{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-128083",
  "citation": "Res. 00345-2009 Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Membresías de club social no constituyen capital social",
  "title_en": "Social club membership fees do not constitute capital stock",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte analiza si los pagos por membresías al Costa Rica Country Club S.A., en la categoría de “socios residentes”, constituyen un aporte al capital social exento del impuesto sobre la renta, o si deben gravarse como ingreso gravable. La sociedad actora, constituida como sociedad anónima con fines de lucro, ofreció a los hijos de los socios la adquisición de un derecho para convertirse en socios residentes mediante el pago de una cuota de ingreso. El Tribunal rechazó esta pretensión y confirmó que dichos pagos son ingresos gravables, no aumentos de capital. La Sala ratifica esta decisión, subrayando que la calidad de socio en una sociedad anónima se adquiere exclusivamente mediante la titularidad de acciones; el pago de la cuota de ingreso confiere solo un derecho de uso de instalaciones, pero no convierte al pagador en accionista. Además, se rechaza la pretensión de diferir el impuesto en 30 años, ya que el ingreso se percibió en un período fiscal concreto. Se desestiman todos los agravios del recurso de casación.",
  "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court examines whether membership payments to Costa Rica Country Club S.A., under the “resident members” category, constitute a capital contribution exempt from income tax, or whether they must be taxed as taxable income. The plaintiff company, incorporated as a for-profit corporation, offered the children of shareholders the right to become resident members by paying an initiation fee. The lower court rejected this claim and confirmed that these payments are taxable income, not capital increases. The Chamber upholds this decision, emphasizing that shareholder status in a corporation is acquired exclusively through the ownership of shares; the payment of the initiation fee confers only a right to use the facilities, but does not make the payer a shareholder. Furthermore, the request to defer the tax over 30 years is rejected, since the income was received in a specific fiscal period. All grounds of the cassation appeal are dismissed.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "date": "2009",
  "year": "2009",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "sociedad anónima",
    "capital social",
    "hecho imponible",
    "cuota de ingreso",
    "socios residentes",
    "renta producto",
    "devengado",
    "preterición de prueba"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 18",
      "law": "Código de Comercio"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 104",
      "law": "Código de Comercio"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 1",
      "law": "Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 5",
      "law": "Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 6",
      "law": "Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 7",
      "law": "Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "sociedad anónima",
    "capital social",
    "membresía",
    "club social",
    "impuesto sobre la renta",
    "hecho imponible",
    "cuota de ingreso",
    "socios residentes",
    "Código de Comercio",
    "Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "corporation",
    "capital stock",
    "membership",
    "social club",
    "income tax",
    "taxable event",
    "initiation fee",
    "resident members",
    "Commercial Code",
    "Income Tax Law"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Segundo: El pago de la cuota de ingreso cuestionado no confiere la condición de socio a la actora, en su condición de sociedad anónima… la normativa que rige la materia (artículos 102 y 104 del Código de Comercio) establece como característica diferenciadora de las sociedades anónimas, la división del capital social en partes figuradas por acciones pagadas a través de contribuciones de los socios, circunstancia que lleva a concluir que “el capital social es la pieza esencial de este tipo de sociedad” (Ídem). Es lo cierto que la condición o cualidad de socio de una sociedad de esta naturaleza está determinada en el aporte que se haga al capital social, y es en proporción a esta prestación de capital que se mide la extensión de los derechos sociales y la participación en la vida de la sociedad y en la distribución de beneficios, en tanto le confiere a su titular derechos corporativos-políticos, de participación en las asambleas y de votar en ellas; así como los de contenido económico, concernientes a participar en el reparto de dividendos y de participar preferentemente en los aumentos de capital de la sociedad… Tercero: A efectos de la determinación del hecho imponible de este tributo, no interesa determinar la organización interna que tenga la actora, en su condición de club social, así como tampoco los derechos y obligaciones que éstos generen conforme a sus estatutos. Por tal motivo, debe distinguirse la condición de socio de la actora, en su condición de sociedad anónima, con las diversas categorías de personas a las que se les permite “vincularse” socialmente con ella; tal y como lo especifica la cláusula 42 del Estatuto de la actora… Es lo cierto que conforme a los estatutos de la actora se establecen diversas categorías de miembros, a los que les corresponden distintos derechos y obligaciones que les confiere el pago de la membresía (“afiliación”) a este club social; sin embargo, se insiste, ello no les otorga la condición de socio en sentido técnico-jurídico, por cuanto lo que se les reconoce es únicamente el derecho de uso y disfrute de las instalaciones…",
  "excerpt_en": "Second: The payment of the questioned initiation fee does not confer the status of shareholder upon the plaintiff, in its capacity as a corporation… the governing regulations (articles 102 and 104 of the Commercial Code) establish as a differentiating characteristic of corporations the division of the capital stock into parts represented by shares paid through contributions from the shareholders, a circumstance that leads to the conclusion that “the corporate capital is the essential element of this type of company.” It is true that the status or quality of shareholder in a company of this nature is determined by the contribution made to the capital stock, and it is in proportion to this capital contribution that the extent of social rights and participation in the life of the company and in the distribution of benefits is measured, since it grants its holder corporate-political rights, the right to participate in shareholders’ meetings and to vote in them; as well as economic rights, concerning the right to share in dividend distributions and to preemptively participate in capital increases of the company… Third: For purposes of determining the taxable event of this tribute, it is irrelevant to determine the internal organization of the plaintiff, in its capacity as a social club, as well as the rights and obligations it generates under its bylaws. For this reason, the status of shareholder of the plaintiff, in its capacity as a corporation, must be distinguished from the various categories of persons who are allowed to “associate” socially with it; as specified in clause 42 of the plaintiff’s Bylaws… It is true that under the plaintiff’s bylaws, various categories of members are established, with different rights and obligations conferred by the payment of membership (“affiliation”) to this social club; however, it is reiterated, this does not grant them the status of shareholder in the technical-legal sense, since what is recognized is only the right to use and enjoy the facilities…",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Appeals denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar recursos",
    "summary_en": "The First Chamber dismisses the cassation appeal and confirms that payments for resident memberships constitute taxable income for income tax purposes, not capital contributions.",
    "summary_es": "La Sala Primera declara sin lugar el recurso de casación y confirma que los pagos por membresías de socios residentes constituyen ingresos gravables del impuesto sobre la renta, no aportes al capital social."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI, citando al Tribunal",
      "quote_en": "It is not true that the plaintiff constitutes itself as an associative or organizational-type company, in which there is a common activity directed toward a result, and where the category of shareholder-member is just another part of the company, as it alleges, since it formally adopts the form of a corporation, in accordance with the requirements established in articles 18 and 104 of the Commercial Code.",
      "quote_es": "No es cierto que la actora se constituya en una sociedad de carácter o naturaleza asociativa, esto es, de tipo organizacional, en la que haya una actividad común dirigida a un resultado, en la que la categoría de socio-accionista es una más de la sociedad, como lo alega, en tanto adopta formalmente la forma de una sociedad anónima, conforme a los requisitos establecidos en los artículos 18 y 104 del Código de Comercio."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI, citando al Tribunal",
      "quote_en": "The payment of the questioned initiation fee does not confer the status of shareholder upon the plaintiff, in its capacity as a corporation… the status or quality of shareholder in a company of this nature is determined by the contribution made to the capital stock.",
      "quote_es": "El pago de la cuota de ingreso cuestionado no confiere la condición de socio a la actora, en su condición de sociedad anónima… la condición o cualidad de socio de una sociedad de esta naturaleza está determinada en el aporte que se haga al capital social."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI, citando al Tribunal",
      "quote_en": "The income received by the plaintiff from this sale does fit the concept of renta-producto (income-product) established by the Income Tax Law.",
      "quote_es": "El ingreso percibido por la actora en concepto de esta venta, si se adapta al concepto de renta-producto que establece la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IX",
      "quote_en": "In reality, those sums of money were received in a specific period, which is why, by legal imperative, payment is due at that time.",
      "quote_es": "En realidad, esas sumas de dinero, fueron adquiridas en un período determinado, razón por la cual por imperativo legal procede su pago en ese momento."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-128083",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-10969",
      "norm_num": "7092",
      "norm_name": "Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "21/04/1988"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-12443",
      "norm_num": "7130",
      "norm_name": "Código Procesal Civil",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "16/08/1989"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "norm_num": "",
      "norm_name": "Código Civil de Costa Rica",
      "tipo_norma": "",
      "norm_fecha": ""
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-6239",
      "norm_num": "3284",
      "norm_name": "Código de Comercio",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "30/04/1964"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-6530",
      "norm_num": "4755",
      "norm_name": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "03/05/1971"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“VI.- Relativo al primer agravio,\r\nalega el recurrente, error en la apreciación de la prueba, y violación de\r\ndistintas normas de fondo. Este reproche, tiene diversos argumentos, por\r\nser tan extenso para una mejor comprensión del estudio se sintetiza de la\r\nsiguiente manera. Sostiene, para ser socio del Contry\r\nClub es necesario, entre otros, cumplir con el requisito de hacer un aporte\r\npatrimonial, siendo además indispensable en todo caso pagar el valor de la\r\ncuota de ingreso. No obstante, explica, tener una acción de la sociedad, no es\r\ntan importante por sus atributos económicos y políticos clásicos, sino más\r\nbien, por el derecho a poder usar las instalaciones, el cual reiteran está\r\nligado al aporte patrimonial, de allí que aporte y uso, sean uno consecuencia\r\ndel otro. Ante este panorama, arguye, el socio residente tiene respecto del uso\r\nde las instalaciones del lugar, el mismo derecho que los accionistas. Desarrolla\r\na lo largo del reproche, que estos y los socios residentes, guardan una relación\r\nasociativa con la actora, negando que los primeros tengan un vínculo asociativo\r\ny los segundos uno conmutativo, porque en realidad los Estatutos del club,\r\ndefinen las dos categorías de miembros, dándoles a ambos el rango de socios,\r\npor eso el pago que hacen para asociarse, es un aporte patrimonial. Continúa,\r\npor más que se acepte que los socios residentes están fuera del esquema de la Asamblea, ello no implica\r\nque no guarden una relación asociativa tal y como lo estatuye el pacto social. Mencionan,\r\nla llamada “cuota de ingreso”, como el equivalente a convertirse en miembro; no\r\nobstante, distinto sucede con lo que se cancela por una acción, lo cual es un\r\ningreso patrimonial. Y es justamente esta, la que debe aportar en primer\r\ntérmino el socio residente, que es muy distinta a la de ingreso, mensualidad y\r\ncuentas específicas. Es por ello, refieren, ha habido indebida valoración de la\r\nprueba, específicamente del Estatuto del Country Club; pues, sopesa de manera\r\ndesproporcionada el Tribunal, el hecho de que los socios residentes no\r\nadquieran derechos al dividendo ni al voto en las asambleas de la Sociedad; desarmonizando\r\nel fenómeno asociativo, ya que pareciera que este se agota en el cumplimiento\r\nde esos requisitos, que son únicos y exclusivos de la sociedad anónima. Olvidan\r\nlos juzgadores, dice, que lo importante en este caso es la ventaja directa del\r\nuso de las instalaciones y no la indirecta de obtener dividendos. De manera muy\r\nconcreta en eso consiste el reclamo de los casacionistas.\r\nEsta Sala coincide con lo dispuesto por el Tribunal, considera acertado el\r\nanálisis que se hace de los estatutos de la sociedad y no comparte la tesis de\r\nlos recurrentes, de que, ha habido yerro en la apreciación de la prueba; por lo\r\nque a continuación se dirá. En primer término, el estudio que se hace de la\r\nrealidad económica de la\r\n Sociedad accionada es totalmente acertado, en ese sentido, el\r\nTribunal sostuvo: “Primero: No es cierto que la actora se\r\nconstituya en una sociedad de carácter o naturaleza asociativa, esto es, de\r\ntipo organizacional, en la que haya una actividad común dirigida a un\r\nresultado, en la que la categoría de socio-accionista es una más de la\r\nsociedad, como lo alega, en tanto adopta formalmente la forma de una\r\nsociedad anónima, conforme a los requisitos establecidos en los artículos\r\n18 y 104 del Código de Comercio… Segundo: El pago de la cuota\r\nde ingreso cuestionado no confiere la condición de socio a la actora, en su\r\ncondición de sociedad anónima… la normativa que rige la materia (artículos\r\n102 y 104 del Código de Comercio) establece como característica diferenciadora de las sociedades anónimas, la división\r\ndel capital social en partes figuradas por acciones pagadas a través de\r\ncontribuciones de los socios, circunstancia que lleva a concluir que “el\r\ncapital social es la pieza esencial de este tipo de sociedad” (Ídem). Es lo\r\ncierto que la condición o cualidad de socio de una sociedad de esta\r\nnaturaleza está determinada en el aporte que se haga al capital social, y\r\nes en proporción a esta prestación de capital que se mide la extensión de los\r\nderechos sociales y la participación en la vida de la sociedad y en la\r\ndistribución de beneficios, en tanto le confiere a su titular derechos\r\ncorporativos-políticos, de participación en las asambleas y de votar en ellas;\r\nasí como los de contenido económico, concernientes a participar en el reparto\r\nde dividendos y de participar preferentemente en los aumentos de capital de la\r\nsociedad… Conviene aclarar que esta condición de socio se adquiere y comprueba\r\ncon el pago y tenencia legal de una acción… las cuales adquieren la cualidad de\r\ntítulo valor, en tanto representa “la parte alícuota del capital social y,\r\nademás del título en que tal parte alícuota se representa”… Tercero:\r\nA efectos de la determinación del hecho imponible de este tributo, no interesa\r\ndeterminar la organización interna que tenga la actora, en su condición de club\r\nsocial, así como tampoco los derechos y obligaciones que éstos generen conforme\r\na sus estatutos. Por tal motivo, debe distinguirse la condición de socio de\r\nla actora, en su condición de sociedad anónima, con las diversas categorías de\r\npersonas a las que se les permite “vincularse” socialmente con ella; tal y como\r\nlo especifica la cláusula 42 del Estatuto de la actora… Es lo cierto que\r\nconforme a los estatutos de la actora se establecen diversas categorías de\r\nmiembros, a los que les corresponden distintos derechos y obligaciones que les\r\nconfiere el pago de la membresía (“afiliación”) a este club social; sin\r\nembargo, se insiste, ello no les otorga la condición de socio en sentido\r\ntécnico-jurídico, por cuanto lo que se les reconoce es únicamente el derecho de\r\nuso y disfrute de las instalaciones… Cuarto: El ingreso percibido por\r\nla actora en concepto de esta venta, si se adapta al concepto de renta-producto\r\nque establece la Ley\r\ndel Impuesto sobre la Renta…”.\r\n(El resaltado es del original). Concuerda este Órgano con esos razonamientos,\r\npues ha quedado demostrado que efectivamente el comportamiento del Country Club\r\ncorresponde a una sociedad anónima tal y como se estipula en el Código de\r\nComercio, ya que, en realidad, las personas beneficiarias del producto ofrecido\r\npor la actora, nunca se convirtieron en accionistas, es decir, en dueños de una\r\nacción, razón por la cual el dinero que aportaron nunca pudo llegar a ser capital\r\nsocial, máxime, tal y como consta en autos, que no hubo ningún cambio en el\r\npacto social que llevara a generar el aumento respectivo. El problema\r\nsurge aquí, porque la propia Empresa utiliza el término “socio” en dos\r\nacepciones, la primera, referida al socio propiamente establecido en el Código\r\nde Comercio, quien es el accionista, se reitera, el dueño de una acción de la\r\nsociedad. La segunda, denomina socio a todos los “miembros” del Club, es\r\ndecir, todas aquellas personas, quienes de alguna forma han adquirido un\r\nderecho para disfrutar de los beneficios que ofrece el Country Club dentro de\r\nsu giro comercial, el cual es “emprender actividades deportivas,\r\nrecreativas, culturales, artísticas y comerciales”. Pero estos no son\r\naccionistas, lo que adquieren es una “membresía”, o en otras palabras,\r\nlo que pagaron fue un derecho para poder cancelar la otra cuota llamada de\r\ningreso y así, disfrutar de las instalaciones del Club (misma situación que\r\nocurre con los hijos de los socios y residentes). Entonces, el yerro lo tiene\r\nel recurrente en la interpretación que le da al numeral 54 del Estatuto del\r\nCountry Club, el cual se refiere a las diferentes categorías de socios que el\r\npacto social establece. Allí se dispuso: “Los socios del club se dividen en\r\nlas siguientes categorías: honorarios, accionistas, residentes, beneficiarios,\r\ndiplomáticos, visitantes y jóvenes estudiantes…” pudiendo la Junta Directiva\r\ncrear otros. No obstante, ello no implica necesariamente que cada uno de estos\r\nobtenga una acción, en los términos del Código de Comercio; de allí la\r\ndiferencia entre los socios accionistas que tienen participación real en la\r\nsociedad y estos otros que son más bien, una clase de miembros. Véase que la\r\naccionada no pudo demostrar, se diera una venta o aumento de acciones o que se\r\nllevara a cabo un incremento del capital social, que se realizaran cambios en\r\nel Pacto Social, y su respectiva inscripción en el Registro Público\r\nNacional. El Tribunal, utiliza un buen estudio sobre la condición de\r\nsocio jurídicamente hablando, como parte de una sociedad anónima. Es claro, que\r\nlos llamados socios residentes y de cualquier otra clase, no son más que\r\nintegrantes del club, quienes pagan una especie de “matrícula” o “derecho\r\nde admisión”, para luego si a bien lo tienen cancelar una cuota de ingreso,\r\nque les va a permitir hacer uso de las instalaciones del lugar en el tanto\r\ncumplan con sus obligaciones. Esto, contrario a los accionistas o socios\r\naccionistas, quienes además de tener derechos y obligaciones como los demás\r\nmiembros, poseen otras prerrogativas propias del titular de una acción de la\r\nsociedad, verbigracia, tener voz y voto en la Asamblea General,\r\nser miembro de la\r\n Junta Directiva, entre otros. Considera el recurrente\r\nque la acción no es tan importante por sus atributos económicos o políticos,\r\nsino más bien por cuanto les da a los accionistas el derecho al uso de las\r\ninstalaciones. Afirmación que no es cierta, en primer término porque, la figura\r\njurídica de la acción y para la cual fue creada, perdería todo su sentido; y en\r\nsegundo lugar, no habría una representación política real de la sociedad, por\r\nparte de los verdaderos inversionistas, de acuerdo a sus propios\r\ninversionistas; lo que es fundamental para dar sustento a la sociedad anónima. Entonces,\r\nse puede afirmar que en el Club hay socios propietarios de acciones, quienes\r\nson los que tienen derecho sobre el capital social (sin que tenga mayor\r\nrelevancia que durante años no se hayan repartido dividendos, lo cual no está\r\ndemostrado) y otros que serían el resto de “socios”, pertenecientes a\r\nlas distintas categorías que no tienen derecho al capital social. Sin embargo,\r\npara que cualquiera de ellos pueda disfrutar del uso del sitio, se requiere la\r\naprobación de la Junta\r\n Directiva y el pago de la cuota de ingreso. Todo lo cual\r\nquiere decir, que la posibilidad de uso no se la da la acción en sí, sino el\r\ncumplimiento de los requisitos que establece el estatuto de la sociedad. Ante\r\nesa posición, no es cierto que el derecho de uso sea una consecuencia directa\r\ndel aporte patrimonial. Según ya se indicó líneas atrás, es el resultado del\r\ncumplimiento de diferentes exigencias impuestas en el pacto social. Tampoco es\r\ncierto que socios accionistas y residentes sean iguales; ha sido clara la\r\ndiferencia que existe entre ellos, según se regula en los estatutos cuando se\r\nlee: “Solamente los socios accionistas tienen voz y voto en la Asamblea General\r\nde Accionistas, y podrán formar parte de la Junta Directiva y\r\ndel Comité de Vigilancia; sin embargo, la Asamblea General\r\nde Accionistas podrá nombrar hasta dos socios residentes para ocupar cargos de\r\nvocal en la Junta\r\n Directiva, quienes tendrán los mismos derechos y obligaciones\r\nde los demás directores, excepto el derecho de voto en las Asambleas”, así\r\nlas cosas, la participación de estos distintos socios está claramente definida,\r\nen su relación asociativa. Lo que llama el casacionista\r\naporte de capital y pretenden sea exonerado del impuesto sobre la renta; no es\r\nmás que el pago del derecho por usar las instalaciones del Country Club, lo que\r\nes su giro empresarial. Sobre el funcionamiento, son solo los socios\r\naccionistas los verdaderos protagonistas de las decisiones que tome la Sociedad. Ante este\r\npanorama, no se podría afirmar que el pago por esa membresía ofrecida a los\r\nhijos de los socios, pueda contemplarse como un aporte al capital, tanto así\r\nque son los mismos accionistas, quienes posteriormente van a decidir el rumbo\r\nque van a tomar esos dineros. El Costa Rica Country Club S.A., fue constituido\r\ncomo una sociedad anónima, y; tiene un giro comercial cuyo fin es de\r\nlucro. En este punto se coincide con el razonamiento hecho por el\r\nTribunal, cuando se afirma que no funciona como una asociación, pues en\r\nrealidad ha sido constituida como una sociedad anónima, cumpliendo las\r\nexigencias del Código Comercial; en donde se hace necesario el aporte de\r\ncapital de los socios para llevar a cabo el cometido empresarial, y cuyo fin es\r\nrepartir las ganancias entre estos. De ahí que no sea aceptable para este\r\nÓrgano la tesis de que se ha convertido en una Asociación, basado en argumentos\r\ncomo el hecho de no haber repartido dividendos en muchos años, o bien, que su\r\núltimo cometido sea brindarle a los “socios” la ventaja de utilizar las\r\ninstalaciones, que además en criterio del casacionista\r\nes aún más importante que la obtención de utilidades. En virtud de lo expuesto,\r\nconsidera esta Sala, no se ha cometido yerro alguno en la apreciación de las\r\npruebas, como tampoco se ha dado la violación a las normar alegadas; de allí\r\nque el reparo deba denegarse. \n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- En el segundo agravio, expone\r\nel recurrente una violación por falta de apreciación de la prueba o su\r\npreterición. En concreto se refieren a: la nota del Colegio de Contadores\r\nPúblicos de Costa Rica, el dictamen pericial del licenciado Guillermo Briceño\r\nRodríguez y la pericia del actuario matemático Mario Herrera Flores. Sobre\r\nla preterición, cabe señalar, ocurre cuando los juzgadores dejan de considerar,\r\nya sea total o parcialmente, las probanzas aportadas a los autos. Ello implica\r\nel desconocimiento del valor que la ley les otorga; y como tal, constituye un\r\nerror de derecho. En este supuesto, le resulta indispensable al casacionista indicar, con precisión, las normas\r\nquebrantadas concernientes al valor de los elementos probatorios que estima han\r\nsido analizados de manera equivocada. Además, es\r\nde rigor señalar en qué consisten los yerros cometidos y a su vez, resulta\r\nimperativo explicitar las normas jurídicas que de manera indirecta, se han\r\nvisto infringidas en cuanto al fondo, desglosándose la forma en que acaeció el\r\nyerro y cómo se ha producido la lesión, todo lo cual, viene establecido de los\r\npreceptos 595 inciso 3, 596 párrafo segundo y 597, todos del Código\r\nProcesal Civil. En el particular, los casacionistas\r\nhacen mención de la norma quebrantada respecto del valor probatorio, dicen cuál\r\nes la prueba mal apreciada, pero omiten explicar en qué consisten los errores,\r\npues se dedican simplemente a enlistar las pruebas y a decir que no saben por\r\nqué el Tribunal no tomó en cuenta los peritajes. No son claros ni precisos al\r\nmomento de expresar la razón por la cual los juzgadores debieron utilizar esas\r\nprobanzas para fundamentar su fallo. Ahora bien, el Tribunal se manifiesta\r\nsobre la petición subsidiaria en los siguientes términos: “Ahora bien,\r\ntampoco es procedente el reclamo subsidiario que hace , para que se\r\nreconozca un pago diferido en el tiempo, en atención a que el disfrute del\r\nderecho de membresía lo es por un tiempo indefinido (vitalicio) que fue\r\npericialmente fijado en un período de treinta años, que es la expectativa de\r\nvida de los socios-residentes, toda vez que el ingreso fue percibido por la\r\nactora en un período fiscal determinado, y aún tratándose de ventas a plazo o\r\ncrédito, es lo cierto que contablemente existen formas para reflejar esos\r\ningresos. Además, debe reiterarse que el pago que se hace y objeto de este\r\nproceso es para adquirir una membresía a un club social, sin que se refleje en\r\nel uso directo de las instalaciones o servicios que brinda el club, y en tal\r\nsentido, no están sujetas al uso que los \" socios- residentes \" hagan\r\nde ellos; lo que hace que deban de gravarse en el período fiscal en que fueron\r\nocasionados.”. Para los recurrentes la afirmación del Ad quem no fue satisfactoria, sin embargo, no indican de qué\r\nforma debieron haber apreciado los jueces la supuesta prueba, que los hubiese\r\nllevado a variar el fallo. Nótese que las manifestaciones en el recurso\r\núnicamente se refieren a que el Tribunal no explica cómo arriba a la conclusión\r\npues debió haber entendido que los ingresos a pagar, tenían que dividirse en un\r\nperíodo de 29 a\r\n30 años. No obstante, estiman, en el fallo cuestionado no se hace ninguna\r\napreciación sobre las probanzas alegadas y cómo era necesario que se\r\nanalizaran. Aunado a lo anterior, mencionan los casacionistas\r\nlas normas de fondo que en su criterio fueron conculcadas, pero de nuevo no\r\nexplican cómo fueron transgredidas, se limitan a enlistarlas; en otras\r\npalabras, no expresan cómo se produce la lesión. Ante este panorama, en vista\r\nde la falta de cumplimiento en la debida técnica del recurso de casación, el\r\nreproche deberá denegarse. \n\r\n\r\n\nVIII.- Sobre el tercer agravio, es\r\nimportante señalar, que esta Sala en ocasiones anteriores ha manifestado\r\nrespecto del comportamiento de una sociedad; y en ese sentido consideró: “ IV.- El contrato de sociedad,\r\ntiene una serie de requisitos cuya observancia es ineludible, si se pretende, a\r\ntravés de él, crear una entelequia jurídica a la que se le reconozca\r\npersonalidad y capacidad. Dentro de ellos, y en lo que interesa para este\r\nasunto, debe definirse una provisión de fondos (capital social) en el mismo\r\nacto fundacional, destinado al cumplimiento del fin asociativo. La nueva\r\npersona jurídica creada por la voluntad de diversos sujetos, ha de tener,\r\nentonces, patrimonio propio, que tiene como origen primigenio el aporte en\r\ntrabajo o capital (bienes o dinero) que permitirá el ejercicio de las\r\nactividades mercantiles. No es un fondo estático, pues puede modificarse, para\r\naumentarlo, o reducirlo, según convenga a los intereses sociales (artículos 18\r\ninciso 8), 156 inciso a) del Código de Comercio). Tiene varias\r\nfinalidades. En primer término permite la realización de los actos mercantiles\r\ndefinidos en el objeto social. También posibilita determinar los derechos\r\npolíticos y económicos de los socios y finalmente es la garantía del\r\ncumplimiento de sus obligaciones (cardinal 981 del Código Civil).” (Resolución\r\nde las 9 horas 10 minutos del 9 de abril del 2008, correspondiente al voto\r\nnúmero 257). Concibe este Órgano decisor que, una\r\nsociedad anónima, por así disponerlo el Código de Comercio, tiene fines de\r\nlucro, en el caso particular, el solo hecho de haber sido creada con esta\r\nestructura establece su cometido. Se demostró (tal y como se explicó en\r\nel considerando VI) que efectivamente el Country Club lleva a cabo\r\nactividades cuya meta es la satisfacción del interés de lucro, su\r\ncomportamiento es de manera diáfana el de una sociedad y no el de una\r\nasociación, como quieren hacer entender los recurrentes. Ahora bien, en segundo\r\nlugar, en el estatuto social, se determinan los derechos políticos y económicos\r\ndel grupo societario, de tal forma que coincide este Órgano con lo fundamentado\r\npor el Tribunal, ya que si bien es cierto, el ordinal 121 ibídem,\r\nabre la posibilidad de que se creen diferentes categorías de socios, estos\r\ndeben tener un mínimo de los derechos corporativos y económicos, pues parte de\r\nla condición de ser una persona con representación en el capital social, es\r\nmenester que tengan el derecho intrínseco en la participación en las decisiones\r\nde gobierno y beneficios o cargas dinerarias que eso conlleve. En consecuencia,\r\naún y cuando alegue el recurrente que el numeral 17 ídem faculta a tener\r\nacciones sin fines lucrativos, lo cierto es que, en el caso particular, las\r\npersonas quienes pagaron las cuotas de ingreso que aquí se discuten, no\r\nhicieron un aporte al capital, tal y como se explicó líneas atrás, en el\r\napartado VI. Así las cosas, siguiendo con el lineamiento planteado,\r\nestos llamados socios residentes o las personas, quienes compran el derecho que\r\nse puso en venta, no participan de ninguna manera en la sociedad anónima,\r\nsimplemente son beneficiarios del uso de las instalaciones del Club, de allí\r\nque no es cierto que tengan calidad de socios tal y como se establece en la ley\r\ncomercial. Ante este panorama no llevan razón los recurrentes, ya que no se el\r\ndio un sentido impropio a lo dispuesto en los cánones 17 y 121 de cita. Así las cosas el agravio\r\ndeberá denegarse. \n\r\n\r\n\nIX.- Relativo al cuarto reproche, se\r\ndebe indicar, que lo allí argumentado coincide con el alegato por el fondo en\r\nlos reproches procesales, de allí que se tenga también en este considerando por\r\nsatisfecho ese agravio. No lleva razón el recurrente, ya que lo pretendido es\r\nque a su representada se le aplique el sistema de devengado, el cual acredita\r\nun ingreso en la contabilidad del contribuyente a partir del momento cuando\r\nrealizada la contraprestación que da derecho a la renta, surge una\r\nresponsabilidad jurídica cierta. Para explicar con mayor claridad el punto,\r\nresulta necesario hacer referencia al hecho generador del tributo; en tal\r\nsentido esta Sala en reiteradas ocasiones ha manifestado: “…el contribuyente\r\npuede advertir y conocer con la debida antelación y con la precisión\r\nsuficiente, el alcance y contenido de las obligaciones fiscales, lo que le\r\nresulta relevante para conocer el régimen de sujeción, hecho imponible, base de\r\ncálculo, tarifa, entre otros elementos del gravamen. Cabe precisar que además\r\ninfiere un ámbito material, dentro del cual, se establecen los componentes del\r\ntributo que necesariamente, deben ser creados por ley expresa. Se trata de los\r\nelementos esenciales y determinantes del gravamen, los que forzosamente, deben\r\nser establecidos por el legislador. Entre estos elementos, se encuentran, de\r\nmanera indefectible, el hecho generador, el sujeto pasivo, la base imponible,\r\nla tarifa, así como momento de cobro, según sea progresivo o instantáneo… Relativo\r\na tal tributo en específico, este Órgano de manera reciente consideró: “El\r\nimpuesto sobre la renta, regulado en la\r\n Ley no. 7092, grava las utilidades y en general, todos los\r\ningresos, continuos o eventuales, percibidos o devengados, que sean\r\nprovenientes de fuente costarricense, entendiendo por esta última expresión,\r\nlos ingresos generados por servicios prestados, bienes situados o capitales\r\nutilizados en el territorio nacional (artículo 1). Así mismo, se impone sobre\r\ntodos aquellos incrementos de patrimonio que no se encuentren debidamente\r\njustificados. Es este precisamente su elemento material. Se fundamenta en el concepto\r\nde renta producto, esto es, grava la riqueza o actividades que generen lucro u onerosidad. Esto quiere decir que son susceptibles de\r\nimposición, las que se originen en el uso de los factores de producción\r\n(tierra, trabajo y capital), pero solo en la fracción de la riqueza que supere\r\nlos costos y gastos incurridos para producirla. Lo contrario, desnaturalizaría\r\nel tributo, pues se impondría sobre la base misma que produce la utilidad y no\r\nsobre esta última. Desde este plano, su base de cálculo está constituida por la\r\nrenta neta, gravable o imponible conceptualizada por el numeral 7 de ese cuerpo\r\nlegal… de conformidad con el artículo 5 de la Ley no. 7092, debe entenderse como renta bruta,\r\nel conjunto de beneficios o ingresos percibidos o devengados por el sujeto\r\npasivo en el respectivo período fiscal. De esta deben excluirse los rubros que\r\nenlista el numeral 6 ibidem. De igual forma, todas\r\naquellas erogaciones que sean útiles y necesarias para producir la actividad\r\nque genera los dividendos. Es decir, al considerar que la actividad primaria es\r\nla fuente que permite la generación de utilidades, todos los rubros que busquen\r\no tengan por finalidad la permanencia del quehacer productivo, en principio,\r\nestán dispensados de la base neta de cálculo (canon 12 del Reglamento de la Ley citada)… En esta\r\norientación, los gastos deducibles son todos aquellos que coadyuvan en la\r\nproducción de las utilidades, o bien, en términos más simples, todas aquellas\r\nerogaciones que se encuentren vinculadas con la obtención de rentas gravables…”\r\n(Resolución de las 8 horas 25 minutos del 25 de marzo de 2008,\r\ncorrespondiente al voto número 214). Con base en lo anterior, entonces,\r\nse debe analizar el acto que genera discrepancia. El Country Club puso a\r\ndisposición de los hijos de los socios, la adquisición de un derecho para poder\r\nconvertirse en socios residentes, a cambio de una determinada cantidad de\r\ndinero; la cual recibió en los períodos fiscales 97 y 98. Así adquirió de esas\r\npersonas el monto total solicitado, el que, ha quedado claro en los\r\nconsiderando anteriores, no correspondía a un aumento del capital social, tal y\r\ncomo lo pretendieron los recurrentes. Por el contrario, estos dineros,\r\ncorresponden a la venta del derecho para poder entrar en aquella categoría de\r\nsocio, a cambio de poder utilizar las instalaciones de la Sociedad, dentro de los\r\nparámetros establecidos en el giro comercial de esta. Ante tal situación,\r\nse concibe que, la actora obtuvo un ingreso o beneficio obtenido en aquellas\r\népocas, producto del negocio jurídico llevado a cabo con los hijos de los\r\nsocios; siendo esto ni más ni menos que una ganancia o renta. Bien lo dispone\r\nel numeral 1 de recién cita, se debe entender por renta el lucro devengado\r\ndurante un período fiscal determinado. De lo anterior se colige, no es\r\nimportante que el monto cobrado por la “membresía” tuviese una vigencia de 30\r\naños a partir del momento cuando se consigue, y que; debido a ello, deba\r\ndiferirse el pago del impuesto a lo largo de todo ese período. En\r\nrealidad, esas sumas de dinero, fueron adquiridas en un período determinado,\r\nrazón por la cual por imperativo legal procede su pago en ese momento. De tal\r\nforma que no es de recibo su alegato en cuanto a los fundamentos de utilizarse\r\nun sistema de devengado, sea contabilizarse la renta a partir del instante en\r\nque se lleva a cabo la contraprestación. Ello porque, en realidad como se\r\nha dicho con insistencia, el pago de esta “matrícula” se hace para poder\r\nadquirir la llamada “cuota de ingreso”, y es hasta ese momento cuando el\r\nnuevo “socio” puede disfrutar del uso de las instalaciones del Club\r\nsiempre que cancele las mesualidades correspondientes\r\na mantenimiento. Entonces, son estas últimas las que van a representar el pago\r\nde la prestación en el transcurso del tiempo. Es por ello, que\r\nel razonamiento utilizado por los casacionistas, no\r\nse comparte por esta Sala, por el contrario, se coincide con lo expuesto por el\r\nTribunal en la resolución que se pretende anular. En virtud de lo\r\nanterior, no es de recibo el agravio y deberá denegarse.”",
  "body_en_text": "VI.- With respect to the first grievance,\nthe appellant alleges error in the assessment of the evidence, and violation of\nvarious substantive rules. This reproach has various arguments; because\nit is so extensive, for a better understanding of the study it is synthesized as\nfollows. He maintains that, to be a member of the Country\nClub it is necessary, among other things, to fulfill the requirement of making a capital contribution (aporte patrimonial),\nit also being indispensable in any case to pay the value of the\nadmission fee. However, he explains, having a share of the company is not\nas important for its classic economic and political attributes, but rather,\nfor the right to be able to use the facilities, which he reiterates is\nlinked to the capital contribution, hence contribution and use are one consequence\nof the other. Given this scenario, he argues, the resident member has, regarding the use\nof the facilities of the place, the same right as the shareholders. He develops\nthroughout the reproach that these and the resident members hold an\nassociative relationship with the plaintiff, denying that the former have an associative link\nand the latter a commutative one, because in reality the Club's Bylaws,\ndefine the two categories of members, giving both the rank of members (socios),\nfor that reason the payment they make to become members is a capital contribution. He continues,\nhowever much it is accepted that the resident members are outside the scheme of the General Assembly (Asamblea), that does not imply\nthat they do not hold an associative relationship just as stipulated in the articles of incorporation (pacto social). They mention\nthe so-called “admission fee” (cuota de ingreso), as the equivalent of becoming a member;\nhowever, what is paid for a share is different, which is a\ncapital income (ingreso patrimonial). And it is precisely this that the resident member must contribute in the first\ninstance, which is very different from the admission fee, monthly fee, and\nspecific charges. It is for this reason, they state, that there has been an improper assessment of the\nevidence, specifically of the Country Club Bylaws; for the Court weighs in a\ndisproportionate manner the fact that the resident members do not\nacquire rights to dividends or to vote in the Company's assemblies; disharmonizing\nthe associative phenomenon, since it would seem that this is exhausted in the fulfillment\nof those requirements, which are unique and exclusive to the joint-stock company (sociedad anónima). The judges\nforget, he says, that what is important in this case is the direct advantage of\nthe use of the facilities and not the indirect one of obtaining dividends. The claim of the appellants on cassation consists very\nspecifically of this.\nThis Chamber agrees with what was decided by the Court, considers the\nanalysis made of the company's bylaws correct, and does not share the thesis of\nthe appellants that there was an error in the assessment of the evidence; therefore,\nwhat follows will be stated. In the first place, the study made of the\neconomic reality of the\ndefendant company is entirely correct; in that sense, the\nCourt held: “First: It is not true that the plaintiff\nconstitutes a company of an associative nature or character, that is, of\nan organizational type, in which there is a common activity directed toward a\nresult, in which the category of member-shareholder is just one more of the\ncompany, as it alleges, insofar as it formally adopts the form of a\njoint-stock company, in accordance with the requirements established in Articles\n18 and 104 of the Code of Commerce… Second: The payment of the\nquestioned admission fee does not confer the status of member (socio) on the plaintiff, in its\ncapacity as a joint-stock company… the regulations governing the matter (Articles\n102 and 104 of the Code of Commerce) establish as a differentiating characteristic of joint-stock companies the division\nof the share capital (capital social) into parts represented by shares (acciones) paid through\ncontributions of the members, a circumstance that leads to the conclusion that “the\nshare capital is the essential piece of this type of company” (Idem). It is\ntrue that the condition or quality of member of a company of this\nnature is determined by the contribution made to the share capital, and\nit is in proportion to this provision of capital that the extent of the\ncorporate rights and participation in the life of the company and in the\ndistribution of benefits is measured, insofar as it confers on its holder corporate-political rights, of participation in assemblies and of voting in them;\nas well as those of economic content, concerning participation in the distribution\nof dividends and of participating preferentially in capital increases of the\ncompany… It is necessary to clarify that this condition of member is acquired and verified\nwith the payment and legal holding of a share… which acquires the quality of a\nnegotiable instrument, insofar as it represents “the aliquot part of the share capital and,\nin addition, the certificate in which such aliquot part is represented”… Third:\nFor the purposes of determining the taxable event (hecho imponible) of this tax, it is not relevant\nto determine the internal organization of the plaintiff, in its capacity as a social\nclub, nor the rights and obligations that these generate in accordance\nwith its bylaws. For this reason, the condition of member of\nthe plaintiff, in its capacity as a joint-stock company, must be distinguished from the various categories of\npersons who are permitted to “associate” socially with it; as\nspecified in clause 42 of the Plaintiff’s Bylaws… It is true that\nin accordance with the plaintiff's bylaws, various categories of\nmembers are established, with corresponding different rights and obligations conferred\nby the payment of the membership (“afiliación”) to this social club;\nhowever, it is insisted, this does not grant them the condition of member in the\ntechnical-legal sense, inasmuch as what is recognized to them is solely the right of\nuse and enjoyment of the facilities… Fourth: The income received by\nthe plaintiff for the concept of this sale, fits the concept of income-product\n(renta-producto) established by the Income Tax Law…”.\n(The highlighting is from the original). This Body agrees with those reasonings,\nsince it has been demonstrated that the Country Club's behavior indeed\ncorresponds to a joint-stock company as stipulated in the Code of\nCommerce, given that, in reality, the persons benefiting from the product offered\nby the plaintiff never became shareholders, that is, owners of a\nshare, which is why the money they contributed could never become share\ncapital (capital social), all the more so, as stated in the case file (autos), since there was no change in the\narticles of incorporation (pacto social) that would lead to generating the respective increase. The problem\narises here because the Company itself uses the term “member” (socio) in two\nsenses; the first, referring to the member properly established in the Code\nof Commerce, who is the shareholder, it is reiterated, the owner of a share of the\ncompany. The second, denominates as member all the “members” of the Club, that\nis, all those persons who in some manner have acquired a\nright to enjoy the benefits offered by the Country Club within\nits commercial purpose (giro comercial), which is “to undertake sports,\nrecreational, cultural, artistic and commercial activities.” But these are not\nshareholders; what they acquire is a “membership” (membresía), or in other words,\nwhat they paid was a right to be able to pay the other fee called the admission\nfee and thus enjoy the Club's facilities (the same situation that\noccurs with the children of members and residents). Therefore, the error lies\nwith the appellant in the interpretation given to clause 54 of the Country\nClub Bylaws, which refers to the different categories of members that the\narticles of incorporation establish. It was stipulated therein: “The members of the club are divided into\nthe following categories: honorary, shareholder, resident, beneficiary,\ndiplomatic, visiting and young student…” the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) being able to\ncreate others. However, that does not necessarily imply that each one of these\nobtains a share, in the terms of the Code of Commerce; hence the\ndifference between the shareholder members who have real participation in the\ncompany and these others who are, rather, a class of member. Note that the\ndefendant could not demonstrate that a sale or increase of shares occurred, or that\nan increase of the share capital was carried out, that changes were made in\nthe Articles of Incorporation, and their respective registration with the National Public Registry. The Court uses a sound study of the condition of\nmember legally speaking, as part of a joint-stock company. It is clear that\nthe so-called resident members and those of any other class are nothing more than\nmembers of the club, who pay a kind of “registration fee (matrícula)” or “right\nof admission (derecho de admisión)”, in order to then, if they so choose, pay an admission fee,\nwhich will allow them to make use of the facilities of the place as long\nas they fulfill their obligations. This, as opposed to the shareholders or shareholder\nmembers, who, in addition to having rights and obligations like the other\nmembers, possess other prerogatives characteristic of the holder of a share of the\ncompany, for example, having a voice and vote in the General Assembly,\nbeing a member of the\nBoard of Directors (Junta Directiva), among others. The appellant considers\nthat the share is not so important for its economic or political attributes,\nbut rather because it gives the shareholders the right to the use of the\nfacilities. An affirmation that is not true; in the first place because, the legal\nfigure of the share, and that for which it was created, would lose all its meaning; and in\nsecond place, there would be no real political representation of the company, on the part\nof the true investors, according to its own\ninvestors; which is fundamental to give sustenance to the joint-stock company. Therefore,\nit can be affirmed that in the Club there are member-owners of shares, who\nare those who have a right over the share capital (without it having major\nrelevance that for years dividends have not been distributed, which is not\nproven) and others who would be the rest of the “members” (socios), belonging to\nthe distinct categories who have no right to the share capital. However,\nfor any of them to be able to enjoy the use of the site, the\napproval of the Board\nof Directors and the payment of the admission fee are required. All of which\nmeans that the possibility of use is not given by the share itself, but by\nthe fulfillment of the requirements established in the company's bylaws. Given\nthat position, it is not true that the right of use is a direct consequence\nof the capital contribution. As already indicated above, it is the result of\nthe fulfillment of different requirements imposed in the articles of incorporation. Nor is it\ntrue that shareholder members and residents are equal; the\ndifference that exists between them has been clear, as regulated in the bylaws when it\nis read: “Only the shareholder members have a voice and vote in the General Assembly\nof Shareholders, and may form part of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) and\nthe Oversight Committee; however, the General Assembly\nof Shareholders may appoint up to two resident members to hold positions as\ndirectors (vocales) on the Board\nof Directors, who shall have the same rights and obligations\nas the other directors, except the right to vote in the Assemblies,” thus,\nthe participation of these different members is clearly defined\nin their associative relationship. What the appellant on cassation calls\na capital contribution and seeks to have exempted from the income tax; is\nnothing more than the payment for the right to use the Country Club's facilities, which\nis its business activity. Regarding the operation, only the shareholder\nmembers are the true protagonists of the decisions made by the Company. Given this\nscenario, it could not be affirmed that the payment for that membership offered to the\nchildren of the members, can be contemplated as a contribution to the capital, so much so\nthat it is the shareholders themselves who will subsequently decide the course\nto be taken with those funds. Costa Rica Country Club S.A., was incorporated\nas a joint-stock company, and it has a commercial purpose the objective of which is\nprofit. On this point, agreement is expressed with the reasoning made by the\nCourt, when it is affirmed that it does not function as an association (asociación), since in\nreality it has been constituted as a joint-stock company, fulfilling the\nrequirements of the Commercial Code; wherein the capital contribution of the members is necessary to carry out the business purpose, and whose objective is\nto distribute the profits among them. Hence, the thesis that it has become an Association (Asociación) is not acceptable to this\nBody, based on arguments\nlike the fact of not having distributed dividends for many years, or that its\nultimate purpose is to provide the “members” the advantage of using the\nfacilities, which furthermore, in the appellant on cassation's opinion,\nis even more important than the obtaining of profits. By virtue of the foregoing,\nthis Chamber considers that no error whatsoever has been committed in the assessment of the\nevidence, nor has the alleged violation of rules occurred; hence\nthe reproach must be denied.\n\nVII.- In the second grievance, the appellant\nsets forth a violation for lack of assessment of the evidence or its pretermission (preterición).\nSpecifically, they refer to: the letter from the College of Public Accountants of Costa Rica (Colegio de Contadores Públicos de Costa Rica), the expert opinion (dictamen pericial) of Licentiate Guillermo Briceño\nRodríguez and the expertise of the actuarial mathematician Mario Herrera Flores. Regarding\npretermission, it is appropriate to note that it occurs when the judges fail to consider,\neither totally or partially, the evidence (probanzas) contributed to the case file. This implies\ndisregard for the value the law grants them; and as such, it constitutes an\nerror of law. In this case, it is indispensable for the appellant on cassation to indicate, with precision, the\ninfringed rules concerning the value of the evidentiary elements they estimate have\nbeen analyzed erroneously. Furthermore, it is\nde rigueur to point out what the committed errors consist of and, in turn, it is\nimperative to specify the legal rules that indirectly have\nbeen infringed regarding the merits, breaking down the manner in which the\nerror occurred and how the injury has been produced, all of which is established in\nprecepts 595 subsection 3, 596 second paragraph and 597, all of the Civil Procedure Code. In this particular case, the appellants on cassation\ndo mention the rule infringed regarding evidentiary value, they say which\nis the evidence poorly assessed, but they omit explaining what the errors consist of,\nsince they simply dedicate themselves to listing the evidence and saying they do not know\nwhy the Court did not take the expert reports into account. They are not clear or precise in\nexpressing the reason why the judges should have used those\nelements of proof (probanzas) to substantiate their ruling. Now then, the Court rules\non the subsidiary petition in the following terms: “Now then,\nneither is the subsidiary claim made procedurally admissible, so that\na payment deferred over time would be recognized, considering that the enjoyment of the\nmembership right is for an indefinite time (for life) which was\nexpertly fixed at a period of thirty years, which is the life expectancy\nof the resident-members, any time the income was received by the\nplaintiff in a determined fiscal period, and even in the case of installment or\ncredit sales, it is true that accounting-wise there are forms to reflect those\nincomes. In addition, it must be reiterated that the payment made and the object of this\nprocess is to acquire a membership to a social club, without it being reflected in\nthe direct use of the facilities or services that the club provides, and in this\nsense, they are not subject to the use that the \"resident-members\" make\nof them; which means they must be taxed in the fiscal period in which they\nwere occasioned.”. For the appellants, the Ad quem's statement was not satisfactory, yet they do not indicate in what\nmanner the judges should have assessed the supposed evidence, which would have\nled them to vary the ruling. Note that the statements in the appeal\nrefer solely to the fact that the Court does not explain how it arrives at the conclusion,\nsince it should have understood that the incomes to be paid had to be divided over a\nperiod of 29 to\n30 years. However, they estimate that in the questioned ruling, no\nassessment is made of the alleged elements of proof and how it was necessary that they\nbe analyzed. In addition to the foregoing, the appellants on cassation mention\nthe substantive rules that in their opinion were violated, but again they do not\nexplain how they were transgressed; they limit themselves to listing them; in other\nwords, they do not express how the injury is produced. Given this scenario, in view\nof the lack of compliance with the proper technique of the cassation appeal (recurso de casación), the\nreproach must be denied.\n\nVIII.- Regarding the third grievance, it is\nimportant to point out that this Chamber, on previous occasions, has ruled\nregarding the behavior of a company; and in that sense it considered: “ IV.- The company contract,\nhas a series of requirements whose observance is unavoidable, if one intends, through\nit, to create a legal entity to which personality and capacity are recognized. Within them, and in what is relevant for this\nmatter, a provision of funds (share capital) must be defined in the same\nfounding act, destined for the fulfillment of the associative purpose. The new\nlegal person created by the will of various subjects must have,\nthen, its own net worth (patrimonio), which has as its original origin the contribution in\nwork or capital (goods or money) that will allow the exercise of the\nmercantile activities. It is not a static fund, since it can be modified, to\nincrease it, or reduce it, as it suits the corporate interests (Articles 18,\nsubsection 8), 156 subsection a) of the Code of Commerce). It has various\npurposes. In the first place, it permits the realization of the mercantile acts\ndefined in the corporate purpose. It also makes it possible to determine the political\nand economic rights of the members (socios) and finally it is the guarantee of the\nfulfillment of its obligations (cardinal 981 of the Civil Code).” (Resolution\nof 9:10 a.m. on April 9, 2008, corresponding to vote\nnumber 257). This deciding Body conceives that a\njoint-stock company, by thus disposing the Code of Commerce, has profit\nobjectives; in the particular case, the mere fact of having been created with this\nstructure establishes its purpose. It was demonstrated (as explained in\nconsiderando VI) that indeed the Country Club carries out\nactivities whose goal is the satisfaction of a profit interest; its\nbehavior is clearly that of a company and not that of an\nassociation (asociación), as the appellants want to make understood. Now then, in second\nplace, in the articles of incorporation, the political and economic rights\nof the corporate group are determined, in such a way that this Body agrees with what was substantiated\nby the Court, since although it is true, ordinal 121 ibidem,\nopens the possibility of creating different categories of members, these\nmust have a minimum of corporate and economic rights, because part of\nthe condition of being a person with representation in the share capital, it is\nnecessary that they have the intrinsic right of participation in the governance\ndecisions and monetary benefits or burdens that this entails. Consequently,\neven though the appellant alleges that clause 17 idem empowers having\nshares without lucrative purposes, the truth is that, in the particular case, the\npersons who paid the admission fees discussed herein, did\nnot make a contribution to the capital, as explained above, in\nsection VI. Thus, continuing with the guideline set forth,\nthese so-called resident members or the persons who buy the right that\nwas put up for sale, do not participate in any way in the joint-stock company,\nthey are simply beneficiaries of the use of the Club's facilities; hence\nit is not true that they have the quality of members (socios) as established in commercial\nlaw. Given this scenario, the appellants are not correct, since an improper\nsense was not given to what is provided in canons 17 and 121 cited. Thus, the grievance\nmust be denied.\n\nIX.- Regarding the fourth reproach, it\nmust be indicated that what is argued therein coincides with the argument on the merits in\nthe procedural reproaches; hence this grievance is also considered\nsatisfied in this considerando. The appellant is not correct, since what is sought is\nfor its represented party to be applied the accrual system (sistema de devengado), which records\nan income in the taxpayer's accounting from the moment when,\nthe consideration giving right to the income having been performed, a\ncertain legal responsibility arises. To explain the point with greater clarity,\nit is necessary to refer to the tax generating event; in this\nsense, this Chamber has on repeated occasions stated: “…the taxpayer\ncan note and know with due anticipation and with sufficient\nprecision, the scope and content of the tax obligations, which\nis relevant to him to know the regime of subjection, taxable event, calculation\nbasis, rate, among other tax elements. It is necessary to specify that it also\ninfers a material scope, within which, the components of the\ntax are established that necessarily must be created by express law. These are the\nessential and determining elements of the tax, which must forcibly\nbe established by the legislator. Among these elements, are found, in\nan inescapable manner, the generating event, the passive subject, the taxable base (base imponible),\nthe rate, as well as the moment of collection, whether progressive or instantaneous… Regarding\nsuch specific tax, this Body recently considered: “The\nincome tax, regulated in\nLaw No. 7092, taxes profits and in general, all\nincome, continuous or occasional, received or accrued (devengados), that are\ncoming from a Costa Rican source, understanding by this latter expression,\nincome generated by services rendered, goods situated or capital\nutilized in the national territory (Article 1). Likewise, it is imposed on\nall those increases in net worth (patrimonio) that are not duly\njustified. This is precisely its material element. It is founded on the concept\nof income-product, that is, it taxes wealth or activities that generate profit or onerosity. This means that those originating\nin the use of production factors (land, labor and capital) are susceptible to taxation, but only the fraction of wealth that exceeds\nthe costs and expenses incurred to produce it. The contrary would denature\nthe tax, since it would be imposed on the very base that produces the profit and not\non the latter. From this standpoint, its calculation basis is constituted by the\nnet, taxable or imposable income conceptualized by numeral 7 of that legal\nbody… in accordance with Article 5 of Law No. 7092, gross income must be understood as\nthe set of benefits or incomes received or accrued by the passive\nsubject in the respective fiscal period. From this must be excluded the items\nlisted in numeral 6 ibidem. Likewise, all\nthose expenses (erogaciones) that are useful and necessary to produce the activity\nthat generates the dividends. That is to say, when considering that the primary activity is\nthe source that permits the generation of profits, all items that seek\nor have as their purpose the permanence of the productive endeavor, in principle,\nare exempt from the net calculation basis (canon 12 of the Regulation to the cited Law)… In this\norientation, deductible expenses are all those that contribute to\nthe production of profits, or, in simpler terms, all those\nexpenses that are linked to the obtaining of taxable incomes…”\n(Resolution of 8:25 a.m. on March 25, 2008,\ncorresponding to vote number 214). Based on the foregoing, then,\nthe act that generates discrepancy must be analyzed. The Country Club made\navailable to the children of the members, the acquisition of a right to be able\nto become resident members, in exchange for a determined amount of\nmoney; which it received in fiscal periods 97 and 98. Thus it acquired from those\npersons the total amount requested, which, as has been made clear in the\nprevious considerandos, did not correspond to an increase in share capital, as\nthe appellants intended. On the contrary, these funds,\ncorrespond to the sale of the right to be able to enter that category of\nmember, in exchange for being able to use the facilities of the Company, within the\nparameters established in its commercial purpose. Given such situation,\nit is conceived that the plaintiff obtained an income or benefit obtained in those\nperiods, a product of the legal transaction carried out with the children of the\nmembers; this being neither more nor less than a gain or income. Well does\nnumeral 1 of the recently cited law provide, income must be understood as the profit accrued\nduring a determined fiscal period. From the foregoing it is inferred that it is not\nimportant that the amount charged for the “membership” had a validity of 30\nyears from the moment when it is obtained, and that, because of this, the payment of the tax should\nbe deferred over the course of that entire period. In\nreality, those sums of money were acquired in a determined period,\nwhich is why, by legal imperative, their payment proceeds at that moment. In such a\nway, the plaintiff's argument regarding the grounds for using\nan accrual system, that is, accounting for the income from the moment\nthe consideration is carried out, is not acceptable. This is because, in reality, as has\nbeen insistently stated, the payment of this “registration fee (matrícula)” is made to be able\nto acquire the so-called “admission fee (cuota de ingreso)”, and it is only at that moment when the\nnew “member” can enjoy the use of the Club's facilities,\nprovided they pay the corresponding monthly fees\nfor maintenance. Therefore, it is these latter fees that are going to represent the payment\nof the provision over the course of time. It is for this reason that\nthe reasoning used by the appellants on cassation is not\nshared by this Chamber; on the contrary, it agrees with what was set forth by the\nCourt in the resolution sought to be annulled.\n\nBy virtue of the foregoing, the grievance is not admissible and must be denied.”\n\n**VI.-** Regarding the **first** grievance, the appellant alleges error in the assessment of the evidence, and violation of various substantive rules. This complaint has diverse arguments; being so extensive, for a better understanding of the study, it is synthesized as follows. He maintains that, to be a member of the Country Club, it is necessary, among other things, to fulfill the requirement of making a capital contribution, it being also indispensable in every case to pay the value of the admission fee. However, he explains, holding a share of the company is not so important for its classic economic and political attributes, but rather, for the right to be able to use the facilities, which, they reiterate, is linked to the capital contribution, hence contribution and use are a consequence of one another. Faced with this scenario, he argues, the resident member has, regarding the use of the facilities of the place, the same right as the shareholders. He develops throughout the complaint that these and the resident members maintain an associative relationship with the plaintiff, denying that the former have an associative link and the latter a commutative one, because in reality the Club’s Bylaws define the two categories of members, giving both the rank of members, for which reason the payment they make to become members is a capital contribution. He continues, even if it is accepted that resident members are outside the scheme of the Shareholders’ Meeting, this does not imply that they do not maintain an associative relationship just as stipulated in the articles of incorporation. They mention the so-called “admission fee,” as the equivalent of becoming a member; however, a different situation occurs with what is paid for a share, which is a capital income. And it is precisely this which the resident member must contribute in the first instance, which is very different from the admission fee, monthly fee, and specific accounts. It is for this reason, they state, that there has been an improper assessment of the evidence, specifically of the Country Club Bylaws; for the Court weighs disproportionately the fact that resident members do not acquire rights to dividends or to vote in the Company’s meetings; disrupting the associative phenomenon, since it would seem that this phenomenon is exhausted in the fulfillment of those requirements, which are unique and exclusive to the corporation (sociedad anónima). The judges forget, he says, that what is important in this case is the direct advantage of the use of the facilities and not the indirect one of obtaining dividends. In a very concrete way, that is what the cassation appellants’ claim consists of. This Chamber coincides with what was ordered by the Court, considers the analysis made of the company’s bylaws to be correct, and does not share the appellants’ thesis that there has been an error in the assessment of the evidence; for which reason it will be stated below. In the first place, the study made of the economic reality of the defendant Company is entirely correct; in that sense, the Court held: *“**First**: It is not true that the plaintiff constitutes a company of an associative character or nature, that is, of an organizational type, in which there is a common activity directed at a result, in which the category of member-shareholder is one more of the company, as it alleges, **insofar as it formally adopts the form of a corporation (sociedad anónima)**, in accordance with the requirements established in articles 18 and 104 of the Code of Commerce… **Second**: The payment of the questioned admission fee does not confer the condition of shareholder to the plaintiff, in its condition as a corporation (sociedad anónima)… the regulations governing the matter (articles 102 and 104 of the Code of Commerce) establish as a differentiating characteristic of corporations (sociedades anónimas), **the division of the social capital into parts represented by shares paid through contributions from the shareholders**, a circumstance that leads to the conclusion that “the social capital is the essential piece of this type of company” (Idem). The truth is that **the condition or quality of shareholder of a company of this nature is determined by the contribution made to the social capital**, and it is in proportion to this capital contribution that the extent of the social rights and the participation in the life of the company and in the distribution of benefits is measured, insofar as it confers upon its holder corporate-political rights, of participation in meetings and voting in them; as well as those of economic content, concerning participating in the distribution of dividends and participating preferentially in the capital increases of the company… It is appropriate to clarify that this condition of shareholder is acquired and proven with the payment and legal possession of a share… which acquire the quality of a negotiable instrument (título valor), insofar as it represents “the aliquot part of the social capital and, in addition, the instrument in which such aliquot part is represented”… **Third**: For the purposes of determining the taxable event of this tax, it does not matter to determine the internal organization that the plaintiff may have, in its condition as a social club, nor the rights and obligations that these may generate according to its bylaws**. For this reason, a distinction must be made between the condition of shareholder of the plaintiff, in its condition as a corporation (sociedad anónima), and the diverse categories of persons who are allowed to “associate” socially with it; just as specified in clause 42 of the plaintiff’s Bylaws… The truth is that, according to the plaintiff’s bylaws, diverse categories of members are established, to whom different rights and obligations correspond, conferred by the payment of the membership (“affiliation”) to this social club; however, it is insisted, this does not grant them the condition of shareholder in a technical-legal sense, since what is recognized to them is only the right to use and enjoy the facilities… **Fourth: The income received by the plaintiff for this sale, does adapt to the concept of income-product established by the Income Tax Law**…”* (The highlighting is from the original). This Body agrees with those reasonings, as it has been proven that indeed the Country Club’s behavior corresponds to a corporation (sociedad anónima) just as stipulated in the Code of Commerce, since, in reality, the persons benefiting from the product offered by the plaintiff never became shareholders, that is, owners of a share, for which reason the money they contributed could never become social capital, especially, as stated in the case file, since there was no change in the articles of incorporation that would lead to generating the respective increase. The problem arises here because the Company itself uses the term *“member (socio)”* in two senses, the first, referring to the shareholder (socio) properly established in the Code of Commerce, who is the shareholder, it is reiterated, the owner of a share of the company. The second, it calls all *“members”* of the Club members (socios), that is, all those persons who in some way have acquired a right to enjoy the benefits offered by the Country Club within its business purpose, which is *“to undertake sporting, recreational, cultural, artistic, and commercial activities”*. But these are not shareholders, what they acquire is a *“membership”*, or in other words, what they paid was a right to be able to pay the other fee called the admission fee and thus, enjoy the Club’s facilities (the same situation that occurs with the children of the shareholders and residents). Therefore, the error lies with the appellant in the interpretation he gives to Article 54 of the Country Club Bylaws, which refers to the different categories of members (socios) that the articles of incorporation establish. There it was provided: *“The members (socios) of the club are divided into the following categories: honorary, shareholders (accionistas), residents, beneficiaries, diplomats, visitors, and young students…”* the Board of Directors being able to create others. However, this does not necessarily imply that each of these obtains a share, in the terms of the Code of Commerce; hence the difference between the shareholder members (socios accionistas) who have real participation in the company and these others who are, rather, a class of members. Note that the defendant could not demonstrate that a sale or increase of shares occurred, or that an increase in social capital was carried out, that changes were made in the Articles of Incorporation, and their respective registration in the National Public Registry. The Court makes good use of a study on the condition of shareholder legally speaking, as part of a corporation (sociedad anónima). It is clear that the so-called resident members and those of any other class, are nothing more than members of the club, who pay a kind of *“enrollment fee”* or *“admission right”*, to then, if they so wish, pay an admission fee, which will allow them to make use of the facilities of the place as long as they comply with their obligations. This, contrary to the shareholders or shareholder members (socios accionistas), who, in addition to having rights and obligations like the other members, possess other prerogatives proper to the holder of a share of the company, for example, having voice and vote in the General Shareholders’ Meeting, being a member of the Board of Directors, among others. The appellant considers that the share is not so important for its economic or political attributes, but rather because it gives the shareholders the right to use the facilities. An assertion that is not true, in the first place because, the legal figure of the share and that for which it was created, would lose all its meaning; and in the second place, there would be no real political representation of the company, on the part of the true investors, according to their own investors; which is fundamental to give substance to the corporation (sociedad anónima). Then, it can be affirmed that in the Club there are member-owners of shares, who are those who have rights over the social capital (without it being of major relevance that dividends have not been distributed for years, which is not proven) and others who would be the rest of the *“members (socios)”*, belonging to the different categories that do not have rights to the social capital. However, for any of them to be able to enjoy the use of the site, the approval of the Board of Directors and the payment of the admission fee are required. All of which means that the possibility of use is not given by the share itself, but by the fulfillment of the requirements established in the company’s bylaws. Given that position, it is not true that the right of use is a direct consequence of the capital contribution. As already indicated earlier, it is the result of fulfilling different requirements imposed in the articles of incorporation. Nor is it true that shareholder members (socios accionistas) and resident members are equal; the difference that exists between them has been clear, as regulated in the bylaws when it is read: *“Only the shareholder members (socios accionistas) have voice and vote in the General Shareholders’ Meeting, and may form part of the Board of Directors and the Oversight Committee; however, the General Shareholders’ Meeting may appoint up to two resident members (socios residentes) to occupy positions as non-voting board members (vocales) on the Board of Directors, who will have the same rights and obligations as the other directors, except the right to vote in the Meetings”*, thus, the participation of these different members is clearly defined in their associative relationship. What the cassation appellant calls a capital contribution and seeks to be exempted from income tax, is nothing more than the payment of the right to use the Country Club’s facilities, which is its business purpose. Regarding the functioning, only the shareholder members (socios accionistas) are the true protagonists of the decisions taken by the Company. Faced with this panorama, it could not be affirmed that the payment for that membership offered to the children of the members (socios) can be considered a contribution to capital, so much so that it is the same shareholders who will subsequently decide the course that that money will take. Costa Rica Country Club S.A., was constituted as a corporation (sociedad anónima), and has a business purpose whose end is for-profit. On this point, we coincide with the reasoning made by the Court, when it is affirmed that it does not function as an association, since in reality it has been constituted as a corporation (sociedad anónima), complying with the requirements of the Commercial Code; where the capital contribution of the shareholders is necessary to carry out the business undertaking, and whose end is to distribute the profits among them. Hence, it is not acceptable for this Body the thesis that it has become an Association, based on arguments such as the fact of not having distributed dividends for many years, or that its ultimate purpose is to provide the “members (socios)” the advantage of using the facilities, which, moreover, in the cassation appellant’s criteria, is even more important than obtaining profits. By virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber considers that no error whatsoever has been committed in the assessment of the evidence, nor has the violation of the alleged rules occurred; hence the complaint must be denied.\n\n**VII.-** In the **second** grievance, the appellant alleges a violation due to lack of assessment of the evidence or its preterition. Specifically, they refer to: the note from the Colegio de Contadores Públicos de Costa Rica, the expert opinion of Licenciado Guillermo Briceño Rodríguez, and the expert report of actuarial mathematician Mario Herrera Flores. Regarding preterition, it should be pointed out that it occurs when the judges omit to consider, whether totally or partially, the evidence provided to the case file. This implies the disregard of the value that the law grants them; and as such, it constitutes an error of law. In this instance, it is indispensable for the cassation appellant to indicate, with precision, the rules violated concerning the value of the evidentiary elements they deem have been analyzed erroneously. Furthermore, it is strictly necessary to point out what the errors committed consist of and, in turn, it is imperative to specify the legal rules that indirectly have been infringed regarding the substance, breaking down the manner in which the error occurred and how the injury has been produced, all of which is established in precepts 595 subsection 3, 596 second paragraph, and 597, all of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this particular case, the cassation appellants mention the rule violated regarding evidentiary value, they say which evidence was poorly assessed, but they omit to explain what the errors consist of, as they simply dedicate themselves to listing the evidence and saying that they do not know why the Court did not take the expert reports into account. They are not clear or precise when expressing the reason why the judges should have used that evidence to substantiate their ruling. Now then, the Court manifests itself regarding the subsidiary petition in the following terms: *“Now then, **nor is the subsidiary claim admissible**, for a deferred payment over time to be recognized, in consideration that the enjoyment of the membership right is for an indefinite time (lifetime) which was expertly fixed at a period of thirty years, which is the life expectancy of the resident-members (socios-residentes), given that the income was received by the plaintiff in a specific fiscal period, and even in the case of installment or credit sales, the truth is that accounting methods exist to reflect that income. Furthermore, it must be reiterated that the payment made and the object of this process is to acquire a membership to a social club, without it being reflected in the direct use of the facilities or services that the club provides, and in that sense, they are not subject to the use that the “resident-members (socios-residentes)” make of them; which means they must be taxed in the fiscal period in which they were incurred.”* For the appellants, the statement of the Ad Quem was not satisfactory; however, they do not indicate in what way the judges should have assessed the alleged evidence, which would have led them to vary the ruling. Note that the manifestations in the appeal only refer to the fact that the Court does not explain how it arrives at the conclusion, as it should have understood that the income to be paid had to be divided over a period of 29 to 30 years. However, they deem that in the questioned ruling, no assessment whatsoever is made of the alleged evidence and how it was necessary that it be analyzed. In addition to the above, the cassation appellants mention the substantive rules that, in their opinion, were violated, but again they do not explain how they were transgressed, they limit themselves to listing them; in other words, they do not express how the injury occurs. Faced with this panorama, in view of the lack of compliance with the proper technique of the cassation appeal, the complaint must be denied.\n\n**VIII.-** Regarding the **third** grievance, it is important to note that this Chamber has previously stated regarding the behavior of a company; and in that sense, it considered: *“**IV.-** The company contract has a series of requirements whose observance is unavoidable if it is intended, through it, to create a legal entity to which personality and capacity is recognized. Among them, and as far as it is relevant for this matter, a provision of funds (social capital) must be defined in the same foundational act, destined for the fulfillment of the associative end. The new legal person created by the will of diverse subjects must have, then, its own equity (patrimonio), which has as its original origin the contribution in work or capital (goods or money) that will permit the exercise of commercial activities. It is not a static fund, since it can be modified, increased, or reduced, as suits the social interests (articles 18 subsection 8), 156 subsection a) of the Code of Commerce). It has several purposes. In the first place, it permits the execution of the commercial acts defined in the corporate purpose. It also makes it possible to determine the political and economic rights of the shareholders (socios) and, finally, it is the guarantee of the fulfillment of its obligations (cardinal 981 of the Civil Code).”* (Resolution of 9 hours 10 minutes of April 9, 2008, corresponding to vote number 257). This Decision-Making Body conceives that a corporation (sociedad anónima), as provided by the Code of Commerce, has for-profit ends; in the particular case, the mere fact of having been created with this structure establishes its purpose. It was demonstrated (as explained in recital **VI**) that indeed the Country Club carries out activities whose goal is the satisfaction of the for-profit interest; its behavior is diaphanously that of a company and not that of an association, as the appellants wish to make understood. Now then, in the second place, in the articles of incorporation, the political and economic rights of the corporate group are determined, in such a way that this Body coincides with what was substantiated by the Court, since although it is true, ordinal 121 ibidem opens the possibility of creating different categories of shareholders (socios), these must have a minimum of corporate and economic rights, because part of the condition of being a person with representation in the social capital means it is necessary that they have the intrinsic right to participate in governance decisions and the monetary benefits or burdens that this entails. Consequently, even when the appellant alleges that article 17 idem empowers holding shares without lucrative ends, the truth is that, in the particular case, the persons who paid the admission fees discussed here did not make a contribution to the capital, as explained earlier, in section **VI.** Thus, continuing with the line of reasoning presented, these so-called resident members (socios residentes) or the persons who buy the right that was put up for sale, do not participate in any way in the corporation (sociedad anónima); they are simply beneficiaries of the use of the Club’s facilities, hence it is not true that they have the quality of shareholders (socios) as established in commercial law. Given this scenario, the appellants are not correct, since no improper sense was given to the provisions of canons 17 and 121 cited. Thus, the grievance must be denied.\n\n**IX.-** Regarding the **fourth** complaint, it must be indicated that what is argued there coincides with the substantive argument in the procedural complaints, hence this grievance is also deemed satisfied in this recital. The appellant is not correct, since what is sought is that the accrual system be applied to his represented party, which accredits an income in the taxpayer’s accounting from the moment when, once the consideration giving the right to the income has been performed, a certain legal responsibility arises. To explain the point more clearly, it is necessary to refer to the taxable event; in this sense, this Chamber has repeatedly stated: *“…the taxpayer can perceive and know, with due advance notice and with sufficient precision, the scope and content of the fiscal obligations, which is relevant to him to know the regime of subjection, taxable event, tax base, tax rate, among other elements of the tax. It should be specified that it also implies a material scope, within which the components of the tax that necessarily must be created by express law are established. These are the essential and determining elements of the tax, which must compulsorily be established by the legislator. Among these elements, are found, unavoidably, the taxable event, the passive subject, the tax base, the tax rate, as well as the moment of collection, depending on whether it is progressive or instantaneous… Relative to this specific tax, this Body recently considered: “The income tax, regulated in Law no.\"\n\n **“VI.-** Regarding the **first** grievance, the appellant alleges error in the appreciation of the evidence, and violation of various substantive norms. This reproach has various arguments, and being so extensive, for a better understanding of the study it is synthesized as follows. It maintains that to be a member of the Country Club it is necessary, among other things, to fulfill the requirement of making a capital contribution (aporte patrimonial), it also being indispensable in any case to pay the value of the admission fee (cuota de ingreso). However, it explains, holding a share of the company is not as important for its classic economic and political attributes, but rather, for the right to be able to use the facilities, which they reiterate is linked to the capital contribution, hence contribution and use are one a consequence of the other. Faced with this scenario, it argues, the resident member has, regarding the use of the premises' facilities, the same right as the shareholders. It develops throughout the reproach that these and the resident members maintain an associative relationship with the plaintiff, denying that the former have an associative link and the latter a commutative one, because in reality the Club's Bylaws define the two categories of members, giving both the rank of members (socios), therefore the payment they make to associate is a capital contribution (aporte patrimonial). It continues, however much it is accepted that resident members are outside the scheme of the General Assembly (Asamblea), that does not imply that they do not maintain an associative relationship just as stipulated in the articles of association. They mention the so-called “admission fee,” as the equivalent of becoming a member; however, something different happens with what is paid for a share, which is a capital income. And it is precisely this, which the resident member must contribute in the first instance, that is very different from the admission fee, monthly fee, and specific accounts. It is for this reason, they state, that there has been an improper valuation of the evidence, specifically of the Country Club's Bylaws; since the Court disproportionately weighs the fact that resident members do not acquire rights to dividends or voting in the assemblies of the Company (la Sociedad); disharmonizing the associative phenomenon, since it appears that this is exhausted in the fulfillment of those requirements, which are unique and exclusive to the corporation (sociedad anónima). The judges forget, it says, that the important thing in this case is the direct advantage of using the facilities and not the indirect one of obtaining dividends. In very concrete terms, this is what the cassation appellants' (casacionistas) claim consists of.\n\nThis Chamber agrees with what was decided by the Court, considers the analysis made of the company's bylaws to be correct, and does not share the appellants' thesis that there has been an error in the appreciation of the evidence; for which reason the following will be stated. In the first instance, the study made of the economic reality of the respondent Company (la Sociedad) is completely correct. In that sense, the Court held: *“**First**: **It is not true that the plaintiff constitutes a company of an associative character or nature**, that is, of an organizational type, in which there is a common activity directed at a result, in which the category of shareholder-member is just another one of the company, as it alleges, **as long as it formally adopts the form of a corporation (sociedad anónima)**, in accordance with the requirements established in articles 18 and 104 of the Código de Comercio… **Second**: **The payment of the questioned admission fee does not confer the status of member on the plaintiff, in its condition as a corporation (sociedad anónima)**… the regulations governing the matter (articles 102 and 104 of the Código de Comercio) establish as a differentiating characteristic of corporations (sociedades anónimas), **the division of the share capital (capital social) into parts represented by shares (acciones) paid through contributions from the partners**, a circumstance that leads to the conclusion that “the share capital (capital social) is the essential component of this type of company” (Idem). It is true that **the condition or quality of member of a company of this nature is determined by the contribution made to the share capital (capital social)**, and it is in proportion to this capital provision that the extent of the corporate rights and participation in the life of the company and in the distribution of benefits is measured, as it confers on its holder corporate-political rights, of participation in the assemblies and voting in them; as well as those of economic content, concerning participating in the distribution of dividends and preferentially participating in the company's capital increases… It should be clarified that this condition of member is acquired and proven with the payment and legal holding of a share (acción)… which acquire the quality of a negotiable instrument, as it represents “the aliquot part of the share capital (capital social) and, in addition, the certificate in which such aliquot part is represented”… **Third**: For the purposes of determining the taxable event (hecho imponible) of this tax, it is not relevant to determine the internal organization that the plaintiff has, in its condition as a social club, nor the rights and obligations that these generate according to its bylaws**. For this reason, a distinction must be made between the condition of member of the plaintiff, in its condition as a corporation (sociedad anónima), and the various categories of persons who are allowed to “associate” socially with it; as specified in clause 42 of the plaintiff's Bylaws… It is true that according to the plaintiff's bylaws, various categories of members are established, to whom correspond different rights and obligations conferred by the payment of the membership (“affiliation”) to this social club; however, it is insisted, this does not grant them the condition of member in a technical-legal sense, since what is recognized to them is only the right of use and enjoyment of the facilities… **Fourth**: The income received (ingreso percibido) by the plaintiff for this sale does adapt to the income-product concept (concepto de renta-producto) established by the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta**…”.* (The highlighting is from the original).\n\nThis Body agrees with those reasonings, as it has been demonstrated that the Country Club's behavior effectively corresponds to a corporation (sociedad anónima) as stipulated in the Código de Comercio, since, in reality, the beneficiary persons of the product offered by the plaintiff never became shareholders, that is, owners of a share, which is why the money they contributed could never become share capital (capital social), especially, as recorded in the case file, because there was no change in the articles of association that would lead to generating the respective increase. The problem arises here, because the Company itself uses the term *“member”* in two meanings, the first, referring to the member properly established in the Código de Comercio, who is the shareholder, it is reiterated, the owner of a share of the company. The second, calls all *“members”* of the Club members, that is, all those persons, who in some way have acquired a right to enjoy the benefits offered by the Country Club within its commercial activity, which is *“to undertake sports, recreational, cultural, artistic, and commercial activities”*. But these are not shareholders; what they acquire is a *“membership”*, or in other words, what they paid was a right to be able to pay the other fee called admission and thus, enjoy the Club's facilities (the same situation occurs with the children of the members and residents). So, the error lies with the appellant in the interpretation given to article 54 of the Country Club's Bylaws, which refers to the different categories of members that the articles of association establish. Therein it was provided: *“The members of the club are divided into the following categories: honorary, shareholders, residents, beneficiaries, diplomats, visitors, and young students…”* with the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) being able to create others. However, this does not necessarily imply that each of these obtains a share, in the terms of the Código de Comercio; hence the difference between the shareholder members who have real participation in the company and these others who are rather, a class of members. See that the respondent could not demonstrate that a sale or increase of shares occurred, or that an increase in share capital (capital social) was carried out, that changes were made in the Articles of Association, and their respective registration in the National Public Registry (Registro Público Nacional). The Court uses a good study on the condition of member, legally speaking, as part of a corporation (sociedad anónima). It is clear that the so-called resident members and those of any other class, are nothing more than club members, who pay a kind of *“registration fee”* or *“admission right”*, to then, if they so wish, pay an admission fee (cuota de ingreso), which will allow them to make use of the premises' facilities as long as they fulfill their obligations. This, contrary to the shareholders or shareholder members, who, in addition to having rights and obligations like the other members, possess other prerogatives proper to the holder of a share of the company, for example, having voice and vote in the General Assembly (Asamblea General), being a member of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva), among others. The appellant considers that the share is not so important for its economic or political attributes, but rather because it gives shareholders the right to use the facilities. An affirmation that is not true, in the first place because, the legal figure of the share and for which it was created, would lose all its meaning; and in the second place, there would be no real political representation of the company, by the true investors, according to their own investors; which is fundamental to sustain the corporation (sociedad anónima). Therefore, it can be affirmed that in the Club there are members who are owners of shares, who are those who have rights over the share capital (capital social) (without it being of major relevance that for years no dividends have been distributed, which is not proven) and others that would be the rest of the *“members”*, belonging to the different categories that have no right to the share capital (capital social). However, for any of them to be able to enjoy the use of the site, the approval of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) and the payment of the admission fee (cuota de ingreso) are required. All of which means that the possibility of use is not given by the share itself, but by the fulfillment of the requirements established by the company's bylaws.\n\nFaced with that position, it is not true that the right of use is a direct consequence of the capital contribution. As already indicated above, it is the result of fulfilling various requirements imposed in the corporate charter. Nor is it true that shareholder partners and residents are the same; the difference between them has been clear, as regulated in the bylaws when one reads: <i>\"Only the shareholder partners have voice and vote in the General Shareholders' Meeting, and may form part of the Board of Directors and the Oversight Committee; however, the General Shareholders' Meeting may appoint up to two resident partners to occupy director-at-large positions on the Board of Directors, who shall have the same rights and obligations as the other directors, except the right to vote at the Meetings\"</i>, thus, the participation of these distinct partners in their associative relationship is clearly defined. What the appellant calls a capital contribution and seeks to have exempted from income tax is nothing more than the payment for the right to use the facilities of the Country Club, which is its business activity. Regarding its operation, only the shareholder partners are the true protagonists of the decisions made by the Company. Faced with this scenario, it could not be affirmed that the payment of that membership offered to the partners' children can be considered a contribution to capital, so much so that it is the same shareholders who subsequently decide the course those funds will take. Costa Rica Country Club S.A. was incorporated as a corporation (sociedad anónima), and has a commercial purpose that is for-profit. On this point, we agree with the reasoning of the Tribunal when it states that it does not operate as an association (asociación), since in reality it has been incorporated as a corporation, complying with the requirements of the Commercial Code; where the capital contribution of the partners is necessary to carry out the business undertaking, and whose purpose is to distribute the profits among them. Hence, it is not acceptable for this Body to accept the thesis that it has become an Association, based on arguments such as the fact of not having distributed dividends for many years, or that its ultimate purpose is to provide the \"partners\" the advantage of using the facilities, which, in the appellant's opinion, is even more important than obtaining profits. By virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber considers that no error whatsoever has been committed in the assessment of the evidence, nor has there been any violation of the alleged rules; consequently, the objection must be rejected.\n\n**VII.-** In the **second** grievance, the appellant alleges a violation due to lack of assessment of the evidence or its pretermission. Specifically, they refer to: the letter from the Costa Rican Board of Public Accountants, the expert opinion of Lic. Guillermo Briceño Rodríguez, and the expert report of actuary Mario Herrera Flores. Regarding pretermission, it should be noted that it occurs when the judges fail to consider, either totally or partially, the evidence submitted to the case file. This implies ignoring the value that the law grants to it, and as such, constitutes an error of law. In this case, it is essential for the appellant to indicate, with precision, the violated rules concerning the value of the evidentiary elements they believe were analyzed incorrectly. Furthermore, it is imperative to indicate what the committed errors consist of, and in turn, it is imperative to specify the substantive legal rules that have been indirectly infringed, breaking down the manner in which the error occurred and how the injury was produced, all of which is established by precepts 595 subsection 3, 596 second paragraph, and 597, all of the Civil Procedure Code. In this particular case, the appellants mention the violated rule regarding evidentiary value, they state which evidence was poorly assessed, but they omit explaining what the errors consist of, as they simply dedicate themselves to listing the evidence and stating that they do not know why the Tribunal did not take the expert reports into account. They are neither clear nor precise when expressing the reason why the judges should have used that evidence to support their ruling. Now, the Tribunal pronounces on the subsidiary petition in the following terms: <i>\"Now, **neither is the subsidiary claim made appropriate**, for a deferred payment over time to be recognized, on the grounds that the enjoyment of the membership right is for an indefinite (lifetime) period, which was expertly set at a period of thirty years, which is the life expectancy of the resident-partners, since the income was received by the plaintiff in a specific fiscal period, and even in the case of installment or credit sales, the truth is that there exist accounting methods to reflect that income. Furthermore, it must be reiterated that the payment made, and the subject of this proceeding, is to acquire a membership to a social club, without it being reflected in the direct use of the facilities or services provided by the club, and in that sense, they are not subject to the use the 'resident-partners' make of them; which requires them to be taxed in the fiscal period in which they were occasioned.\"</i>. For the appellants, the Ad Quem's statement was not satisfactory; however, they do not indicate how the judges should have assessed the alleged evidence, which would have led them to vary the ruling. Note that the statements in the appeal only refer to the Tribunal not explaining how it reaches its conclusion, since it should have understood that the income to be paid had to be divided over a period of 29 to 30 years. However, they consider that in the questioned ruling, no assessment is made of the alleged evidence and how it was necessary for it to be analyzed. Added to the above, the appellants mention the substantive rules that, in their opinion, were violated, but again do not explain how they were transgressed; they limit themselves to listing them. In other words, they do not express how the injury occurs. Given this scenario, in view of the failure to comply with the proper technique of the cassation appeal, the reproach must be denied.\n\n**VIII.-** Regarding the **third** grievance, it is important to note that this Chamber has previously expressed its opinion regarding the conduct of a company (sociedad); and in that sense, it considered: <i>\" **IV.-** The company contract has a series of requirements, the observance of which is unavoidable if one intends, through it, to create a legal entity to which personality and capacity are recognized. Within them, and as pertains to this matter, a provision of funds (capital stock, capital social) must be defined in the foundational act itself, destined for the fulfillment of the associative purpose. The new legal person created by the will of various subjects must, then, have its own equity, which has as its primordial origin the contribution in labor or capital (goods or money) that will allow the exercise of commercial activities. It is not a static fund, as it can be modified, increased or reduced, according to the social interests (articles 18 subsection 8), 156 subsection a) of the Commercial Code). It has several purposes. In the first place, it allows the execution of the commercial acts defined in the corporate purpose. It also makes it possible to determine the political and economic rights of the partners and, finally, it is the guarantee for the fulfillment of its obligations (cardinal 981 of the Civil Code).\" </i> (Resolution of 9:10 a.m. on April 9, 2008, corresponding to vote number 257). This Deciding Body considers that a corporation, as provided by the Commercial Code, has for-profit purposes; in this particular case, the mere fact of having been created with this structure establishes its purpose. It was demonstrated (as explained in considering **VI**) that the Country Club effectively carries out activities whose goal is the satisfaction of the profit interest; its conduct is transparently that of a company and not that of an association (asociación), as the appellants wish to imply. Now, secondly, in the corporate bylaws (estatuto social), the political and economic rights of the corporate group are determined, such that this Body coincides with the Tribunal's reasoning, since even though it is true that ordinal 121 ibidem opens the possibility of creating different categories of partners, these must have a minimum of corporate and economic rights, because part of the condition of being a person with representation in the capital stock is that they must have the intrinsic right to participate in governance decisions and the monetary benefits or burdens that entails. Consequently, even if the appellant alleges that numeral 17 idem empowers holding shares without profit motives, the truth is that, in this particular case, the persons who paid the entrance fees (cuotas de ingreso) discussed here did not make a contribution to the capital, as explained above in section **VI.** Thus, following the outlined guideline, these so-called resident partners or the persons who purchase the right that was put up for sale do not participate in any way in the corporation; they are simply beneficiaries of the use of the Club's facilities. Hence, it is not true that they have the status of partners as established in commercial law. Faced with this scenario, the appellants are not correct, as no improper meaning was given to the provisions of canons 17 and 121 cited. Thus, the grievance should be denied.\n\n**IX.-** Concerning the **fourth** reproach, it must be indicated that what is argued therein coincides with the substantive argument in the procedural reproaches; hence, this grievance is also considered satisfied in this considering. The appellant is not correct, since what is sought is that the accrued system (sistema de devengado) be applied to its represented party, which credits an income in the taxpayer's accounting from the moment when, once the consideration giving the right to the income is performed, a certain legal responsibility arises. To explain the point more clearly, it is necessary to refer to the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax; in this sense, this Chamber has repeatedly stated: <i>\"...the taxpayer can perceive and know, with due advance notice and sufficient precision, the scope and content of the fiscal obligations, which is relevant for knowing the regime of subjection, taxable event, basis of calculation, rate, among other elements of the levy. It should be specified that it also infers a material scope, within which the components of the tax are established that necessarily must be created by express law. These are the essential and determining elements of the levy, which must forcibly be established by the legislator. Among these elements, are inevitably found the taxable event, the taxpayer, the tax base, the rate, as well as the time of collection, whether progressive or instantaneous... Regarding that specific tax, this Body recently considered: 'Income tax (impuesto sobre la renta), regulated in Law No. 7092, taxes profits and, in general, all income, continuous or occasional, received or accrued, that comes from a Costa Rican source, meaning by this latter expression, income generated by services rendered, goods located, or capital used in the national territory (Article 1). Likewise, it is levied on all unjustified increases in equity. This is precisely its material element. It is based on the concept of income-product (renta producto), that is, it taxes wealth or activities that generate profit or onerosity. This means that those originating from the use of production factors (land, labor, and capital) are subject to imposition, but only on the fraction of wealth that exceeds the costs and expenses incurred to produce it. The opposite would denature the tax, as it would be imposed on the very base that produces the profit and not on the latter. From this standpoint, its calculation basis is constituted by the net, taxable, or assessable income conceptualized by numeral 7 of that legal body... in accordance with Article 5 of Law No. 7092, gross income must be understood as the set of benefits or income received or accrued by the taxpayer in the respective fiscal period. From this, the items listed in numeral 6 ibidem must be excluded. Likewise, all disbursements that are useful and necessary to produce the activity that generates the dividends. That is to say, considering that the primary activity is the source that allows the generation of profits, all items that seek or have the purpose of the permanence of the productive endeavor are, in principle, exempted from the net calculation basis (canon 12 of the Regulation of the cited Law)... In this orientation, deductible expenses are all those that contribute to the production of profits, or, in simpler terms, all those disbursements that are linked to obtaining taxable income...'\" </i> (Resolution of 8:25 a.m. on March 25, 2008, corresponding to vote number 214). Based on the foregoing, then, the act generating the discrepancy must be analyzed. The Country Club made available to the partners' children the acquisition of a right to become resident partners, in exchange for a specific amount of money, which it received in the 1997 and 1998 fiscal periods. It thus acquired from those persons the total requested amount, which, as has been made clear in the preceding considerings, did not correspond to an increase in capital stock, as the appellants sought. On the contrary, these monies correspond to the sale of the right to be able to enter that category of partner, in exchange for being able to use the facilities of the Company, within the parameters established in its commercial activity. Faced with such a situation, it is conceived that the plaintiff obtained an income or benefit in those periods, a product of the legal transaction carried out with the partners' children; this being nothing more or less than a gain or income. As numeral 1 recently cited rightly provides, income must be understood as the profit accrued (devengado) during a specific fiscal period. From the foregoing, it follows that it is not important that the amount collected for the \"membership\" had a validity of 30 years from the moment it is obtained, and that, due to this, the payment of the tax should be deferred over that entire period. In reality, those sums of money were acquired in a specific period, for which reason, by legal imperative, their payment is due at that time. Thus, their argument regarding the grounds for using an accrued system, that is, accounting for the income from the moment the consideration is carried out, is not admissible. This is because, in reality, as has been repeatedly stated, the payment of this \"<i>enrollment fee\"</i> is made to be able to acquire the so-called \"<i>entrance fee (cuota de ingreso)</i>\", and it is only at that moment that the new \"<i>partner\"</i> can enjoy the use of the Club's facilities, provided they pay the corresponding maintenance monthly fees (mesualidades). Therefore, it is these latter fees that will represent the payment for the service over time. For this reason, the reasoning used by the appellants is not shared by this Chamber; on the contrary, we concur with what was stated by the Tribunal in the resolution sought to be annulled. By virtue of the foregoing, the grievance is not admissible and must be denied.\""
}