{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0007-135238",
  "citation": "Res. 16288-2010 Sala Constitucional",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "constitutional_decision",
  "title_es": "Amparo por inacción municipal ante inundaciones de aguas pluviales",
  "title_en": "Amparo against municipal inaction on stormwater flooding",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional conoce un recurso de amparo contra la Municipalidad de Liberia por haber modificado el curso de aguas pluviales, lo que provocó inundaciones y estancamientos en la propiedad de la recurrente y en el Barrio La Cruz, con riesgo para la salud y la vida de los habitantes. La recurrente alega violación a los artículos 21 y 50 constitucionales y al derecho de petición, ya que la Municipalidad no respondió una nota presentada el 21 de abril de 2010. La Sala recuerda la obligación objetiva del Estado de tutelar la vida humana, que incluye deberes positivos de protección cuando hay peligros inminentes. En el caso, constata que existe un problema real de desbordamiento por insuficiencia hidráulica del canal, reconocido por la propia autoridad, y que la Municipalidad no ha adoptado medidas concretas para solucionarlo, evidenciando inercia. Además, la denuncia presentada por los recurrentes no fue resuelta en un plazo razonable, vulnerando el derecho de petición. La Sala declara con lugar el recurso en todos sus extremos, ordenando a la Municipalidad actuar para eliminar el peligro, responder la denuncia y condenando al pago de costas, daños y perjuicios.",
  "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber hears an amparo against the Municipality of Liberia for altering the course of stormwater, causing flooding and ponding on the petitioner's property and in Barrio La Cruz, creating risks to health and life. The petitioner alleges violations of Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution and the right to petition, since the Municipality failed to respond to a letter submitted on April 21, 2010. The Chamber reaffirms the State’s objective obligation to protect human life, including positive duties when there is imminent danger. The Court finds that a genuine overflow problem exists due to insufficient hydraulic capacity of the channel, acknowledged by the municipal authorities, and that the Municipality has taken no concrete measures to resolve it, evidencing inertia. Furthermore, the complaint filed by the petitioners was not resolved within a reasonable time, violating their right to petition. The Chamber grants the amparo in its entirety, ordering the Municipality to take action to eliminate the danger, to respond to the complaint, and ordering the payment of costs, damages, and losses.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional",
  "date": "2010",
  "year": "2010",
  "topic_ids": [
    "procedural-environmental"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "procedural-environmental",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "amparo",
    "aguas pluviales",
    "obligación objetiva del Estado",
    "derecho de petición",
    "Artículo 27 Constitución",
    "Artículo 50 Constitución",
    "in dubio pro natura",
    "principio precautorio"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 21",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 27",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 41",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 50",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 261",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 325",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 330",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 331",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "amparo",
    "aguas pluviales",
    "inundaciones",
    "obligación objetiva del Estado",
    "derecho de petición",
    "Artículo 50 Constitución",
    "Municipalidad de Liberia",
    "Sala Constitucional",
    "inercia municipal",
    "pronta respuesta"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "amparo",
    "stormwater",
    "flooding",
    "State objective obligation",
    "right to petition",
    "Article 50 Constitution",
    "Municipality of Liberia",
    "Constitutional Chamber",
    "municipal inertia",
    "prompt response"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Queda plenamente demostrado que en el Barrio La Cruz en el cantón de Liberia, Guanacaste existe un problema con el desbordamiento de las aguas pluviales y que ello provoca inundaciones que representan un peligro potencial para la vida e integridad física de las personas que allí residen. En efecto, aún y cuando bajo juramento se indica a este Tribunal que dichos problemas de estancamiento de aguas son de vieja data y que no son producto de los trabajos que se realizaron el año pasado en esa alcantarilla, de los propios autos se colige que sea cual sea la razón de dicho problema, el mismo existe y persiste a la fecha en la cual se rinde el informe de ley por parte de la autoridad recurrida, ya que el propio Alcalde Municipal es conteste en determinar la existencia de un problema de desfogue de las aguas pluviales, las cuales son recogidas en un canal cuya capacidad hidráulica resulta insuficiente, con su consecuente desbordamiento. De especial interés para la resolución del sub lite, resulta lo expuesto por la propia autoridad recurrida en el sentido de que el Concejo Municipal improbó el presupuesto ordinario 2010 (período 2006-2010), por lo que las obras de mejora de ese paso de alcantarilla y el consecuente mantenimiento de la misma, con los trabajos de programación de limpiezas de la zanja que se requieren realizar de manera periódica, los cuales incluyen el bombeo de las aguas estancadas, con el fin de prevenir problemas de salud pública, no será solventado sino hasta tanto sea incluido en el nuevo contenido presupuestario en el Presupuesto Extraordinario. No obstante, pese a que la autoridad accionada, conoce la problemática denunciada, a la fecha no ha adoptado las medidas concretas y necesarias para solucionarlas. En criterio de este Tribunal Constitucional, independientemente de las actuaciones que ya se han realizado a la fecha, lo cierto es que, en el sub examine, queda manifiesta la inercia y falta de eficiencia para atender con prontitud, la situación acusada, lo cual, configura no sólo un quebranto a los derechos al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos y a un procedimiento pronto y cumplido sino que, esencialmente, implica una transgresión a la obligación objetiva de tutelar la vida y la integridad física de las personas que residen en Barrio La Cruz, directamente afectadas por las inundaciones en cuestión.",
  "excerpt_en": "It has been fully demonstrated that in Barrio La Cruz in the canton of Liberia, Guanacaste, there is a problem with stormwater overflow and that this causes flooding that poses a potential danger to the life and physical integrity of the people residing there. Indeed, even though under oath this Court is told that these water pooling problems are of long standing and are not a product of the work carried out last year on that culvert, it is gathered from the case file that whatever the reason for said problem, it exists and persists as of the date on which the legal report is rendered by the respondent authority, since the Municipal Mayor himself concurs in determining the existence of a stormwater drainage problem, where the waters are collected in a channel whose hydraulic capacity is insufficient, with its consequent overflow. Of special interest for the resolution of the sub lite is what was stated by the respondent authority itself to the effect that the Municipal Council disapproved the ordinary 2010 budget (2006-2010 period), so that the improvement works for that culvert crossing and its consequent maintenance, with the scheduled cleaning works for the ditch that need to be carried out periodically, which include pumping of stagnant waters, in order to prevent public health problems, will not be resolved until it is included in the new budget content in the Extraordinary Budget. However, despite the fact that the respondent authority knows of the denounced problem, to date it has not adopted the concrete and necessary measures to solve them. In the opinion of this Constitutional Chamber, regardless of the actions that have already been taken to date, the truth is that, in the sub examine, the inertia and lack of efficiency to promptly address the denounced situation is evident, which configures not only a breach of the rights to the proper functioning of public services and to a prompt and fulfilled procedure but, essentially, implies a transgression of the objective obligation to protect the life and physical integrity of the people residing in Barrio La Cruz, directly affected by the floods in question.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Granted",
    "label_es": "Con lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Chamber grants the amparo for violation of the right to petition and the objective obligation to protect life, given the Municipality of Liberia's inertia in resolving stormwater flooding.",
    "summary_es": "La Sala declara con lugar el recurso de amparo por violación del derecho de petición y la obligación objetiva de tutelar la vida, ante la inercia de la Municipalidad de Liberia para solucionar inundaciones por aguas pluviales."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Fallo IV — Sobre la obligación objetiva del Estado",
      "quote_en": "the current trend is to impose on the State various positive conducts, in the sense that beyond merely not disturbing the physical existence of persons, it must act in protection thereof, in the face of the multiple dangers that threaten it, whether they come from the actions of the State itself or from other persons, and even from nature itself.",
      "quote_es": "la tendencia actual es imponer al Estado diversas conductas positivas, en el sentido de que (sic) más allá de que (sic) no debe perturbar la existencia física de las personas debe actuar en tutela de su protección, ante los múltiples peligros que la acechan, bien sea que ellos provengan de acciones del Estado mismo o de otras personas, e inclusive, de la misma naturaleza."
    },
    {
      "context": "Fallo V — Sobre el fondo",
      "quote_en": "In the opinion of this Constitutional Chamber, regardless of the actions that have already been taken to date, the truth is that, in the sub examine, the inertia and lack of efficiency to promptly address the denounced situation is evident, which configures not only a breach of the rights to the proper functioning of public services and to a prompt and fulfilled procedure but, essentially, implies a transgression of the objective obligation to protect the life and physical integrity of the people residing in Barrio La Cruz.",
      "quote_es": "En criterio de este Tribunal Constitucional, independientemente de las actuaciones que ya se han realizado a la fecha, lo cierto es que, en el sub examine, queda manifiesta la inercia y falta de eficiencia para atender con prontitud, la situación acusada, lo cual, configura no sólo un quebranto a los derechos al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos y a un procedimiento pronto y cumplido sino que, esencialmente, implica una transgresión a la obligación objetiva de tutelar la vida y la integridad física de las personas que residen en Barrio La Cruz."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0007-135238",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-13231",
      "norm_num": "6227",
      "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-38533",
      "norm_num": "7135",
      "norm_name": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "11/10/1989"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "norm_num": "0",
      "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política",
      "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política",
      "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“I.- Objeto del recurso. El recurrente considera lesionados sus derechos\r\nfundamentales, en particular los contenidos en los artículos 21 y 50\r\nconstitucionales, en virtud de que la Municipalidad de Liberia decidió modificar el\r\ncurso de las aguas pluviales que corren por la calle pública que se ubica en el\r\nlindero norte de la propiedad de la amparada, para lo cual construyó una\r\nalcantarilla y como consecuencia de ello, se formó una enorme zanja en donde se\r\nempozan las aguas, creando un peligro por la proliferación de enfermedades, y\r\nademás, dichas aguas inundan su propiedad causando una erosión constante. Agrega que por esa razón el 21 de abril anterior, dirigió una nota\r\nal Alcalde pero hasta la fecha tampoco le ha sido contestada.\n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- Sobre la obligación objetiva del Estado de tutelar la vida humana. En cuanto a este\r\nextremo, este Tribunal Constitucional, en la sentencia número 2003-011519 de\r\nlas 10:30 horas del\r\n10 de octubre de 2003, reconoció lo siguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n“(…)Ha sido usual que el derecho a la vida, frecuentemente analizado\r\nconjuntamente con el derecho a la integridad física, haya sido entendido como\r\nun derecho de contenido negativo, es decir, su objeto se limitaba a la\r\npretensión contra el Estado de que (sic) se abstuviera de realizar acciones\r\ndirigidas a eliminar la existencia física de las personas, por ejemplo la\r\ntortura o la pena de muerte, o bien que castigara a las personas, públicas y\r\nprivadas, que atentaran contra la vida e integridad de los otros, a través del\r\nsistema penal; sin embargo, la tendencia actual es imponer al Estado diversas\r\nconductas positivas, en el sentido de que (sic) más allá de que (sic) no debe\r\nperturbar la existencia física de las personas debe actuar en tutela de su\r\nprotección, ante los múltiples peligros que la acechan, bien sea que ellos\r\nprovengan de acciones del Estado mismo o de otras personas, e inclusive, de la\r\nmisma naturaleza. De ahí que, por ejemplo, los temas ambientales han\r\npasado a ser, al menos en nuestro país, un asunto de índole constitucional,\r\npuesto que el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado fue\r\nelevado a rango de derecho fundamental. Ahora bien, es menester aclarar que la\r\nexistencia objetiva de una obligación del Estado en lo referente a la\r\nprotección del derecho a la vida no apareja, ineludiblemente, un derecho\r\nsubjetivo de las personas a exigir, a través de los organismos judiciales, que\r\nse tome una medida determinada, pero sí a que se tomen las medidas idóneas en\r\ntutela de ese derecho, ante actitudes abiertamente negligentes de las\r\nautoridades públicas. Se trata así de que (sic) el Estado adquiere la\r\nobligación de regular las áreas de la vida\r\nsocial de las cuales puedan surgir peligros para la existencia física de los\r\nhabitantes de su territorio, ya sea a través de la ley, de reglamentos, de\r\nacuerdos o de otras medidas relacionadas con la organización y los\r\nprocedimientos administrativos, y del derecho subjetivo de las personas a que\r\nasí se proceda, en forma diligente. En consecuencia, la posibilidad de\r\nexigir judicialmente, a través del recurso de amparo, un tipo específico de\r\nactividad prestacional por parte del Estado en cumplimiento de su deber de\r\nprotección a la vida e integridad física de sus habitantes, es restringida a la\r\nclara verificación de un peligro inminente contra esos derechos de las\r\npersonas, de forma tal que si por ejemplo, una determinada comunidad estimara\r\nnecesario contar con un hospital para la atención de sus pobladores (o de\r\ncualquier otra obra pública), no es por la vía del amparo que se debe exigir\r\nsino a través de los mecanismos previamente establecidos y ante los órganos y\r\nentes competentes, quienes deberán atender la petición y resolver su \r\nprocedencia técnica, que no implica necesariamente una respuesta\r\npositiva. De lo que se desprende que la injerencia de la jurisdicción\r\nconstitucional solamente es viable ante la inercia comprobada del Estado, a través de sus órganos competentes, en atender\r\nlas demandas que en ejercicio de sus derechos realicen los habitantes del país (…)”.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nV.- Sobre el fondo. Queda plenamente demostrado que en el Barrio La Cruz en el cantón de Liberia,\r\nGuanacaste existe un problema con el desbordamiento de las aguas pluviales y\r\nque ello provoca inundaciones que representan un peligro potencial para la vida\r\ne integridad física de las personas que allí residen. En efecto, aún y cuando\r\nbajo juramento se indica a este Tribunal que dichos problemas de estancamiento\r\nde aguas son de vieja data y que no son producto de los trabajos que se\r\nrealizaron el año pasado en esa alcantarilla, de los propios autos se colige\r\nque sea cual sea la razón de dicho problema, el mismo existe y persiste a la\r\nfecha en la cual se rinde el informe de ley por parte de la autoridad\r\nrecurrida, ya que el propio Alcalde Municipal es conteste en determinar la\r\nexistencia de un problema de desfogue de las aguas pluviales, las cuales son\r\nrecogidas en un canal cuya capacidad hidráulica resulta insuficiente, con su\r\nconsecuente desbordamiento. De especial interés para la resolución del sub\r\nlite, resulta lo expuesto por la propia autoridad recurrida en el sentido\r\nde que el Concejo Municipal improbó el presupuesto ordinario 2010 (período\r\n2006-2010), por lo que las obras de mejora de ese paso de alcantarilla y el\r\nconsecuente mantenimiento de la misma, con los trabajos de programación de\r\nlimpiezas de la zanja que se requieren realizar de manera periódica, los cuales\r\nincluyen el bombeo de las aguas estancadas, con el fin de prevenir problemas de\r\nsalud pública, no será solventado sino hasta tanto sea incluido en el nuevo\r\ncontenido presupuestario en el Presupuesto Extraordinario. No obstante, pese a\r\nque la autoridad accionada, conoce la problemática denunciada, a la fecha no ha\r\nadoptado las medidas concretas y necesarias para solucionarlas. En criterio de\r\neste Tribunal Constitucional, independientemente de las actuaciones que ya se\r\nhan realizado a la fecha, lo cierto es que, en el sub examine, queda\r\nmanifiesta la inercia y falta de eficiencia para atender con prontitud, la\r\nsituación acusada, lo cual, configura no sólo un quebranto a los derechos al\r\nbuen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos y a un procedimiento pronto y\r\ncumplido sino que, esencialmente, implica una transgresión a la obligación\r\nobjetiva de tutelar la vida y la integridad física de las personas que residen\r\nen Barrio La Cruz,\r\ndirectamente afectadas por las inundaciones en cuestión.\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- Sobre el\r\nderecho de petición. El\r\nderecho de petición, establecido en el artículo 27 Constitucional, hace\r\nreferencia a la facultad que posee todo ciudadano para dirigirse por escrito a\r\ncualquier funcionario público o entidad oficial con el fin de exponer un asunto\r\nde su interés y en donde lo que se demande es una información preconstituida,\r\ndonde la Administración\r\nno tiene nada que resolver, se habla de peticiones puras y simples de\r\ninformación. Esta garantía se complementa con el derecho a\r\nobtener pronta respuesta, aunque esto último no significa que el administrado\r\ndeba recibir una contestación favorable a sus intereses. En otras palabras, es\r\nel derecho a pedir y no el derecho a obtener lo que se pide -aún cuando el\r\nfuncionario público deba resolver con estricta sujeción a la ley-, pues la\r\nlibertad de petición se funda en otro principio; esto es, que la Administración no\r\npuede coartar el derecho de los administrados para dirigirse a los órganos\r\npúblicos. De esta manera, la vía de petición permite plantear a la Administración lo\r\nque no se puede obtener por vía de recurso ante ella,\r\nsiempre y cuando a ésta no le esté vedado hacerlo por tratarse de materia\r\nreglada. Consecuentemente, el derecho tutelado en el numeral 27 citado\r\nestá conformado por una parte formal y otra sustancial: la primera se refiere\r\nal medio por el cual se solicita y a su vez se proporciona la información (ante\r\nuna petición por escrito, la\r\n Administración debe responder también por escrito); la\r\nsegunda, a la concordancia entre lo que se pide y la respuesta que se brinda.\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- Sin embargo, en este punto deben\r\ndiferenciarse las peticiones puras y simples de información, los reclamos\r\nadministrativos, las denuncias y otras solicitudes. En el primer caso,\r\nnormalmente la respuesta deberá darse dentro de los diez días siguientes a la\r\nrecepción de la petición, como lo ordena el artículo 32 de la Ley de Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional; excepcionalmente, si la contestación no puede brindarse dentro\r\nde ese término por razones justificadas, la Administración está\r\nobligada a explicar, dentro del plazo exigido por la Ley, cuáles son los motivos\r\npor los que no puede atender la petición en ese momento -obviamente, en el\r\nentendido de que más adelante, cuando pueda hacerlo, deberá responder\r\ncabalmente la petición-. La explicación correspondiente deberá ser clara, profusa y detallada, con el objeto de que el petente\r\nquede debidamente informado y pueda ejercer las acciones legales que juzgue\r\napropiadas. En el segundo caso, cuando se trata de reclamos o recursos -en\r\nque el particular pide la declaración o restitución de un derecho subjetivo-,\r\ncomo lo ha señalado esta Sala, no es el artículo 27 Constitucional el\r\naplicable, sino el 41: \"Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar\r\nreparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona,\r\npropiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin\r\ndenegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes\". Lo anterior, por\r\ncuanto los reclamos y recursos administrativos, a diferencia de las peticiones\r\npuras, requieren un procedimiento para verificar los\r\nhechos que han de servir de motivo al acto final, así como\r\nadoptar las medidas probatorias pertinentes (véase la sentencia número\r\n2002-03851 de las 14:56 horas del\r\n30 de abril de 2000). Usualmente, el término para resolver está dado por el\r\nartículo 261, párrafo 1°, de la\r\n Ley General de la Administración Pública,\r\nque establece que el procedimiento administrativo ordinario debe ser concluido,\r\npor acto final, dentro del plazo de dos meses posteriores a su iniciación\r\n(véase la sentencia número 759-93 de las 16:39 horas del 15 de febrero de\r\n1993). En la hipótesis del procedimiento sumario, el\r\nartículo 325 de esa misma ley dispone un plazo de un mes -a partir de su\r\ninicio- para que la\r\n Administración concluya la tramitación. Además, en lo\r\ntocante a la fase recursiva o procedimiento de impugnación, el numeral 261,\r\npárrafo 2° del mismo cuerpo legal fija también el término de un mes para\r\nresolver. Lo anterior se afirma en el entendido de que, en virtud del principio del\r\ndebido proceso que rige en la vía administrativa, la autoridad recurrida está\r\nobligada no sólo a resolver dentro del\r\nperíodo conferido por la ley para tal efecto, sino también a notificar la\r\nresolución respectiva dentro de ese mismo lapso de tiempo. En el tercer\r\ncaso, cuando se trata de denuncias, la\r\n Sala ha reconocido y declarado que, como instituto jurídico\r\nutilizado por los administrados para poner en conocimiento de la Administración\r\nhechos que el denunciante estima irregulares, ilegales o contrarios al orden\r\npúblico, ésta deviene en un modo de participación en asuntos que conciernen al\r\ninterés público, perfectamente compatible y, de hecho, fundamentada en el\r\nprincipio democrático, por lo que se ubica -al igual que las peticiones de información,\r\nlos reclamos administrativos y las solicitudes de otorgamiento de ciertos\r\nderechos-, dentro del concepto genérico de petición establecido en el artículo\r\n27 constitucional, con su correlativo derecho de obtener resolución. Por esa\r\nrazón, si bien el denunciante no es parte en el procedimiento y no existe un\r\nplazo legalmente establecido para resolver al efecto, esta Sala ha sostenido\r\nreiteradamente que aquel tiene derecho a que se le comunique el resultado de su\r\ngestión en un término razonable (véase la resolución número 2002-06543 de las\r\n08:57 horas del 05 de julio de 2002). Por último, entratándose de\r\nsolicitudes para obtener autorizaciones, permisos y/o licencias, los artículos\r\n330 y 331 de la Ley\r\n General de Administración Pública disponen que la Administración\r\ncuenta con el plazo de un mes, contado a partir del momento en que recibe la\r\nsolicitud, para resolver lo que en derecho corresponda (véanse las resoluciones\r\nnúmero 171-89 de las 09:30 horas del 15 de diciembre de 19989 y número 3072-93\r\nde las 16:00 horas del 30 de junio de 1993).\n\r\n\r\n\nVIII.- Además de ello, las Administraciones\r\nPúblicas están obligadas a notificarle oportunamente al administrado, por\r\nescrito, cuál ha sido el resultado de sus gestiones o recursos. Sobre este tema, ha dicho la Sala lo siguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n \"En punto al derecho de petición y\r\npronta resolución, así como al de acceso a la justicia pronta y cumplida es\r\ncopiosa la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, de conformidad con la cual se ha\r\ndeterminado que el artículo 27 de la Constitución Política\r\nconsagra el derecho de petición y pronta resolución, el cual consiste en una\r\nfacultad que tienen los administrados para realizar peticiones ante las\r\nautoridades públicas. Se ha indicado que la petición debe hacerse por\r\nescrito, y, por lo tanto, ante una petición formal corresponde una respuesta\r\nformal, de donde no es dable estimar que el silencio negativo sea respuesta;\r\nademás, la misma debe ser en tiempo y debe ser comunicada al\r\npeticionario, pues éste lo que requiere, y tiene derecho a exigir, no\r\nes que se dé una respuesta sino que se le dé, a él, una respuesta. La\r\ncontestación que ofrezca el funcionario o entidad pública requerido de\r\ninformación, no puede limitarse a dar constancia de que se recibió la petición,\r\nsino que debe examinar el contenido de la solicitud y resolverla conforme a las\r\natribuciones jurídicas que le competen, lo que no implica que la respuesta deba\r\nser favorable a las pretensiones del administrado, sino que le debe responder\r\nlo antes posible.\" (Sentencia\r\nnúmero 4229-98 de las 16:30 horas del 17 de julio de 1998. El\r\nsubrayado no es del\r\noriginal).\n\r\n\r\n\nIX.- En la especie, no sólo se ha acreditado\r\nque el Alcalde Municipal de Liberia recurrido ha tardado un plazo realmente\r\nirrazonable y desproporcionado en atender la denuncia de los recurrentes en\r\nfecha 21 de abril de 2010, sino que, además, a la fecha en que se rinde el\r\ninforme requerido en autos, aún sigue sin resolverla, toda vez que en su\r\ninforme manifestó expresamente que procederá de inmediato a contestarla.\n\r\n\r\n\nX.- Corolario. En mérito de las consideraciones\r\nexpuestas, se impone declarar con lugar el recurso en todos sus extremos\r\npetitorios, como\r\nen efecto se dispone y con las consecuencias que de seguido se dirán.”",
  "body_en_text": "**I.- Purpose of the remedy (amparo).** The petitioner considers his fundamental rights infringed, particularly those contained in Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution, by virtue of the fact that the Municipality of Liberia decided to modify the course of the stormwater (aguas pluviales) that runs through the public street located on the northern boundary of the protected party's property, for which it constructed a culvert (alcantarilla) and as a consequence, a huge ditch formed where water stagnates, creating a danger due to the proliferation of diseases, and furthermore, said waters flood her property causing constant erosion. He adds that for this reason, on the past 21st of April, he addressed a note to the Mayor but to date it has also not been answered.\n\n**IV.- Regarding the State's objective obligation to safeguard human life.** On this point, this Constitutional Court, in judgment number 2003-011519 at 10:30 a.m. on October 10, 2003, recognized the following:\n\n\"(…)It has been usual for the right to life, frequently analyzed together with the right to physical integrity, to have been understood as a right of negative content, that is, its object was limited to the claim against the State that it (sic) refrain from carrying out actions directed at eliminating the physical existence of persons, for example torture or the death penalty, or that it punish persons, public and private, who threaten the life and integrity of others, through the penal system; however, the current trend is to impose upon the State various positive conducts, in the sense that (sic) beyond the fact that it (sic) must not disturb the physical existence of persons, it must act in protection of that existence, given the multiple dangers that beset it, whether they come from actions of the State itself or from other persons, and even from nature itself. Hence, for example, environmental issues have become, at least in our country, a matter of constitutional import, since the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment was elevated to the rank of fundamental right. Now, it is necessary to clarify that the objective existence of a State obligation regarding the protection of the right to life does not inevitably entail a subjective right of individuals to demand, through judicial bodies, that a specific measure be taken, but it does entail a right to have suitable measures taken in protection of that right, in the face of openly negligent attitudes by public authorities. Thus, it follows that (sic) the State acquires the obligation to regulate the areas of social life from which dangers may arise for the physical existence of the inhabitants of its territory, whether through law, regulations, agreements, or other measures related to administrative organization and procedures, and individuals have the subjective right to have this done diligently. Consequently, the possibility of judicially demanding, through the remedy of amparo, a specific type of welfare activity from the State in compliance with its duty to protect the life and physical integrity of its inhabitants, is restricted to the clear verification of an imminent danger against those rights of individuals, such that if, for example, a certain community deemed it necessary to have a hospital for the care of its residents (or any other public work), it is not through the remedy of amparo that it should be demanded but through the previously established mechanisms and before the competent bodies and entities, who must attend to the petition and resolve its technical feasibility, which does not necessarily imply a positive response. From which it follows that the intervention of the constitutional jurisdiction is only viable in the face of the proven inertia of the State, through its competent bodies, in attending to the demands made by the country's inhabitants in the exercise of their rights (…)”.\n\n**V.- On the merits.** It has been fully demonstrated that in Barrio La Cruz in the canton of Liberia, Guanacaste, there exists a problem with the overflow of stormwater (aguas pluviales) and that this causes flooding that represents a potential danger to the life and physical integrity of the persons residing there. Indeed, even though under oath it was indicated to this Court that these water stagnation problems are long-standing and not the product of the work carried out last year on that culvert (alcantarilla), it can be inferred from the case file itself that whatever the reason for this problem, it exists and persists as of the date on which the legal report is submitted by the respondent authority, since the Municipal Mayor himself concurs in determining the existence of a problem with the discharge of stormwater (aguas pluviales), which is collected in a channel whose hydraulic capacity proves insufficient, with its consequent overflow. Of special interest for the resolution of the sub lite matter is what was stated by the respondent authority itself to the effect that the Municipal Council rejected the ordinary budget 2010 (period 2006-2010), meaning that the improvement works for that culvert crossing and the consequent maintenance thereof, with the scheduled cleaning works for the ditch that are required to be carried out periodically, which include the pumping of stagnant waters in order to prevent public health problems, will not be resolved until it is included in the new budget content in the Extraordinary Budget. However, despite the fact that the sued authority knows the denounced issue, to date it has not adopted the concrete and necessary measures to resolve it. In the opinion of this Constitutional Court, regardless of the actions that have already been carried out to date, the truth is that, in the sub examine matter, the inertia and lack of efficiency in promptly attending to the situation in question is manifest, which constitutes not only a violation of the rights to the proper functioning of public services and to a prompt and complete procedure, but also essentially implies a transgression of the objective obligation to safeguard the life and physical integrity of the persons residing in Barrio La Cruz, who are directly affected by the flooding in question.\n\n**VI.- Regarding the right of petition.** The right of petition, established in Article 27 of the Constitution, refers to the faculty held by every citizen to address in writing any public official or official entity for the purpose of presenting a matter of their interest and where what is demanded is pre-existing information, where the Administration has nothing to resolve; these are termed pure and simple requests for information. This guarantee is complemented by the right to obtain a prompt response, although the latter does not mean that the administered party must receive a response favorable to their interests. In other words, it is the right to ask and not the right to obtain what is asked - even though the public official must resolve in strict accordance with the law - since the freedom of petition is based on another principle; that is, that the Administration cannot curtail the right of the administered parties to address the public bodies.\n\nIn this way, the petition route allows raising before the Administration what cannot be obtained through an appeal before it, provided that the latter is not prohibited from doing so because it involves a regulated matter. Consequently, the right protected in the aforementioned numeral 27 is composed of a formal part and a substantial part: the first refers to the means by which information is requested and in turn provided (in response to a written petition, the Administration must also respond in writing); the second, to the concordance between what is requested and the response provided.\n\n**VII.-** However, at this point a distinction must be made between pure and simple petitions for information, administrative claims, complaints, and other requests. In the first case, the response must normally be given within ten days following receipt of the petition, as ordered by Article 32 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional; exceptionally, if the response cannot be provided within that term for justified reasons, the Administration is obligated to explain, within the period required by the Law, the reasons why it cannot address the petition at that time—obviously, on the understanding that later, when it can do so, it must fully respond to the petition. The corresponding explanation must be clear, extensive, and detailed, so that the petitioner is duly informed and can exercise the legal actions they deem appropriate. In the second case, when dealing with claims or appeals—in which the individual requests the declaration or restitution of a subjective right—as this Chamber has indicated, the applicable article is not Article 27 of the Constitution, but Article 41: \"*Occurring to the laws, everyone shall find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws*.\" The foregoing, because administrative claims and appeals, unlike pure petitions, require a procedure to verify the facts that will serve as the basis for the final act, as well as to adopt the pertinent evidentiary measures (see ruling number 2002-03851 of 2:56 p.m. on April 30, 2000). Usually, the term for resolution is provided by Article 261, paragraph 1, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which establishes that the ordinary administrative procedure must be concluded, by final act, within the period of two months after its initiation (see ruling number 759-93 of 4:39 p.m. on February 15, 1993). In the hypothesis of the summary procedure, Article 325 of that same law provides a period of one month—from its initiation—for the Administration to conclude the processing. Furthermore, regarding the appeal phase or challenge procedure, numeral 261, paragraph 2 of the same legal body also sets a term of one month for resolution. The foregoing is affirmed on the understanding that, by virtue of the principle of due process that governs in the administrative route, the appealed authority is obligated not only to resolve within the period conferred by law for such effect, but also to notify the respective resolution within that same time span. In the third case, when dealing with complaints, the Chamber has recognized and declared that, as a legal instrument used by those administered to bring facts that the complainant deems irregular, illegal, or contrary to public order to the attention of the Administration, this becomes a mode of participation in matters concerning the public interest, perfectly compatible with and, in fact, founded on the democratic principle, so it is located—like petitions for information, administrative claims, and requests for the granting of certain rights—within the generic concept of petition established in Article 27 of the Constitution, with its correlative right to obtain a resolution. For that reason, although the complainant is not a party to the procedure and there is no legally established period to resolve the matter, this Chamber has repeatedly held that the former has the right to be informed of the result of their action within a reasonable time (see resolution number 2002-06543 of 8:57 a.m. on July 5, 2002). Finally, in the case of requests to obtain authorizations, permits, and/or licenses, Articles 330 and 331 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública provide that the Administration has a period of one month, counted from the moment it receives the request, to resolve what is appropriate under the law (see resolutions number 171-89 of 9:30 a.m. on December 15, 1989 and number 3072-93 of 4:00 p.m. on June 30, 1993).\n\n**VIII.-** In addition to this, the Public Administrations are obligated to notify the administered person in a timely manner, in writing, of the result of their actions or appeals. On this subject, the Chamber has stated the following:\n\n \"Regarding the right of petition and prompt resolution, as well as the right to prompt and complete access to justice, the jurisprudence of this Chamber is copious, according to which it has been determined that Article 27 of the Constitución Política enshrines the right of petition and prompt resolution, which consists of a faculty that those administered have to make petitions before public authorities. It has been indicated that the petition must be made in writing, and, therefore, a formal petition corresponds to a formal response, whence it is not permissible to consider that administrative silence is a response; furthermore, **it must be timely and must be communicated to the petitioner, because what the latter requires,** and has the right to demand, is not that a response be given but that a response be given to him or her. The response offered by the requested official or public entity cannot be limited to providing proof of receipt of the petition, but must examine the content of the request and resolve it according to the legal powers that pertain to it, which does not imply that the response must be favorable to the claims of the administered person, but rather that it must respond as soon as possible.\" (Ruling number 4229-98 of 4:30 p.m. on July 17, 1998. The underlining is not from the original).\n\n**IX.-** In this case, it has not only been demonstrated that the appealed Municipal Mayor of Liberia has delayed for a truly unreasonable and disproportionate period in addressing the complaint of the appellants dated April 21, 2010, but also that, as of the date the report required in the proceedings is rendered, it still remains unresolved, since in his report he expressly stated that he will proceed to answer it immediately.\n\n**X.-** **Corollary.** By virtue of the considerations set forth, it is imperative to declare the appeal granted in all its petitionary terms, as is indeed ordered and with the consequences that will be stated below.\"\n\nIn the opinion of this Constitutional Court, regardless of the actions that have already been taken to date, the fact is that, in *the case at hand*, the inertia and lack of efficiency in promptly addressing the denounced situation is manifest, which constitutes not only a violation of the rights to the proper functioning of public services and to a prompt and fulfilled procedure but, essentially, implies a transgression of the objective obligation to protect the life and physical integrity of the people residing in Barrio La Cruz, directly affected by the floods in question.\n\n**VI.- On the right of petition.** The right of petition, established in Article 27 of the Constitution, refers to the power held by every citizen to address any public official or official entity in writing in order to present a matter of their interest and where what is requested is pre-existing information, where the Administration has nothing to resolve; these are referred to as pure and simple requests for information. This guarantee is complemented by the right to obtain a prompt response, although the latter does not mean that the individual must receive a favorable response to their interests. In other words, it is the right to ask and not the right to obtain what is asked—even though the public official must resolve in strict accordance with the law—since the freedom of petition is based on another principle; that is, that the Administration cannot curtail the right of individuals to address public bodies. In this way, the petition route allows the Administration to be presented with matters that cannot be obtained via an appeal before it, provided the Administration is not prohibited from doing so because it is a regulated matter. Consequently, the right protected in the cited Article 27 is comprised of a formal part and a substantial part: the first refers to the means by which information is requested and, in turn, provided (in response to a written petition, the Administration must also respond in writing); the second, to the concordance between what is asked and the response provided.\n\n**VII.-** However, at this point, a distinction must be made between pure and simple requests for information, administrative claims, complaints, and other requests. In the first case, the response must normally be given within ten days following the receipt of the petition, as ordered by Article 32 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional); exceptionally, if the response cannot be provided within that term for justified reasons, the Administration is obligated to explain, within the timeframe required by the Law, the reasons why it cannot attend to the petition at that moment—obviously, on the understanding that later, when it can do so, it must fully respond to the petition. The corresponding explanation must be clear, profuse, and detailed, so that the petitioner is duly informed and can exercise the legal actions they deem appropriate. In the second case, when dealing with claims or appeals—in which the individual requests the declaration or restitution of a subjective right—as this Chamber has indicated, it is not Article 27 of the Constitution that is applicable, but Article 41: \"*Occurring to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be administered prompt, fulfilled justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws*\". The foregoing, because administrative claims and appeals, unlike pure petitions, require a procedure to verify the facts that will serve as the basis for the final act, as well as to adopt the pertinent evidentiary measures (see ruling number 2002-03851 of 14:56 hours on April 30, 2000). Usually, the term for resolving is given by Article 261, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which establishes that the ordinary administrative procedure must be concluded, by a final act, within a period of two months following its initiation (see ruling number 759-93 of 16:39 hours on February 15, 1993). In the case of the summary procedure, Article 325 of that same law provides a period of one month—from its initiation—for the Administration to conclude the processing. Additionally, regarding the appeals phase or challenge procedure, Article 261, paragraph 2 of the same legal body also sets a term of one month to resolve. The foregoing is stated on the understanding that, by virtue of the due process principle that governs administrative proceedings, the appealed authority is obligated not only to resolve within the period granted by law for that purpose, but also to notify the respective resolution within that same period of time. In the third case, when dealing with complaints, the Chamber has recognized and declared that, as a legal institute used by individuals to bring to the Administration's attention facts that the complainant deems irregular, illegal, or contrary to public order, this becomes a mode of participation in matters concerning the public interest, perfectly compatible with, and in fact, grounded in the democratic principle, and therefore it is located—just like petitions for information, administrative claims, and requests for the granting of certain rights—within the generic concept of petition established in Article 27 of the Constitution, with its correlative right to obtain a resolution. For this reason, although the complainant is not a party to the procedure and there is no legally established deadline to resolve the matter, this Chamber has repeatedly held that the complainant has the right to be informed of the result of their action within a reasonable time (see resolution number 2002-06543 of 08:57 hours on July 5, 2002). Lastly, in the case of requests to obtain authorizations, permits, and/or licenses, Articles 330 and 331 of the General Law of Public Administration provide that the Administration has a period of one month, counted from the moment it receives the request, to resolve what is legally appropriate (see resolutions number 171-89 of 09:30 hours on December 15, 1989 and number 3072-93 of 16:00 hours on June 30, 1993).\n\n**VIII.-** In addition to this, the Public Administrations are obligated to notify the individual in a timely manner, in writing, of the result of their actions or appeals. On this subject, the Chamber has stated the following:\n\n\"Regarding the right of petition and prompt resolution, as well as the right of access to prompt and fulfilled justice, the jurisprudence of this Chamber is copious, according to which it has been determined that Article 27 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) enshrines the right of petition and prompt resolution, which consists of a power that individuals have to make petitions before public authorities. It has been indicated that the petition must be made in writing, and, therefore, a formal petition warrants a formal response, hence it is not possible to consider that negative silence constitutes a response; furthermore, **it must be on time and must be communicated to the petitioner, since what the petitioner requires,** and has the right to demand, is not that a response be given but that a response be given *to him*. The response offered by the requested official or public entity cannot be limited to providing proof of receipt of the petition, but must examine the content of the request and resolve it according to the legal powers that correspond to it, which does not imply that the response must be favorable to the individual's claims, but rather that they must respond as soon as possible.\" (Ruling number 4229-98 of 16:30 hours on July 17, 1998. The underlining is not from the original).\n\n**IX.-** In the specific case, it has not only been proven that the appealed Municipal Mayor of Liberia has taken a truly unreasonable and disproportionate amount of time to address the complaint of the petitioners dated April 21, 2010, but also that, as of the date the report required in the case file was rendered, he still has not resolved it, since in his report he expressly stated that he would proceed immediately to answer it.\n\n**X.- Corollary.** By virtue of the considerations set forth, it is necessary to declare the appeal granted in all its petitionary extremes, as is indeed ordered and with the consequences to be stated hereinafter.”"
}