{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-125733",
  "citation": "Res. 00771-2008 Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Improcedencia de responsabilidad estatal por no aprobación legislativa de concesión en Isla Caballo",
  "title_en": "State Liability Inapplicable for Legislative Non-Approval of Isla Caballo Concession",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Primera rechazó un recurso de casación que pretendía declarar la responsabilidad del Estado por la omisión de la Asamblea Legislativa en aprobar concesiones otorgadas por la Municipalidad de Puntarenas sobre parcelas en Isla Caballo. La sentencia determina que la aprobación legislativa exigida por el artículo 42 de la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre no es un mero control de legalidad, sino que implica un examen de oportunidad y conveniencia, de naturaleza discrecional y política. Por tanto, los concesionarios solo tenían una expectativa de derecho, no un derecho adquirido, y asumían el riesgo de la no aprobación. La Sala también descarta la aplicación del silencio positivo y de un plazo razonable de cuatro años, subrayando que en materia ambiental y bienes de dominio público esa figura es improcedente. La falta de aprobación no generó daño resarcible, pues no se lesionó ningún derecho subjetivo preexistente.",
  "summary_en": "The First Chamber rejected an appeal seeking to hold the State liable for the Legislative Assembly's failure to approve concessions granted by the Municipality of Puntarenas over plots on Isla Caballo. The ruling determines that legislative approval required by Article 42 of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Law is not a mere legality check but entails a discretionary and political review of opportunity and convenience. Thus, the concessionaires only had a mere expectation of a right, not a vested right, and assumed the risk of non-approval. The Chamber also dismisses the application of administrative silence (positive) and a reasonable four-year deadline, emphasizing that such figure is inapplicable in environmental matters and public domain assets. The lack of approval caused no compensable injury, as no preexisting subjective right was violated.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "date": "2008",
  "year": "2008",
  "topic_ids": [
    "water-law",
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": null,
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "demanialidad",
    "bienes de dominio público",
    "silencio positivo",
    "zona marítimo terrestre (ZMT)",
    "discrecionalidad gubernativa",
    "expectativa de derecho",
    "requisito de eficacia",
    "control político"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 42",
      "law": "Ley 6043"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 9",
      "law": "Ley 6043"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 10",
      "law": "Ley 6043"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 140 inciso 19",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 145 inciso 4",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "concesión zona marítimo terrestre",
    "Isla Caballo",
    "aprobación legislativa",
    "responsabilidad del Estado",
    "silencio positivo",
    "bienes de dominio público",
    "Ley 6043",
    "discrecionalidad",
    "expectativa de derecho",
    "control político"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "maritime-terrestrial zone concession",
    "Isla Caballo",
    "legislative approval",
    "state liability",
    "administrative silence",
    "public domain assets",
    "Law 6043",
    "discretionary power",
    "legal expectation",
    "political control"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "A la luz del anterior precedente, resulta claro que la aprobación impartida por la Asamblea Legislativa tocante a concesiones otorgadas por las municipalidades respecto de islas o islotes marítimos, no sólo es de legalidad, sino que, atendiendo a su naturaleza intrínseca (fundamentalmente política) abarca también aspectos de oportunidad y conveniencia, lo cual implica que no se está ante un acto reglado. Por el contrario, hay manifestación de discrecionalidad gubernativa de primer grado. Por esta razón, a las empresas actoras no les podía asistir certeza de que el Poder Legislativo aprobaría la concesión que la Municipalidad del Cantón Central de Puntarenas les había otorgado. A lo sumo, lo que tendrían sería una simple expectativa de derecho de que ello sucedería. En consecuencia, no pueden alegar ningún derecho adquirido en virtud de la aprobación que el indicado Gobierno Local dio a la solicitud de concesión, pues faltaba un requisito de eficacia: la aprobación por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa (artículo 145 inciso 4 de la LGAP).",
  "excerpt_en": "In light of the foregoing precedent, it is clear that the approval given by the Legislative Assembly regarding concessions granted by municipalities over maritime islands or islets is not only a legality review but, given its intrinsic nature (fundamentally political), also encompasses aspects of opportunity and convenience, which means it is not a regulated act. On the contrary, it involves a first-degree governmental discretion. For this reason, the plaintiff companies could not have had certainty that the Legislative Branch would approve the concession the Municipality of the Central Canton of Puntarenas had granted them. At most, they had a mere legal expectation that this would happen. Consequently, they cannot claim any vested right by virtue of the approval the said Local Government gave to the concession application, since a condition of effectiveness was missing: approval by the Legislative Assembly (Article 145, section 4, of the LGAP).",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The appeal is dismissed, upholding the ruling that denied compensation for the legislative non-approval of the Isla Caballo concession.",
    "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación contra la sentencia que denegó la indemnización por la no aprobación legislativa de la concesión en Isla Caballo."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "the approval given by the Legislative Assembly regarding concessions granted by municipalities over maritime islands or islets is not only a legality review but, given its intrinsic nature (fundamentally political), also encompasses aspects of opportunity and convenience",
      "quote_es": "la aprobación impartida por la Asamblea Legislativa tocante a concesiones otorgadas por las municipalidades respecto de islas o islotes marítimos, no sólo es de legalidad, sino que, atendiendo a su naturaleza intrínseca (fundamentalmente política) abarca también aspectos de oportunidad y conveniencia"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has been clear and consistent in denying the possibility of administrative silence (positive) arising in environmental matters and concerning public domain assets",
      "quote_es": "la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha sido clara y constante en el sentido de denegar la posibilidad de que se configure el silencio positivo en relación con la materia ambiental y con los bienes de dominio público"
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-32006",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 6043  Art. 42"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-125733",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-13231",
      "norm_num": "6227",
      "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-32006",
      "norm_num": "6043",
      "norm_name": "Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "02/03/1977"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-57436",
      "norm_num": "8508",
      "norm_name": "Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "28/04/2006"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "norm_num": "0",
      "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política",
      "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política",
      "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“III.- Como se indicó, la parte actora pretende, con este proceso, se declare la responsabilidad del Estado por la supuesta omisión de la Asamblea Legislativa en la aprobación de las concesiones de varias parcelas ubicadas en Isla Caballo. Al respecto, debe indicarse que, de conformidad con lo preceptuado en el numeral 190 de la LGAP, la Administración Pública responde por su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal. Se incluye cualquier forma de manifestación de la conducta pública, sea por acción u omisión. Este canon debe ser relacionado con lo dispuesto en el ordinal 1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, el cual, en su inciso segundo, señala, de manera expresa, que los motivos de ilegalidad comprenden cualquier infracción, ya sea por acción u omisión al ordenamiento jurídico. Según lo ha indicado esta Sala de manera reiterada (véase, entre otras, la sentencia 702 de las 10 horas 25 minutos del 27 de septiembre del 2007), la responsabilidad extracontractual administrativa se enmarca dentro de un régimen preeminentemente objetivo. Se procura la reparación indemnizatoria a quien ha experimentado un daño atribuible a la organización pública como centro de autoridad. “Siempre que se haya sufrido una lesión como consecuencia de una conducta pública, sea esta activa u omisiva, que la víctima no tiene la obligación de soportar, se impone el deber de resarcimiento, en virtud del postulado de reparación integral del daño que se desprende del numeral 41 de la Constitución Política.”(fallo antes indicado). Asimismo, conforme lo señala el artículo 196 de la LGAP, para que el daño sea resarcible debe ser efectivo, evaluable e individualizable en relación con una persona o grupo. IV.- El numeral primero de la Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, número 6043, dispone la demanialidad o dominio público de la zona marítimo terrestre, al señalar que forma parte del patrimonio nacional perteneciente al Estado y, por lo tanto, es inalienable e imprescriptible. De conformidad con el canon 9 ejúsdem, dicha zona está conformada por la franja de doscientos metros de ancho a lo largo de los litorales Atlántico y Pacífico de la República, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza, medidos horizontalmente a partir de la línea de pleamar ordinaria y los terrenos y rocas que deje el mar en descubierto en la marea baja. Agrega que, para todos los efectos legales, comprende también a las islas, islotes y peñascos marítimos, así como toda tierra o formación natural que sobre salga del nivel del océano dentro del mar territorial de la República. Queda exceptuada la Isla del Coco, la cual es del dominio y posesión directos del Estado y aquellas otras islas cuyo dominio o administración se determinen en esa ley o en leyes especiales. Esa zona se compone de dos secciones –artículo 10 ibídem-: 1) zona pública, que es la franja de 50 metros de ancho a contar de la pleamar ordinaria y las áreas que quedan al descubierto durante la marea baja; y 2) zona restringida, es decir, la franja de los 150 metros restantes o por los demás terrenos en casos de islas. Los islotes, peñascos y demás áreas pequeñas y formaciones naturales que sobresalgan del mar corresponden a la zona pública. Por su parte, los cánones 39 y 40 de dicha legislación disponen que las municipalidades son las competentes para otorgar las concesiones en la zona restringida de la zona marítimo terrestre ubicada en su territorio. El numeral 42 exige, para que el acto administrativo de concesión resulte eficaz, la aprobación de varios entes descentralizados así como del Parlamento, según el destino y naturaleza del bien. Dispone ese artículo de la Ley 6043: “ Las concesiones en las áreas turísticas requieren la aprobación del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo. En las demás áreas de la zona marítimo terrestre la aprobación corresponderá al Instituto de Tierras y Colonización./ Estos institutos no podrán denegar la aprobación, salvo que ésta viole la ley, lo que deberán indicar expresamente, en forma razonada./ Si la concesión se refiere a una isla o islote marítimos, o parte de las mismas, será necesaria la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa.”(Lo subrayado y resaltado en negrita no son del original). Tocante a la concesión de islas o islotes marítimos, lo anterior es reafirmado por el canon 43 del Reglamento de esa Ley, Decreto Ejecutivo número 7841-P del 16 de diciembre de 1977 y sus reformas, al disponer: “En el caso de solicitudes de concesión sobre parte o el total de islas o islotes marítimos, deberá remitirse a la Asamblea Legislativa, el original del contrato de concesión y copia del expediente, con todos los antecedentes del caso para su aprobación.” Para el sub júdice, interesa determinar si la aprobación impartida por el Parlamento es solamente de legalidad, en cuyo caso se estaría ante un acto reglado, y, por tanto, sólo por ese motivo podría denegarse la aprobación; o si por el contrario, también abarca aspectos de oportunidad y conveniencia. Es menester indicar, previo al análisis respectivo, que el requerimiento de la aprobación legislativa, distinto a lo señalado por el casacionista, encuentra asidero o fundamento constitucional en el canon 140 inciso 19 de la Carta Política. Dispone esa norma: “Son deberes y atribuciones que corresponden conjuntamente al Presidente y al respectivo Ministro de Gobierno: … 19) Suscribir los contratos administrativos no comprendidos en el inciso 14) del artículo 121 de esta Constitución, a reserva de someterlos a la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa cuando estipulen exención de impuestos o tasas, o tengan por objeto la explotación de servicios públicos, recursos o riquezas naturales del Estado./ La aprobación legislativa a estos contratos no les dará carácter de leyes ni los eximirá de su régimen jurídico administrativo. No se aplicará lo dispuesto en este inciso a los empréstitos u otros convenios similares, a que se refiere el inciso 15) del artículo 121, los cuales se regirán por sus normas especiales.”(Lo subrayado no es del original). Es diáfana esa disposición al señalar que, tratándose de contratos cuyo objeto esté referido, entre otros, a recursos o riquezas naturales del Estado, como son las islas o islotes marítimos, se requiere, necesariamente, la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa, sin que ello implique una variación en el régimen jurídico administrativo aplicable. No obstante que dicha disposición constitucional está referida a contratos firmados por el Poder Ejecutivo, tratándose de convenios suscritos por otros órganos o entes, por ejemplo las municipalidades, si su objeto es alguno de los ahí señalados, verbigracia, los “recursos o riquezas naturales del Estado”, tal y como sucede en el sub lite, por principio, no sólo resulta conveniente, sino necesaria la aprobación legislativa, en virtud del interés público, o más aún, interés nacional involucrado según lo indica la Sala Constitucional en los votos números 2006-454 de las 14 horas 45 minutos del 25 de enero del 2006 y 2007-2063 de las 14 horas 40 minutos del 14 de febrero del 2007. Por otro lado, del tenor literal del canon 42 de la Ley 6043, se deduce con claridad que lo dispuesto en el párrafo segundo, sea la imposibilidad de negar la aprobación salvo por razones de legalidad, sólo está referido al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (ICT) y al Instituto de Tierras y Colonización (ITCO), hoy Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA). Señala dicho párrafo: “Estos institutos no podrán denegar la aprobación , salvo que ésta viole la ley, lo que deberán indicar expresamente, en forma razonada.”(Lo subrayado es suplido). ¿Cuáles institutos?, pues los señalados en el párrafo primero: ICT e ITCO, hoy IDA. Asimismo, resulta sintomático el hecho de que lo señalado en torno a la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa se ubique en un párrafo posterior de esa disposición, lo cual hace presumir que no deviene obligatoria y tampoco que el contralor sea de mera legalidad. Si no fuese de esta manera, el actual párrafo tercero se habría insertado luego del primero, para que lo cubriera lo dispuesto en el segundo. Por demás, parece lógico que así sea. No tiene ningún sentido poner a los señores Diputados a valorar si se cumplieron los requisitos legales para el otorgamiento de concesiones. Esa es una función administrativa que la municipalidad o el instituto correspondiente están llamados a hacer, y por la que no se justificaría elevar un expediente de concesión a la Asamblea Legislativa. En todo caso, cualquier duda acerca de la manera de interpretar dicho canon 42 de la Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, concretamente, respecto de la aprobación que debe impartir el Parlamento cuando la concesión tenga como objeto una isla o islote, quedó zanjada en la señalada sentencia 454 de las 14 horas 55 minutos del 25 de enero del 2006 de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en donde, en lo de interés, se indica: “XI.- DEL USO Y APROVECHAMIENTO DE LAS ISLAS E ISLOTES. … Por ello, se estima, que además de necesaria es conveniente la exigencia de la aprobación legislativa en este tipo de contratos (concesión sobre islas e islotes), en tanto actúa a modo de control político respecto de un \" bien de la Nación \" de fundamental importancia, al estar ubicado en el mar territorial, sobre el que el Estado ejerce su soberanía, en forma completa y exclusiva (artículo 6 constitucional) . Asimismo, es útil y necesario un amplio debate en el Plenario Legislativo, a fin de que los diputados examinen el objeto, fin, oportunidad y legalidad de la concesión. Nótese que la explotación y aprovechamiento de este \" bien de la Nación \" tiene fuertes repercusiones a nivel económico, social, además de las ambientales y ecológicas, e inclusive políticas; motivo por el cual debe darse participación a todas las fracciones representadas … XII.- CONTINUACIÓN. (1).- Asimismo, es importante advertir que la doctrina ha entendido que la aprobación representa una declaración fundada en valoraciones sobre el mérito, oportunidad, utilidad y legalidad del acto sometido a su conocimiento; de donde se constata que el sujeto que aprueba no coopera a la formación del acto sometido a su aprobación, únicamente declara que el acto sometido a su examen es útil y oportuno, para tener así por realizada la condición de la cual la ley hace depender la eficacia del acto. Es decir, que la actuación legislativa en esta materia actúa como condicionante de eficacia jurídica de este tipo de contratos, en tanto el contrato no queda completo ni produce efectos naturales hasta tanto no sobreviene esta aprobación; constituyéndose en un control, no sólo de legalidad, sino también de orden político. De manera que, en este caso, la Asamblea Legislativa no está legitimada para integrar su voluntad al contrato que aprueba, por cuanto ésta fue expresada por el sujeto que tramitó y ante quien se gestionó la concesión, sea, la respectiva municipalidad que formula la consulta ante la Asamblea. Así, el órgano legislativo, puede aprobarlo o improbarlo en su totalidad -no parcialmente-, dependiendo de la oportunidad, legalidad y bondad misma del contrato, pero sin modificarlo o transformarlo, porque la potestad de suscripción de la concesión corresponde exclusivamente a las municipalidades. De manera que una eventual intervención de la Asamblea en cuanto al contenido de las concesiones de islas o islotes por parte de los legisladores, haría inconstitucional el acto, en perjuicio de la autonomía municipal, constitucionalmente reconocida en el artículo 170.”(Sólo lo subrayado no es del original). A la luz del anterior precedente, resulta claro que la aprobación impartida por la Asamblea Legislativa tocante a concesiones otorgadas por las municipalidades respecto de islas o islotes marítimos, no sólo es de legalidad, sino que, atendiendo a su naturaleza intrínseca (fundamentalmente política) abarca también aspectos de oportunidad y conveniencia, lo cual implica que no se está ante un acto reglado. Por el contrario, hay manifestación de discrecionalidad gubernativa de primer grado. Por esta razón, a las empresas actoras no les podía asistir certeza de que el Poder Legislativo aprobaría la concesión que la Municipalidad del Cantón Central de Puntarenas les había otorgado. A lo sumo, lo que tendrían sería una simple expectativa de derecho de que ello sucedería. En consecuencia, no pueden alegar ningún derecho adquirido en virtud de la aprobación que el indicado Gobierno Local dio a la solicitud de concesión, pues faltaba un requisito de eficacia: la aprobación por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa (artículo 145 inciso 4 de la LGAP). Como bien lo indica el Tribunal, la posibilidad de no aprobación legislativa de la concesión es un riesgo que debe correr quien pretende desarrollar algún proyecto en una isla o islote marítimos o en parte de ellos. V.- Señala el casacionsita que el Poder Legislativo debía aprobar su solicitud de concesión dentro de un plazo razonable, el cual, indica, es el cuatrienal dispuesto en el canon 119 del Reglamento Interno de la Asamblea Legislativa. Esta Sala no comparte ese aserto. Además de lo expuesto en el considerando anterior, en el sentido de que el contralor ejercido por el Parlamento no es sólo de legalidad, sino también de oportunidad y conveniencia, dispone la indicada norma: “ Artículo 119.- Caducidad de los asuntos Al finalizar una legislatura, los asuntos pendientes de resolución podrán estudiarse en la siguiente, por iniciativa del Poder Ejecutivo o de los diputados. En todos estos casos, tales asuntos seguirán los trámites que aún les falten. Pasados cuatro años calendario a partir de su iniciación, se tendrán como no presentados y sin más trámite se ordenará su archivo./No obstante, la Asamblea podrá conceder un nuevo plazo por votación de los dos tercios del total de sus miembros, siempre que la moción correspondiente se presente antes del vencimiento del plazo.”(Lo subrayado no es del original). Se aprecia con facilidad que esa disposición no establece ningún plazo para que el Parlamento apruebe un proyecto de ley. Por el contrario, señala que, si pasados cuatro años desde que se inició un expediente, no es votado, se ordenará su archivo sin más trámite. Consecuentemente, no resulta aplicable a la especie. Sin embargo, como bien lo señalaron los jueces de instancia, con base en la doctrina que inspira el numeral 137 de la LGAP, de entenderse que sí es actuable, el hecho de que la Asamblea Legislativa no votara el proyecto de ley de concesión a favor de las actoras dentro del plazo de cuatro años, y no solicitarse el otorgamiento de un nuevo plazo, debe entenderse como un rechazo tácito. Además, con la no aprobación, no se viola, ni lesiona, derecho subjetivo preexistente, ni se limita a suprime una situación jurídica, pues el otorgamiento de una concesión, en estos casos, posee discrecionalidad gubernativa de mayor rango. VI.- Por último, alega el casacionista que, como la Asamblea Legislativa no aprobó dentro del plazo razonable de cuatro años la concesión otorgada a sus poderdantes, se debe de entender autorizada en virtud de la figura del silencio positivo, pero, como no existe mecanismo procesal para hacerla valer, sólo puede exigir la responsabilidad del Estado por esa conducta omisiva. Con independencia de lo señalado en los apartados IV y V de esta sentencia, en el sentido de que las actoras no tenían certeza de que la Asamblea Legislativa les aprobaría la concesión y que el numeral 119 del Reglamento Interno del Parlamento no establece plazo alguno para que el Poder Legislativo apruebe las concesiones respecto de islas e islotes marítimos, razones por las cuales no se le irrogó daño alguno a la parte actora, debe señalarse que la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha sido clara y constante en el sentido de denegar la posibilidad de que se configure el silencio positivo en relación con la materia ambiental y con los bienes de dominio público (al respecto, pueden consultarse, entre muchos otros, los votos de ese órgano jurisdiccional números 1886 de las 9 horas 12 minutos de 7 de abril de 1995 y 2063 de las 14 horas 45 minutos del 14 de febrero del 2007). Al amparo de ese criterio, en el sub júdice resulta improcedente la aplicación de esa figura, al pretenderse la concesión de varias parcelas ubicadas en la Isla Caballo, la cual, según ya se indicó, es un bien de dominio público de naturaleza ambiental, por estar ubicada en la zona costera. Ergo, al no ser procedente la aplicación de la figura del silencio positivo en esta lite, la tesis del recurrente para reclamar responsabilidad del Estado carece de sustento, razón por la cual no resulta de recibo. VII.- En mérito de las razones expuestas, al no tener la Asamblea Legislativa el deber de aprobar la concesión de una isla, menos en un plazo determinado, ni configurarse el silencio positivo, se impone el rechazo del recurso interpuesto. Considerando la naturaleza del sub júdice –asunto de puro derecho en el que se discute la interpretación de dos normas, una legal y otra reglamentaria-, esta Sala considera que la parte actora ha tenido suficiente motivo para litigar, razón por la cual deberá resolverse sin especial condenatoria en costas (artículo 150 inciso 3 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).”",
  "body_en_text": "III.- As noted, the plaintiff seeks, through this proceeding, a declaration of State liability for the alleged failure of the Legislative Assembly to approve the concessions for several parcels located on Isla Caballo. In this regard, it must be stated that, pursuant to the provisions of article 190 of the LGAP, the Public Administration is liable for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation. This includes any form of manifestation of public conduct, whether by action or omission. This canon must be related to the provisions of article 1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, which, in its second paragraph, expressly states that the grounds for illegality include any violation, whether by action or omission, of the legal system. As this Chamber has repeatedly held (see, among others, judgment 702 of 10:25 a.m. on September 27, 2007), administrative tort liability (responsabilidad extracontractual administrativa) falls within a preeminently objective regime. It seeks compensatory reparation for those who have suffered damage attributable to the public organization as a center of authority. \"Whenever an injury has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, whether active or omissive, which the victim has no obligation to bear, the duty of compensation is imposed, by virtue of the principle of full reparation of damages derived from article 41 of the Constitución Política.\" (aforementioned ruling). Likewise, as stated in article 196 of the LGAP, for damage to be compensable, it must be effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group. IV.- The first article of the Ley de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, number 6043, establishes the public domain status (demanialidad o dominio público) of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), indicating that it forms part of the national patrimony belonging to the State and is therefore inalienable and imprescriptible. Pursuant to article 9 of the same law, said zone is comprised of the two-hundred-meter-wide strip along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the Republic, whatever its nature, measured horizontally from the ordinary high-water line (pleamar ordinaria) and the lands and rocks left uncovered by the sea at low tide. It adds that, for all legal purposes, it also includes maritime islands, islets, and rocks, as well as any land or natural formation projecting above ocean level within the Republic's territorial sea. Excepted is Isla del Coco, which is under the direct ownership and possession of the State, and those other islands whose ownership or administration is determined in that law or in special laws. This zone is composed of two sections –article 10 of the same law-: 1) public zone (zona pública), which is the fifty-meter-wide strip from the ordinary high-water line and the areas left uncovered during low tide; and 2) restricted zone (zona restringida), that is, the remaining one hundred fifty meters or the remaining lands in the case of islands. Islets, rocks, and other small areas and natural formations projecting from the sea belong to the public zone. For their part, articles 39 and 40 of said legislation provide that municipalities are competent to grant concessions in the restricted zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone located in their territory. Article 42 requires, for the administrative act of concession to be effective, the approval of various decentralized entities as well as the Parliament, depending on the purpose and nature of the property. That article of Law 6043 provides: \"Concessions in tourist areas require the approval of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo. In other areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone, the approval shall correspond to the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización./ These institutes may not deny approval, unless it violates the law, which they must expressly indicate, in a reasoned manner./ If the concession refers to a maritime island or islet, or part thereof, the approval of the Legislative Assembly shall be required.\" (The underlining and bold highlighting are not in the original). Regarding the concession of maritime islands or islets, the foregoing is reaffirmed by article 43 of the Regulation of that Law, Decreto Ejecutivo number 7841-P of December 16, 1977, and its amendments, by providing: \"In the case of concession applications for part or all of maritime islands or islets, the original concession contract and a copy of the file, with all the case records, must be sent to the Legislative Assembly for its approval.\" For the sub júdice, it is of interest to determine whether the approval given by the Parliament is solely of legality, in which case it would be a regulated act, and therefore approval could only be denied for that reason; or if, on the contrary, it also encompasses aspects of opportunity and convenience. It is necessary to indicate, prior to the respective analysis, that the requirement of legislative approval, contrary to what the appellant on cassation stated, finds its basis or constitutional foundation in article 140, subsection 19 of the Carta Política. That rule provides: \"The following are duties and powers jointly held by the President and the respective Government Minister: … 19) To sign administrative contracts not included in subsection 14) of article 121 of this Constitution, with the reservation of submitting them to the approval of the Legislative Assembly when they stipulate exemption from taxes or duties, or have as their object the exploitation of public services, natural resources, or natural wealth of the State./ The legislative approval of these contracts shall not give them the character of laws nor exempt them from their administrative legal regime. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to loans or other similar agreements, referred to in subsection 15) of article 121, which shall be governed by their special rules.\" (The underlining is not in the original). That provision is clear in indicating that, in the case of contracts whose object pertains to, among others, natural resources or wealth of the State, such as maritime islands or islets, the approval of the Legislative Assembly is necessarily required, without this implying a change in the applicable administrative legal regime. Although that constitutional provision refers to contracts signed by the Executive Branch, in the case of agreements entered into by other bodies or entities, for example municipalities, if their object is any of those stated therein, for instance, \"natural resources or wealth of the State,\" as occurs in the sub lite, in principle, legislative approval is not only advisable but necessary, by virtue of the public interest, or even more so, the national interest involved, as indicated by the Sala Constitucional in votes numbers 2006-454 of 2:45 p.m. on January 25, 2006, and 2007-2063 of 2:40 p.m. on February 14, 2007. On the other hand, from the literal wording of article 42 of Law 6043, it is clearly deduced that the provision in the second paragraph, i.e., the impossibility of denying approval except for reasons of legality, only refers to the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (ICT) and the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización (ITCO), now the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA). That paragraph states: \"These institutes may not deny approval, unless it violates the law, which they must expressly indicate, in a reasoned manner.\" (The underlining is supplied). Which institutes? Those indicated in the first paragraph: ICT and ITCO, now IDA. Likewise, it is symptomatic that the provision concerning the Legislative Assembly's approval is located in a later paragraph of that provision, which leads to the presumption that it does not become obligatory nor that the control is merely of legality. If it were not so, the current third paragraph would have been inserted after the first, so that it would be covered by the provisions of the second. Moreover, it seems logical that this is the case. It makes no sense to task the Congress Members with evaluating whether the legal requirements for granting concessions were met. That is an administrative function that the municipality or the corresponding institute is called upon to perform, and for which elevating a concession file to the Legislative Assembly would not be justified. In any event, any doubt about how to interpret said article 42 of the Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, specifically regarding the approval that the Parliament must grant when the concession's object is an island or islet, was settled in the aforementioned judgment 454 of 2:55 p.m. on January 25, 2006, of the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, where, in what is of interest, it states: \"XI.- OF THE USE AND EXPLOITATION OF ISLANDS AND ISLETS. … For this reason, it is estimated that the requirement of legislative approval in this type of contracts (concession of islands and islets) is not only necessary but also advisable, insofar as it acts as a form of political control regarding a ' good of the Nation ' of fundamental importance, being located in the territorial sea, over which the State exercises its sovereignty, fully and exclusively (article 6 of the Constitution). Likewise, a broad debate in the Legislative Plenary is useful and necessary so that the deputies examine the object, purpose, timeliness, and legality of the concession. Note that the exploitation and use of this ' good of the Nation ' has strong repercussions at the economic and social levels, in addition to environmental and ecological ones, and even political ones; which is why participation should be given to all represented groups … XII.- CONTINUED. (1).- Likewise, it is important to note that legal doctrine has understood that approval represents a declaration based on assessments of the merit, timeliness, utility, and legality of the act submitted for its consideration; which confirms that the approving subject does not cooperate in forming the act submitted for its approval, but merely declares that the act submitted for its examination is useful and timely, thereby considering the condition upon which the law makes the act's effectiveness depend to be fulfilled. That is, the legislative action in this matter acts as a condition of legal effectiveness for this type of contract, insofar as the contract is not complete and does not produce natural effects until this approval occurs; constituting a control, not only of legality, but also of a political nature. Thus, in this case, the Legislative Assembly is not entitled to integrate its will into the contract it approves, because the will was expressed by the subject that processed and before whom the concession was managed, i.e., the respective municipality that formulates the consultation to the Assembly. Thus, the legislative body may approve or disapprove it in its entirety -not partially-, depending on the timeliness, legality, and intrinsic merits of the contract, but without modifying or transforming it, because the power to sign the concession belongs exclusively to the municipalities. So that an eventual intervention by the Assembly regarding the content of concessions for islands or islets by the legislators, would render the act unconstitutional, to the detriment of municipal autonomy, constitutionally recognized in article 170.\" (Only the underlining is not in the original). In light of the preceding precedent, it is clear that the approval given by the Legislative Assembly regarding concessions granted by municipalities for maritime islands or islets is not only of legality but, considering its intrinsic nature (fundamentally political), also encompasses aspects of opportunity and convenience, which implies that it is not a regulated act. On the contrary, there is a manifestation of first-degree governmental discretion. For this reason, the plaintiff companies could not have had certainty that the Legislative Branch would approve the concession that the Municipalidad del Cantón Central de Puntarenas had granted them. At most, they would have had a mere expectation of a right that this would happen. Consequently, they cannot claim any acquired right by virtue of the approval that said Local Government gave to the concession application, as a condition of effectiveness was lacking: the approval by the Legislative Assembly (article 145, subsection 4 of the LGAP). As the lower Court well indicates, the possibility of the concession not being approved by the Legislature is a risk that must be borne by anyone seeking to develop a project on a maritime island or islet or part thereof. V.- The appellant on cassation argues that the Legislative Branch should have approved his concession application within a reasonable period, which, he indicates, is the four-year period established in article 119 of the Reglamento Interno de la Asamblea Legislativa. This Chamber does not share that assertion. In addition to what was set forth in the preceding considering, in the sense that the control exercised by the Parliament is not only of legality but also of opportunity and convenience, the indicated rule provides: \"Article 119.- Expiration of matters At the end of a legislative term, matters pending resolution may be considered in the following term, on the initiative of the Executive Branch or the deputies. In all these cases, such matters shall follow the procedures still pending. After four calendar years have passed from their initiation, they shall be considered as not filed and their filing shall be ordered without further procedure./ However, the Assembly may grant a new time period by a vote of two-thirds of its total members, provided that the corresponding motion is presented before the expiration of the period.\" (The underlining is not in the original). It is easily seen that this provision does not establish any deadline for the Parliament to approve a bill. On the contrary, it states that, if four years have passed since a file was initiated without being voted on, its filing shall be ordered without further procedure. Consequently, it is not applicable to the case at hand. However, as the lower court judges correctly pointed out, based on the legal doctrine inspiring article 137 of the LGAP, if it is understood to be actionable, the fact that the Legislative Assembly did not vote on the concession bill in favor of the plaintiffs within the four-year period, and that the granting of a new time period was not requested, must be understood as a tacit rejection. Additionally, with the non-approval, no pre-existing subjective right is violated or damaged, nor is a legal situation limited or suppressed, since the granting of a concession, in these cases, involves governmental discretion of a higher rank. VI.- Finally, the appellant on cassation claims that, because the Legislative Assembly did not approve the concession granted to his clients within the reasonable four-year period, it must be deemed authorized by virtue of the figure of positive silence (silencio positivo), but, since there is no procedural mechanism to enforce it, only the liability of the State for that omissive conduct can be claimed. Regardless of what was stated in sections IV and V of this judgment, in the sense that the plaintiffs had no certainty that the Legislative Assembly would approve the concession for them and that article 119 of the Reglamento Interno del Parlamento does not establish any deadline for the Legislative Branch to approve concessions for maritime islands and islets, reasons for which no damage was caused to the plaintiff, it must be noted that the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has been clear and consistent in denying the possibility of positive silence arising in relation to environmental matters and public domain goods (demand domain goods) (in this regard, see, among many others, votes of that jurisdictional body numbers 1886 of 9:12 a.m. on April 7, 1995, and 2063 of 2:45 p.m. on February 14, 2007). Under that criterion, in the sub júdice, the application of that figure is inappropriate, as the intended matter is the concession of several parcels located on Isla Caballo, which, as already indicated, is a public domain good of an environmental nature, being located in the coastal zone. Ergo, since the application of the figure of positive silence is not proper in this lite, the appellant's thesis for claiming State liability lacks support, which is why it is not admissible. VII.- By virtue of the reasons set forth, as the Legislative Assembly has no duty to approve the concession of an island, much less within a specific deadline, and as positive silence does not arise, the rejection of the appeal filed is unavoidable. Considering the nature of the sub júdice –a matter of pure law in which the interpretation of two norms is discussed, one legal and one regulatory-, this Chamber considers that the plaintiff has had sufficient reason to litigate, which is why it must be resolved without special condemnation on costs (article 150, subsection 3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).\"\n\nThe provisions of this subsection shall not apply to loans or other similar agreements referred to in subsection 15) of Article 121, which shall be governed by their special rules.” (The underlining is not from the original). That provision is clear in stating that, in the case of contracts whose object pertains, among other things, to natural resources or wealth of the State, such as maritime islands or islets, the approval of the Legislative Assembly is necessarily required, without this implying a change in the applicable administrative legal regime. Even though that constitutional provision refers to contracts signed by the Executive Branch, in the case of agreements signed by other bodies or entities, for example municipalities, if their object is one of those indicated therein, for instance, the “natural resources or wealth of the State,” as occurs in the case at bar, as a matter of principle, legislative approval is not only advisable but necessary, by virtue of the public interest, or moreover, the national interest involved, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in rulings number 2006-454 of 14 hours 45 minutes on January 25, 2006, and 2007-2063 of 14 hours 40 minutes on February 14, 2007.\n\nOn the other hand, from the literal wording of canon 42 of Law 6043, it is clearly inferred that the provision in the second paragraph, that is, the impossibility of denying approval except for reasons of legality, only refers to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT) and the Institute of Lands and Colonization (ITCO), today the Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA). That paragraph states: “These institutes may not deny approval, except if it violates the law, which they must expressly indicate, in a reasoned manner.” (The underlining is supplied). Which institutes? Those indicated in the first paragraph: ICT and ITCO, today IDA. Likewise, it is symptomatic that the provisions regarding the approval of the Legislative Assembly are located in a subsequent paragraph of that provision, which leads to the presumption that it does not become obligatory, nor that the oversight is merely of legality. If it were not so, the current third paragraph would have been inserted after the first, so that it would be covered by the provision in the second. Moreover, this seems logical. It makes no sense to have the Deputies assess whether the legal requirements for granting concessions were met. That is an administrative function that the corresponding municipality or institute is called upon to perform, and for which it would not be justified to elevate a concession file to the Legislative Assembly. In any case, any doubt about the manner of interpreting said canon 42 of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, specifically, regarding the approval that must be given by Parliament when the concession has as its object an island or islet, was settled in the aforementioned judgment 454 of 14 hours 55 minutes on January 25, 2006, of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, where, as relevant, it states: “XI.- ON THE USE AND EXPLOITATION OF ISLANDS AND ISLETS. … For this reason, it is considered that, in addition to being necessary, the requirement of legislative approval in this type of contract (concession over islands and islets) is advisable, insofar as it acts as a form of political control over a “good of the Nation” of fundamental importance, being located in the territorial sea, over which the State exercises its sovereignty completely and exclusively (Article 6 of the Constitution). Likewise, a broad debate in the Legislative Plenary is useful and necessary, so that the deputies examine the object, purpose, timeliness, and legality of the concession. Note that the exploitation and use of this “good of the Nation” has strong economic and social repercussions, in addition to environmental, ecological, and even political ones; which is why all represented factions should participate … XII.- CONTINUED. (1).- Likewise, it is important to note that the doctrine has understood that approval represents a declaration based on assessments of the merit, timeliness, usefulness, and legality of the act submitted for its consideration; from which it is verified that the subject who approves does not cooperate in the formation of the act submitted for approval, but only declares that the act submitted for examination is useful and timely, thereby deeming fulfilled the condition upon which the law makes the efficacy of the act dependent. That is, that the legislative action in this matter acts as a condition of legal efficacy for this type of contract, insofar as the contract is not complete and does not produce its natural effects until this approval occurs; constituting a control, not only of legality, but also of a political nature. So that, in this case, the Legislative Assembly is not empowered to integrate its will into the contract it approves, since this was expressed by the subject who processed and before whom the concession was managed, that is, the respective municipality that formulates the consultation before the Assembly. Thus, the legislative body may approve or disapprove it in its entirety—not partially—depending on the timeliness, legality, and intrinsic merit of the contract, but without modifying or transforming it, because the power to sign the concession belongs exclusively to the municipalities. So that a potential intervention by the Assembly regarding the content of island or islet concessions by the legislators would render the act unconstitutional, to the detriment of municipal autonomy, constitutionally recognized in Article 170.” (Only the underlining is not from the original). In light of the above precedent, it is clear that the approval given by the Legislative Assembly regarding concessions granted by municipalities over maritime islands or islets is not only a matter of legality, but that, given its intrinsic nature (fundamentally political), it also encompasses aspects of timeliness and suitability, which implies that it is not a mandated act. On the contrary, there is a manifestation of first-degree governmental discretion. For this reason, the plaintiff companies could not have had certainty that the Legislative Branch would approve the concession that the Municipality of the Central Canton of Puntarenas had granted them. At most, they would have had a mere expectation of right that this would happen. Consequently, they cannot claim any acquired right by virtue of the approval that said Local Government gave to the concession application, since a requirement for efficacy was missing: the approval by the Legislative Assembly (Article 145, subsection 4 of the LGAP). As the Tribunal correctly indicates, the possibility of legislative non-approval of the concession is a risk that anyone seeking to develop a project on a maritime island or islet, or part thereof, must bear.\n\nV.- The appellant indicates that the Legislative Branch had to approve their concession application within a reasonable period, which, they indicate, is the four-year period provided in canon 119 of the Internal Regulations of the Legislative Assembly. This Chamber does not share that assertion. In addition to what was stated in the preceding recital, namely that the control exercised by Parliament is not only of legality, but also of timeliness and suitability, the indicated rule provides: “Article 119.- Expiration of matters At the end of a legislative term, matters pending resolution may be studied in the following term, on the initiative of the Executive Branch or of the deputies. In all these cases, such matters shall follow the procedures they still lack. After four calendar years have elapsed from their initiation, they shall be deemed as not presented and their archiving shall be ordered without further procedure./However, the Assembly may grant a new period by vote of two-thirds of its total members, provided the corresponding motion is presented before the expiration of the period.” (The underlining is not from the original). It is readily apparent that this provision does not establish any period for Parliament to approve a bill. On the contrary, it indicates that if, after four years have elapsed since a file was initiated, it has not been voted on, its archiving shall be ordered without further procedure. Consequently, it is not applicable to the case. However, as correctly noted by the trial judges, based on the doctrine inspiring numeral 137 of the LGAP, if it is understood to be actionable, the fact that the Legislative Assembly did not vote on the bill for the concession in favor of the plaintiffs within the four-year period, and that the granting of a new period was not requested, must be understood as an implicit rejection.\n\nFurthermore, with the non-approval, no pre-existing subjective right is violated or injured, nor is a legal situation limited or suppressed, since the granting of a concession, in these cases, involves governmental discretion of a higher order.\n\nVI.- Finally, the appellant alleges that, since the Legislative Assembly did not approve the concession granted to their principals within the reasonable four-year period, it must be deemed authorized by virtue of the figure of positive silence, but, since there is no procedural mechanism to enforce it, they can only demand the responsibility of the State for that omissive conduct. Regardless of what was stated in sections IV and V of this judgment, namely that the plaintiffs had no certainty that the Legislative Assembly would approve the concession for them and that numeral 119 of the Internal Regulations of Parliament does not establish any period for the Legislative Branch to approve concessions regarding maritime islands and islets, reasons for which no damage was caused to the plaintiff, it must be noted that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has been clear and consistent in denying the possibility that positive silence is configured in relation to environmental matters and with public domain goods (in this regard, one may consult, among many others, rulings of that jurisdictional body numbers 1886 of 9 hours 12 minutes on April 7, 1995, and 2063 of 14 hours 45 minutes on February 14, 2007). Under that criterion, in the case at bar, the application of that figure is improper, as the concession sought involves several parcels located on Isla Caballo, which, as already indicated, is a public domain good of an environmental nature, being located in the coastal zone. Ergo, since the application of the figure of positive silence in this litigation is not appropriate, the appellant’s thesis for claiming State responsibility lacks support, which is why it is not admissible.\n\nVII.- By virtue of the reasons stated, since the Legislative Assembly had no duty to approve the concession of an island, much less within a specific period, nor was positive silence configured, the rejection of the filed appeal is required.\n\nConsidering the nature of the sub judice –a matter of pure law in which the interpretation of two norms is discussed, one statutory and one regulatory–, this Chamber considers that the plaintiff has had sufficient grounds to litigate, for which reason it must be resolved without a special order as to costs (article 150, subsection 3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).”\n\nThat is to say, that legislative action in this matter acts as a condition of legal effectiveness for this type of contract, insofar as the contract is neither complete nor produces its natural effects until such approval is obtained; constituting a control, not only of legality, but also of a political nature. Thus, in this case, the Legislative Assembly is not empowered to integrate its will into the contract it approves, since that will was expressed by the subject who processed and before whom the concession was requested, that is, the respective municipal government that submits the inquiry to the Assembly. Thus, the legislative body may approve or reject it in its entirety—not partially—depending on the timeliness, legality, and inherent merits of the contract itself, but without modifying or transforming it, because the power to grant the concession belongs exclusively to the municipal governments. Consequently, any eventual intervention by the Assembly regarding the content of concessions for islands or islets by legislators would render the act unconstitutional, to the detriment of municipal autonomy, constitutionally recognized in Article 170.” (Only the underlined portions are not from the original). In light of the foregoing precedent, it is clear that the approval given by the Legislative Assembly concerning concessions granted by municipal governments regarding maritime islands or islets is not only one of legality, but, given its intrinsic nature (fundamentally political), also encompasses aspects of timeliness and suitability, which implies that this is not a strictly regulated act. On the contrary, there is a manifestation of first-degree governmental discretion. For this reason, the plaintiff companies could not have had certainty that the Legislative Branch would approve the concession that the Municipality of the Central Canton of Puntarenas had granted them. At most, what they would have had is a mere expectation of right that this would occur. Consequently, they cannot claim any acquired right by virtue of the approval that the indicated Local Government gave to the concession application, since a requirement for effectiveness was lacking: the approval by the Legislative Assembly (Article 145, subsection 4 of the LGAP). As the Court correctly indicates, the possibility of legislative non-approval of the concession is a risk that must be borne by anyone seeking to develop a project on a maritime island or islet or on part thereof.\n\n**V.-** The appellant argues that the Legislative Branch had to approve its concession application within a reasonable period, which, it indicates, is the four-year period established in canon 119 of the Internal Regulations of the Legislative Assembly. This Chamber does not share that assertion. In addition to what was set forth in the preceding considerando, in the sense that the oversight exercised by Parliament is not only one of legality, but also of timeliness and suitability, the indicated rule provides: \" **Article 119.- Expiration of matters** At the end of a legislative term, matters pending resolution may be considered in the following term, upon the initiative of the Executive Branch or of the deputies. In all these cases, such matters shall follow the procedures they still lack. After four calendar years have passed from their initiation, they shall be considered as not having been filed and their archiving shall be ordered without further processing./Nevertheless, the Assembly may grant a new period by vote of two-thirds of its total membership, provided that the corresponding motion is presented before the expiration of the period.” (The underlined portion is not from the original). It is easily observed that this provision does not establish any period for Parliament to approve a bill. On the contrary, it indicates that, if four years have passed since a file was initiated and it has not been voted on, its archiving shall be ordered without further processing. Consequently, it is not applicable to the case at hand. However, as the lower court judges correctly pointed out, based on the doctrine that inspires numeral 137 of the LGAP, if it is understood that it is actionable, the fact that the Legislative Assembly did not vote on the concession bill in favor of the plaintiffs within the four-year period, and that the granting of a new period was not requested, must be understood as a tacit rejection. Moreover, with the non-approval, no pre-existing subjective right is violated or injured, nor is a legal situation limited or suppressed, since the granting of a concession, in these cases, possesses governmental discretion of a higher rank.\n\n**VI.-** Finally, the appellant alleges that, since the Legislative Assembly did not approve the concession granted to its principals within the reasonable four-year period, it must be understood as authorized by virtue of the figure of positive silence, but, since no procedural mechanism exists to enforce it, it can only demand the State's liability for that omissive conduct. Independently of what was indicated in sections IV and V of this judgment, in the sense that the plaintiffs had no certainty that the Legislative Assembly would approve their concession and that numeral 119 of the Parliament's Internal Regulations does not establish any period for the Legislative Branch to approve concessions regarding maritime islands and islets, reasons why no harm was caused to the plaintiff party, it must be noted that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has been clear and constant in the sense of denying the possibility that positive silence can be configured in relation to environmental matters and public domain property (in this regard, one may consult, among many others, rulings of that jurisdictional body numbers 1886 of 9 hours 12 minutes on April 7, 1995, and 2063 of 14 hours 45 minutes on February 14, 2007). Under the protection of that criterion, in the sub judice case, the application of that figure is improper, as the concession of several parcels located on Isla Caballo was sought, which, as already indicated, is a public domain property of an environmental nature, by being located in the coastal zone. Ergo, since the application of the figure of positive silence in this lite is not proper, the appellant's thesis for claiming State liability lacks support, a reason for which it is not admissible.\n\n**VII.-** By virtue of the reasons set forth, since the Legislative Assembly does not have the duty to approve the concession of an island, much less within a specific period, and positive silence is not configured, the rejection of the appeal filed is required. Considering the nature of the sub judice—a matter of pure law in which the interpretation of two rules is debated, one legal and one regulatory—this Chamber considers that the plaintiff party has had sufficient cause to litigate, a reason why it shall be resolved without special condemnation as to costs (Article 150, subsection 3 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure).”"
}