{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0007-122192",
  "citation": "Res. 15870-2007 Sala Constitucional",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
  "title_es": "Construcción de rampas para personas con discapacidad en Urbanización Bribrí",
  "title_en": "Construction of ramps for persons with disabilities in Bribrí urbanization",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional conoce un recurso de amparo contra la Municipalidad de San José por la suspensión de obras de construcción de rampas de acceso para personas con discapacidad en la Alameda 1 de la Urbanización Bribrí, en Lomas del Río, Pavas. La recurrente alega violación de los derechos de libre tránsito e igualdad de los amparados, quienes utilizan silla de ruedas y férulas. La Sala fundamenta su decisión en los artículos 33 y 51 constitucionales, la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y la Ley 7600 de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Personas con Discapacidad, destacando la obligación estatal de eliminar barreras físicas y garantizar la integración social de esta población. Determina que la Municipalidad tiene el deber de adecuar las vías públicas a las normas de urbanismo y que la justificación de posible aparcamiento de vehículos no es válida para suspender las obras. Declara con lugar el amparo, ordenando al Alcalde adoptar las medidas necesarias para construir aceras y rampas que garanticen el libre tránsito seguro de las personas con discapacidad, condenando además al pago de costas, daños y perjuicios.",
  "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber hears an amparo appeal against the Municipality of San José for the suspension of ramp construction works for persons with disabilities at Alameda 1, Urbanización Bribrí, in Lomas del Río, Pavas. The appellant claims violation of the free transit and equality rights of the protected persons, who require a wheelchair and leg braces. The Chamber bases its decision on Articles 33 and 51 of the Constitution, the American Convention on Human Rights, and Law 7600 on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, emphasizing the state's obligation to eliminate physical barriers and guarantee the social integration of this population. It determines that the Municipality has a duty to adapt public roads to urban planning standards and that the justification of potential vehicle parking is not valid for suspending the works. The amparo is granted, ordering the Mayor to take the necessary measures to build sidewalks and ramps ensuring the safe free transit of persons with disabilities, also awarding costs, damages, and losses.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional",
  "date": "2007",
  "year": "2007",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "recurso de amparo",
    "discapacidad",
    "Ley 7600",
    "libre tránsito",
    "principio de igualdad",
    "municipalidad",
    "urbanismo",
    "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 33",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 51",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": null,
      "law": "Ley 7600"
    },
    {
      "article": null,
      "law": "Ley 7948"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 1",
      "law": "Ley de Construcciones"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 15",
      "law": "Ley de Planificación Urbana"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 13 inciso g",
      "law": "Código Municipal"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 24",
      "law": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "recurso de amparo",
    "Sala Constitucional",
    "discapacidad",
    "rampas de acceso",
    "libre tránsito",
    "igualdad",
    "Ley 7600",
    "municipalidad",
    "urbanismo",
    "derechos fundamentales"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "amparo appeal",
    "Constitutional Chamber",
    "disability",
    "access ramps",
    "free transit",
    "equality",
    "Law 7600",
    "municipality",
    "urban planning",
    "fundamental rights"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Es claro entonces que forma parte de la tutela de los intereses y servicios locales -en los términos del artículo 169 constitucional- la obligación de la Municipalidad recurrida de velar por la adecuación de los caminos y las vías públicas a las normas de urbanismo, por lo que puede y debe promover todas las acciones y procedimientos que el ordenamiento establece con ese propósito, más aún en este asunto en que está de por medio la tutela de los derechos de las personas con discapacidad quienes requieren no solo circular libremente por las zonas públicas sino también el poder hacerlo bajo condiciones de seguridad. [...] la omisión de la autoridad recurrida en adoptar las medidas pertinentes para adecuar la situación planteada por la promovente al ordenamiento urbano y específicamente a lo dispuesto por la Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Personas con Discapacidad\" número 7600, trasgrede el Derecho de la Constitución, por lo que debe declararse con lugar el amparo.",
  "excerpt_en": "It is clear, then, that part of the protection of local interests and services—within the terms of Article 169 of the Constitution—includes the obligation of the respondent Municipality to ensure the adaptation of roads and public thoroughfares to urban planning standards, for which it can and must promote all actions and procedures that the legal system establishes for this purpose, even more so in this matter where the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities is at stake, who require not only free movement in public areas but also the ability to do so under safe conditions. [...] the omission of the respondent authority to adopt the pertinent measures to adapt the situation raised by the petitioner to urban planning and specifically to the provisions of the Equal Opportunities Law for Persons with Disabilities No. 7600, violates Constitutional Law, and therefore the amparo must be granted.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Granted",
    "label_es": "Con lugar",
    "summary_en": "The amparo is granted, ordering the Mayor of San José to take the necessary measures for Alameda 1 to have sidewalks and access ramps guaranteeing the safe free transit of persons with disabilities, and the municipality is ordered to pay costs, damages, and losses.",
    "summary_es": "Se declara con lugar el amparo, ordenando al Alcalde Municipal de San José adoptar las medidas necesarias para que la Alameda 1 cuente con aceras y rampas de acceso que garanticen el libre tránsito seguro de las personas con discapacidad, y se condena a la municipalidad al pago de costas, daños y perjuicios."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "the respondent authority's omission to adopt the pertinent measures to adapt the situation raised by the petitioner to urban planning and specifically to the provisions of Law 7600 on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities violates Constitutional Law",
      "quote_es": "la omisión de la autoridad recurrida en adoptar las medidas pertinentes para adecuar la situación planteada por la promovente al ordenamiento urbano y específicamente a lo dispuesto por la Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Personas con Discapacidad número 7600, trasgrede el Derecho de la Constitución"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VIII",
      "quote_en": "the justification provided by the respondent Mayor is not valid, in the sense that in that community ramps have not been built nor sidewalks improved because the petitioner's request was reconsidered due to the possibility that opening the alameda would lead to vehicle parking in that area",
      "quote_es": "no es válida la justificación que brinda el Alcalde recurrido en el sentido de que en esa comunidad no se han construido rampas ni se han mejorado las aceras porque la gestión de la recurrente fue reconsiderada ante la posibilidad de que al abrirse la alameda, se daría el aparcamiento de vehículos en esa zona"
    },
    {
      "context": "Corolario IX",
      "quote_en": "the consequences that will derive from the measures ordered in this amparo constitute a further determined and sure step by the State towards the progressive elimination of barriers that still exist against persons with disabilities",
      "quote_es": "las consecuencias que se derivarán de las medidas ordenadas en este amparo, resultan ser un paso más decidido y certero del Estado hacia la eliminación progresiva de barreras que todavía existen en contra de las personas con discapacidad"
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-23261",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7600"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0007-122192",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-23261",
      "norm_num": "7600",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Personas con Discapacidad",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "02/05/1996"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-38533",
      "norm_num": "7135",
      "norm_name": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "11/10/1989"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "norm_num": "0",
      "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política",
      "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política",
      "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“ III.- Objeto del\r\nrecurso. La recurrente considera lesionados los derechos fundamentales de\r\nlos amparados, en particular los contenidos en los artículos 22 y 33\r\nconstitucionales, en virtud de que a pesar de que desde el mes de enero del año\r\nen curso solicitó a la Alcaldía Municipal de San José, la construcción de\r\nrampas que permitan el acceso a las personas con discapacidad en la Alameda 1\r\nde la Urbanización Bribrí en Lomas del Río, Pavas y\r\nde que durante el mes de febrero siguiente se inició la obra, posteriormente se\r\nsuspendió sin que a la fecha de interposición de este recurso se haya concluido\r\nla construcción de su interés. \n\r\n\r\n\nIV.-Sobre el fondo. En primer término, es\r\nimportante señalar que la Constitución Política de Costa Rica y la Convención\r\nAmericana sobre Derechos Humanos (instrumento internacional con fuerza superior\r\na la ley por disposición del artículo 7 constitucional) consagran el principio\r\nde igualdad de las personas y la prohibición de hacer distinciones contrarias a\r\nsu dignidad –artículos 33 y 24 respectivamente-. Adicionalmente, los derechos\r\nde las personas discapacitadas están reconocidos en otros instrumentos\r\ninternacionales como la \"Convención Americana para la Eliminación de todas\r\nlas Formas de Discriminación contra las Personas con Discapacidad\",\r\naprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa por Ley número 7948 y la \"Ley de\r\nIgualdad de Oportunidades para las Personas con Discapacidad\" número 7600,\r\npublicada en La Gaceta del 29 de mayo de 1996. La citada Convención define en\r\nsu artículo 1° la discriminación, de la siguiente manera: \n\r\n\r\n\n\"El término discriminación\r\ncontra las personas con discapacidad, significa toda distinción, exclusión o\r\nrestricción basada en una discapacidad, antecedente de discapacidad,\r\nconsecuencia de discapacidad presente o pasada, que tenga el efecto o el\r\npropósito de impedir o anular el reconocimiento, goce o ejercicio por parte de\r\nlas personas con discapacidad, de sus derechos humanos y libertades\r\nfundamentales.\" \n\r\n\r\n\nAsimismo, se\r\nconsagra la obligación de los Estados que la suscribieron, entre ellos Costa\r\nRica, a adoptar: \n\r\n\r\n\n\"las medidas para eliminar\r\nprogresivamente la discriminación y promover la integración por parte de las\r\nautoridades gubernamentales y/o entidades privadas en la prestación o\r\nsuministro de bienes, servicios, instalaciones, programas, actividades, tales\r\ncomo el empleo, el transporte, las comunicaciones, la vivienda, la recreación,\r\nla educación, el deporte, el acceso a la justicia y los servicios policiales y\r\nlas actividades políticas y de administración.\" \n\r\n\r\n\nPor su parte, de\r\nimportancia para la resolución del presente asunto resulta conveniente señalar\r\nlo dispuesto en la Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Personas con Discapacidad\r\nnúmero 7600 la cual establece en términos generales la obligación que tienen\r\nlas instituciones, tanto públicas como privadas, de proveer todo el apoyo\r\ntécnico que sea necesario para las personas con discapacidad, a fin de\r\ngarantizar sus derechos: \n\r\n\r\n\n“Artículo 5.- Ayudas técnicas y\r\nservicios de apoyo \n\r\n\r\n\nLas instituciones públicas y las\r\nprivadas de servicio público deberán proveer, a las personas con discapacidad,\r\nlos servicios de apoyo y las ayudas técnicas requeridos para garantizar el\r\nejercicio de sus derechos y deberes.” \n\r\n\r\n\nV.- A la\r\nluz de lo expuesto, es evidente que existen una serie de disposiciones vigentes\r\nen nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, que prohíben todo tipo de discriminación\r\ncontra las personas en razón de su discapacidad, las cuales deben ser\r\nrespetadas tanto por sujetos de derecho público como de derecho privado pues la\r\ntutela efectiva de los derechos de esas personas resulta ser uno de los medios\r\npor los cuales este grupo de la población puede tener una vida lo más\r\nindependiente y normal posible, en aras de que su integración a la sociedad sea\r\nplena y efectiva. Es claro que dentro de estos derechos se encuentra el libre\r\nacceso a los servicios públicos, el derecho al libre tránsito por las vías\r\npúblicas y, en general, la garantía para las personas con discapacidad de que\r\npuedan llevar una vida independiente tanto en su ámbito privado como en todo\r\naquello que tiene que ver con su desarrollo en la sociedad, lo cual implica\r\nnecesariamente la obligación del Estado de que este colectivo pueda acceder a\r\ntodos los servicios y facilidades que existan en una ciudad, en iguales\r\ncondiciones que cualquier otra persona. \n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- Caso\r\nconcreto. La recurrente reclama que los amparados son dos personas con\r\ndiscapacidad que requieren trasladarse por las vías públicas de la Urbanización\r\nBribrí en Lomas del Río Pavas, el primero en silla de\r\nruedas y el segundo con férulas pero a pesar de que realizó una gestión expresa\r\nen ese sentido ante el Alcalde Municipal de San José y de que a principios de\r\neste año se iniciaron las obras, luego se paralizaron y desde entonces no se ha\r\ncontinuado con las rampas de acceso a la Alameda 1 de esa Urbanización con lo\r\ncual continúan existentes varios inconvenientes y obstáculos que le impiden a\r\nlos tutelado circular de manera segura, entre ellos el pésimo estado de las\r\naceras, la no existencia de las medidas mínimas en la aceras requeridas para la\r\ncirculación así como también la carencia de rampas, con lo cual, esa población\r\ncon discapacidad en general y los amparados en particular, ven limitada su\r\nlibertad de tránsito y su derecho de acceder a esa libertad sin que se hagan\r\ndistinciones contrarias a su dignidad. Sobre este punto en concreto, la Sala se\r\npronunció en sentencia N° 234-00 de las 12:06 horas\r\ndel 7 de enero de 2000 que en lo que interesa dispuso: \n\r\n\r\n\n“V.- En el caso concreto, es\r\nincuestionable la competencia del ente municipal para administrar los intereses\r\ny servicios locales del Cantón de San José, tal y como lo determina la misma\r\nConstitución Política en su artículo 169, otorgándole para tal efecto autonomía\r\nmunicipal (artículo 170 ibíd). Si bien es cierto el\r\nartículo 169 no define ni da mayores elementos de juicio como para extraer en\r\nforma definitiva lo que debe entenderse por \"intereses y servicios\r\nlocales\", ya la Sala en otras oportunidades ha dicho que se trata de un\r\nconcepto jurídico indeterminado como lo son el de \"orden público\" o\r\nel de \"buenas costumbres\" por citar algunos que también la\r\nConstitución utiliza; sin embargo, la Sala también ha admitido que \"…la\r\npotestad atribuida a los gobiernos locales para planificar el desarrollo urbano\r\ndentro de los límites de su territorio sí integra el concepto constitucional de\r\n\"intereses y servicios locales\" a que hace referencia el artículo 169\r\nde la Constitución (…)\" (ver en ese sentido la sentencia N° 5757-94). \n\r\n\r\n\nAsí las cosas,\r\nla normativa constitucional encuentra desarrollo en la legislación vigente,\r\nespecíficamente el artículo 1° de la Ley de Construcciones claramente determina\r\nque son las Municipalidades de la República las encargadas de que las ciudades\r\ny demás poblaciones reúnan las condiciones necesarias de seguridad, salubridad\r\ny belleza en sus vías públicas y en los edificios y construcciones que en\r\nterrenos de las mismas se levanten, sin perjuicio de las facultades que las\r\nleyes conceden en estas materias a otros órganos administrativos. Asimismo, el\r\nartículo 15 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana reconoce la competencia y\r\nautoridad de los gobiernos municipales para planificar y controlar el\r\ndesarrollo urbano, dentro de los límites de su territorio jurisdiccional, y el\r\nartículo 13 inciso g) del Código Municipal señala que son atribuciones del\r\nConcejo dictar las medidas de ordenamiento urbano. \n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- Es claro entonces que forma parte de la\r\ntutela de los intereses y servicios locales -en los términos del artículo 169\r\nconstitucional- la obligación de la Municipalidad recurrida de velar por la\r\nadecuación de los caminos y las vías públicas a las normas de urbanismo, por lo\r\nque puede y debe promover todas las acciones y procedimientos que el\r\nordenamiento establece con ese propósito, más aún en este asunto en que está de\r\npor medio la tutela de los derechos de las personas con discapacidad quienes\r\nrequieren no solo circular libremente por las zonas públicas sino también el\r\npoder hacerlo bajo condiciones de seguridad. Así las cosas, desde todo punto de\r\nvista se justifica la adopción de medidas particulares, como las que reclama la\r\nrecurrente en el sentido de que se facilite el libre tránsito de los amparados\r\ny demás personas por las zonas públicas de la Urbanización Bribrí\r\nde Lomas del Río de Pavas, a través de aceras que cumplan con los requisitos\r\nestablecidos y que se encuentren en buenas condiciones así como también\r\nmediante la construcción de rampas de acceso a esas aceras; punto que -a toda\r\nluz- encuentra fundamento en el derecho consagrado en el artículo 51 de la\r\nConstitución Política como en los Instrumentos Internacionales en materia de\r\nDerechos Humanos vigentes en la República, que conceden una protección\r\nparticular a las personas que menciona el actor. Desde esta perspectiva, la\r\nomisión de la autoridad recurrida en adoptar las medidas pertinentes para\r\nadecuar la situación planteada por la promovente al\r\nordenamiento urbano y específicamente a lo dispuesto por la Ley de Igualdad de\r\nOportunidades para las Personas con Discapacidad\" número 7600, trasgrede el Derecho de la Constitución, por lo que debe\r\ndeclararse con lugar el amparo. \n\r\n\r\n\nVIII.- Así las cosas, resulta evidente que se\r\nha dado negligencia de parte de las autoridades de la Municipalidad de San José\r\npues, como se desprende de lo dicho, no puede dejarse de lado que el Estado\r\nadquiere la obligación de regular las áreas de la vida social de las cuales\r\npuedan surgir peligros para la existencia física de los habitantes de su territorio,\r\nya sea a través de la ley, de reglamentos, de acuerdos o de otras medidas\r\nrelacionadas con la organización y los procedimientos administrativos, y del\r\nderecho subjetivo de las personas a que así se proceda, en forma diligente. En\r\nconsecuencia, la posibilidad de exigir, judicialmente, a través del recurso de\r\namparo, un tipo específico de actividad prestacional\r\npor parte del Estado en cumplimiento de su deber de protección a la vida e\r\nintegridad física de sus habitantes, es restringida a la clara verificación de\r\nun peligro inminente contra esos derechos de las personas, como se da en este\r\ncaso, de lo que se desprende que la injerencia de la jurisdicción\r\nconstitucional solamente es viable ante la inercia comprobada del Estado, a\r\ntravés de sus órganos competentes, en atender las demandas que en ejercicio de\r\nsus derechos realicen los habitantes del país, como sucede en el caso concreto\r\n(ver en ese sentido sentencia número 2005-01713 de las 14:53 horas del 23 de\r\nfebrero de 2005). Por tales razones, resulta evidente que sí se ha dado una\r\nnegligencia del Estado que inclusive es reconocida bajo fe de juramento, por lo\r\ncual el amparo debe ser estimado, ordenándose al Alcalde Municipal de San José\r\nque adopte las medidas que sean necesarias para que la Alameda 1 de la\r\nUrbanización Bribrí de Lomas del Río en Pavas cuente\r\ncon aceras y rampas de acceso a las mismas que le garanticen a la población con\r\ndiscapacidad, su derecho al libre tránsito así como que el ejercicio de este\r\nderecho se realice de la mejor manera posible. Sobre el particular, debe\r\nindicarse finalmente que para la Sala que no es válida la justificación que\r\nbrinda el Alcalde recurrido en el sentido de que en esa comunidad no se han\r\nconstruido rampas ni se han mejorado las aceras porque la gestión de la recurrente\r\nfue reconsiderada ante la posibilidad de que al abrirse la alameda, se daría el\r\naparcamiento de vehículos en esa zona y que por ello, se suspendió la\r\nrealización de la obra que se venía construyendo, pues el ingreso a los\r\nedificios, las condiciones en que se encuentren las aceras y la existencia\r\nmisma de aceras, entre otras cosas de la vida cotidiana, deben garantizar a\r\ntoda la población con discapacidad, el libre acceso y por ello el Estado no\r\nsolo debe pensar en rampas de acceso o ascensores o aceras libres sino también\r\ndebe tomarse en cuenta que la libre circulación y el acceso a los edificios,\r\ncalles, servicios públicos, entre otros, debe garantizarse a toda la población\r\ncon discapacidad. Desde cualquier punto de vista, admitir lo contrario se traduce\r\nen una violación a la igualdad de oportunidades que tienen éstas personas como\r\nparte de la sociedad y es por ello, que situaciones así no hacen más que\r\nnegarle a esta población la posibilidad de insertarse en la sociedad de manera\r\nnatural y realizar sus actividades de forma adecuada (ver en ese sentido la\r\nsentencia Nº 2004-04648 de las 12:26 horas del 30 de abril de 2004). \n\r\n\r\n\nIX.- Corolario. Lo dicho en los considerandos precedentes cobra vital importancia cuando se\r\ntoma en cuenta que la integración social de las personas con discapacidad, debe\r\nser un objetivo prioritario del Estado que tiene la obligación de adoptar los\r\nmecanismos que sean necesarios para eliminar progresivamente las barreras que\r\nlimitan a las personas con discapacidad el ejercicio de su derecho a una vida\r\nindependiente. Ese objetivo es de obligado cumplimiento para el Estado pues\r\nimplica construir una sociedad para todas las personas, sin distinción alguna y\r\ndonde puedan desarrollarse desempeñando un papel activo e independiente. En el\r\ncaso de las personas con discapacidad, esa integración tiene dos aspectos: uno\r\nque es el esfuerzo que requiere asumir la persona con discapacidad para asumir\r\nel reto y la responsabilidad de integrarse en el mundo del trabajo, del\r\nestudio, del deporte, del arte, de la participación ciudadana, entre otros y\r\notro, es la necesaria actitud favorable de la sociedad, de los empresarios,\r\npero sobre todo el apoyo decidido del Estado para propiciar este cambio y por\r\nello, las consecuencias que se derivarán de las medidas ordenadas en este\r\namparo, resultan ser un paso más decidido y certero del Estado hacia la\r\neliminación progresiva de barreras que todavía existen en contra de las\r\npersonas con discapacidad y constituirá, específicamente en el caso de los\r\namparados, un paso más para su inserción en la sociedad, lo cual, sin duda\r\nalguna, tiene fundamento constitucional en el artículo 33 que prohíbe cualquier\r\nforma de discriminación y de desigualdad. En ese sentido, debe tenerse en\r\ncuenta también que esta Sala en la sentencia N°\r\n8161-04 de las 10:53 horas del 23 de julio de 2004 dispuso que “la Constitución\r\nPolítica recoge, implícitamente, el derecho fundamental de los administrados al\r\nbuen y eficiente funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, esto es, que sean\r\nprestados con elevados estándares de calidad, el cual tiene como correlato\r\nnecesario la obligación de las administraciones públicas de prestarlos de forma\r\ncontinua, regular, célere, eficaz y eficiente. Esta última obligación se\r\ndesprende de la relación sistemática de varios preceptos constitucionales,\r\ntales como el 140, inciso 8, el cual le impone al Poder Ejecutivo el deber de\r\n“Vigilar el buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias\r\nadministrativas”, el 139, inciso 4), en cuanto incorpora el concepto de “buena\r\nmarcha del Gobierno” y el 191 en la medida que incorpora el principio de\r\n“eficiencia de la administración”. Así las cosas, no cabe duda entonces de que\r\nsi tal garantía individual atípica o innominada ya ha sido reconocida por este\r\nTribunal, no solamente le es aplicable a un colectivo específico de personas\r\nsino que involucra a todos los individuos que habitan en este país y ello, sin\r\nduda alguna, incluye a las personas con discapacidad.”",
  "body_en_text": "“ III.- Purpose of the recourse (recurso). The petitioner considers the fundamental rights of the amparados (persons protected by the amparo) to have been violated, particularly those contained in Articles 22 and 33 of the Constitution, by virtue of the fact that despite having requested, since January of this year, that the Municipal Mayor's Office of San José construct ramps to allow access for persons with disabilities on Alameda 1 of the Urbanización Bribrí in Lomas del Río, Pavas, and that work began during the following February, it was subsequently suspended without the construction of interest to her having been completed as of the date this recourse was filed.\n\nIV.- On the merits. First, it is important to note that the Political Constitution of Costa Rica and the American Convention on Human Rights (an international instrument with force superior to law by provision of Article 7 of the Constitution) enshrine the principle of equality of persons and the prohibition of making distinctions contrary to their dignity – Articles 33 and 24 respectively. Additionally, the rights of persons with disabilities are recognized in other international instruments such as the \"Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities\", approved by the Legislative Assembly through Law No. 7948, and the \"Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities\" (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Personas con Discapacidad) No. 7600, published in La Gaceta of May 29, 1996. The cited Convention defines discrimination in its Article 1, as follows:\n\n\"The term discrimination against persons with disabilities means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction based on a disability, record of disability, condition of present or past disability, which has the effect or purpose of preventing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by persons with disabilities of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.\"\n\nLikewise, the obligation of the States that signed it, including Costa Rica, is enshrined to adopt:\n\n\"measures to progressively eliminate discrimination and promote integration by governmental authorities and/or private entities in the provision or supply of goods, services, facilities, programs, activities, such as employment, transportation, communications, housing, recreation, education, sports, access to justice and police services, and political and administrative activities.\"\n\nFor its part, of importance for the resolution of this matter, it is appropriate to point out the provisions of the Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities No. 7600, which establishes, in general terms, the obligation of institutions, both public and private, to provide all technical support necessary for persons with disabilities, in order to guarantee their rights:\n\n“Article 5.- Technical aids and support services\n\nPublic institutions and private public-service institutions must provide, to persons with disabilities, the support services and technical aids required to guarantee the exercise of their rights and duties.”\n\nV.- In light of the above, it is evident that there is a series of provisions in force in our legal system that prohibit all types of discrimination against persons based on their disability, which must be respected by subjects of both public law and private law since the effective guardianship of the rights of these persons is one of the means by which this population group can have a life as independent and normal as possible, in the interest of achieving full and effective integration into society. It is clear that among these rights is free access to public services, the right to free movement (libre tránsito) on public thoroughfares, and, in general, the guarantee for persons with disabilities to be able to lead an independent life both in their private sphere and in everything related to their development in society, which necessarily implies the State's obligation to ensure that this group can access all services and facilities that exist in a city, under the same conditions as any other person.\n\nVI.- Specific case. The petitioner claims that the amparados are two persons with disabilities who need to travel on the public thoroughfares of the Urbanización Bribrí in Lomas del Río Pavas, the first in a wheelchair and the second with splints, but despite having made an express request to that effect before the Municipal Mayor of San José and despite work having begun at the beginning of this year, it was subsequently paralyzed and since then the access ramps to Alameda 1 of that Urbanización have not been continued, with several inconveniences and obstacles continuing to exist that prevent the protected persons from circulating safely, among them the deplorable state of the sidewalks (aceras), the lack of minimum measures on the sidewalks required for circulation, as well as the lack of ramps, whereby that population with disabilities in general, and the amparados in particular, see their freedom of movement limited and their right to access that freedom without distinctions contrary to their dignity being made. On this specific point, this Chamber ruled in judgment (sentencia) N° 234-00 of 12:06 hours on January 7, 2000, which, as relevant, provided:\n\n“V.- In the specific case, the competence of the municipal entity to administer the local interests and services of the Canton of San José is unquestionable, as determined by the Political Constitution itself in its Article 169, granting it municipal autonomy for that purpose (Article 170 ibid.). Although it is true that Article 169 does not define nor give greater elements of judgment to definitively extract what should be understood by \"local interests and services,\" this Chamber has already said on other occasions that it is an indeterminate legal concept, such as those of \"public order\" or \"good customs,\" to cite some that the Constitution also uses; however, this Chamber has also admitted that \"…the power attributed to local governments to plan urban development within the limits of their territory does integrate the constitutional concept of 'local interests and services' referred to in Article 169 of the Constitution (…)\" (see in that regard judgment N° 5757-94).\n\nThus, the constitutional regulations are developed in the legislation in force, specifically Article 1 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) clearly determines that the Municipalities of the Republic are responsible for ensuring that cities and other towns meet the necessary conditions of safety, health, and beauty in their public thoroughfares and in the buildings and constructions erected on land thereof, without prejudice to the powers that the laws grant in these matters to other administrative bodies. Likewise, Article 15 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) recognizes the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their jurisdictional territory, and Article 13, section g) of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) indicates that it is the attributions of the Council to dictate urban planning measures.\n\nVII.- It is clear, then, that part of the guardianship of local interests and services – in the terms of Article 169 of the Constitution – is the obligation of the recurred Municipality to ensure the adaptation of roads and public thoroughfares to urban planning standards, and therefore it can and must promote all actions and procedures that the legal system establishes for that purpose, even more so in this matter where the guardianship of the rights of persons with disabilities is at stake, who require not only to circulate freely through public areas but also to be able to do so under safe conditions. Thus, from every point of view, the adoption of particular measures is justified, such as those claimed by the petitioner to facilitate the free movement of the amparados and other persons through the public areas of the Urbanización Bribrí in Lomas del Río de Pavas, through sidewalks that meet the established requirements and are in good condition, as well as through the construction of access ramps to those sidewalks; a point that – clearly – finds its basis in the right enshrined in Article 51 of the Political Constitution as well as in the International Instruments on Human Rights in force in the Republic, which grant particular protection to the persons mentioned by the petitioner. From this perspective, the omission of the recurred authority in adopting the pertinent measures to adapt the situation raised by the petitioner to urban planning regulations and specifically to the provisions of the \"Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities\" No. 7600, violates the Right of the Constitution, and therefore the amparo must be granted.\n\nVIII.- Thus, it is evident that there has been negligence on the part of the authorities of the Municipality of San José since, as can be inferred from what has been said, it cannot be ignored that the State acquires the obligation to regulate the areas of social life from which dangers may arise for the physical existence of the inhabitants of its territory, whether through law, regulations, agreements, or other measures related to organization and administrative procedures, and from the subjective right of persons to have this done diligently. Consequently, the possibility of demanding, judicially, through the amparo recourse (recurso de amparo), a specific type of benefit-providing activity (actividad prestacional) by the State in fulfillment of its duty to protect the life and physical integrity of its inhabitants, is restricted to the clear verification of an imminent danger against those persons' rights, as occurs in this case, from which it follows that the intervention of the constitutional jurisdiction is only viable in the face of proven inertia by the State, through its competent bodies, in attending to the demands that the country's inhabitants make in the exercise of their rights, as happens in the specific case (see in that regard judgment number 2005-01713 of 14:53 hours on February 23, 2005). For these reasons, it is evident that there has indeed been negligence by the State, which is even acknowledged under oath (fe de juramento), and therefore the amparo must be granted, ordering the Municipal Mayor of San José to adopt the measures necessary so that Alameda 1 of the Urbanización Bribrí in Lomas del Río in Pavas has sidewalks and access ramps to them that guarantee the population with disabilities their right to free movement and that the exercise of this right be carried out in the best possible way. In this regard, it must finally be indicated that for this Chamber, the justification provided by the recurred Mayor is not valid, to the effect that ramps have not been built nor the sidewalks improved in that community because the petitioner's request was reconsidered in light of the possibility that, upon opening the alameda (tree-lined promenade), vehicle parking would occur in that area and that, therefore, the execution of the work that was being built was suspended, since access to buildings, the conditions in which the sidewalks are found, and the very existence of sidewalks, among other things of daily life, must guarantee free access to the entire population with disabilities, and for this reason the State must not only think about access ramps, elevators, or clear sidewalks but must also consider that free circulation and access to buildings, streets, public services, among others, must be guaranteed to the entire population with disabilities. From any point of view, admitting the contrary translates into a violation of the equality of opportunities that these persons have as part of society, and it is for this reason that situations like this do nothing more than deny this population the possibility of inserting themselves into society naturally and carrying out their activities adequately (see in that regard judgment No. 2004-04648 of 12:26 hours on April 30, 2004).\n\nIX.- Corollary. What has been said in the preceding considerandos takes on vital importance when one considers that the social integration of persons with disabilities must be a priority objective of the State, which has the obligation to adopt the mechanisms necessary to progressively eliminate the barriers that limit persons with disabilities in the exercise of their right to an independent life. That objective is of mandatory fulfillment for the State since it implies building a society for all persons, without any distinction, and where they can develop by playing an active and independent role. In the case of persons with disabilities, that integration has two aspects: one, the effort that the person with a disability must undertake to face the challenge and the responsibility of integrating into the worlds of work, study, sports, art, citizen participation, among others; and the other, the necessary favorable attitude of society, of businesspeople, but above all the determined support of the State to foster this change. For this reason, the consequences that will derive from the measures ordered in this amparo turn out to be another decisive and certain step by the State toward the progressive elimination of barriers that still exist against persons with disabilities, and will constitute, specifically in the case of the amparados, another step toward their insertion into society, which, without any doubt, has a constitutional basis in Article 33, which prohibits any form of discrimination and inequality. In that sense, it must also be borne in mind that this Chamber, in judgment N° 8161-04 of 10:53 hours on July 23, 2004, provided that “the Political Constitution implicitly enshrines the fundamental right of the administered to the good and efficient functioning of public services, that is, that they be provided with high-quality standards, which has as a necessary corollary the obligation of public administrations to provide them continuously, regularly, swiftly, effectively, and efficiently. This latter obligation follows from the systematic interrelation of several constitutional precepts, such as Article 140, section 8, which imposes on the Executive Branch the duty to ‘Oversee the good functioning of administrative services and dependencies,’ Article 139, section 4), insofar as it incorporates the concept of ‘good march of the Government,’ and Article 191 to the extent that it incorporates the principle of ‘efficiency of the administration.’ Thus, there is no doubt then that if such an atypical or unnamed individual guarantee has already been recognized by this Tribunal, it is applicable not only to a specific collective of persons but involves all individuals who inhabit this country, and that, without any doubt, includes persons with disabilities.”\n\nThus, from every point of view, the adoption of particular measures is justified, such as those the petitioner demands, namely that the free movement of the protected persons and others through the public areas of the Urbanización Bribrí de Lomas del Río de Pavas be facilitated, by means of sidewalks (aceras) that meet the established requirements and are in good condition, as well as by the construction of access ramps to those sidewalks (aceras); a point that clearly finds its basis in the right enshrined in Article 51 of the Political Constitution as well as in the International Human Rights Instruments in force in the Republic, which grant particular protection to the persons mentioned by the plaintiff. From this perspective, the omission of the respondent authority in adopting the pertinent measures to adapt the situation raised by the petitioner to urban planning and specifically to the provisions of the “Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Personas con Discapacidad” number 7600, violates the Right of the Constitution, and therefore the amparo must be granted.\n\n**VIII.-** Thus, it is evident that there has been negligence on the part of the authorities of the Municipalidad de San José since, as can be inferred from what has been stated, it cannot be overlooked that the State acquires the obligation to regulate the areas of social life from which dangers to the physical existence of the inhabitants of its territory may arise, whether through law, regulations, agreements, or other measures related to administrative organization and procedures, and the subjective right of individuals to have this done diligently. Consequently, the possibility of judicially demanding, through the amparo remedy (recurso de amparo), a specific type of service-providing activity from the State in compliance with its duty to protect the life and physical integrity of its inhabitants, is restricted to the clear verification of an imminent danger against those rights of individuals, as occurs in this case, from which it follows that the intervention of the constitutional jurisdiction is only viable in the face of the verified inertia of the State, through its competent bodies, in addressing the demands that the country's inhabitants make in the exercise of their rights, as occurs in the specific case (see in this sense judgment number 2005-01713 of 14:53 hours on February 23, 2005). For these reasons, it is evident that there has indeed been negligence on the part of the State, which is even acknowledged under oath, and therefore the amparo must be granted, ordering the Alcalde Municipal de San José to adopt the measures necessary so that Alameda 1 of the Urbanización Bribrí de Lomas del Río in Pavas has sidewalks (aceras) and access ramps to them that guarantee the population with disabilities their right to free movement and that the exercise of this right be carried out in the best possible way. In this regard, it must finally be stated that for this Chamber, the justification provided by the respondent Mayor, that in that community ramps have not been built and sidewalks (aceras) have not been improved because the petitioner's request was reconsidered given the possibility that opening the promenade (alameda) would lead to vehicles parking in that area and that, therefore, the work being carried out was suspended, is not valid, because access to buildings, the conditions of the sidewalks (aceras), and the very existence of sidewalks (aceras), among other things of daily life, must guarantee free access to the entire population with disabilities, and therefore the State must not only think about access ramps or elevators or clear sidewalks (aceras) but must also take into account that free movement and access to buildings, streets, public services, among others, must be guaranteed to the entire population with disabilities. From any point of view, admitting the contrary results in a violation of the equality of opportunity that these persons have as part of society, and it is therefore that such situations only deny this population the possibility of integrating into society naturally and carrying out their activities adequately (see in this sense judgment No. 2004-04648 of 12:26 hours on April 30, 2004).\n\n**IX.- Corollary.** What has been stated in the preceding recitals (considerandos) is of vital importance when considering that the social integration of persons with disabilities must be a priority objective of the State, which has the obligation to adopt the necessary mechanisms to progressively eliminate the barriers that limit persons with disabilities in the exercise of their right to an independent life. This objective is mandatory for the State because it implies building a society for all people, without any distinction, where they can develop by playing an active and independent role. In the case of persons with disabilities, this integration has two aspects: one is the effort that the person with a disability must assume to take on the challenge and responsibility of integrating into the world of work, study, sports, art, citizen participation, among others, and the other is the necessary favorable attitude of society, of employers, but above all the decisive support of the State to promote this change, and therefore, the consequences that will derive from the measures ordered in this amparo prove to be another decisive and accurate step by the State towards the progressive elimination of barriers that still exist against persons with disabilities, and will constitute, specifically in the case of the protected persons (amparados), a further step for their insertion into society, which undoubtedly has constitutional basis in Article 33, which prohibits any form of discrimination and inequality. In this sense, it must also be considered that this Chamber, in judgment No. 8161-04 of 10:53 hours on July 23, 2004, ordered that “the Political Constitution implicitly incorporates the fundamental right of the governed to the good and efficient functioning of public services, that is, that they be provided with high-quality standards, which has as its necessary corollary the obligation of public administrations to provide them continuously, regularly, swiftly, effectively, and efficiently. This last obligation follows from the systematic relationship of several constitutional precepts, such as 140, subsection 8, which imposes on the Executive Branch the duty to ‘Monitor the good functioning of administrative services and dependencies,’ 139, subsection 4), in that it incorporates the concept of ‘good progress of the Government,’ and 191 in that it incorporates the principle of ‘efficiency of the administration.’ Thus, there is no doubt then that if such an atypical or unnamed individual guarantee has already been recognized by this Court, it is not only applicable to a specific group of people but involves all individuals who inhabit this country, and this undoubtedly includes persons with disabilities.”\n\n**VII.-** It is clear then that the obligation of the respondent Municipality to ensure that roads and public thoroughfares conform to urban planning standards forms part of the protection of local interests and services—within the terms of Article 169 of the Constitution—and therefore it can and must pursue all actions and procedures established by law for that purpose, even more so in this matter where the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities is at stake, who require not only to circulate freely through public areas but also to be able to do so under safe conditions. Thus, from every point of view, the adoption of particular measures is justified, such as those demanded by the appellant to the effect that the free transit of the protected persons and other individuals through the public areas of the Bribrí Urbanization in Lomas del Río de Pavas be facilitated, by means of sidewalks that meet the established requirements and are in good condition, as well as through the construction of access ramps to those sidewalks; a point that—by all means—finds its basis in the right enshrined in Article 51 of the Political Constitution as well as in the International Human Rights Instruments in force in the Republic, which grant particular protection to the persons mentioned by the claimant. From this perspective, the omission of the respondent authority to adopt the pertinent measures to adjust the situation raised by the petitioner (promovente) to urban planning regulations and specifically to the provisions of the \"Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities Law\" number 7600, violates the Law of the Constitution, and therefore the amparo must be granted.\n\n**VIII.-** Thus, it is evident that there has been negligence on the part of the authorities of the Municipality of San José since, as is clear from the foregoing, it cannot be overlooked that the State acquires the obligation to regulate the areas of social life from which dangers to the physical existence of the inhabitants of its territory may arise, whether through law, regulations, agreements, or other measures related to administrative organization and procedures, and from the subjective right of individuals to have this done diligently. Consequently, the possibility of demanding, judicially, through the amparo remedy, a specific type of affirmative action (prestacional) by the State in fulfillment of its duty to protect the life and physical integrity of its inhabitants, is restricted to the clear verification of an imminent danger against those rights of individuals, as occurs in this case, from which it follows that the intervention of the constitutional jurisdiction is only viable in the face of proven inertia by the State, through its competent organs, in addressing the demands that the country's inhabitants make in the exercise of their rights, as happens in the specific case (see in that regard ruling number 2005-01713 of 2:53 p.m. on February 23, 2005). For these reasons, it is evident that there has indeed been negligence by the State which is even acknowledged under oath, and therefore the amparo must be granted, ordering the Municipal Mayor of San José to adopt whatever measures are necessary so that Alameda 1 of the Bribrí Urbanization in Lomas del Río in Pavas has sidewalks and access ramps to them that guarantee the population with disabilities their right to free transit, as well as that the exercise of this right be carried out in the best possible manner. On this matter, it must finally be indicated that, for this Chamber, the justification offered by the respondent Mayor is not valid, to the effect that in that community no ramps have been built nor have the sidewalks been improved because the petitioner's (recurrente) request was reconsidered given the possibility that, upon opening the alameda, vehicles would park in that area and that, for that reason, the execution of the work that was being built was suspended, since access to buildings, the conditions in which the sidewalks are found, and the very existence of sidewalks, among other things of daily life, must guarantee free access to the entire population with disabilities, and for that reason the State must not only think about access ramps or elevators or clear sidewalks but must also take into account that free circulation and access to buildings, streets, public services, among others, must be guaranteed to the entire population with disabilities. From any point of view, admitting the contrary translates into a violation of the equality of opportunities that these persons have as part of society, and it is for this reason that such situations do nothing more than deny this population the possibility of integrating into society naturally and carrying out their activities adequately (see in that regard ruling No. 2004-04648 of 12:26 p.m. on April 30, 2004).\n\n**IX.- Corollary.** What has been stated in the preceding recitals (considerandos) takes on vital importance when one considers that the social integration of persons with disabilities must be a priority objective of the State, which has the obligation to adopt whatever mechanisms are necessary to progressively eliminate the barriers that limit persons with disabilities in the exercise of their right to an independent life. That objective is mandatory for the State because it implies building a society for all persons, without any distinction, and where they can develop by playing an active and independent role. In the case of persons with disabilities, that integration has two aspects: one is the effort that the person with a disability must assume to take on the challenge and responsibility of integrating into the world of work, study, sports, art, citizen participation, among others, and another is the necessary favorable attitude of society, of business owners, but above all the determined support of the State to promote this change, and for that reason, the consequences derived from the measures ordered in this amparo turn out to be a more determined and accurate step by the State toward the progressive elimination of barriers that still exist against persons with disabilities, and will constitute, specifically in the case of the protected persons, one more step toward their integration into society, which, without any doubt, has a constitutional basis in Article 33, which prohibits any form of discrimination and inequality. In that sense, it must also be borne in mind that this Chamber, in ruling No. 8161-04 of 10:53 a.m. on July 23, 2004, held that “the Political Constitution implicitly enshrines the fundamental right of administered persons to the good and efficient functioning of public services, that is, that they be provided with high quality standards, which has as a necessary corollary the obligation of public administrations to provide them continuously, regularly, speedily, effectively, and efficiently. This latter obligation follows from the systematic relationship of several constitutional precepts, such as Article 140, subsection 8, which imposes on the Executive Branch the duty to ‘Monitor the good functioning of administrative services and dependencies,’ Article 139, subsection 4), insofar as it incorporates the concept of ‘good running of the Government,’ and Article 191 insofar as it incorporates the principle of ‘efficiency of the administration.’ Thus, there is no doubt then that if such an atypical or unnamed individual guarantee has already been recognized by this Tribunal, it is not only applicable to a specific collective of persons but involves all individuals who live in this country, and that, without any doubt, includes persons with disabilities.”"
}