procedure –uti singuli–. This right is regulated in the General Law of Public Administration in its Sixth Chapter entitled 'On access to the file and its parts,' Third Title of the Second Book in Articles 272 to 274. Article 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and grave gap in our legal system that has persisted for more than fifty years since the validity of the constitutional text. The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectoral; thus, by way of example, the Law of the National Archives System No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it with respect to documents with scientific and cultural value of the entities and public bodies –passive subjects– that make up the National Archives System (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Branches and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body).\n\nVI.- ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SUBJECTS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. The active subject of the right enshrined in Article 30 of the Magna Carta is every person or every administered party, so the purpose of the constituent power was to reduce administrative secrecy to its minimum expression and to expand administrative transparency and publicity. Independently of the foregoing, the constitutional text also provides for privileged institutional access to administrative information such as, for example, that enjoyed by the investigative commissions of the Legislative Assembly (Article 121, subsection 23, of the Political Constitution) for the exercise of its political control. It must be noted that privileged institutional access is regulated by the legal or infra-constitutional system for other hypotheses such as the Comptroller General of the Republic (Articles 13 of Organic Law No. 7428 of August 26, 1994; 20, paragraph 2, of the Law on Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, No. 6872 of June 17, 1983, and its reforms), the Ombudsman's Office (Article 12, paragraph 2, of Law No. 7319 of November 17, 1992, and its reforms), the Commissions for Promoting Competition and the National Consumer Commission (Article 64 of Law No. 7274 of December 20, 1994), the tax administration (Articles 105, 106, and 107 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures), etc. Regarding the passive subjects of the right of access to administrative information, it must be taken into consideration that Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to 'administrative departments,' meaning that all public entities and their bodies shall be passive subjects, both from the Central Administration —State or major public entity— and from the institutional or service-based Decentralized Administration —the majority of the autonomous institutions—, territorial —municipalities—, and corporate —professional associations, productive or industrial corporations such as the Liga Agroindustrial de la Caña de Azúcar, the Instituto del Café, the Junta del Tabaco, the Corporación Arrocera, the Corporaciones Ganadera y Hortícola Nacional, etc.—. The right of access must be made extensive, passively, to public enterprises that assume forms of collective organization under private law through which a public administration carries out a business, industrial, or commercial activity and intervenes in the economy and the market, such as Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo Sociedad Anónima (RECOPE), Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz Sociedad Anónima (CNFL), Radiográfica de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima (RACSA), Correos de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia Sociedad Anónima (EPSH), etc., especially when they possess information of public interest. Finally, private persons who exercise, permanently or temporarily, a public power or competence by virtue of legal or contractual authorization (munera pubblica), such as public service or works concessionaires, interested third-party managers, notaries, public accountants, engineers, architects, surveyors, etc., may eventually become passive subjects when they handle or possess information —documents— of a clear public interest.\n\nVII.- OBJECT OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. The constitutional text in its Article 30 refers to free access to 'administrative departments'; unrestricted access to the physical facilities of administrative dependencies or offices would be useless and insufficient to achieve the purpose of having administered parties informed and knowledgeable about administrative management. Consequently, a finalist or axiological hermeneutics of the constitutional rule must lead us to conclude that administered parties or persons can access any information held by the respective public entities and bodies, regardless of its medium, be it documentary —files, records, archives, card indexes—, electronic or computer-based —databases, electronic files, automated card indexes, diskettes, compact discs—, audiovisual, tape-recorded, etc.\n\nVIII.- INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC LIMITS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. Regarding the intrinsic limits to the essential content of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) The purpose of the right, which is 'information on matters of public interest,' so that when the administrative information sought does not concern a matter of such nature, the right is vitiated and access cannot be obtained. 2) The second limit is constituted by what is established in paragraph 2 of Article 30 of the Constitution by stipulating 'State secrets are exempt.' The state secret as a limit to the right of access to administrative information is a matter reserved to law (Article 19, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration); however, more than fifty years have passed since the Constitution came into force and the legislative omission in issuing a law on state secrets and classified matters still persists. This legislative gap has obviously caused serious uncertainty and has fostered the contra legem custom of the Executive Branch of classifying, by way of executive decree, in a specific and conjunctural manner, some matters as reserved or classified as constituting, in its understanding, state secrets. Concerning the sphere, extension, and scope of the state secret, doctrine is unanimous in accepting that it encompasses aspects such as national security (internal or external), national defense against aggressions that threaten the sovereignty and independence of the State, and foreign relations agreed upon between the State and the rest of the subjects of Public International Law (see Article 284 of the Penal Code, when criminalizing the crime of 'revelation of secrets'). It is not superfluous to distinguish between secrecy for objective and material reasons (ratione materia), referring to the three aspects previously indicated (national security, national defense, and foreign relations), and the secrecy imposed on public officials or servants (ratione personae) who, by reason of the exercise of their functions, become aware of a certain type of information regarding which they must maintain a duty of discretion and confidentiality (see Article 337 of the Penal Code when criminalizing and punishing the crime of 'disclosure of secrets'). The state secret is regulated in the legality framework in a disjointed, dispersed, and imprecise manner (e.g., General Police Law No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, by qualifying the reports and documents of the Directorate of State Security as confidential and, eventually, declarable as state secret by the President of the Republic —Article 16—; the General Civil Aviation Law regarding some agreements of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation —Article 303—, etc.). The state secret, as it constitutes an exception to the constitutional principles or values of transparency and publicity of public powers and their management, must be interpreted and applied, at all times, restrictively. Concerning the extrinsic limitations or limits of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) Article 28 of the Political Constitution establishes public morals and public order as an extrinsic limit of any right, as their contours have been defined by this Chamber in Votes numbers 1635-90 of 17:00 hours on November 14, 1990, 1420-91 of 09:00 hours on July 24, 1991, 3550-92 of 16:00 hours on November 24, 1992, 3004-92 of 14:30 hours on October 9, 1992, 0138-93 of 15:55 hours on January 12, 1993, and 3173-93 of 14:57 hours on July 6, 1993, among others. 2) Article 24 of the Political Constitution guarantees all persons a sphere of intangible privacy from the rest of the subjects of law, such that those intimate, sensitive, or nominative data that a public entity or body has collected, processed, and stored, by appearing in its physical or automated archives, records, and files, cannot be accessed by any person, as this would imply an unconstitutional external intrusion or interference. Obviously, the foregoing is more applicable when the administered party has themselves brought to the attention of a public administration confidential information, as required, for the purpose of obtaining a specific result or benefit. In reality, this limitation is intimately linked to the first indicated intrinsic limit, since, very probably, in such a case, the information sought does not concern matters of public but private interest. Closely linked to this limitation are bank secrecy, understood as the duty imposed on all financial intermediation entities not to reveal the information and data they possess about their clients from any banking transaction or contract concluded with them, especially in the case of checking accounts, since Article 615 of the Commercial Code expressly enshrines it for that hypothesis; and the industrial, commercial, or economic secrecy of companies regarding certain ideas, products, or industrial procedures and their financial, credit, and tax statements. There will be situations in which a private party's information held by a public entity or body may have, especially when considered together with that of other private parties, a clear public dimension and vocation, circumstances that must be progressively and casuistically identified by this Constitutional Tribunal. 3) The investigation of crimes, when dealing with criminal investigations carried out by administrative or judicial police forces, for the purpose of guaranteeing the accuracy and success of the investigation and, above all, to respect the presumption of innocence, the honor, and the privacy of the persons involved.\" (resolution number 2004-05693 of fifteen hours thirty-six minutes on May twenty-six, two thousand four).\n\nIn this way, it is understood that it is a fundamental right whose exercise is not unrestricted but is subject to certain limits. Thus, for example, on one hand, when the administrative information sought does not concern 'information on matters of public interest,' the right is vitiated and access cannot be obtained; and on the other hand, the right to privacy must be respected at all times, protecting the personal information that may be on file.\n\n**V.- On the specific case.-** In the matter under study by this Tribunal, it is observed that the appellant effectively made an express request to the Board of Directors of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad in which she required certain information related to the companies that have contracts for the sale of electrical cogeneration with ICE; a request that, as inferred from folio 05, was presented on September 3, 2007. As detailed in the case file, this action was transferred to the Deputy Manager of the Electricity Sector on September 7, 2007, and the latter, through official note number 0510.1330.2007 of September 19, 2007, indicated to the appellant that prior to attending to the request, she must prove the public interest that assists her in requesting said information. In this regard, it is verified that the petitioner indeed requests various information, which is not of a confidential nature, confirming the alleged violation, as she requests, on one hand, the name of the companies that have electrical cogeneration contracts with ICE, the quantity and price of the kilowatts purchased, and the price at which ICE sells them to consumers; on the other hand, she asks who the shareholders registered in each of the companies are. In this regard, it is observed that such information (names of the companies that have electrical cogeneration contracts with ICE, the quantity and price of the kilowatts purchased, the price at which ICE sells them to consumers, and the names of the shareholders) is not of a confidential nature but clearly information of public interest, of course, on the understanding that when she asks about the shareholders, the only thing that can be provided about them is their name and not other data of a private nature such as their address, telephone number, or others. In this way, a violation of the right of access to administrative information was configured when access to such information was conditioned on the appellant proving the public interest that assists her, because it is one thing that Article 30 of the Constitution refers to access to administrative information of public interest, and quite another to require the interested party to demonstrate their public interest, since public interest is a requirement of the information and not of the person requesting it.\n\nTherefore, given that in the case before us, what has been requested is not confidential information or information involving a merely private interest, but rather, it is information directly related to the contracting of private parties for the provision of the public electricity service; given that the information is being conditioned not because it compromises State secrets, or involves confidential information of the counterparty, or implies an undue benefit or an opportunity to illegitimately harm the Administration, the counterparty, or even third parties—which are the exceptional circumstances permitting the Administration to limit access to administrative information—but rather because the appellant is required to demonstrate her public interest—a requirement not imposed on the administered party by the regulations—a violation of the right of access to administrative information is confirmed, and it is therefore necessary to declare the appeal well-founded, solely with respect to this aspect, and with the consequences detailed in the operative part of this resolution.”\n\n“I.- Purpose of the appeal.- The appellant, who made an information request to ICE on September 3, 2007, considers that conditioning her access to information of a public nature on demonstrating her public interest in accessing that data is contrary to the provisions of Article 30 of the Political Constitution, even more so when the legal basis on which that condition is intended to be founded is not applicable to the specific case. She considers that, in application of the principles of transparency, accountability, and evaluation of results, she is not only entitled to request such information, but also that the respondent is obligated to provide it.”\n\n“…III.- On the merits.- In this matter, it is appropriate to analyze the scope and limitations of two fundamental rights, namely, the right of petition and prompt resolution (Articles 27 and 41 of the Constitution) and the right of access to administrative information (Article 30 of the Constitution). As analyzed below, no violation of the former is observed, but a violation of the latter is. A) Regarding the right of petition and prompt resolution.- The right of petition, established in Article 27 of the Constitution, refers to the power of every citizen to address any public official or official entity in writing for the purpose of presenting a matter of his or her interest. This guarantee is complemented by the right to obtain a prompt response, although this does not mean that the administered party must receive a response favorable to his or her interests. At this point, a distinction must be made between pure and simple requests for information, administrative claims, complaints, and other requests. In the first case, the response must normally be given within ten days following receipt of the petition, as ordered by Article 32 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional. Exceptionally, if the response cannot be provided within that term for justified reasons, the Administration is obligated to explain, within the period required by Law, the reasons why it cannot attend to the petition at that time—obviously, on the understanding that later, when it can do so, it must fully respond to the petition—. The corresponding explanation must be clear, extensive, and detailed, so that the petitioner is duly informed and can exercise the legal actions deemed appropriate. In the second case, when dealing with claims or appeals—in which the individual requests the declaration or restitution of a subjective right—as this Chamber has indicated, it is not Article 27 of the Constitution that is applicable, but rather Article 41: \"Occurring to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws.\" The foregoing, because administrative claims and appeals, unlike pure petitions, require a procedure to verify the facts that will serve as the basis for the final act, as well as to adopt the pertinent evidentiary measures (see ruling No. 2002-03851 of 2:56 p.m. on April 30, 2002). Usually, the term for resolution is provided by Article 261, paragraph 1, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which establishes that the ordinary administrative procedure must be concluded, by final act, within a period of two months after its initiation (see ruling number 759-93 of 4:39 p.m. on February 15, 1993). In the hypothesis of the summary procedure, Article 325 of that same law provides a period of one month—from its initiation—for the Administration to conclude the proceeding. Furthermore, regarding the appeal phase or challenge procedure, numeral 261, paragraph 2 of the same legal body also sets a term of one month for resolution. The foregoing is affirmed on the understanding that, by virtue of the principle of due process that governs in the administrative venue, the respondent authority is obligated not only to resolve within the period conferred by law for such effect, but also to notify the respective resolution within that same period of time. In the third case, when dealing with complaints, the Chamber has recognized and declared that, as a legal instrument used by the administered parties to bring to the Administration's attention facts that the complainant considers irregular, illegal, or contrary to public order, this becomes a mode of participation in matters concerning the public interest, perfectly compatible with and, in fact, based on the democratic principle, and therefore falls—like requests for information, administrative claims, and applications for the granting of certain rights—within the generic concept of petition established in Article 27 of the Constitution, with its correlative right to obtain a resolution. For this reason, although the complainant is not a party to the procedure and there is no legally established period for resolving in this regard, this Chamber has repeatedly held that he or she, if so desired, has the right to be informed of the result of his or her action within a reasonable term (see resolution No. 2002-06543 of 8:57 a.m. on July 5, 2002). Finally, in the case of applications to obtain authorizations, permits, and/or licenses, Articles 330 and 331 of the Ley General de Administración Pública provide that the Administration has a period of one month, counted from the moment it receives the application, to resolve what is appropriate in law (see resolutions No. 171-89 of nine-thirty a.m. on December fifteen, nineteen eighty-nine, and No. 3072-93 of 4:00 p.m. on June 30, 1993). In the event that the application does not meet all the necessary requirements, the appropriate course is for the Administration to issue the corresponding notice to rectify defects (ruling No. 2001-01116 of 5:21 p.m. on February 7, 2001). When a public body or entity exceeds these time limits, in principle, a violation of the right to prompt and complete administrative justice established in Article 41 of the Political Constitution occurs. However, the foregoing in no way implies a constitutionalization of legal time limits, since what is protected is the right that every person has to have his or her case resolved within a reasonable time; a period that must be established in each specific case, considering the technical complexity of the matter in question, the extent of the evidence to be taken, the consequences of the delay for the parties or the degree of impact on the person or the environment of the challenged act, the conduct of the litigants and the authorities involved, the ordinary guidelines and margins of the type of procedure in question, and the average standard for the resolution of similar matters by the authorities of the same subject matter (see rulings No. 2003-13640 of 1:50 p.m. on November 28, 2003). Therefore, a failure to comply with legal terms may sometimes not entail a violation of Articles 27 and 41 of the Constitution. Applying all of the foregoing to the case presented by the appellant, it is verified that she exercised her right of petition and that the requested response was granted to her within a reasonable time, namely, she made the request on September 3, 2007, and a response was given to her—although certainly not the one the appellant expected—on September 19, 2007, which is why no violation of the right of petition and prompt resolution is configured. It is evident that the content of the request was examined within a reasonable time and a response was provided, even though it was not favorable to the appellant's claim, which this Court has repeatedly admitted as valid since what matters is that a response to the formulated request is provided and not necessarily that the merits of the claims raised be granted. The treatment given to the right of access to administrative information is analyzed below.”\n\n“IV.- B) Regarding the right of access to administrative information.- Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to \"administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest,\" a fundamental right that in legal scholarship has been called the right of access to administrative information, and which emanates from the principle of publicity that covers administrative action, as an object of public interest. This Constitutional Court, on several previous occasions, has referred to the fundamental right derived from Article 30 of our Magna Carta, called the right of access to administrative information, stating the following:”\n\n“IV.- THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. Ordinal 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to \"administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest,\" a fundamental right that in legal scholarship has been called the right of access to administrative archives and records; however, the most accurate designation should be the right of access to administrative information, since access to the material or virtual supports of public administrations is the instrument or mechanism for achieving the intended purpose, which is for the administered parties to become informed of the information held by those administrations. It is necessary to point out that the administrative information of public interest sought by an administered party is not always found in an administrative file, archive, or record. The right of access to administrative information is a control mechanism in the hands of the administered parties, since it allows them to exercise optimal control over the legality and the opportunity, convenience, or merit and, in general, the efficacy and efficiency of the administrative function carried out by the various public entities. Efficient and effective public administrations are those that submit to public control and scrutiny, but citizen control cannot exist without adequate information. In this way, a logical chain can be established between access to administrative information, knowledge and handling of it, effective and timely citizen control, and efficient public administrations. The right of access to administrative information has profound roots in a series of principles and values inherent to the Social and Democratic Rule of Law, which, at the same time, it enacts. Thus, effective and direct citizen participation in the management and handling of public affairs is inconceivable without having a significant body of information about administrative competencies and services; likewise, the democratic principle is strengthened when diverse social, economic, and political forces and groups actively and informedly participate in the formation and execution of public will. Finally, the right of access to administrative information is an indispensable tool, like many others, for the full validity of the principles of administrative transparency and publicity. The content of the right of access to administrative information is truly broad and comprises a set of powers held by the person exercising it, such as the following: a) access to public departments, dependencies, offices, and buildings; b) access to archives, records, files, and physical or automated documents—databases, data files—; c) the administered party's power to know the stored personal or nominative data that affect him or her in any way; d) the administered party's power to rectify or eliminate that data if it is erroneous, incorrect, or false; e) the right to know the content of physical or virtual documents and files; and f) the right to obtain, at his or her cost, certifications or copies thereof.”\n\n“V.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. A clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—within—an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or administered party interested in accessing specific administrative information—uti universi—and the latter is granted only to the interested parties in a concrete and specific administrative procedure—uti singuli—. This right is regulated in the Ley General de la Administración Pública in its Sixth Chapter entitled \"On access to the file and its pieces,\" Third Title of the Second Book in Articles 272 to 274. Numeral 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the right of access ad extra, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and grave gap in our legal system that has persisted for more than fifty years since the constitutional text came into force. The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectoral; thus, by way of example, the Ley del Sistema Nacional de Archivos No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it with respect to documents with scientific and cultural value of the public entities and bodies—passive subjects—that make up the National Archives System (Legislative, Judicial, Executive Powers, and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and particular archives subject to the provisions of that legal body).”\n\n“VI.- ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SUBJECTS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. The active subject of the right enshrined in Article 30 of the Magna Carta is every person or every administered party, thus the purpose of the constituent was to reduce administrative secrecy to its minimum expression and to broaden administrative transparency and publicity. Independently of the foregoing, the constitutional text also provides for a privileged institutional access to administrative information, such as, for example, that enjoyed by the investigative commissions of the Legislative Assembly (Article 121, subsection 23, of the Political Constitution) for the exercise of their political control. It should be noted that privileged institutional access is regulated by the legal or infra-constitutional order for other hypotheses, such as the Contraloría General de la República (Articles 13 of the Organic Law No. 7428 of August 26, 1994; 20, paragraph 2, of the Law on Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, No. 6872 of June 17, 1983, and its reforms), the Defensoría de los Habitantes (Article 12, paragraph 2, of Law No. 7319 of November 17, 1992, and its reforms), the commissions for the Promotion of Competition and National Consumer Commission (Article 64 of Law No. 7274 of December 20, 1994), the tax administration (Articles 105, 106, and 107 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures), etc. Regarding the passive subjects of the right of access to administrative information, it must be taken into consideration that numeral 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to \"administrative departments,\" meaning that passive subjects are all public entities and their bodies, both of the Central Administration—the State or larger public entity—and of the institutional or service-based Decentralized Administration—the majority of autonomous institutions—, territorial—municipalities—, and corporate—professional colleges, productive or industrial corporations such as the Liga Agroindustrial de la Caña de Azúcar, the Instituto del Café, the Junta del Tabaco, the Corporación Arrocera, the Corporaciones Ganadera and Hortícola Nacional, etc.—. The right of access must be extended, passively, to public companies that assume collective organizational forms of private law through which some public administration exercises entrepreneurial, industrial, or commercial activity and intervenes in the economy and the market, such as the Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo Sociedad Anónima (RECOPE), the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz Sociedad Anónima (CNFL), Radiográfica de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima (RACSA), Correos de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia Sociedad Anónima (EPSH), etc., especially when they possess information of public interest. Finally, private persons who permanently or temporarily exercise a public power or competence by virtue of legal or contractual authorization (munera pubblica), such as concessionaires of public services or works, interested managers, notaries, public accountants, engineers, architects, surveyors, etc., may eventually become passive subjects when they handle or possess information—documents—of a clear public interest.”\n\n“VII.- OBJECT OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. The constitutional text in its numeral 30 refers to free access to \"administrative departments,\" as unrestricted access to the physical facilities of administrative dependencies or offices would be useless and insufficient to achieve the goal of having administered parties informed and knowledgeable about administrative management. Consequently, a teleological or axiological hermeneutics of the constitutional norm must lead us to conclude that the administered parties or persons can access any information in the possession of the respective public entities and bodies, regardless of its medium, whether documentary—files, records, archives, data files—, electronic or computer-based—databases, electronic files, automated files, diskettes, compact discs—, audiovisual, tape-recorded, etc.”\n\n“VIII.- INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC LIMITS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION. Regarding the intrinsic limits to the essential content of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) The purpose of the right, which is \"information on matters of public interest,\" so that when the administrative information sought does not concern an aspect of such a nature, the right is undermined and cannot be accessed. 2) The second limit is constituted by what is established in paragraph 2 of constitutional ordinal 30, stipulating \"State secrets are excepted.\" The State secret as a limit to the right of access to administrative information is a matter of law (Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública); however, more than fifty years have passed since the Constitution came into force, and the legislative omission in issuing a law on state secrets and classified matters still persists.”\n\nThis legislative gap has, obviously, caused serious uncertainty and has fostered the custom contra legem of the Executive Branch to classify, by means of executive decree, in a specific and circumstantial manner, certain matters as reserved or classified because, in its understanding, they constitute state secrets. Regarding the scope, extent, and reach of the State secret, the doctrine is unanimous in accepting that it includes aspects such as national security (internal or external), national defense against aggressions that threaten the sovereignty and independence of the State, and foreign relations agreed upon between the State and the other subjects of Public International Law (see article 284 of the Penal Code, when typifying the crime of \"revelation of secrets\"). It is not superfluous to distinguish between secrecy for objective and material reasons (ratione materia), referring to the three previously indicated aspects (national security, defense, and foreign relations), and the secrecy imposed on public officials or servants (ratione personae) who, by reason of the exercise of their functions, are aware of a certain type of information, regarding which they must maintain a duty of confidentiality and reserve (see article 337 of the Penal Code when typifying and sanctioning the crime of \"divulging secrets\"). The state secret is regulated in the body of law in a disjointed, dispersed, and imprecise manner (e.g., General Police Law No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, when classifying as confidential and, eventually, declarable as a State secret by the President of the Republic, the reports and documents of the Directorate of State Security —article 16—; the General Civil Aviation Law regarding certain agreements of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation —article 303—, etc.). The State secret, insofar as it constitutes an exception to the constitutional principles or values of transparency and publicity of public powers and their management, must be interpreted and applied, at all times, in a restrictive manner. Regarding the extrinsic limitations or limits of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) Article 28 of the Political Constitution establishes morality and public order as an extrinsic limit of any right, as their contours have been defined by this Chamber in Votes numbers 1635-90 of 5:00 p.m. on November 14, 1990, 1420-91 of 9:00 a.m. on July 24, 1991, 3550–92 of 4:00 p.m. on November 24, 1992, 3004-92 of 2:30 p.m. on October 9, 1992, 0138-93 of 3:55 p.m. on January 12, 1993, and 3173-93 of 2:57 p.m. on July 6, 1993, among others. 2) Article 24 of the Political Constitution guarantees all persons a sphere of privacy that is intangible for the rest of legal subjects, such that those intimate, sensitive, or personal data that a public entity or body has collected, processed, and stored, because they appear in its physical or automated archives, registries, and case files (expedientes), cannot be accessed by any person, as this would imply an unconstitutional intrusion or external interference. Obviously, the foregoing is more applicable when the administered party has brought to the attention of a public administration confidential information, because it is required, for the purpose of obtaining a specific result or benefit. In reality, this limitation is intimately linked to the first intrinsic limit indicated, since, most probably, in such a case the information sought does not relate to matters of public interest but rather private interest. Intimately linked to this limitation are banking secrecy, understood as the duty imposed on any financial intermediary entity not to reveal the information and data it possesses about its clients for any banking operation or banking contract entered into with them, especially regarding checking accounts, since numeral 615 of the Commercial Code expressly enshrines it for that hypothesis, and the industrial, commercial, or economic secrecy of companies regarding certain ideas, products, or industrial procedures and their financial, credit, and tax statements. There will be situations in which the information of a private individual held by a public entity or body may have, especially when considered together with that of other private individuals, a clear public dimension and vocation, circumstances that must be progressively and casuistically identified by this Constitutional Court. 3) The investigation of crimes, when it involves criminal investigations carried out by administrative or judicial police bodies, for the purpose of guaranteeing the accuracy and success of the investigation and, above all, to respect the presumption of innocence, honor, and privacy of the persons involved.\" (resolution (resolución) number 2004-05693 of three thirty-six p.m. on May twenty-sixth, two thousand four).\n\nThis makes it understood that it is a fundamental right whose exercise is not unrestricted, but rather is subject to certain limits. Thus, for example, on the one hand, when the administrative information sought does not concern \"information on matters of public interest,\" the right is vitiated and cannot be accessed; and on the other hand, the right to privacy must be respected at all times by protecting personal information that is on record.\n\nV.- Regarding the specific case.- In the matter under study by this Tribunal, it is observed that the appellant indeed made an express request to the Board of Directors of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad in which she required certain information related to the companies that have contracts for the sale of electrical cogeneration with ICE; a requirement that, as deduced from folio 05, was filed on September 3, 2007. As broken down from the case file (expediente), this request was transferred to the Deputy Manager of the Electricity Sector on September 7, 2007, and this official, by means of official communication number 0510.1330.2007 of September 19, 2007, indicated to the appellant that prior to addressing the request, she had to prove the public interest that assists her in requesting said information. In this regard, it is verified that the protected party indeed requests various information, which is not of a confidential nature, proving the alleged violation, since she requests, on the one hand, the name of the companies that have electrical cogeneration contracts with ICE, the quantity and price of the kilowatts purchased, and the price at which ICE sells it to consumers; on the other hand, she asks who the shareholders registered in each of the companies are. In this regard, it is observed that such information (name of the companies that have electrical cogeneration contracts with ICE, the quantity and price of the kilowatts purchased, the price at which ICE sells it to consumers, and the names of the shareholders) is not of a confidential nature but is clearly information of public interest, of course, on the understanding that when she asks about the shareholders, the only thing that can be provided about them is their name and not other data of a private nature such as their address, telephone number, or others. In this way, a violation of the right of access to administrative information was configured when access to such information was conditioned on proving the public interest that assists the appellant, because one thing is that constitutional Article 30 refers to access to administrative information of public interest, and quite another is to demand that the interested party demonstrate his public interest, since public interest is a requirement of the information and not of the person who requests it. Therefore, given that in the case before us, what was requested is not information of a confidential type or vested with a merely private interest, but on the contrary, it is information directly related to the contracting of private subjects for the provision of the public electricity service; given that the information is conditioned, not because it compromises State secrets, or involves confidential information of the counterparty, or implies an undue benefit or an opportunity to illegitimately harm the Administration, the counterparty, or even third parties —which are the exceptional cases that allow the Administration to limit access to administrative information—, but rather because the appellant is required to demonstrate her public interest —a requirement that the regulations do not demand of the administered party—, a violation of the right of access to administrative information is verified, making it necessary to declare the appeal with merit, only with respect to this aspect, and with the consequences detailed in the operative part of this resolution (resolución).\"\n\n*Finally*, regarding\nrequests to obtain authorizations, permits, and/or licenses, articles 330 and 331 of the General Public Administration Law provide that the Administration has a period of one month, counted from the moment it receives the request, to resolve what is legally appropriate (see resolutions N° 171-89 of nine hours thirty minutes on December fifteenth, nineteen eighty-nine and N° 3072-93 of 16:00 hours on June 30, 1993). In the event that the request does not meet all necessary requirements, it is proper for the Administration to issue the corresponding prevention so that the defects may be corrected (judgment N° 2001-01116 of 17:21 hours on February 7, 2001). When a public body or entity exceeds these timeframes, in principle, it causes a violation of the right to prompt and fulfilled administrative justice established in article 41 of the Political Constitution. However, the foregoing in no way implies a constitutionalization (constitucionalización) of legal deadlines, since what is protected is the right every person has to have their case resolved within a reasonable timeframe; a timeframe that must be established in each specific case, considering the technical complexity of the matter at hand, the breadth of the evidence to be discharged, the consequences of the delay for the parties or the degree of impact on the person or the environment of the contested act, the conduct of the litigants and the authorities involved, the ordinary guidelines and margins of the type of procedure in question, and the average standard for the resolution of similar matters by authorities in the same field (see judgments Nº 2003-13640 of 13:50 hours on November 28, 2003). Therefore, a breach of legal terms may sometimes not entail a violation of articles 27 and 41 of the Constitution. Applying all the foregoing to the case raised by the appellant, it is verified that she exercised her right of petition and that the requested response was granted to her within a reasonable timeframe, namely, she made the request on September 3, 2007, and she was given a response—although certainly not the one the appellant expected—on September 19, 2007, reason for which no violation of the right to petition and prompt resolution is constituted. It is evident that the content of the request was examined within a reasonable timeframe and a response was provided even though it was not favorable to the appellant's claim, which on repeated occasions has been admitted as valid by this Tribunal since what matters is that a response is provided to the submitted petition and not necessarily that the merits of the claims raised be granted. The treatment given to the right of access to administrative information is analyzed below.\n\n**IV.- B) On the right of access to administrative information.-** Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to *“administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest”*, a fundamental right that in doctrine has been called the right of access to administrative information, and which emanates from the principle of publicity that covers administrative action, as an object of public interest. This Constitutional Tribunal, on several prior occasions, has referred to the fundamental right derived from article 30 of our Magna Carta, called the right of access to administrative information, stating the following:\n\n**“IV.- THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** Article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to ‘administrative departments for purposes of information on matters of public interest,’ a fundamental right which in doctrine has been called the right of access to administrative archives and records; however, the most accurate name must be the right of access to administrative information, since access to the material or virtual supports of public administrations is the instrument or mechanism to achieve the proposed goal, which consists of allowing administered parties to learn of the information held by those administrations. It is necessary to indicate that the administrative information of public interest sought by an administered party is not always found in an administrative file, archive, or record. The right of access to administrative information is a control mechanism in the hands of the administered parties, since it allows them to exercise optimal control over the legality and the timeliness, convenience, or merit and, in general, the efficacy and efficiency of the administrative function carried out by the various public entities. Efficient and effective public administrations are those that submit to public control and scrutiny, but citizen control cannot exist without adequate information. In this way, a logical chain can be established between access to administrative information, knowledge and handling of this information, effective and timely citizen control, and efficient public administrations. The right of access to administrative information has a deep foundation in a series of principles and values inherent to the Social and Democratic State of Law, which, at the same time, it enacts. Thus, effective and direct citizen participation in the management and handling of public affairs is inconceivable without a significant body of information about administrative competencies and services; likewise, the democratic principle is strengthened when the various social, economic, and political forces and groups participate actively and informedly in the formation and execution of public will. Finally, the right of access to administrative information is an indispensable tool, like many others, for the full validity of the principles of administrative transparency and publicity. The content of the right of access to administrative information is truly broad and is composed of a bundle of faculties held by the person exercising it, such as the following: a) access to public departments, units, offices, and buildings; b) access to physical or automated archives, records, files, and documents—databases, file systems—; c) the faculty of the administered party to know the personal or nominative data stored that affects them in some way, d) the faculty of the administered party to rectify or eliminate such data if they are erroneous, incorrect, or false; e) the right to know the content of physical or virtual documents and files; and f) the right to obtain, at their cost, certifications or copies thereof.\n\n**V.- TYPOLOGY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** A clear distinction can be made between the right of access to administrative information (a) ad extra—outside—and (b) ad intra—inside—an administrative procedure. The former is granted to any person or administered party interested in accessing specific administrative information—uti universi—and the latter, only to the interested parties in a specific and concrete administrative procedure—uti singuli—. This right is regulated in the General Public Administration Law in its Sixth Chapter titled “On Access to the File and Its Pieces,” Third Title of the Second Book in articles 272 to 274. Article 30 of the Political Constitution evidently refers to the ad extra right of access, since it is absolutely independent of the existence of an administrative procedure. This right has not been legislatively developed in a systematic and coherent manner, which constitutes a serious and grave gap in our legal system that has persisted for more than fifty years since the constitutional text came into force. The regulation of this right has been fragmented and sectoral; thus, by way of example, the National Archive System Law No. 7202 of October 24, 1990, regulates it with respect to documents with scientific and cultural value from the public entities and bodies—passive subjects—that make up the National Archive System (the Legislative, Judicial, Executive Branches, and other public entities with legal personality, as well as those deposited in private and individual archives subject to the provisions of that legal body).\n\n**VI.- ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SUBJECTS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** The active subject of the right enshrined in article 30 of the Magna Carta is every person or every administered party; therefore, the constituent's purpose was to reduce administrative secrecy to its minimum expression and expand administrative transparency and publicity. Independently of the foregoing, the constitutional text also provides for a privileged institutional access to administrative information, such as, for example, that enjoyed by the investigation commissions of the Legislative Assembly (article 121, subsection 23, of the Political Constitution) for the exercise of their political control. It should be noted that privileged institutional access is regulated by the legal or infra-constitutional (infraconstitucional) system for other situations such as the General Comptroller of the Republic (articles 13 of Organic Law No. 7428 of August 26, 1994; 20, paragraph 2, of the Law on Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, No. 6872 of June 17, 1983, and its amendments), the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría de los Habitantes) (article 12, paragraph 2, of Law No. 7319 of November 17, 1992, and its amendments), the commissions to Promote Competition and the National Consumer Commission (article 64 of Law No. 7274 of December 20, 1994), the tax administration (articles 105, 106, and 107 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures), etc. Regarding the passive subjects of the right of access to administrative information, it must be taken into consideration that article 30 of the Political Constitution guarantees free access to “administrative departments”; thus, all public entities and their bodies shall be passive subjects, both from the Central Administration—the State or major public entity—and from the institutional or service-based Decentralized Administration—the majority of autonomous institutions—, territorial—municipalities—and corporate—professional associations, productive or industrial corporations such as the Sugar Cane Agroindustrial League (Liga Agroindustrial de la Caña de Azúcar), the Coffee Institute (Instituto del Café), the Tobacco Board (Junta del Tabaco), the Rice Corporation (Corporación Arrocera), the National Livestock and Horticultural Corporations (Corporaciones Ganadera y Hortícola Nacional), etc.—. The right of access must be extended, passively, to public enterprises that assume collective organizational forms of private law through which some public administration carries out a business, industrial, or commercial activity and intervenes in the economy and the market, such as the Costa Rican Oil Refinery, S.A. (Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo Sociedad Anónima, RECOPE), the National Power and Light Company, S.A. (Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz Sociedad Anónima, CNFL), Radiográfica de Costa Rica, S.A. (RACSA), Correos de Costa Rica, S.A., the Heredia Public Services Company, S.A. (Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia Sociedad Anónima, EPSH), etc., especially when they possess information of public interest. Finally, private individuals who permanently or temporarily exercise a public power or competency by virtue of legal or contractual authorization (munera pubblica), such as concessionaires of public services or works, interested managers, notaries, public accountants, engineers, architects, surveyors, etc., may eventually become passive subjects when they manage or possess information—documents—of clear public interest.\n\n**VII.- OBJECT OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** The constitutional text in its article 30 refers to free access to “administrative departments,” given that unrestricted access to the physical facilities of administrative units or offices would be useless and insufficient to achieve the goal of having informed administered parties knowledgeable about administrative management. Consequently, a purposive or axiological hermeneutics of the constitutional rule must lead us to conclude that administered parties or individuals may access any information held by the respective public entities and bodies, regardless of its medium, whether documentary—files, records, archives, card indexes—, electronic or digital—databases, electronic files, automated file systems, diskettes, compact discs—, audiovisual, magnetic tape, etc.\n\n**VIII.- INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC LIMITS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION.** Regarding the intrinsic limits to the essential content of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) The purpose of the right, which is “information on matters of public interest,” such that when the administrative information sought does not concern a matter of such a nature, the right is vitiated and access cannot be granted. 2) The second limit is constituted by what is established in paragraph 2 of article 30 of the Constitution, stipulating “State secrets are exempted.” The state secret as a limit to the right of access to administrative information is a matter of legislative reserve (article 19, paragraph 1, of the General Public Administration Law); however, more than fifty years have passed since the Constitution came into force, and the legislative omission in enacting a law on state secrets and classified matters still persists. This legislative gap has, obviously, caused grave uncertainty and has fostered the custom contra legem of the Executive Branch to classify, by way of executive decree, in a specific and circumstantial manner, some matters as reserved or classified for constituting, in its understanding, a state secret. Regarding the scope, extension, and reach of the state secret, doctrine is unanimous in accepting that it encompasses aspects such as national security (internal or external), national defense against aggressions that threaten the sovereignty and independence of the State, and the foreign relations conducted between the State and the rest of the subjects of Public International Law (see article 284 of the Penal Code, when typifying the crime of “revelation of secrets”). It is worthwhile to distinguish between secrecy for objective and material reasons (ratione materia), referring to the three previously indicated aspects (national security, defense, and foreign relations), and the secrecy imposed on public officials or servants (ratione personae), who, by reason of the exercise of their functions, know a certain type of information regarding which they must maintain a duty of discretion and confidentiality (see article 337 of the Penal Code when typifying and sanctioning the crime of “divulging secrets”). The state secret is regulated in the block of legality in a disjointed, dispersed, and imprecise manner (e.g., General Police Law No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, when classifying the reports and documents of the Directorate of State Security as confidential and, eventually, declarable as a State secret by the President of the Republic—article 16—; the General Civil Aviation Law with respect to some agreements of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation—article 303—, etc.). The state secret, insofar as it constitutes an exception to the constitutional principles or values of transparency and publicity of the public powers and their management, must be interpreted and applied, at all times, restrictively. Concerning the extrinsic limitations or limits of the right of access to administrative information, we have the following: 1) Article 28 of the Political Constitution establishes morality and public order as an extrinsic limit of any right, as their contours have been defined by this Chamber in Rulings numbers 1635-90 of 17:00 hours on November 14, 1990, 1420-91 of 09:00 hours on July 24, 1991, 3550–92 of 16:00 hours on November 24, 1992, 3004-92 of 14:30 hours on October 9, 1992, 0138-93 of 15:55 hours on January 12, 1993, and 3173-93 of 14:57 hours on July 6, 1993, among others. 2) Article 24 of the Political Constitution guarantees all persons a sphere of intangible privacy from the rest of legal subjects, such that those intimate, sensitive, or nominative data that a public entity or body has collected, processed, and stored, by appearing in its physical or automated archives, records, and files, cannot be accessed by any person, as this would entail an unconstitutional external intrusion or interference. Obviously, the foregoing applies to a greater extent when the administered party themselves has made confidential information known to a public administration, because it was required, for the purpose of obtaining a specific result or benefit. In reality, this limitation is closely linked to the first intrinsic limit indicated, since, very probably, in such a case, the requested information does not pertain to matters of public interest, but rather private interest. Closely linked to this limitation are banking secrecy, understood as the duty imposed on every financial intermediary entity not to reveal the information and data it possesses on its clients from any banking operation or contract entered into with them, especially regarding checking accounts, since article 615 of the Commerce Code expressly enshrines it for that scenario; and the industrial, commercial, or economic secrecy of companies regarding certain ideas, products, or industrial procedures and their financial, credit, and tax statements. There will be situations in which the information of a private individual held by a public entity or body may have, especially when considered together with that of other private individuals, a clear public dimension and purpose, circumstances that must be progressively and casuistically identified by this Constitutional Tribunal. 3) The investigation of crimes, when dealing with criminal investigations carried out by administrative or judicial police forces, for the purpose of guaranteeing the accuracy and success of the investigation and, above all, to respect the presumption of innocence, honor, and privacy of the persons involved.” (resolution number 2004-05693 of fifteen hours and thirty-six minutes on May twenty-sixth, two thousand four).\n\nThus, it is understood that this is a fundamental right whose exercise is not unrestricted, but rather subject to certain limits. For example, *on the one hand,* when the administrative information sought does not pertain to \"information on matters of public interest,\" the right is vitiated and access cannot be granted; and *on the other hand,* the right to privacy must be respected at all times, protecting the personal information that appears.\n\n**V.- On the specific case.-** In the matter under study by this Tribunal, it is observed that the appellant indeed made an express request to the Board of Directors of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad) in which she required certain information related to the companies that have contracts for the sale of electric cogeneration to ICE; a requirement that, as evident from folio 05, was submitted on September 3, 2007. As detailed in the file, this request was forwarded to the Deputy Manager of the Electricity Sector on September 7, 2007, and by official letter number 0510.1330.2007 of September 19, 2007, he informed the appellant that, prior to attending to the request, she had to prove the public interest that assists her in requesting said information. In this regard, it is verified that the protected party indeed requests various information, which is not of a confidential nature, confirming the alleged violation, since she asks, *on the one hand,* for the name of the companies that have electric cogeneration contracts with ICE, the quantity and price of the kilowatts purchased, and the price at which ICE sells it to consumers; *on the other hand,* she asks who the registered shareholders are in each of the companies. In this regard, it is observed that such information (name of the companies that have electric cogeneration contracts with ICE, the quantity and price of the kilowatts purchased, the price at which ICE sells it to consumers, and the names of the shareholders) is not of a confidential nature but rather clearly information of public interest, with the understanding, of course, that when she asks about the shareholders, the only information that can be provided about them is their name and not other private data such as their address, telephone number, or others. In this way, a violation of the right of access to administrative information was constituted when access to such information was conditioned on the proof of the public interest that assists the appellant, since it is one thing for article 30 of the Constitution to refer to access to administrative information of public interest, and quite another to require the interested party to demonstrate their public interest, because public interest is a requirement of the information, not of the person requesting it. Therefore, given that in the case before us, what is requested is not information of a confidential type or vested with a merely private interest, but on the contrary, it concerns information directly related to the contracting of private subjects for the provision of the public electricity service; given that the information is conditioned, not because it compromises State secrets, or involves confidential information of the counterparty, or implies an undue benefit or an opportunity to illegitimately harm the Administration, the counterparty, or even third parties—which are the exceptional situations that allow the Administration to limit access to administrative information—, but rather because the appellant is required to demonstrate her public interest—a requirement that the regulations do not demand of the administered party—, a violation of the right of access to administrative information is verified, making it necessary to declare the appeal with merit, solely with respect to this aspect, and with the consequences detailed in the operative part of this resolution.”" }