{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0007-137444", "citation": "Res. 03177-2011 Sala Constitucional", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "constitutional_decision", "title_es": "Hábeas corpus por presunta falta de fundamentación de prisión preventiva", "title_en": "Habeas corpus for alleged lack of reasoning in pre-trial detention order", "summary_es": "La Sala Constitucional rechaza un recurso de hábeas corpus interpuesto por la defensa de un imputado en un proceso penal por secuestro extorsivo, robo agravado y privación de libertad. El recurrente alegó irregularidades como violación al principio de imparcialidad por ser la misma jueza quien ordenó el allanamiento y la prisión preventiva, falta de acceso a la prueba y ausencia de debida fundamentación de la medida cautelar. La Sala reitera que el hábeas corpus no es una instancia más del proceso penal y que su competencia se limita a verificar que la prisión preventiva se haya dictado conforme a las normas del debido proceso, sin fiscalizar la valoración probatoria. Concluye que no se acreditó violación alguna: la actuación de la misma jueza en allanamiento y prisión preventiva no quebranta la imparcialidad, pues el juez penal actúa como juez de garantías; las disconformidades sobre la prueba deben plantearse ante el juez de la causa; y la resolución impugnada sí contiene una fundamentación suficiente, tanto en la indicación de los elementos de convicción como en la valoración de los peligros procesales de fuga, obstaculización y reiteración delictiva.", "summary_en": "The Constitutional Chamber denied a habeas corpus petition filed by the defense of a defendant in criminal proceedings for extortionate kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and deprivation of liberty. The petitioner claimed irregularities, including violation of the impartiality principle because the same judge ordered both the search warrant and the pre-trial detention, lack of access to evidence, and insufficient reasoning of the detention order. The Chamber reiterated that habeas corpus is not an additional instance within the criminal process and its review is limited to verifying whether pre-trial detention was ordered in conformity with due process, without scrutinizing evidentiary assessments. It found no violation: the same judge acting on both the search and the detention does not breach impartiality, as the criminal judge acts as a guarantee judge; disagreements over evidence must be raised before the trial court; and the challenged ruling contained sufficient reasoning, detailing both the evidentiary elements justifying probable cause and the procedural risks of flight, obstruction, and recidivism.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Constitucional", "date": "2011", "year": "2011", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "hábeas corpus", "prisión preventiva", "juez de garantías", "principio de imparcialidad", "peligro de fuga", "peligro de obstaculización", "continuidad delictiva" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 35", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 39", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 42", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 153", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 154", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 16", "law": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional" }, { "article": "Art. 239", "law": "Código Procesal Penal" } ], "keywords_es": [ "hábeas corpus", "prisión preventiva", "debida fundamentación", "principio de imparcialidad", "juez de garantías", "peligro de fuga", "peligro de obstaculización", "delincuencia organizada", "debido proceso" ], "keywords_en": [ "habeas corpus", "pre-trial detention", "sufficient reasoning", "principle of impartiality", "guarantee judge", "risk of flight", "risk of obstruction", "organized crime", "due process" ], "excerpt_es": "“(...) En primer lugar, no constituye violación al principio de imparcialidad el hecho de que haya sido un mismo juez quien ordenara el allanamiento y la medida cautelar de prisión preventiva. Recuérdese que el juez penal es un juez de garantías, garante del proceso en general y dentro de éste, protege los derechos del sometido a proceso, y además la ley procesal penal lo faculta para ordenar allanamientos y decidir acerca de la privación de la libertad, según lo considere, en los casos y por los procedimientos que establece la Constitución y la Ley. Razón por la cual, nada obsta que el mismo juez que ordenó un allanamiento, luego sea quien dicte la prisión preventiva, pues no sólo ambos actos obedecen a supuestos diferentes, sino que, según se dijo, en ambos actúa como garante. (...)”", "excerpt_en": "“(...) In the first place, the fact that the same judge ordered the search warrant and the precautionary measure of pre-trial detention does not constitute a violation of the principle of impartiality. It must be remembered that the criminal judge is a guarantee judge, guarantor of the proceeding in general, and within it, protects the rights of the accused, and furthermore, the criminal procedural law empowers the judge to order searches and decide on the deprivation of liberty, as deemed appropriate, in the cases and by the procedures established in the Constitution and the law. For this reason, there is no impediment to the same judge who ordered a search later issuing a pre-trial detention order, not only because both acts arise from different legal bases, but because, as stated, in both the judge acts as a guarantor. (...)”", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The habeas corpus petition is denied, as no violation of the impartiality principle or lack of reasoning in the pre-trial detention order was demonstrated.", "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso de hábeas corpus, al no acreditarse violación al principio de imparcialidad ni falta de fundamentación de la prisión preventiva." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando II", "quote_en": "the mere existence of a criminal proceeding cannot be interpreted, per se, as an illegitimate threat to the personal liberty of the accused", "quote_es": "la mera existencia de un proceso penal no puede interpretarse, per se, como una amenaza ilegítima a la libertad personal del imputado" }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "the fact that the same judge ordered the search warrant and the precautionary measure of pre-trial detention does not constitute a violation of the principle of impartiality", "quote_es": "no constituye violación al principio de imparcialidad el hecho de que haya sido un mismo juez quien ordenara el allanamiento y la medida cautelar de prisión preventiva" }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "the criminal judge is a guarantee judge, guarantor of the proceeding in general and, within it, protects the rights of the accused", "quote_es": "el juez penal es un juez de garantías, garante del proceso en general y dentro de éste, protege los derechos del sometido a proceso" }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "it is an unavoidable duty of the criminal judge, when ordering such a drastic measure, to justify the decision by indicating the factual and legal grounds on which it rests, because it is not about repeating the legal prerequisites that allow the measure, but about giving them substance", "quote_es": "para el Juez Penal constituye un deber ineludible, al ordenar tan drástica medida, fundamentar su decisión, indicando los motivos de hecho y de derecho en que se apoya, pues no se trata de repetir los presupuestos legales que permiten la medida, sino de darles contenido" } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0007-137444", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-38533", "norm_num": "7135", "norm_name": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "11/10/1989" }, { "doc_id": "norm-41297", "norm_num": "7594", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal — Acción penal en delitos ambientales", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "10/04/1996" }, { "doc_id": "norm-871", "norm_num": "0", "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“I.- OBJETO DEL RECURSO. El recurrente solicita la tutela de\r\nlos derechos fundamentales de su representado, específicamente, su libertad\r\npersonal. Cuestiona una serie de irregularidades en el proceso penal, tales\r\ncomo, que la Fiscalía\r\nsólo puso a disposición del tutelado parte de la prueba que existe en su contra\r\ny que en la audiencia no presentó todas las pruebas que tiene en su poder; que\r\nse violentó el principio de imparcialidad, por cuanto, la misma jueza que\r\ndispuso las medidas cautelares, fue la que ordenó la diligencia judicial de\r\nallanamiento y, finalmente, que la juzgadora no fundamentó, debidamente, la\r\norden de prisión preventiva impuesta contra el tutelado. \n\r\n\r\n\nII.- SOBRE EL RECURSO DE HABEAS CORPUS.\r\nDe conformidad con\r\nel ámbito de competencia de este Tribunal, definido en la propia Constitución\r\nPolítica y en la Ley de la\r\n Jurisdicción Constitucional, el recurso de habeas corpus\r\ntiene por objeto garantizar la libertad e integridad personales, contra los\r\nactos y omisiones que provengan de una autoridad de cualquier orden, incluso\r\njudicial, que impliquen una amenaza, perturbación o restricción indebida a los\r\nmismos, así como, contra las restricciones ilegítimas al derecho de trasladarse\r\nde un lugar a otro de la República y\r\nde libre permanencia, salida e ingreso en el territorio nacional. Además, el\r\nartículo 16 de la Ley de la\r\n Jurisdicción Constitucional prevé la posibilidad que este\r\nTribunal examine –en la vía de habeas corpus y por conexidad–\r\nviolaciones a otros derechos fundamentales distintos a la libertad personal,\r\nsiempre que éstos tengan, necesariamente, una estricta incidencia sobre la\r\nlibertad, su restricción efectiva o la amenaza de su restricción. Pero, además,\r\nno es cualquier amenaza a la libertad que es amparable en esta sede. Así, en\r\nsentencia No. 1142-1994 de las 15:03 hrs. de 1° de marzo de 1994, este Tribunal\r\naclaró lo siguiente:\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n“(…) En lo que respecta a\r\nla amenaza de la libertad capaz de ser protegida por Hábeas Corpus, no es\r\ncualquier amenaza la que produce tal efecto, sino que la misma debe ser\r\nprecisa, grave, cierta, actual, concreta e inminente, pues de no ser así se\r\nestaría en presencia de un futuro incierto que podría no ocasionar ninguna\r\nviolación a ese preciado derecho constitucional y por ende incapaz de ser\r\nprotegida por el instituto del Hábeas Corpus. (…)”\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nEn este contexto, este Tribunal ha indicado, reiteradamente,\r\nque la mera existencia de un proceso penal no puede interpretarse, per se, como una amenaza ilegítima a la\r\nlibertad personal del imputado, toda vez que, el propio ordenamiento procesal\r\npenal establece las vías suficientes e idóneas para asegurar que éste se\r\ntramite con estricta observancia de las garantías, las facultades y los\r\nderechos previstos para las personas en la Constitución\r\n Política, en el Derecho Internacional o Comunitario vigente\r\nen Costa Rica y en el Código Procesal Penal. Asimismo, al precisar el ámbito de\r\ncompetencia de este Tribunal Constitucional en relación al proceso de habeas\r\ncorpus, conviene reiterar que no es una instancia más en el proceso penal, por\r\nlo que no le corresponde entrar a fiscalizar las actuaciones de las autoridades\r\npenales en el ejercicio de sus competencias, so pena de violentar el artículo\r\n153 de la Carta Magna. \r\nEn virtud de lo expuesto, el análisis de este Tribunal se limita a determinar\r\nsi las medidas cautelares de prisión preventiva han sido dictadas de\r\nconformidad con las normas procesales atinentes al debido proceso y no a\r\nfiscalizar si el análisis de la prueba habida en el proceso ha sido la\r\ncorrecta, toda vez que, como se dijo, esta Jurisdicción no se erige como una\r\ninstancia más dentro del proceso penal. Asimismo, las valoraciones del\r\nrecurrente respecto a la conducta procesal de las autoridades del Ministerio\r\nPúblico, deben ser discutidas en las instancias ordinarias previstas para esos\r\nefectos. Nótese, sobre el particular, que por este medio se pretende discutir\r\naspectos de fondo, propios de ser ventilados en la jurisdicción penal y,\r\nespecíficamente, ante el juez de garantías, al que debe presentar sus\r\nargumentos en relación a la supuesta falta de acceso a los elementos\r\nprobatorios que custodia el Ministerio Público, siendo que, este Tribunal ha\r\nindicado que dichas disconformidades deben ser presentadas en el momento\r\nprocesal oportuno, a saber, en la audiencia oral que se llevó a cabo,\r\noportunidad en la que el recurrente debió acusar los agravios señalados. \n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- SOBRE LA PRESUNTA\r\n INFRACCIÓN AL PRINCIPIO DE IMPARCIALIDAD. El derecho a ser juzgado por un juez\r\nnatural, independiente e imparcial, forma parte esencial del debido proceso y\r\nconstituye un requisito indispensable de un Estado democrático de derecho. En\r\nel ordenamiento jurídico interno, estos principios derivan de lo dispuesto en\r\nlos artículos 39 (juez competente) 35 (juez natural) 42 (imparcialidad) y 154\r\n(independencia) de la Constitución\r\n Política. También, se encuentran previstos en diversos\r\ninstrumentos de derecho internacional, como por ejemplo, los artículos 10 de la Declaración\r\n Universal de Derechos Humanos, 14, inciso 1), del Pacto\r\nInternacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y 8, inciso 1°), de la Convención\r\n Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Nuestro ordenamiento\r\njurídico consagra el principio de objetividad en el artículo 6 del Código\r\nProcesal Penal, al señalar: “Los jueces deberán resolver con objetividad los\r\nasuntos sometidos a su conocimiento”. Ahora bien, en el caso concreto, el\r\nrecurrente cuestiona que la Jueza Penal\r\nde Heredia dictó tanto la autorización para realizar un allanamiento en la\r\nvivienda de los imputados, como la medida cautelar de prisión preventiva. Sin\r\nembargo, este Tribunal Constitucional ha indicado, reiteradamente, que esa\r\nsituación no implica, por sí misma, una infracción al principio de\r\nimparcialidad. En la sentencia No. 2010-012287 de las 14:33 hrs. de 21 de julio\r\nde 2010, se indicó lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\n“(...) En primer lugar, no\r\nconstituye violación al principio de imparcialidad el hecho de que haya sido un\r\nmismo juez quien ordenara el allanamiento y la medida cautelar de prisión\r\npreventiva. Recuérdese que el juez penal es un juez de garantías,\r\ngarante del proceso en general y dentro de éste, protege los derechos del\r\nsometido a proceso, y además la ley procesal penal lo faculta para ordenar\r\nallanamientos y decidir acerca de la privación de la libertad, según lo\r\nconsidere, en los casos y por los procedimientos que establece la Constitución\r\ny la Ley. Razón\r\npor la cual, nada obsta que el mismo juez que ordenó un allanamiento, luego sea\r\nquien dicte la prisión preventiva, pues no sólo ambos actos obedecen a\r\nsupuestos diferentes, sino que, según se dijo, en ambos actúa como garante. Es\r\nmás, si se atiende a este carácter, es hasta deseable que sea el mismo juez el\r\nque conozca ambas diligencias, pues conociendo de antemano la prueba existente\r\n(producto del allanamiento), tiene la inmediatez necesaria para resolver sobre\r\nla prisión preventiva y valorar los elementos de prueba necesarios para\r\nproceder a ordenarla o desestimarla. Además, en todo caso, el ordenamiento\r\nprocesal penal contempla vías suficientes para canalizar las objeciones que,\r\nrelacionadas con la regularidad del proceso existan, y que finalmente pueden\r\nser discutidas durante el proceso (...)”. (lo destacado no corresponde al original). \n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nEn consonancia con lo anterior, el agravio debe ser\r\ndesestimado. En todo caso, si el recurrente considera que existe una causal de\r\nrecusación o que la jueza penal debió excusarse de conocer la pretensión del\r\nMinisterio Público porque, en su criterio, existe duda sobre su objetividad,\r\nasí lo puede alegar en el propio proceso penal, de conformidad con las reglas\r\nestablecidas en los artículos 55 y siguientes del Código Procesal Penal.\r\nAdemás, si existe alguna disconformidad con lo actuado, lo procedente es que el\r\nrecurrente la presente en el marco del proceso penal correspondiente, pues esta\r\nCámara Constitucional no es una instancia más a la que le corresponda vigilar\r\nlo actuado por las autoridades penales.\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- SOBRE LA FUNDAMENTACIÓN\r\n DE LA PRISIÓN PREVENTIVA. Este Tribunal Constitucional ha dispuesto en su jurisprudencia que la\r\nprivación de libertad como medida cautelar es excepcional y que, únicamente,\r\npuede ser decretada por el Juzgador cuando existan razones procesales objetivas\r\nque la hagan indispensable, a fin de asegurar el descubrimiento de la verdad\r\nreal y la actuación de la ley penal. Asimismo, para el Juez Penal constituye un\r\ndeber ineludible, al ordenar tan drástica medida, fundamentar su decisión,\r\nindicando los motivos de hecho y de derecho en que se apoya, pues no se trata\r\nde repetir los presupuestos legales que permiten la medida, sino de darles contenido,\r\ncon el fin que el interesado pueda ejercer su derecho de defensa e impugnar la\r\ndecisión ante el Superior. En el caso concreto, se encuentra debidamente\r\ndemostrado que el 24 de febrero del año en curso la Fiscalía Adjunta\r\nde Crimen Organizado le solicitó al Juzgado Penal de Heredia la convocatoria a\r\nuna audiencia oral para requerir la imposición de medidas cautelares contra los\r\nencartados (ver folios 7-8 de la copia del legajo de medidas cautelares).\r\nAsimismo, se constató que mediante resolución de las 08:55 hrs. de 25 de\r\nfebrero de 20011, el Juzgado Penal de Heredia señaló las 13:00 hrs. de ese\r\nmismo día, para la realización de la audiencia (ver folio 23 de la copia del\r\nlegajo de medidas cautelares). Además, se verificó que la audiencia oral se inició\r\na las 13:40 hrs. y se prolongó hasta las 23:00 hrs. de 25 de febrero de 2011,\r\nsin embargo, por un problema técnico no se pudo grabar la fundamentación\r\noral realizada por la Juzgadora,\r\nsin embargo, las partes apersonadas en el proceso estaban conscientes de la\r\ndificultad técnica y, se les advirtió que durante la audiencia se les\r\nexplicaban las razones, pero, además, se harían constar por escrito. De esta\r\nmanera, a partir del registro escrito en el cual se consigna lo expuesto en la\r\naudiencia oral, fue posible acreditar que, en la especie, no se verifica el\r\nsupuesto vicio de falta de fundamentación, ni tampoco\r\nlos supuestos agravios alegados por el recurrente en relación a la falta de\r\nindicación de la fecha y hora de la decisión, ya que, si él estaba presente en\r\nla audiencia, era evidente que estaba consciente de tales elementos y, por lo\r\ndemás, sí están consignados en la respectiva minuta de la audiencia. En\r\nrelación a la fundamentación de la medida cautelar,\r\nse constata que la juzgadora recurrida sí hizo referencia a los elementos\r\nprobatorios que constan en autos y que justifican la supuesta participación del\r\ntutelado en los hechos ilícitos que se le atribuyen. Sobre el particular, la\r\njuzgadora manifestó lo siguiente: “(...) Se considera existen suficientes\r\nelementos de convicción, para presumir que los encartados (...) son con\r\nprobabilidad autores de los hechos ilícitos que se les investiga, a saber los\r\ndelitos de Secuestro Extorsivo, Robo Agravado y\r\nPrivación de Libertad, hechos ocurridos el veinticinco de marzo del dos mil\r\nonce (sic), para este estadio procesal lo que se debe tomar en cuenta para la\r\naplicación de una medida cautelar tan gravosa como la prisión preventiva, es la\r\nexistencia de un indicio comprobado y no una certeza, por lo que con todos los\r\nelementos de convicción señalados por el Ministerio Público se puede arribar a\r\nla conclusión de que los imputados (...) son con probabilidad autores de los\r\nhechos ilícitos que se investigan en su contra, se tiene que la declaración de\r\nlos ofendidos (...) quienes describen de forma clara y circunstanciada, cómo\r\nocurrieron los hechos (...) además de describir la cantidad de personas que lo\r\nsecuestraron, el vehículo en el que los encartados viajaban, el cual utilizaron\r\npara trasladarlos, los informes del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, en\r\ndonde se destacan las diligencias policiales en torno a la investigación,\r\nvigilancias, entrevistas y seguimientos a los imputados, decomiso de videos,\r\npropiamente del peaje de Tres Ríos, el Mall Paseo de las Flores y el Servicentro Texaco de Heredia, en\r\ndonde se capta el vehículo (l200) utilizado por los imputados, siguiendo a\r\ncorta distancia al ofendido y el momento en que a gran velocidad trasladan al\r\nofendido a la Ventana B\r\ndel ICE en Cachí, además de los informes contables de\r\nla actividad bancaria de los mismos, la presencia de billetes marcados en los\r\nbancos, los cuales fueron cambiados a mandato de los imputados (...)”. \r\nEn el caso del tutelado, se justificó, concretamente, que el 30 y el 1° de\r\nabril de 2010, fecha en que se pagó el dinero por el secuestro del ofendido,\r\néste tenía en su poder el vehículo con el que se dieron los hechos, el cual, se\r\nencontraba golpeado, tal y como lo habían descrito los ofendidos. Además, la\r\njuzgadora manifestó que “(...) Por otro lado se constató en la investigación\r\nque todo el dinero y bienes obtenidos por los cuatros encartados (...) no es\r\ncoincidente con sus ingresos salariales ni estatus social, dineros y bienes que\r\nfueron adquiridos posterior a que se diera el secuestro extorsivo.\r\nPor otro lado se desprende de la investigación la relación existente entre los\r\ncuatro imputados (...) De toda la investigación se desprende el nexo entre los\r\nimputados, siendo que la participación de cada uno fue determinante para la\r\ncomisión de los hechos que se presume realizaron, siendo así que la\r\nparticipación (...) fue en el sentido de que este proporcionó el sitio y\r\nlas llaves donde se mantuvo retenido al ofendido (...) mientras que los\r\nencartados (...) fueron los que privaron de su libertad a los ofendidos y\r\nrealizaron todo el despliegue extorsivo (...)”.\r\nDe otra parte, en relación a los peligros procesales atribuidos al caso del\r\ntutelado, Salazar Hernández, la juzgadora manifestó lo siguiente: “(...) \r\nse tiene que se encuentra presente el peligro de fuga, obstaculización y\r\ncontinuidad delictiva, en cuanto al peligro de fuga el mismo manifestó en su\r\ndeclaración indagatoria ser mecánico y electricista, se debe analizar el\r\narraigo laboral a la luz de las facilidades que tiene el imputado para movilizarse,\r\ncambiarse u sustraerse de un lugar a otro, sin que exista un arraigo a una zona\r\nu oficio, en ese sentido sin desmerecer en forma alguna las labores manifiesta\r\nSalazar Hernández realiza (sic), lo cierto es que las mismas no le\r\nsignifican arraigo a un sitio determinado, pues él es su propio patrono y puede\r\ntrasladarse de un lugar a otro sin que le signifique obstáculo alguno (...)\r\nsiempre dentro del peligro de fuga, además se valoró que el mismo indicó recibe\r\nun millón de colones de ingreso mensuales sin embargo no existe registro\r\nbancario alguno que respalde su dicho, por otro lado se valoró la alta\r\npenalidad –de cinco y quince años en adelante–,\r\nsiendo que ante las facilidades de desplazarse a cualquier parte del país y\r\nante la presencia de los elementos de convicción señalados, estas posibles\r\npenas tan elevadas se convierten en un aliciente para que quiera\r\nsustraerse del proceso, aunado a la magnitud del daño causado, considerando lo\r\nviolento y excesivo del actuar de los encartados ante la vulnerabilidad que\r\nrepresentaba el ofendido (...)”. En cuanto al peligro de obstaculización,\r\nse consideró que aún existe prueba importante que recabar, especialmente, la\r\nprueba testimonial, en la que es presumible que de todo el despliegue de\r\nviolencia de los imputados, busquen a los ofendidos y testigos para impedir que\r\ntestifiquen en su contra y de esa forma beneficiarse. Adicionalmente, en\r\ncuanto al peligro de continuidad delictiva, se tiene que la juzgadora constató\r\nque el encartado presenta sentencias condenatorias por los delitos de tentativa\r\nde robo agravado, cohecho propio en modalidad penalidad del corruptor y robo\r\nagravado, considerando la juzgadora lo siguiente “(...) es evidente que el\r\nencartado es una persona proclive a cometer este tipo de delincuencia, siendo\r\nque ya ha enfrentado sentencias condenatorias en su contra por tres delitos\r\ndiferentes y no ha sido suficiente contención ni motivación, con lo cual es\r\nrazonablemente presumible que de estar en libertad continuara su actuar\r\ndelictiva, lo cual refleja además que sus labores no constituyen arraigo\r\nsuficiente para motivarse según lo demanda la norma (...)”. A mayor\r\nabundamiento, la juzgadora justificó otra causal de prisión preventiva\r\nestablecida en el artículo 239 bis del Código Procesal Penal, propiamente, el\r\ninciso d), que se refiere a la delincuencia organizada, considerando que, en el\r\ncaso concreto, la evidencia demuestra que los encartados tenían un plan\r\npreviamente acordado con distribución clara de funciones y con un fin común, en\r\ndonde concurren más de dos personas y tratándose de un delito grave. A partir\r\nde las consideraciones expuestas, se descarta que la resolución que impuso una\r\nmedida cautelar de prisión preventiva al tutelado, carezca de fundamentación, motivo por el cual, lo procedente es desestimar\r\neste extremo del recurso. \n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- CONCLUSIÓN. Corolario de las consideraciones\r\nrealizadas, se impone declarar sin lugar el recurso.”", "body_en_text": "“I.- PURPOSE OF THE APPEAL. The appellant seeks the protection of the fundamental rights of his client, specifically, his personal liberty. He challenges a series of irregularities in the criminal proceeding, such as that the Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía) only made available to the protected party part of the evidence that exists against him and that at the hearing it did not present all the evidence in its possession; that the principle of impartiality was violated, because the same judge who ordered the precautionary measures was the one who ordered the judicial search (allanamiento) and, finally, that the judge did not properly state the grounds (fundamentar) for the pretrial detention (prisión preventiva) order imposed against the protected party.\n\nII.- ON THE HABEAS CORPUS APPEAL. In accordance with the scope of jurisdiction of this Court, defined in the Political Constitution itself and in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), the purpose of the habeas corpus appeal is to guarantee personal liberty and integrity against acts and omissions originating from an authority of any kind, including judicial, that imply a threat, disturbance, or undue restriction thereof, as well as against illegitimate restrictions on the right to move from one place to another within the Republic and to freely remain, leave, and enter the national territory. In addition, article 16 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction provides for the possibility that this Court may examine—through habeas corpus and by connection (conexidad)—violations of other fundamental rights distinct from personal liberty, provided that these necessarily have a strict impact on liberty, its effective restriction, or the threat of its restriction. But, furthermore, not just any threat to liberty is protectable in this venue. Thus, in judgment No. 1142-1994 of 15:03 hrs. of March 1, 1994, this Court clarified the following:\n\n“(…) With respect to the threat to liberty capable of being protected by Habeas Corpus, not just any threat produces such an effect, but rather it must be precise, serious, certain, current, concrete, and imminent, because if it is not, one would be in the presence of an uncertain future that might not cause any violation to that precious constitutional right and therefore incapable of being protected by the institution of Habeas Corpus. (…)”\n\nIn this context, this Court has repeatedly indicated that the mere existence of a criminal proceeding cannot be interpreted, per se, as an illegitimate threat to the personal liberty of the accused (imputado), given that the criminal procedural law itself establishes sufficient and suitable avenues to ensure that it is processed with strict observance of the guarantees, powers, and rights provided for individuals in the Political Constitution, in the International or Community Law in force in Costa Rica, and in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). Likewise, when defining the scope of jurisdiction of this Constitutional Court in relation to the habeas corpus proceeding, it is appropriate to reiterate that it is not an additional instance within the criminal proceeding, and therefore it is not its role to oversee the actions of criminal authorities in the exercise of their powers, under penalty of violating article 153 of the Constitution (Carta Magna). By virtue of the foregoing, this Court's analysis is limited to determining whether the precautionary measure of pretrial detention was ordered in accordance with the procedural rules pertaining to due process and not to overseeing whether the analysis of the evidence in the proceeding was correct, given that, as stated, this Jurisdiction does not stand as an additional instance within the criminal proceeding. Likewise, the appellant's assessments regarding the procedural conduct of the authorities of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) must be discussed in the ordinary instances provided for that purpose. Note, on this point, that this means seeks to discuss substantive aspects, suitable to be aired in the criminal jurisdiction and, specifically, before the judge of guarantees (juez de garantías), to whom he must present his arguments regarding the alleged lack of access to the evidentiary elements guarded by the Public Prosecutor's Office, given that this Court has indicated that such disagreements must be presented at the appropriate procedural moment, namely, at the oral hearing that took place, an opportunity at which the appellant should have raised the grievances indicated.\n\nIV.- ON THE ALLEGED INFRINGEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF IMPARTIALITY. The right to be judged by a natural, independent, and impartial judge is an essential part of due process and constitutes an indispensable requirement of a democratic state governed by the rule of law. In the domestic legal system, these principles derive from the provisions of articles 39 (competent judge), 35 (natural judge), 42 (impartiality), and 154 (independence) of the Political Constitution. They are also provided for in various international law instruments, such as article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 14, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and article 8, paragraph 1, of the American Convention on Human Rights. Our legal system enshrines the principle of objectivity in article 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by stating: “Judges must resolve with objectivity the matters submitted to their consideration.” Now then, in the specific case, the appellant questions that the Criminal Judge (Jueza Penal) of Heredia issued both the authorization to carry out a search (allanamiento) at the accused persons’ home and the precautionary measure of pretrial detention. However, this Constitutional Court has repeatedly indicated that this situation does not imply, in itself, an infringement of the principle of impartiality. In judgment No. 2010-012287 of 14:33 hrs. of July 21, 2010, the following was stated:\n\n“(...) In the first place, the fact that the same judge ordered the search and the precautionary measure of pretrial detention does not constitute a violation of the principle of impartiality. It should be remembered that the criminal judge is a judge of guarantees, the guarantor of the proceeding in general and within it, protects the rights of the person subject to proceedings, and furthermore the criminal procedural law authorizes him to order searches and decide on the deprivation of liberty, as he considers, in the cases and through the procedures established by the Constitution and the Law. For this reason, there is no obstacle to the same judge who ordered a search later being the one who orders pretrial detention, since not only do both acts respond to different requirements, but, as stated, in both he acts as guarantor. Moreover, considering this nature, it is even desirable that the same judge handles both proceedings, because knowing the existing evidence beforehand (resulting from the search), he has the necessary immediacy to decide on pretrial detention and to assess the evidentiary elements necessary to proceed to order or dismiss it. In addition, in any case, the criminal procedural law provides sufficient avenues to channel objections that may exist related to the regularity of the proceeding, and that can ultimately be discussed during the proceeding (...)”. (the highlighting does not correspond to the original).\n\nIn line with the above, the grievance must be dismissed. In any case, if the appellant considers that there is a ground for recusal or that the criminal judge should have excused herself from hearing the Public Prosecutor's Office's request because, in his opinion, there is doubt about her objectivity, he can so argue in the criminal proceeding itself, in accordance with the rules established in articles 55 and following of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In addition, if there is any disagreement with what was acted upon, the appropriate course is for the appellant to present it within the framework of the corresponding criminal proceeding, as this Constitutional Chamber (Cámara Constitucional) is not an additional instance responsible for overseeing the actions of criminal authorities.\n\nV.- ON THE STATEMENT OF GROUNDS (FUNDAMENTACIÓN) FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION. This Constitutional Court has established in its case law that the deprivation of liberty as a precautionary measure is exceptional and may only be decreed by the Judge when there are objective procedural reasons that make it indispensable, in order to ensure the discovery of the real truth and the application of criminal law. Likewise, it is an unavoidable duty for the Criminal Judge, when ordering such a drastic measure, to state the grounds (fundamentar) for his decision, indicating the reasons of fact and of law on which it is based, since the issue is not to repeat the legal requirements that permit the measure, but to give them content, so that the interested party can exercise his right of defense and challenge the decision before a higher authority. In the specific case, it has been duly demonstrated that on February 24 of this year, the Deputy Prosecutor for Organized Crime (Fiscalía Adjunta de Crimen Organizado) requested the Criminal Court (Juzgado Penal) of Heredia to convene an oral hearing to request the imposition of precautionary measures against the defendants (encartados) (see folios 7-8 of the copy of the precautionary measures file). Likewise, it was verified that by resolution of 08:55 hrs. of February 25, 2011, the Criminal Court of Heredia set 13:00 hrs. of that same day for the holding of the hearing (see folio 23 of the copy of the precautionary measures file). In addition, it was verified that the oral hearing began at 13:40 hrs. and continued until 23:00 hrs. on February 25, 2011; however, due to a technical problem it was not possible to record the oral statement of grounds (fundamentación) made by the Judge, however, the parties appearing in the proceeding were aware of the technical difficulty and were warned that during the hearing the reasons would be explained to them, but also that they would be recorded in writing. In this way, from the written record in which what was stated at the oral hearing is set down, it was possible to prove that, in this case, the alleged defect of lack of statement of grounds (fundamentación) is not verified, nor the alleged grievances claimed by the appellant in relation to the lack of indication of the date and time of the decision, since, if he was present at the hearing, it was evident that he was aware of such elements and, moreover, they are indeed recorded in the respective minute of the hearing. In relation to the statement of grounds (fundamentación) for the precautionary measure, it is verified that the respondent judge did make reference to the evidentiary elements that are in the record and that justify the alleged participation of the protected party in the illicit acts attributed to him. On this point, the judge stated the following: “(...) It is considered that there are sufficient elements of conviction to presume that the defendants (...) are probably the perpetrators of the illicit acts under investigation, namely the crimes of Extortionate Kidnapping (Secuestro Extorsivo), Aggravated Robbery (Robo Agravado), and Deprivation of Liberty (Privación de Libertad), events that occurred on March twenty-fifth, two thousand eleven (sic), for this procedural stage what must be taken into account for the application of a precautionary measure as onerous as pretrial detention is the existence of a verified indicium and not a certainty, so that with all the elements of conviction indicated by the Public Prosecutor's Office, one can reach the conclusion that the accused (...) are probably the perpetrators of the illicit acts under investigation against them; we have the statement of the victims (ofendidos) (...) who clearly and circumstantially describe how the events occurred (...) in addition to describing the number of people who kidnapped him, the vehicle in which the defendants were traveling, which they used to transport them, the reports of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), which highlight the police proceedings related to the investigation, surveillance, interviews, and tailing of the accused, seizure of videos, specifically from the Tres Ríos toll, the Mall Paseo de las Flores, and the Texaco Service Station in Heredia, in which the vehicle (l200) used by the accused is captured, following the victim at a short distance and the moment in which at great speed they transfer the victim to the Ventana B of ICE in Cachí, in addition to the accounting reports of their banking activity, the presence of marked bills in the banks, which were exchanged at the behest of the accused (...)”. In the case of the protected party, it was specifically justified that on March 30 and April 1, 2010, the date on which the ransom money for the victim's kidnapping was paid, he had in his possession the vehicle with which the events occurred, which was found to be damaged, just as described by the victims. In addition, the judge stated that “(...) On the other hand, it was verified in the investigation that all the money and goods obtained by the four defendants (...) is not consistent with their salary income nor their social status, monies and goods that were acquired after the extortionate kidnapping occurred. On the other hand, the relationship existing among the four accused (...) is evident from the investigation. From the entire investigation, the nexus among the accused is evident, with the participation of each one being decisive for the commission of the acts they are presumed to have carried out, such that the participation (...) was in the sense that he provided the site and the keys where the victim was held (...) while the defendants (...) were the ones who deprived the victims of their liberty and carried out all the extortion actions (...)”. On the other hand, in relation to the procedural dangers attributed to the case of the protected party, Salazar Hernández, the judge stated the following: “(...) it is found that the danger of flight (peligro de fuga), obstruction (obstaculización), and criminal continuity (continuidad delictiva) is present; as for the danger of flight, he himself stated in his investigative statement that he is a mechanic and electrician, one must analyze work ties (arraigo laboral) in light of the facilities the accused has to move, change location, or withdraw from one place to another, without there being ties (arraigo) to a specific area or trade. In that sense, without diminishing in any way the work that Salazar Hernández claims to do (sic), the truth is that they do not signify ties to a specific place for him, since he is his own boss and can move from one place to another without it being any obstacle (...) always within the danger of flight, it was also assessed that he indicated he receives one million colones in monthly income, however, there is no banking record whatsoever to support his claim; on the other hand, the high penalty—from five and fifteen years onward—was assessed, such that given the facilities to move to any part of the country and in the presence of the indicated elements of conviction, these potential, very high sentences become an incentive for him to want to withdraw from the proceeding, coupled with the magnitude of the damage caused, considering the violence and excessiveness of the defendants' actions in view of the vulnerability the victim represented (...)”. As for the danger of obstruction, it was considered that there is still important evidence to be gathered, especially testimonial evidence, in which it is presumable that from the entire display of violence by the accused, they would seek out the victims and witnesses to prevent them from testifying against them and thus benefit themselves. Additionally, regarding the danger of criminal continuity, it is found that the judge verified that the defendant has prior convictions (sentencias condenatorias) for the crimes of attempted aggravated robbery, active bribery (cohecho propio) in the modality of penalty of the corrupter, and aggravated robbery, with the judge considering the following: “(...) it is evident that the defendant is a person prone to committing this type of crime, having already faced convictions against him for three different crimes, and this has not been sufficient deterrence or motivation, thus it is reasonably presumable that if he were free he would continue his criminal activity, which also reflects that his work does not constitute sufficient ties (arraigo) to motivate him as the norm demands (...)”. Furthermore, the judge justified another ground for pretrial detention established in article 239 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically, paragraph d), which refers to organized crime (delincuencia organizada), considering that in the specific case, the evidence demonstrates that the defendants had a plan previously agreed upon with a clear distribution of roles and with a common purpose, in which more than two people participate and involving a serious crime. From the considerations set forth, it is ruled out that the decision imposing the precautionary measure of pretrial detention on the protected party lacks a statement of grounds (fundamentación), for which reason, the appropriate course is to dismiss this part of the appeal.\n\nVI.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary of the considerations made, it is necessary to declare the appeal without merit.”\n\nThe right to be tried by a natural, independent, and impartial judge is an essential part of due process and constitutes an indispensable requirement of a democratic state of law. In the domestic legal order, these principles derive from the provisions of articles 39 (competent judge), 35 (natural judge), 42 (impartiality), and 154 (independence) of the Constitución Política. They are also provided for in various international law instruments, such as, for example, articles 10 of the Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, 14(1) of the Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, and 8(1) of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Our legal system enshrines the principle of objectivity in Article 6 of the Código Procesal Penal, by stating: “Judges shall resolve matters submitted to their knowledge with objectivity.” Now, in the specific case, the appellant challenges that the Jueza Penal of Heredia issued both the authorization to conduct a raid (allanamiento) on the accused’s home and the precautionary measure of pretrial detention (prisión preventiva). However, this Constitutional Court has indicated, repeatedly, that that situation does not imply, in and of itself, a violation of the principle of impartiality. In ruling No. 2010-012287 of 14:33 hrs. on July 21, 2010, the following was stated:\n\n“(...) First, it does not constitute a violation of the principle of impartiality that a single judge ordered both the raid and the precautionary measure of pretrial detention. It should be remembered that a criminal judge is a judge of guarantees (juez de garantías), guarantor of the process in general and, within it, protects the rights of the person subject to proceedings, and furthermore, the criminal procedural law empowers the judge to order raids and decide on the deprivation of liberty, as deemed appropriate, in the cases and through the procedures established by the Constitución and the Ley. For this reason, there is no obstacle to the same judge who ordered a raid subsequently ordering pretrial detention, since not only do both acts respond to different factual bases, but, as stated, in both the judge acts as guarantor. Moreover, considering this character, it is even desirable for the same judge to hear both proceedings, because having prior knowledge of the existing evidence (resulting from the raid) provides the immediate familiarity necessary to rule on pretrial detention and assess the evidentiary elements needed to order or dismiss it. Furthermore, in any event, the criminal procedural system provides sufficient avenues to channel objections related to the propriety of the process, which can ultimately be discussed during the proceedings (...).” (highlighting not in original).\n\nIn line with the foregoing, the grievance must be dismissed. In any event, if the appellant believes that a ground for recusal exists or that the criminal judge should have excused herself from hearing the Public Prosecutor's request because, in his view, there is doubt about her objectivity, he may so argue within the criminal proceedings themselves, in accordance with the rules established in articles 55 et seq. of the Código Procesal Penal. Furthermore, if there is any disagreement with the actions taken, the appropriate course is for the appellant to raise it within the framework of the corresponding criminal proceedings, since this Constitutional Chamber is not an additional instance responsible for overseeing the actions of criminal authorities.\n\nV.- ON THE REASONING (FUNDAMENTACIÓN) OF THE PRETRIAL DETENTION. This Constitutional Court has established in its case law that deprivation of liberty as a precautionary measure is exceptional and may only be ordered by the trial judge when there are objective procedural reasons making it indispensable to ensure the discovery of the real truth and the application of the criminal law. Likewise, it is an unavoidable duty for the Criminal Judge, when ordering such a drastic measure, to substantiate her decision, indicating the factual and legal grounds on which it is based, for it is not a matter of repeating the legal requirements that allow the measure, but of giving them content, so that the affected party may exercise his right of defense and challenge the decision before the Superior Court. In the specific case, it is duly demonstrated that on February 24 of this year, the Fiscalía Adjunta of Organized Crime requested the Juzgado Penal of Heredia to convene an oral hearing to request the imposition of precautionary measures against the defendants (see folios 7-8 of the copy of the precautionary measures file). Likewise, it was confirmed that by resolution at 08:55 hrs. on February 25, 2011, the Juzgado Penal of Heredia set 13:00 hrs. of that same day for the hearing (see folio 23 of the copy of the precautionary measures file). Furthermore, it was verified that the oral hearing began at 13:40 hrs. and continued until 23:00 hrs. on February 25, 2011; however, due to a technical problem, the oral reasoning (fundamentación) provided by the Judge could not be recorded. Nevertheless, the parties appearing in the proceedings were aware of the technical difficulty and were warned that the reasons would be explained to them during the hearing, but would also be recorded in writing. In this way, based on the written record setting forth what was presented at the oral hearing, it was possible to prove that, in this case, the alleged defect of lack of reasoning is not present, nor are the alleged grievances claimed by the appellant regarding the failure to indicate the date and time of the decision, since, if he was present at the hearing, it was evident he was aware of those elements and, moreover, they are recorded in the respective hearing minutes. Regarding the reasoning of the precautionary measure, it is verified that the appealed judge did refer to the evidentiary elements contained in the record that justify the alleged participation of the petitioner in the unlawful acts attributed to him. On this point, the judge stated the following: “(...) It is considered that sufficient evidentiary elements (elementos de convicción) exist to presume that the defendants (...) are probably the perpetrators of the unlawful acts under investigation, namely the crimes of Extortionate Kidnapping (Secuestro Extorsivo), Aggravated Robbery (Robo Agravado), and Deprivation of Liberty (Privación de Libertad), events that occurred on March twenty-fifth, two thousand eleven (sic). At this procedural stage, what must be taken into account for the application of a precautionary measure as burdensome as pretrial detention is the existence of a proven indication (indicio comprobado) and not a certainty, so that with all the evidentiary elements indicated by the Public Prosecutor's Office, the conclusion can be reached that the defendants (...) are probably the perpetrators of the unlawful acts investigated against them. We have the statements of the victims (...), who clearly and in detail describe how the events occurred (...), in addition to describing the number of people who kidnapped them, the vehicle in which the defendants were traveling, which they used to transport them, the reports from the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, detailing the police activities surrounding the investigation, surveillance, interviews, and tracking of the defendants, seizure of videos, specifically from the Tres Ríos toll, the Mall Paseo de las Flores, and the Texaco Servicentro in Heredia, where the vehicle (l200) used by the defendants is captured, following the victim at a short distance, and the moment they transport the victim at high speed to the ICE's Ventana B in Cachí, in addition to the accounting reports of their banking activity, the presence of marked bills in the banks, which were changed under the orders of the defendants (...).” In the petitioner’s case, it was specifically justified that on March 30 and April 1, 2010, the dates on which the ransom for the victim's kidnapping was paid, he had in his possession the vehicle used in the events, which was damaged, just as the victims had described. Additionally, the judge stated that “(...) On the other hand, the investigation confirmed that all the money and goods obtained by the four defendants (...) is not consistent with their salary income or social status, money and goods acquired after the extortionate kidnapping took place. On the other hand, the investigation reveals the existing relationship among the four defendants (...). The investigation reveals the nexus among the defendants, with the participation of each being decisive for the commission of the acts they are presumed to have carried out, such that the participation (...) involved this person providing the location and keys where the victim was held (...) while the defendants (...) were the ones who deprived the victims of their liberty and carried out the entire extortionate scheme (...).” Furthermore, regarding the procedural dangers attributed to the petitioner, Salazar Hernández, the judge stated the following: “(...) it is determined that the danger of flight, obstruction, and continued criminal activity are present. Regarding the danger of flight, he stated in his investigative statement that he is a mechanic and electrician. Employment ties (arraigo laboral) must be analyzed in light of the defendant's ability to move, change locations, or remove himself from one place to another, without having ties to a specific area or trade. In that sense, without in any way detracting from the work that Salazar Hernández states he performs (sic), the fact is that it does not provide ties to a specific location, since he is his own employer and can move from one place to another without any obstacle (...). Still within the danger of flight, it was also assessed that he stated he receives one million colones in monthly income, yet there is no bank record to support his claim. On the other hand, the high penalty –from five and fifteen years onward– was assessed, and given the ease of moving to any part of the country and the presence of the evidentiary elements noted, these potentially very high penalties become an incentive for him to seek to evade the proceedings, coupled with the magnitude of the harm caused, considering the violent and excessive behavior of the defendants given the vulnerability of the victim (...).” Regarding the danger of obstruction, it was considered that significant evidence still needs to be gathered, especially testimonial evidence, in which it is presumable that, due to the defendants' entire display of violence, they may seek out the victims and witnesses to prevent them from testifying against them and thereby benefit. Additionally, regarding the danger of continued criminal activity, the judge confirmed that the defendant has prior convictions for the crimes of attempted aggravated robbery, active bribery in the modality of corruptor penalty, and aggravated robbery, with the judge considering the following: “(...) it is evident that the defendant is a person prone to commit this type of crime, having already faced prior convictions for three different crimes, and this has not been sufficient deterrent or motivation, making it reasonably presumable that if free, he would continue his criminal behavior, which also reflects that his work does not constitute sufficient ties to serve as motivation as required by law (...).” More extensively, the judge justified another ground for pretrial detention established in article 239 bis of the Código Procesal Penal, specifically subsection d), referring to organized crime, considering that in the specific case, the evidence shows the defendants had a previously agreed plan with a clear distribution of functions and a common purpose, where more than two persons are involved and it concerns a serious crime. Based on the stated considerations, it is ruled out that the resolution imposing the precautionary measure of pretrial detention on the petitioner lacks reasoning, and therefore, this aspect of the appeal must be dismissed.\n\nVI.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary to the considerations made, the appeal must be dismissed.”\n\nFurthermore, Article 16 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) provides for the possibility that this Court may examine—through habeas corpus and by connexity—violations of other fundamental rights distinct from personal liberty, provided that these necessarily have a strict impact on liberty, its effective restriction, or the threat of its restriction. But, moreover, not just any threat to liberty is amenable to protection in this venue. Thus, in judgment No. 1142-1994 of 3:03 p.m. on March 1, 1994, this Court clarified the following:\n\n“(…) With respect to the threat to liberty capable of being protected by Habeas Corpus, it is not just any threat that produces such an effect; rather, it must be precise, serious, certain, current, concrete, and imminent, for if it were not so, one would be in the presence of an uncertain future that might not cause any violation of that precious constitutional right and therefore incapable of being protected by the institution of Habeas Corpus. (…)”\n\nIn this context, this Court has repeatedly indicated that the mere existence of a criminal proceeding cannot be interpreted, per se, as an illegitimate threat to the personal liberty of the accused, given that the criminal procedural system itself establishes sufficient and suitable avenues to ensure that it is processed with strict observance of the guarantees, powers, and rights provided for individuals in the Political Constitution, in the International or Community Law in force in Costa Rica, and in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Likewise, in specifying the scope of jurisdiction of this Constitutional Court in relation to the habeas corpus proceeding, it is worth reiterating that it is not one more instance in the criminal process; therefore, it is not its place to oversee the actions of criminal authorities in the exercise of their powers, under penalty of violating Article 153 of the Magna Carta. By virtue of the foregoing, this Court's analysis is limited to determining whether the precautionary measures of pretrial detention were ordered in accordance with the procedural rules pertaining to due process, and not to overseeing whether the analysis of the evidence existing in the proceeding was correct, given that, as stated, this Jurisdiction does not stand as one more instance within the criminal process. Likewise, the appellant's assessments regarding the procedural conduct of the Public Prosecutor's Office authorities must be discussed in the ordinary instances provided for those purposes. Note, on this point, that by this means the intention is to discuss substantive aspects, appropriate to be aired in the criminal jurisdiction and, specifically, before the judge of guarantees, to whom he must present his arguments regarding the alleged lack of access to the evidentiary elements held by the Public Prosecutor's Office, it being the case that this Court has indicated that such disagreements must be presented at the opportune procedural moment, namely, in the oral hearing that took place, an opportunity in which the appellant should have asserted the alleged grievances.\n\nIV.- ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF IMPARTIALITY. The right to be judged by a natural, independent, and impartial judge forms an essential part of due process and constitutes an indispensable requirement of a democratic state of law. In the domestic legal system, these principles derive from the provisions of Articles 39 (competent judge), 35 (natural judge), 42 (impartiality), and 154 (independence) of the Political Constitution. They are also provided for in various international law instruments, such as, for example, Articles 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights. Our legal system enshrines the principle of objectivity in Article 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, stating: “Judges must resolve matters submitted to their knowledge with objectivity.” Now, in the specific case, the appellant questions that the Criminal Judge of Heredia ordered both the authorization to carry out a raid on the accused's dwelling and the precautionary measure of pretrial detention. However, this Constitutional Court has repeatedly indicated that this situation does not imply, in itself, a violation of the principle of impartiality. In judgment No. 2010-012287 of 2:33 p.m. on July 21, 2010, the following was stated:\n\n“(...) In the first place, the fact that it was the same judge who ordered the raid and the precautionary measure of pretrial detention does not constitute a violation of the principle of impartiality. It should be remembered that the criminal judge is a judge of guarantees, guarantor of the process in general, and within it, protects the rights of the person subject to the process, and furthermore, the criminal procedural law empowers him or her to order raids and decide on the deprivation of liberty, as he or she deems appropriate, in the cases and through the procedures established by the Constitution and the Law. For this reason, nothing prevents the same judge who ordered a raid from later being the one who orders pretrial detention, since not only do both acts stem from different grounds, but, as stated, in both acts the judge acts as guarantor. Moreover, considering this role, it is even desirable that it be the same judge who hears both proceedings, because, knowing the existing evidence beforehand (as a result of the raid), he or she has the necessary immediacy to decide on pretrial detention and assess the evidentiary elements necessary to proceed to order or reject it. Furthermore, in any case, the criminal procedural system provides sufficient avenues to channel the objections that, related to the regularity of the process, exist, and which may ultimately be discussed during the process (...)”. (emphasis not in the original).\n\nIn line with the foregoing, the grievance must be dismissed. In any case, if the appellant considers that a ground for recusal exists or that the criminal judge should have excused herself from hearing the Public Prosecutor's Office's petition because, in his opinion, there is doubt about her objectivity, he may so allege in the criminal process itself, in accordance with the rules established in Articles 55 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, if there is any disagreement with what has been done, the appropriate course is for the appellant to present it within the framework of the corresponding criminal process, since this Constitutional Chamber is not one more instance responsible for monitoring the actions of the criminal authorities.\n\nV.- ON THE REASONING (FUNDAMENTACIÓN) OF THE PRETRIAL DETENTION. This Constitutional Court has established in its case law that the deprivation of liberty as a precautionary measure is exceptional and that it may only be ordered by the Judge when objective procedural reasons exist that make it indispensable, in order to ensure the discovery of the real truth and the enforcement of criminal law. Likewise, for the Criminal Judge, it constitutes an unavoidable duty, when ordering such a drastic measure, to provide the reasoning (fundamentación) for his or her decision, indicating the factual and legal grounds on which it is based, since it is not a matter of repeating the legal requirements that allow the measure, but of giving them content, so that the interested party can exercise his or her right of defense and challenge the decision before the Superior Court. In the specific case, it is duly demonstrated that on February 24 of the current year, the Deputy Prosecutor's Office of Organized Crime requested the Criminal Court of Heredia to convene an oral hearing to request the imposition of precautionary measures against the defendants (see folios 7-8 of the copy of the precautionary measures file). Likewise, it was verified that by resolution of 08:55 a.m. on February 25, 2011, the Criminal Court of Heredia set 1:00 p.m. of that same day for the hearing to take place (see folio 23 of the copy of the precautionary measures file). Furthermore, it was verified that the oral hearing began at 1:40 p.m. and lasted until 11:00 p.m. on February 25, 2011; however, due to a technical problem, the oral reasoning (fundamentación) provided by the Judge could not be recorded; however, the parties appearing in the process were aware of the technical difficulty and were warned that the reasons were being explained to them during the hearing, but, in addition, they would be recorded in writing. In this way, from the written record which sets forth what was stated in the oral hearing, it was possible to prove that, in this case, the alleged defect of lack of reasoning (fundamentación) is not verified, nor are the alleged grievances claimed by the appellant in relation to the failure to indicate the date and time of the decision, since, if he was present at the hearing, it was evident that he was aware of such elements, and, moreover, they are indeed recorded in the respective hearing minute. In relation to the reasoning (fundamentación) of the precautionary measure, it is verified that the respondent judge did refer to the evidentiary elements contained in the case file that justify the alleged participation of the protected person in the illicit acts attributed to him. On this particular, the judge stated the following: “(...) It is considered that there are sufficient elements of conviction to presume that the defendants (...) are probably the authors of the illicit acts under investigation, namely the crimes of Extortionate Kidnapping (Secuestro Extorsivo), Aggravated Robbery, and Deprivation of Liberty, acts that occurred on March twenty-fifth, two thousand eleven (sic); for this procedural stage, what must be taken into account for the application of a precautionary measure as burdensome as pretrial detention is the existence of a proven indication and not a certainty; therefore, with all the elements of conviction indicated by the Public Prosecutor's Office, one can reach the conclusion that the accused (...) are probably the authors of the illicit acts being investigated against them; it is noted that the statement of the victims (...) who clearly and circumstantially describe how the acts occurred (...) in addition to describing the number of people who kidnapped them, the vehicle in which the defendants were traveling, which they used to transport them, the reports of the Judicial Investigation Agency, highlighting the police procedures related to the investigation, surveillance, interviews, and follow-ups on the accused, seizure of videos, specifically from the Tres Ríos toll, Mall Paseo de las Flores, and the Texaco Service Station (Servicentro Texaco) in Heredia, where the vehicle (L200) used by the accused is captured, following the victim at a short distance and the moment when they transport the victim at high speed to La Ventana B of ICE in Cachí, in addition to the accounting reports of their banking activity, the presence of marked bills in the banks, which were exchanged at the behest of the accused (...).” In the case of the protected person, it was justified, specifically, that on March 30 and April 1, 2010, the date on which the ransom money for the victim's kidnapping was paid, he had in his possession the vehicle used in the events, which was dented, just as the victims had described. In addition, the judge stated that “(...) On the other hand, it was verified in the investigation that all the money and goods obtained by the four defendants (...) is not consistent with their salary income or social status, money and goods that were acquired after the extortionate kidnapping (secuestro extorsivo) took place. On the other hand, the relationship existing among the four accused emerges from the investigation (...). From the entire investigation, the link between the accused is evident, the participation of each one being decisive for the commission of the acts they are presumed to have carried out, it being the case that the participation of (...) was in the sense that he provided the site and the keys where the victim (...) was held, while the defendants (...) were those who deprived the victims of their liberty and carried out all the extortionate (extorsivo) action (...).” Furthermore, in relation to the procedural risks attributed to the case of the protected person, Salazar Hernández, the judge stated the following: “(...) it is found that the risk of flight, obstruction, and criminal continuity is present; as for the risk of flight, he stated in his investigative statement that he is a mechanic and electrician; one must analyze his employment ties in light of the facilities the accused has to move, change, or withdraw from one place to another, without there being ties to an area or trade; in that sense, without in any way detracting from the work Salazar Hernández states he performs (sic), the truth is that it does not provide him with ties to a specific place, since he is his own employer and can move from one place to another without any obstacle (...) still within the risk of flight, it was also assessed that he indicated he receives one million colones in monthly income; however, there is no bank record whatsoever to support his claim; on the other hand, the high penalty—from five to fifteen years onwards—was assessed, and given the facilities to move anywhere in the country and in the presence of the indicated elements of conviction, these possible very high sentences become an incentive for him to want to evade the process, coupled with the magnitude of the harm caused, considering the violent and excessive nature of the defendants' actions given the vulnerability the victim represented (...).” Regarding the risk of obstruction, it was considered that there is still important evidence to be gathered, especially testimonial evidence, in which it is presumable that, given the entire display of violence by the accused, they may seek out the victims and witnesses to prevent them from testifying against them and thus benefit themselves. Additionally, regarding the risk of criminal continuity, it is noted that the judge verified that the defendant has convictions for the crimes of attempted aggravated robbery, active bribery in the form of corruption, and aggravated robbery, the judge considering the following: “(...) it is evident that the defendant is a person prone to committing this type of crime, having already faced convictions against him for three different crimes and this has not been sufficient deterrent or motivation; thus, it is reasonably presumable that if he were free, he would continue his criminal activity, which also reflects that his work does not constitute sufficient ties for motivation as the rule demands (...).” Further to this, the judge justified another cause for pretrial detention established in Article 239 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically subsection d), which refers to organized crime, considering that, in the specific case, the evidence demonstrates that the defendants had a previously agreed-upon plan with a clear distribution of functions and a common purpose, involving more than two people and dealing with a serious crime. Based on the considerations set forth, the possibility that the resolution imposing a precautionary measure of pretrial detention on the protected person lacks reasoning (fundamentación) is dismissed, for which reason, the appropriate course is to dismiss this aspect of the appeal.\n\nVI.- CONCLUSION. As a corollary of the considerations made, it is necessary to declare the appeal without merit.”" }