{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0007-136495", "citation": "Res. 01081-2011 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Debido proceso en procedimiento disciplinario del Poder Judicial", "title_en": "Due Process in Judicial Branch Disciplinary Proceeding", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional conoce un recurso de amparo interpuesto por funcionarios del Poder Judicial sancionados por el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial con ocho días de suspensión sin goce de salario, por participar en una intermediación financiera ilegal que violó la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central. Los recurrentes alegaron violación al debido proceso, falta de fundamentación, incongruencia, desproporción e irrazonabilidad de la sanción. La Sala analizó la aplicación del principio dispositivo y de congruencia en procedimientos administrativos, reiterando que en los procedimientos disciplinarios no rige el principio dispositivo, pues el órgano instructor tiene amplias facultades para buscar la verdad real de los hechos, conforme a los artículos 214, 221 y 297 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Consideró que la resolución impugnada estaba debidamente motivada, que la calificación de la falta como grave fue comunicada desde el traslado de cargos y que la sanción era proporcional y razonable. Rechazó los alegatos sobre incoherencia y omisión de valoración probatoria por ser cuestiones de legalidad ordinaria. Declaró sin lugar el recurso.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber reviewed an amparo filed by Judicial Branch employees sanctioned by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal with an eight-day unpaid suspension for engaging in illegal financial intermediation in violation of the Central Bank Organic Law. The petitioners alleged due process violations, lack of reasoning, incongruity, disproportionality, and unreasonableness of the sanction. The Chamber analyzed the application of the dispositive principle and congruence in administrative proceedings, reiterating that in disciplinary procedures the dispositive principle does not apply, as the investigating body has broad powers to ascertain the real truth of the facts, pursuant to Articles 214, 221 and 297 of the General Public Administration Act. It held that the challenged decision was duly reasoned, that the classification of the misconduct as serious was communicated from the initial charges, and that the sanction was proportional and reasonable. It rejected the claims of inconsistency and failure to assess evidence as matters of ordinary legality. The amparo was denied.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "2011", "year": "2011", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "debido proceso", "principio dispositivo", "congruencia", "procedimiento administrativo disciplinario", "Inspección Judicial", "verdad real", "LGAP", "recurso de amparo" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 214", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 221", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 297", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 132", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 156", "law": "Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica" }, { "article": "Art. 39", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 41", "law": "Constitución Política" } ], "keywords_es": [ "Recurso de amparo", "Debido proceso", "Principio dispositivo", "Congruencia", "Procedimiento administrativo disciplinario", "Poder Judicial", "Inspección Judicial", "Sanción disciplinaria", "Proporcionalidad", "Razonabilidad", "Verdad real", "LGAP" ], "keywords_en": [ "Amparo appeal", "Due process", "Dispositive principle", "Congruence", "Administrative disciplinary proceeding", "Judicial Branch", "Judicial Inspection", "Disciplinary sanction", "Proportionality", "Reasonableness", "Material truth", "LGAP" ], "excerpt_es": "Bajo esta inteligencia, en los procedimientos administrativos al estar empeñados claros intereses públicos, no rige el principio dispositivo y la congruencia. Ese principio resulta predicable, única y exclusivamente, en los procedimientos disciplinarios, los cuales, incluso suelen estar precedidos de una investigación preliminar que coadyuva a definir claramente, desde un principio, los cargos o faltas que se le imputan a un funcionario (…)\".\n\nComo se puede apreciar, desde el auto de traslado de cargos, se les hizo saber a los amparados que los hechos reprochados podrían calificarse como graves, lo que resulta conforme con la sanción finalmente impuesta. Aunado a lo anterior, en ambas resoluciones se delimitaron las conductas reprochadas.\n\nComo corolario de lo expuesto, se impone declarar sin lugar el recurso.", "excerpt_en": "Under this understanding, in administrative proceedings where clear public interests are at stake, the dispositive principle and congruence do not govern. That principle is applicable, only and exclusively, in disciplinary proceedings, which are often preceded by a preliminary investigation that helps to clearly define, from the outset, the charges or misconduct attributed to an official (…)\".\n\nAs can be seen, from the initial notification of charges, the petitioners were informed that the reproached acts could be classified as serious, which is consistent with the sanction ultimately imposed. Moreover, in both decisions, the sanctioned conduct was delineated.\n\nAs a corollary of the foregoing, the appeal must be dismissed.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber denied the amparo, holding that due process was not violated, the sanctioning decision was duly reasoned, and the sanction was proportional and reasonable.", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional declaró sin lugar el recurso de amparo al considerar que no se violó el debido proceso, la resolución sancionatoria estaba debidamente motivada y la sanción era proporcional y razonable." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "Under this understanding, in administrative proceedings where clear public interests are at stake, the dispositive principle and congruence do not govern. That principle is applicable, only and exclusively, in disciplinary proceedings...", "quote_es": "Bajo esta inteligencia, en los procedimientos administrativos al estar empeñados claros intereses públicos, no rige el principio dispositivo y la congruencia. Ese principio resulta predicable, única y exclusivamente, en los procedimientos disciplinarios..." }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "A rights-limiting act is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional.", "quote_es": "Un acto limitativo de derechos es razonable cuando cumple con una triple condición: debe ser necesario, idóneo y proporcional." }, { "context": "Considerando VII", "quote_en": "As a corollary of the foregoing, the appeal must be dismissed.", "quote_es": "Como corolario de lo expuesto, se impone declarar sin lugar el recurso." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0007-136495", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-13231", "norm_num": "6227", "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978" }, { "doc_id": "norm-40928", "norm_num": "7558", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "03/11/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-871", "norm_num": "0", "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“I.- OBJETO DEL RECURSO. El recurrente estimó transgredido el\r\nderecho al debido proceso de sus representados, pues, en su criterio, la\r\nresolución del Tribunal de la Inspección\r\n Judicial de las 15:30 hrs. de 17 de marzo de 2010, que\r\ndeclaró con lugar la queja seguida contra los amparados, no solo carece de la\r\ndebida fundamentación, sino que es incongruente,\r\ndesproporcionada e irrazonable. Aunado a lo anterior, no existe coherencia en\r\nla resolución del Consejo Superior, Nº 102-10, celebrada el 18 de noviembre de\r\n2010, artículo XXII, que confirmó el acto\r\nadministrativo recurrido en cuanto declaró con lugar la queja y calificó la\r\nfalta de grave.\n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- SOBRE EL PRINCIPIO DE\r\nCONGRUENCIA. Este\r\nTribunal Constitucional, en el Voto Nº 2006-05754 de las 11:56 hrs. de 28 de abril\r\nde 2006, con redacción del Magistrado Jinesta Lobo,\r\nse pronunció sobre el principio dispositivo y la congruencia de las\r\nresoluciones administrativas, estimando, en lo que interesa, lo\r\nsiguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n“(…) V.- SOBRE EL PRINCIPIO DISPOSITIVO. Respecto de la presunta violación a\r\neste principio, conviene señalar que la Ley General\r\nde la Administración\r\n Pública regula, en su \"Libro Segundo\" los\r\nprincipios generales del procedimiento administrativo, cuyo objeto es la\r\naveriguación de la verdad real. Aunque en principio, el desalojo administrativo\r\nse tramita sobre la base de la causal propuesta por el promoverte, nada impide\r\nque se conozcan hechos nuevos, en ejercicio de las amplias facultades del\r\nórgano instructor para averiguar la verdad material. Así se desprende, de la\r\nrelación de los artículos 214, 221 y 297 de esa Ley, que al efecto disponen lo\r\nsiguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n “.Artículo 214.- \n\r\n\r\n\n 1.- (…) \n\r\n\r\n\n 2.- Su objeto más importante es\r\nla verificación de la verdad real de los hechos que sirven de motivo al acto\r\nfinal”\n\r\n\r\n\n “Artículo 221.- \n\r\n\r\n\n 1.- En el procedimiento\r\nadministrativo deberá verificar los hechos que sirven de motivo al acto final\r\nen la forma más fiel y completa posible, para lo cual el órgano que o dirige\r\ndeberá adoptar todas las medidas probatorias pertinentes o necesarias, aún si\r\nno han sido propuestas por las partes y aún contra la voluntad de éstas\r\núltimas”.\n\r\n\r\n\n A mayor abundamiento, el\r\nartículo 297, párrafo 1), prescribe lo siguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n “Artículo 2197.- \n\r\n\r\n\n 1.- La Administración\r\nordenará y practicará todas las diligencias de prueba necesarias para\r\ndeterminar la verdad real de los hechos objeto del trámite, de oficio o a\r\npetición de parte.\n\r\n\r\n\n 2.- (…)”\n\r\n\r\n\n Bajo esta inteligencia, en los\r\nprocedimientos administrativos al estar empeñados claros intereses públicos, no\r\nrige el principio dispositivo y la congruencia. Ese principio resulta\r\npredicable, única y exclusivamente, en los procedimientos disciplinarios, los\r\ncuales, incluso suelen estar precedidos de una investigación preliminar que\r\ncoadyuva a definir claramente, desde un principio, los cargos o faltas que se\r\nle imputan a un funcionario (…)”.\n\r\n\r\n\nSe acreditó que mediante la\r\nresolución del Tribunal de la Inspección\r\n Judicial de las 10:55 hrs. de 5 de junio de 2009, se dispuso\r\nla apertura de un procedimiento administrativo disciplinario en contra de los\r\namparados y el traslado de cargos, para determinar la verdad real de los hechos\r\nimputados, a saber, lo siguiente: “conducta impropia y violación del artículo\r\n156 de la Ley Orgánica\r\ndel Banco Central de Costa Rica” (folios 21- 24 de las copias del expediente\r\nadministrativo). También, consta que por resolución de ese Tribunal, Nº\r\n265-2010 de las 15:30 hrs. de 17 de marzo de 2010, se calificó de grave\r\nla falta cometida por los amparados –haber participado en una ilegal\r\nintermediación financiera con violación a las reglas atinentes de la Ley Orgánica\r\ndel Banco Central de Costa Rica- e impuso la sanción de ocho días de suspensión\r\nsin goce de salario (copia a folios 25- 28). Como se puede apreciar, desde el\r\nauto de traslado de cargos, se les hizo saber a los amparados que los hechos\r\nreprochados podrían calificarse como graves, lo que resulta conforme con la\r\nsanción finalmente impuesta. Aunado a lo anterior, en ambas resoluciones se\r\ndelimitaron las conductas reprochadas. \n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- SOBRE LA DEBIDA FUNDAMENTACIÓN. Por resolución de ese Tribunal, Nº\r\n265-2010 de las 15:30 hrs. de 17 de marzo de 2010, se calificó de grave\r\nla falta comedida por los amparados –haber participado en una ilegal\r\nintermediación financiera con violación a las reglas atinentes de la Ley Orgánica\r\ndel Banco Central de Costa Rica- e impuso la sanción de ocho días de suspensión\r\nsin goce de salario, estimando en lo que interesa, lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n“(…) la actividad desplegada por\r\ntodos los encausados, prestatario y acreedores, ahorrantes\r\no inversionistas, han incurrido en falta muy grave, puesto que todos han de\r\nsaber que esa actividad solo se puede realizar con autorización y bajo la\r\nsupervisión de la Superintendencia\r\ngeneral (sic) de Entidades Financieras, conforma la Ley Orgánica\r\ndel Banco Central y sus reglamentos, además de que el fatal resultado de la\r\nactividad ha causado zozobra en ellos mismo y, en general, en el ámbito del\r\nPoder Judicial, puesto que fue de conocimiento público y nadie se explica que,\r\ndada la calidad y la profesión de los “ahorrantes”,\r\nestos fueran a caer en semejante trampa, lo que ha ocasionado, ciertamente, un\r\nmerecido ludibrio, pues ellos mejor que nadie han de saber que a mayor\r\nrentabilidad hay mayor riego y que el desmesurado afán de lucro es altamente\r\npeligroso (…)” (copia\r\na folios 25- 28).\n\r\n\r\n\nComo se puede apreciar, la resolución\r\nse encuentra debidamente motivada.\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- SOBRE LA PROPORCIONALIDAD Y\r\nRAZONABILIDAD DE LA SANCIÓN IMPUESTA.\r\nEsta Sala, en\r\nreiterados pronunciamientos, ha indicado que este principio constituye,\r\nincluso, un parámetro de constitucionalidad de los actos sujetos al derecho\r\npúblico (leyes, reglamentos y actos administrativos en general), razón por la\r\ncual, se ha preocupado de su análisis y desarrollo. Siguiendo la doctrina\r\nalemana, esta Sala Constitucional ha considerado que los componentes básicos de\r\nla proporcionalidad lo son la legitimidad, la idoneidad, la necesidad y la\r\nproporcionalidad en sentido estricto. Así, en el Voto No. 3933-98 de las 09:50\r\nhrs. del 12 de junio de 1998, indicó lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n“(…)\r\nLa legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o\r\ndisposición impugnado, no debe estar al menos legalmente prohibido. La\r\nidoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada deber ser apta para alcanzar\r\nefectivamente el objetivo pretendido. La necesidad significa que entre varias\r\nmedidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, debe la autoridad\r\ncompetente elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la\r\npersona. La proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aparte del\r\nrequisito de que la norma sea apta y necesaria, lo ordenado por ella no debe\r\nestar fuera de proporción con respecto al objetivo pretendido, es decir, no le\r\nsea \"inexigible\" al individuo (…).” \n\r\n\r\n\nEn el Voto No. 8858-98 de las 16:33\r\nhrs. del 15 de diciembre de 1998, este Tribunal volvió a mencionar los\r\ncomponentes referidos, al indicar lo siguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n“(…)\r\nUn acto limitativo de derechos es razonable cuando cumple con una triple\r\ncondición: debe ser necesario, idóneo y proporcional. La necesidad de\r\nuna medida hace directa referencia a la existencia de una base fáctica que haga\r\npreciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes de la colectividad - o de un\r\ndeterminado grupo - mediante la adopción de una medida de diferenciación. Es\r\ndecir, que si dicha actuación no es realizada, importantes intereses públicos\r\nvan a ser lesionados. Si la limitación no es necesaria, tampoco podrá ser\r\nconsiderada como razonable, y por ende constitucionalmente válida. La idoneidad,\r\npor su parte, importa un juicio referente a si el tipo de restricción a ser\r\nadoptado cumple o no con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada. La inidoneidad de la medida nos indicaría que pueden existir\r\notros mecanismos que en mejor manera solucionen la necesidad existente, pudiendo\r\nalgunos de ellos cumplir con la finalidad propuesta sin restringir el disfrute\r\ndel derecho en cuestión. Por su parte, la proporcionalidad nos remite a\r\nun juicio de necesaria comparación entre la finalidad perseguida por el acto y\r\nel tipo de restricción que se impone o pretende imponer, de manera que la\r\nlimitación no sea de entidad marcadamente superior al beneficio que con ella se\r\npretende obtener en beneficio de la colectividad. De los dos últimos elementos,\r\npodría decirse que el primero se basa en un juicio cualitativo, en cuanto que\r\nel segundo parte de una comparación cuantitativa de los dos objetos analizados.\r\n(…).” \n\r\n\r\n\n En\r\nel Voto No. 1739-92 de las 11:45 hrs. del 1° de julio de 1992, esta Sala estimó\r\nque debe distinguirse entre lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n“(…)\r\nrazonabilidad técnica, que es, como se dijo, la\r\nproporcionalidad entre medios y fines; razonabilidad\r\njurídica, o la adecuación a la Constitución\r\nen general, y en especial, a los derechos y libertades reconocidos o supuestos\r\npor ella; y finalmente, razonabilidad de los efectos\r\nsobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a esos derechos\r\notras limitaciones o cargas que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y\r\nrégimen de los derechos mismos, ni mayores que las indispensables para que\r\nfuncionen razonablemente en la vida de la sociedad. (…).”\n\r\n\r\n\nConviene indicar que el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad cumple un rol de primer\r\norden en el Derecho Administrativo, al proyectarse en diversos ámbitos. Así, es\r\nde vital importancia como límite al ejercicio de la discrecionalidad\r\nadministrativa, al establecer la Ley General\r\nde la Administración\r\n Pública que no podrán dictarse actos administrativos\r\ndiscrecionales contrarios a las reglas unívocas de la ciencia o de la técnica,\r\no a los principios elementales de justicia, lógica o conveniencia (artículos\r\n16, párrafo 1°, 158, párrafo 4° y 160). En materia de los elementos\r\nconstitutivos de índole material objetivo (motivo, contenido y fin), debe\r\nexistir una relación de proporcionalidad entre los mismos, así para una falta\r\ndisciplinaria específica de un funcionario –motivo- debe existir una sanción\r\nproporcionada –amonestación verbal o escrita, suspensión o destitución-, en tal\r\nsentido el artículo 132, párrafo 2°, de la Ley General\r\nde la Administración\r\n Pública establece que el contenido “Deberá ser (…)\r\nproporcionado al fin legal y correspondiente al motivo, cuando ambos se hallen\r\nregulados”. En el terreno del derecho administrativo sancionador y del derecho\r\ntributario, el principio de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad\r\nes determinante para evitar sanciones o tributos desorbitados o\r\ndesproporcionados. Como se puede apreciar, desde el auto de traslado de\r\ncargos, se les hizo saber a los amparados que los hechos reprochados podrían\r\ncalificarse como graves, lo que resulta conforme con la sanción finalmente\r\nimpuesta. En este sentido, la sanción impuesta no solo se encuentra\r\ndentro de los parámetros dispuestos para la falta cometida, sino que se adecua\r\nal interés que pretendía proteger.-\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- SOBRE LA INCOHERENCIA\r\n RECLAMADA Y LA OMISIÓN DE\r\nVALORAR LA PRUEBA RECABADA.\r\nEsas\r\ndisconformidades, son extremos de legalidad ordinaria que deben ser discutidos\r\nen las vías correspondientes. \n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- CONCLUSIÓN.- Como corolario de lo expuesto, se\r\nimpone declarar sin lugar el recurso.-“", "body_en_text": "“I.- PURPOSE OF THE APPEAL. The appellant considered that his represented parties’ right to due process (debido proceso) had been violated, since, in his opinion, the ruling of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial) of 3:30 p.m. on March 17, 2010, which upheld the complaint against the protected parties, not only lacks proper reasoning (debida fundamentación) but is also incongruent, disproportionate, and unreasonable. In addition, there is no coherence in the Superior Council’s resolution, No. 102-10, held on November 18, 2010, Article XXII, which confirmed the appealed administrative act insofar as it upheld the complaint and classified the misconduct as serious.\n\nIII.- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CONGRUENCE. This Constitutional Court, in Ruling No. 2006-05754 of 11:56 a.m. on April 28, 2006, drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo, ruled on the dispositive principle (principio dispositivo) and the congruence of administrative resolutions, holding, in relevant part, the following:\n\n“(…) V.- ON THE DISPOSITIVE PRINCIPLE. Regarding the alleged violation of this principle, it should be noted that the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) regulates, in its ‘Second Book’, the general principles of the administrative procedure, whose purpose is the ascertainment of the real truth (verdad real). Although, in principle, the administrative proceeding is conducted based on the grounds proposed by the promoter, nothing prevents new facts from being known, in exercise of the broad powers of the investigating body to ascertain the material truth (verdad material). This is evident from the interplay of Articles 214, 221, and 297 of that Law, which, to that effect, provide the following:\n\n “.Article 214.-\n\n 1.- (…)\n\n 2.- Its most important purpose is the verification of the real truth of the facts that serve as the grounds for the final act”\n\n “Article 221.-\n\n 1.- In the administrative procedure, the facts serving as the grounds for the final act must be verified in the most faithful and complete manner possible, for which the directing body must adopt all pertinent or necessary evidentiary measures, even if they have not been proposed by the parties and even against the will of the latter.”\n\n Furthermore, Article 297, paragraph 1), prescribes the following:\n\n “Article 2197.-\n\n 1.- The Administration shall order and execute all necessary evidentiary proceedings to determine the real truth of the facts subject to the process, on its own motion (de oficio) or at the request of a party.\n\n 2.- (…)”\n\n Under this reasoning, in administrative proceedings where clear public interests are at stake, the dispositive principle and the principle of congruence do not apply. That principle is applicable, solely and exclusively, in disciplinary proceedings, which are even often preceded by a preliminary investigation that helps to clearly define, from the outset, the charges or misconducts imputed to an official (…)”.\n\nIt was proven that by virtue of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal's ruling of 10:55 a.m. on June 5, 2009, the opening of a disciplinary administrative proceeding against the protected parties and the notification of charges (traslado de cargos) were ordered, to determine the real truth of the facts imputed, namely, the following: “improper conduct and violation of Article 156 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica)” (folios 21-24 of the copies of the administrative file). It is also recorded that by resolution of that Tribunal, No. 265-2010 of 3:30 p.m. on March 17, 2010, the misconduct committed by the protected parties – having participated in illegal financial intermediation in violation of the relevant rules of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica – was classified as serious and the sanction of eight days of suspension without pay was imposed (copy at folios 25-28). As can be seen, from the order notifying charges, the protected parties were informed that the reproached acts could be classified as serious, which is consistent with the sanction finally imposed. In addition to the foregoing, the reproached conducts were delimited in both resolutions.\n\nIV.- ON PROPER REASONING (DEBIDA FUNDAMENTACIÓN). By resolution of that Tribunal, No. 265-2010 of 3:30 p.m. on March 17, 2010, the misconduct committed by the protected parties – having participated in illegal financial intermediation in violation of the relevant rules of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica – was classified as serious and the sanction of eight days of suspension without pay was imposed, holding, in relevant part, the following:\n\n“(…) the activity deployed by all the defendants, borrower and creditors, savers (ahorrantes) or investors, has incurred in very serious misconduct, since all should know that this activity can only be carried out with authorization and under the supervision of the General Superintendency (sic) of Financial Entities, according to the Organic Law of the Central Bank and its regulations, besides which the fatal result of the activity has caused anxiety among themselves and, in general, within the sphere of the Judiciary (Poder Judicial), since it was of public knowledge and no one can understand that, given the quality and profession of the ‘savers' (ahorrantes), these would fall into such a trap, which has caused, certainly, a deserved ridicule, because they better than anyone should know that greater profitability entails greater risk and that the inordinate eagerness for profit is highly dangerous (…)” (copy at folios 25-28).\n\nAs can be seen, the resolution is duly reasoned.\n\nV.- ON THE PROPORTIONALITY AND REASONABLENESS OF THE SANCTION IMPOSED. This Chamber, in repeated pronouncements, has indicated that this principle constitutes even a parameter of constitutionality for acts subject to public law (laws, regulations (reglamentos), and administrative acts in general), which is why it has concerned itself with its analysis and development. Following German doctrine, this Constitutional Chamber has considered that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Thus, in Ruling No. 3933-98 of 9:50 a.m. on June 12, 1998, it stated the following:\n\n“(…) Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective sought with the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited. Suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve such an objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person.\n\nStrict proportionality provides that apart from the requirement that the norm be suitable and necessary, what it orders must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be “unreasonable to demand” of the individual (…).”\n\nIn Voto No. 8858-98 of 16:33 hrs. of December 15, 1998, this Court again mentioned the referred components, stating the following:\n\n“(…) An act that limits rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. The **necessity** of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is, if such action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. **Suitability**, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing need, some of which may fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, **proportionality** refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not markedly greater in magnitude than the benefit intended to be obtained for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second starts from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed. (…).”\n\nIn Voto No. 1739-92 of 11:45 hrs. of July 1, 1992, this Chamber considered that a distinction must be made between the following:\n\n“(…) technical reasonableness, which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; legal reasonableness, or the adequacy to the Constitution in general, and especially, to the rights and freedoms recognized or assumed by it; and finally, reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights other limitations or burdens than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society. (…).”\n\nIt is worth noting that the principle of reasonableness and proportionality plays a leading role in Administrative Law, as it is projected in various areas. Thus, it is of vital importance as a limit on the exercise of administrative discretion, as the Ley General de la Administración Pública establishes that discretionary administrative acts may not be issued contrary to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to the elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience (articles 16, paragraph 1, 158, paragraph 4, and 160). Regarding the constitutive elements of an objective material nature (motive, content, and purpose), a proportional relationship must exist among them, thus for a specific disciplinary fault of an official—motive—there must be a proportionate sanction—verbal or written reprimand, suspension, or dismissal—, in that sense article 132, paragraph 2, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública establishes that the content “Must be (…) proportionate to the legal purpose and corresponding to the motive, when both are regulated.” In the field of administrative sanctioning law and tax law, the principle of proportionality and reasonableness is decisive to avoid exorbitant or disproportionate sanctions or taxes. As can be appreciated, from the order of notice of charges (auto de traslado de cargos), the petitioners were made aware that the reproached acts could be classified as serious, which is consistent with the sanction ultimately imposed. In this sense, the imposed sanction is not only within the parameters provided for the committed fault, but also conforms to the interest it sought to protect.-\n\n**VI.- ON THE ALLEGED INCOHERENCE AND THE OMISSION TO ASSESS THE EVIDENCE GATHERED.** These disagreements are matters of ordinary legality that must be discussed in the corresponding venues.\n\n**VII.- CONCLUSION.-** As a corollary of the foregoing, it is necessary to declare the appeal without merit.-”\n\nof **March 17, 2010**, the offense committed by the petitioners—having participated in illegal financial intermediation (intermediación financiera) in violation of the relevant rules of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica—was classified as serious and the sanction of eight days of suspension without pay was imposed, considering the following, in relevant part:\n\n“(…) the activity carried out by all the defendants, borrower and creditors, savers (ahorrantes) or investors, have incurred a very serious offense, since everyone must know that this activity can only be carried out with authorization and under the supervision of the General Superintendency (sic) of Financial Entities, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Central Bank and its regulations, in addition to the fact that the fatal result of the activity has caused unease among themselves and, in general, within the sphere of the Judiciary, since it was of public knowledge and no one can explain how, given the standing and profession of the “savers (ahorrantes)”, they fell into such a trap, which has certainly caused deserved mockery, because they better than anyone should know that higher returns entail higher risk and that the excessive desire for profit is highly dangerous (…)” (copy at folios 25-28).\n\nAs can be seen, the resolution is duly reasoned.\n\n**V.- ON THE PROPORTIONALITY AND REASONABLENESS (RAZONABILIDAD) OF THE SANCTION IMPOSED.** This Chamber, in repeated pronouncements, has indicated that this principle even constitutes a parameter of constitutionality for acts subject to public law (laws, regulations, and administrative acts in general), for which reason it has concerned itself with its analysis and development. Following German doctrine, this Constitutional Chamber has considered that the basic components of proportionality are legitimacy, suitability (idoneidad), necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. Thus, in Voto No. 3933-98 of 09:50 hrs. on June 12, 1998, it stated the following:\n\n“(…) Legitimacy refers to the objective sought by the challenged act or provision not being, at least, legally prohibited. Suitability (idoneidad) indicates that the state measure in question must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective. Necessity means that among several equally apt measures to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person. Proportionality in the strict sense stipulates that apart from the requirement that the rule be apt and necessary, what it orders must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be ‘inexigible’ to the individual (…).”\n\nIn Voto No. 8858-98 of 16:33 hrs. on December 15, 1998, this Tribunal again mentioned the referred components, stating the following:\n\n“(…) An act limiting rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable (idóneo), and proportional. The **necessity** of a measure makes direct reference to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community - or of a specific group - through the adoption of a measure of differentiation. That is, if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable either, and therefore constitutionally valid. **Suitability (idoneidad)**, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or not the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability (inidoneidad) of the measure would indicate to us that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing need, with some of them possibly fulfilling the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, **proportionality** refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not of a markedly greater magnitude than the benefit that is intended to be obtained thereby for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second proceeds from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed. (…).”\n\nIn Voto No. 1739-92 of 11:45 hrs. on July 1, 1992, this Chamber considered that a distinction must be made between the following:\n\n“(…) technical reasonableness (razonabilidad), which is, as stated, the proportionality between means and ends; juridical reasonableness (razonabilidad), or the conformity to the Constitution in general, and especially, to the rights and freedoms recognized or implied by it; and finally, reasonableness (razonabilidad) of the effects on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on those rights limitations or burdens other than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, nor greater than those indispensable for them to function reasonably in the life of society. (…).”\n\nIt should be noted that the principle of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality plays a leading role in Administrative Law, projecting itself in various areas. Thus, it is of vital importance as a limit to the exercise of administrative discretion, as the General Law of the Public Administration establishes that discretionary administrative acts may not be issued contrary to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience (articles 16, paragraph 1, 158, paragraph 4, and 160). Regarding the constituent elements of an objective material nature (grounds, content, and purpose), a relationship of proportionality must exist between them, so for a specific disciplinary offense of an official —grounds— there must be a proportionate sanction —verbal or written warning, suspension, or dismissal—, in this sense article 132, paragraph 2, of the General Law of the Public Administration establishes that the content “Must be (…) proportionate to the legal purpose and corresponding to the grounds, when both are regulated.” In the field of administrative sanctioning law and tax law, the principle of proportionality and reasonableness (razonabilidad) is decisive to avoid exorbitant or disproportionate sanctions or taxes. As can be seen, from the notice of charges, the petitioners were informed that the reproached acts could be classified as serious, which is in accordance with the sanction finally imposed. In this sense, the sanction imposed is not only within the parameters provided for the offense committed, but also conforms to the interest it sought to protect.-\n\n**VI.- ON THE CLAIMED INCOHERENCE AND THE OMISSION TO ASSESS THE COLLECTED EVIDENCE.** These disagreements are matters of ordinary legality that must be discussed in the corresponding avenues.\n\n**VII.- CONCLUSION.-** As a corollary to the foregoing, it is necessary to declare the appeal without merit.-“" }