{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0007-123091", "citation": "Res. 01652-2008 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Negativa de SUGEF de entregar información bancaria a comisión legislativa no viola derechos fundamentales", "title_en": "SUGEF's refusal to provide banking information to a legislative committee does not violate fundamental rights", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional conoció un recurso de amparo presentado por miembros de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Narcotráfico de la Asamblea Legislativa, quienes alegaban que la negativa del Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF) a suministrar información sobre actividades comerciales y financieras de ciertas empresas y personas, acordada por dicha comisión, violaba sus derechos fundamentales. La Sala analizó la naturaleza y los límites de las comisiones legislativas de investigación, reiterando que, si bien ejercen un control político, sus recomendaciones carecen de efectos vinculantes y no pueden invadir competencias de otros poderes, como el Poder Judicial. Se determinó que la información solicitada era de carácter confidencial y estaba protegida por el secreto bancario y el derecho a la intimidad del artículo 24 constitucional, sin acreditarse un interés público excepcional que justificara su levantamiento. La Sala concluyó que la negativa de SUGEF fue legítima y no vulneró los derechos de los recurrentes, declarando sin lugar el amparo.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber addressed an amparo action filed by members of the Legislative Assembly's Special Permanent Narcotics Committee, who claimed that the refusal of the Superintendent of Financial Entities (SUGEF) to provide information on the commercial and financial activities of certain companies and individuals, as agreed by the committee, violated their fundamental rights. The Chamber analyzed the nature and limits of legislative investigative committees, reiterating that although they exercise political control, their recommendations are non-binding and cannot encroach upon the powers of other branches, such as the Judiciary. It determined that the requested information was confidential and protected by bank secrecy and the right to privacy under Article 24 of the Constitution, with no exceptional public interest demonstrated to justify its disclosure. The Chamber concluded that SUGEF's refusal was lawful and did not violate the petitioners' rights, thereby denying the amparo.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "2008", "year": "2008", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "SUGEF", "secreto bancario", "comisiones investigadoras", "control político", "derecho a la intimidad", "Artículo 24 constitucional", "amparo", "información confidencial" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 24", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 121 inciso 23", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 615", "law": "Ley 3284" }, { "article": "Art. 11", "law": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos" }, { "article": "Art. 132", "law": "Ley 7558" } ], "keywords_es": [ "SUGEF", "secreto bancario", "comisiones legislativas de investigación", "derecho a la intimidad", "información confidencial", "Artículo 24 Constitución Política", "límites control político", "recurso de amparo", "Sala Constitucional" ], "keywords_en": [ "SUGEF", "bank secrecy", "legislative investigative committees", "right to privacy", "confidential information", "Article 24 Political Constitución", "limits of political control", "amparo action", "Constitutional Chamber" ], "excerpt_es": "Sobre el particular la Sala no considera que la negativa de la autoridad accionada de suministrar la información requerida por los recurrentes sea ilegítima ni que viole los derechos fundamentales de los actores (teniendo en cuenta, precisamente, las limitaciones que el Derecho de la Constitución impone a la actividad desplegada por las comisiones legislativas de investigación, así como la naturaleza privada de la información requerida por los recurrentes), motivo por el cual lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el amparo en todos sus extremos. Queda de manifiesto que la situación impugnada en este recurso jurisdiccional, lejos de vulnerar los derechos fundamentales por los promoventes, se adecua al Derecho de la Constitución, en cuanto se trata de información confidencial, que se encuentra protegida por el derecho consagrado en el artículo 24 de la Constitución Política, como se expuso con anterioridad.", "excerpt_en": "On this point, the Chamber does not consider that the refusal of the respondent authority to provide the information requested by the petitioners is unlawful or that it violates the fundamental rights of the parties (taking into account exactly the limitations that Constitutional Law imposes on the activities conducted by legislative investigative committees, as well as the private nature of the information requested by the petitioners), and therefore it is appropriate to deny the amparo in all its aspects. It is clear that the situation challenged in this jurisdictional remedy, far from violating the petitioners' fundamental rights, complies with Constitutional Law since it concerns confidential information, which is protected by the right enshrined in Article 24 of the Political Constitution, as previously set forth.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber denied the amparo, holding that SUGEF's refusal to deliver confidential banking information to a legislative committee did not violate fundamental rights.", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional declaró sin lugar el recurso de amparo, estimando que la negativa de SUGEF a entregar información bancaria confidencial a una comisión legislativa no violó derechos fundamentales." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando VII", "quote_en": "It is clear that legislative investigative committees cannot assume powers that belong exclusively to the Judicial Branch.", "quote_es": "Es evidente que las comisiones legislativas de investigación no puedan arrogarse competencias que correspondan con exclusividad al Poder Judicial." }, { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "Legislative committees cannot order the Superintendent of Financial Entities to provide information or exhibit private documents protected by Article 24 of the Constitution.", "quote_es": "Las comisiones legislativas no puedan ordenar al Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras que suministre información o exhiba documentos privados que están protegidos por el artículo 24 constitucional." }, { "context": "Considerando VIII", "quote_en": "The information is confidential and covered by bank secrecy, in accordance with Article 132 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica.", "quote_es": "La información de naturaleza confidencial y está cubierta por el secreto bancario, de acuerdo con el artículo 132 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-6239", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 3284 Art. 615" }, { "target_id": "norm-40928", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7558 Art. 132" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0007-123091", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-40928", "norm_num": "7558", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "03/11/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-6239", "norm_num": "3284", "norm_name": "Código de Comercio", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/04/1964" }, { "doc_id": "norm-871", "norm_num": "0", "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“I.- Los recurrentes reclaman la violación de sus derechos fundamentales, en\r\nparticular de los derechos protegidos en los artículos 27 y 30 de la Constitución Política,\r\npor la negativa del Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras de\r\nsuministrar la información relativa a las actividades comerciales y financieras\r\nde la empresa Liberta S. A, así como\r\nde los señores Elda Zúñiga Valenciano y Jorge Castro Mora y la empresa Tierra\r\nMojada S. A, según fue acordado por la Comisión Permanente\r\nEspecial de Narcotráfico en las sesiones ordinarias N°21 de 19 de octubre de\r\n2006 y N°22 de 26 de octubre de 2006, respectivamente. En su criterio, lo\r\nanterior es ilegítimo y lesiona el Derecho de la Constitución. \n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- La Sala Constitucional, en otras oportunidades, se ha referido sobre la\r\nnaturaleza de las comisiones legislativas de investigación, y ha precisado\r\ncuales son las potestades y los límites de estos órganos en el ejercicio de sus\r\natribuciones constitucionales. Así, por ejemplo, en la sentencia N°3967-98 de\r\n12 de junio de 1998, se dijo: \n\r\n\r\n\n«Sobre las Comisiones Investigadoras de la\r\nAsamblea Legislativa.- En distintas resoluciones de esta Sala se ha\r\nreconocido la constitucionalidad de la atribución de la Asamblea Legislativa\r\npara nombrar Comisiones investigadoras (ver entre otras, sentencias 441-91-91\r\nde las dieciséis horas con quince minutos del día veinte de febrero de mil\r\nnovecientos noventa y uno y 1640-95 de las dieciocho horas con cincuenta y\r\nsiete minutos del veintidós de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco,\r\n0441-91 de las dieciséis horas con quince minutos del día veinte de febrero de\r\nmil novecientos noventa y uno, y 441-91 del veinte de febrero de mil\r\nnovecientos noventa y uno y 1898-97 de las trece horas dieciocho minutos del\r\ncuatro de abril de mil novecientos noventa y siete). Han expresado estos\r\nprecedentes que la función que realizan las Comisiones es de naturaleza\r\nesencialmente política, por lo que sus recomendaciones tienen esa naturaleza y\r\nno constituyen sanciones de tipo jurídico. Por tal razón, el ejercicio del\r\ncontrol se produce de conformidad con criterios de oportunidad política,\r\nlibremente valorados por la Asamblea Legislativa, ajenos a las consideraciones\r\njurídicas y por ello las recomendaciones de las comisiones investigadoras\r\ncarecen de efectos vinculantes para los demás órganos del Estado, por lo que se\r\nconsidera que los efectos del control parlamentario se dan en el ámbito de la\r\nrepercusión pública, la presión social, la sanción moral y la desaprobación\r\npolítica. En consecuencia, se ha aceptado que la medida sancionatoria o correctiva\r\nrecomendada por una comisión investigadora es de carácter, moral, social y\r\npolítico (sentencias 174-92 de las nueve horas y cinco minutos del veinticuatro\r\nde enero de mil novecientos noventa y dos y 3464-93 de las catorce horas con\r\ncincuenta y siete minutos del veinte de julio de mil novecientos noventa y\r\ntres), aspectos todos éstos que esta sentencia no entra a examinar.» \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- En este sentido, si bien es indudable que la Asamblea Legislativa puede\r\nejercer el control político mediante sus comisiones de investigación (en\r\nestricto apego a lo dispuesto por el artículo 121 inciso 23) de la Constitución\r\nPolítica) no es menos cierto que las recomendaciones de estos órganos pueden\r\nincidir de manera negativa sobre las personas que recae esta actividad. En la\r\nsentencia citada, la Sala señaló: \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n«Sobre la procedencia del amparo.- Empece lo dicho\r\nen el considerando anterior, también ha de reconocerse que las recomendaciones\r\nde las Comisiones Investigadoras podrían tener graves consecuencias negativas\r\npara las personas o instituciones públicas cuestionadas, pues se trata de\r\nsugerencias o resoluciones dirigidas a la administración pública, las que son\r\ndadas a conocer al público, reciben gran cobertura de parte de los medios de\r\ncomunicación colectiva y, en definitiva, contribuyen a crear la \"opinión\r\npública\". De ahí que el amparo resulta procedente ante la posibilidad de\r\nque, mediante el ejercicio de su facultad investigadora, la Asamblea\r\nLegislativa haya incidido negativamente en la esfera de los derechos fundamentales\r\nde los ciudadanos que esta Sala tutela, sobre todo cuando sus actuaciones\r\nexceden las reglas esenciales de protección de esos mismo derechos». \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nV.- De ahí que las potestades, así como las recomendaciones emitidas por estos\r\nórganos en el ejercicio de sus potestades constitucionales no son irrestrictas;\r\npor el contrario, están sometidas a ciertos límites que han sido desarrollados\r\npor la Jurisprudencia Constitucional. Sobre el particular, en la sentencia\r\ntranscrita, la Sala señaló: \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n«Sobre los límites materiales a la función de\r\ncontrol de las Comisiones Especiales Investigadoras. Además de haber tenido que\r\ngarantizar el derecho de defensa del compareciente, la Asamblea Legislativa\r\ntiene que someterse, en cuanto al contenido del informe que produzca y sus\r\nrecomendaciones, a ciertos límites situados también en el Derecho de la\r\nConstitución. Sobre este punto, la jurisprudencia constitucional ha determinado\r\npor lo menos dos que ahora merecen ser destacadas: que las recomendaciones\r\ncontenidas en los informes no se refieran a la inhabilitación para el ejercicio\r\nde funciones públicas por plazo indeterminado (artículo 40 constitucional), así\r\ncomo que las mismas invadan la independencia otros órganos o entes públicos o privados\r\n(Supremos poderes, partidos políticos, entre otros)». \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nEn este orden de ideas, otro límite que el Derecho de la Constitución\r\nimpone a la actividad desplegada por las comisiones legislativas de\r\ninvestigación es, en términos generales, la imposibilidad de requerir la\r\nexhibición de documentos privados o confidenciales que están protegidos por\r\nfuerza del artículo 24 constitucional, en que se reconoce el derecho a la\r\nintimidad, a la libertad y al secreto de las telecomunicaciones, así como en el\r\nartículo 11.2 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, en cuya virtud: “Nadie\r\npuede ser objeto de injerencias arbitrarias o abusivas en su vida privada, en\r\nla de su familia, en su domicilio o en su correspondencia, ni de ataques\r\nilegales a su honra o reputación”. En efecto, a todas luces es evidente que\r\ntales documentos únicamente pueden ser requeridos por un Juez Penal en\r\nejercicio de sus atribuciones constitucionales, una vez que el Ministerio\r\nPúblico así lo haya solicitado. De ahí que las comisiones legislativas de\r\ninvestigación no tengan la facultad de exigirlos por sobre el secreto bancario,\r\na menos que se trate de una situación muy calificada, excepcional, en la cual\r\nse acrediten verdaderas razones de interés publico que así lo justifiquen, todo\r\nlo cual lo deberá examinar la Sala Constitucional en el caso concreto, en sus\r\nfunciones de interprete último y de guardián de la Constitución, así como de\r\ngarante de los derechos fundamentales. De otra parte, si las comisiones\r\nlegislativas, en el ejercicio de sus atribuciones constitucionales, determinan\r\nque una situación concreta eventualmente puede constituir un delito, bien\r\npueden formular la denuncia correspondiente al Ministerio Público, a quien el\r\nordenamiento jurídico le asigna la facultad de perseguir las actividades\r\ndelictivas, y requerir de los jueces penales la imposición de las sanciones\r\ncorrespondientes, para quienes resulten responsables de una actividad típica,\r\nantijurídica y culpable. \n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- Cabe mencionar\r\nque el control político, tal y como se indicó en la sentencia N°N°7408-98, “se\r\nejerce en relación con determinados hechos o situaciones de interés público, a\r\nlos que pueden estar ligados ciertas actuaciones de funcionarios, políticos e\r\ninstituciones públicas”. Lo anterior, teniendo en cuenta los alcances de lo\r\nprevisto en el artículo 121 inciso 23) constitucional, según el cual: \n\r\n\r\n\n“Artículo 121.- Además de las otras atribuciones que le\r\nconfiere esta Constitución, corresponde exclusivamente a la Asamblea\r\nLegislativa: (…) \n\r\n\r\n\n23)\r\nNombrar Comisiones de su seno para que investiguen cualquier asunto que la\r\nAsamblea les encomiende, y rindan el informe correspondiente. \n\r\n\r\n\nLas\r\nComisiones tendrán libre acceso a todas las dependencias oficiales para\r\nrealizar las investigaciones y recabar los datos que juzguen necesarios. Podrán\r\nrecibir toda clase de pruebas y hacer comparecer ante sí a cualquier persona,\r\ncon el objeto de interrogarla;” \n\r\n\r\n\nDe modo que las actividades privadas de los particulares, así como la de\r\nlos funcionarios públicos o de los políticos, no pueden ser objeto de\r\ninvestigación, a menos que transciendan de la esfera de lo meramente\r\nprivado, caso en el cual cede la protección del derecho reconocido en el\r\nartículo 24 constitucional, todo lo cual debe ser apreciado, se repite, en el\r\ncaso concreto por el Tribunal Constitucional. Tampoco es irrestricta la\r\nfacultad las comisiones de acceder libremente a las dependencias oficiales y de\r\nrecabar los datos que juzguen necesarios en función del objeto de su\r\ninvestigación; por el contrario, es evidente que esta actividad está supeditada\r\nal Derecho de la Constitución y, en particular, a la observancia oportuna de\r\nlos derechos reconocidos en la Constitución Política, como en los Instrumentos\r\nInternacionales en materia de Derechos Humanos aplicables en la República. De\r\nahí que las comisiones legislativas no puedan ordenar al Superintendente\r\nGeneral de Entidades Financieras que suministre información o exhiba documentos\r\nprivados que están protegidos por el artículo 24 constitucional, como son los\r\nque han solicitado los recurrentes en el caso presente, los cuales claramente\r\nson de carácter confidencial y cuya exhibición está desprovista de todo interés\r\npúblico. \n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- Por demás se\r\ndebe reiterar que las Comisiones Legislativas, en el ejercicio de sus\r\natribuciones constitucionales, deben abstenerse de invadir las competencias de\r\notros poderes y órganos estatales, como los que la Constitución Política, en su\r\nartículo 153 y siguientes, garantiza al Poder Judicial. Lo anterior,\r\nprecisamente en razón de las diferencias existentes entre el control “objetivado”\r\ndel jurisdiccional y el “subjetivo” del control político. En efecto,\r\neste carácter objetivado del control jurisdiccional significa que tiene\r\ncomo parámetro o canon de control un conjunto normativo preexistente y no\r\ndisponible por parte del órgano que lo ejerce, en tanto, en el control político\r\nno existe ningún criterio predeterminado de valoración, sino que se trata de una\r\nlibre apreciación por parte del titular del control político. Otra\r\ndiferencia radica en el objeto del control, el cual en el caso del control\r\njurídico o jurisdiccional no se realiza sobre personas u órganos, sino sobre\r\nsus actos jurídicamente relevantes, es decir, los productos objetivados\r\nde la voluntad de tales órganos, según un parámetro objetivo y previo de\r\nvaloración que es precisamente el ordenamiento jurídico. Por este motivo,\r\nes evidente que las comisiones legislativas de investigación no puedan\r\narrogarse competencias que correspondan con exclusividad al Poder Judicial,\r\nentre ellas el control jurisdiccional de constitucionalidad y de legalidad de\r\nlas actuaciones y las omisiones de todos los poderes y dependencias estatales. \n\r\n\r\n\n VIII.-\r\nAhora bien, en el caso concreto se discute si la negativa del\r\nSuperintendente General de Entidades Financieras de suministrar la información\r\nrequerida por los integrantes de la Comisión Permanente Especial de\r\nNarcotráfico de la Asamblea Legislativa lesiona o no el Derecho de la\r\nConstitución. En concreto, los actores solicitaron diversos estudios relacionados\r\ncon las actividades comerciales y financieras de las siguientes personas\r\nfísicas y jurídicas: Tierra Mojada S.A., Elda Zúñiga Valenciano, Jorge Castro\r\nMora y libertad, S.A.; por su parte, la autoridad recurrida expuso en su\r\ninforme que esa información es de naturaleza confidencial y está cubierta por\r\nel secreto bancario, de acuerdo con el artículo 132 de la Ley Orgánica del\r\nBanco Central de Costa Rica. Sobre el particular la Sala no considera que la\r\nnegativa de la autoridad accionada de suministrar la información requerida por\r\nlos recurrentes sea ilegítima ni que viole los derechos fundamentales de los\r\nactores (teniendo en cuenta, precisamente, las limitaciones que el Derecho de\r\nla Constitución impone a la actividad desplegada por las comisiones legislativas\r\nde investigación, así como la naturaleza privada de la información requerida\r\npor los recurrentes), motivo por el cual lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el\r\namparo en todos sus extremos. Queda de manifiesto que la situación impugnada en\r\neste recurso jurisdiccional, lejos de vulnerar los derechos fundamentales por\r\nlos promoventes, se adecua al Derecho de la Constitución, en cuanto se trata de\r\ninformación confidencial, que se encuentra protegida por el derecho consagrado\r\nen el artículo 24 de la Constitución Política, como se expuso con anterioridad.\r\nNo es indebida la actuación de la autoridad accionada en el caso concreto,\r\nrazón por la que se debe denegar el amparo.”", "body_en_text": "I.- The petitioners claim a violation of their fundamental rights, particularly the rights protected in Articles 27 and 30 of the Political Constitution, due to the refusal of the General Superintendent of Financial Entities to supply information regarding the commercial and financial activities of the company Liberta S.A., as well as of Mrs. Elda Zúñiga Valenciano and Mr. Jorge Castro Mora and the company Tierra Mojada S.A., as agreed by the Comisión Permanente Especial de Narcotráfico in regular sessions No. 21 of October 19, 2006, and No. 22 of October 26, 2006, respectively. In their view, the foregoing is illegitimate and injures the Law of the Constitution.\n\nIII.- The Constitutional Chamber, on other occasions, has referred to the nature of legislative investigating committees, and has specified the powers and limits of these bodies in the exercise of their constitutional attributions. Thus, for example, in decision No. 3967-98 of June 12, 1998, it was stated:\n\n«Regarding the Investigating Committees of the Legislative Assembly.- In various decisions of this Chamber, the constitutionality of the Legislative Assembly's attribution to appoint investigating Committees has been recognized (see, among others, decisions 441-91-91 at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes on February twentieth, nineteen ninety-one, and 1640-95 at eighteen hours and fifty-seven minutes on March twenty-second, nineteen ninety-five, 0441-91 at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes on February twentieth, nineteen ninety-one, and 441-91 of February twentieth, nineteen ninety-one, and 1898-97 at thirteen hours eighteen minutes on April fourth, nineteen ninety-seven). These precedents have expressed that the function performed by the Committees is of an essentially political nature, and therefore their recommendations have that nature and do not constitute legal sanctions. For this reason, the exercise of control is carried out in accordance with criteria of political expediency, freely assessed by the Legislative Assembly, unrelated to legal considerations, and therefore the recommendations of the investigating committees lack binding effects on other State bodies, meaning the effects of parliamentary control are considered to occur in the sphere of public repercussion, social pressure, moral sanction, and political disapproval. Consequently, it has been accepted that the sanctioning or corrective measure recommended by an investigating committee is of a moral, social, and political nature (decisions 174-92 at nine hours and five minutes on January twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-two, and 3464-93 at fourteen hours and fifty-seven minutes on July twentieth, nineteen ninety-three), all aspects that this decision does not proceed to examine.»\n\nIV.- In this regard, while it is undoubtedly true that the Legislative Assembly may exercise political control through its investigating committees (in strict adherence to the provisions of Article 121, subsection 23) of the Political Constitution), it is no less true that the recommendations of these bodies may negatively impact the persons subject to this activity. In the cited decision, the Chamber stated:\n\n«On the admissibility of the amparo (amparo).- Notwithstanding what was said in the preceding recital (considerando), it must also be recognized that the recommendations of the Investigating Committees could have serious negative consequences for the questioned persons or public institutions, since they are suggestions or resolutions directed at the public administration, which are made known to the public, receive extensive coverage from the mass media, and, ultimately, contribute to creating \"public opinion.\" Hence, the amparo (amparo) is admissible given the possibility that, through the exercise of its investigatory power, the Legislative Assembly may have negatively impacted the sphere of the fundamental rights of citizens that this Chamber protects, especially when its actions exceed the essential rules for the protection of those same rights.»\n\nV.- Hence, the powers, as well as the recommendations issued by these bodies in the exercise of their constitutional powers, are not unrestricted; on the contrary, they are subject to certain limits that have been developed by Constitutional Jurisprudence. On this point, in the transcribed decision, the Chamber stated:\n\n«On the material limits to the oversight function of the Special Investigating Committees. In addition to having had to guarantee the right of defense of the person summoned, the Legislative Assembly must submit, regarding the content of the report it produces and its recommendations, to certain limits also situated in the Law of the Constitution. On this point, constitutional jurisprudence has determined at least two that now merit being highlighted: that the recommendations contained in the reports not refer to disqualification from holding public office for an indeterminate period (Article 40 of the Constitution), and that they not invade the independence of other public or private bodies or entities (Supreme Powers, political parties, among others).»\n\nIn this vein, another limit that the Law of the Constitution imposes on the activity carried out by legislative investigating committees is, in general terms, the impossibility of requiring the disclosure of private or confidential documents that are protected by virtue of Article 24 of the Constitution, which recognizes the right to privacy, freedom, and the secrecy of communications, as well as in Article 11.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, by virtue of which: “No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.” Indeed, it is clearly evident that such documents may only be requested by a Criminal Judge in the exercise of his constitutional attributions, once the Public Prosecutor's Office has so requested. Hence, legislative investigating committees do not have the power to demand them over bank secrecy, unless it is a highly qualified, exceptional situation in which genuine reasons of public interest are demonstrated that justify it, all of which must be examined by the Constitutional Chamber in the specific case, in its functions as the ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution, as well as guarantor of fundamental rights. On the other hand, if the legislative committees, in the exercise of their constitutional attributions, determine that a specific situation could potentially constitute a crime, they may well file the corresponding complaint with the Public Prosecutor's Office, to which the legal system assigns the power to pursue criminal activities, and to request that criminal judges impose the corresponding sanctions on those found responsible for a typical, unlawful, and culpable act.\n\nVI.- It is worth mentioning that political control, as indicated in decision No. 7408-98, “is exercised in relation to specific facts or situations of public interest, to which certain actions of officials, politicians, and public institutions may be linked.” The foregoing, taking into account the scope of the provisions of Article 121, subsection 23) of the Constitution, according to which:\n\n“Article 121.- In addition to the other attributions conferred by this Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly: (…)\n\n23) To appoint Committees from its membership to investigate any matter entrusted to them by the Assembly, and to render the corresponding report.\n\nThe Committees shall have free access to all official offices to conduct investigations and gather the data they deem necessary. They may receive all kinds of evidence and summon any person to appear before them for the purpose of questioning them;”\n\nThus, the private activities of individuals, as well as those of public officials or politicians, cannot be the subject of investigation, unless they transcend the sphere of the merely private, in which case the protection of the right recognized in Article 24 of the Constitution yields, all of which must be assessed, it is repeated, in the specific case by the Constitutional Court. Nor is the power of the committees to freely access official offices and to gather the data they deem necessary according to the object of their investigation unrestricted; on the contrary, it is evident that this activity is subject to the Law of the Constitution and, in particular, to the timely observance of the rights recognized in the Political Constitution, as well as in the International Instruments on Human Rights applicable in the Republic. Hence, the legislative committees cannot order the General Superintendent of Financial Entities to supply information or exhibit private documents that are protected by Article 24 of the Constitution, such as those that the petitioners have requested in the present case, which are clearly confidential in nature and whose disclosure is devoid of any public interest.\n\nVII.- Furthermore, it must be reiterated that the Legislative Committees, in the exercise of their constitutional attributions, must refrain from invading the competencies of other powers and state bodies, such as those that the Political Constitution, in its Article 153 and subsequent articles, guarantees to the Judicial Branch. The foregoing, precisely because of the differences existing between the “objectified” control of the jurisdictional realm and the “subjective” control of the political realm. Indeed, this objectified nature of jurisdictional control means that its parameter or standard of review is a pre-existing normative body not modifiable by the body exercising it, whereas in political control there is no predetermined criterion of assessment; rather, it is a matter of free appreciation by the holder of the political control. Another difference lies in the object of control, which in the case of legal or jurisdictional control is not exercised over persons or bodies, but over their legally relevant acts, that is, the objectified products of the will of such bodies, according to an objective and prior parameter of assessment, which is precisely the legal system. For this reason, it is evident that legislative investigating committees cannot arrogate to themselves competencies that correspond exclusively to the Judicial Branch, among them the jurisdictional control of constitutionality and legality of the actions and omissions of all state powers and offices.\n\nVIII.- Now then, in the specific case, what is being debated is whether the refusal of the General Superintendent of Financial Entities to supply the information requested by the members of the Comisión Permanente Especial de Narcotráfico of the Legislative Assembly violates or not the Law of the Constitution. Specifically, the petitioners requested various studies related to the commercial and financial activities of the following natural and legal persons: Tierra Mojada S.A., Elda Zúñiga Valenciano, Jorge Castro Mora, and Liberta S.A.; for its part, the respondent authority stated in its report that this information is confidential in nature and is covered by bank secrecy, in accordance with Article 132 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica. On this point, the Chamber does not consider that the refusal of the respondent authority to supply the information requested by the petitioners is illegitimate or that it violates the fundamental rights of the petitioners (taking into account, precisely, the limitations that the Law of the Constitution imposes on the activity carried out by legislative investigating committees, as well as the private nature of the information requested by the petitioners), for which reason the appropriate course is to declare the amparo (amparo) without merit in all its aspects. It is evident that the situation challenged in this jurisdictional remedy, far from violating the fundamental rights of the petitioners, conforms to the Law of the Constitution, insofar as it involves confidential information, which is protected by the right enshrined in Article 24 of the Political Constitution, as previously set forth. The action of the respondent authority in the specific case is not improper, which is why the amparo (amparo) must be denied.\n\nOn another matter, if the legislative commissions, in the exercise of their constitutional powers, determine that a specific situation may potentially constitute a crime, they may well file the corresponding complaint with the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), to whom the legal system assigns the authority to pursue criminal activities, and to request the criminal judges to impose the corresponding sanctions on those found responsible for a typical, unlawful, and culpable activity.\n\n**VI.-** It is worth mentioning that political control, as indicated in judgment No. 7408-98, \"*is exercised in relation to specific facts or situations of public interest, to which certain actions of officials, politicians, and public institutions may be linked*.\" The foregoing, taking into account the scope of the provisions of Article 121, subsection 23) of the Constitution, according to which:\n\n***\"Article 121.-** In addition to the other powers conferred by this Constitution, the following correspond exclusively to the Legislative Assembly: (…)*\n\n*23) To appoint Commissions from within its membership to investigate any matter that the Assembly entrusts to them, and to render the corresponding report.*\n\n*The Commissions shall have free access to all official departments to carry out investigations and collect the data they deem necessary. They may receive all kinds of evidence and summon any person to appear before them for the purpose of interrogation;\"*\n\nThus, the private activities of individuals, as well as those of public officials or politicians, cannot be the subject of investigation, unless they transcend the *sphere of the merely private*, in which case the protection of the right recognized in Article 24 of the Constitution yields, all of which must be assessed, it is repeated, in the specific case by the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional). Nor is the power of the commissions to freely access official departments and collect the data they deem necessary for the purpose of their investigation unrestricted; on the contrary, it is evident that this activity is subject to the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución) and, in particular, to the timely observance of the rights recognized in the Political Constitution, as well as in the International Instruments on Human Rights applicable in the Republic. Hence, the legislative commissions cannot order the Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras to provide information or exhibit private documents that are protected by Article 24 of the Constitution, such as those requested by the petitioners in the present case, which are clearly confidential in nature and whose exhibition is devoid of any public interest.\n\n**VII.-** Moreover, it must be reiterated that the Legislative Commissions, in the exercise of their constitutional powers, must refrain from invading the competences of other state powers and bodies, such as those that the Political Constitution, in its Article 153 and following, guarantees to the Judicial Branch. The foregoing, precisely by reason of the differences between the \"*objectified*\" control of the jurisdictional and the \"*subjective*\" control of the political. In effect, this *objectified* character of jurisdictional control means that it has as its parameter or canon of control a pre-existing normative set that is not available to the body exercising it, whereas, in political control, there is no predetermined criterion of evaluation, but rather it is a matter of *a free assessment* by the holder of the political control. Another difference lies in the object of the control, which in the case of legal or jurisdictional control is not carried out on persons or bodies, but on their *legally relevant acts*, i.e., the objectified products of the will of such bodies, according to an *objective and prior parameter of evaluation which is precisely the legal system.* For this reason, it is evident that the legislative investigative commissions cannot arrogate to themselves competences that correspond exclusively to the Judicial Branch, among them the jurisdictional control of constitutionality and legality of the actions and omissions of all state powers and departments.\n\n**VIII.-** Now, in the specific case, the question is whether the refusal of the Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras to provide the information requested by the members of the Comisión Permanente Especial de Narcotráfico of the Legislative Assembly injures or not the Law of the Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested various studies related to the commercial and financial activities of the following natural and legal persons: Tierra Mojada S.A., Elda Zúñiga Valenciano, Jorge Castro Mora and Libertad, S.A.; for its part, the respondent authority stated in its report that this information is of a confidential nature and is covered by bank secrecy, in accordance with Article 132 of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica. On this matter, the Chamber does not consider that the refusal of the respondent authority to provide the information requested by the petitioners is illegitimate, nor that it violates the fundamental rights of the plaintiffs (bearing in mind, precisely, the limitations that the Law of the Constitution imposes on the activity carried out by the legislative investigative commissions, as well as the private nature of the information requested by the petitioners), for which reason it is appropriate to declare the amparo action without merit in all its aspects. It is manifest that the situation challenged in this jurisdictional remedy, far from violating the fundamental rights of the promoters, conforms to the Law of the Constitution, as it concerns confidential information, which is protected by the right enshrined in Article 24 of the Political Constitution, as previously stated. The action of the respondent authority in the specific case is not improper, for which reason the amparo must be denied.”\n\nThus, legislative investigating committees do not have the power to demand such information in contravention of bank secrecy, unless it involves a very specific, exceptional situation in which genuine reasons of public interest that justify it are demonstrated, all of which must be examined by the Constitutional Chamber in the specific case, in its role as the ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution, as well as the guarantor of fundamental rights. Moreover, if legislative committees, in the exercise of their constitutional powers, determine that a specific situation could potentially constitute a crime, they may file the corresponding complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, to which the legal system assigns the power to pursue criminal activities and request criminal judges to impose the corresponding penalties on those found responsible for a typical, unlawful, and culpable act.\n\nVI.- It is worth noting that political control, as stated in judgment No. 7408-98, “is exercised in relation to specific facts or situations of public interest, to which certain actions by officials, politicians, and public institutions may be linked.” The foregoing, taking into account the scope of the provisions of Article 121, subsection 23) of the Constitution, according to which:\n\n“Article 121.- In addition to the other powers conferred by this Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly: (…)\n\n23) To appoint committees from within its membership to investigate any matter that the Assembly entrusts to them, and to render the corresponding report.\n\nThe committees shall have free access to all official offices to conduct investigations and gather any data they deem necessary. They may receive all types of evidence and summon any person to appear before them for the purpose of questioning them;”\n\nThus, the private activities of individuals, as well as those of public officials or politicians, cannot be the subject of investigation unless they transcend the sphere of the merely private, in which case the protection of the right recognized in Article 24 of the Constitution yields, all of which must be assessed, it bears repeating, in the specific case by the Constitutional Court. Nor is the power of the committees to freely access official offices and gather data they deem necessary for the purpose of their investigation unrestricted; on the contrary, it is evident that this activity is subject to the Law of the Constitution and, in particular, to the timely observance of the rights recognized in the Political Constitution, as well as in applicable International Human Rights Instruments in the Republic. Hence, legislative committees cannot order the General Superintendent of Financial Entities to provide information or exhibit private documents that are protected by Article 24 of the Constitution, such as those requested by the petitioners in the present case, which are clearly confidential in nature and whose disclosure lacks any public interest.\n\nVII.- Furthermore, it must be reiterated that Legislative Committees, in the exercise of their constitutional powers, must refrain from invading the competencies of other branches and state bodies, such as those guaranteed to the Judicial Branch by the Political Constitution in its Article 153 and following. The foregoing is precisely due to the differences between the “objectivized” control of the jurisdictional function and the “subjective” control of political control. Indeed, this objectivized nature of jurisdictional control means that its parameter or standard of review is a pre-existing normative set that is not disposable by the body exercising it, whereas in political control, there is no predetermined criterion for assessment; rather, it involves a free appreciation by the holder of political control. Another difference lies in the object of the control, which in the case of legal or jurisdictional control is not carried out on persons or bodies, but on their legally relevant acts, that is, the objectivized products of the will of such bodies, according to an objective and pre-existing parameter of assessment that is precisely the legal system. For this reason, it is evident that legislative investigating committees cannot arrogate to themselves competencies that correspond exclusively to the Judicial Branch, including the jurisdictional control of constitutionality and legality over the actions and omissions of all state powers and agencies.\n\nVIII.- Now, in the specific case, it is disputed whether the refusal of the General Superintendent of Financial Entities to provide the information requested by the members of the Permanent Special Committee on Drug Trafficking of the Legislative Assembly violates the Law of the Constitution or not. Specifically, the petitioners requested various studies related to the commercial and financial activities of the following natural and legal persons: Tierra Mojada S.A., Elda Zúñiga Valenciano, Jorge Castro Mora, and libertad, S.A.; for its part, the respondent authority stated in its report that this information is confidential in nature and covered by bank secrecy, in accordance with Article 132 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica. On this matter, the Chamber does not consider that the refusal of the respondent authority to provide the information requested by the petitioners is illegitimate or that it violates the fundamental rights of the petitioners (taking into account, precisely, the limitations that the Law of the Constitution imposes on the activity carried out by legislative investigating committees, as well as the private nature of the information requested by the petitioners), which is why the proper course is to deny the amparo in all its aspects. It is clear that the situation challenged in this jurisdictional remedy, far from violating the fundamental rights of the parties bringing the action, conforms to the Law of the Constitution, insofar as it involves confidential information protected by the right enshrined in Article 24 of the Political Constitution, as previously stated. The action of the respondent authority in the specific case is not improper, which is why the amparo must be denied.”" }