{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-129549", "citation": "Res. 01257-2009 Sala Segunda de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Reestructuración en SUGEF no justifica despido por inidoneidad personal", "title_en": "SUGEF restructuring does not justify dismissal based on personal unsuitability", "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte resolvió un recurso de casación laboral presentado por una extrabajadora de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF), quien alegó que su despido, justificado bajo un proceso de reestructuración institucional, fue en realidad arbitrario e ilegal. La Sala confirmó la sentencia de segunda instancia, declarando la nulidad del despido. El tribunal determinó que, aunque la reestructuración organizacional está permitida por el artículo 192 de la Constitución como excepción al principio de estabilidad laboral, ésta debe ser un proceso objetivo que implique la supresión real de plazas, no la revisión subjetiva de las habilidades y competencias de un funcionario para ajustarlo a nuevos perfiles. En este caso, la trabajadora fue evaluada con pruebas psicométricas y de competencias, y despedida porque sus habilidades 'no se ajustaban a las competencias requeridas' para el nuevo puesto, a pesar de cumplir los requisitos académicos. La Sala consideró que esto constituyó una causal subjetiva de despido encubierta, no autorizada por la ley, y utilizó el proceso de reestructuración como un pretexto para despedir a una abogada y nombrar a otra en su lugar. El fallo ordenó retrotraer los efectos al momento del acto nulo, implicando la reinstalación de la trabajadora con el pago de salarios caídos, menos las sumas ya recibidas por cesantía y otras indemnizaciones.", "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled on a labor appeal filed by a former employee of the General Superintendency of Financial Entities (SUGEF), who claimed her dismissal, justified under an institutional restructuring process, was actually arbitrary and illegal. The Chamber upheld the lower court's ruling, declaring the dismissal null. The court held that, although organizational restructuring is permitted by Article 192 of the Constitution as an exception to the principle of employment stability, it must be an objective process entailing the actual elimination of positions, not the subjective review of an employee's skills and competencies to fit new profiles. In this case, the employee underwent psychometric and competency tests and was dismissed because her skills 'did not match the required competencies' for the new position, despite meeting the academic requirements. The Chamber found this constituted a disguised subjective dismissal ground not authorized by law, and that the restructuring process was used as a pretext to dismiss a lawyer and appoint another in her place. The ruling ordered the effects to be retroacted to the time of the null act, implying the reinstatement of the employee with payment of back wages, minus sums already received as severance and other compensations.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte", "date": "2009", "year": "2009", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "reestructuración institucional", "estabilidad laboral", "despido nulo", "reinstalación", "SUGEF", "causal subjetiva de despido", "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "Sala Segunda de la Corte" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 192", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 41", "law": "Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional" }, { "article": "Art. 188", "law": "Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional" }, { "article": "Art. 81", "law": "Código de Trabajo" }, { "article": "Art. 43", "law": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil" } ], "keywords_es": [ "despido nulo", "reestructuración institucional", "estabilidad laboral", "empleo público", "SUGEF", "Sala Segunda", "reinstalación", "Costa Rica", "desviación de poder", "causal subjetiva de despido", "derecho laboral" ], "keywords_en": [ "null dismissal", "institutional restructuring", "employment stability", "public employment", "SUGEF", "Second Chamber", "reinstatement", "Costa Rica", "abuse of power", "subjective dismissal ground", "labor law" ], "excerpt_es": "Lo anterior significa, que la cesación en su cargo no correspondió a una reestructuración objetiva producto de la cual, su plaza desapareciera, sino a un examen de sus aptitudes y habilidades del que se infiere que el incumplimiento de los nuevos estándares establecidos, motivaron su cese. Tal proceder no está autorizado por el constituyente, pues el resolver de esa forma, es una manera velada por medio de la cual la actora fue despedida en razón de sus condiciones personales, permitiéndose por ese medio, una causal subjetiva de despido no autorizada por la ley ni por la Constitución, con lo que resultó arbitrario e ilegal el despidió de la reclamante, utilizándose el proceso de reestructuración como una excusa o pretexto para cesarla y nombrar en su lugar a otra profesional. Si por principio, los servidores de la Administración Pública están amparados por la estabilidad en el empleo, no es posible admitir que, so pretexto de un proceso de reorganización, se modifiquen los requisitos y condiciones personales con las que el servidor accedió a su puesto, porque por ese medio se abriría un peligroso portillo a la arbitrariedad y a la inseguridad.", "excerpt_en": "The foregoing means that the termination of her position did not correspond to an objective restructuring as a result of which her position disappeared, but rather to an examination of her aptitudes and abilities from which it is inferred that failure to meet the new standards established motivated her dismissal. Such conduct is not authorized by the Constitution, because to rule in that way is a veiled manner by which the plaintiff was dismissed by reason of her personal conditions, thereby allowing a subjective ground for dismissal not authorized by law or the Constitution, rendering the dismissal of the claimant arbitrary and illegal, using the restructuring process as an excuse or pretext to dismiss her and appoint another professional in her place. If, as a principle, public administration servants are protected by employment stability, it is not permissible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, the requirements and personal conditions with which the servant entered his position be modified, because this would open a dangerous gateway to arbitrariness and insecurity.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Annuls dismissal", "label_es": "Anula despido", "summary_en": "The Second Chamber declares the employee's dismissal null, finding that the restructuring at SUGEF was used as a pretext for a dismissal based on personal conditions, upholding the appealed judgment and ordering reinstatement with back pay.", "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda declara nulo el despido de la trabajadora por considerar que la reestructuración en SUGEF fue utilizada como pretexto para un despido basado en condiciones personales, confirmando la sentencia recurrida y ordenando la reinstalación con salarios caídos." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "Reorganizations or restructurings, authorized by the Constitution as an exception to the general principle of employment stability for public officials, refer to a transformation in the organizational structure of the entity, which entails the elimination or change of unnecessary positions to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization of services.", "quote_es": "Las reorganizaciones o reestructuraciones, autorizadas por el constituyente, como excepción al principio general de la estabilidad en el empleo de los funcionarios públicos, refieren a una transformación en la estructura organizacional de la entidad, que motiva la eliminación o el cambio de plazas innecesarias para conseguir una más eficaz y económica reorganización de los servicios." }, { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "It constitutes an objective ground for dismissal distinct from those grounds established in the Labor Code, which address faults committed by the worker or incapacity to perform his duties, for which the employer can validly dismiss him. In no way could it be interpreted that, under the pretext of a reorganization for that purpose, the employee's skills or performance in his position can be examined, since this would mean applying a subjective ground for dismissal, not contemplated in the constitutional norm, within the concept of reorganization.", "quote_es": "Constituye una causal objetiva de despido distinta de aquellas causales establecidas en el Código de Trabajo, que atiende a las faltas cometidas por el trabajador o la incapacidad para la ejecución de sus funciones, por las cuales el patrono puede válidamente despedirlo. En modo alguno se podría interpretar que, so pretexto de una reorganización para alcanzar ese objetivo, se pueda examinar las habilidades o el desempeño del servidor en su puesto, dado que ello significaría aplicar una causal subjetiva de despido, no contemplada en la norma constitucional, dentro del concepto de reorganización." }, { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "Such conduct is not authorized by the Constitution, because to rule in that way is a veiled manner by which the plaintiff was dismissed by reason of her personal conditions, thereby allowing a subjective ground for dismissal not authorized by law or the Constitution.", "quote_es": "Tal proceder no está autorizado por el constituyente, pues el resolver de esa forma, es una manera velada por medio de la cual la actora fue despedida en razón de sus condiciones personales, permitiéndose por ese medio, una causal subjetiva de despido no autorizada por la ley ni por la Constitución." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-129549", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-8045", "norm_num": "", "norm_name": "Código de Trabajo", "tipo_norma": "", "norm_fecha": "" }, { "doc_id": "norm-871", "norm_num": "0", "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949" }, { "doc_id": "norm-8975", "norm_num": "", "norm_name": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "tipo_norma": "", "norm_fecha": "" }, { "doc_id": "norm-9925", "norm_num": "1644", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "26/09/1953" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“ III.- El despido de la demandante fue justificado en un proceso de reestructuración organizacional y del recurso humano de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, aprobado por el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero en la sesión n° 124-99, artículo 6, del 9 de noviembre de 1999 y por la Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica en sesión n° 5014-99, artículo 5, del 12 de noviembre de 1999 (demanda, contestación y prueba n° 6 del expediente administrativo). Como principio fundamental del régimen de empleo público, el numeral 192 constitucional instituyó el denominado “derecho a la estabilidad en el empleo”, el cual ha sido concebido como el derecho del servidor público a conservar su puesto y de perderlo sólo en caso de incurrir en alguna de las causales de despido establecidas por la legislación de trabajo o cuando resulte necesaria una reducción forzosa de servicios por falta de fondos o para lograr una mejor organización del servicio. Respecto de los servidores bancarios, el artículo 41, inciso 6) de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, expresamente les reconoce, los beneficios mínimos contemplados en las leyes de trabajo y de servicio civil de la República, lo que redunda en la aplicación en su favor de los derechos contemplados por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil. El artículo 43 de ese estatuto, establece la remoción de los servidores amparados por esa normativa, únicamente cuando incurrieren en las causales contempladas en el artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo y 41, inciso d), de esa ley, o en actos que impliquen infracción grave de tal normativa, de sus reglamentos, o de los reglamentos interiores de trabajo respectivos. También contempla dicha ley, la posibilidad de remoción en aquellos casos en que resulte necesaria la reducción forzosa de servicios por falta absoluta de fondos; o para conseguir una más eficaz y económica reorganización de los mismos, siempre que esa reorganización afecte por lo menos al 60% de los empleados de la respectiva dependencia. Por otra parte, el “Convenio de Partes suscrito entre el Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus Trabajadores” en el año 1988, en su artículo 24 dispone: “INAMOVILIDAD. Todos los empleados del Banco amparados por contrato de trabajo por tiempo indefinido son inamovibles según lo dispone el artículo 188 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, concepto que debe interpretarse como la garantía de los empleados bancarios a no ser despedidos arbitrariamente...”. Cabe destacar lo dispuesto en la Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República n° 7107 de 4 de noviembre de 1988, publicada en La Gaceta n° 222 del 22 de noviembre de 1988, transitorio anexo 3 de los artículos del Sistema Bancario Nacional, artículo 188, que expresa: “Cada banco del Estado deberá tener un escalafón en el que se les garantice la carrera bancaria a sus funcionarios, así como su inamovilidad y sus ascensos en forma tal que se les asegura el derecho de ascender en dichas instituciones desde la escala inferior hasta poder ocupar las posiciones más elevadas, con base en méritos. Cualquier modificación que lleven a cabo los bancos adecuar sus escalafones regulares a las condiciones imperantes en el momento, no afectará en forma alguna a los empleados que ingresaron con anterioridad…” (lo destacado no es del original). De lo anterior resulta que al ser la estabilidad laboral, una garantía constitucional para el funcionario bancario, los casos específicos de reorganización de servicios en los que se cercene ese derecho, deben ser valorados con absoluta objetividad y apegados a la legalidad. Los procedimientos legales establecidos al efecto deben respetarse y también los derechos de los servidores directa o indirectamente involucrados, de manera que tanto las nuevas formas organizativas propuestas, los criterios para determinar cuáles plazas se mantienen dentro del órgano o entidad y sus condiciones, así como la propuesta sobre los funcionarios que habrán de ser removidos o trasladados, son asuntos que deben manejarse con plena transparencia y objetividad, pues de lo contrario, se estaría abriendo un peligroso portillo a la arbitrariedad, para que sea la voluntad del jerarca -o de los encargados de ejecutar los cambios- la que disponga esos aspectos, aún sin ninguna fundamentación o utilizando mecanismos indebidos o criterios discriminatorios. En esta materia, la Sala Constitucional ha reconocido la constitucionalidad de los procesos de reestructuración en la Administración Pública, en los siguientes términos: “Derecho al trabajo y estabilidad en el empleo. En una relación de empleo público, la proyección del derecho al trabajo protegido por el artículo 56 constitucional contiene como uno de sus postulados a favor del trabajador el de la estabilidad en el puesto. En efecto, no puede desconocerse que ello es lo que permite al servidor acceder a una serie de beneficios sociales y económicos que posibilitan su superación académica y laboral, proporcionándole la seguridad necesaria para su desarrollo personal y del núcleo familiar que de él depende, lo que efectiviza realmente el sentido del derecho al trabajo como garantía individual y obligación con la sociedad, en la expresión utilizada por el texto constitucional. Es por ello que los servidores sólo pueden ser removidos por vía de excepción, ante una causal de despido justificado, o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, siendo uno de los casos precisamente los procesos de reestructuración a que puede someterse una institución, encontrándose esto último, además, en consonancia con los principios que se derivan del artículo 192 de la Constitución Política. Ahora bien, el sometimiento a un proceso legítimo de modernización, que garantice la óptima utilización de los fondos públicos y la más alta eficiencia en la prestación de los servicios encomendados a una institución, es, desde luego, un motivo legítimo para ejecutar cambios organizacionales que, en la mayoría de los casos, irremediablemente conllevan la supresión de determinadas plazas. Pero justamente por ser una excepción a la garantía constitucional de estabilidad para el trabajador, su aplicación por parte de la administración debe ser ejecutada con absoluta objetividad, transparencia y seriedad, y de ahí la exigencia de estudios técnicos calificados que puedan validar la toma de decisiones, con base en un modelo coherente y efectivo. Bajo este orden de ideas, esta Sala admite que si la nueva estructura no puede dar cabida a la reubicación de un funcionario, toda vez que las funciones sustantivas que venía desempeñando desaparecen, por suprimirse en atención a criterios de eficiencia y modernización, es legítimo su cese con apego a la disposición constitucional comentada”. (Lo destacado no es del original) (voto de la Sala Constitucional n° 4951-2000 de las 16:37 horas del 27 de junio de 2000). Sobre el mismo tema esa Sala también indicó: “Como lo ha indicado la Sala en reiterados pronunciamientos, el artículo 192 de la Constitución Política faculta a la Administración Pública para disponer la reestructuración de las diversas dependencias que la componen, con el fin de alcanzar un mejor desempeño y organización de las mismas, para lo cual podrá ordenar no sólo la eliminación y recalificación de plazas, sino el traslado de los funcionarios. La autorización que brinda el ordenamiento para prescindir de los servicios de un funcionario público por motivo de reestructuración implica necesariamente que el puesto, considerado en sí mismo, sea dispensable en la estructura vigente y además de imposible integración en la nueva organización institucional. De manera que el Estado podrá poner en práctica su facultad de trasladar o despedir forzosamente a sus funcionarios por razones de reorganización, siempre y cuando ésta se fundamente en la necesidad real -debidamente comprobada- de mejorar el servicio público y respete el procedimiento establecido a tal efecto. En todo caso, y para hacer efectiva la tutela de los derechos de los administrados, la jurisdicción constitucional de libertad está legitimada para revisar si la figura de la reestructuración es utilizada para encubrir despidos que se realizan por motivos ajenos a los meramente organizacionales. Esto con el objetivo de evitar que la necesidad de reorganización y modernización del Estado sirva para eximir a la Administración de su elemental obligación de actuar siempre en respeto de los derechos y libertades que el Estado Social de Derecho reconoce a los individuos”. (El subrayado es del redactor) (votos de la Sala Constitucional n°s 1846, de las 14:57 horas del 29 de febrero; 2496, de las 17:39 horas del 21 de marzo; 4951, de las 16:37 horas del 27 de junio y 5783, de las 16:01 horas del 11 de julio todas del año 2000). Lo anterior establece el alcance que ha de dársele al concepto de “reorganización” o “reestructuración”, con que la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras despidió a la actora. Las reorganizaciones o reestructuraciones, autorizadas por el constituyente, como excepción al principio general de la estabilidad en el empleo de los funcionarios públicos, refieren a una transformación en la estructura organizacional de la entidad, que motiva la eliminación o el cambio de plazas innecesarias para conseguir una más eficaz y económica reorganización de los servicios. Constituye una causal objetiva de despido distinta de aquellas causales establecidas en el Código de Trabajo, que atiende a las faltas cometidas por el trabajador o la incapacidad para la ejecución de sus funciones, por las cuales el patrono puede válidamente despedirlo. En modo alguno se podría interpretar que, so pretexto de una reorganización para alcanzar ese objetivo, se pueda examinar las habilidades o el desempeño del servidor en su puesto, dado que ello significaría aplicar una causal subjetiva de despido, no contemplada en la norma constitucional, dentro del concepto de reorganización. En varios recursos de amparo interpuestos por funcionarios del Banco demandado, en relación con el proceso de reestructuración objeto de estudio, la Sala Constitucional se pronunció en estos términos: “Por otra parte, analizada la relación de hechos consignada en el considerando II, se observa que el proceso de reestructuración de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras se fundamenta en estudios técnicos realizados por empresas consultoras especializadas en la materia, y tiene como finalidad garantizar la eficiencia del servicio público y la mejor utilización de los recursos públicos. Además, la decisión de ejecutar un plan de modernización fue comunicada con antelación a los funcionarios públicos afectados, a fin de que adoptaran las medidas que estimaran pertinentes. Finalmente, el proceso de reestructuración fue debida y oportunamente aprobado por las instancias competentes a tal efecto, a saber, el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero y la Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica. En consecuencia, tampoco se observa que la amenaza de despido de los amparados provenga de una actuación intempestiva o arbitraria de parte de la Administración” (voto n° 2000-1846, de las 14:57 horas del 29 de febrero de 2000). En los votos 3136, de las 10:52 horas del 14 de abril; 4362, de las 12:21 horas del 19 de mayo y 11357, de las 10:08 horas del 20 de diciembre, todos del año 2000, la Sala Constitucional declaró sin lugar sendos recursos de amparo en los que la actora figuraba como recurrente, y en el último de ellos señaló: “En considerable cantidad de amparos, la Sala Constitucional ha tenido la oportunidad de pronunciarse sobre el procedimiento de reestructuración en la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, su corrección desde el punto de vista formal y declarar que en sí mismo ese proceso no viola los derechos fundamentales de los servidores públicos. Obviamente, en esa forma de resolver no se prejuzga, como no era procedente, sobre los impactos individuales que se puedan dar con la aplicación de los parámetros reformadores que han sido aprobados. Recuérdese que esta reestructuración está fundamentada e íntimamente ligada con los precedentes de la efectuada en el Banco Central de Costa Rica, que de alguna manera esta Sala avaló. Siendo esta la base a partir de la cual se procede a la aplicación individual de los mecanismos revisores del personal preexistente, para declarar si se conforman o no con los principios y valores que informan la reestructuración, como por ejemplo, si las personas involucradas llenan a satisfacción el perfil aprobado y si obtienen o no las calificaciones mínimas exigidas a partir de la aplicación de criterios objetivos y sustancialmente iguales para todos los servidores, esos mecanismos resultan ser aspectos de legalidad que no pueden ser examinados en la vía del control de constitucionalidad. Esta conclusión es a la que llega la Sala no sin antes advertir que a esta regla general se aplicaría, por excepción, los errores gruesos y la arbitrariedad evidente que conduzcan a casos patológicos de desviación de poder. Sin embargo, en el presente asunto no encuentra la Sala que los hechos conduzcan a tal calificación. En efecto, lo que la amparada alega es la forma como se la evaluó y calificó, lo que según se afirma en el recurso, \"es el resultado de la confrontación de perfiles reales con los ideales del proyecto, a partir de las evaluaciones, entre otros aspectos, de las aptitudes intelectuales, del pensamiento crítico, del razonamiento lógico-abstracto, del razonamiento verbal, de los factores de personalidad, dominio, control racional, confianza en sí, sociabilidad, confiabilidad, formación, experiencia, idiomas extranjeros (inglés)\". Si el resultado, en el caso de la recurrente, fue una calificación insuficiente para ubicarse en la categoría pretendida, si la evaluación o calificación fue correcta o incorrecta, si la aplicación de los criterios objetivos en los que se funda la evaluación se hizo con fundamento científico o no, son aspectos de legalidad ordinaria que esta Sala no puede entrar a revisar… y este Tribunal no está para controlar la aplicación de la legislación a un caso concreto, como ha quedado dicho, salvo la desviación de poder que pudiera resultar en la infracción de derechos fundamentales, que no se advierte en el caso concreto”. De modo que en el caso de la actora no se puede considerar, que la validez del procedimiento de su despido haya sido avalado por la Sala Constitucional. Este despacho judicial al igual que aquella Sala ha reconocido la legalidad en la Administración Pública de los procesos de reestructuración, lo que la Constitucional declaró respecto de la reestructuración llevada a cabo en la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras y avala esta Sala, por no ser atendibles los reparos de la actora en cuanto señaló que las pruebas aplicadas en el proceso de reestructuración no cumplían parámetros mínimos de confiabilidad y acusó que no se valoró la experiencia acumulada, la habilidad técnica, el nivel académico ni el desempeño, por cuanto tales afirmaciones no han sido acreditadas, más bien, de la documental constante en autos se desprende que sí se tuvieron en cuenta factores como los indicados por la actora (véanse las pruebas números 17, 26 y anexos 19 y 20 del expediente administrativo). Por su parte, el Colegio Profesional de Psicólogos de Costa Rica, cuya intervención solicitó el sindicato (folios 185 a 187) manifestó que no había encontrado anomalía alguna en la actuación de las profesionales encargadas de desarrollar el proceso (folios 170 y 171), y la accionada en cuanto a los test o pruebas aplicadas reconoció -en su recurso de amparo n° 99-009337-0007-CO-, que estas fueron adaptadas al medio nacional (prueba número 39 del expediente administrativo). De la documental aportada números 26, 32, 33 y anexos 19 y 20 del expediente administrativo, se desprende que la actora tuvo acceso al resultado de las pruebas realizadas y estuvo en la posibilidad de discutirlas, con auxilio de un profesional en la materia (véase también pruebas números 35, 36 y anexos 23 y 24 del citado expediente). De igual forma, de la documental numerada como prueba del 16A al 16F se extrae que sí se mantuvo comunicación con los empleados en relación con el proceso y que la experiencia laboral fue valorada. También se dio información de los elementos evaluados y sobre la interpretación de las pruebas (documental rotulada como prueba número 23 y anexos 20 a 22 del expediente citado). Luego, de la prueba identificada con el número 15 del expediente administrativo, se extrae que los trabajadores fueron debidamente informados de que el proceso podía concluir en despidos con responsabilidad patronal. Además, consta en autos que todo el personal de la estructura ocupacional de la SUGEF incluida la Asesoría Jurídica, estuvo sujeto al plan de reestructuración organizacional y de recurso humano de esa dependencia, y por ende sumido en las pruebas de evaluación académica, sicológica y conductual, así como de aptitud intelectual, de personalidad y de estilo de trabajo a que fue sometido todo el personal incluida la demandante, evaluación con la cual se determinaba si se cumplía o no con los nuevos perfiles y requisitos para los distintos puestos. Sin embargo, lo que compete en el sublite para resolver este asunto, es analizar la legalidad del despido concreto de la trabajadora.\n\n IV.- En el caso que nos ocupa, la cesación de la demandante se justificó como se dijo, en la existencia del proceso de reestructuración que se daba en la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Dicha reestructuración tuvo como objetivos principales los siguientes: “Introducir los ajustes necesarios al esquema organizacional conforme a los requerimientos del enfoque de supervisión basado en riesgos. / Establecer una organización que permita una asignación clara de responsabilidades, la especialización de las funciones y una capacidad de respuesta oportuna frente a las necesidades y la evolución del Sistema Financiero Nacional. / Integrar los procesos de supervisión mediante una adecuada supervisión coordinación y comunicación entre las diferentes áreas de la SUGEF. / Procurar el uso racional de los recursos humanos y financieros destinados a la fiscalización de las entidades...” (anexo 13 del expediente administrativo). De la nota remitida a la actora, se desprenden las razones que motivaron su despido. En esa comunicación se le indicó:\n\n“En mi condición de jerarca administrativo de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras me corresponde implementar la restructuración aprobada, la cual como primera etapa consistió en una evaluación de las habilidades competenciales de cada funcionario, para cada uno de los puestos, en razón de que cada uno de los mismos requiere distintos grados de pensamiento crítico, razonamiento lógico, razonamiento verbal, estilo de trabajo/dirección y factores de personalidad. / La segunda etapa consistió en la evaluación del personal a través de un ranking forzado. Se solicitó a los superiores inmediatos de cada uno de los funcionarios que realizaran una evaluación integral de su personal, en la que tomaran en cuenta tanto sus destrezas técnicas como sus habilidades competenciales. De esta forma se valoró la iniciativa, comunicación escrita, manejo del tiempo, planificación, programación y control, solución de problemas, toma de decisiones y destreza técnica. / La tercera etapa consistió en la evaluación del personal de esta entidad, a través de diferentes instrumentos que permitieran valorar el cumplimiento por parte de dichos funcionarios de los nuevos requisitos establecidos en relación con la formación académica y experiencia profesional. / A partir de estas evaluaciones y de sus resultados, he debido tomar decisiones en relación con su permanencia en esta organización. De conformidad con las evaluaciones llevadas a cabo, usted cuenta con los requisitos académicos para desempeñar el cargo de Profesional en Gestión Bancaria 3, de la Dirección General de Asesoría Jurídica, no obstante, las evaluaciones de competencia indican que sus habilidades no se ajustan a las competencias requeridas para desempeñar dicho cargo. Asimismo, confrontando su perfil con otros puestos de la nueva estructura, no fue posible su reubicación a lo interno de esta entidad” (anexo 11 y prueba n° 4 del expediente administrativo). (La negrilla y subrayado son del redactor).\n\n \n\n Se observa de la documentación trascrita que la trabajadora fue cesada, luego de que le fueron valorados los siguientes puntos: 1) sus habilidades en el puesto en aspectos tales como pensamiento crítico, razonamiento lógico, razonamiento verbal, estilo de trabajo/dirección y factores de personalidad; 2) la evaluación que realizara su superior en relación con capacidades tales como iniciativa, comunicación escrita, manejo del tiempo, planificación, solución de problemas, toma de decisiones, etc. y por último, 3) el cumplimiento de los nuevos requisitos establecidos en relación con la formación académica y experiencia profesional. A la actora se le comunicó que cumplía con los requisitos académicos establecidos para el cargo de Profesional en Gestión Bancaria 3; sin embargo, se le despidió porque de acuerdo con las otras evaluaciones realizadas carece de las habilidades requeridas para desempeñarse en ese puesto. Lo anterior significa, que la cesación en su cargo no correspondió a una reestructuración objetiva producto de la cual, su plaza desapareciera, sino a un examen de sus aptitudes y habilidades del que se infiere que el incumplimiento de los nuevos estándares establecidos, motivaron su cese. Tal proceder no está autorizado por el constituyente, pues el resolver de esa forma, es una manera velada por medio de la cual la actora fue despedida en razón de sus condiciones personales, permitiéndose por ese medio, una causal subjetiva de despido no autorizada por la ley ni por la Constitución, con lo que resultó arbitrario e ilegal el despidió de la reclamante, utilizándose el proceso de reestructuración como una excusa o pretexto para cesarla y nombrar en su lugar a otra profesional. Si por principio, los servidores de la Administración Pública están amparados por la estabilidad en el empleo, no es posible admitir que, so pretexto de un proceso de reorganización, se modifiquen los requisitos y condiciones personales con las que el servidor accedió a su puesto, porque por ese medio se abriría un peligroso portillo a la arbitrariedad y a la inseguridad. En este sentido se debe mencionar que el artículo 47 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, al referirse al despido por reorganización, señala que al prescindir de los servidores, se atenderán criterios tales como eficiencia, antigüedad, carácter, conducta, aptitudes y demás condiciones que resulten de la calificación de los servicios, lo cual se entiende, para el supuesto en que se conserven ciertas plazas de una misma categoría que se elimina. Mas el caso en estudio es diferente, porque lo que operó en la especie fue una revaloración de las aptitudes y habilidades con las cuales la actora fue admitida y nombrada en su cargo; revaloración que se realizó con cánones distintos a aquellos con los que fue inicialmente contratada y los que, al no cumplir, motivaron su cesación. Debe quedar claro que el derecho a la estabilidad de los funcionarios públicos, sólo puede ser eliminado, por las causales expresamente señaladas en la ley, pues no le está permitido a ninguna entidad pública realizar procesos de reorganización que concluyan con despidos, apartándose de la normativa constitucional y legal. Como reestructuración solo puede calificarse la contemplada en la norma constitucional y desarrollada en los incisos a) y b) del artículo 47 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, y no cualquier otro proceso. Los llamados procesos de modernización o las revisiones de las estructuras de personal, pueden denominarse de muy diversas maneras, llámense recalificación laboral, reingeniería, reestructuración, estrategias transicionales, rearquitectura organizacional, rediseño estructural, aplanamiento orgánico, reversión laboral, reinvención estructural. Todas esas medidas que tiendan a reducir costos, invocando eficiencia, deben realizarse conforme a la Constitución y a la ley, y no pueden de ningún modo convertirse en un mecanismo para revisar actos de nombramiento que se han realizado de manera legal muchos años antes. El ordenamiento jurídico permite que las entidades públicas impongan nuevos requisitos a los puestos, exijan nuevos perfiles y con base en ello, contraten al personal idóneo para ocuparlos, sin perjuicio de los derechos de quienes ocupen esos puestos. En los votos de la Sala Constitucional citados, dictados por esa Sala con ocasión de recursos de amparo interpuestos por funcionarios de la SUGEF, contra esa institución, se advierte que la actora también recurrió en esa vía, el proceso de reestructuración que finalmente culminó con su despido. Sin embargo, tales acciones de amparo fueron rechazadas, entre otras por las siguientes razones:\n\n“En el caso concreto, aparte de las anteriores consideraciones, no puede obviarse que apenas se está ejecutando el proceso de reestructuración en la SUGEF, cuya finalización fue acordada para el 30 de junio del 2000 (independientemente en cuál sesión se emitió este acuerdo), y que no se acredita en autos que la amparada sea de las personas que van a ser destituidas, pues existe además el compromiso institucional de que previo a tomar ese tipo de decisión se procurará la reubicación en otro puesto dentro del mismo Órgano, en el Banco Central de Costa Rica, o en cualquiera de los otros Órganos de Desconcentración Máxima del ente emisor. Asimismo, entiende Sala por haberlo manifestado así expresamente el informante, que las pruebas hasta el momento realizadas no se constituirán más que en otro elemento adicional a considerar junto a la formación académica, la experiencia profesional y el conocimiento del idioma inglés, de forma tal que el hecho de no haber resultado \"calificado\" de conformidad con las mismas, no es determinante a efecto de una decisión de despido en su contra, según ha indicado bajo juramento -con las consecuencias hasta de índole penal que contempla la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional en caso de afirmar inexactitudes o falsedades a este Tribunal- el Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras. En esta tesitura, estima la Sala que en estos momentos la presentación de este amparo resulta prematura, habida cuenta que no pende en perjuicio de la amparada ninguna amenaza cierta e inminente de ser despedida sin respeto de sus derechos fundamentales, (…) Lejos de ello, las pruebas que se les ha estado aplicando a todo el personal de la SUGEF se constituirán en un parámetro objetivo a ser utilizado por el jerarca a fin de tomar decisiones ulteriores en relación con el personal que definitivamente permanecerá en ese Órgano, conjuntamente con otros como el récord académico y profesional de cada servidor y la evaluación del jefe inmediato...” (voto de la Sala Constitucional n° 1856-00, de las 15:07 horas del 29 de febrero, citado por el n° 3136, de las 10:52 horas del 14 de abril ambos de 2000).\n\n \n\n De conformidad con las razones expuestas, en atención a los concretos agravios planteados por la recurrente, bien podría decirse que el ad-quem incurrió en una errónea e inadecuada valoración de la prueba al cuestionar en términos generales la validez y legalidad del proceso de reestructuración, mas no así al señalar que el despido de la demandante fue ilegítimo por arbitrario e ilegal, pues como se dijo se le removió después de examinar sus condiciones personales y determinarse que no cumplía con los requisitos del puesto, según un nuevo perfil establecido por el propio empleador, para nombrar en su lugar a otra abogada. Consecuentemente, estimamos nulo el despido del que fue objeto la actora y al estar en presencia de un despido nulo, los efectos de esa declaratoria deben retrotraerse al momento o fecha de dicho acto, de manera que las cosas deben volver al estado en que se encontraban antes de su emisión. En consecuencia, se debe confirmar la sentencia recurrida, puntualizando que al monto que sea en corresponderle a la demandante se le deberán rebajar las sumas canceladas por preaviso, auxilio de cesantía y demás indemnizaciones recibidas por ella (anexo 12 del expediente administrativo), así como cualesquier otro rubro que por concepto de salario haya recibido con posterioridad a esa liquidación. Sobre los montos a pagar por tal concepto deberá también hacerse el rebajo de las cargas sociales.”", "body_en_text": "III.- The dismissal of the plaintiff was justified by an organizational and human-resource restructuring (reestructuración) process at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero in session No. 124-99, article 6, of November 9, 1999, and by the Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica in session No. 5014-99, article 5, of November 12, 1999 (complaint, answer, and evidence No. 6 of the administrative file). As a fundamental principle of the public employment regime, Article 192 of the Constitution established the so-called “right to employment stability (estabilidad en el empleo),” which has been conceived as the right of the public servant to retain their position and to lose it only in the event of incurring any of the grounds for dismissal established by labor legislation or when a forced reduction of services becomes necessary due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the service. Regarding bank servants, Article 41, subsection 6) of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional expressly recognizes for them the minimum benefits contemplated in the labor and civil service laws of the Republic, which results in the application in their favor of the rights contemplated by the Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Article 43 of that statute establishes the removal of servants covered by that regulation only when they incur the grounds contemplated in Article 81 of the Código de Trabajo and 41, subsection d), of that law, or in acts that imply a serious infraction of such regulation, its regulations, or the respective internal work regulations. Said law also contemplates the possibility of removal in those cases where a forced reduction of services becomes necessary due to an absolute lack of funds, or to achieve a more effective and economical reorganization (reorganización) of the same, provided that said reorganization affects at least 60% of the employees of the respective unit. On the other hand, the “Convenio de Partes signed between the Banco Central de Costa Rica and its Workers” in 1988, in its Article 24, provides: “INAMOVILIDAD. All employees of the Bank covered by an indefinite-term employment contract are inamovibles (irremovable) as provided in Article 188 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, a concept that must be interpreted as the guarantee of bank employees not to be arbitrarily dismissed…”. It is worth noting the provisions of the Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República No. 7107 of November 4, 1988, published in La Gaceta No. 222 of November 22, 1988, transitory annex 3 of the articles of the Sistema Bancario Nacional, Article 188, which states: “Each State bank must have a career ladder (escalafón) in which the banking career is guaranteed to its officials, as well as their inamovilidad (irremovability) and their promotions in such a way that the right to ascend in said institutions is ensured, from the lowest level to being able to occupy the highest positions, based on merit. Any modification carried out by the banks to adapt their regular career ladders to the prevailing conditions at the time shall not affect in any way the employees who entered previously…” (the highlighted portion is not from the original). From the foregoing, it follows that since employment stability is a constitutional guarantee for the bank official, specific cases of reorganization of services in which that right is curtailed must be assessed with absolute objectivity and in compliance with legality. The legal procedures established for this purpose must be respected, as well as the rights of the servants directly or indirectly involved, so that both the proposed new organizational forms, the criteria for determining which positions are maintained within the body or entity and their conditions, as well as the proposal regarding the officials to be removed or transferred, are matters that must be handled with full transparency and objectivity, otherwise a dangerous loophole to arbitrariness would be opened, so that the will of the hierarch—or of those in charge of executing the changes—disposes of those aspects, even without any foundation or using improper mechanisms or discriminatory criteria.\n\nIn this matter, the Sala Constitucional has recognized the constitutionality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, in the following terms: “Right to work and employment stability. In a public employment relationship, the projection of the right to work protected by Article 56 of the Constitution contains as one of its postulates in favor of the worker that of stability in the position. Indeed, it cannot be ignored that this is what allows the servant to access a series of social and economic benefits that enable their academic and labor advancement, providing them with the necessary security for their personal development and that of the family nucleus that depends on them, which truly realizes the meaning of the right to work as an individual guarantee and obligation to society, in the expression used by the constitutional text. That is why servants can only be removed by way of exception, before a cause for justified dismissal, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, one of the cases being precisely the restructuring processes to which an institution may be subjected, the latter being, moreover, in line with the principles derived from Article 192 of the Political Constitution. Now, submission to a legitimate modernization process, which guarantees the optimal use of public funds and the highest efficiency in the provision of the services entrusted to an institution, is, of course, a legitimate reason to execute organizational changes that, in most cases, inevitably entail the suppression of certain positions. But precisely because it is an exception to the constitutional guarantee of stability for the worker, its application by the administration must be executed with absolute objectivity, transparency, and seriousness, and hence the requirement for qualified technical studies that can validate decision-making, based on a coherent and effective model. Under this order of ideas, this Chamber admits that if the new structure cannot accommodate the relocation of an official, since the substantive functions they had been performing disappear, being suppressed in response to efficiency and modernization criteria, their termination is legitimate in compliance with the commented constitutional provision.” (The highlighted portion is not from the original) (Vote of the Sala Constitucional No. 4951-2000 of 4:37 p.m. on June 27, 2000).\n\nOn the same topic, that Chamber also indicated: “As the Chamber has indicated in repeated pronouncements, Article 192 of the Political Constitution empowers the Public Administration to arrange the restructuring of the various units that compose it, in order to achieve better performance and organization thereof, for which it may order not only the elimination and reclassification of positions, but also the transfer of officials. The authorization provided by the legal system to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is dispensable in the current structure and also impossible to integrate into the new institutional organization. Thus, the State may implement its power to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reorganization reasons, provided that it is based on the real need—duly proven—to improve public service and respects the procedure established for that purpose. In any case, and to make effective the protection of the rights of the administered parties, the constitutional jurisdiction of liberty is legitimized to review whether the figure of restructuring is used to conceal dismissals carried out for reasons alien to the purely organizational ones. This is with the objective of preventing the need for reorganization and modernization of the State from serving to exempt the Administration from its elementary obligation to always act in respect of the rights and freedoms that the Social State of Law recognizes to individuals.” (The underline is from the drafter) (Votes of the Sala Constitucional Nos. 1846, of 2:57 p.m. on February 29; 2496, of 5:39 p.m. on March 21; 4951, of 4:37 p.m. on June 27; and 5783, of 4:01 p.m. on July 11, all of the year 2000).\n\nThe foregoing establishes the scope to be given to the concept of “reorganization” or “restructuring” with which the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras dismissed the plaintiff. Reorganizations or restructurings, authorized by the constituent power, as an exception to the general principle of employment stability for public officials, refer to a transformation in the organizational structure of the entity that motivates the elimination or change of unnecessary positions to achieve a more effective and economical reorganization of services. It constitutes an objective ground for dismissal distinct from those grounds established in the Código de Trabajo, which address faults committed by the worker or incapacity to perform their functions, for which the employer can validly dismiss them. In no way could it be interpreted that, under the pretext of a reorganization to achieve that objective, the skills or performance of the servant in their position could be examined, given that this would mean applying a subjective ground for dismissal, not contemplated in the constitutional norm, within the concept of reorganization.\n\nIn several amparo appeals filed by officials of the defendant Bank, in relation to the restructuring process under study, the Sala Constitucional ruled in these terms: “On the other hand, analyzing the relation of facts set forth in Considerando II, it is observed that the restructuring process of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras is based on technical studies carried out by consulting firms specialized in the matter, and its purpose is to guarantee the efficiency of the public service and the better use of public resources. Furthermore, the decision to execute a modernization plan was communicated in advance to the affected public officials, so that they could adopt the measures they deemed pertinent. Finally, the restructuring process was duly and timely approved by the competent instances for this purpose, namely, the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero and the Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica. Consequently, it is also not observed that the threat of dismissal of the amparo-protected parties comes from an untimely or arbitrary action on the part of the Administration” (Vote No. 2000-1846, of 2:57 p.m. on February 29, 2000). In votes 3136, of 10:52 a.m. on April 14; 4362, of 12:21 p.m. on May 19; and 11357, of 10:08 a.m. on December 20, all of the year 2000, the Sala Constitucional dismissed several amparo appeals in which the plaintiff appeared as appellant, and in the last of them, it pointed out: “In a considerable number of amparos, the Sala Constitucional has had the opportunity to rule on the restructuring procedure at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, its correctness from a formal standpoint, and to declare that in itself that process does not violate the fundamental rights of public servants. Obviously, in that manner of resolving, no prejudgment is made, as was not appropriate, regarding the individual impacts that may occur with the application of the reforming parameters that have been approved. It should be remembered that this restructuring is based upon and intimately linked to the precedents of the one carried out at the Banco Central de Costa Rica, which this Chamber in some way endorsed. This being the basis from which the individual application of the review mechanisms for the pre-existing personnel proceeds, to declare whether or not they conform to the principles and values that inform the restructuring, such as, for example, whether the persons involved satisfactorily fill the approved profile and whether or not they obtain the minimum qualifications required from the application of objective criteria that are substantially equal for all servants, those mechanisms turn out to be aspects of legality that cannot be examined through the channel of constitutionality control. This conclusion is reached by the Chamber not without first warning that this general rule would apply, by exception, gross errors and evident arbitrariness leading to pathological cases of deviation of power. However, in the present matter, the Chamber does not find that the facts lead to such a qualification. Indeed, what the amparo-protected party alleges is the way she was evaluated and graded, which, as stated in the appeal, \\“is the result of the comparison of real profiles with the ideal ones of the project, based on the evaluations, among other aspects, of intellectual aptitudes, critical thinking, logical-abstract reasoning, verbal reasoning, personality factors, dominance, rational control, self-confidence, sociability, reliability, training, experience, foreign languages (English)\\\". If the result, in the appellant's case, was an insufficient grade to place herself in the intended category, whether the evaluation or grading was correct or incorrect, whether the application of the objective criteria on which the evaluation is based was done with scientific foundation or not, are ordinary legality aspects that this Chamber cannot review… and this Court is not there to control the application of legislation to a specific case, as stated, except for deviation of power that could result in the infringement of fundamental rights, which is not noted in the specific case.” Thus, in the case of the plaintiff, it cannot be considered that the validity of the procedure for her dismissal was endorsed by the Sala Constitucional.\n\nThis judicial office, like that Chamber, has recognized the legality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, which the Constitutional Chamber declared regarding the restructuring carried out at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and this Chamber endorses, since the plaintiff's objections are not tenable in that she pointed out that the tests applied in the restructuring process did not meet minimum reliability parameters and she alleged that accumulated experience, technical skill, academic level, and performance were not assessed, because such affirmations have not been accredited; rather, from the documentary evidence on file, it can be deduced that factors such as those indicated by the plaintiff were taken into account (see evidence numbers 17, 26, and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file). For its part, the Colegio Profesional de Psicólogos de Costa Rica, whose intervention was requested by the union (folios 185 to 187), stated that it had found no anomaly in the performance of the professionals in charge of developing the process (folios 170 and 171), and the defendant, regarding the tests applied, acknowledged—in its amparo appeal No. 99-009337-0007-CO—that these were adapted to the national context (evidence number 39 of the administrative file). From the documentary evidence provided, numbers 26, 32, 33, and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file, it can be deduced that the plaintiff had access to the results of the tests carried out and was able to discuss them, with the assistance of a professional in the field (see also evidence numbers 35, 36, and annexes 23 and 24 of the cited file). Likewise, from the documentary evidence numbered as proof 16A to 16F, it is extracted that communication was indeed maintained with the employees regarding the process and that work experience was assessed. Information was also provided on the evaluated elements and the interpretation of the tests (documentary evidence labeled as proof number 23 and annexes 20 to 22 of the cited file). Then, from the evidence identified with number 15 of the administrative file, it is extracted that the workers were duly informed that the process could result in dismissals with employer liability. Furthermore, it is on record that all personnel of the occupational structure of SUGEF, including the Asesoría Jurídica, were subject to the organizational and human-resource restructuring plan of that unit, and therefore underwent the academic, psychological, and behavioral evaluation tests, as well as those for intellectual aptitude, personality, and work style, to which all personnel, including the plaintiff, were submitted, an evaluation with which it was determined whether or not the new profiles and requirements for the different positions were met. However, what is relevant in the sub-lite case to resolve this matter is to analyze the legality of the specific dismissal of the worker.\n\nIV.- In the case at hand, the termination of the plaintiff was justified, as stated, by the existence of the restructuring process taking place at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Said restructuring had the following main objectives: “Introduce the necessary adjustments to the organizational scheme in accordance with the requirements of the risk-based supervision approach. / Establish an organization that allows a clear assignment of responsibilities, specialization of functions, and a capacity for timely response to the needs and evolution of the Sistema Financiero Nacional. / Integrate the supervision processes through adequate coordination and communication between the different areas of SUGEF. / Seek the rational use of human and financial resources destined for the oversight of the entities...” (annex 13 of the administrative file). From the note sent to the plaintiff, the reasons that motivated her dismissal can be deduced. In that communication, she was informed:\n\n“In my capacity as administrative hierarch of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, it is my responsibility to implement the approved restructuring, which as a first stage consisted of an evaluation of the competency skills of each official, for each of the positions, because each one requires different degrees of critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/leadership style, and personality factors. / The second stage consisted of the evaluation of personnel through a forced ranking. The immediate superiors of each of the officials were asked to carry out an integral evaluation of their personnel, taking into account both their technical skills and their competency skills. In this way, initiative, written communication, time management, planning, programming and control, problem-solving, decision-making, and technical skill were assessed. / The third stage consisted of the evaluation of the personnel of this entity, through different instruments that would allow assessing the compliance of said officials with the new requirements established in relation to academic training and professional experience. / Based on these evaluations and their results, I have had to make decisions regarding your permanence in this organization. In accordance with the evaluations carried out, you meet the academic requirements to hold the position of Profesional en Gestión Bancaria 3, of the Dirección General de Asesoría Jurídica, however, the competence evaluations indicate that your skills do not adjust to the competencies required to perform that position. Likewise, comparing your profile with other positions in the new structure, it was not possible to relocate you internally within this entity” (annex 11 and evidence No. 4 of the administrative file). (The bold and underline are from the drafter).\n\nIt is observed from the transcribed documentation that the worker was terminated after the following points were assessed: 1) her skills in the position in aspects such as critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/leadership style, and personality factors; 2) the evaluation carried out by her superior in relation to capabilities such as initiative, written communication, time management, planning, problem-solving, decision-making, etc.; and finally, 3) compliance with the new requirements established in relation to academic training and professional experience. The plaintiff was informed that she met the academic requirements established for the position of Profesional en Gestión Bancaria 3; however, she was dismissed because, according to the other evaluations carried out, she lacked the skills required to perform in that position. The foregoing means that her termination from her position did not correspond to an objective restructuring as a result of which her position disappeared, but rather to an examination of her aptitudes and skills from which it is inferred that non-compliance with the newly established standards motivated her termination. Such a course of action is not authorized by the constituent power, since resolving in that way is a veiled manner by which the plaintiff was dismissed based on her personal conditions, thereby permitting a subjective ground for dismissal not authorized by law or by the Constitution, with the result that the dismissal of the claimant was arbitrary and illegal, the restructuring process being used as an excuse or pretext to terminate her and appoint another professional in her place. If, in principle, servants of the Public Administration are protected by employment stability, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, the requirements and personal conditions with which the servant accessed their position be modified, because through that means a dangerous loophole to arbitrariness and insecurity would be opened. In this sense, it must be mentioned that Article 47 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil, when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, points out that when dispensing with servants, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions resulting from the evaluation of services shall be considered, which is understood for the case where certain positions of the same category being eliminated are retained. But the case under study is different, because what operated in this instance was a reassessment of the aptitudes and skills with which the plaintiff was admitted and appointed to her position; a reassessment that was carried out with standards different from those with which she was initially hired, and which, upon not being met, motivated her termination. It must be clear that the right to stability of public officials can only be eliminated by the grounds expressly indicated in the law, since no public entity is permitted to carry out reorganization processes that conclude in dismissals, departing from constitutional and legal regulations. Only the process contemplated in the constitutional norm and developed in subsections a) and b) of Article 47 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil can be qualified as restructuring, and not any other process. The so-called modernization processes or reviews of personnel structures can be named in many different ways, let them be called labor reclassification, reengineering, restructuring, transitional strategies, organizational rearchitecture, structural redesign, organizational flattening, labor reversal, structural reinvention. All those measures that tend to reduce costs, invoking efficiency, must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and can in no way become a mechanism to review appointment acts that were performed legally many years earlier. The legal system allows public entities to impose new requirements on positions, demand new profiles, and based on that, hire the suitable personnel to fill them, without prejudice to the rights of those who occupy those positions. In the cited votes of the Sala Constitucional, issued by that Chamber on the occasion of amparo appeals filed by SUGEF officials against that institution, it is noted that the plaintiff also appealed through that channel against the restructuring process that ultimately culminated in her dismissal. However, such amparo actions were rejected, among other reasons, for the following:\n\n“In the specific case, apart from the previous considerations, it cannot be overlooked that the restructuring process at SUGEF is barely being executed, the completion of which was agreed for June 30, 2000 (regardless of in which session this agreement was issued), and that it is not accredited in the file that the amparo-protected party is one of the persons who are going to be dismissed, since there is also the institutional commitment that, prior to making that type of decision, relocation in another position within the same Body, in the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or in any of the other Maximum Decentralization Bodies of the issuing entity will be sought. Likewise, the Chamber understands—because the informant expressly stated so—that the tests carried out so far will constitute nothing more than another additional element to consider together with academic training, professional experience, and knowledge of the English language, so that the fact of not having been \\\"qualified\\\" according to said tests is not determinative for the purpose of a dismissal decision against her, as indicated under oath—with consequences including criminal ones contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional in case of affirming inaccuracies or falsehoods to this Court—by the Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras. In this context, the Chamber considers that at this moment the filing of this amparo is premature, given that no certain and imminent threat of being dismissed without respect for her fundamental rights hangs over the amparo-protected party, (…) Far from it, the tests that have been administered to all SUGEF personnel will constitute an objective parameter to be used by the hierarch in order to make subsequent decisions regarding the personnel who will definitively remain in that Body, jointly with others such as the academic and professional record of each servant and the evaluation of the immediate superior...” (Vote of the Sala Constitucional No. 1856-00, of 3:07 p.m. on February 29, cited by No. 3136, of 10:52 a.m. on April 14, both of 2000).\n\nIn accordance with the reasons stated, in attention to the specific grievances raised by the appellant, it could well be said that the lower court incurred an erroneous and inadequate assessment of the evidence by questioning in general terms the validity and legality of the restructuring process, but not by pointing out that the dismissal of the plaintiff was illegitimate as arbitrary and illegal, because, as stated, she was removed after her personal conditions were examined and it was determined that she did not meet the requirements of the position, according to a new profile established by the employer itself, to appoint another lawyer in her place. Consequently, we deem null the dismissal of which the plaintiff was the object, and being in the presence of a null dismissal, the effects of that declaration must be retroacted to the moment or date of said act, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, specifying that from the amount that ultimately corresponds to the plaintiff, the sums paid for preavis (advance notice), auxilio de cesantía (severance pay), and other indemnities received by her (annex 12 of the administrative file), as well as any other item that by way of salary she may have received after that settlement, shall be deducted.\n\n“**III.-** The dismissal of the plaintiff was justified by a process of organizational and human-resource restructuring of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero in session No. 124-99, Article 6, of November 9, 1999, and by the Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica in session No. 5014-99, Article 5, of November 12, 1999 (complaint, answer, and exhibit No. 6 of the administrative file). As a fundamental principle of the public employment regime, constitutional numeral 192 instituted the so-called *“right to job stability (estabilidad en el empleo)”*, which has been conceived as the right of the public servant to keep his or her position and to lose it only in the event of incurring one of the grounds for dismissal established by labor legislation or when a forced reduction of services is necessary due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the service. Regarding banking servants, Article 41, subsection 6) of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional expressly recognizes the minimum benefits contemplated in the labor and civil service laws of the Republic, which translates into the application in their favor of the rights contemplated by the Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Article 43 of that statute establishes the removal of servants covered by that regulation only when they incur the grounds contemplated in Article 81 of the Código de Trabajo and Article 41, subsection d), of that law, or in acts that imply a serious infraction of such regulation, of its rules, or of the respective internal labor regulations. Said law also contemplates the possibility of removal in those cases in which a forced reduction of services is necessary due to an absolute lack of funds; or to achieve a more effective and economical reorganization thereof, provided that such reorganization affects at least 60% of the employees of the respective unit. Furthermore, the “Convenio de Partes suscrito entre el Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus Trabajadores” of the year 1988, in its *Article 24*, provides: “*JOB SECURITY (INAMOVILIDAD). All Bank employees covered by an indefinite-term employment contract enjoy job security (inamovibles) as set forth in Article 188 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, a concept that must be interpreted as the guarantee of banking employees against arbitrary dismissal…*”. It is worth highlighting the provisions of the Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República No. 7107 of November 4, 1988, published in La Gaceta No. 222 of November 22, 1988, temporary annex 3 of the articles of the Sistema Bancario Nacional, Article 188, which states: “*Each State bank shall have a job classification structure (escalafón) that guarantees its officials a banking career, as well as their job security (inamovilidad) and their promotions in such a way as to ensure them the right to advance within said institutions from the lowest level to the highest positions, based on merit. Any modification that the banks carry out to adapt their regular classification structures to the prevailing conditions at the time shall not affect in any way the employees who entered previously…* ” (emphasis not in original). From the foregoing, it follows that since labor stability is a constitutional guarantee for the banking official, the specific cases of reorganization of services in which that right is curtailed must be assessed with absolute objectivity and in strict adherence to legality. The legal procedures established for that purpose must be respected, as well as the rights of the servants directly or indirectly involved, so that the proposed new organizational forms, the criteria for determining which positions are maintained within the body or entity and their conditions, as well as the proposal regarding which officials are to be removed or transferred, are matters that must be handled with full transparency and objectivity; otherwise, a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness would be opened, allowing the will of the hierarch—or those responsible for executing the changes—to decide these aspects, even without any substantiation or through the use of improper mechanisms or discriminatory criteria. On this matter, the Sala Constitucional has recognized the constitutionality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, in the following terms: “***Right to work and job stability (estabilidad en el empleo)**. In a public employment relationship, the projection of the right to work protected by constitutional article 56 contains as one of its postulates in favor of the worker that of stability in the position. Indeed, it cannot be ignored that this is what allows the servant to access a series of social and economic benefits that enable his or her academic and professional advancement, providing the security necessary for his or her personal development and that of the family unit that depends on him or her, which truly actualizes the meaning of the right to work as an individual guarantee and obligation to society, in the expression used by the constitutional text. It is for this reason that servants can only be removed by way of exception, upon a cause for justified dismissal, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, one of those cases being precisely the restructuring processes to which an institution may be subjected, the latter also being in consonance with the principles derived from Article 192 of the Constitución Política. Now then, submission to a legitimate modernization process, which guarantees the optimal use of public funds and the highest efficiency in the provision of the services entrusted to an institution, is, of course, a legitimate motive for executing organizational changes that, in most cases, inevitably entail the suppression of certain positions. **But precisely because it is an exception to the constitutional guarantee of stability for the worker, its application by the administration must be executed with absolute objectivity, transparency, and seriousness, and hence the requirement for qualified technical studies that can validate the decision-making, based on a coherent and effective model. Under this line of thought, this Chamber admits that if the new structure cannot accommodate the relocation of an official, given that the substantive functions he or she had been performing disappear, being suppressed in light of efficiency and modernization criteria, his or her cessation is legitimate in adherence to the commented constitutional provision***. (Emphasis not in original) (ruling of the Sala Constitucional No. 4951-2000 of 4:37 p.m. on June 27, 2000). On the same subject, that Chamber also stated: “*As the Chamber has indicated in repeated pronouncements, Article 192 of the Constitución Política empowers the Public Administration to order the restructuring of the various offices that compose it, in order to achieve better performance and organization thereof, for which it may order not only the elimination and reclassification of positions, but also the transfer of officials. **The authorization that the legal system provides to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is dispensable in the current structure and also of impossible integration into the new institutional organization. Thus, the State may put into practice its power to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization, provided that such reorganization is based on a real need—duly verified—to improve the public service and respects the procedure established for that purpose. In any case, and to make effective the protection of the rights of the administered, the constitutional jurisdiction of liberty is legitimized to review whether the figure of restructuring is used to conceal dismissals carried out for reasons other than purely organizational ones. This is with the objective of preventing the need for reorganization and modernization of the State from serving to exempt the Administration from its elementary obligation to always act in respect of the rights and freedoms that the Social State of Law recognizes to individuals***”. (The underlining is by the writer) (rulings of the Sala Constitucional Nos. 1846, of 2:57 p.m. on February 29; 2496, of 5:39 p.m. on March 21; 4951, of 4:37 p.m. on June 27; and 5783, of 4:01 p.m. on July 11, all of the year 2000). The foregoing establishes the scope that must be given to the concept of “reorganization” or “restructuring,” under which the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras dismissed the plaintiff. The reorganizations or restructurings, authorized by the constituent, as an exception to the general principle of job stability (estabilidad en el empleo) of public officials, refer to a transformation in the organizational structure of the entity, which motivates the elimination or change of unnecessary positions to achieve a more effective and economical reorganization of services. It constitutes an objective ground for dismissal distinct from those grounds established in the Código de Trabajo, which address faults committed by the worker or the inability to perform his or her functions, for which the employer can validly dismiss him or her. In no way could it be interpreted that, under the pretext of a reorganization to achieve that objective, the skills or performance of the servant in his or her position may be examined, given that this would mean applying a subjective ground for dismissal, not contemplated in the constitutional norm, within the concept of reorganization. In several amparo appeals filed by officials of the defendant Bank, in relation to the restructuring process under study, the Sala Constitucional ruled in these terms: “*Furthermore, analyzing the statement of facts set forth in Considerando II, it is observed that the **restructuring process** of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras is based on technical studies carried out by consulting firms specialized in the matter, and its purpose is to guarantee the efficiency of the public service and the best utilization of public resources. In addition, the decision to execute a modernization plan was communicated in advance to the affected public officials, so that they could adopt the measures they deemed pertinent. Finally, the restructuring process was duly and timely approved by the competent bodies for that purpose, namely, the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero and the Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica. Consequently, it is also not observed that the threat of dismissal of the protected parties arises from an untimely or arbitrary action on the part of the Administration*” (ruling No. 2000-1846, of 2:57 p.m. on February 29, 2000). In rulings 3136, of 10:52 a.m. on April 14; 4362, of 12:21 p.m. on May 19; and 11357, of 10:08 a.m. on December 20, all of the year 2000, the Sala Constitucional dismissed several amparo appeals in which the plaintiff appeared as the appellant, and in the last of them it stated: “*In a considerable number of amparo cases, the Sala Constitucional has had the opportunity to rule on the restructuring procedure at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, its correctness from a formal standpoint, and to declare that in itself that process does not violate the fundamental rights of public servants. Obviously, in that form of resolution, no prejudgment is made, as it was not procedurally appropriate, on the individual impacts that may occur with the application of the reform parameters that have been approved. Recall that this restructuring is grounded upon and intimately linked to the precedents of the one carried out at the Banco Central de Costa Rica, which this Chamber in some way endorsed. Since this is the basis from which the individual application of the reviewing mechanisms for the pre-existing personnel proceeds, in order to declare whether or not they conform to the principles and values that inform the restructuring, such as, for example, whether the persons involved satisfactorily meet the approved profile and whether or not they obtain the minimum qualifications required through the application of objective criteria that are substantially equal for all servants, those mechanisms turn out to be aspects of legality that cannot be examined in the avenue of constitutional review. This is the conclusion reached by the Chamber, not without first warning that this general rule would be subject, by exception, to gross errors and evident arbitrariness that lead to pathological cases of deviation of power (desviación de poder). However, in the present matter, the Chamber does not find that the facts lead to such a classification. Indeed, what the protected party alleges is the manner in which she was evaluated and rated, which, as asserted in the appeal, \"is the result of the comparison of real profiles with the ideal ones of the project, based on evaluations, among other aspects, of intellectual aptitudes, critical thinking, logical-abstract reasoning, verbal reasoning, personality factors, dominance, rational control, self-confidence, sociability, reliability, training, experience, foreign languages (English)\". If the result, in the case of the appellant, was an insufficient rating to place her in the intended category, if the evaluation or rating was correct or incorrect, if the application of the objective criteria upon which the evaluation is based was done with scientific basis or not, these are aspects of ordinary legality that this Chamber cannot review… and this Tribunal is not here to control the application of legislation to a specific case, as has been stated, except for the deviation of power (desviación de poder) that could result in the infringement of fundamental rights, which is not observed in the specific case*”. Thus, in the case of the plaintiff, it cannot be considered that the validity of the procedure for her dismissal was endorsed by the Sala Constitucional. This judicial office, like that Chamber, has recognized the legality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, which the Constitucional Court declared regarding the restructuring carried out at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and which this Chamber endorses, as the plaintiff's objections—in which she pointed out that the tests applied in the restructuring process did not meet minimum reliability parameters and accused that accumulated experience, technical skill, academic level, and performance were not evaluated—are not sustainable, because such claims have not been proven; rather, from the documentary evidence in the record, it appears that factors such as those indicated by the plaintiff were taken into account (see exhibits numbers 17, 26, and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file). For its part, the Colegio Profesional de Psicólogos de Costa Rica, whose intervention was requested by the union (folios 185 to 187), stated that it had not found any anomaly in the conduct of the professionals in charge of carrying out the process (folios 170 and 171), and the defendant, regarding the tests applied, recognized—in its amparo appeal No. 99-009337-0007-CO—that these were adapted to the national context (exhibit number 39 of the administrative file). From the documentary evidence provided, numbers 26, 32, 33 and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file, it appears that the plaintiff had access to the results of the tests administered and was in a position to discuss them, with the assistance of a professional in the field (see also exhibits numbers 35, 36 and annexes 23 and 24 of the cited file). Likewise, from the documentary evidence numbered as exhibit 16A through 16F, it is inferred that communication with the employees regarding the process was indeed maintained and that work experience was assessed. Information was also provided regarding the elements evaluated and the interpretation of the tests (documentary evidence labeled as exhibit number 23 and annexes 20 to 22 of the cited file). Subsequently, from the evidence identified with number 15 of the administrative file, it is inferred that the workers were duly informed that the process could conclude in dismissals with employer liability (despidos con responsabilidad patronal). Furthermore, it is recorded in the proceedings that all the personnel in the occupational structure of the SUGEF, including the Legal Advisory Office, were subject to the plan for organizational and human-resource restructuring of that office, and therefore subject to the academic, psychological, and behavioral evaluation tests, as well as those for intellectual aptitude, personality, and work style to which all personnel were subjected, including the plaintiff, an evaluation through which it was determined whether or not the new profiles and requirements for the different positions were met. However, what is relevant in the sub-lite to resolve this matter is to analyze the legality of the specific dismissal of the worker.\n\n**IV.-** In the case before us, the cessation of the plaintiff was justified, as stated, by the existence of the restructuring process taking place at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Said restructuring had the following **main objectives**: “*Introduce the necessary adjustments to the organizational scheme in accordance with the requirements of the risk-based supervision approach. / Establish an organization that allows for a clear allocation of responsibilities, the specialization of functions, and a capacity for timely response to the needs and evolution of the Sistema Financiero Nacional. / Integrate supervision processes through adequate supervision, coordination, and communication among the different areas of the SUGEF. / Seek the rational use of human and financial resources destined for the oversight of the entities…* ” (annex 13 of the administrative file). From the note sent to the plaintiff, the reasons that motivated her dismissal are evident. In that communication, she was told:\n\n“*In my capacity as administrative hierarch of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, I am responsible for implementing the approved restructuring, which, as a first stage, consisted of a **competency skills assessment (evaluación de las habilidades competenciales) of each official, for each of the positions**, given that each one of them requires different degrees of critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work style/management, and personality factors. / The second stage consisted of **the evaluation of personnel through a forced ranking (ranking forzado). The immediate superiors of each official were asked to perform an integral evaluation of their personnel, taking into account both their technical skills and their competency skills (habilidades competenciales).** In this way, initiative, written communication, time management, planning, programming and control, problem-solving, decision-making, and technical skill were assessed. / The third stage consisted of the **evaluation of the personnel of this entity, through different instruments that would allow for the assessment of compliance by said officials with the new requirements established in relation to academic training and professional experience.** / Based on these evaluations and their results, I have had to make decisions regarding your permanence in this organization. In accordance with the evaluations carried out, **you meet the academic requirements to hold the position of Profesional en Gestión Bancaria 3, of the Dirección General de Asesoría Jurídica, however, the competency evaluations (evaluaciones de competencia) indicate that your skills do not align with the competencies required to perform said position.** ”*\n\nLikewise, comparing her profile with other positions in the new structure, it was not possible to relocate her within this entity” (anexo 11 and prueba n° 4 del expediente administrativo). (The bold and underline are by the writer).\n\n\n\n It is observed from the transcribed documentation that the worker was dismissed after the following points were assessed: 1) her skills in the position in aspects such as critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/management style, and personality factors; 2) the evaluation carried out by her superior regarding abilities such as initiative, written communication, time management, planning, problem-solving, decision-making, etc.; and finally, 3) compliance with the new requirements established regarding academic training and professional experience. The plaintiff was informed that she met the academic requirements established for the position of Professional in Bank Management 3; however, she was dismissed because, according to the other evaluations carried out, she lacks the skills required to perform in that position. The foregoing means that the termination of her position did not correspond to an objective restructuring as a result of which her position disappeared, but rather to an examination of her aptitudes and skills from which it is inferred that the failure to meet the new established standards motivated her dismissal. Such a course of action is not authorized by the constituent power, since resolving in that manner is a veiled way through which the plaintiff was dismissed based on her personal conditions, thereby allowing a subjective cause for dismissal not authorized by law or by the Constitution, making the dismissal of the claimant arbitrary and illegal, with the restructuring process being used as an excuse or pretext to dismiss her and appoint another professional in her place. If, in principle, public administration servants are protected by employment stability, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, the requirements and personal conditions under which the servant accessed their position be modified, because through that means a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness and insecurity would be opened. In this regard, it should be mentioned that Article 47 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil, when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, indicates that when dispensing with the services of servants, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions resulting from the service rating will be considered, which is understood, for the case in which certain positions of the same category that is being eliminated are retained. But the case under study is different, because what operated in this instance was a re-evaluation of the aptitudes and skills with which the plaintiff was admitted and appointed to her position; a re-evaluation that was carried out with different standards from those under which she was initially hired and which, upon not being met, motivated her dismissal. It must be clear that the right to stability of public officials can only be eliminated by the causes expressly indicated in the law, since no public entity is permitted to carry out reorganization processes that conclude in dismissals, departing from constitutional and legal regulations. The only process that can be classified as restructuring is that contemplated in the constitutional norm and developed in subsections a) and b) of Article 47 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil, and not any other process. So-called modernization processes or reviews of personnel structures can be called by many different names, be it labor reclassification, reengineering, **restructuring**, transitional strategies, organizational re-architecture, structural redesign, organizational flattening, labor reversion, structural reinvention. All those measures that tend to reduce costs, invoking efficiency, must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and can in no way become a mechanism to review appointment acts that were legally carried out many years before. The legal system allows public entities to impose new requirements on positions, demand new profiles, and, based on that, hire suitable personnel to occupy them, without prejudice to the rights of those who occupy those positions. In the votes of the Sala Constitucional cited, issued by that Chamber on the occasion of amparo appeals filed by officials of SUGEF against that institution, it is noted that the plaintiff also resorted through that avenue to challenge the restructuring process that finally culminated in her dismissal. However, such amparo actions were rejected, among others, for the following reasons:\n\n“In the specific case, apart from the foregoing considerations, it cannot be overlooked **that the restructuring process at SUGEF is barely being executed**, whose completion was agreed for June 30, 2000 (regardless of the session in which this agreement was issued), and that it is not accredited in the case file that **the petitioner is among the people who will be dismissed, since there also exists the institutional commitment that, prior to making such a decision, relocation to another position** within the same Body, at the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or in any of the other Órganos de Desconcentración Máxima of the issuing entity will be sought. Likewise, the Chamber understands, as expressly stated by the informant, that **the tests carried out so far will not constitute more than another additional element to consider along with academic training, professional experience, and knowledge of the English language, such that the fact of not having been \"qualified\" in accordance with them is not determinative for a dismissal decision against her**, as the Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras has indicated under oath—with the consequences, including those of a criminal nature, contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional in case of stating inaccuracies or falsehoods to this Tribunal. In this context, the Chamber considers that at this moment the filing of this amparo **is premature**, given that **no certain and imminent threat of being dismissed without respect for her fundamental rights hangs to the detriment of the petitioner,** (…) Far from it, the tests that have been applied to all SUGEF personnel will constitute an objective parameter to be used by the head in order to make subsequent decisions regarding the personnel who will definitively remain in that Body, jointly with others such as the academic and professional record of each servant and the evaluation of the immediate supervisor…”\n\n(voto de la Sala Constitucional n° 1856-00, de las 15:07 horas del 29 de febrero, cited by n° 3136, de las 10:52 horas del 14 de abril, both of 2000).\n\n\n\n In accordance with the reasons set forth, in light of the specific grievances raised by the appellant, it could well be said that the ad-quem incurred an erroneous and inadequate assessment of the evidence by generally questioning the validity and legality of the restructuring process, but not so in pointing out that the plaintiff’s dismissal was illegitimate because it was arbitrary and illegal, since, as stated, she was removed after examining her personal conditions and determining that she did not meet the requirements of the position, according to a new profile established by the employer itself, in order to appoint another lawyer in her place. Consequently, we deem the dismissal of the plaintiff to be null and void, and being in the presence of a null dismissal, the effects of that declaration must be retroacted to the moment or date of said act, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. In consequence, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, specifying that from the amount that may correspond to the plaintiff, the sums paid for prior notice, severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), and other indemnities received by her should be deducted (anexo 12 del expediente administrativo), as well as any other item that by way of salary she may have received subsequent to that settlement. Regarding the amounts to be paid for that concept, the deduction of social charges must also be made.”\n\nNow, subjection to a legitimate modernization process that guarantees the optimal use of public funds and the highest efficiency in the provision of the services entrusted to an institution is, of course, a legitimate reason to implement organizational changes that, in most cases, inevitably entail the elimination of certain positions. But precisely because it is an exception to the constitutional guarantee of employment stability for the worker, its application by the administration must be carried out with absolute objectivity, transparency, and seriousness, hence the requirement for qualified technical studies that can validate decision-making, based on a coherent and effective model. Under this line of reasoning, this Chamber admits that if the new structure cannot accommodate the reassignment of an official, since the substantive functions they had been performing disappear, being eliminated in pursuit of efficiency and modernization criteria, their dismissal is legitimate in accordance with the aforementioned constitutional provision\". (The highlighting is not from the original) (vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 4951-2000 of 16:37 hours on June 27, 2000). On the same subject, that Chamber also stated: \"As the Chamber has indicated in repeated pronouncements, Article 192 of the Political Constitution empowers the Public Administration to order the restructuring of the various dependencies that comprise it, in order to achieve better performance and organization thereof, for which it may order not only the elimination and reclassification of positions, but also the transfer of officials. The authorization provided by the legal system to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is dispensable in the current structure and, furthermore, impossible to integrate into the new institutional organization. Thus, the State may implement its power to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization, provided that this is based on the real need—duly proven—to improve the public service and respects the procedure established for that purpose. In any case, and to make effective the protection of the rights of the governed, the constitutional jurisdiction of liberty is empowered to review whether the figure of restructuring is used to conceal dismissals carried out for reasons other than merely organizational ones. This with the aim of preventing the need for reorganization and modernization of the State from serving to exempt the Administration from its elementary obligation to always act in respect of the rights and freedoms that the Social State of Law recognizes to individuals\". (The underlining is by the drafter) (votes of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 1846, of 14:57 hours on February 29; 2496, of 17:39 hours on March 21; 4951, of 16:37 hours on June 27; and 5783, of 16:01 hours on July 11, all of the year 2000). The foregoing establishes the scope to be given to the concept of \"reorganization\" or \"restructuring,\" with which the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras dismissed the plaintiff. The reorganizations or restructurings, authorized by the constitutional framer, as an exception to the general principle of employment stability for public officials, refer to a transformation in the organizational structure of the entity, which motivates the elimination or change of unnecessary positions to achieve a more effective and economical reorganization of services. It constitutes an objective ground for dismissal distinct from those grounds established in the Labor Code, which address faults committed by the worker or the inability to perform their functions, for which the employer may validly dismiss them. In no way could it be interpreted that, under the pretext of a reorganization to achieve that objective, the skills or performance of the employee in their position may be examined, given that this would mean applying a subjective ground for dismissal, not contemplated in the constitutional norm, within the concept of reorganization.\n\nIn several recurso de amparo petitions filed by officials of the defendant Bank, in relation to the restructuring process under study, the Constitutional Chamber ruled in these terms: \"Moreover, having analyzed the recitation of facts set forth in Considerando II, it is observed that the restructuring process of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras is based on technical studies conducted by consulting firms specialized in the matter, and its purpose is to guarantee the efficiency of the public service and the best use of public resources. Furthermore, the decision to execute a modernization plan was communicated in advance to the affected public officials, so that they could adopt the measures they deemed pertinent. Finally, the restructuring process was duly and timely approved by the competent bodies for that purpose, namely, the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero and the Board of Directors of the Banco Central de Costa Rica. Consequently, it is also not observed that the threat of dismissal of the amparo petitioners stems from an untimely or arbitrary action on the part of the Administration\" (vote No. 2000-1846, of 14:57 hours on February 29, 2000). In votes 3136, of 10:52 hours on April 14; 4362, of 12:21 hours on May 19; and 11357, of 10:08 hours on December 20, all of the year 2000, the Constitutional Chamber dismissed without merit the respective recurso de amparo petitions in which the plaintiff appeared as petitioner, and in the last of them it pointed out: \"In a considerable number of amparo cases, the Constitutional Chamber has had the opportunity to rule on the restructuring procedure in the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, its correctness from a formal standpoint, and to declare that, in itself, that process does not violate the fundamental rights of public servants. Obviously, in that manner of resolving, it is not prejudged, as it was not appropriate, on the individual impacts that may occur with the application of the reforming parameters that have been approved. It should be remembered that this restructuring is grounded upon and intimately linked with the precedents of the one carried out at the Banco Central de Costa Rica, which this Chamber endorsed in some way. This being the basis from which the individual application of the review mechanisms for the pre-existing personnel proceeds, in order to declare whether or not they conform to the principles and values that inform the restructuring, such as, for example, whether the persons involved satisfactorily meet the approved profile and whether or not they obtain the minimum qualifications required based on the application of objective criteria that are substantially equal for all employees, these mechanisms turn out to be aspects of legality that cannot be examined through the avenue of constitutionality control. This conclusion is the one reached by the Chamber, but not without first warning that this general rule would apply, by exception, to gross errors and evident arbitrariness leading to pathological cases of misuse of power. However, in the present matter, the Chamber does not find that the facts lead to such a classification. In effect, what the amparo petitioner alleges is the manner in which she was evaluated and graded, which, as stated in the appeal, 'is the result of the confrontation of real profiles with the ideal ones of the project, based on evaluations, among other aspects, of intellectual aptitudes, critical thinking, logical-abstract reasoning, verbal reasoning, personality factors, dominance, rational control, self-confidence, sociability, reliability, training, experience, foreign languages (English)'. If the result, in the case of the petitioner, was an insufficient grade to place herself in the intended category, if the evaluation or grading was correct or incorrect, if the application of the objective criteria on which the evaluation is based was done with a scientific basis or not, these are matters of ordinary legality that this Chamber cannot review… and this Tribunal is not here to control the application of legislation to a specific case, as has been stated, except for the misuse of power that could result in the infringement of fundamental rights, which is not noted in the specific case\". Therefore, in the case of the plaintiff, it cannot be considered that the validity of her dismissal procedure was endorsed by the Constitutional Chamber. This judicial office, like that Chamber, has recognized the legality in the Public Administration of restructuring processes, which the Constitutional Chamber declared regarding the restructuring carried out at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, and this Chamber endorses, as the plaintiff's objections are not tenable inasmuch as she pointed out that the tests applied in the restructuring process did not meet minimum reliability parameters and alleged that accumulated experience, technical skill, academic level, and performance were not evaluated, because such assertions have not been proven; rather, from the documentary evidence on record, it can be deduced that factors such as those indicated by the plaintiff were indeed taken into account (see evidence numbers 17, 26 and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file). For its part, the Colegio Profesional de Psicólogos de Costa Rica, whose intervention was requested by the union (folios 185 to 187), stated that it had not found any anomaly in the performance of the professionals in charge of developing the process (folios 170 and 171), and the defendant, regarding the tests applied, acknowledged—in her recurso de amparo No. 99-009337-0007-CO—that these were adapted to the national context (evidence number 39 of the administrative file). From the contributed documentary evidence numbers 26, 32, 33 and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file, it is clear that the plaintiff had access to the results of the tests performed and was able to discuss them, with the assistance of a professional in the field (see also evidence numbers 35, 36 and annexes 23 and 24 of the cited file). Likewise, from the documentary evidence numbered as evidence from 16A to 16F, it can be extracted that communication was indeed maintained with the employees regarding the process and that work experience was evaluated. Information was also provided on the elements evaluated and on the interpretation of the tests (documentary evidence labeled as evidence number 23 and annexes 20 to 22 of the cited file). Furthermore, from the evidence identified with number 15 of the administrative file, it can be extracted that the workers were duly informed that the process could result in dismissals with employer liability. In addition, it is on record that all personnel of the occupational structure of SUGEF, including the Legal Advisory Office, were subject to the organizational and human resources restructuring plan of that dependency, and therefore underwent the academic, psychological, and behavioral evaluation tests, as well as intellectual aptitude, personality, and work style tests to which all personnel were subjected, including the plaintiff, an evaluation with which it was determined whether or not the new profiles and requirements for the different positions were met. However, what is relevant in the sub lite to resolve this matter is to analyze the legality of the specific dismissal of the worker.\n\nIV.- In the case at hand, the dismissal of the plaintiff was justified, as stated, by the existence of the restructuring process taking place at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Said restructuring had the following main objectives: \"To introduce the necessary adjustments to the organizational scheme in accordance with the requirements of the risk-based supervision approach. / To establish an organization that allows for a clear assignment of responsibilities, the specialization of functions, and a capacity for timely response to the needs and evolution of the National Financial System. / To integrate the supervision processes through adequate coordination and communication between the different areas of SUGEF. / To seek the rational use of human and financial resources destined for the oversight of the entities...\" (annex 13 of the administrative file). From the communication sent to the plaintiff, the reasons that motivated her dismissal are evident. In that communication, she was told:\n\n\"In my capacity as administrative head of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, it is my responsibility to implement the approved restructuring, which as a first stage consisted of an evaluation of the competency skills of each official, for each of the positions, because each one of them requires different degrees of critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/direction style, and personality factors. / The second stage consisted of the evaluation of the personnel through a forced ranking. The immediate supervisors of each of the officials were asked to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of their personnel, in which they would take into account both their technical skills and their competency skills. In this way, initiative, written communication, time management, planning, programming and control, problem solving, decision making, and technical skill were evaluated. / The third stage consisted of the evaluation of the personnel of this entity, through different instruments that would allow valuing the compliance by said officials with the new requirements established in relation to academic training and professional experience. / Based on these evaluations and their results, I have had to make decisions regarding your continuance in this organization. According to the evaluations carried out, you meet the academic requirements to perform the position of Professional in Bank Management 3, of the General Directorate of Legal Advisory, however, the competency evaluations indicate that your skills do not adjust to the competencies required to perform said position. Likewise, comparing your profile with other positions in the new structure, your reassignment internally within this entity was not possible\" (annex 11 and evidence No. 4 of the administrative file). (The bolding and underlining are by the drafter).\n\nIt is observed from the transcribed documentation that the worker was dismissed, after the following points were evaluated with respect to her: 1) her skills in the position in aspects such as critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/direction style, and personality factors; 2) the evaluation carried out by her supervisor in relation to capabilities such as initiative, written communication, time management, planning, problem solving, decision making, etc., and finally, 3) compliance with the new requirements established in relation to academic training and professional experience. The plaintiff was informed that she met the academic requirements established for the position of Professional in Bank Management 3; however, she was dismissed because, according to the other evaluations carried out, she lacked the skills required to perform in that position. The foregoing means that the cessation in her position did not correspond to an objective restructuring as a result of which her position disappeared, but rather to an examination of her aptitudes and skills from which it is inferred that the failure to meet the new established standards motivated her dismissal. Such a course of action is not authorized by the constitutional framer, because resolving in that manner is a veiled way by which the plaintiff was dismissed based on her personal conditions, thereby allowing a subjective ground for dismissal not authorized by law or by the Constitution, which made the dismissal of the claimant arbitrary and illegal, using the restructuring process as an excuse or pretext to dismiss her and appoint another professional in her place. If, in principle, the servants of the Public Administration are protected by employment stability, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, the requirements and personal conditions with which the employee acceded to their position are modified, because by that means a dangerous loophole to arbitrariness and insecurity would be opened. In this sense, it should be mentioned that Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute, when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, indicates that when dispensing with employees, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions resulting from the service rating will be considered, which is understood for the scenario in which certain positions of the same category being eliminated are kept. But the case under study is different, because what operated in this instance was a reassessment of the aptitudes and skills with which the plaintiff was admitted and appointed to her position; a reassessment that was carried out using standards different from those with which she was initially hired and which, upon not meeting them, motivated her dismissal. It must be clear that the right to stability of public officials can only be eliminated by the grounds expressly indicated in the law, for no public entity is permitted to carry out reorganization processes that conclude with dismissals, deviating from constitutional and legal regulations. Only that contemplated in the constitutional norm and developed in subsections a) and b) of Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute can be classified as restructuring, and not any other process. The so-called modernization processes or reviews of personnel structures can be named in very diverse ways, whether called labor recalification, re-engineering, restructuring, transitional strategies, organizational re-architecture, structural redesign, organizational flattening, labor reversal, structural reinvention. All those measures that tend to reduce costs, invoking efficiency, must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and can in no way become a mechanism to review appointment acts that were carried out legally many years before. The legal system allows public entities to impose new requirements for positions, demand new profiles, and based on that, hire the suitable personnel to occupy them, without prejudice to the rights of those who occupy those positions. In the votes of the Constitutional Chamber cited, issued by that Chamber on the occasion of recurso de amparo petitions filed by SUGEF officials against that institution, it is warned that the plaintiff also challenged, through that avenue, the restructuring process that ultimately culminated in her dismissal. However, such amparo actions were rejected, among other reasons, for the following:\n\n\"In the specific case, apart from the foregoing considerations, it cannot be overlooked that the restructuring process at SUGEF is only just being executed, the completion of which was agreed for June 30, 2000 (regardless of in which session this agreement was issued), and that it is not proven in the record that the amparo petitioner is one of the persons who will be dismissed, as there is also the institutional commitment that prior to making that type of decision, reassignment in another position will be sought within the same Body, in the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or in any of the other Maximum Deconcentration Organs of the issuing entity. Likewise, the Chamber understands, because the reporting party expressly stated it so, that the tests performed up to now will constitute nothing more than another additional element to consider together with academic training, professional experience, and knowledge of the English language, so that the fact of not having been 'qualified' in accordance with them is not determinative for the purpose of a decision of dismissal against her, as the Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras has indicated under oath—with the consequences, even of a criminal nature, contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction in the event of affirming inaccuracies or falsehoods before this Tribunal.\"\n\nIn this context, the Chamber considers that at this moment the filing of this amparo is premature, given that there is no certain and imminent threat pending against the petitioner of being dismissed without respect for her fundamental rights, (…) Far from it, the tests that have been applied to all SUGEF personnel will constitute an objective parameter to be used by the superior in order to make subsequent decisions regarding the personnel who will definitively remain in that Body, together with others such as the academic and professional record of each employee and the evaluation of the immediate superior…” (vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1856-00, at 3:07 p.m. on February 29, cited by No. 3136, at 10:52 a.m. on April 14, both of 2000).\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\nIn accordance with the reasons set forth, with regard to the specific grievances raised by the appellant, it could well be said that the ad-quem erred in an incorrect and inadequate assessment of the evidence by generally questioning the validity and legality of the restructuring process, but not in stating that the plaintiff's dismissal was illegitimate because it was arbitrary and illegal, since as stated she was removed after examining her personal conditions and determining that she did not meet the requirements of the position, according to a new profile established by the employer itself, in order to appoint another lawyer in her place. Consequently, we deem the dismissal of the plaintiff to be null and void, and being in the presence of a null dismissal, the effects of that declaration must be retroactive to the moment or date of said act, such that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, specifying that from the amount that may correspond to the plaintiff, the sums paid for notice, severance pay, and other indemnities received by her must be deducted (annex 12 of the administrative file), as well as any other item that by way of salary she may have received after that settlement. From the amounts to be paid for that concept, the social charges must also be deducted.”" }