{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-128149", "citation": "Res. 00309-2009 Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Voto salvado sobre comiso de vivienda afectada a patrimonio familiar", "title_en": "Dissenting vote on the forfeiture of a family patrimony home", "summary_es": "El presente documento reproduce el voto salvado de la jueza Doris Arias Madrigal en un recurso de casación ante el Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón. La mayoría del tribunal había confirmado el comiso de una vivienda que, a pesar de estar constituida como patrimonio familiar, fue utilizada por la madre sentenciada para actividades de narcotráfico. La jueza disidente considera que el régimen de patrimonio familiar otorga una protección especial al inmueble, no solo frente a acreedores, sino también como espacio vital de la familia. Argumenta que el comiso afecta desproporcionadamente los derechos de una menor de edad, hija de la sentenciada, quien habitaba la vivienda desde pequeña y no es un tercero de buena fe en el sentido restrictivo interpretado por la mayoría. La jueza sostiene que el interés superior del niño, consagrado en la Constitución y en tratados internacionales, debe prevalecer sobre la consecuencia penal del comiso. Por ello, declara con lugar el recurso y ordena el reenvío para una nueva fundamentación que pondere los derechos fundamentales de los ocupantes del inmueble familiar.", "summary_en": "This document contains the dissenting vote of Judge Doris Arias Madrigal in a criminal appeal before the San Ramón Court of Cassation. The majority had upheld the forfeiture of a home that, despite being designated as family patrimony, was used by the convicted mother for drug trafficking. The dissenting judge argues that the family patrimony regime provides special protection to the property, not only against creditors but also as the vital space of the family. She contends that the forfeiture disproportionately affects the rights of a minor child of the convicted mother who had lived in the home from a young age and who is not a third party in the restrictive sense interpreted by the majority. The judge holds that the best interests of the child, enshrined in the Constitution and international treaties, must prevail over the criminal consequence of forfeiture. Consequently, she grants the appeal and orders a remand for a new reasoning that weighs the fundamental rights of the occupants of the family home.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón", "date": "2009", "year": "2009", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "patrimonio familiar", "voto salvado", "comiso", "interés superior del niño", "principio de proporcionalidad", "recurso de casación", "tercero de buena fe" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 51", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 17 inciso 1", "law": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos" }, { "article": "Art. 19", "law": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos" }, { "article": "Art. 32 inciso 1", "law": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos" }, { "article": "Art. 3", "law": "Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño" }, { "article": "Art. 27", "law": "Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño" }, { "article": "Art. 7", "law": "Ley 7142" }, { "article": "Art. 1", "law": "Código de Familia" } ], "keywords_es": [ "comiso penal", "patrimonio familiar", "interés superior del niño", "vivienda familiar", "proporcionalidad de la pena", "derecho a la vivienda", "narcotráfico", "Tribunal de Casación Penal" ], "keywords_en": [ "criminal forfeiture", "family patrimony", "best interests of the child", "family home", "proportionality of punishment", "right to housing", "drug trafficking", "Court of Criminal Cassation" ], "excerpt_es": "Considero que de las normas antes transcritas, así como de la jurisprudencia de la Sala II de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, otra es la interpretación que cabe realizar sobre el régimen de patrimonio familiar, y la tutela que corresponde; frente a un comiso de la vivienda familiar, que no observa los derechos de terceros protegidos especialmente por la ley y los tratados internacionales, en este caso de la menor de edad [Nombre2].., quien también habita el inmueble familiar y que por acciones de otra persona, como es el caso de su madre aquí sentenciada y no propias, será privada de un lugar -la vivienda- en el cual pueda desarrollarse con un nivel de vida adecuado física, mental, espiritual, moral y social.", "excerpt_en": "I consider that from the norms transcribed above, as well as from the jurisprudence of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, a different interpretation must be made of the family patrimony regime and the corresponding protection; in the face of a forfeiture of the family home, which disregards the rights of third parties specially protected by law and international treaties, in this case the minor [Name2].., who also lives in the family home and who, by actions of another person—her mother here sentenced—and not her own, would be deprived of a place—the home—in which she can develop with an adequate standard of living physically, mentally, spiritually, morally and socially.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Granted (dissenting vote)", "label_es": "Con lugar (voto salvado)", "summary_en": "The cassation appeal is granted due to lack of reasoning in the forfeiture, ordering a remand for a new ruling that weighs the minor's rights and the principle of proportionality.", "summary_es": "Se declara con lugar el recurso de casación por falta de fundamentación del comiso, ordenando el reenvío para una nueva resolución que pondere los derechos de la menor y el principio de proporcionalidad." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Voto salvado, Considerando III", "quote_en": "The norms that protect human rights in our legal system have a higher rank than ordinary law and protect the person and their dignity, in such a way that they provide not only for the adoption of legislative measures, but also for mechanisms to guarantee the result, that is, to make rights and freedoms effective, to which all state entities are obliged, including the Court that must decide.", "quote_es": "las normas que tutelan derechos humanos en nuestro ordenamiento tienen un rango superior a la ley y tutelan a la persona, al respeto a su dignidad, de forma tal que contemplan no solamente que se adopten medidas legislativas, sino también mecanismos para garantizar el resultado es decir, para hacer eficaces los derechos y libertades a lo cual están obligados todos los entes estatales, incluido el Tribunal al que le corresponde decidir." }, { "context": "Voto salvado, Considerando III", "quote_en": "The correct solution consists in interpreting the norms that regulate the family patrimony encumbrance—in accordance with article 10 of the Civil Code—taking into account the proper meaning of this legal institution, as well as its doctrinal, historical and legislative antecedents and the social reality of the time in which it is to be applied, attending fundamentally to its spirit and purpose.", "quote_es": "la solución correcta consiste en interpretar las normas que regulan la afectación a patrimonio familiar -conforme al artículo 10 del Código Civil-, teniendo en cuenta el sentido propio de este instituto jurídico, así como sus antecedentes tanto doctrinarios, como históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que ha de ser aplicado, atendiendo fundamentalmente a su espíritu y finalidad." }, { "context": "Voto salvado, Considerando III", "quote_en": "The measure is not proportional; proportionality is a constitutional parameter that the ordinary judge must apply when applying any norm or act, according to which constitutional precepts, values and principles cannot be marginalized, given the judicial function of ensuring the supremacy of law and the preservation of the legal order.", "quote_es": "la medida no es proporcional, que es un parámetro de carácter constitucional con el que debe actuar el juez ordinario, al momento de aplicar cualquier norma o acto, según el cual no puede marginar los preceptos, valores y principios constitucionales dada la función judicial de asegurar la supremacía del derecho y la preservación del ordenamiento jurídico." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-10806", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7142 Art. 7" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-128149", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-10806", "norm_num": "7142", "norm_name": "Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social de la Mujer", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "08/03/1990" }, { "doc_id": "norm-12391", "norm_num": "7052", "norm_name": "Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "13/11/1986" }, { "doc_id": "norm-29254", "norm_num": "7786", "norm_name": "Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento al terrorismo", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/04/1998" }, { "doc_id": "norm-48392", "norm_num": "8204", "norm_name": "Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento al terrorismo", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "26/12/2001" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "VOTO SALVADO DE LA JUEZA DORIS ARIAS MADRIGAL\n\n \n\n “III. […] En el presente caso, me aparto del voto de mayoría, considerando que la afectación de un inmueble como patrimonio familiar, implica una mayor protección del inmueble tanto, desde el punto de vista económico, como en consideración al espacio en el que históricamente se desarrollaron las actividades y relaciones específicas de la vida familiar, como célula fundamental de la sociedad. En ese sentido, se afirma por la doctrina que el patrimonio familiar es como \"una institución especial que puede coexistir con el régimen patrimonial del matrimonio, aunque, en puridad, opera autónomamente y se rige por normas propias. Esta afectación se da sobre un inmueble urbano o rural para la satisfacción de las necesidades de sustento y de la vivienda del titular y su familia y, en consecuencia, se le sustrae a las contingencias económicas que pudieran provocar, en lo sucesivo su embargo o enajenación. (MAZZINGHI, [Nombre1]: TRATADO DE DERECHO DE FAMILIA, Tomo 2, Editorial Astrea. Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1993, pág. 588). Lo que ha sido ampliado en la interpretación de la Sala II de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, especializada en estos temas de familia, que en el voto 00169-98 de las quince horas treinta minutos del quince de julio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, señaló: “esa afectación busca preservar el hogar familiar, poniéndolo a cubierto, no sólo de la ejecución por las deudas contra el cónyuge que constituye la afectación, sino también de los eventuales actos de disposición que él mismo quisiese realizar respecto del bien afectado(… ) Del análisis de esa normativa y de las motivaciones de su promulgación, se aprecia que la intención del legislador no fue la de restringir el instituto jurídico de la afectación del inmueble a patrimonio familiar, sino más bien, ampliar el espectro de su aplicación para todo tipo de propietario, independientemente de su estado civil y, consecuentemente incluir como beneficiarios a los diversos familiares que habiten el inmueble”. \n\nEn cuanto a la afectación de un inmueble como inmueble familiar, debe observarse que la institución ha evolucionado, reconociéndose que el ámbito de cobertura abarca tanto a la familia de derecho como la de hecho, y que tratándose de inmueble de desarrollo social desde la constitución de la escritura de compra esta debe ser afectada con el régimen de inmueble familiar, así y en ese sentido, artículo 7, Ley N° 7142, del 2 de marzo de 1990, conocida como \"Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social de la Mujer y reforma a los artículos 42, 43 y 47 inc. c) del Código de Familia que fueron reformadas por la Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social de la Mujer y artículo 56 de la Ley 7052, Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional para La Vivienda. Por otra parte, el ordenamiento jurídico debe interpretarse en forma hermenéutica y se cuenta con un conjunto normativo nacional e internacional que tutela los derechos humanos de la familia, de sus integrantes, máxime cuando se trate de menores de edad a los cuáles hay que garantizarles el interés superior. Así, a partir de la consideración del Estado social democrático y de Derecho que emana de la Constitución Política, encontramos que el artículo 51 protege a la familia: \n\nArtículo 51.- La familia, como elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, tiene derecho a la protección especial del Estado. Igualmente tendrán derecho a esa protección la madre, el niño, el anciano y el enfermo desvalido. \n\nIgual protección contemplan los tratados internacionales de Derechos Humanos, así y en ese sentido los artículos 17, inc. 1), y 32, inc. 1), de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Ley No. 4534 del 23 de febrero de 1970, señala: \n\nArtículo 17.- Protección a la familia 1. La familia es el elemento natural y fundamental de la sociedad y debe ser protegida por la sociedad y el Estado. Protección a la familia 2. Se reconoce el derecho del hombre y la mujer a contraer matrimonio y a fundar una familia si tiene la edad y las condiciones requeridas para ello por las leyes internas, en la medida en que éstas no afecten al principio de no discriminación establecido en esa Convención.3. El matrimonio no puede celebrarse sin el libre y pleno consentimiento de los contrayentes. 4. Los Estados Partes deben tomar medidas apropiadas para asegurar la igualdad de derechos y la adecuada equivalencia de responsabilidad de los cónyuges en cuanto al matrimonio durante el matrimonio y en caso de disolución del mismo. En caso de disolución, se adoptarán disposiciones que aseguren la protección necesaria de los hijos, sobre la base única del interés y conveniencia de ellos.5. La ley debe reconocer iguales derechos tanto a los hijos nacidos fuera de matrimonio como a los nacidos dentro del mismo. \n\nTambién la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, en el artículo 19 tutela los derechos del niño y especifica: \n\nArtículo 19: Derechos del niño Todo niño tiene derecho a medidas de protección que su condición de menor requieren por parte de su familia, de la sociedad y del Estado. \n\nAsimismo, la Convención Americana refiere en su artículo 32, la forma de interpretación de los Derechos Humanos, que ha ser integral a favor de la persona así, al efecto se indica: \n\nArtículo 32.- Correlación entre deberes y derechos 1. Toda persona tiene deberes para con la familia, la comunidad y la humanidad. 2. Los derechos de cada persona están limitados por los derechos de los demás, por la seguridad de todos y por las justas exigencias del bien común, en una sociedad democrática. \n\nEn cuanto a los derechos del niño y la niña, la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño ratificada por nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, desde su preámbulo señala que, la infancia tiene derecho a cuidados y asistencia especiales; a la vez que la familia, como grupo fundamental de la sociedad y medio natural para el crecimiento y el bienestar de todos sus miembros, y en particular de los niños, debe recibir la protección y asistencia necesarias para poder asumir plenamente sus responsabilidades dentro de la comunidad. Reconoce asimismo que el niño, para el pleno y armonioso desarrollo de su personalidad, debe crecer en el seno de la familia, en un ambiente de felicidad, amor y comprensión. Luego, en el texto de la Convención, se señala que el principio rector de toda interpretación, es el interés superior, que está contemplado en el artículo 3: \n\nArtículo 3. 1. En todas las medidas concernientes a los niños que tomen las instituciones públicas o privadas de bienestar social, los tribunales, las autoridades administrativas o los órganos legislativos, una consideración primordial a que se atenderá será el interés superior del niño. 2. Los Estados Partes se comprometen a asegurar al niño la protección y el cuidado que sean necesarios para su bienestar, teniendo en cuenta los derechos y deberes de sus padres, tutores u otras personas responsables de él ante la ley y, con ese fin, tomarán todas las medidas legislativas y administrativas adecuadas.3. Los Estados Partes se asegurarán de que las instituciones, servicios y establecimientos encargados del cuidado o la protección de los niños cumplan las normas establecidas por las autoridades competentes, especialmente en materia de seguridad, sanidad, número y competencia de su personal, así como en relación con la existencia de una supervisión adecuada. \n\nAsimismo en el artículo 27 de la Convención de los Derechos del Niño, se prevé la creación y mantenimiento de condiciones para un desarrollo adecuado de los niños, entre ellos, el derecho a una vivienda en su inciso 3). Así se indica: \n\nArtículo 27. 1. Los Estados Partes reconocen el derecho de todo niño a un nivel de vida adecuado para su desarrollo físico, mental, espiritual, moral y social. 2. A los padres u otras personas encargadas del niño les incumbe la responsabilidad primordial de proporcionar, dentro de sus posibilidades y medios económicos, las condiciones de vida que sean necesarias para el desarrollo del niño. 3. Los Estados Partes, de acuerdo con las condiciones nacionales y con arreglo a sus medios, adoptarán medidas apropiadas para ayudar a los padres y a otras personas responsables por el niño a dar efectividad a este derecho y, en caso necesario, proporcionarán asistencia material y programas de apoyo, particularmente con respecto a la nutrición, el vestuario y la vivienda (…). \n\nEn el caso bajo examen, se ha ordenado el comiso de la vivienda afectada a la condición de inmueble familiar que ha sido utilizada por la madre para el tráfico de droga, con fundamento en los artículos 83, 93 y 94 de la Ley Nº [Placa1] SOBRE ESTUPEFACIENTES, SUSTANCIAS PSICOTRÓPICAS, DROGAS DE USO NO AUTORIZADO, LEGITIMACIÓN DE CAPITALES Y ACTIVIDADES CONEXAS, a partir del concepto de que una menor que habita una vivienda con la connotación de inmueble familiar no es un tercereo de buena fe, porque el inmueble familiar tiene una función limitada a la de preservarlo frente acreedores u enajenación por parte de su propietario y que en este caso, procede el comiso dado que en la vivienda se desarrolló por la convicta la narcoactividad. Coincido con el voto de mayoría, en que el comiso es una consecuencia del delito, sin embargo estimo que en este caso hay que hacer unas precisiones en cuanto al comiso de la vivienda, pues se trata de un domicilio familiar, en el que además de la sentenciada habitan otras personas como es su hija, una menor de edad (ver certificación de nacimiento de [Nombre2]. hija de [Nombre3]., padre [Nombre4]. nacida el 2 de noviembre de 1994, folio 282). La menor llegó a habitar la vivienda desde el año 1998, cuando contaba con cuatro años, fecha en que se constituyó el patrimonio familiar de una vivienda, para que se convirtiera en la residencia de una familia de hecho integrada por [Nombre5]. y [Nombre3]. a la cual ella aportó una menor, la niña [Nombre3]. (Ver constitución de Patrimonio Familiar a nombre de [Nombre5]. el 24 de julio de 1998, folio 128). \n\nConsidero que de las normas antes transcritas, así como de la jurisprudencia de la Sala II de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, otra es la interpretación que cabe realizar sobre el régimen de patrimonio familiar, y la tutela que corresponde; frente a un comiso de la vivienda familiar, que no observa los derechos de terceros protegidos especialmente por la ley y los tratados internacionales, en este caso de la menor de edad [Nombre2].., quien también habita el inmueble familiar y que por acciones de otra persona, como es el caso de su madre aquí sentenciada y no propias, será privada de un lugar -la vivienda- en el cual pueda desarrollarse con un nivel de vida adecuado física, mental, espiritual, moral y social. Las normas que tutelan derechos humanos en nuestro ordenamiento tienen un rango superior a la ley y tutelan a la persona, al respeto a su dignidad, de forma tal que contemplan no solamente que se adopten medidas legislativas, sino también mecanismos para garantizar el resultado es decir, para hacer eficaces los derechos y libertades a lo cual están obligados todos los entes estatales, incluido el Tribunal al que le corresponde decidir. En el subjúdice, aunque no se incluye a la menor como beneficiaria del derecho de inmueble familiar, lo cierto es que ella llegó al mismo desde temprana edad como parte de la prole de la madre, y habita en el inmueble y como lo señalado la Sala II, en la sentencia antes citada, que se ha ampliado el espectro de aplicación del patrimonio familiar e incluye como beneficiarios a los diversos familiares que habiten el inmueble. En ese sentido se dijo en la sentencia de comentario lo siguiente: \n\n“Del análisis de esa normativa y de las motivaciones de su promulgación, se aprecia que la intención del legislador no fue la de restringir el instituto jurídico de la afectación del inmueble a patrimonio familiar, sino más bien, ampliar el espectro de su aplicación para todo tipo de propietario, independientemente de su estado civil y, consecuentemente incluir como beneficiarios a los diversos familiares que habiten el inmueble. No obstante, el legislador no estableció ningún tipo de disposición en el supuesto de que se de la afectación y, por omisión del propietario, no se indique en forma expresa quiénes son los beneficiarios de la misma. Ante esta circunstancia, no es posible interpretar -como lo hace el Tribunal-, que en este caso, las hijas producto del matrimonio de las partes no se consideran beneficiarias de esa afectación, puesto que, de arribar a esa conclusión, se violentaría el interés social en proteger el bienestar de la familia, el cual es un principio tutelado por el artículo 1 del Código de Familia y, específicamente por el numeral 17, inciso 4), de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos -ley N° 4534 del 23 de febrero de 1970-, que en lo que interesa establece que entre las medidas de protección a la familia, \"...en caso de disolución, se adoptarán disposiciones que aseguren la protección necesaria a los hijos, sobre la base única del interés y conveniencia de ellos...\". Aún más cuando existe una manifestación de voluntad del actor, como propietario registral, donde determina que la finalidad del inmueble es fungir como \"habitación familiar\". Por esto, la solución correcta consiste en interpretar las normas que regulan la afectación a patrimonio familiar -conforme al artículo 10 del Código Civil-, teniendo en cuenta el sentido propio de este instituto jurídico, así como sus antecedentes tanto doctrinarios, como históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que ha de ser aplicado, atendiendo fundamentalmente a su espíritu y finalidad”. \n\nAsimismo, la menor de edad [Nombre3]. se desarrolla en esa vivienda conjuntamente con la familia, entre las que se incluye la sentenciada. De forma tal que, no puede decirse que la vivienda, sea el instrumento con el que se cometió el delito, pues tratándose de un inmueble en el que habitan y se desarrollan varias personas, sería una interpretación muy restringida concluir que la actividad delictiva de la madre, deba afectar al resto del grupo familiar, dado que no siempre el resto de la familia comparte ni está de acuerdo en la actividad delictiva, o en muchas ocasiones, dadas las condiciones socio-económicas y afectivas los que no compartan la actividad por diversas razones no pueden abandonar la vivienda; lo cual en todo caso esta protegido por el artículo36 Constitucional, en el sentido de que no están obligados a denunciar ni a declarar contra sus familiares los miembros de este grupo. Por otra parte, en este caso, la investigación giró en torno a la sentenciada [Nombre3]., no así en contra de la menor, la sería constreñida a abandonar el domicilio familiar, por virtud del comiso de los bienes sufriendo consecuencias no planificadas ni queridas por la menor y que la afectarían en su desarrollo integral y en su dignidad humana. Finalmente estimo que la medida no es proporcional, que es un parámetro de carácter constitucional con el que debe actuar el juez ordinario, al momento de aplicar cualquier norma o acto, según el cual no puede marginar los preceptos, valores y principios constitucionales dada la función judicial de asegurar la supremacía del derecho y la preservación del ordenamiento jurídico.El comiso, como consecuencia jurídica debe observar el proincipio de proporcionalidad, en igual sentido ver Sala Tercera voto 0024-2004 de las 9:40 horas del 23 de enero de 2004. En consecuencia, declaro con lugar el recurso en cuanto a la falta de fundamentación del comiso y se ordene el reenvío para una nueva fundamentación.“", "body_en_text": "DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE DORIS ARIAS MADRIGAL\n\n\n“III. […] In the present case, I depart from the majority vote, considering that the encumbrance (afectación) of a property as a family patrimony (patrimonio familiar) implies greater protection of the property, both from an economic point of view and in consideration of the space in which the specific activities and relationships of family life historically developed, as the fundamental cell of society. In that sense, doctrine affirms that the family patrimony is like \"*a special institution that can coexist with the patrimonial regime of marriage, although, in essence, it operates autonomously and is governed by its own rules. This encumbrance (afectación) applies to an urban or rural property for the satisfaction of the sustenance and housing needs of the owner and their family, and, consequently, it is shielded from the economic contingencies that could subsequently cause its seizure or transfer* (MAZZINGHI, [Nombre1]: TRATADO DE DERECHO DE FAMILIA, Tomo 2, Editorial Astrea. Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1993, pág. 588). This has been expanded in the interpretation of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, specialized in these family matters, which in Voto 00169-98 of fifteen hours thirty minutes of July fifteenth, nineteen ninety-eight, stated: “*that encumbrance (afectación) seeks to preserve the family home, protecting it not only from execution for debts against the spouse who constitutes the encumbrance (afectación), but also from any eventual acts of disposition that he himself might wish to carry out regarding the encumbered property (… ) From the analysis of that legislation and the motivations for its enactment, it is evident that the legislator's intention was not to restrict the legal institute of the encumbrance (afectación) of the property to a family patrimony (patrimonio familiar), but rather to broaden the scope of its application for all types of owners, regardless of their marital status, and consequently to include various family members who inhabit the property as beneficiaries*”.\n\nRegarding the encumbrance (afectación) of a property as a family home (inmueble familiar), it should be noted that the institution has evolved, recognizing that the scope of coverage encompasses both de jure and de facto families, and that in the case of a social development property, from the constitution of the purchase deed, it must be encumbered under the family home (inmueble familiar) regime, thus and in that sense, Article 7, Law No. 7142, of March 2, 1990, known as \"Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social de la Mujer\" and the reform to Articles 42, 43, and 47(c) of the Family Code which were reformed by the Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social de la Mujer and Article 56 of Law 7052, Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional para La Vivienda. On the other hand, the legal system must be interpreted hermeneutically, and there is a set of national and international regulations that protect the human rights of the family and its members, especially when it concerns minors who must be guaranteed the best interest. Thus, based on the consideration of the social democratic State of Law that emanates from the Political Constitution, we find that Article 51 protects the family:\n\nArticle 51.- The family, as the natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State. Likewise, the mother, the child, the elderly, and the helpless sick shall have the right to that protection.\n\nThe same protection is contemplated in international Human Rights treaties, thus and in that sense Articles 17(1) and 32(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Law No. 4534 of February 23, 1970, state:\n\nArticle 17.- Protection of the Family 1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state. Protection of the Family 2. The right of men and women to contract marriage and to raise a family is recognized if they meet the conditions required for it by domestic laws, insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of non-discrimination established in this Convention. 3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.4. The States Parties shall take appropriate steps to ensure the equality of rights and the adequate balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, during marriage, and in the event of its dissolution. In case of dissolution, provisions shall be adopted to ensure the necessary protection of the children, based solely on their interest and convenience.5. The law shall recognize equal rights for children born out of wedlock and those born within it.\n\nThe American Convention on Human Rights also protects the rights of the child in Article 19 and specifies:\n\nArticle 19: Rights of the Child Every child has the right to the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor on the part of his family, society, and the state.\n\nLikewise, the American Convention refers in its Article 32 to the manner of interpreting Human Rights, which must be integral in favor of the person, thus, to that effect it states:\n\nArticle 32.- Relationship between Duties and Rights 1. Every person has responsibilities to his family, his community, and mankind.2. The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.\n\nRegarding the rights of the child, the Convention on the Rights of the Child ratified by our legal system, from its preamble, states that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance; and that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members, and particularly of children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community. It also recognizes that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love, and understanding. Later, in the text of the Convention, it is pointed out that the guiding principle of any interpretation is the best interest, which is set forth in Article 3:\n\nArticle 3. 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, a primary consideration to which due regard shall be taken shall be the best interest of the child. 2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.\n\nSimilarly, Article 27 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides for the creation and maintenance of conditions for adequate development of children, among them, the right to housing in its subsection 3). It states:\n\nArticle 27. 1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development. 2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the child's development. 3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing (…).\n\nIn the case under review, the confiscation (comiso) of the dwelling encumbered to the condition of a family home (inmueble familiar) that was used by the mother for drug trafficking has been ordered, based on Articles 83, 93, and 94 of Law No. [Placa1] SOBRE ESTUPEFACIENTES, SUSTANCIAS PSICOTRÓPICAS, DROGAS DE USO NO AUTORIZADO, LEGITIMACIÓN DE CAPITALES Y ACTIVIDADES CONEXAS, based on the concept that a minor who lives in a dwelling with the connotation of a family home (inmueble familiar) is not a third party of good faith, because the family home (inmueble familiar) has a function limited to preserving it against creditors or transfer by its owner and that in this case, the confiscation (comiso) is appropriate given that the convict engaged in narco-activity in the dwelling. I agree with the majority vote that confiscation (comiso) is a consequence of the crime, however, I believe that in this case some clarifications must be made regarding the confiscation (comiso) of the dwelling, as it is a family domicile, in which, in addition to the sentenced person, other people live, such as her daughter, a minor (see birth certificate of [Nombre2]. daughter of [Nombre3]., father [Nombre4]. born on November 2, 1994, page 282). The minor came to live in the dwelling in 1998, when she was four years old, on the date when the family patrimony (patrimonio familiar) of a dwelling was constituted, so that it would become the residence of a de facto family composed of [Nombre5]. and [Nombre3]., to which she contributed a minor, the girl [Nombre3]. (See constitution of the family patrimony (patrimonio familiar) in the name of [Nombre5]. on July 24, 1998, page 128).\n\nI consider that from the norms transcribed above, as well as from the jurisprudence of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, a different interpretation must be made regarding the family patrimony (patrimonio familiar) regime and the corresponding protection; in the face of a confiscation (comiso) of the family dwelling that does not observe the rights of third parties specially protected by law and international treaties, in this case of the minor [Nombre2]., who also lives in the family home (inmueble familiar) and who, due to the actions of another person, as is the case of her mother, the sentenced party here, and not her own, will be deprived of a place—the dwelling—in which she can develop with an adequate standard of living physically, mentally, spiritually, morally, and socially. The norms that protect human rights in our legal system have a rank superior to law and protect the person, respect for their dignity, in such a way that they contemplate not only the adoption of legislative measures but also mechanisms to guarantee the result, that is, to make the rights and freedoms effective, to which all state entities are obliged, including the Court that must decide. In the sub judice, although the minor is not included as a beneficiary of the family home (inmueble familiar) right, the truth is that she arrived there at an early age as part of the mother's offspring, and lives in the property, and as noted by the Second Chamber in the judgment cited above, the scope of application of the family patrimony (patrimonio familiar) has been broadened and includes as beneficiaries the various family members who inhabit the property. In that sense, the following was said in the commentary judgment:\n\n“From the analysis of that legislation and the motivations for its enactment, it is evident that the legislator's intention was not to restrict the legal institute of the encumbrance (afectación) of the property to a family patrimony (patrimonio familiar), but rather to broaden the scope of its application for all types of owners, regardless of their marital status, and consequently to include various family members who inhabit the property as beneficiaries. However, the legislator did not establish any type of provision for the event that the encumbrance (afectación) exists and, due to an omission by the owner, the beneficiaries thereof are not expressly indicated. In this circumstance, it is not possible to interpret—as the Court did—that in this case, the daughters born of the marriage of the parties are not considered beneficiaries of that encumbrance (afectación), since reaching that conclusion would violate the social interest in protecting the well-being of the family, which is a principle protected by Article 1 of the Family Code and, specifically, by numeral 17(4) of the American Convention on Human Rights—Law No. 4534 of February 23, 1970—which, as relevant, establishes that among the measures of protection for the family, '...in case of dissolution, provisions shall be adopted to ensure the necessary protection of the children, based solely on their interest and convenience...' Even more so when there is a declaration of intent by the plaintiff, as the registered owner, specifying that the purpose of the property is to serve as the 'family room'. Therefore, the correct solution consists of interpreting the norms that regulate the encumbrance (afectación) to the family patrimony (patrimonio familiar)—in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code—taking into account the proper meaning of this legal institute, as well as its doctrinal, historical, and legislative background and the social reality of the time in which it must be applied, attending fundamentally to its spirit and purpose”.\n\nLikewise, the minor [Nombre3]. is developing in that dwelling jointly with the family, which includes the sentenced party. Thus, it cannot be said that the dwelling is the instrument with which the crime was committed, because in the case of a property in which several people live and develop, it would be a very restricted interpretation to conclude that the criminal activity of the mother must affect the rest of the family group, given that the rest of the family does not always share or agree with the criminal activity, or on many occasions, given the socio-economic and emotional conditions, those who do not share the activity for various reasons cannot leave the dwelling; which in any case is protected by Article 36 of the Constitution, in the sense that members of this group are not obliged to denounce or testify against their family members. Furthermore, in this case, the investigation revolved around the sentenced party [Nombre3]., and not against the minor, who would be forced to abandon the family domicile by virtue of the confiscation (comiso) of the assets, suffering consequences neither planned nor desired by the minor and that would affect her in her integral development and her human dignity. Finally, I believe that the measure is not proportional, which is a constitutional parameter with which the ordinary judge must act when applying any norm or act, according to which they cannot set aside constitutional precepts, values, and principles given the judicial function of ensuring the supremacy of law and the preservation of the legal system. Confiscation (comiso), as a legal consequence, must observe the principle of proportionality, in the same sense see Third Chamber, Voto 0024-2004 of 9:40 hours on January 23, 2004. Consequently, I declare the appeal has merit regarding the lack of reasoning for the confiscation (comiso) and order the referral back for a new reasoning.”\n\nborn on November 2, 1994, folio 282). The minor came to live in the dwelling in 1998, when she was four years old, the date on which the family homestead (patrimonio familiar) of a dwelling was constituted, so that it would become the residence of a de facto family composed of [Name5] and [Name3], to which she contributed a minor, the girl [Name3]. (See constitution of Family Homestead in the name of [Name5] on July 24, 1998, folio 128).\n\nI believe that from the provisions transcribed above, as well as from the jurisprudence of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, a different interpretation must be made regarding the family homestead regime, and the corresponding protection; in the face of a forfeiture (comiso) of the family dwelling, which does not observe the rights of third parties specially protected by law and international treaties, in this case the minor [Name2]., who also inhabits the family property and who, due to the actions of another person, as is the case of her mother sentenced here and not her own, will be deprived of a place—the dwelling—in which she can develop with an adequate standard of living physically, mentally, spiritually, morally, and socially. The norms that protect human rights in our legal system have a rank superior to law and protect the person, respect for their dignity, in such a way that they contemplate not only the adoption of legislative measures, but also mechanisms to guarantee the result, that is, to make effective the rights and freedoms, to which all state entities are obliged, including the Court that must decide. In the sub judice, although the minor is not included as a beneficiary of the family property right, the truth is that she arrived there at an early age as part of the mother’s offspring, and inhabits the property, and as the Second Chamber pointed out in the aforementioned ruling, the spectrum of application of the family homestead has been broadened and includes as beneficiaries the various family members who inhabit the property. In that sense, the ruling under comment stated the following:\n\n“From the analysis of these regulations and the motivations for their enactment, it is evident that the legislator's intention was not to restrict the legal institution of the property's encumbrance as a family homestead, but rather, to broaden the spectrum of its application to all types of owners, regardless of their marital status and, consequently, to include as beneficiaries the various family members who inhabit the property. However, the legislator did not establish any type of provision in the event that the encumbrance occurs and, due to the owner's omission, it is not expressly indicated who the beneficiaries thereof are. Faced with this circumstance, it is not possible to interpret—as the Court does—that, in this case, the daughters born of the parties' marriage are not considered beneficiaries of that encumbrance, since, arriving at that conclusion would violate the social interest in protecting the well-being of the family, which is a principle protected by Article 1 of the Family Code and, specifically by numeral 17, subsection 4), of the American Convention on Human Rights—Law No. 4534 of February 23, 1970—which, as relevant, establishes that among the measures for the protection of the family, **\"...in case of dissolution, provisions shall be adopted to ensure the necessary protection of the children, based solely on their best interest and convenience...\"**. Even more so when there is a manifestation of will by the plaintiff, as the registered owner, where it determines that the purpose of the property is to serve as a \"family dwelling.\" For this reason, the correct solution consists of interpreting the norms that regulate the encumbrance as a family homestead—in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code—taking into account the proper meaning of this legal institution, as well as its doctrinal, historical, and legislative background and the social reality of the time in which it must be applied, fundamentally attending to its spirit and purpose.”\n\nLikewise, the minor [Name3] develops in that dwelling jointly with the family, among which the sentenced person is included. In such a way that it cannot be said that the dwelling was the instrument with which the crime was committed, because in the case of a property in which several persons inhabit and develop, it would be a very restrictive interpretation to conclude that the criminal activity of the mother must affect the rest of the family group, given that the rest of the family does not always share or agree with the criminal activity, or on many occasions, given the socio-economic and emotional conditions, those who do not share the activity for various reasons cannot abandon the dwelling; which in any case is protected by Constitutional Article 36, in the sense that the members of this group are not obligated to denounce or testify against their family members. Moreover, in this case, the investigation revolved around the sentenced [Name3], and not against the minor, who would be forced to abandon the family home, by virtue of the forfeiture of assets, suffering consequences neither planned nor desired by the minor and that would affect her in her integral development and human dignity. Finally, I estimate that the measure is not proportional, which is a constitutional parameter with which the ordinary judge must act when applying any norm or act, according to which they cannot marginalize constitutional precepts, values, and principles given the judicial function of ensuring the supremacy of law and the preservation of the legal order. Forfeiture, as a legal consequence, must observe the principle of proportionality; in the same sense, see Third Chamber, Ruling 0024-2004 of 9:40 a.m. on January 23, 2004. Consequently, I grant the appeal regarding the lack of reasoning for the forfeiture and order the remand for new reasoning.\"\n\nI concur with the majority vote that confiscation is a consequence of the crime; however, I believe that in this case certain clarifications must be made regarding the confiscation of the dwelling, since it is a family home in which, in addition to the convicted person, other individuals reside, such as her daughter, a minor (see birth certificate of [Name2], daughter of [Name3], father [Name4], born November 2, 1994, folio 282). The minor came to live in the dwelling in 1998, when she was four years old, the date on which the family patrimony of a dwelling was constituted, so that it became the residence of a de facto family composed of [Name5] and [Name3], to which she contributed a minor, the child [Name3]. (See constitution of Family Patrimony in the name of [Name5] on July 24, 1998, folio 128).\n\nI consider that, from the provisions transcribed above, as well as from the jurisprudence of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, a different interpretation must be made regarding the family patrimony regime and the corresponding protection, in the face of a confiscation of the family dwelling that disregards the rights of third parties specially protected by law and international treaties, in this case the minor [Name2], who also inhabits the family property and who, due to the actions of another person, specifically her mother, the convicted party here, and not her own actions, will be deprived of a place—the dwelling—in which she can develop with an adequate standard of living physically, mentally, spiritually, morally, and socially. The provisions that protect human rights in our legal system hold a rank superior to ordinary law and protect the person and respect for their dignity, such that they contemplate not only the adoption of legislative measures, but also mechanisms to guarantee the result, that is, to make effective the rights and freedoms to which all state entities are obligated, including the Court that must decide. In the case sub judice, although the minor is not included as a beneficiary of the right of the family property, the fact is that she arrived there at an early age as part of the mother's offspring and inhabits the property, and as indicated by the Second Chamber in the previously cited judgment, the scope of application of the family patrimony has been broadened and includes as beneficiaries the various relatives who inhabit the property. In that sense, the commented judgment stated the following:\n\n“From the analysis of those regulations and the motivations for their enactment, it is evident that the legislator's intention was not to restrict the legal institute of the encumbrance of a property as family patrimony, but rather to broaden the scope of its application to all types of owners, regardless of their marital status, and consequently to include as beneficiaries the various relatives who inhabit the property. However, the legislator did not establish any type of provision for the scenario where the encumbrance occurs and, due to the owner's omission, the beneficiaries thereof are not expressly indicated. Given this circumstance, it is not possible to interpret—as the Court does—that in this case, the daughters born of the parties' marriage are not considered beneficiaries of that encumbrance, since arriving at that conclusion would violate the social interest in protecting the family's well-being, which is a principle protected by Article 1 of the Family Code and, specifically, by numeral 17, subsection 4) of the American Convention on Human Rights—Law No. 4534 of February 23, 1970—which, as relevant, establishes that among the measures for the protection of the family, '...in the event of dissolution, provisions shall be adopted to ensure the necessary protection of children, based solely on their best interests and convenience...'. Even more so when there is a manifestation of intent by the plaintiff, as the registered owner, determining that the purpose of the property is to serve as a 'family dwelling'. For this reason, the correct solution consists of interpreting the provisions that regulate the encumbrance as family patrimony—in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code—taking into account the proper meaning of this legal institute, as well as its doctrinal, historical, and legislative background and the social reality of the time in which it must be applied, fundamentally attending to its spirit and purpose.”\n\nLikewise, the minor [Name3] develops in that dwelling jointly with the family, which includes the convicted party. Therefore, it cannot be said that the dwelling was the instrument with which the crime was committed, because in the case of a property inhabited and used for development by several persons, it would be a very restrictive interpretation to conclude that the criminal activity of the mother must affect the rest of the family group, given that the rest of the family does not always share or agree with the criminal activity, or on many occasions, given the socio-economic and emotional conditions, those who do not share the activity for various reasons cannot abandon the dwelling; all of which is in any case protected by Article 36 of the Constitution, in the sense that members of this group are not obligated to denounce or testify against their relatives. Furthermore, in this case, the investigation centered on the convicted party [Name3], and not against the minor, who would be constrained to abandon the family home by virtue of the confiscation of assets, suffering consequences neither planned nor desired by the minor, which would affect her in her integral development and human dignity. Finally, I consider that the measure is not proportional, which is a constitutional parameter that the ordinary judge must apply when applying any rule or act, according to which they cannot disregard precepts, values, and constitutional principles given the judicial function of ensuring the supremacy of law and the preservation of the legal order. Confiscation, as a legal consequence, must observe the principle of proportionality; in the same sense, see Third Chamber Vote 0024-2004 of 9:40 a.m. on January 23, 2004. Consequently, I grant the appeal regarding the lack of reasoning for the confiscation and order the case to be remanded for new reasoning." }