{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0007-122782", "citation": "Res. 13906-2007 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Desalojo administrativo del domicilio familiar contradice decisión judicial previa", "title_en": "Administrative eviction of family home contradicts prior court ruling", "summary_es": "Esta sentencia de la Sala Constitucional resuelve un recurso de amparo interpuesto por una madre contra las autoridades del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, quienes ordenaron el desalojo administrativo de ella y sus hijos menores de edad del inmueble que constituía el domicilio familiar. La recurrente alegó violación de sus derechos fundamentales, en particular los reconocidos en los artículos 39, 41 y 51 de la Constitución Política. La Sala estimó el recurso, tras constatar que el Juzgado de Familia de San José había denegado previamente, en el marco de un proceso de divorcio, una solicitud similar del ex cónyuge para obligar a la amparada a abandonar la vivienda. La autoridad administrativa ignoró esa decisión judicial y acogió un desalojo basado en la titularidad registral. La Sala, apoyándose en su propia jurisprudencia, determinó que el desahucio administrativo es improcedente cuando existe una controversia sobre el derecho de propiedad o posesión que ya fue objeto de pronunciamiento judicial, pues la Administración no puede sustituir el criterio judicial ni desconocer una resolución jurisdiccional firme. Se declara con lugar el amparo, se anula la orden de desalojo y se condena al Estado al pago de costas, daños y perjuicios.", "summary_en": "This Constitutional Chamber ruling decides an amparo action filed by a mother against the Public Security Ministry authorities, who ordered the administrative eviction of her and her minor children from the family home. The petitioner alleged violation of her fundamental rights, particularly those under Articles 39, 41, and 51 of the Constitution. The Chamber granted the amparo, finding that the San José Family Court had previously denied, within divorce proceedings, a similar request by the ex-spouse to force the petitioner to leave the dwelling. The administrative authority ignored that judicial decision and granted an eviction based on registered title. The Chamber, relying on its own precedent, held that administrative eviction is inadmissible when there is a dispute over ownership or possession already resolved by a court, since the Administration cannot substitute a judicial decision or disregard a final court ruling. The amparo is granted, the eviction order is annulled, and the State is ordered to pay costs and damages.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "2007", "year": "2007", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "desahucio administrativo", "recurso de amparo", "domicilio familiar", "derechos fundamentales", "Derecho de la Constitución", "sentencia 85-98", "condena en costas, daños y perjuicios" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 39", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 41", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 51", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 455", "law": "Código Procesal Civil" }, { "article": "Art. 132", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 50", "law": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional" } ], "keywords_es": [ "Desalojo administrativo", "Recurso de amparo", "Domicilio familiar", "Derechos fundamentales", "Sentencia 2004-04251", "Ministerio de Seguridad Pública", "Lesión del Derecho de la Constitución", "Juzgado de Familia", "Artículo 50 Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional" ], "keywords_en": [ "Administrative eviction", "Amparo action", "Family home", "Fundamental rights", "Ruling 2004-04251", "Public Security Ministry", "Violation of Constitutional Law", "Family Court", "Article 50 Constitutional Jurisdiction Law" ], "excerpt_es": "Queda de manifiesto que la situación planteada en este recurso en modo alguno faculta a la autoridad accionada a decretar el desahucio administrativo, como en efecto se hizo, todo lo cual sin duda constituye una grosera violación de los derechos fundamentales de la actora y de los amparados que debe ser reparada en esta Jurisdicción. Por demás, se debe advertir que en esta sentencia la Sala Constitucional omite todo pronunciamiento en cuanto a si dicho bien constituye o no un bien ganancial, o en cuanto al contrato de alquiler que el Sr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero suscribió con un tercero, al tratarse de unos extremos de mera legalidad que exceden, a todas luces, la naturaleza sumaria de este recurso. Consecuentemente, lo procedente es declarar con lugar el amparo, no sin antes advertir al recurrido, con sustento en lo dispuesto por el artículo 50 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que no debe incurrir a futuro en los actos u omisiones que dieron mérito a la acogida de este proceso.", "excerpt_en": "It is clear that the situation raised in this appeal in no way empowers the respondent authority to decree the administrative eviction, as was indeed done, all of which undoubtedly constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental rights of the plaintiff and the protected parties that must be remedied in this Jurisdiction. Furthermore, it should be noted that in this ruling the Constitutional Chamber omits any pronouncement as to whether said property constitutes community property or not, or regarding the rental agreement that Mr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero signed with a third party, as these are matters of mere legality that clearly exceed the summary nature of this appeal. Consequently, it is appropriate to grant the amparo, not without first warning the respondent, based on the provisions of Article 50 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, not to engage in future acts or omissions that gave merit to the acceptance of this proceeding.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Granted", "label_es": "Con lugar", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber granted the amparo, annulled the administrative eviction order, and ordered the State to pay costs and damages.", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional declaró con lugar el amparo, anuló la orden de desalojo administrativo y condenó al Estado al pago de costas, daños y perjuicios." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando III de la sentencia reproducida", "quote_en": "“…the Chamber has held that it is not for the Administration to substitute the judicial criterion that must be given to definitively settle the property or possession issues that may be involved in the specific case, and in case of doubt or controversy the matter must be heard and decided by a judge.”", "quote_es": "“…la Sala ha señalado que no le corresponde a la Administración sustituir el criterio judicial que deba darse para zanjar definitivamente las cuestiones de propiedad o de posesión que puedan estar involucradas en el caso concreto y en caso de duda o controversia el asunto debe ser conocido y resuelto por un juez.”" }, { "context": "Considerando IV de la sentencia reproducida", "quote_en": "“Consequently, given a court ruling that discards the occupation by mere tolerance of the petitioner and refers the parties to discuss in the ordinary courts who holds a better right, the administrative eviction is inadmissible, and therefore the appeal must be granted with the annulment of the order issued.”", "quote_es": "“En consecuencia, existiendo una resolución judicial que descarta la ocupación por mera tolerancia de la recurrente y que envía a las partes a discutir en la vía ordinaria sobre quién ostenta un mejor derecho, el desahucio administrativo resulta improcedente, motivo por el cual el recurso debe acogerse con la anulación de la orden dictada.”" } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0007-122782", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-12443", "norm_num": "7130", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Civil", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "16/08/1989" }, { "doc_id": "norm-13231", "norm_num": "6227", "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978" }, { "doc_id": "norm-38533", "norm_num": "7135", "norm_name": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "11/10/1989" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“I.- La recurrente reclama la violación de sus\r\nderechos fundamentales y de sus hijos menores de edad, en particular de los\r\nderechos protegidos en los artículos 39, 41 y 51 de la Constitución Política, por\r\ncuanto las autoridades del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública acogieron una\r\nsolicitud de desalojo administrativo formulada por su excónyuge, en su contra y\r\nde sus hijos, sobre el inmueble que constituye el domicilio familiar. En su criterio, lo anterior es ilegítimo y lesiona el Derecho de la\r\nConstitución. \n\r\n\r\n\nII.- De relevancia para la decisión de este\r\nasunto se tiene por acreditado que: \n\r\n\r\n\na. \r\nel Juzgado\r\nPrimero de Familia de San José,\r\npor resolución de las 15:10 hrs. de 14 de marzo de 2007, dio trámite al abreviado\r\nde divorcio interpuesto por el Sr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero contra la\r\namparada; en este acto se denegó la solicitud planteada por el actor con el fin\r\nde obligar a la tutelada a abandonar el inmueble que detentaba (folios 9 a 11); \n\r\n\r\n\nb. \r\nante una\r\ngestión formulada por el anterior esposo de la recurrente, el Sr. Carlos\r\nRoberto Arias Romero, las autoridades del\r\nMinisterio de Seguridad Pública, en resolución N°2553-07-DM de las 10:00 hrs.\r\nde 11 de julio de 2007, acogieron una gestión de desalojo administrativo\r\nformulada en su contra y de sus hijos menores de edad (informe a folio\r\n24); \n\r\n\r\n\nc. \r\nlas\r\nautoridades del\r\nMinisterio de Seguridad Pública, mediante la resolución N°3232-07-DM de las\r\n10:10 hrs. de 14 de agosto de 2007, desestimaron la\r\nreposición planteada por la recurrente contra la decisión anterior; en este\r\nacto se otorgó un término de 72 horas para desocupar el inmueble (informe a\r\nfolio 24). \n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- La Sala Constitucional, en la sentencia\r\nN°2004-04251 de las 14:12 hrs. de 23 de abril de 2004,\r\nse pronunció respecto de una situación similar a la que aquí ocupa,\r\nconsiderándose que la actuación de las autoridades del Ministerio de Seguridad\r\nPública lesiona el Derecho de la Constitución. En esta sentencia se dispuso: \n\r\n\r\n\n“I.- Hechos\r\nprobados. De\r\nimportancia para la decisión de este asunto, se\r\nestiman como\r\ndebidamente demostrados los siguientes hechos, sea porque así han sido\r\nacreditados o bien porque el recurrido haya omitido referirse a ellos según lo\r\nprevenido en el auto inicial: \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n El veintisiete de\r\njunio de dos mil tres, el señor Walter Salazar Marchena interpuso un proceso de\r\ndesahucio administrativo contra la recurrente María del Carmen González\r\nEspinoza sobre la propiedad inscrita en el Registro Público, sección de\r\npropiedad, matrícula de folio real 071947-000, situada en el Distrito de\r\nLiberia de la Provincia de Guanacaste. (Folio 1 del expediente\r\nadministrativo) \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n Mediante\r\nresolución número 3115-2003 D.M. de las nueve horas con treinta minutos del dos\r\nde setiembre del dos mil tres, el Ministerio de Seguridad Pública acogió la\r\ngestión de desahucio administrativo planteado contra la recurrente María del\r\nCarmen González Espinoza, otorgándole un plazo de cinco días hábiles para\r\ndesalojar y la posibilidad de interponer recurso de reposición contra dicho\r\nacto. (Informe visible a folio 10 y folio 9 del expediente\r\nadministrativo) \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n El tres de\r\nnoviembre del dos mil tres, la recurrente González Espinoza interpuso recurso\r\nde reposición contra la resolución número 3115-2003 D.M., indicando que el\r\nJuzgado Contravencional de Menor Cuantía de Liberia mediante sentencia 85-98 de\r\nlas siete horas del cuatro de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, declaró\r\nsin lugar el desahucio promovido en su contra por el señor Walter Salazar\r\nMarchena y otra por considerar que no se trataba de un asunto de mera\r\ntolerancia por lo que debía discutirse en otra vía. (Folios 12 y 19 del\r\nexpediente administrativo) \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\n \n\r\n\r\n\nMediante resolución número 4108-2003 D.M. de las once horas y treinta\r\nminutos del quince de diciembre del dos mil tres, el Ministro de Seguridad\r\nPública declaró sin lugar el recurso de reposición planteado por la recurrente\r\nGonzález Espinoza. (Informe a folio 10 y folio 44 del expediente\r\nadministrativo) \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nII.-Objeto del recurso. Reclama la recurrente que la autoridad\r\nrecurrida acogió las diligencias de desalojo administrativo interpuestas en su\r\ncontra por su excompañero, a pesar que el Juzgado Contravencional de Liberia\r\npor sentencia dictada a las siete horas del cuatro de mayo de mil novecientos\r\nnoventa y ocho, consideró que en su caso se está \"... ante un asunto de\r\npropiedad, más que una simple relación de ocupación del inmueble por mera\r\ntolerancia...\", razón por la cual considera que improcedente que se le\r\ndesaloje en vía administrativa. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- De importancia para la resolución de este\r\nasunto debe rescatarse que tal como lo ha indicado la Sala en otras\r\noportunidades, el artículo 455 del Código Procesal Civil es claro en cuanto a\r\nque el desahucio administrativo es un procedimiento sumarísimo, que realiza la\r\nautoridad de policía correspondiente, a solicitud del interesado con derecho a\r\npedir la desocupación, \"sin trámite alguno\". La jurisprudencia de\r\nesta Sala ha requerido que, de previo a ejecutar el\r\nlanzamiento, la autoridad policial realice una corta indagación para constatar\r\nsi lo solicitado por el gestionante es consistente o no con los supuestos que\r\nautorizan el desahucio administrativo. El sentido esencial de dicha indagación\r\n-aparte de garantizar la observancia del derecho de defensa que asiste al\r\nafectado por la solicitud de desalojo- es el de asegurar que la resolución que\r\nse dicte esté debidamente motivada, puesto que es claro que el contenido de\r\ndicho acuerdo, como todo acto administrativo, debe \"ser lícito, posible,\r\nclaro y preciso y abarcar todas las cuestiones de hecho y derecho surgidas del\r\nmotivo, aunque no hayan sido debatidas por las partes interesadas\"\r\n(artículo 132 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Además, debe ser\r\n\"proporcionado al fin legal y correspondiente al motivo, cuando ambos se\r\nhallen regulados\" (ibídem). De no proceder en este\r\nsentido, el acto carecería de motivo legítimo, y -por tanto- devendría nulo.\r\nAsí las cosas, si de su indagación preparatoria, llega la autoridad policial al\r\nconvencimiento de que la gestión de desalojo concuerda con los supuestos\r\nfácticos que prevé la ley, entonces lo propio y correcto es acogerla y\r\nejecutarla como corresponda. Aunado a lo anterior y de importancia para esta\r\nresolución, también debe rescatarse que la Sala ha señalado que no le\r\ncorresponde a la Administración sustituir el criterio judicial que deba darse\r\npara zanjar definitivamente las cuestiones de propiedad o de posesión que\r\npuedan estar involucradas en el caso concreto y en caso de duda o controversia\r\nel asunto debe ser conocido y resuelto por un juez. \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- Partiendo de lo anterior, considera esta\r\nSala que en el caso concreto se ha producido una evidente violación a los\r\nderechos fundamentales de la amparada, por los motivos que de seguido se\r\nexponen. De las pruebas visibles en el expediente, logra desprenderse que al\r\nmomento de presentación de la solicitud de desahucio por parte del señor Walter\r\nSalazar Marchena, dicho promovente logró demostrar que la propiedad en cuestión\r\nse encuentra registralmente a su nombre, motivo por el cual estima esta Sala\r\nque hasta ese momento la actuación de la autoridad recurrida al decretar el\r\ndesalojo se encontraba apegada a derecho. Ahora bien, es a partir de la\r\ninterposición del recurso de reposición por parte de la recurrente que se empieza\r\na configurar la actuación arbitraria de la Administración, pues consta que en\r\ndicho escrito la recurrente informó a la autoridad recurrida de la existencia\r\nde la sentencia 85-98 de las siete horas del cuatro de mayo de mil novecientos\r\nnoventa y ocho del Juzgado Contravencional de Menor Cuantía de Liberia,\r\nmediante la cual se declaró sin lugar un desahucio promovido por el señor\r\nWalter Salazar Marchena contra la recurrente sobre el mismo inmueble, e incluso\r\nla autoridad recurrida tiene una copia de dicha sentencia en el expediente. En ella, el Juzgado Contravencional señaló que en ese caso se\r\nestaba “ante un problema de derecho de propiedad, más que de una simple\r\nrelación de ocupación del\r\ninmueble por mera tolerancia”, por lo que más adelante indica que las partes\r\ndeben acudir “a la vía correspondiente a discutir sus posibles derechos”. Es\r\nclaro que a partir de dicha sentencia, el promovente del desahucio debía acudir\r\na la vía ordinaria a dilucidar si tiene o no un mejor\r\nderecho sobre el inmueble en cuestión, y no acudir a la vía administrativa\r\nhaciendo caso omiso de la resolución jurisdiccional mencionada. Todavía más\r\nincomprensible resulta que la autoridad recurrida haya obviado dicha sentencia\r\naportada por la recurrente, y que al momento de la resolución del recurso de\r\nreposición ni siquiera se haya pronunciado al respecto. Si\r\nbien entiende la Sala la situación que señala el señor Walter Salazar Marchena,\r\nlo cierto es que no puede obviarse la existencia de la sentencia indicada, por\r\nlo que debe discutirse el mejor derecho en la vía ordinaria que corresponda.\r\nEn consecuencia, existiendo una resolución judicial que descarta la ocupación\r\npor mera tolerancia de la recurrente y que envía a las partes a discutir en la\r\nvía ordinaria sobre quién ostenta un mejor derecho, el desahucio administrativo\r\nresulta improcedente, motivo por el cual el recurso debe acogerse con la\r\nanulación de la orden dictada.” \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nTales consideraciones, sin duda son aplicables al\r\ncaso concreto, en el cual las autoridades del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública\r\nordenaron el desalojo de la recurrente y de los amparados sobre el inmueble que\r\nconstituía el domicilio familiar, pese a que con anterioridad el Juzgado de\r\nFamilia de San José había denegado una gestión formulada por el Sr. Carlos\r\nRoberto Arias Romero en el mismo sentido. Queda de manifiesto que la situación\r\nplanteada en este recurso en modo alguno faculta a la\r\nautoridad accionada a decretar el desahucio administrativo, como en efecto se hizo, todo lo cual sin duda\r\nconstituye una grosera violación de los derechos fundamentales de la actora y\r\nde los amparados que debe ser reparada en esta Jurisdicción. Por demás, se debe\r\nadvertir que en esta sentencia la Sala Constitucional omite todo\r\npronunciamiento en cuanto a si dicho bien constituye o no un bien ganancial, o\r\nen cuanto al contrato de alquiler que el Sr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero\r\nsuscribió con un tercero, al tratarse de unos extremos de mera legalidad que\r\nexceden, a todas luces, la naturaleza sumaria de este recurso.\r\nConsecuentemente, lo procedente es declarar con lugar el amparo, no sin antes\r\nadvertir al recurrido, con sustento en lo dispuesto por el artículo 50 de la\r\nLey de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que no debe incurrir a futuro en los\r\nactos u omisiones que dieron mérito a la acogida de este proceso. “", "body_en_text": "I.- The petitioner claims the violation of her fundamental rights and those of her minor children, in particular the rights protected in articles 39, 41, and 51 of the Political Constitution, because the authorities of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública granted a request for administrative eviction (desalojo administrativo) filed by her former spouse against her and her children, regarding the property that constitutes the family home. In her view, the foregoing is illegitimate and injures the Law of the Constitution.\n\nII.- Of relevance to the decision in this matter, the following is deemed accredited:\n\na. the Juzgado Primero de Familia de San José, by resolution at 3:10 p.m. on March 14, 2007, processed the abbreviated divorce proceeding filed by Mr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero against the protected party; in this act, the request made by the plaintiff to force the protected person to abandon the property she held was denied (folios 9 to 11);\n\nb. in response to a petition filed by the petitioner's former husband, Mr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero, the authorities of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, in resolution N°2553-07-DM at 10:00 a.m. on July 11, 2007, granted an administrative eviction (desalojo administrativo) petition filed against her and her minor children (report at folio 24);\n\nc. the authorities of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, through resolution N°3232-07-DM at 10:10 a.m. on August 14, 2007, dismissed the motion for reconsideration (reposición) filed by the petitioner against the prior decision; in this act, a term of 72 hours was granted to vacate the property (report at folio 24).\n\nIII.- The Constitutional Chamber, in judgment N°2004-04251 at 2:12 p.m. on April 23, 2004, ruled on a situation similar to the one at hand here, finding that the actions of the authorities of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública injure the Law of the Constitution. In that judgment, it ordered:\n\n\"I.- Proven facts. Of importance for the decision in this matter, the following facts are deemed duly demonstrated, either because they have been accredited or because the respondent omitted to refer to them as provided in the initial order:\n\nOn June twenty-seventh, two thousand three, Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena filed an administrative eviction proceeding (proceso de desahucio administrativo) against the petitioner María del Carmen González Espinoza over the property registered in the Public Registry, property section, folio real registration number 071947-000, located in the District of Liberia of the Province of Guanacaste. (Folio 1 of the administrative file)\n\nThrough resolution number 3115-2003 D.M. at nine-thirty a.m. on September second, two thousand three, the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública granted the administrative eviction (desahucio administrativo) petition filed against the petitioner María del Carmen González Espinoza, granting her a term of five business days to vacate and the possibility of filing a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) against said act. (Report visible at folio 10 and folio 9 of the administrative file)\n\nOn November third, two thousand three, the petitioner González Espinoza filed a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) against resolution number 3115-2003 D.M., stating that the Juzgado Contravencional de Menor Cuantía de Liberia, through judgment 85-98 at seven a.m. on May fourth, nineteen ninety-eight, dismissed the eviction (desahucio) brought against her by Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena and another, considering that it was not a matter of mere tolerance and therefore should be discussed in another venue. (Folios 12 and 19 of the administrative file)\n\nThrough resolution number 4108-2003 D.M. at eleven-thirty a.m. on December fifteenth, two thousand three, the Minister of Seguridad Pública dismissed the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) filed by the petitioner González Espinoza. (Report at folio 10 and folio 44 of the administrative file)\n\nII.- Object of the appeal. The petitioner claims that the respondent authority granted the administrative eviction (desalojo administrativo) proceedings brought against her by her former partner, even though the Juzgado Contravencional de Liberia, by judgment rendered at seven a.m. on May fourth, nineteen ninety-eight, considered that in her case it is \"... a property matter, rather than a simple relationship of occupation of the property by mere tolerance...\", which is why she considers it improper to evict her through administrative means.\n\nIII.- Of importance for the resolution of this matter, it must be noted that, as this Chamber has indicated on other occasions, article 455 of the Code of Civil Procedure is clear that administrative eviction (desahucio administrativo) is a highly summary proceeding, carried out by the corresponding police authority, at the request of the interested party with the right to request vacating, \"without any proceeding whatsoever\". The jurisprudence of this Chamber has required that, prior to executing the removal (lanzamiento), the police authority conduct a brief investigation to verify whether what is requested by the petitioner is consistent or not with the assumptions that authorize administrative eviction (desahucio administrativo). The essential purpose of said investigation — aside from guaranteeing the observance of the right of defense that assists the person affected by the eviction (desalojo) request — is to ensure that the resolution issued is duly reasoned, since it is clear that the content of said decision, like any administrative act, must \"be lawful, possible, clear, and precise and cover all questions of fact and law arising from the motive, even if they have not been debated by the interested parties\" (article 132 of the General Law of Public Administration). Furthermore, it must be \"proportional to the legal purpose and corresponding to the motive, when both are regulated\" (ibidem). If it does not proceed in this manner, the act would lack a legitimate motive, and -therefore- would become null. Thus, if from its preparatory investigation, the police authority becomes convinced that the eviction (desalojo) petition matches the factual assumptions provided by law, then it is proper and correct to grant it and execute it accordingly. In addition to the foregoing, and of importance for this resolution, it must also be noted that the Chamber has stated that it is not the Administration's role to substitute the judicial criterion that must be given to definitively settle questions of property or possession that may be involved in the specific case, and in case of doubt or controversy, the matter must be heard and resolved by a judge.\n\nIV.- Based on the foregoing, this Chamber considers that in the specific case, an evident violation of the protected party's fundamental rights has occurred, for the reasons set forth below. From the evidence visible in the file, it can be deduced that at the time of filing the eviction request (solicitud de desahucio) by Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena, said promoter managed to demonstrate that the property in question is registered in his name, which is why this Chamber considers that up to that moment, the respondent authority's action in decreeing the eviction (desalojo) was in accordance with law. However, it is from the filing of the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) by the petitioner that the arbitrary action of the Administration begins to take shape, since it is on record that in said writing, the petitioner informed the respondent authority of the existence of judgment 85-98 at seven a.m. on May fourth, nineteen ninety-eight, from the Juzgado Contravencional de Menor Cuantía de Liberia, through which an eviction (desahucio) brought by Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena against the petitioner over the same property was dismissed, and the respondent authority even has a copy of said judgment in the file. In it, the Contraventional Court indicated that in that case, it was \"facing a problem of property law, rather than a simple relationship of occupation of the property by mere tolerance,\" which is why it later indicates that the parties must go \"to the corresponding venue to discuss their possible rights.\" It is clear that after said judgment, the promoter of the eviction (desahucio) should have gone to the ordinary venue to determine whether or not he has a better right over the property in question, and not go to the administrative venue ignoring the aforementioned jurisdictional resolution. It is even more incomprehensible that the respondent authority ignored said judgment provided by the petitioner, and at the time of resolving the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición), did not even rule on it. While the Chamber understands the situation pointed out by Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena, the truth is that the existence of the indicated judgment cannot be ignored, and therefore, the better right must be discussed in the corresponding ordinary venue. Consequently, there being a judicial resolution that rules out occupation by mere tolerance by the petitioner and sends the parties to discuss in the ordinary venue who holds a better right, the administrative eviction (desahucio administrativo) is improper, which is why the appeal must be granted with the annulment of the issued order.\"\n\nSuch considerations are undoubtedly applicable to the specific case, in which the authorities of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública ordered the eviction (desalojo) of the petitioner and the protected persons from the property that constituted the family home, despite the fact that the Juzgado de Familia de San José had previously denied a petition filed by Mr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero in the same vein. It is manifest that the situation raised in this appeal in no way authorizes the respondent authority to decree the administrative eviction (desahucio administrativo), as was done, all of which undoubtedly constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental rights of the plaintiff and the protected persons that must be remedied in this Jurisdiction. Furthermore, it should be noted that in this judgment, the Constitutional Chamber omits any ruling as to whether said property constitutes a marital asset (bien ganancial) or not, or regarding the lease contract that Mr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero signed with a third party, as these are points of mere legality that clearly exceed the summary nature of this appeal. Consequently, the appropriate course is to declare the amparo appeal with merit, not without first warning the respondent, based on the provisions of article 50 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, that they must not incur in the future in the acts or omissions that gave merit to the granting of this proceeding.\n\nThe essential purpose of that inquiry—apart from guaranteeing the observance of the right of defense held by the person affected by the eviction (desahucio) request—is to ensure that the resolution issued is duly reasoned, since it is clear that the content of said decision, like any administrative act, must \"be lawful, possible, clear, and precise and encompass all questions of fact and law arising from the grounds, even if they have not been debated by the interested parties\" (Article 132 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). Furthermore, it must be \"proportionate to the legal purpose and corresponding to the grounds, when both are regulated\" (ibidem). Failure to proceed in this manner would mean the act lacks legitimate grounds, and—therefore—would become null and void. Thus, if from its preparatory inquiry, the police authority becomes convinced that the eviction (desahucio) proceeding aligns with the factual circumstances provided for by law, then the proper and correct course is to accept and execute it as appropriate. Coupled with the foregoing, and of importance for this resolution, it must also be noted that the Chamber has indicated that it is not the Administration's role to substitute the judicial criterion that must be applied to definitively settle questions of ownership or possession that may be involved in the specific case, and in the event of doubt or controversy, the matter must be heard and resolved by a judge.\n\n**IV.-** Based on the foregoing, this Chamber considers that in the specific case, a clear violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner (amparada) has occurred, for the reasons set forth below. From the evidence visible in the case file (expediente), it can be deduced that at the time of the presentation of the eviction (desahucio) request by Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena, said petitioner was able to demonstrate that the property in question is registered in his name. For this reason, this Chamber finds that up to that point, the action of the appealed authority in decreeing the eviction (desalojo) was in accordance with the law. However, it is from the filing of the appeal for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) by the appellant that the Administration’s arbitrary action begins to take shape, since the record shows that in said brief, the appellant informed the appealed authority of the existence of judgment 85-98, issued at seven o'clock on May fourth, nineteen ninety-eight, by the Juzgado Contravencional de Menor Cuantía de Liberia, through which an eviction (desahucio) brought by Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena against the appellant on the same property was dismissed, and the appealed authority even has a copy of said judgment in the case file (expediente). In it, the Juzgado Contravencional indicated that in that case, it was “faced with a problem of property rights, rather than a simple relationship of occupation of the property by mere tolerance,” and therefore later indicates that the parties must resort “to the appropriate venue to discuss their potential rights.” It is clear that based on that judgment, the promoter of the eviction (desahucio) should have gone to the ordinary courts to determine whether or not he has a superior right to the property in question, and not resorted to the administrative route, ignoring the aforementioned jurisdictional resolution. It is even more incomprehensible that the appealed authority overlooked said judgment provided by the appellant, and that when resolving the appeal for reconsideration (recurso de reposición), it did not even rule on the matter. While the Chamber understands the situation described by Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena, the truth is that the existence of the indicated judgment cannot be ignored, and therefore the superior right must be discussed in the corresponding ordinary venue. Consequently, with a judicial resolution existing that dismisses the occupation by mere tolerance of the appellant and sends the parties to discuss in the ordinary venue who holds a superior right, the administrative eviction (desahucio administrativo) is improper, for which reason the appeal must be upheld with the annulment of the issued order.”\n\nSuch considerations are undoubtedly applicable to the specific case, in which the authorities of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública ordered the eviction (desalojo) of the appellant and the protected parties (amparados) from the property that constituted the family home, despite the fact that the Juzgado de Familia de San José had previously denied a petition filed by Mr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero to the same effect. It is clear that the situation raised in this appeal in no way empowers the respondent authority to decree the administrative eviction (desahucio administrativo), as was indeed done, all of which undoubtedly constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental rights of the plaintiff and the protected parties (amparados) that must be remedied in this Jurisdiction. Moreover, it should be noted that in this judgment, the Sala Constitucional omits any ruling regarding whether said property constitutes community property (bien ganancial) or not, or regarding the rental contract that Mr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero signed with a third party, as these are matters of mere legality that clearly exceed the summary nature of this appeal. Consequently, the proper course is to declare the amparo with merit (con lugar), not without first warning the respondent, based on the provisions of Article 50 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, not to incur in the future in the acts or omissions that gave merit to the acceptance of this proceeding.\"\n\n(Report at folio 10 and folio 44 of the administrative file)\n\n**II.- Purpose of the appeal.** The appellant claims that the appealed authority granted the administrative eviction proceedings (diligencias de desalojo administrativo) filed against her by her former partner, despite the fact that the Contraventional Court of Liberia, in a judgment issued at seven o'clock on May fourth, nineteen ninety-eight, considered that in her case it is \"... a property matter, rather than a simple relationship of occupation of the property by mere tolerance...\", which is why she considers it improper to evict her through administrative channels.\n\n**III.-** Of importance for the resolution of this matter, it must be noted that, as this Chamber has indicated on other occasions, Article 455 of the Civil Procedure Code is clear that administrative eviction (desahucio administrativo) is a summary proceeding, carried out by the corresponding police authority, at the request of the interested party with the right to request the eviction, \"without any procedure whatsoever.\" The jurisprudence of this Chamber has required that, prior to executing the eviction (lanzamiento), the police authority conduct a brief inquiry to verify whether or not what is requested by the petitioner is consistent with the assumptions that authorize administrative eviction. The essential purpose of said inquiry—apart from guaranteeing observance of the right of defense that assists the person affected by the eviction request—is to ensure that the resolution issued is duly reasoned, since it is clear that the content of said decision, like any administrative act, must \"be lawful, possible, clear, and precise and cover all questions of fact and law arising from the cause, even if they have not been debated by the interested parties\" (Article 132 of the General Law of Public Administration). Furthermore, it must be \"proportionate to the legal purpose and corresponding to the cause, when both are regulated\" (ibidem). Failure to proceed in this manner would render the act lacking in legitimate cause, and—therefore—it would become null. Thus, if from its preparatory inquiry, the police authority reaches the conviction that the eviction proceeding (gestión de desalojo) aligns with the factual assumptions provided for by law, then the proper and correct course is to grant it and execute it accordingly. In addition to the foregoing and of importance for this resolution, it must also be noted that the Chamber has stated that it is not for the Administration to substitute the judicial criterion that must be provided to definitively settle the property or possession issues that may be involved in the specific case, and in case of doubt or controversy, the matter must be heard and resolved by a judge.\n\n**IV.-** Based on the foregoing, this Chamber considers that in the specific case, a clear violation of the fundamental rights of the protected party (amparada) has occurred, for the reasons set forth below. From the evidence visible in the file, it can be deduced that at the time of filing the eviction request (solicitud de desahucio) by Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena, said petitioner managed to demonstrate that the property in question is registered in his name, which is why this Chamber considers that up to that point, the action of the appealed authority in ordering the eviction was in accordance with the law. However, it is from the filing of the appeal for reversal (recurso de reposición) by the appellant that the arbitrary action of the Administration begins to take shape, since it is recorded that in said writ, the appellant informed the appealed authority of the existence of judgment 85-98 of seven o'clock on May fourth, nineteen ninety-eight from the Small Claims Contraventional Court of Liberia (Juzgado Contravencional de Menor Cuantía de Liberia), by which an eviction sought by Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena against the appellant regarding the same property was dismissed, and the appealed authority even has a copy of said judgment in the file. In it, the Contraventional Court indicated that in that case it was \"facing a problem of property rights, rather than a simple relationship of occupation of the property by mere tolerance,\" and therefore later indicates that the parties must resort \"to the appropriate channel to discuss their possible rights.\" It is clear that from said judgment onward, the petitioner of the eviction should have resorted to the ordinary courts to determine whether or not he has a better right over the property in question, and not resort to administrative channels, ignoring the aforementioned jurisdictional resolution. Even more incomprehensible is that the appealed authority ignored said judgment provided by the appellant, and that at the time of resolving the appeal for reversal, it did not even rule on this point. While the Chamber understands the situation stated by Mr. Walter Salazar Marchena, the truth is that the existence of the indicated judgment cannot be ignored, and therefore the better right must be discussed in the corresponding ordinary channels. Consequently, since there is a judicial resolution that rules out occupation by mere tolerance by the appellant and that refers the parties to discuss in the ordinary courts who holds a better right, the administrative eviction is improper, which is why the appeal must be granted, with the annulment of the order issued.”\n\nSuch considerations are undoubtedly applicable to the specific case, in which the authorities of the Ministry of Public Security ordered the eviction of the appellant and the protected parties from the property that constituted the family home, despite the fact that previously the Family Court of San José had denied a petition filed by Mr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero in the same vein. It is clear that the situation raised in this appeal in no way empowers the defendant authority to decree administrative eviction, as was indeed done, all of which undoubtedly constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental rights of the plaintiff and the protected parties that must be remedied in this Jurisdiction. Furthermore, it must be noted that in this judgment, the Constitutional Chamber omits any pronouncement as to whether or not said property constitutes community property (bien ganancial), or regarding the rental contract that Mr. Carlos Roberto Arias Romero entered into with a third party, as these are matters of mere legality that clearly exceed the summary nature of this appeal. Consequently, the appropriate course is to grant the amparo, not without first warning the respondent, based on the provisions of Article 50 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, that he must not in the future incur in the acts or omissions that gave merit to the granting of this proceeding. “" }