{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-122567", "citation": "Res. 00614-2008 Sala Tercera de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Ejecución de condenatorias abstractas en hábeas corpus y amparo", "title_en": "Enforcement of abstract damages awards in habeas corpus and amparo", "summary_es": "La Sala Tercera, al resolver un recurso de casación penal, analiza la naturaleza de la ejecución de sentencia de las condenas abstractas dictadas por la Sala Constitucional en casos de hábeas corpus y amparo, cuando se declara la violación de un derecho fundamental. La sentencia aclara que dicha condena en abstracto no prejuzga la existencia real de daños y perjuicios ni su cuantía, sino que abre la competencia del juez contencioso-administrativo para un verdadero proceso de conocimiento. En esta etapa, el ejecutante tiene la carga procesal de demostrar la existencia, naturaleza y extensión del daño, así como el nexo causal entre la conducta administrativa lesiva y los perjuicios reclamados, con base en los criterios de imputación del artículo 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (funcionamiento normal/anormal, legítimo/ilegítimo). La Sala reitera que la responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado es objetiva pero moderada, exigiendo criterios de imputación sin caer en una transferencia patrimonial automática. La ejecución de sentencia se desnaturaliza y se convierte en un proceso declarativo, no en una mera liquidación.", "summary_en": "The Criminal Chamber, resolving a criminal appeal, analyzes the enforcement of abstract damages rulings issued by the Constitutional Chamber in habeas corpus and amparo proceedings when a fundamental right violation is declared. The ruling clarifies that such abstract condemnation does not prejudge the actual existence or quantification of damages, but rather opens the jurisdiction of the administrative-contentious judge for a full evidentiary trial. In this stage, the claimant bears the procedural burden of proving the existence, nature, and extent of the harm, as well as the causal link between the harmful administrative conduct and the claimed damages, based on the imputation criteria of Article 190 of the General Public Administration Act (normal/abnormal, legitimate/illegitimate functioning). The Chamber reiterates that the State's patrimonial liability is objective but moderated, requiring imputation criteria to avoid automatic wealth transfer. The enforcement proceeding thus becomes a declaratory process, not a mere liquidation.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Tercera de la Corte", "date": "2008", "year": "2008", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado", "condenatoria en abstracto", "ejecución de sentencia", "nexo causal", "LGAP", "Sala Constitucional", "hábeas corpus", "amparo" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 190", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 41", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 26", "law": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional" }, { "article": "Art. 51", "law": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional" }, { "article": "Art. 194", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" } ], "keywords_es": [ "responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado", "condenatoria en abstracto", "ejecución de sentencia", "Sala Constitucional", "hábeas corpus", "amparo", "carga de la prueba", "nexo causal", "LGAP artículo 190", "responsabilidad objetiva moderada", "Sala Tercera de la Corte", "recurso de casación penal", "daños y perjuicios", "proceso de conocimiento" ], "keywords_en": [ "State patrimonial liability", "abstract condemnation", "sentence enforcement", "Constitutional Chamber", "habeas corpus", "amparo", "burden of proof", "causal link", "LGAP Article 190", "moderated objective liability", "Third Chamber of the Court", "criminal cassation appeal", "damages", "declaratory process" ], "excerpt_es": "En este caso, se trata de una condenatoria en abstracto que debe ser concretada en ejecución posterior, por ende, en estos casos es de rigor valorar la situación y circunstancias en las que los derechos tutelados fueron vulnerados, en razón de que como se ha indicado supra, el pronunciamiento que dicta el Tribunal Constitucional es en abstracto. Así, la condenatoria referida, lo que hace es abrir la competencia del juzgador contencioso administrativo para analizar sobre la existencia real o no de los daños y perjuicios, y fijar su monto acorde con las circunstancias propias del caso.\n\nLa naturaleza de la substancia debatida exige una probanza objetiva de la existencia de los daños acusados, y luego, que son efectivamente consecuencia inmediata y directa de la conducta del Estado, sea esta activa u omisiva. De este modo, se impone la demostración de la existencia de un nexo causal entre estos dos apartes. Es decir, dentro del proceso el juzgador debe dirimir si los daños que presenta el ejecutante son consecuencia del funcionamiento público o si por el contrario, son el resultado de factores ajenos al quehacer administrativo.\n\nLo dicho significa que la condenatoria dictada por la Sala Constitucional no genera per se, un deber de reconocimiento de la indemnización requerida por el ejecutante, más bien, este pronunciamiento presupone un juicio valorativo de la real existencia del daño.", "excerpt_en": "In this case, it is an abstract condemnation that must be made concrete in a subsequent enforcement proceeding; therefore, it is essential to assess the situation and circumstances under which the protected rights were violated, because, as indicated above, the ruling issued by the Constitutional Court is abstract. Thus, the referred condemnation opens the jurisdiction of the administrative-contentious judge to analyze the actual existence or non-existence of damages and set their amount according to the specific circumstances of the case.\n\nThe nature of the debated substance demands objective proof of the existence of the alleged damages, and subsequently, that they are indeed the immediate and direct consequence of the State's conduct, whether active or omissive. Thus, the demonstration of a causal link between these two elements is required. That is, within the proceeding, the judge must determine whether the damages presented by the claimant are a consequence of public functioning or, on the contrary, the result of factors unrelated to administrative activity.\n\nThis means that the condemnation issued by the Constitutional Chamber does not per se generate a duty to recognize the compensation sought by the claimant; rather, this ruling presupposes a value judgment on the actual existence of the harm.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The Criminal Chamber dismisses the criminal cassation appeal, upholding the conviction for aggravated deprivation of liberty without profit motive, but clarifies that enforcement of the abstract damages award from the habeas corpus proceeding requires a declaratory trial where the causal link and actual existence of harm must be proved.", "summary_es": "La Sala Tercera declara sin lugar el recurso de casación penal, confirmando la condena por privación agravada de libertad sin ánimo de lucro, pero precisando que la ejecución de la condena abstracta de daños y perjuicios proveniente del hábeas corpus requiere un proceso de conocimiento donde se demuestre el nexo causal y la existencia real del daño." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "the patrimonial (not civil) and extracontractual liability of the Public Administration falls within a preeminently objective regime, which fundamentally encompasses both the risk theory and the balance in the patrimonial equation.", "quote_es": "la responsabilidad patrimonial (que no civil) y extracontractual de la Administración Pública, se enmarca dentro de un régimen preeminentemente objetivo, que comprende en su base tanto la teoría del riesgo como el equilibrio en la ecuación patrimonial." }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "Whenever a harm has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, whether active or omissive, which there is no duty to bear, the duty to compensate is imposed, by virtue of the principle of full reparation for harm derived from Article 41 of the Political Constitution.", "quote_es": "En tanto se haya sufrido una lesión como consecuencia de una conducta pública, sea esta activa u omisiva, que no tiene el deber de soportar, se impone el deber de resarcimiento, en virtud del principio de reparación integral del daño que se desprende del numeral 41 de la Constitución Política." }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "the condemnation issued by the Constitutional Chamber does not per se generate a duty to recognize the compensation sought by the claimant; rather, this ruling presupposes a value judgment on the actual existence of the harm.", "quote_es": "la condenatoria dictada por la Sala Constitucional no genera per se, un deber de reconocimiento de la indemnización requerida por el ejecutante, más bien, este pronunciamiento presupone un juicio valorativo de la real existencia del daño." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-122567", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-12443", "norm_num": "7130", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Civil", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "16/08/1989" }, { "doc_id": "norm-13231", "norm_num": "6227", "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978" }, { "doc_id": "norm-7331", "norm_num": "", "norm_name": "Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa", "tipo_norma": "", "norm_fecha": "" }, { "doc_id": "norm-871", "norm_num": "0", "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“V. […] El Estado es responsable\r\npatrimonialmente frente a terceros por los daños que ocasione su funcionamiento\r\nnormal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo, salvo el caso fortuito, la culpa de la\r\nvíctima o el hecho de un tercero y este principio\r\ngeneral lo sientan los artículos 9, 11 y 41 de la Constitución Política\r\ny lo recoge el artículo 190 de la LGAP. Frente a la\r\npersona que ha sufrido un daño que se relacione con el funcionamiento de la Administración,\r\nésta debe responder, con independencia del título bajo el cual se acoja tal\r\nresponsabilidad, que deberá en todo caso establecerse, es decir, debe\r\ndeterminarse el nexo causal del daño con la actividad pública y el criterio de\r\nimputación de esta responsabilidad, que no obstante ser objetiva, no renuncia a\r\ntener criterios de imputación, pues lo contrario implicaría una simple\r\ntraslación de responsabilidad al patrimonio estatal, lo que resulta\r\nimprocedente. La responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado surge por la necesidad\r\nde proteger al administrado de los daños que la actividad de aquélla ocasiona y\r\nque el perjudicado no está en la\r\nobligación jurídica de soportar. La imputación del resultado lesivo a la Administración hace\r\nsurgir su deber de indemnizar por la antijuricidad de su comportamiento dañoso.\r\nEn cuanto a este tema, esta Sala recientemente señaló “[…]. Ahora bien, por más amplios que sean los\r\ntérminos en los que actualmente se valora la responsabilidad patrimonial del\r\nEstado, no se renuncia a exigir ciertos criterios de imputación del daño a la\r\nactividad pública pues, de lo contrario, sería insostenible para la Administración\r\nque se le atribuyera la responsabilidad de todo el funcionamiento de la\r\nsociedad sólo por la vinculación de las actividades incluso particulares, con\r\nlos fines y funciones esenciales del Estado, de manera que es necesario\r\nracionalizar y dotar de criterios jurídicos adecuados la esfera de imputación\r\ndel daño a la\r\n Administración Pública. En nuestro medio, ciertamente los numerales 9, 11 y 41\r\nde la Constitución\r\n Política son la base para establecer el deber de\r\nindemnización que pesa sobre el Estado por los daños ocasionados, sin embargo,\r\nlos criterios de imputación están definidos con claridad en los artículos 190 y\r\n191 de la Ley General\r\nde la Administración\r\n Pública, cuando señala el artículo 190 que la Administración\r\n Pública responderá “por todos \r\nlos daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o\r\nanormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero”. Esta\r\nes la norma general que sienta las bases de la responsabilidad patrimonial del\r\nEstado en nuestro medio. Los supuestos que contemplan las normas siguientes\r\nreferidas a la responsabilidad por la conducta ilícita de los servidores\r\npúblicos y por conducta lícita complementan este régimen, pero las premisas\r\ngenerales las define el artículo citado. \r\nEs a partir de estos conceptos de funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo,\r\nnormal o anormal de la Administración,\r\nque se debe definir cuándo se imputa una conducta dañosa y cuándo debe\r\nresponder patrimonialmente el Estado. Y al respecto, la Sala Primera\r\nha señalado “[…] Por las particularidades propias de la responsabilidad de la\r\n Administración Pública, generadas a través de su evolución\r\ngradual, así como el carácter objetivo alcanzado, con claro fundamento\r\nconstitucional, no puede interpretarse como un deber resarcitorio,\r\nirrestricto y permanente, aplicable siempre y para todas las hipótesis de\r\nlesión. Sería inaudito un régimen de tal naturaleza y materialmente\r\ninsoportable para cualquier Estado con recursos financieros limitados. Por ello\r\nse ha acudido a criterios de imputación que de alguna forma dimensionan, dentro\r\nde la objetividad dicha, ese deber indemnizatorio originado por la conducta\r\npública. De allí que puede afirmarse que, el nacional, es un régimen de\r\nresponsabilidad patrimonial de la\r\n Administración Pública de carácter objetivamente moderado, en\r\ntanto no renuncia a parámetros o criterios de imputación, sobre todo en lo\r\ntocante a la anormalidad e ilicitud, en la que de una u otra forma, valora y\r\ncalifica la conducta del aparato público. Se trata de criterios amplios y\r\ndiversos a los de dolo y culpa que tradicionalmente utiliza el derecho común, pero\r\nque no por ello, dejan de convertirse en criterios de atribución que\r\nalejan el instituto de una mera transferencia patrimonial automática, sin\r\nvaloración alguna de la conducta administrativa desplegada. De esta manera,\r\nel numeral 190 de nuestra Ley General de la\r\n Administración Pública refiere a “funcionamiento legítimo o\r\nilegítimo, normal o anormal”, de donde la legitimidad o su antítesis, hace\r\nreferencia básicamente a las conductas jurídicas de la Administración,\r\nmientras que lo normal o anormal, apunta, ante todo (pero no en exclusiva), a\r\nla conducta material de la Administración,\r\nrepresentada entre otras, por la actividad prestacional que se atribuye al\r\nEstado, como parte de la categoría social que también se le asigna en procura\r\ndel bienestar general del colectivo. Nótese como el artículo 194 de la indicada\r\nley, hace referencia a los “actos lícitos”, bajo la concepción de actividad\r\njurídica, distinguiéndolos en la misma norma, de lo que califica como\r\n“funcionamiento normal\", entendido como actividad material. De esta\r\nmanera, la anormalidad atiende a aquellas conductas administrativas, que en sí\r\nmismas, se apartan de la buena administración (conforme al concepto\r\nutilizado por la propia Ley General en el artículo 102 inciso d., que entre\r\notras cosas incluye la eficacia y la eficiencia) o de la organización, de las\r\nreglas técnicas o de la pericia y el prudente quehacer en el despliegue de sus\r\nactuaciones, con efecto lesivo para la persona. Esto permite señalar que la\r\nanormalidad puede manifestarse a través de un mal funcionamiento; un\r\nfuncionamiento tardío, o una ausencia total de funcionamiento. Anormalidad e\r\nilicitud, no deben por tanto adoptarse como conceptos equivalentes, ni\r\nsiquiera en lo que corresponde a la hipótesis de aquel funcionamiento que\r\nsiendo debido o conforme con las reglas antedichas, produce un resultado\r\ndañoso, denominado por algún sector doctrinal como “funcionamiento anormal por\r\nresultado”, pues en tal caso, lo que opera es una responsabilidad por\r\nfuncionamiento normal con efecto o resultado lesivo, indemnizable, claro está,\r\nsiempre que se cubran los requisitos preestablecidos expresamente por el propio\r\nOrdenamiento Jurídico (véase el mismo artículo 194 de la Ley General\r\nde la\r\n Administración Pública). Tampoco debe confundirse esta\r\n“anormalidad” del funcionamiento y la “ilegitimidad” de éste, con la\r\nantijuricidad genérica y de base, imprescindible en toda reparación civil. En\r\nefecto, la responsabilidad patrimonial nace de la antijuricidad, que a su vez\r\nse constituye en su fundamento (derivado algunas veces de una norma positiva,\r\nmientras que en otras, del principio básico traducido en el deber de no dañar a\r\notro), y que para esta materia particular se concreta en la inexistencia de ese\r\ndeber para soportar el daño. Así las cosas, si no existe para la víctima\r\nel deber de sobrellevar la lesión (manifiesta como consecuencia final ablativa\r\nde la conducta pública), es porque la Administración\r\ndebía evitarla, o, en caso contrario y bajo ciertas circunstancias, asumir las\r\nconsecuencias reparadoras de aquella que no pudo impedir, bien por\r\nimprevisible, bien por inevitable. Cuando tal deber de sobrellevar la lesión no\r\nexiste, se produce el incumpliendo al deber de indemnidad patrimonial de la\r\npersona, y en ese tanto, habrá que reputar la lesión causada en la esfera\r\njurídica de la víctima, como antijurídica, y por ende, de obligada reparación.\r\nDe esta manera, puede afirmarse que sólo es indemnizable la lesión que\r\nconfrontada con la globalidad del Ordenamiento, pueda reputarse como\r\nantijurídica en su base, en tanto que el régimen jurídico la considera\r\ninaceptable para la víctima, con independencia de la calificación, que\r\nposterior y necesariamente, se atribuya a la conducta pública. Lo\r\ncontrario sería afirmar la compensación por acción dañosa frente a un menoscabo\r\nque el Ordenamiento no reprocha y que, por el contrario, tolera y conciente\r\ncomo normal y justificado […] Esa reiterada antijuricidad estará siempre\r\npresente en el daño indemnizable, bien sea por funcionamiento normal o anormal,\r\nlegítimo o ilegítimo. Sea como fuere, esos cuatro criterios de\r\nimputación que utiliza la Ley General\r\nde la\r\n Administración Pública en el artículo 190, han de\r\nreputarse de cobijo y respaldo constitucional, en tanto concretan la\r\ntransferencia que el constituyente realizó en el numeral 41 al legislador\r\nordinario (“ocurriendo a las leyes”) e instrumentalizan la tutela judicial\r\nefectiva que consagra la Constitución. Y\r\nsiendo ello así, habrá de concluirse que tales criterios aplican para la\r\nresponsabilidad patrimonial de toda autoridad pública, sea administrativa,\r\nlegislativa o jurisdiccional […]”precedente número 308-06 de las 10:30 horas\r\ndel 25 de mayo de 2006 de la Sala Primera\r\n[…]” precedente 1273-07 de las 10:31 horas del 30 de octubre de 2007. Ahora\r\nbien. Cuando se trata de la responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración,\r\ncomo se indicó, teniendo en cuenta los parámetros de imputación que señala la\r\nley, demostrados estos y el resultado dañoso, procede declarar su\r\nresponsabilidad patrimonial, independientemente de que se compruebe o no la\r\nexistencia de una conducta delictiva del funcionario. Así, en cuanto a este\r\ntema la jurisprudencia de la\r\n Sala Primera ha puntualizado “[…]Ya\r\nesta Sala ha tenido la oportunidad de pronunciarse sobre el régimen de\r\nresponsabilidad patrimonial a que está sujeto el Estado. En este sentido en el\r\nfallo no. 584 de las 10 horas 40 minutos del 11 de agosto del 2005 realizó un\r\namplio desarrollo y análisis sobre esta temática, detallando sus\r\nparticularidades, marco de evolución, sustento constitucional entre otras\r\nconsideraciones de importancia. En lo que viene relevante al caso, cabe señalar\r\nque la responsabilidad patrimonial (que no civil) y extracontractual de la Administración Pública,\r\nse enmarca dentro de un régimen preeminentemente objetivo, que comprende en su\r\nbase tanto la teoría del riesgo como el equilibrio en la ecuación patrimonial.\r\nCon ello se procura esencialmente, la reparación indemnizatoria a quien ha\r\nsufrido una lesión atribuible a la organización pública como centro de\r\nautoridad. Este criterio finalista produce a su vez, una transformación plena\r\nen el eje central de la responsabilidad misma, pues abandona la observación\r\nanalítica del sujeto productor del daño y la calificación de su conducta, para\r\nubicarse en la posición de la víctima, que menguada en su situación jurídica,\r\nqueda eximida en la comprobación de cualquier parámetro subjetivo del agente\r\npúblico actuante (salvo en lo que a su responsabilidad personal se refiere).\r\nEsto ocasiona, sin duda, un giro radical en el enfoque propio de su fundamento,\r\nya que habrá responsabilidad del Estado siempre que la víctima no tenga el\r\ndeber de soportar el daño, ya sea este de naturaleza patrimonial o\r\nextrapatrimonial. A partir de allí, es patente la reversión de los componentes\r\ny efectos del instituto en pleno. Tanto los presupuestos esenciales como la\r\ncarga de la prueba, adquieren un nuevo matiz, que libera al afectado no solo de\r\namarras sustanciales sino también procesales, y coloca a la Administración en\r\nla obligada descarga frente a los cargos y hechos que se le imputan. En este\r\nmarco, la responsabilidad marcadamente objetiva dispensa el análisis de\r\nfactores de corte subjetivo e individual del agente productor para la\r\ndeterminabilidad de la reparación del daño, trasladándose a la esfera del\r\nlesionado. En tanto se haya sufrido una lesión como consecuencia de una\r\nconducta pública, sea esta activa u omisiva, que no tiene el deber de soportar,\r\nse impone el deber de resarcimiento, en virtud del principio de reparación\r\nintegral del daño que se desprende del numeral 41 de la Constitución Política. En este mismo sentido,\r\npueden consultarse, entre muchas otras, las sentencias de esta Sala números 138\r\nde las 15 horas 5 minutos del 23 de agosto; 192 de las 14 horas 15 minutos del\r\n6 de noviembre, ambas de 1991; 48 de las 14 horas 10 minutos del 29 de mayo de\r\n1996 y 55 de las 14 horas treinta minutos del 4 de julio de 1997.) A la\r\nluz de lo dispuesto en dichos precedentes, y como bien lo dispuso el Tribunal,\r\nel Ordenamiento Jurídico, a partir de la Ley General de la Administración Pública,\r\nadopta, según se ha dicho, el sistema de responsabilidad preeminentemente\r\nobjetiva. Por ello, no es necesaria la existencia -y, por ende, su\r\ndemostración-, del dolo o la culpa o, en general, una falta subjetiva imputable\r\na los servidores o funcionarios públicos para que surja el deber de resarcir\r\nlos daños y perjuicios causados por su funcionamiento. Por ello, el canon 190\r\nde ese cuerpo legal dispone con meridiana claridad la responsabilidad del\r\nEstado por su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo que\r\nconverjan en el caso concreto, las causas eximentes que esa misma disposición,\r\nde forma taxativa expresa, a saber; la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima y\r\nel hecho de un tercero, correspondiéndole a la Administración\r\nacreditar su existencia. De este órgano colegiado, puede verse las sentencias\r\nde esta misma Sala no. 589-F-99 de 14 horas 20 minutos del primero de octubre\r\nde 1999 y no. 252-F-01, de las 16 horas 15 minutos del 28 de marzo del 2001.En\r\nesta misma línea, el canon 194.3 de ese mismo cuerpo legal sienta las bases\r\nlegales de la responsabilidad del Estado Legislador. Los numerales 9, 11, 33,\r\n41 y 154, todos de la\r\n Carta Magna, constituyen el fundamento y sustento de la\r\nresponsabilidad del Estado Juez por el error judicial, el funcionamiento\r\nanormal o ilícito de la función jurisdiccional. De ahí que no podría sostenerse\r\nuna “impunidad” del Estado, bajo el fundamento de que carece de desarrollo\r\nlegal, pues aquella se encuentra establecida por principio, en el marco de la Constitución, a la\r\nvez que supondría un quebranto a la seguridad jurídica, el principio de\r\nigualdad y al control de la arbitrariedad de los poderes públicos. Así visto,\r\nsu reconocimiento no está condicionado a la existencia de mandato legal que la\r\nregule. La responsabilidad aludida se rige por lo estatuido en la Carta Fundamental,\r\nes decir, constituye un principio de base constitucional, impuesto por las\r\nnormas referidas y que busca el control del ejercicio de toda la función y\r\nconducta del Estado en cualquiera de sus esferas, así como la tutela de los\r\nderechos e intereses de los justiciables […]” precedente número 74-07 de\r\nlas 10:15 horas del 2 de febrero de 2007 de la Sala Primera. En el\r\ncaso concreto, el objeto del proceso de hábeas corpus ante la Sala Constitucional\r\nconstituyó la privación ilegítima de libertad de B por parte de las autoridades\r\ndel Centro de Información Policial de la Fuerza Pública de\r\nPérez Zeledón, J P I y D M L, ocurrida el 30 de abril de 2004. Se analizó la\r\nconducta injustificada de dos funcionarios públicos en ejercicio de sus cargos\r\nque privaron de libertad a esta persona. Se cuestionó la realización de un acto\r\nque se demandaba arbitrario por parte de autoridades públicas, es decir, por el\r\nfuncionamiento de la\r\n Administración. La Sala Constitucional pidió informes a los\r\nfuncionarios involucrados y a los jerarcas públicos que tenían que ver con el\r\nacto cuestionado y al resolver el recurso señaló “[…] Hechos probados. De\r\nimportancia para la decisión de este asunto, se estiman como debidamente\r\ndemostrados los siguientes hechos, sea porque así han sido acreditados o bien\r\nporque el recurrido haya omitido referirse a ellos según lo prevenido en el\r\nauto inicial: Que mediante resolución del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo\r\ndel dieciséis de marzo del año en curso, se les otorgó la condición de\r\nresidentes rentistas al amparado y a su esposa, Ann Maxine Patton, por lo que\r\nmediante oficio número P-182-2001, dicho instituto se solicitó a la Dirección General\r\nde Migración y Extranjería la concesión de la categoría migratoria de residente\r\nal amparado y su esposa (folios 17 y 18 e informe a folio 9); b) que el treinta\r\nde abril del año en curso, aproximadamente a las diecisiete horas y quince\r\nminutos, los funcionarios del CIFP, J P I y D M L, procedieron a seguir al vehículo del\r\namparado en base a \"informes confidenciales\" y una denuncia de que\r\nexistía un extranjero en situación irregular que era necesario identificar\r\n(folio 36 e informe a folio 27); c) que cuando el auto del amparado se éste se\r\ndetuvo, solicitaron la identificación del amparado y de su esposa, quienes les\r\nmostraron únicamente una licencia del estado de Arizona a nombre de B (folio 36\r\ne informe a folio 27); c) que al solicitarle al amparado otro documento de\r\nidentificación para determinar su legalidad en el país, éste les manifestó que\r\nlo tenía en su casa, y al solicitarle que los acompañaran a sus oficinas, se\r\nrehusó verbal y físicamente por lo que solicitaron ayuda a la Delegación Cantonal\r\nde la Fuerza Pública\r\nde Pérez Zeledón logrando llevara al amparado dicha delegación, mientras su\r\nesposa traía los pasaportes (informes a folios 27 y 72); d) que se comunicaron\r\ncon oficiales de Migración, para determinar el estatus migratorio del amparado\r\ny su esposa, por cuanto el pasaporte facilitado era de Grenada y expedido en\r\nuna fecha anterior a la que, según la respectiva certificación de entradas y\r\nsalidas de Migración, el amparado se encontraba residiendo en Costa Rica,\r\nhabiendo utilizado un pasaporte estadounidense para entrar y salir del país;\r\nademás, de que en el pasaporte de Grenada mostrado, la última entrada al país\r\nera del dieciséis de setiembre del año pasado, dato ilegal a la vista, por\r\nhaber transcurrido siete meses y medio desde su entrada al país (folios 35, 37 a 40 e informe\r\na folio 27); e) que a las veintidós horas del mismo día, el amparado salió de la Delegación Cantonal\r\nde la Fuerza Pública\r\nde Pérez Zeledón ante la presencia de su abogado, sin presentar golpes\r\nvisibles, ni molestias y en compañía de los oficiales del Organismo de\r\nInvestigación Judicial de Pérez Zeledón, Ricardo Calderón y Bernardo Fallas,\r\npor lo que el amparado firmó el libro aceptando no haber sido maltratado ni\r\ngolpeado (informe a folio 72). II.- Objeto del recurso.- En la especie,\r\nel recurrente alega que el treinta de abril del dos mil uno, aproximadamente a\r\nlas dieciséis horas treinta minutos, el amparado y su esposa transitaban en su\r\nvehículo en las inmediaciones de la localidad de Quebradas de Pérez Zeledón,\r\ncuando de forma \"intempestiva\" y \"temeraria\" un automóvil\r\nmarca Cherokee, con vidrios polarizados y sin rotulación policial de ninguna\r\nclase, los interceptó mediante una maniobra que obligó al amparado a detenerse.\r\nIndica que del vehículo marca Cherokee se bajaron dos personas vestidos de\r\nciviles, una de ellas con un arma de fuego, quienes de forma\r\n\"abusiva\" le solicitaron al amparado que saliera de su vehículo\r\nporque tenía que acompañarlos a la Delegación Policial\r\nde la zona en calidad de detenido, ya que había una orden de investigación\r\nemitida en su contra por la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, lo\r\nanterior sin identificarse como funcionarios policiales y sin mostrar orden\r\nalguna, por lo que el amparado solicitó que lo hicieran y ante esto dispararon\r\na sus pies. Posteriormente fueron conducidos a la delegación referida, donde\r\nestuvieron detenidas aproximadamente hasta las diecinueve horas y treinta\r\nminutos, lo que considera violatorio de sus derechos. III.- Respuesta de las\r\nautoridades.- Las autoridades recurridas afirman en el informe rendido bajo\r\nla fe del juramento que la detención de que fue objeto el amparado y su esposa\r\nfue legítima, puesto que no portaba en ese momento con documento alguno que\r\ndemostraran la legalidad de su permanencia en el país. Dicha detención fue\r\nejecutada por oficiales del Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía y Seguridad\r\nPública, en razón de que existían informes confidenciales, relacionados con un\r\nextranjero al que era necesario identificar por estar en aparente situación\r\nirregular y el amparado no logró demostrar la legalidad de su situación\r\nmigratoria. Constata la Sala\r\nque se le concedió tiempo para que la persona que lo acompañaba (su esposa) se\r\ntrasladara a recoger los documentos pertinentes, por lo que una vez aportados a\r\nese despacho se procedió a poner en libertad al amparado y a su esposa.\r\nContrario a lo referido en el escrito de interposición, los funcionarios aducen\r\nque el trato al amparado y su acompañante en ningún momento fue\r\nagresivo ni violatorio de sus derechos, que ellos se identificaron debidamente,\r\nno estaban armados y en ningún momento dispararon a los pies del amparado como\r\nclama el recurrente. IV.- La\r\n Detención (artículo 37 constitucional).- Considera la Sala que en el caso concreto\r\nefectivamente se violentó el derecho a libertad del amparado, por cuanto el\r\nfundamento para proceder al traslado y detención del mismo a la Delegación lo fue la\r\nexistencia de \"informes confidenciales\", lo que en primer lugar no\r\nconstituye una razón objetiva y en segundo lugar, no se aporta prueba alguna en\r\nlos autos de tal circunstancia. Debe empezarse por mencionar que los oficiales\r\ninvolucrados en el asunto no eran funcionarios de la Dirección General\r\nde Migración, de donde resulta que no tenían competencia para detener e\r\ninterrogar al amparado por \"cuestiones migratorias\". Si bien es\r\ncierto que el hecho de que el amparado presentara como documento de\r\nidentificación una licencia de conducir de origen extranjero –específicamente\r\nestadounidense- y que cuando tuvo que mostrar su pasaporte presentó uno de\r\nGrenada, a pesar de que posteriormente se pudo comprobar que había ingresado al\r\npaís con uno estadounidense, expedido tiempo antes de que lo fuera el de\r\nGrenada, ello es una circunstancia que pudo haber encontrado sospechosa e\r\ninvestigado la policía migratoria, pero no los oficiales del Centro de\r\nInformación Policial del Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía y Seguridad\r\nPública que carecen de competencia para hacerlo. Refieren las autoridades\r\nrecurridas que otro de los fundamentos para proceder a lo que efectivamente fue\r\nuna detención del amparado, fue la existencia de una denuncia interpuesta ante\r\nel Centro de Información de la Fuerza Pública en relación con un ciudadano de\r\napellidos W J y su esposa T, de donde era necesario solicitar la información\r\nveraz que pudiese comprobar que el amparado y su esposa no fueran esas\r\npersonas. Tampoco de esta denuncia se aporta en el expediente más que el dicho\r\ndel Ministro de Gobernación y Policía y Seguridad Pública; pero es que aun\r\npartiendo que dicha denuncia efectivamente haya existido, los apellidos del\r\namparado, ni por asomo, tienen un parecido con los del extranjero denunciado,\r\ncircunstancia que se comprobó desde el momento en que el amparado presentó la\r\nlicencia de conducir. De lo anterior se concluye que no hubo en ningún momento\r\nrazón para proceder a la detención del amparado, porque como lo han mencionados\r\nlos precedentes de esta Sala, no es posible detener a una persona por la sola\r\ndenuncia o mera sospecha, por no constituir éstos indicios comprobados de haber\r\ncometido delito, presupuesto necesario al tenor del artículo 37 constitucional\r\n[…] V.- Conclusión.- De todo lo anterior se puede rescatar que los\r\nfuncionarios involucrados violentaron el principio de legalidad al asumir\r\natribuciones ajenas a su competencia como suyas, lesionando con dicha\r\nactuación, el derecho a la libertad del amparado. No existía razón para\r\nproceder a la detención del amparado, ya que la sola existencia de los dos\r\nfundamentos que dan las autoridades recurridas, a saber los informes\r\nconfidenciales y la denuncia, no eran suficientes en los términos del artículo\r\n37 constitucional. En lo que respecta a los informes confidenciales, no es\r\nposible aceptar dicha justificación porque ello implicaría que una autoridad\r\ncualquiera podría detener a una persona y alegar que lo hizo debido a\r\n\"informes confidenciales\", reservando el origen de mismos por su\r\ncondición, llevando a la nada el contenido del derecho constitucional a la\r\nlibertad reconocido por la Constitución Política y protegido por la\r\njurisprudencia de este Tribunal. En cuanto a la denuncia, ya se hizo referencia\r\na la que ha sido la línea de pensamiento de la Sala. Así las cosas, y\r\nsiendo que una vez comprobado que tanto el amparado como su esposa gozan de la\r\ncondición de ciudadanos rentistas, se procedió a dejarlos en libertad, es\r\nmenester declarar el recurso pura y simplemente con lugar para los efectos\r\nindemnizatorios que procedan […]”. precedente\r\nnúmero 8457-01 de las 8:46 horas del 24 de agosto de 2001. Desde el punto de\r\nvista del proceso sumarísimo de tutela a la libertad que es el habeas corpus, la Sala Constitucional\r\nconstató la ilegitimidad de la detención del amparado –en este caso la víctima\r\nB- y el fin principal del proceso –hacer cesar la violación al derecho\r\nfundamental- cedió por cuanto al momento de resolver ya el ofendido había sido\r\npuesto en libertad. No obstante ello, en todo caso y como lo prescribe el\r\nartículo 26 párrafo segundo –y el 41 en \r\nmateria de recursos de amparo- ambos de la Ley sobre la Jurisdicción\r\n Constitucional, al declarar la violación un derecho\r\nfundamental de manera automática procede condenar al Estado al pago de los\r\ndaños y perjuicios ocasionados. Se ha discutido mucho sobre el alcance de esta\r\ncondenatoria, pues en estos procesos no se evacua prueba que se dirija a la\r\ndemostración de los daños ocasionados ni del vínculo o nexo causal entre la\r\nactividad administrativa y los daños y perjuicios que se reclaman, aunque es\r\nindudable que toda violación a un derecho fundamental implica ya una obligación\r\nestatal de reparar. De allí que se\r\nseñale que efectivamente tal condenatoria asigna un derecho al amparado. Sin\r\nembargo, dada la naturaleza de los procesos sumarios de amparo y habeas corpus,\r\nno obstante que al ser acogidos se demuestra la lesión a derechos\r\nfundamentales, la decisión estimatoria del reclamo en habeas corpus o amparo no\r\nha establecido la naturaleza y el alcance de a responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración,\r\ncomo tampoco la existencia, naturaleza y extensión, así como el alcance y\r\ncuantificación de los daños que se pretendan sufridos. Y precisamente por la\r\nnaturaleza de las resoluciones de la Sala Constitucional\r\nque declaran con lugar los recursos de habeas corpus o de amparo, la vía de\r\nejecución de sentencia de lo contencioso administrativo para este tipo de\r\nfallo, se ve desnaturalizada pues se convierte, no en un proceso de ejecución\r\ncomún –en el que se liquidan los daños y se discute su monto- sino en un\r\nverdadero proceso de conocimiento, en el que el amparado debe probar la\r\nexistencia, naturaleza y extensión del daño así como los montos pretendidos, lo\r\nque significa iniciar un verdadero \r\njuicio ordinario para el reclamo de los daños y perjuicios, probando su\r\nexistencia, el vínculo y responsabilidad estatal, su obligación de resarcirlos\r\ny su monto. La propia Sala Primera de la Corte ha reconocido esta realidad, valorando la\r\nejecución de las condenatorias en recursos de amparo, equiparables a las que\r\nsuceden en los habeas corpus. Así, en el precedente número 138-f-06 de las 8:10\r\nhoras del 16 de marzo de 2006 “[…] tratándose de procesos de ejecución de\r\nsentencia de los fallos dictados por la jurisdicción constitucional en recursos\r\nde amparos, es de rigor hacer algunas precisiones. Como se sabe, la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional\r\nasigna a la Sala\r\nde la materia la potestad jurisdiccional para condenar a la reposición de los\r\ndaños y perjuicios que se deriven de los actos de las autoridades públicas o\r\nprivadas sujetas al ámbito tutelar de este recurso, que lesionen el régimen de\r\nlos derechos fundamentales de las personas. En este sentido, respecto del\r\nproceso de amparo, el párrafo inicial del numeral 51 de ese cuerpo normativo\r\nindica con claridad: “... toda resolución que acoja el recurso condenará en\r\nabstracto a la indemnización de los daños y perjuicios causados y al pago de\r\nlas costas del recurso, y se reservará sui liquidación para la ejecución de\r\nsentencia.” En este caso, se trata de una condenatoria en abstracto que debe\r\nser concretada en ejecución posterior, por ende, en estos casos es de rigor\r\nvalorar la situación y circunstancias en las que los derechos tutelados fueron\r\nvulnerados, en razón de que como se ha indicado supra, el pronunciamiento que\r\ndicta el Tribunal Constitucional es en abstracto. Así, la condenatoria\r\nreferida, lo que hace es abrir la competencia del juzgador contencioso\r\nadministrativo para analizar sobre la existencia real o no de los daños y\r\nperjuicios, y fijar su monto acorde con las circunstancias propias del caso.\r\nEllo es así, por cuanto en estos lo que se hace es analizar la validez\r\nconstitucional de la conducta pública, en virtud de la cual se han lesionado\r\nderechos y libertades constitucionalmente consagradas. En este tipo de\r\nprocesos constitucionales no existe un debate o análisis respecto de los\r\ndaños y perjuicios que puedan derivarse de la conducta transgresora, lo que en\r\norden a su naturaleza sería improcedente. Por ello, tal valoración\r\nresultaría contraproducente a la razón y esencia misma de tal proceso. Por\r\ntanto, la etapa de ejecución de sentencia, constituye una de verificación que\r\nlos términos de la sentencia que ejecuta el fallo dictado por la Sala Constitucional\r\n(referida a una condenatoria en abstracto) haya ponderado de forma adecuada, la\r\ndemostración de que efectivamente se ha producido un daño, la existencia de un\r\nvínculo de causalidad entre los daños alegados y la conducta que se atribuye,\r\nen este caso, al Estado o ente público menor, de modo que se le pueda\r\nimputar ese efecto lesivo. A la vez, verifica que el fallo de la\r\nejecución se encuentre dentro de los parámetros preestablecidos por el\r\npronunciamiento que da origen a ese proceso. Se trata entonces de una instancia\r\nde medición del ejercicio jurisdiccional, consistente en la confrontación de\r\nlas disposiciones de la resolución de la ejecución respecto a las medidas que\r\nse derivan de la sentencia constitucional antecedente, que impone el deber de\r\nanálisis de los diferentes aspectos indicados […] De lo anterior, queda claro\r\nque el pronunciamiento del Tribunal Constitucional no prejuzga sobre la real\r\nexistencia de daños y perjuicios a favor del amparado, y cuantificación de\r\nestas partidas, sino que en realidad, emite una condena en abstracto por\r\nmandamiento expreso de ley. Por tal razón, el examen de la procedencia de esas\r\npartidas, debe ser objeto de análisis dentro de un proceso de ejecución, según\r\nlo estatuye el canon 51 de la Ley\r\nde la\r\n Jurisdicción Constitucional citado. De esta forma,\r\ncorresponde a la jurisdicción contenciosa definir la procedencia y cuantía de\r\nestos extremos. Así mismo, el proceso de ejecución de sentencia en este tipo de\r\nsupuestos, se constituye como una litis “sui generis”, muy próxima, a un\r\nproceso de conocimiento. Según se indicó, con base en las particularidades\r\naludidas, no consiste en una mera liquidación de los extremos que el ejecutante\r\nconsidera constituyen los daños y los perjuicios. La naturaleza de la\r\nsubstancia debatida exige una probanza objetiva de la existencia de los daños\r\nacusados, y luego, que son efectivamente consecuencia inmediata y directa de la\r\nconducta del Estado, sea esta activa u omisiva. De este modo, se impone la\r\ndemostración de la existencia de un nexo causal entre estos dos apartes. \r\nEs decir, dentro del proceso el juzgador debe dirimir si los daños que presenta\r\nel ejecutante son consecuencia del funcionamiento público o si por el\r\ncontrario, son el resultado de factores ajenos al quehacer administrativo. Solo\r\ncon tal demostración puede endilgarse al Estado la responsabilidad pecuniaria\r\nque exige el ejecutante, lo cual impone una condición sine qua non para su\r\ncondenatoria. En este sentido, el nexo de causalidad resulta ser el elemento\r\ntrascendental que permitiría acceder a sus pretensiones, que al tenor de lo\r\ndispuesto por el numeral 317 en relación al 693, ambos del Código Procesal\r\nCivil, ha de ser demostrado por quien pretende, en tanto se trata de hechos que\r\npersiguen constituir el derecho de resarcimiento que alega. Por otro lado, la\r\ncuantía de los reclamos debe sustentarse en los elementos de prueba aportados,\r\ncuando sean de rigor (pues para el caso del daño moral subjetivo, son otras las\r\nreglas de aplicación, según se analizará adelante). Ya esta Sala ha indicado\r\nque de la relación de los ordinales 317, inciso 1, 693 y 694 del Código\r\nProcesal Civil, en concordancia con la cláusula supletoria general contenida en\r\nel artículo 103 de la\r\n Ley Reguladora de la\r\n Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, se infiere, con\r\nclaridad meridiana, que en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia, cuando ha\r\nmediado condenatoria en abstracto al pago de los daños y perjuicios irrogados\r\npor una actuación del Estado violatoria del régimen de los derechos\r\nfundamentales, la carga procesal de acreditar los hechos constitutivos del\r\nderecho subjetivo al resarcimiento corre por cuenta de quien los afirma, en este\r\ncaso, del ejecutante (en relación, fallo No. 54 de las 15 horas 10 minutos\r\ndel 12 de junio de 1996). Lo dicho significa que la condenatoria dictada por\r\nla Sala\r\n Constitucional no genera per se, un deber de reconocimiento\r\nde la indemnización requerida por el ejecutante, más bien, este pronunciamiento\r\npresupone un juicio valorativo de la real existencia del daño. Para tales\r\nefectos, los menoscabos alegados deben ser reales y naturalmente requerirán de\r\nlas pruebas pertinentes, dado que, como tribunales de instancia, los juzgadores\r\ndel proceso de ejecución deberán necesariamente evacuar las probanzas ofrecidas\r\ny en las sentencias se deben elencar los hechos probados y no probados, así\r\ncomo el análisis de la relación de causalidad entre las conductas cuestionadas,\r\nlos daños y perjuicios y, con base en criterios de equidad y legalidad,\r\ndeterminar la existencia o no de lo reclamado, pasa así establecer la\r\ncondenatoria en concreto. En tal sentido, las sentencias deberán aplicar\r\nlas normas de fondo referidas a los daños y perjuicios, y lógicamente apreciar\r\nla prueba en los términos establecidos por el Código Procesal Civil (en este\r\nsentido, de esta Sala, resolución No. 799 de las 11 horas del 18 de octubre del\r\n2002.) De lo anterior se colige que se trata de un proceso en el que las\r\npartes deben debatir sobre la existencia del daño, su vinculación con la parte\r\ndemandada y la ejecutante, su cuantificación y otros argumentos inherentes a\r\neste tipo de litigios. De este modo, el nexo causal constituye el\r\ninexorable marco relacional que debe presentarse entre ambos extremos para\r\ngenerar como resultado el deber de resarcir. Este vínculo resulta elemental\r\npara generar la imputación del daño, es decir, para atribuir a un sujeto en\r\nparticular, en la especie, el Estado, el daño causado. Este detalle es\r\nfundamental para poder vincular los hechos que dieron paso a la condenatoria en\r\nsede constitucional, con las pretensiones resarcitorias que se solicitan en vía\r\nde ejecución de sentencia, puesto que tal reconocimiento no surge como consecuencia\r\nirrefutable de aquella condena, sino de un proceso posterior en el que se\r\nacredita mediante los mecanismos probatorios ya indicados su existencia y la\r\nrelación de la referida causal entre los actos administrativos y los daños\r\nreclamados. Visto así, la procedencia de las partidas liquidadas así como\r\nla cuantía de las sumas otorgadas por el juzgador, no deben ser fijadas\r\nmediante criterios antojadizos o arbitrarios, más bien, deben atender al mérito\r\nde los autos y derivarse del contradictorio requerido en este sentido, bajo\r\npena de contravenir el derecho […]” destacados son suplidos (en el mismos\r\nsentido y también de la\r\n Sala Primera consúltense entre otros, los precedentes número 112\r\nde las 14:15 horas del 15 de julio de 1992; 14 de las 16:00 horas\r\ndel 2 de marzo; 41 de las 15:00 horas del 18 de junio;. 65 de las 14:00 horas\r\ndel 1 de octubre, todas las anteriores de 1993; \r\n100 de las 16:10 horas del 9 de noviembre; 116 de las 14:00 horas del 16 de diciembre,\r\nambas de 1994; 45 de las 14 horas 45 minutos del 25 de abril y No. 99 de las 16\r\nhoras del 20 de setiembre; las dos últimas de 1995)105-97 de las 14:31 del\r\n21 de noviembre de 1997. Y no obstante que las consideraciones hechas se\r\nrefieren a los procesos de ejecución de las condenatorias en recursos de\r\namparo, resultan de aplicación en lo que a las condenatorias por daños en los\r\nhabeas corpus corresponde, pues las disposiciones en ambos casos son las\r\nmismas, como surge de la relación del párrafo segundo del artículo 26 y el 51\r\nde la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\n Constitucional antes citados, situación que no se modifica\r\ncon la promulgación del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. En cuanto a\r\nello se ha señalado “En la ejecución\r\nde amparos y hábeas corpus no (sic) enfrentamos a sentencias dictadas por la Sala Constitucional,\r\nque en ese extremo específico tienen el carácter de condena. Una condena que\r\nsin embargo tiene la particularidad de la indeterminación de los extremos\r\nindemnizatorios concedidos […] En su concepto tradicional, las ejecuciones de sentencia\r\nse han restringido a la cuantificación de los daños y perjuicios, que de\r\nantemano, han sido demostradas en el proceso de conocimiento. Así se ha dicho\r\ncon frecuencia que se demuestran en el\r\nproceso principal y se cuantifica en la ejecución (cuando no ha sido posible\r\nhacerlo en el de conocimiento). Sin embargo, la situación es diversa tratándose\r\nde las ejecuciones de la\r\n Sala Constitucional, pues ya hemos señalado reiteradamente,\r\nque la condena efectuada por la\r\n Sala en el aspecto resarcitorio se efectúa en abstracto, y\r\nque ello obliga a la demostración y cuantificación del daño en la etapa de\r\nejecución. Esta circunstancia marca diferencia importante con la ejecución\r\n‘común’. En este particular proceso, se\r\ndemuestra y se cuantifica. Ello desnaturaliza la esencia misma de la ejecución,\r\npues en este caso, no se ejecuta simplemente, sino que se demuestran y\r\nreconocen los daños y perjuicios, de previo a su liquidación […]” González\r\nCamacho, Óscar Eduardo y otros. El Nuevo Proceso Contencioso Administrativo.\r\nSan José, Poder Judicial, Departamento de Artes Gráficas 2006. 664 p. p. 608 y\r\n609. La base de este proceso serán siempre los hechos objeto del habeas corpus o de amparo,\r\ntal cual están acreditados en la sentencia y a este respecto, este proceso de\r\nejecución no puede desconocerlos.”", "body_en_text": "V. […] The State is patrimonially liable to third parties for damages caused by its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning, except in cases of fortuitous events, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party; this general principle is established by Articles 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution and is adopted by Article 190 of the LGAP. In relation to a person who has suffered damage related to the functioning of the Administration, it must respond, regardless of the title under which such liability is claimed, which must in all cases be established, that is, the causal link between the damage and the public activity and the criterion for imputing this liability must be determined. Although it is objective, it does not renounce imputation criteria, since the contrary would imply a simple transfer of liability to the state patrimony, which is improper. The State's patrimonial liability arises from the need to protect the administered party from damages caused by its activity and which the injured party is not legally obligated to bear. The imputation of the harmful result to the Administration gives rise to its duty to indemnify for the unlawfulness of its damaging conduct. On this topic, this Chamber recently indicated \"[...]. However, no matter how broad the terms in which the State's patrimonial liability is currently assessed, it does not renounce the requirement of certain criteria for imputing damage to public activity, because otherwise it would be unsustainable for the Administration to be attributed liability for the entire functioning of society merely due to the connection of activities, even private ones, with the essential purposes and functions of the State. It is therefore necessary to rationalize and provide the sphere of imputation of damage to the Public Administration with adequate legal criteria. In our context, certainly numerals 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution are the basis for establishing the duty of indemnification borne by the State for damages caused. However, the imputation criteria are clearly defined in Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration, where Article 190 states that the Public Administration shall respond 'for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party.' This is the general rule that establishes the foundations of the State's patrimonial liability in our context. The scenarios contemplated by the following rules, referring to liability for the unlawful conduct of public servants and for lawful conduct, complement this regime, but the general premises are defined by the cited article. It is based on these concepts of legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning of the Administration, that one must define when harmful conduct is imputed and when the State must respond patrimonially. And in this regard, the First Chamber has indicated \"[...] Due to the particularities inherent to the liability of the Public Administration, generated through its gradual evolution, as well as the objective character achieved, with clear constitutional foundation, it cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted and permanent compensatory duty, applicable always and for all hypotheses of injury. A regime of such nature would be unprecedented and materially unbearable for any State with limited financial resources. For this reason, imputation criteria have been used which, in some way, dimension, within said objectivity, that indemnity duty originated by public conduct. Hence, it can be affirmed that the national system is a regime of patrimonial liability of the Public Administration of an objectively moderate nature, insofar as it does not renounce parameters or criteria of imputation, especially regarding abnormality and unlawfulness, in which, one way or another, the conduct of the public apparatus is assessed and qualified. These are broad and different criteria from those of malice (dolo) and fault (culpa) traditionally used by common law, but which nonetheless become criteria of attribution that distance the institute from a mere automatic patrimonial transfer, without any assessment of the administrative conduct deployed. In this way, numeral 190 of our General Law of Public Administration refers to 'legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning,' where legitimacy or its antithesis refers basically to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented, among other things, by the service-providing activity attributed to the State, as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the collective. Note how Article 194 of the indicated law refers to 'lawful acts,' under the conception of legal activity, distinguishing them in the same rule from what it qualifies as 'normal functioning,' understood as material activity. In this way, abnormality addresses those administrative conducts which, in themselves, depart from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, from technical rules or from expertise and prudent action in the deployment of its actions, with a harmful effect on the person. This allows noting that abnormality can manifest through malfunctioning; delayed functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Abnormality and unlawfulness should therefore not be adopted as equivalent concepts, not even regarding the hypothesis of that functioning which, being due or in accordance with the aforementioned rules, produces a harmful result, called by some doctrinal sector 'abnormal functioning by result,' because in such case, what operates is a liability for normal functioning with a harmful effect or result, indemnifiable, of course, provided that the requirements expressly pre-established by the Legal System itself are met (see the same Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration). Nor should this 'abnormality' of functioning and the 'illegitimacy' of it be confused with the generic and basic unlawfulness, essential in all civil reparation. Indeed, patrimonial liability arises from unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive norm, while in other times, from the basic principle translated into the duty not to harm another), and which for this particular matter is concretized in the inexistence of that duty to bear the damage. Thus, if the victim has no duty to endure the injury (manifest as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent, whether due to unforeseeability or inevitability. When such a duty to endure the injury does not exist, the breach of the duty to the person's patrimonial indemnity occurs, and to that extent, the injury caused in the victim's legal sphere must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, subject to mandatory reparation. In this way, it can be affirmed that only the injury is indemnifiable which, confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be deemed unlawful at its base, insofar as the legal regime considers it unacceptable for the victim, regardless of the qualification that, subsequently and necessarily, is attributed to the public conduct. The contrary would be to affirm compensation for a harmful action in the face of a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and which, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified [...] That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in the indemnifiable damage, whether due to normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning. Be that as it may, those four imputation criteria used by the General Law of Public Administration in Article 190 must be deemed to have constitutional shelter and support, insofar as they concretize the transfer that the constituent made in numeral 41 to the ordinary legislator ('recourse to the laws') and instrumentalize the effective judicial protection enshrined in the Constitution. And this being so, it must be concluded that such criteria apply to the patrimonial liability of all public authority, whether administrative, legislative, or jurisdictional [...]\" precedent number 308-06 of 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2006 of the First Chamber [...]\" precedent 1273-07 of 10:31 a.m. on October 30, 2007. Now then. When dealing with the patrimonial liability of the Administration, as indicated, taking into account the imputation parameters indicated by law, once these and the harmful result are demonstrated, it is proper to declare its patrimonial liability, regardless of whether or not the existence of criminal conduct by the official is proven. Thus, on this topic, the jurisprudence of the First Chamber has specified \"[...] This Chamber has already had the opportunity to rule on the regime of patrimonial liability to which the State is subject. In this sense, in ruling No. 584 of 10 hours 40 minutes on August 11, 2005, it conducted a broad development and analysis on this topic, detailing its particularities, evolutionary framework, constitutional support, among other important considerations. Regarding what is relevant to the case, it should be noted that the patrimonial (not civil) and non-contractual liability of the Public Administration is framed within a preeminently objective regime, which fundamentally comprises both the theory of risk and the equilibrium in the patrimonial equation. This essentially seeks the indemnity reparation for one who has suffered an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority. This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a full transformation in the central axis of the liability itself, because it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except regarding their personal liability). This undoubtedly causes a radical shift in the approach of its foundation, since the State will be liable whenever the victim has no duty to bear the damage, whether it is of a patrimonial or non-patrimonial nature. From there, the reversal of the components and effects of the institute is evident. Both the essential presuppositions and the burden of proof acquire a new nuance, which frees the affected person not only from substantial but also procedural ties, and places the Administration in the obligated discharge against the charges and facts imputed to it. Within this framework, the markedly objective liability dispenses with the analysis of subjective and individual factors of the producing agent for the determination of the reparation of the damage, transferring to the sphere of the injured person. As long as an injury has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, be it active or omissive, which one has no duty to bear, the duty of compensation is imposed, by virtue of the principle of integral reparation of the damage that derives from numeral 41 of the Political Constitution. In this same sense, one may consult, among many others, the judgments of this Chamber numbers 138 of 3:05 p.m. on August 23; 192 of 2:15 p.m. on November 6, both of 1991; 48 of 2:10 p.m. on May 29, 1996 and 55 of 2:30 p.m. on July 4, 1997. In light of the provisions in said precedents, and as the Tribunal correctly provided, the Legal System, based on the General Law of Public Administration, adopts, as stated, the preeminently objective liability system. Therefore, the existence—and thus its demonstration—of malice (dolo) or fault (culpa) or, in general, a subjective fault imputable to the public servants or officials is not necessary for the duty to compensate the damages and losses caused by its functioning to arise. Therefore, canon 190 of that legal body clearly provides for the State's liability for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, unless the exempting causes that this same provision exhaustively expresses converge in the specific case, namely; force majeure, fault of the victim, and act of a third party, it being the responsibility of the Administration to prove their existence. From this collegiate body, see judgments of this same Chamber No. 589-F-99 of 2:20 p.m. on October 1, 1999 and No. 252-F-01 of 4:15 p.m. on March 28, 2001. In this same line, canon 194.3 of that same legal body establishes the legal bases for the liability of the State-Legislator. Numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of the Magna Carta, constitute the foundation and support of the liability of the State-Judge for judicial error, the abnormal or unlawful functioning of the jurisdictional function. Hence, one could not sustain an 'impunity' of the State, on the grounds that it lacks legal development, since it is established in principle, within the framework of the Constitution, at the same time that it would suppose a breach of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of the arbitrariness of public powers. Seen thus, its recognition is not conditioned on the existence of a legal mandate regulating it. The referred liability is governed by what is established in the Fundamental Charter, that is, it constitutes a principle of constitutional basis, imposed by the referenced norms and which seeks the control of the exercise of all the function and conduct of the State in any of its spheres, as well as the protection of the rights and interests of those subject to justice [...]\" precedent number 74-07 of 10:15 a.m. on February 2, 2007 of the First Chamber. In the specific case, the subject matter of the habeas corpus proceeding before the Constitutional Chamber was the illegitimate deprivation of liberty of B by the authorities of the Police Information Center of the Public Force of Pérez Zeledón, J P I and D M L, which occurred on April 30, 2004. The unjustified conduct of two public officials in the exercise of their duties who deprived this person of liberty was analyzed. The carrying out of an act that was claimed to be arbitrary by public authorities was questioned, that is, due to the functioning of the Administration. The Constitutional Chamber requested reports from the involved officials and from the public superiors who were involved with the questioned act, and when resolving the appeal, it stated \"[...] Proven facts. Of importance for the decision of this matter, the following facts are deemed duly proven, either because they have been so accredited or because the respondent has omitted to refer to them as provided in the initial ruling: a) That by resolution of the Costa Rican Institute of Tourism of March sixteenth of the current year, the protected party and his wife, Ann Maxine Patton, were granted the condition of rentier residents, so by official letter number P-182-2001, said institute requested the General Directorate of Migration and Immigration to grant the migratory category of resident to the protected party and his wife (folios 17 and 18 and report at folio 9); b) that on April thirtieth of the current year, approximately at 5:15 p.m., the CIFP officials, J P I and D M L, proceeded to follow the protected party's vehicle based on 'confidential reports' and a complaint that there existed a foreigner in an irregular situation that needed to be identified (folio 36 and report at folio 27); c) that when the protected party's car stopped, they requested the identification of the protected party and his wife, who showed them only a driver's license from the state of Arizona in the name of B (folio 36 and report at folio 27); d) that upon requesting another identification document from the protected party to determine his legality in the country, he told them he had it at his house, and upon requesting he accompany them to their offices, he refused verbally and physically, so they requested help from the Cantonal Delegation of the Public Force of Pérez Zeledón, managing to take the protected party to said delegation, while his wife brought the passports (reports at folios 27 and 72); e) that they communicated with Immigration officials to determine the migratory status of the protected party and his wife, because the passport provided was from Grenada and issued on a date prior to the one on which, according to the respective certification of entries and exits from Immigration, the protected party was residing in Costa Rica, having used a United States passport to enter and exit the country; furthermore, that in the Grenada passport shown, the last entry to the country was on September sixteenth of last year, an illegal fact on its face, since seven and a half months had elapsed since his entry to the country (folios 35, 37 to 40 and report at folio 27); f) that at ten o'clock at night on the same day, the protected party left the Cantonal Delegation of the Public Force of Pérez Zeledón in the presence of his lawyer, without presenting visible blows or discomfort, and in the company of officials of the Judicial Investigation Organization of Pérez Zeledón, Ricardo Calderón and Bernardo Fallas, for which the protected party signed the book accepting not having been mistreated or beaten (report at folio 72). II.- Subject matter of the appeal.- In the species, the appellant alleges that on April thirtieth, two thousand one, approximately at 4:30 p.m., the protected party and his wife were traveling in their vehicle in the vicinity of the town of Quebradas of Pérez Zeledón, when in a 'sudden' and 'reckless' manner, a Cherokee brand automobile, with polarized windows and without any police markings, intercepted them through a maneuver that forced the protected party to stop. He indicates that from the Cherokee brand vehicle, two people dressed in civilian clothes got out, one of them with a firearm, who in an 'abusive' manner requested the protected party to get out of his vehicle because he had to accompany them to the Police Delegation of the area under detention, since there was an investigation order issued against him by the General Directorate of Migration and Immigration, all without identifying themselves as police officials and without showing any order, so the protected party requested they do so, and in response to this, they shot at his feet. Subsequently, they were taken to the referred delegation, where they were detained approximately until 7:30 p.m., which he considers a violation of his rights. III.- Response of the authorities.- The respondent authorities affirm in the report rendered under oath that the detention of the protected party and his wife was legitimate, since he did not carry at that moment any document proving the legality of his stay in the country. Said detention was executed by officials of the Ministry of Governance, Police, and Public Security, because there were confidential reports related to a foreigner who needed to be identified for being in an apparent irregular situation, and the protected party could not prove the legality of his migratory situation. The Chamber verifies that time was granted for the person accompanying him (his wife) to go and collect the pertinent documents, so once they were provided to that office, the protected party and his wife were released. Contrary to what is stated in the filing brief, the officials argue that the treatment of the protected party and his companion was at no time aggressive nor violative of their rights, that they properly identified themselves, were not armed, and at no time shot at the feet of the protected party as the appellant claims. IV.- The Detention (Article 37 of the Constitution).- The Chamber considers that in the specific case, the protected party's right to liberty was indeed violated, because the basis for proceeding with his transfer and detention at the Delegation was the existence of 'confidential reports,' which in the first place does not constitute an objective reason, and in the second place, no proof whatsoever of this circumstance is provided in the court record. It must begin by mentioning that the officials involved in the matter were not officials of the General Directorate of Migration, meaning they were not competent to detain and interrogate the protected party for 'migratory matters.' While it is true that the fact that the protected party presented a driver's license of foreign origin—specifically United States—as an identification document, and that when he had to show his passport he presented one from Grenada, even though it could later be verified that he had entered the country with a United States one, issued some time before that of Grenada, this is a circumstance that the migratory police could have found suspicious and investigated, but not the officials of the Police Information Center of the Ministry of Governance, Police, and Public Security, who lack competence to do so. The respondent authorities state that another of the grounds for proceeding to what was effectively a detention of the protected party was the existence of a complaint filed before the Information Center of the Public Force in relation to a citizen with surnames W J and his wife T, making it necessary to request truthful information that could verify that the protected party and his wife were not those persons. Neither is this complaint provided in the case file beyond the statement of the Minister of Governance, Police, and Public Security; but even assuming that said complaint actually existed, the surnames of the protected party do not, by any stretch, bear a resemblance to those of the denounced foreigner, a circumstance that was verified from the moment the protected party presented his driver's license. From the foregoing, it is concluded that there was at no time any reason to proceed to the detention of the protected party, because, as the precedents of this Chamber have mentioned, it is not possible to detain a person based on a mere complaint or mere suspicion, since these do not constitute proven indications of having committed a crime, a necessary presupposition according to the terms of Article 37 of the Constitution [...] V.- Conclusion.- From all the foregoing, it can be gathered that the involved officials violated the principle of legality by assuming attributions outside their competence as their own, thereby harming, with said action, the protected party's right to liberty. There was no reason to proceed to the detention of the protected party, since the mere existence of the two grounds provided by the respondent authorities, namely the confidential reports and the complaint, were not sufficient under the terms of Article 37 of the Constitution. Regarding the confidential reports, it is not possible to accept such justification because this would imply that any authority could detain a person and claim they did so due to 'confidential reports,' reserving their origin due to their condition, thereby bringing the content of the constitutional right to liberty recognized by the Political Constitution and protected by the jurisprudence of this Court to nothingness. As for the complaint, reference has already been made to the line of thought of the Chamber. Thus, and since once it was verified that both the protected party and his wife enjoy the condition of rentier citizens, they were released, it is necessary to declare the appeal with merit purely and simply for the indemnity effects that may proceed [...]\". precedent number 8457-01 of 8:46 a.m. on August 24, 2001. From the point of view of the summary process for the protection of liberty that is habeas corpus, the Constitutional Chamber verified the illegitimacy of the detention of the protected party—in this case, the victim B—and the main purpose of the process—to cease the violation of the fundamental right—was satisfied because by the time of resolving, the offended party had already been released. Despite this, in any case, and as prescribed by Article 26, second paragraph—and Article 41 in matters of amparo appeals—both of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, upon declaring the violation of a fundamental right, it automatically proceeds to order the State to pay the damages and losses caused. Much has been discussed regarding the scope of this condemnation, since in these processes, evidence is not presented that is directed toward demonstrating the damages caused or the link or causal nexus between the administrative activity and the damages and losses claimed, although it is undeniable that every violation of a fundamental right already implies a state obligation to repair. Hence, it is indicated that indeed such condemnation assigns a right to the protected party. However, given the nature of the summary amparo and habeas corpus processes, although when they are granted the injury to fundamental rights is demonstrated, the estimatory decision on the claim in habeas corpus or amparo has not established the nature and scope of the patrimonial liability of the Administration, nor the existence, nature, and extent, as well as the scope and quantification of the damages claimed to have been suffered. And precisely due to the nature of the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber that grant habeas corpus or amparo appeals, the route of executing the judgment through the contentious-administrative proceeding for this type of ruling is distorted, becoming not a common execution process—in which damages are liquidated and their amount discussed—but a true trial process, in which the protected party must prove the existence, nature, and extent of the damage as well as the amounts claimed, which means initiating a true ordinary trial for the claim of damages and losses, proving their existence, the link and state liability, its obligation to compensate them, and their amount. The First Chamber of the Court itself has recognized this reality, assessing the execution of condemnations in amparo appeals, comparable to those occurring in habeas corpus. Thus, in precedent number 138-f-06 of 8:10 a.m. on March 16, 2006 \"[...] In cases of sentence execution processes for rulings issued by the constitutional jurisdiction in amparo appeals, it is essential to make some clarifications. As is known, the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction assigns to the Chamber of that subject matter the jurisdictional power to order the reparation of the damages and losses derived from the acts of public authorities or private ones subject to the protective scope of this appeal, that injure the regime of fundamental rights of individuals. In this sense, regarding the amparo process, the initial paragraph of numeral 51 of that normative body clearly indicates: '...\n\nAny ruling that upholds the appeal shall order, in the abstract, the compensation for the damages and losses caused and the payment of the costs of the appeal, reserving their liquidation for the execution of judgment.” In this case, it involves an abstract condemnation that must be made concrete in a subsequent execution proceeding; therefore, in these cases, it is essential to assess the situation and circumstances in which the protected rights were violated, given that, as indicated above, the pronouncement issued by the Constitutional Chamber is in the abstract. Thus, the referred condemnation serves to open the jurisdiction of the contentious-administrative judge to analyze the actual existence or non-existence of the damages and losses, and to set their amount according to the specific circumstances of the case. This is so because, in these proceedings, what is done is to analyze the constitutional validity of the public conduct by virtue of which constitutionally enshrined rights and freedoms have been harmed. In this type of constitutional proceeding, there is no debate or analysis regarding the damages and losses that may arise from the offending conduct, which, by its nature, would be improper. Therefore, such an assessment would be counterproductive to the very reason and essence of such a proceeding. Hence, the stage of execution of judgment constitutes a verification that the terms of the judgment executing the ruling issued by the Constitutional Chamber (referring to an abstract condemnation) have adequately weighed the demonstration that damage has indeed occurred, the existence of a causal link between the alleged damages and the conduct attributed, in this case, to the State or a decentralized public entity, so that this harmful effect can be imputed to it. At the same time, it verifies that the execution ruling falls within the parameters pre-established by the pronouncement that gave rise to that proceeding. It is, then, an instance for measuring jurisdictional exercise, consisting of the confrontation of the provisions of the execution resolution with the measures derived from the preceding constitutional judgment, which imposes the duty to analyze the different aspects indicated […] From the foregoing, it is clear that the pronouncement of the Constitutional Chamber does not prejudge the actual existence of damages and losses in favor of the protected party, nor the quantification of these items, but rather, it issues a condemnation in the abstract by express mandate of law. For this reason, the examination of the appropriateness of these items must be the subject of analysis within an execution proceeding, as established by canon 51 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law cited. In this way, it is for the contentious jurisdiction to define the appropriateness and amount of these elements. Likewise, the execution of judgment proceeding in this type of situation is constituted as a “sui generis” litigation, very close to a trial on the merits. As indicated, based on the aforementioned particularities, it does not consist of a mere liquidation of the elements that the executing party considers constitute the damages and losses. The nature of the debated substance requires objective proof of the existence of the alleged damages, and then, that they are effectively the immediate and direct consequence of the State's conduct, whether by act or omission. Thus, the demonstration of the existence of a causal link between these two aspects is required. That is to say, within the proceeding, the judge must determine whether the damages presented by the executing party are a consequence of the public functioning or if, on the contrary, they are the result of factors unrelated to the administrative activity. Only with such demonstration can the pecuniary liability demanded by the executing party be attributed to the State, which imposes a sine qua non condition for its condemnation. In this sense, the causal link turns out to be the transcendental element that would allow access to their claims, which, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 317 in relation to 693, both of the Civil Procedure Code, must be demonstrated by the claimant, insofar as they are facts aimed at establishing the right to compensation alleged. On the other hand, the amount of the claims must be supported by the evidentiary elements provided, when they are required (since for the case of subjective moral damage, other application rules apply, as will be analyzed below). This Chamber has already indicated that from the relationship of provisions 317, subsection 1, 693, and 694 of the Civil Procedure Code, in conjunction with the general supplementary clause contained in Article 103 of the Regulating Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, it is inferred, with absolute clarity, that at the stage of execution of judgment, when there has been an abstract condemnation for the payment of damages and losses caused by State action violating the regime of fundamental rights, the procedural burden of proving the constitutive facts of the subjective right to compensation falls on the party asserting them, in this case, the executing party (in this regard, ruling No. 54 of 15 hours 10 minutes of June 12, 1996). The foregoing means that the condemnation issued by the Constitutional Chamber does not generate, per se, a duty to recognize the compensation required by the executing party; rather, this pronouncement presupposes a value judgment on the actual existence of the damage. For such purposes, the alleged harm must be real and will naturally require the pertinent evidence, given that, as courts of instance, the judges in the execution proceeding must necessarily evaluate the proofs offered, and the judgments must list the proven and unproven facts, as well as the analysis of the causal relationship between the questioned conducts and the damages and losses, and, based on criteria of equity and legality, determine the existence or non-existence of the claim, thereby establishing the concrete condemnation. In this regard, the judgments must apply the substantive norms referring to damages and losses, and logically assess the evidence under the terms established by the Civil Procedure Code (in this sense, from this Chamber, resolution No. 799 of 11 hours of October 18, 2002.) From the above, it follows that this is a proceeding in which the parties must debate the existence of the damage, its connection with the defendant and the executing party, its quantification, and other arguments inherent to this type of litigation. Thus, the causal link constitutes the inexorable relational framework that must exist between both ends to generate, as a result, the duty to compensate. This link is elementary to generate the imputation of the damage, that is, to attribute the damage caused to a particular subject, in the specific case, the State. This detail is fundamental to be able to link the facts that gave rise to the condemnation in the constitutional venue with the compensatory claims requested in the execution of judgment proceeding, since such recognition does not arise as an irrefutable consequence of that condemnation, but rather from a subsequent proceeding in which its existence and the relationship of the aforementioned causation between the administrative acts and the claimed damages are proven through the evidentiary mechanisms already indicated. Seen in this way, the appropriateness of the liquidated items, as well as the amount of the sums awarded by the judge, must not be fixed by whimsical or arbitrary criteria; rather, they must attend to the merit of the case file and derive from the required adversarial process in this regard, under penalty of contravening the law […]” highlights are supplied (in the same sense and also from the First Chamber, consult, among others, precedents number 112 of 14:15 hours of July 15, 1992; 14 of 16:00 hours of March 2; 41 of 15:00 hours of June 18; 65 of 14:00 hours of October 1, all of the above from 1993; 100 of 16:10 hours of November 9; 116 of 14:00 hours of December 16, both from 1994; 45 of 14 hours 45 minutes of April 25 and No. 99 of 16 hours of September 20; the last two from 1995) 105-97 of 14:31 of November 21, 1997. And notwithstanding that the considerations made refer to the execution proceedings of condemnations in amparo appeals, they are applicable insofar as condemnations for damages in habeas corpus are concerned, since the provisions in both cases are the same, as arises from the relationship of the second paragraph of Article 26 and 51 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law cited above, a situation that is not modified by the enactment of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. In this regard, it has been stated: “In the execution of amparos and habeas corpus, we do not (sic) face judgments issued by the Constitutional Chamber, which in that specific aspect have the character of condemnation. A condemnation that, however, has the particularity of the indeterminacy of the compensatory elements granted […] In its traditional concept, judgment executions have been restricted to the quantification of damages and losses, which beforehand, have been demonstrated in the trial on the merits. Thus, it has frequently been said that they are demonstrated in the main proceeding and quantified in the execution (when it has not been possible to do so in the trial on the merits). However, the situation is different in the case of the executions of the Constitutional Chamber, since we have repeatedly pointed out that the condemnation made by the Chamber in the compensatory aspect is made in the abstract, and that this requires the demonstration and quantification of the damage at the execution stage. This circumstance marks an important difference with the ‘common’ execution. In this particular proceeding, it is demonstrated and it is quantified. This denatures the very essence of the execution, because in this case, it is not simply executed, but rather the damages and losses are demonstrated and recognized, prior to their liquidation […]” González Camacho, Óscar Eduardo and others. The New Contentious-Administrative Process. San José, Poder Judicial, Departamento de Artes Gráficas 2006. 664 p. p. 608 and 609. The basis of this proceeding will always be the facts subject to the habeas corpus or amparo, exactly as they are accredited in the judgment, and in this respect, this execution proceeding cannot disregard them.”\n\n…that being the case, it must be concluded that such criteria apply to the patrimonial liability of all public authorities, whether administrative, legislative, or jurisdictional…\" precedent number 308-06 of 10:30 a.m. on May 25, 2006, of the First Chamber…\" precedent 1273-07 of 10:31 a.m. on October 30, 2007. Now then. When it comes to the patrimonial liability of the Administration, as indicated, taking into account the parameters of attribution set forth by law, once these and the harmful result are demonstrated, it is proper to declare its patrimonial liability, regardless of whether the existence of a criminal act by the official is proven or not. Thus, regarding this issue, the jurisprudence of the First Chamber has specified: \"…This Chamber has already had the opportunity to pronounce on the patrimonial liability regime to which the State is subject. In this regard, in ruling no. 584 of 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005, it carried out a broad development and analysis of this subject, detailing its particularities, evolutionary framework, constitutional basis, among other considerations of importance. In what is relevant to the case, it should be noted that the patrimonial (and not civil) and extracontractual liability of the Public Administration is framed within a preeminently objective regime, which fundamentally comprises both the theory of risk and the equilibrium in the patrimonial equation. The essential purpose of this is the compensatory reparation for whoever has suffered an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority. This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a complete transformation in the central axis of liability itself, as it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except as regards their personal liability). This undoubtedly causes a radical shift in the approach proper to its foundation, since there will be State liability whenever the victim does not have the duty to bear the damage, whether it is of a patrimonial or extra-patrimonial nature. From this point, the reversal of the components and effects of the institute in full is evident. Both the essential prerequisites and the burden of proof acquire a new nuance, which frees the affected party not only from substantial but also procedural ties, and places upon the Administration the obligated discharge against the charges and facts attributed to it. Within this framework, the markedly objective liability dispenses with the analysis of subjective and individual factors of the producing agent for the determination of the reparation of the damage, transferring focus to the sphere of the injured party. Insofar as an injury has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, whether active or by omission, which one does not have the duty to bear, the duty of compensation is imposed, by virtue of the principle of integral reparation of damages derived from numeral 41 of the Political Constitution. In this same sense, one can consult, among many others, the judgments of this Chamber, numbers 138 of 3:05 p.m. on August 23; 192 of 2:15 p.m. on November 6, both of 1991; 48 of 2:10 p.m. on May 29, 1996, and 55 of 2:30 p.m. on July 4, 1997.) In light of the provisions of said precedents, and as the Tribunal properly ordered, the Legal System, from the General Law of the Public Administration, adopts, as has been stated, the preeminently objective liability system. Therefore, the existence—and, thus, its proof—of intent or fault or, in general, a subjective lack attributable to public servants or officials is not necessary for the duty to compensate the damages and losses caused by their operation to arise. For this reason, canon 190 of that legal body clearly establishes the liability of the State for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, unless the exonerating causes that the same provision taxatively expresses converge in the specific case, namely; force majeure, the fault of the victim, and the act of a third party, with the burden falling on the Administration to prove their existence. From this collegiate body, one can see the judgments of this same Chamber, no. 589-F-99 of 2:20 p.m. on October 1, 1999, and no. 252-F-01, of 4:15 p.m. on March 28, 2001. In this same vein, canon 194.3 of that same legal body establishes the legal bases for the liability of the State as Legislator. Numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of the Magna Carta, constitute the foundation and support of the liability of the State as Judge for judicial error, abnormal or illicit operation of the jurisdictional function. Hence, one could not sustain an 'impunity' of the State under the argument that it lacks legal development, since that liability is established in principle within the framework of the Constitution, and at the same time, it would imply a breach of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of arbitrariness of public powers. Thus seen, its recognition is not conditional upon the existence of a legal mandate regulating it. The liability referred to is governed by what is established in the Fundamental Charter, that is, it constitutes a principle of constitutional basis, imposed by the referenced norms, and which seeks control over the exercise of all State function and conduct in any of its spheres, as well as the protection of the rights and interests of justiciable parties…\" precedent number 74-07 of 10:15 a.m. on February 2, 2007, of the First Chamber. In the specific case, the object of the habeas corpus proceeding before the Constitutional Chamber was the unlawful deprivation of liberty of B by the authorities of the Police Information Center of the Fuerza Pública of Pérez Zeledón, J P I and D M L, which occurred on April 30, 2004. The unjustified conduct of two public officials in the exercise of their duties who deprived this person of liberty was analyzed. The execution of an act that was claimed to be arbitrary by public authorities, that is, by the operation of the Administration, was questioned. The Constitutional Chamber requested reports from the officials involved and from the public superiors related to the questioned act, and when resolving the appeal, stated: \"… I. Proven facts. Of importance for the decision of this matter, the following facts are deemed duly proven, either because they have been accredited or because the respondent has omitted to refer to them as provided in the initial order: a) That by resolution of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute of March sixteenth of the current year, the status of rentier residents was granted to the petitioner and his wife, Ann Maxine Patton, for which, by official letter number P-182-2001, said institute requested the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners to grant the migratory category of resident to the petitioner and his wife (folios 17 and 18 and report at folio 9); b) that on the thirtieth of April of the current year, at approximately seventeen hours and fifteen minutes, the CIFP officials, J P I and D M L, proceeded to follow the petitioner's vehicle based on 'confidential reports' and a complaint that there was a foreigner in an irregular situation who needed to be identified (folio 36 and report at folio 27); c) that when the petitioner's car stopped, they requested identification from the petitioner and his wife, who showed them only a driver's license from the state of Arizona in the name of B (folio 36 and report at folio 27); c) that when asking the petitioner for another identification document to determine his legality in the country, he told them that he had it at home, and when asking him to accompany them to their offices, he refused verbally and physically, so they requested help from the Cantonal Delegation of the Fuerza Pública of Pérez Zeledón, managing to take the petitioner to said delegation while his wife brought the passports (reports at folios 27 and 72); d) that they communicated with Migration officials to determine the migratory status of the petitioner and his wife, because the passport provided was from Grenada and issued on a date prior to which, according to the respective certification of entries and exits from Migration, the petitioner had been residing in Costa Rica, having used a U.S. passport to enter and exit the country; furthermore, that in the Grenadan passport shown, the last entry into the country was on September sixteenth of last year, a fact illegal on its face, as seven and a half months had elapsed since his entry into the country (folios 35, 37 to 40 and report at folio 27); e) that at twenty-two hours on the same day, the petitioner left the Cantonal Delegation of the Fuerza Pública of Pérez Zeledón in the presence of his lawyer, without visible blows or discomfort and accompanied by the officials of the Judicial Investigation Agency of Pérez Zeledón, Ricardo Calderón and Bernardo Fallas, for which the petitioner signed the book accepting not having been mistreated or beaten (report at folio 72). II.- Object of the appeal.- In this case, the appellant alleges that on April thirtieth, two thousand one, at approximately sixteen hours thirty minutes, the petitioner and his wife were traveling in their vehicle in the vicinity of the town of Quebradas de Pérez Zeledón, when 'suddenly' and 'recklessly' a Cherokee make automobile, with tinted windows and without police markings of any kind, intercepted them by a maneuver that forced the petitioner to stop. He indicates that two people dressed in civilian clothes got out of the Cherokee make vehicle, one of them with a firearm, who in an 'abusive' manner asked the petitioner to get out of his vehicle because he had to accompany them to the Police Delegation of the area under detention, since there was an investigation order issued against him by the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners, all the above without identifying themselves as police officials and without showing any order, for which the petitioner asked them to do so, and upon this, they shot at his feet. Subsequently, they were taken to the referred delegation, where they were detained approximately until nineteen hours and thirty minutes, which he considers a violation of his rights. III.- Response of the authorities.- The respondent authorities state in the report rendered under oath that the detention to which the petitioner and his wife were subjected was legitimate, since he did not carry at that moment any document proving the legality of his stay in the country. Said detention was executed by officials of the Ministry of Governance and Police and Public Security, because there were confidential reports related to a foreigner who needed to be identified for being in an apparently irregular situation, and the petitioner could not prove the legality of his migratory situation. The Chamber notes that time was granted so that the person accompanying him (his wife) could go to collect the pertinent documents, so once they were provided to that office, the petitioner and his wife were released. Contrary to what is stated in the filing writ, the officials argue that the treatment of the petitioner and his companion was at no time aggressive or violative of their rights, that they duly identified themselves, were not armed, and at no time shot at the petitioner's feet as the appellant claims. IV.- The Detention (Article 37 of the Constitution).- The Chamber considers that in the specific case, the petitioner's right to liberty was indeed violated, because the basis for proceeding with his transfer and detention at the Delegation was the existence of 'confidential reports,' which in the first place does not constitute an objective reason, and in the second place, no evidence of such circumstance is provided in the case file. It must begin by mentioning that the officials involved in the matter were not officials of the General Directorate of Migration, from which it follows that they lacked competence to detain and interrogate the petitioner for 'immigration matters.' While it is true that the fact that the petitioner presented a foreign-origin driver's license—specifically American—as an identification document, and that when he had to show his passport, he presented one from Grenada, even though it could later be proven that he had entered the country with an American one, issued some time before the Grenadan one was, this is a circumstance that the immigration police could have found suspicious and investigated, but not the officials of the Police Information Center of the Ministry of Governance and Police and Public Security, who lack the competence to do so. The respondent authorities state that another of the grounds for proceeding with what was indeed a detention of the petitioner was the existence of a complaint filed with the Information Center of the Fuerza Pública in relation to a citizen with the last names W J and his wife T, making it necessary to request truthful information that could verify that the petitioner and his wife were not those persons. Of this complaint as well, nothing more is provided in the file than the statement of the Minister of Governance and Police and Public Security; but even assuming that said complaint indeed existed, the petitioner's last names do not, by any stretch, bear a resemblance to those of the denounced foreigner, a circumstance that was verified from the moment the petitioner presented his driver's license. From the above, it is concluded that at no time was there a reason to proceed with the detention of the petitioner, because, as the precedents of this Chamber have mentioned, it is not possible to detain a person based solely on a complaint or mere suspicion, as these do not constitute proven indications of having committed a crime, a necessary prerequisite under the terms of Article 37 of the Constitution… V.- Conclusion.- From all the above, it can be deduced that the officials involved violated the principle of legality by assuming as their own attributions alien to their competence, injuring, with said action, the petitioner's right to liberty. There was no reason to proceed with the detention of the petitioner, since the mere existence of the two grounds provided by the respondent authorities, namely the confidential reports and the complaint, were not sufficient under the terms of Article 37 of the Constitution. Regarding the confidential reports, it is not possible to accept such a justification because that would imply that any authority could detain a person and claim they did so due to 'confidential reports,' reserving the origin of the same due to their condition, thereby rendering the content of the constitutional right to liberty recognized by the Political Constitution and protected by the jurisprudence of this Tribunal meaningless. As for the complaint, reference has already been made to what has been the line of thought of the Chamber. Thus, the situation being, and given that once it was verified that both the petitioner and his wife enjoy the status of rentier citizens, they were released, it is necessary to declare the appeal clearly and simply with merit for the compensatory effects that may proceed…\" precedent number 8457-01 of 8:46 a.m. on August 24, 2001. From the perspective of the summary process for the protection of liberty that habeas corpus is, the Constitutional Chamber verified the illegitimacy of the petitioner's detention—in this case, the victim B—and the main purpose of the process—to stop the violation of the fundamental right—ceased because by the time of the resolution, the offended party had already been released. Notwithstanding this, in any case, and as prescribed by Article 26, second paragraph—and Article 41 in matters of amparo appeals—both of the Law on the Constitutional Jurisdiction, upon declaring the violation of a fundamental right, condemnation of the State to pay the damages and losses caused automatically proceeds. Much has been discussed about the scope of this condemnation, since in these processes, evidence aimed at proving the damages caused or the link or causal nexus between the administrative activity and the damages and losses claimed is not evaluated, although it is undeniable that any violation of a fundamental right already implies a State obligation to repair. Hence, it is pointed out that such condemnation indeed grants a right to the petitioner. However, given the nature of the summary processes of amparo and habeas corpus, even though the injury to fundamental rights is demonstrated when they are upheld, the favorable decision on the claim in habeas corpus or amparo has not established the nature and scope of the patrimonial liability of the Administration, nor the existence, nature, and extent, as well as the scope and quantification, of the damages allegedly suffered. And precisely because of the nature of the resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber that declare habeas corpus or amparo appeals with merit, the avenue of execution of judgment in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction for this type of ruling is distorted, since it becomes not a common execution process—in which damages are liquidated and their amount is discussed—but rather a true cognition process, in which the petitioner must prove the existence, nature, and extent of the damage, as well as the amounts claimed, which means initiating a true ordinary trial for the claim of damages and losses, proving their existence, the link and State liability, its obligation to compensate them, and their amount. The First Chamber of the Court itself has recognized this reality, assessing the execution of condemnations in amparo appeals, which are comparable to those that occur in habeas corpus. Thus, in precedent number 138-f-06 of 8:10 a.m. on March 16, 2006: \"…When it comes to execution of judgment processes for rulings issued by the constitutional jurisdiction in amparo appeals, it is essential to make some clarifications. As is known, the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction assigns to the Chamber of the matter the jurisdictional power to order the restitution of damages and losses derived from the acts of public or private authorities subject to the protective scope of this appeal, which injure the regime of fundamental rights of persons. In this sense, regarding the amparo process, the initial paragraph of numeral 51 of that normative body clearly indicates: '... any resolution that upholds the appeal shall condemn in abstract form to the compensation of the damages and losses caused and to the payment of the costs of the appeal, and shall reserve their liquidation for the execution of judgment.' In this case, it is an abstract condemnation that must be made concrete in subsequent execution; therefore, in these cases, it is essential to assess the situation and circumstances in which the protected rights were violated, because, as indicated supra, the pronouncement issued by the Constitutional Tribunal is in abstract form. Thus, the referred condemnation opens the competence of the contentious-administrative judge to analyze the real existence or not of the damages and losses, and to set their amount according to the specific circumstances of the case. This is so because, in these processes, what is done is to analyze the constitutional validity of the public conduct by virtue of which constitutionally enshrined rights and freedoms have been injured. In this type of constitutional process, there is no debate or analysis regarding the damages and losses that may derive from the transgressing conduct, which, given their nature, would be inappropriate. For this reason, such an assessment would be counterproductive to the very reason and essence of such a process. Therefore, the execution of judgment phase constitutes one of verification that the terms of the judgment executing the ruling issued by the Constitutional Chamber (referring to an abstract condemnation) have adequately weighed the demonstration that damage has indeed been produced, the existence of a causal link between the damages alleged and the conduct attributed, in this case, to the State or minor public entity, so that this harmful effect can be attributed to it. At the same time, it verifies that the execution ruling falls within the parameters pre-established by the pronouncement that gives rise to that process. It is thus an instance of measuring the jurisdictional exercise, consisting of contrasting the provisions of the execution resolution against the measures derived from the antecedent constitutional judgment, which imposes the duty of analysis of the different indicated aspects… From the above, it is clear that the pronouncement of the Constitutional Tribunal does not prejudge the real existence of damages and losses in favor of the petitioner and the quantification of these items, but rather, it actually issues an abstract condemnation by express mandate of law. For this reason, the examination of the appropriateness of these items must be the object of analysis within an execution process, as established by canon 51 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction cited. In this way, it falls to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to define the appropriateness and amount of these elements. Likewise, the execution of judgment process in this type of case is constituted as a 'sui generis' litigation, very close to a cognition process. As indicated, based on the aforementioned particularities, it does not consist of a mere liquidation of the items that the executing party considers constitute the damages and losses. The nature of the debated substance demands objective proof of the existence of the damages claimed, and then, that they are effectively the immediate and direct consequence of the State's conduct, whether active or by omission. In this way, the proof of the existence of a causal nexus between these two parts is required. That is to say, within the process, the judge must decide whether the damages presented by the executing party are a consequence of public operation or whether, on the contrary, they are the result of factors alien to administrative action. Only with such proof can pecuniary liability be attributed to the State as demanded by the executing party, which imposes a conditio sine qua non for their condemnation. In this sense, the causal nexus turns out to be the essential element that would allow granting their claims, which, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 317 in relation to 693, both of the Civil Procedural Code, must be proven by the claimant, insofar as it concerns facts that seek to establish the right to compensation they allege. On the other hand, the amount of the claims must be based on the evidentiary elements provided, when appropriate (since for the case of subjective non-material damage, other application rules apply, as will be analyzed below).\n\nThis Chamber has already indicated that from the relationship of sections 317, subsection 1, 693, and 694 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), in conjunction with the general supplementary clause contained in Article 103 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), it is inferred, with crystal clarity, **that in the sentence execution stage, when there has been an abstract condemnation to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by a State action violating the regime of fundamental rights, the procedural burden of proving the facts constituting the subjective right to compensation is borne by the person asserting them, in this case, the executing party** (in relation, ruling No. 54 of 15 hours 10 minutes of June 12, 1996). **This means that the condemnation issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) does not per se generate a duty to recognize the compensation sought by the executing party; rather, this pronouncement presupposes a value judgment on the actual existence of the damage (daño)**. For such purposes, the losses (menoscabos) alleged must be real and will naturally require the pertinent evidence, given that, as trial courts, the judges of the execution process must necessarily evaluate the evidence offered, and in the judgments they must list the proven and unproven facts, as well as the analysis of the causal link (relación de causalidad) between the questioned conducts, the damages (daños y perjuicios), and, based on criteria of equity and legality, determine the existence or not of what is claimed, thus proceeding to establish the concrete condemnation. In this sense, the judgments must apply the substantive rules referring to damages (daños y perjuicios), and logically weigh the evidence in the terms established by the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) (in this sense, from this Chamber, resolution No. 799 of 11 hours of October 18, 2002**.) From the foregoing it can be inferred that this is a process in which the parties must debate the existence of the damage (daño), its linkage with the defendant and the executing plaintiff, its quantification, and other arguments inherent to this type of litigation**. **In this way, the causal link (nexo causal) constitutes the inexorable relational framework that must exist between both extremes to generate, as a result, the duty to compensate. This link is essential for generating the imputation of the damage (daño), that is, to attribute to a specific subject, in the present case, the State, the damage caused. This detail is fundamental to be able to link the facts that gave rise to the condemnation in the constitutional venue with the compensation claims sought in the sentence execution proceeding, since such recognition does not arise as an irrefutable consequence of that condemnation, but rather from a subsequent process in which its existence and the relationship of the aforementioned causal link between the administrative acts and the claimed damages (daños) are proven through the evidentiary mechanisms already indicated**. Viewed this way, the appropriateness of the liquidated items as well as the amount of the sums awarded by the judge must not be established through capricious or arbitrary criteria, but rather must attend to the merit of the proceedings and derive from the required adversarial process, under penalty of violating the law [...]\" the emphasized portions are supplied (in the same sense and also from the First Chamber (Sala Primera), consult, among others, the precedents number *112 of 14:15 hours of July 15, 1992; 14 of 16:00 hours of March 2; 41 of 15:00 hours of June 18; 65 of 14:00 hours of October 1, all the foregoing from 1993; 100 of 16:10 hours of November 9; 116 of 14:00 hours of December 16, both from 1994; 45 of 14 hours 45 minutes of April 25 and No. 99 of 16 hours of September 20; the last two from 1995)* 105-97 of 14:31 of November 21, 1997. And notwithstanding that the considerations made refer to the processes for executing condemnations in amparo (amparo) appeals, they are applicable with respect to condemnations for damages (daños) in habeas corpus proceedings, since the provisions in both cases are the same, as arises from the relationship of the second paragraph of Article 26 and Article 51 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) cited above, a situation that is not modified by the enactment of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). In this regard, it has been stated \"*In the execution of amparos (amparos) and habeas corpus (hábeas corpus), we are not (sic) faced with judgments issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which in that specific aspect have the character of a condemnation. A condemnation that nevertheless has the particularity of the indeterminacy of the compensatory aspects granted [...] In its traditional concept, sentence executions have been restricted to the quantification of damages (daños y perjuicios), which, beforehand, have been demonstrated in the trial on the merits (proceso de conocimiento). Thus, it has been frequently said that they are demonstrated in the main proceeding and quantified in the execution (when it has not been possible to do so in the trial on the merits). However, the situation is different in the case of executions of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), as we have repeatedly indicated that the condemnation made by the Chamber (Sala) in the compensatory aspect is made in the abstract, and that this requires the demonstration and quantification of the damage (daño) in the execution stage. This circumstance marks an important difference from the ‘common’ execution. In this particular process, it is demonstrated and quantified. This distorts the very essence of the execution, because in this case, it is not simply executed, but rather the damages (daños y perjuicios) are demonstrated and recognized, prior to their liquidation [...]\" González Camacho, Óscar Eduardo et al. *El Nuevo Proceso Contencioso Administrativo*. San José, Poder Judicial, Departamento de Artes Gráficas 2006. 664 p. pp. 608 and 609. The basis of this process will always be the facts subject of the habeas corpus or amparo (amparo), just as they are accredited in the judgment, and in this respect, this execution process cannot disregard them.\"\n\nThe imputation of the harmful result to the Administration gives rise to its duty to compensate for the unlawfulness of its harmful behavior. Regarding this topic, this Chamber recently stated “[…]. Now, however broad the terms under which the State's patrimonial liability is currently assessed may be, there is no waiver of the requirement for certain criteria for imputing the damage to the public activity, because, otherwise, it would be unsustainable for the Administration to be attributed liability for the entire functioning of society merely due to the connection of even private activities with the essential purposes and functions of the State. Thus, it is necessary to rationalize and provide suitable legal criteria for the sphere of imputing the damage to the Public Administration. In our system, certainly numerals 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution are the basis for establishing the duty of compensation that weighs on the State for damages caused; however, the criteria for imputation are clearly defined in Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of the Public Administration, when Article 190 states that the Public Administration shall be liable 'for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party.' This is the general rule that lays the foundations for the State's patrimonial liability in our system. The scenarios contemplated in the following rules referring to liability for the unlawful conduct of public servants and for lawful conduct complement this regime, but the general premises are defined by the cited Article. It is from these concepts of legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning of the Administration that one must define when harmful conduct is imputed and when the State must answer financially. And in that regard, the First Chamber has stated “[…] Due to the particularities inherent to the liability of the Public Administration, generated through its gradual evolution, as well as the objective character achieved, with clear constitutional foundation, it cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted and permanent duty to compensate, applicable always and for all hypotheses of injury. A regime of such nature would be unheard of and materially unbearable for any State with limited financial resources. For this reason, criteria of imputation have been used that somehow dimension, within said objectivity, that compensatory duty originating from public conduct. Hence, it can be affirmed that the national regime is one of patrimonial liability of the Public Administration of a moderately objective nature, insofar as it does not renounce parameters or criteria of imputation, especially regarding abnormality and unlawfulness, in which, in one way or another, the conduct of the public apparatus is assessed and qualified. These are broad and diverse criteria from those of malice and fault traditionally used by common law, but which do not, for that reason, cease to be criteria of attribution that distance the institute from a mere automatic transfer of assets, without any assessment of the administrative conduct deployed. Thus, numeral 190 of our General Law of the Public Administration refers to 'legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning,' where legitimacy, or its antithesis, refers basically to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normality or abnormality points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented, among others, by the service-provision activity attributed to the State, as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the community. Note how Article 194 of the indicated law refers to 'lawful acts,' under the conception of legal activity, distinguishing them in the same rule from what it qualifies as 'normal functioning,' understood as material activity. In this way, abnormality addresses those administrative conducts that, in themselves, deviate from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes efficacy and efficiency) or from organization, technical rules, or the skill and prudent endeavor in the deployment of its actions, with harmful effect for the person. This allows us to point out that abnormality can manifest itself through poor functioning, delayed functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Abnormality and unlawfulness, therefore, should not be adopted as equivalent concepts, not even in what corresponds to the hypothesis of that functioning which, being due or in conformity with the abovementioned rules, produces a harmful result, called by some doctrinal sector 'abnormal functioning by result,' because in such case, what operates is a liability for normal functioning with a harmful effect or result, compensable, of course, provided that the prerequisites expressly pre-established by the Legal System itself are met (see Article 194 of the General Law of the Public Administration itself). Nor should this 'abnormality' of the functioning and the 'illegitimacy' thereof be confused with the generic and foundational unlawfulness, essential in all civil reparation. Indeed, patrimonial liability is born of unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive rule, while in others, from the basic principle translated into the duty not to harm another), and which for this particular matter is concretized in the non-existence of that duty to bear the damage. Thus, if there is no duty for the victim to endure the injury (manifested as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, failing that and under certain circumstances, assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent, whether because it was unforeseeable or unavoidable. When such duty to endure the injury does not exist, a breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person occurs, and to that extent, the injury caused in the legal sphere of the victim must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory reparation. Thus, it can be affirmed that only the injury that, confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be deemed unlawful in its base is compensable, insofar as the legal regime considers it unacceptable for the victim, regardless of the qualification that, subsequently and necessarily, is attributed to the public conduct. The opposite would be to affirm compensation for a harmful action in the face of an impairment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified […] That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in compensable damage, whether due to normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning. Be that as it may, those four criteria of imputation that the General Law of the Public Administration uses in Article 190, must be deemed to have constitutional shelter and backing, insofar as they concretize the transfer that the constituent made in numeral 41 to the ordinary legislator ('occurring to the laws') and instrumentalize the effective judicial protection enshrined in the Constitution. And this being so, it must be concluded that such criteria apply for the patrimonial liability of all public authority, whether administrative, legislative, or jurisdictional […]” precedent number 308-06 of 10:30 hours on May 25, 2006, of the First Chamber […]” precedent 1273-07 of 10:31 hours on October 30, 2007. Now then. When it comes to the patrimonial liability of the Administration, as indicated, bearing in mind the parameters of imputation set forth in the law, once these and the harmful result are demonstrated, it is appropriate to declare its patrimonial liability, regardless of whether or not the existence of criminal conduct by the official is proven. Thus, regarding this topic, the case law of the First Chamber has specified “[…] This Chamber has already had the opportunity to rule on the regime of patrimonial liability to which the State is subject. In this sense, in judgment no. 584 of 10 hours 40 minutes on August 11, 2005, it carried out a broad development and analysis on this subject, detailing its particularities, framework of evolution, constitutional support, among other considerations of importance. In what becomes relevant to the case, it should be noted that the patrimonial (not civil) and non-contractual liability of the Public Administration is framed within a preeminently objective regime, which fundamentally includes both the theory of risk and the balance in the equity equation. This essentially seeks compensatory reparation for anyone who has suffered an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority. This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a full transformation in the central axis of liability itself, because it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except regarding their personal liability). This causes, without a doubt, a radical shift in the approach inherent to its foundation, since there will be State liability whenever the victim does not have the duty to bear the damage, whether this is of a material or non-material nature. From that point on, the reversal of the components and effects of the institute as a whole is evident. Both the essential presuppositions and the burden of proof acquire a new nuance, which frees the affected party not only from substantive but also procedural ties, and places the Administration in the obligatory discharge regarding the charges and facts attributed to it. Within this framework, the markedly objective liability dispenses with the analysis of subjective and individual factors of the producing agent for the determinability of damage reparation, transferring itself to the sphere of the injured party. So long as an injury has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, be it active or omissive, that one does not have the duty to bear, the duty of compensation is imposed, by virtue of the principle of full reparation of damage that stems from numeral 41 of the Political Constitution. In this same sense, one may consult, among many others, the judgments of this Chamber numbers 138 of 15 hours 5 minutes on August 23; 192 of 14 hours 15 minutes on November 6, both of 1991; 48 of 14 hours 10 minutes on May 29, 1996; and 55 of 14 hours thirty minutes on July 4, 1997.) In light of the provisions of said precedents, and as the Court rightly ordered, the Legal System, based on the General Law of the Public Administration, adopts, as has been said, the system of preeminently objective liability. For this reason, the existence—and, therefore, its demonstration—of malice or fault or, in general, a subjective lack imputable to the public servants or officials is not necessary for the duty to compensate the damages and losses caused by its functioning to arise. Therefore, canon 190 of that legal body provides with crystal clarity the State's liability for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, unless the exempting causes that that same provision, exhaustively, expresses—namely; force majeure, fault of the victim, and the act of a third party—converge in the specific case, with it corresponding to the Administration to prove their existence. From this collegiate body, one may see the judgments of this same Chamber no. 589-F-99 of 14 hours 20 minutes on October 1, 1999, and no. 252-F-01, of 16 hours 15 minutes on March 28, 2001. Along this same line, canon 194.3 of that same legal body lays the legal foundations for the liability of the State as Legislator. Numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, and 154, all of the Magna Carta, constitute the foundation and support for the liability of the State as Judge for judicial error, and the abnormal or unlawful functioning of the jurisdictional function. Hence, one could not sustain an 'impunity' of the State under the basis that it lacks legal development, since that liability is established in principle, within the framework of the Constitution, while it would also imply a breach of legal certainty, the principle of equality, and the control of the arbitrariness of public powers. Viewed this way, its recognition is not conditioned on the existence of a legal mandate that regulates it. The aforementioned liability is governed by what is established in the Fundamental Charter, that is, it constitutes a principle of constitutional basis, imposed by the referenced norms and that seeks control over the exercise of all State function and conduct in any of its spheres, as well as the protection of the rights and interests of the citizens subject to justice […]” precedent number 74-07 of 10:15 hours on February 2, 2007, of the First Chamber. In the specific case, the object of the habeas corpus proceedings before the Constitutional Chamber was the illegitimate deprivation of liberty of B by the authorities of the Police Information Center of the Public Force of Pérez Zeledón, J P I and D M L, occurring on April 30, 2004. The unjustified conduct of two public officials in the exercise of their duties who deprived this person of liberty was analyzed. The carrying out of an act claimed as arbitrary by public authorities, that is, by the functioning of the Administration, was questioned. The Constitutional Chamber requested reports from the officials involved and from the public superiors who had to do with the questioned act, and upon resolving the appeal, stated “[…] Proven Facts. Of importance for the decision of this matter, the following facts are deemed duly proven, either because they have been so accredited or because the respondent omitted to refer to them according to what was provided in the initial order: That by resolution of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute of March sixteenth of the current year, the status of rentier residents was granted to the protected party and his wife, Ann Maxine Patton, for which reason, by official letter number P-182-2001, said institute requested the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners to grant the migratory category of resident to the protected party and his wife (folios 17 and 18 and report on folio 9); b) that on April thirtieth of the current year, at approximately seventeen hours and fifteen minutes, the officials of the CIFP, J P I and D M L, proceeded to follow the protected party's vehicle based on 'confidential reports' and a complaint that there was a foreigner in an irregular situation who needed to be identified (folio 36 and report on folio 27); c) that when the protected party's car stopped, they requested identification from the protected party and his wife, who showed them only an Arizona state license under the name B (folio 36 and report on folio 27); c) that upon requesting another identification document from the protected party to determine his legality in the country, he told them that he had it at his home, and upon requesting that he accompany them to their offices, he refused verbally and physically, for which they requested help from the Cantonal Delegation of the Public Force of Pérez Zeledón, managing to bring the protected party to said delegation, while his wife brought the passports (reports on folios 27 and 72); d) that they communicated with Migration officials to determine the migratory status of the protected party and his wife, because the passport provided was from Grenada and issued on a date prior to when, according to the respective certification of entries and exits from Migration, the protected party was residing in Costa Rica, having used a United States passport to enter and exit the country; in addition, that in the Grenada passport shown, the last entry into the country was September sixteenth of last year, data illegal on its face, because seven and a half months had elapsed since his entry into the country (folios 35, 37 to 40 and report on folio 27); e) that at twenty-two hours on the same day, the protected party left the Cantonal Delegation of the Public Force of Pérez Zeledón in the presence of his lawyer, without presenting visible injuries or discomfort, and in the company of officials of the Judicial Investigation Agency of Pérez Zeledón, Ricardo Calderón and Bernardo Fallas, for which the protected party signed the register accepting not having been mistreated or struck (report on folio 72). II.- Object of the appeal.- In the case at hand, the appellant alleges that on April thirtieth, two thousand one, at approximately sixteen hours thirty minutes, the protected party and his wife were traveling in their vehicle in the vicinity of the locality of Quebradas de Pérez Zeledón, when an 'unexpected' and 'reckless' Cherokee brand automobile, with tinted windows and without any police markings, intercepted them by means of a maneuver that forced the protected party to stop. It indicates that from the Cherokee brand vehicle, two people dressed in civilian clothes got out, one of them with a firearm, who in an 'abusive' manner requested that the protected party get out of his vehicle because he had to accompany them to the Police Delegation in the area under arrest, since there was an investigation order issued against him by the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners, the above without identifying themselves as police officials and without showing any order, for which the protected party requested that they do so and before this they shot at his feet. Subsequently, they were taken to the referenced delegation, where they were detained until approximately nineteen hours and thirty minutes, which he considers violative of his rights. III.- Response of the authorities.- The respondent authorities affirm in the report rendered under the faith of the oath that the detention of which the protected party and his wife were the object was legitimate, since at that moment he did not carry any document that would prove the legality of their permanence in the country. Said detention was executed by officials of the Ministry of Government and Police and Public Security, due to the fact that confidential reports existed relating to a foreigner that needed to be identified for being in an apparently irregular situation, and the protected party was unable to prove the legality of his migratory situation. The Chamber verifies that time was granted for the person accompanying him (his wife) to go and collect the pertinent documents, so that once they were provided to that office, the protected party and his wife were released. Contrary to what was stated in the filing document, the officials argue that the treatment of the protected party and his companion was at no moment aggressive nor violative of their rights, that they identified themselves properly, were not armed, and at no moment shot at the protected party's feet as the appellant claims. IV.- The Detention (Article 37 of the Constitution).- The Chamber considers that in the specific case, the protected party's right to liberty was effectively violated, since the basis for proceeding with the transfer and detention thereof to the Delegation was the existence of 'confidential reports,' which in the first place does not constitute an objective reason, and in the second place, no proof whatsoever of such circumstance is provided in the case file. One must begin by mentioning that the officials involved in the matter were not officials of the General Directorate of Migration, from which it follows that they lacked competence to detain and interrogate the protected party for 'migratory matters.'\n\nWhile it is true that the fact that the protected party presented a driver's license of foreign origin—specifically from the United States—as an identification document, and that when required to show his passport, he presented one from Grenada, even though it was later verified that he had entered the country with a United States passport issued before the Grenadian one, is a circumstance that the immigration police could have found suspicious and investigated, but not the officers of the Police Information Center of the Ministry of Governance and Police and Public Security, who lack the competence to do so. The respondent authorities state that another of the grounds for proceeding with what was effectively a detention of the protected party was the existence of a complaint filed with the Information Center of the Public Force regarding a citizen with the last names W J and his wife T, from which it was necessary to request truthful information that could verify that the protected party and his wife were not those persons. Of this complaint as well, nothing more is provided in the case file than the statement of the Minister of Governance and Police and Public Security; but even assuming that such a complaint actually existed, the protected party's last names do not, in any way, bear any resemblance to those of the denounced foreigner, a circumstance that was verified from the moment the protected party presented the driver's license. From the above, it is concluded that at no time was there a reason to proceed with the detention of the protected party, because as the precedents of this Chamber have mentioned, it is not possible to detain a person based on a mere complaint or simple suspicion, as these do not constitute verified indications of having committed a crime, a necessary prerequisite under the terms of Article 37 of the Constitution […] **V.- Conclusion.-** From all the above, it can be gathered that the involved officials violated the principle of legality by assuming powers outside their competence as their own, thereby injuring the protected party's right to liberty through such action. There was no reason to proceed with the detention of the protected party, since the mere existence of the two grounds provided by the respondent authorities, namely the confidential reports and the complaint, were not sufficient under the terms of Article 37 of the Constitution. Regarding the confidential reports, it is not possible to accept such justification because it would imply that any authority could detain a person and claim they did so based on \"confidential reports,\" reserving their origin due to their nature, rendering the content of the constitutional right to liberty recognized by the Political Constitution and protected by the jurisprudence of this Court meaningless. As for the complaint, reference has already been made to the line of thought of the Chamber. Thus, and given that once it was verified that both the protected party and his wife enjoy the status of rentier citizens, they were released, it is necessary to declare the appeal simply and plainly with merit for the indemnification purposes that may proceed […]”. Precedent number 8457-01 of 8:46 a.m. on August 24, 2001. From the perspective of the summary process for the protection of liberty that is habeas corpus, the Constitutional Chamber verified the illegitimacy of the detention of the protected party—in this case, the victim B—and the primary purpose of the process—to cease the violation of the fundamental right—yielded because by the time of the decision, the offended party had already been released. Notwithstanding this, in any case and as prescribed by the second paragraph of Article 26—and Article 41 regarding amparo appeals—both of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction, upon declaring the violation of a fundamental right, it automatically proceeds to condemn the State to pay the resulting damages and losses. Much has been discussed about the scope of this condemnation, because in these processes, no evidence is produced aimed at demonstrating the damages caused or the link or causal nexus between the administrative activity and the claimed damages and losses, although it is unquestionable that every violation of a fundamental right already implies a state obligation to repair. Hence, it is noted that such condemnation indeed assigns a right to the protected party. However, given the nature of the summary processes of amparo and habeas corpus, despite the fact that when granted, they demonstrate the injury to fundamental rights, the decision upholding the claim in habeas corpus or amparo has not established the nature and scope of the Administration's patrimonial liability, nor the existence, nature, and extent, as well as the scope and quantification, of the damages allegedly suffered. And precisely due to the nature of the Constitutional Chamber's rulings that declare habeas corpus or amparo appeals with merit, the avenue for executing the judgment in the contentious-administrative track for this type of ruling becomes distorted, as it turns not into a common execution proceeding—in which damages are liquidated and their amount is discussed—but into a true declarative proceeding, in which the protected party must prove the existence, nature, and extent of the damage as well as the amounts claimed, which means initiating a true ordinary trial for claiming damages and losses, proving their existence, the link and state responsibility, its obligation to compensate them, and their amount. The First Chamber of the Court itself has recognized this reality, assessing the execution of condemnations in amparo appeals, which are comparable to those occurring in habeas corpus proceedings. Thus, in precedent number 138-f-06 of 8:10 a.m. on March 16, 2006: “[…] in the case of proceedings for the execution of judgment of rulings issued by the constitutional jurisdiction in amparo appeals, it is essential to make some clarifications. As is known, the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction assigns to the Constitutional Chamber the jurisdictional power to condemn to the restoration of damages and losses arising from the acts of public or private authorities subject to the protective scope of this appeal, which injure the regime of people's fundamental rights. In this regard, concerning the amparo process, the opening paragraph of Article 51 of that normative body clearly states: ‘... every resolution that upholds the appeal shall condemn, in abstract, to the indemnification of the damages and losses caused and to the payment of the costs of the appeal, and shall reserve their liquidation for the execution of sentence.’ In this case, it is a condemnation in abstract that must be made concrete in a subsequent execution; therefore, in these cases, it is essential to assess the situation and circumstances in which the protected rights were violated, because, as indicated above, the pronouncement issued by the Constitutional Court is in abstract. Thus, the referred condemnation opens the competence of the contentious-administrative judge to analyze the real existence or not of the damages and losses, and to set their amount according to the specific circumstances of the case. This is so because, in these proceedings, what is done is to analyze the constitutional validity of the public conduct by virtue of which constitutionally enshrined rights and freedoms have been injured. In this type of constitutional process, there is no debate or analysis regarding the damages and losses that may derive from the transgressing conduct, which, in light of its nature, would be inappropriate. **For this reason, such an assessment would be counterproductive to the very reason and essence of such a process. Therefore, the stage of execution of judgment constitutes a verification that the terms of the sentence executing the ruling issued by the Constitutional Chamber (referring to a condemnation in abstract) has adequately weighed the demonstration that damage has effectively occurred, the existence of a causal link between the alleged damages and the conduct attributed, in this case, to the State or minor public entity, so that this harmful effect can be imputed to it**. At the same time, it verifies that the execution ruling falls within the parameters pre-established by the pronouncement that gives rise to that process. It is, then, an instance for measuring the jurisdictional exercise, consisting of confronting the provisions of the execution resolution against the measures derived from the preceding constitutional sentence, which imposes the duty of analyzing the different aspects indicated […] From the above, it is clear that the Constitutional Court's pronouncement does not prejudge the real existence of damages and losses in favor of the protected party, nor the quantification of these items, but rather, in reality, issues a condemnation in abstract by express mandate of law. For this reason, the examination of the appropriateness of these items must be the subject of analysis within an execution proceeding, as stipulated by the cited Canon 51 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction. In this manner, it corresponds to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to define the appropriateness and amount of these heads of claim. Likewise, the execution of sentence proceeding in this type of case is constituted as a “sui generis” litigation, very close to a declarative proceeding. As indicated, based on the particularities mentioned, it does not consist of a mere liquidation of the items that the executing party considers constitute the damages and losses. **The nature of the debated substance requires objective proof of the existence of the alleged damages, and then, that they are effectively an immediate and direct consequence of the State's conduct, whether active or omissive**. In this way, the demonstration of the existence of a causal nexus between these two parts is imposed. That is, within the proceeding, the judge must decide whether the damages presented by the executing party are a consequence of public functioning or if, on the contrary, they are the result of factors unrelated to administrative activity. Only with such demonstration can pecuniary responsibility be attributed to the State as demanded by the executing party, which imposes a sine qua non condition for its condemnation. In this sense, the causal nexus turns out to be the transcendental element that would allow granting the claims, which, under the provisions of Article 317 in relation to 693, both of the Civil Procedure Code, must be demonstrated by the claimant, as these are facts that seek to constitute the right to compensation claimed. On the other hand, the amount of the claims must be supported by the evidentiary elements provided, when they are required (since for the case of subjective moral damage, other application rules apply, as will be analyzed later). This Chamber has already indicated that from the relationship of Articles 317, section 1, 693, and 694 of the Civil Procedure Code, in concordance with the general supplementary clause contained in Article 103 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, it is inferred, with clear clarity, **that in the stage of execution of judgment, when there has been a condemnation in abstract for the payment of damages and losses caused by State action violating the regime of fundamental rights, the procedural burden of proving the constitutive facts of the subjective right to compensation falls on the party who asserts them, in this case, the executing party** (in relation, ruling No. 54 of 3:10 p.m. on June 12, 1996). **What has been said means that the condemnation issued by the Constitutional Chamber does not generate, per se, a duty to recognize the indemnification required by the executing party; rather, this pronouncement presupposes a value judgment on the real existence of the damage**. For such purposes, the alleged detriments must be real and naturally will require the pertinent evidence, given that, as trial courts, the judges in the execution proceeding must necessarily hear the evidence offered and the judgments must list the proven and unproven facts, as well as the analysis of the causal relationship between the questioned conducts, the damages and losses, and, based on criteria of equity and legality, determine the existence or not of what is claimed, thus establishing the condemnation in concrete. In such sense, the judgments must apply the substantive rules referring to damages and losses, and logically assess the evidence under the terms established by the Civil Procedure Code (in this sense, from this Chamber, resolution No. 799 of 11:00 a.m. on October 18, 2002**.) From the above, it follows that it is a process in which the parties must debate the existence of the damage, its link with the defendant and the executing party, its quantification, and other arguments inherent to this type of litigation**. **In this way, the causal nexus constitutes the inexorable relational framework that must exist between both extremes to generate the duty to compensate as a result. This link is elementary for generating the imputation of the damage, that is, for attributing the caused damage to a particular subject, in this instance, the State. This detail is fundamental for being able to link the facts that gave rise to the condemnation in the constitutional venue with the compensatory claims requested through the avenue of execution of judgment, since such recognition does not arise as an irrefutable consequence of that condemnation, but from a subsequent process in which its existence and the relationship of the referred causal link between the administrative acts and the claimed damages are proven through the evidentiary mechanisms already indicated**. Seen thus, the appropriateness of the liquidated items as well as the amount of the sums awarded by the judge must not be fixed by capricious or arbitrary criteria; rather, they must attend to the merit of the case file and derive from the adversarial proceedings required in this sense, under penalty of contravening the right […]” the highlighting is supplied (in the same sense and also from the First Chamber, consult, among others, the precedents number *112 of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; 14 of 4:00 p.m. on March 2; 41 of 3:00 p.m. on June 18; 65 of 2:00 p.m. on October 1, all the foregoing from 1993; 100 of 4:10 p.m. on November 9; 116 of 2:00 p.m. on December 16, both from 1994; 45 of 2:45 p.m. on April 25 and No. 99 of 4:00 p.m. on September 20; the last two from 1995)* 105-97 of 2:31 p.m. on November 21, 1997. And despite the fact that the considerations made refer to the execution proceedings of condemnations in amparo appeals, they are applicable to what corresponds to condemnations for damages in habeas corpus, since the provisions in both cases are the same, as emerges from the relationship of the second paragraph of Article 26 and Article 51 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction cited above, a situation that is not modified by the enactment of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. In this regard, it has been noted: “*In the execution of amparos and habeas corpus, we are not (sic) faced with sentences dictated by the Constitutional Chamber, which in that specific aspect have the character of a condemnation. A condemnation that, however, has the particularity of the indeterminacy of the indemnification heads granted […] In its traditional concept, the executions of judgment have been restricted to the quantification of damages and losses, which beforehand have been demonstrated in the declarative process. Thus, it has been frequently said that they are demonstrated in the main process and quantified in the execution (when it has not been possible to do so in the declarative one). However, the situation is different in the case of the Constitutional Chamber's executions, because we have repeatedly pointed out that the condemnation made by the Chamber in the compensatory aspect is made in abstract, and that this obliges the demonstration and quantification of the damage in the execution stage. This circumstance marks an important difference from the ‘common’ execution. In this particular process, it is demonstrated and quantified. This distorts the very essence of the execution, because in this case, it is not simply executed, but rather the damages and losses are demonstrated and recognized, prior to their liquidation […]”* González Camacho, Óscar Eduardo and others. *El Nuevo Proceso Contencioso Administrativo*. San José, Poder Judicial, Departamento de Artes Gráficas 2006. 664 p. pp. 608 and 609. The basis of this process will always be the facts that were the subject of the habeas corpus or amparo, exactly as they are proven in the sentence, and in this regard, this execution process cannot disregard them." }