{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-130233",
  "citation": "Res. 01261-2009 Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Principio precautorio legitima sacrificio sanitario de bovinos pese a duda sobre tuberculosis",
  "title_en": "Precautionary principle legitimizes sanitary slaughter of cattle despite doubt about tuberculosis",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Primera analiza un recurso de casación contra la sentencia que denegó la anulación de actos administrativos de la Dirección de Salud Animal del MAG y la consiguiente indemnización de daños y perjuicios a la empresa actora. La administración ordenó el sacrificio de bovinos, cuarentena y destrucción de leche tras detectar brote de tuberculosis en el hato. La empresa alegó que la prueba de tuberculina no era suficiente ni estaba respaldada por certificados de calidad, y reclamó indemnización total. La Sala confirma el fallo impugnado, aplicando el principio precautorio con fundamento en los artículos 46 y 50 de la Constitución Política y el artículo 11 de la Ley de Biodiversidad. Establece que la duda razonable sobre la existencia de tuberculosis derivada de múltiples resultados positivos y la ausencia de un certificado de calidad no invalida la actuación administrativa lícita y normal dirigida a proteger la salud humana, animal y el ambiente. En cuanto a la indemnización, mantiene el 50% del valor de los animales sacrificados según la Ley 1207 y desestima otros daños reclamados por falta de prueba o por constituir lucro cesante.",
  "summary_en": "The First Chamber analyzes a cassation appeal against a judgment that denied the annulment of administrative acts by the MAG's Animal Health Directorate and the consequent compensation for damages. The administration ordered the slaughter of cattle, quarantine, and destruction of milk after detecting a tuberculosis outbreak in the herd. The company argued that the tuberculin test was insufficient and not supported by quality certificates, and claimed full compensation. The Chamber confirms the appealed judgment, applying the precautionary principle based on Articles 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution and Article 11 of the Biodiversity Law. It establishes that reasonable doubt about the existence of tuberculosis, derived from multiple positive results and the absence of a quality certificate, does not invalidate the lawful and normal administrative action aimed at protecting human and animal health and the environment. Regarding compensation, it upholds the 50% of the value of the slaughtered animals per Law 1207 and dismisses other claimed damages for lack of evidence or because they constitute lost profits.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "date": "2009",
  "year": "2009",
  "topic_ids": [
    "art-50-constitution",
    "biodiversity-law-7788"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": null,
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "principio precautorio",
    "indubio pro natura",
    "duda razonable",
    "tuberculina",
    "zoonosis",
    "SENASA",
    "LANASEVE",
    "lucro cesante"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 7",
      "law": "Ley 1207"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 7",
      "law": "Ley 6243"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 11",
      "law": "Ley 7788"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 46",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 50",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 194",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "principio precautorio",
    "tuberculosis bovina",
    "Dirección de Salud Animal",
    "MAG",
    "indemnización",
    "duda razonable",
    "certificado de control de calidad",
    "Sala Primera",
    "Ley 1207",
    "Ley 6243"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "precautionary principle",
    "bovine tuberculosis",
    "Animal Health Directorate",
    "Ministry of Agriculture",
    "compensation",
    "reasonable doubt",
    "quality control certificate",
    "First Chamber",
    "Law 1207",
    "Law 6243"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "XII.- ... La tuberculosis es una enfermedad zoonótica, que constituye un peligro para la ganadería y la salud pública. Por ende, se está ante una situación que pone en peligro o amenaza de daños graves no solo a elementos de la biodiversidad (hatos lecheros vecinos de la propiedad de la empresa actora), sino también al ser humano (salud pública). En el sub júdice, a la luz del cuadro fáctico antes expuesto, resulta evidente la existencia de una duda razonable –al no existir certeza científica debido a la falta del certificado de control de calidad y eficacia de la tuberculina- que le imponía a la Administración Pública el deber, en acato del principio precautorio, de actuar como lo hizo. Esta duda razonable surge por cuanto, en tres ocasiones diferentes (primero en el matadero El Valle, luego en los resultados de los estudios de laboratorio del LANASEVE; y, por último, en las pruebas practicadas por la Dirección de Salud Animal del MAG), se determinó la existencia de tuberculosis en animales de la empresa actora.\n\nXVIII.- ... Como se apuntó, la ausencia de certeza científica no era óbice para que la Administración Pública actuara de la manera como lo hizo, ya que el principio precautorio así lo exigía. Por su parte, la ley en comentario solo prevé, como indemnización, el pago del 50% del valor, pericialmente fijado, de los animales sacrificados, tal y como fue resarcida la sociedad demandante (véanse los hechos probados 17 y 19, no cuestionados por el casacionista), no el 100% en caso de duda. Por tanto, al haber sido indemnizada la empresa actora, en cuanto al sacrificio de sus semovientes, según lo dispuesto en la normativa aplicable al sub júdice, se colige la improcedencia del reclamo de mérito.",
  "excerpt_en": "XII.- ... Tuberculosis is a zoonotic disease, which constitutes a danger to livestock and public health. Therefore, we are facing a situation that endangers or threatens serious harm not only to elements of biodiversity (neighboring dairy herds of the plaintiff company's property), but also to human beings (public health). In the case at hand, in light of the factual scenario set forth above, the existence of a reasonable doubt is evident —given the lack of scientific certainty due to the absence of a certificate of quality and efficacy control of the tuberculin— which imposed on the Public Administration the duty, in compliance with the precautionary principle, to act as it did. This reasonable doubt arises because, on three different occasions (first at the El Valle slaughterhouse, then in the results of the LANASEVE laboratory studies; and finally, in the tests performed by the MAG's Animal Health Directorate), the existence of tuberculosis was determined in animals of the plaintiff company.\n\nXVIII.- ... As noted, the absence of scientific certainty was not an obstacle for the Public Administration to act in the manner it did, since the precautionary principle so required. For its part, the law in question only provides, as compensation, the payment of 50% of the expert-assessed value of the slaughtered animals, as the plaintiff company was compensated (see proven facts 17 and 19, not challenged by the appellant), not 100% in case of doubt. Therefore, since the plaintiff company was compensated for the slaughter of its cattle, according to the applicable regulations in the case, the inadmissibility of the claim in question is evident.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The First Chamber denies the cassation appeal filed by the plaintiff company, confirming the judgment that rejected the annulment of administrative acts and additional compensation, considering that the MAG's Animal Health Directorate acted lawfully, based on the precautionary principle and sanitary legislation.",
    "summary_es": "La Sala Primera rechaza el recurso de casación interpuesto por la empresa actora, confirmando la sentencia que denegó la anulación de actos administrativos y la indemnización adicional, al considerar que la actuación de la Dirección de Salud Animal del MAG fue lícita, basada en el principio precautorio y en la legislación sanitaria."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando XII",
      "quote_en": "In the case at hand, in light of the factual scenario set forth above, the existence of a reasonable doubt is evident —given the lack of scientific certainty due to the absence of a certificate of quality and efficacy control of the tuberculin— which imposed on the Public Administration the duty, in compliance with the precautionary principle, to act as it did.",
      "quote_es": "En el sub júdice, a la luz del cuadro fáctico antes expuesto, resulta evidente la existencia de una duda razonable –al no existir certeza científica debido a la falta del certificado de control de calidad y eficacia de la tuberculina- que le imponía a la Administración Pública el deber, en acato del principio precautorio, de actuar como lo hizo."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando XVIII",
      "quote_en": "The absence of scientific certainty was not an obstacle for the Public Administration to act in the manner it did, since the precautionary principle so required.",
      "quote_es": "La ausencia de certeza científica no era óbice para que la Administración Pública actuara de la manera como lo hizo, ya que el principio precautorio así lo exigía."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-39796",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7788  Art. 11"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-130233",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-12443",
      "norm_num": "7130",
      "norm_name": "Código Procesal Civil",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "16/08/1989"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-13231",
      "norm_num": "6227",
      "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-39796",
      "norm_num": "7788",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Biodiversidad",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "30/04/1998"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-7331",
      "norm_num": "",
      "norm_name": "Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa",
      "tipo_norma": "",
      "norm_fecha": ""
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "norm_num": "0",
      "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política",
      "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política",
      "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“XI.- El meollo de lo alegado por el\r\nrecurrente estriba en que, a su entender, los juzgadores de instancia\r\nincurrieron en indebida valoración de la prueba señalada, al estimar que la\r\ntuberculina aplicada a los bovinos de la empresa actora, para diagnosticar la\r\ntuberculosis, estaba amparada a certificados de control de calidad, lo cual,\r\nindica, no es cierto. Al respecto, es menester apuntar lo\r\nsiguiente. En primer lugar, los reportes de pruebas de tuberculinas,\r\ncontenidos en los documentos identificados como 12 y 15, al ser originales,\r\nrevisten la naturaleza de documentos públicos (artículo 369 del Código Procesal\r\nCivil); empero, el casacionista omitió señalar como\r\nconculcada la norma de valor de ese tipo de probanza, lo cual impide a esta\r\nSala verter pronunciamiento en torno a esos medios de convicción. En\r\nsegundo término, la Ley\r\nnúmero 1207 del 9 de octubre de 1950, conocida como “Ley de Tuberculosis\r\nBovina”, aunque derogada, en lo de interés dispone: “Artículo\r\n2º Se declara obligatoria la prueba de tuberculina para todos los\r\nanimales vacunos, las veces que se considere conveniente, la cual será aplicada\r\npor los funcionarios debidamente capacitados que designen los Ministerios de\r\nAgricultura e Industria y Salubridad Pública. Artículo 3º Los animales\r\nvacunos en los cuales la prueba de tuberculina hubiese dado resultado positivo\r\nserán aislados inmediatamente y sacrificados una vez llenados los requisitos a\r\nque se refiere los artículos siguientes. … Artículo 15º Sólo el Estado\r\npuede preparar o importar la tuberculina de uso veterinario.” Por su\r\nparte, el Decreto Ejecutivo 10120-A de 9 de mayo de 1979, “Reglamento sobre el\r\nControl de la\r\n Tuberculosis Bovina”, dispone: “Artículo 1º La Tuberculina\r\no cualquier otro producto biológico que se utilice para diagnosticar la\r\ntuberculosis en los animales domésticos solo podrá ser importada por el\r\nPrograma de Salud Animal MAG-BID. Artículo 2º Le compete\r\nexclusivamente al Programa Nacional de Salud Animal controlar la calidad y\r\neficacia de la tuberculina utilizada para diagnóstico en los animales. \r\nArtículo 5º Cuando la\r\n Dirección del Programa Nacional de Salud Animal reciba la\r\ninformación a que hacen mención los artículos tercero y cuarto de este Reglamento,\r\nprocederán inmediatamente a realizar el estudio epidemiológico del hato\r\nafectado y a hacer la prueba de tuberculina a la totalidad del ganado existente\r\nen el mismo. Artículo 7º Los animales que fueren clasificados como\r\nreaccionantes, serán debidamente identificados,\r\nmarcados a fuego, evaluados e inmediatamente sacrificados, esto de conformidad\r\ncon la Ley No\r\n1207.”(Lo\r\nsubrayado es suplido). La forma de controlar la calidad y eficacia de\r\nla tuberculina por parte de la\r\n Dirección de Salud Animal (hoy Servicio Nacional de Salud\r\nAnimal –SENASA-), es con el respectivo certificado de\r\ncontrol de calidad. Por ende, constituye un requisito necesario para que\r\ndicha prueba pueda aplicarse en los bovinos. En el sub-júdice, la parte actora, desde un inicio -hecho tercero de\r\nla demanda- señaló que la tuberculina utilizada en el hato de su propiedad no\r\nestaba certificada. Por su parte, en el hecho probado antecedido con el\r\nnúmero 20, se establece: “que las tuberculinas utilizadas y aplicadas\r\na los animales de la parte actora, son importadas desde México para uso\r\nexclusivo de la Dirección\r\nde Salud Animal del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, programa oficial de\r\ncombate de la tuberculosis, al amparo y autorización de la Ley No 1207 de 4\r\nde octubre de 1950; provienen de la Productora Nacional\r\nde Biológicos Veterinarios, amparados a un certificado de control de calidad,\r\nestableciéndose en los mismos la potencia de la dosis, para ser verificado su\r\najuste a los estándares de la Oficina Internacional de Epizootias (ver escrito\r\nde demanda y su contestación, e informe suscrito por el Dr. José Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, Director de Salud Animal, folios 506 a 508).”(Lo\r\nsubrayado es suplido). En torno a este punto, en el apartado V de la\r\nsentencia impugnada, el Tribunal consideró lo siguiente: “V.- \r\nSEGUNDO AGRAVIO. SOBRE LA\r\n ALEGADA AUSENCIA DE CONTROL DE CALIDAD DE LAS PRUEBAS\r\nTUBERCULINAS. Como límites al ejercicio de la discrecionalidad\r\nadministrativa, los artículos 16.1 y 160 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública,\r\nexpresamente vedan a la\r\n Administración el dictado de actos contrarios a las reglas\r\nunívocas de la ciencia o de la técnica, o a principios elementales de justicia,\r\nlógica o conveniencia. Para poder determinar en cada caso concreto el\r\ncumplimiento o no de esas reglas, es necesario hacer un análisis de la prueba\r\nde carácter técnico o científico que se haya aportado al proceso. En el caso en\r\nexamen, a solicitud de la parte actora, se le pidió un informe a la Dirección Nacional\r\nde Salud Animal del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, a efecto de que\r\n\"indique si las tuberculinas y/o productos biológicos del lote utilizado\r\npara diagnosticar la presunta existencia de tuberculosis bovina en el hato de\r\nla empresa Sucesores Clemente Marín S.A., se encuentran debidamente\r\nregistrados, y certificada tanto su calidad como su eficacia, a nivel nacional\r\ne internacional, así como los métodos de diagnóstico utilizados, y en caso\r\npositivo y/o afirmativo, que se aporte copia certificada de los\r\nmismos.\" (ver folio 143 vuelto). En su informe número DSA.128-2004, visible a folio 506, el Dr. Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, Director de Salud Animal, del Ministerio\r\nde Agricultura y Ganadería, fue muy claro en señalar que las tuberculinas\r\nutilizadas y aplicadas a los animales de la empresa Sucesores Clemente Marín\r\nS.A., al igual que todas las que se utilizan en el país, se importan desde\r\nMéxico y provienen de la\r\n Productora Nacional de Biológicos Veterinarios, las cuales\r\nvienen amparadas en un certificado de control de calidad, que establece la\r\npotencia de la dosis, a efecto de ser verificado su ajuste a los estándares\r\nestablecidos por la\r\n Oficina Internacional de Epizootias, órgano de carácter\r\ninternacional, que establece a nivel mundial esos valores, en el Manual de\r\nEstándares para pruebas de diagnóstico y vacunas. Tomando en cuenta lo\r\nanterior, coincide este Tribunal con lo establecido por el Juez de instancia,\r\nen el sentido que, al ser la parte actora la que formula la pretensión\r\nanulatoria del acto administrativo impugnado, le correspondía, sin lugar a\r\ndudas, la carga de la prueba en relación con los hechos que fundamentan esa\r\npretensión (317 Código Procesal Civil). A pesar de lo anterior, es ostensible\r\nque la actora no trajo probanza alguna que desacreditara el informe técnico rendido\r\npor el Dr. Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, a efecto de tener\r\npor demostrado que las pruebas tuberculinas, utilizadas en el hato de su\r\npropiedad, no contaban con certificado de calidad, pues únicamente se limitó a\r\nplantear cuestionamientos respecto del contenido de aquel dictamen. Así las\r\ncosas, este Tribunal no tiene razones para no concederle el valor que le\r\ncorresponde a esa prueba de carácter técnico, y siendo que la actora no aporta\r\nprueba que desacredite el contenido de la misma, lo resuelto por el Juez A-quo\r\ndebe ser confirmado. Por las mismas razones no son de recibo los\r\ncuestionamientos que hace la actora de los documentos que constan en el legajo\r\nde pruebas aportado por la representación estatal, correspondientes a los\r\n\"reportes de prueba tuberculina\" realizados en la finca de la\r\nsociedad accionante (documentos números 3, 4, 10, 11,\r\n12 y 15), pues de igual forma la accionante no\r\npresentó ninguna prueba tendiente a desvirtuar que las mismas se realizaron sin\r\ncontrol de calidad. Consecuentemente, no se advierte un incumplimiento de las\r\nreglas unívocas de la ciencia y la técnica (artículo 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública)\r\npara el caso concreto, debiendo mantenerse lo resuelto.-“ Esta\r\nSala no comparte el criterio de los juzgadores de instancia. En primer\r\nlugar, de conformidad con el canon 301 inciso 2) de la LGAP,\r\nen relación con el numeral 54 de la\r\n LRJCA, las declaraciones o informes\r\nque rindan los representantes o servidores de la Administración Pública\r\nse reputarán como testimonio para todo efecto legal. Ergo, lo afirmado\r\npor el doctor Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo en su informe\r\nvisible a folios 506 a\r\n508 reviste ese carácter, no el de prueba técnica como fue señalado por el\r\nTribunal. En segundo lugar, este medio de convicción no resulta idóneo\r\npara demostrar la existencia del certificado de control de calidad de la\r\ntuberculina. La única manera de comprobar que se contaba con él, era con\r\nsu aportación al expediente. La empresa actora, se repite, desde un\r\ninicio, ha señalado su inexistencia (véase hecho tercero de la demanda), por\r\nende, exigirle la demostración de su dicho, como lo señala el Ad quem, implica colocarla en estado de indefensión, al\r\ntratarse de un hecho negativo, conculcándose, además, el canon 317 del Código\r\nProcesal Civil, fundamentalmente, lo preceptuado en su inciso primero. \r\nTómese en cuenta que, cuando requirió se ordenara el informe a la Dirección Nacional\r\nde Salud Animal del MAG, solicitó expresamente que, en caso de afirmarse la\r\nexistencia del certificado de calidad y eficacia, se aportara copia debidamente\r\ncertificada. Dentro de esta línea de pensamiento, la representación\r\nestatal, al contestar el aludido hecho tercero de la demanda, en lo de interés,\r\nseñala: “Estas tuberculinas son importadas desde México y provienen de\r\nla Productora\r\n Nacional de Biológicos Veterinarios, amparadas a un\r\nCertificado de Control de Calidad, en el cual se establece la potencia de la\r\ndosis a efectos de verificar que se ajuste a los estándares establecidos por la Oficina Internacional\r\nde Epizootias en su Manual de Estándares para Pruebas de Diagnóstico y Vacunas.\r\n(Ver Documento N. 10).”(Lo resaltado es del original). A tenor\r\nde lo indicado en el inciso segundo del referido numeral 317 del Código de\r\ncita, al oponerse a la pretensión de la compañía demandante, afirmando un hecho\r\nextintivo de su derecho, le correspondía demostrarlo. Para esos efectos,\r\nremite al documento no. 10 del legajo de pruebas que aportó. No obstante,\r\nahí solo constan copias fotostáticas de dos certificados de control de calidad,\r\nemitidos por la empresa mexicana Productora Nacional de Biológicos\r\nVeterinarios, correspondientes, el primero al lote 2420048 de tuberculina\r\nbovina tipo P.P.D. y, el segundo al lote 2320307 de\r\ntuberculina aviar tipo P.P.D. Empero, no se\r\nencuentran debidamente legalizados, conforme lo dispone el numeral 294 inciso\r\na) de la LGAP. \r\nEllo implica que no podían surtir efectos jurídicos en Costa Rica, según lo han\r\nseñalado tanto la\r\n Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia en el fallo 76-92 de las 16 horas 30 minutos del 15 de enero de 1992;\r\ncuanto este órgano jurisdiccional en la sentencia 715-F-2006 de las 11 horas 20\r\nminutos del 27 de septiembre de 2006. Además, en los documentos números\r\n3, 4 y 11, de ese mismo legajo de pruebas, obran una serie de reportes de\r\npruebas de tuberculina que no coinciden con esos números de series o lotes, y\r\nsin que conste en el expediente sus correspondientes certificados de control de\r\ncalidad y eficacia. Al amparo de lo anteriormente expuesto, lleva razón\r\nel casacionista al señalar el error en que incurrió\r\nel Tribunal al prohijar el hecho demostrado antecedido con el número 20. \r\nNo consta en el expediente elemento probatorio idóneo que lo ampare. No\r\nobstante, lo anterior no conlleva la quiebra del fallo, por las razones que se\r\nexponen de seguido.\n\r\n\r\n\nXII.- Resulta oportuno reparar en el cuadro\r\nfáctico acontecido en esta lite. El 9 de julio de 1999, el médico\r\nveterinario del matadero El Valle, doctor Ricardo Aguilar Jiménez, detectó un\r\ncaso con sintomatología compatible con tuberculosis a nivel de matanza,\r\nproveniente de la finca de la empresa actora. Se remitieron muestras al\r\nLaboratorio Nacional de Servicios Veterinarios (LANASEVE). \r\nEl resultado fue positivo por tinción de Ziehl Neelsen. Debido a ello, la Oficina de Defensa Zoosanitaria Nacional, Región Huetar\r\nNorte, de la\r\n Dirección Nacional de Salud Animal del MAG, efectuó un\r\nmuestreo del 10% del hato de la demandante -15 bovinos hembras de la raza Holstein, escogidas al azar-. Se les practicó la\r\nprueba de tuberculina bovina en el pliegue anocaudal\r\npara el diagnóstico de esa enfermedad. Cuatro animales resultaron\r\nreactores. Por tal motivo, el 26 de octubre del mismo año se practicó la\r\nprueba cervical comparativa a los reactores como diagnóstico diferencial,\r\nutilizando PPD bovis y PPD avium. De nuevo,\r\nresultaron positivas a la PPD bovina. En consecuencia, se\r\ntuberculinizó a todo el hato. Se incluyeron a los animales de tres meses\r\nde edad en adelante. De los 179 sometidos a la prueba anocaudal,\r\n89 fueron reactores. Luego, el 4 de enero de 2000, se efectuaron pruebas\r\ncervicales comparativas a nivel de la tabla del cuello, para lo cual se utilizó\r\nla PPD\r\nbovis y la\r\n PPD avium. \r\nDe los 179 animales, 90 resultaron positivos a la prueba anocaudal,\r\n84 a la\r\ncervical PPD bovino –uno negativo-, 73 a la cervical PPD avium -12 negativos-. \r\nEn virtud de lo anterior, la\r\n Dirección de Salud Animal, en resolución de las 9 horas del\r\n12 de enero de 2000, ordenó cuarentenar la finca,\r\nmarcar los animales con la “S” de sacrificio, separar todos los animales\r\nreactores del hato, efectuar el avalúo de los animales positivos a tuberculosis\r\npor el perito del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, sacrificar los animales,\r\nsalvaguardando las condiciones de bioseguridad,\r\ncontinuar con el saneamiento del resto de los semovientes de la actora, e\r\niniciar el monitoreo y vigilancia en la fincas vecinas. Como fue señalado\r\npor los juzgadores de ambas instancias, uno de los principios rectores del\r\nDerecho Ambiental, que subyace en los numerales 46 y 50 de la Constitución Política,\r\nes el precautorio o de evitación prudente. De conformidad con la\r\ndoctrina, en esta materia no solo existen riesgos ciertos, sino también puede\r\ncaber incertidumbre científica respecto del alcance de algunos daños. \r\nEste postulado, entonces, exige que, cuando una duda razonable surja en\r\nrelación con la peligrosidad de cualquier actividad de repercusiones\r\nambientales o a la salud humana, se evite, o se tomen las medidas pertinentes\r\npara que ese eventual daño, científicamente no comprobado todavía, no llegue a\r\nproducirse. Dos son sus presupuestos: falta de certidumbre\r\ncientífica y la amenaza de daño. De manera explícita se encuentra\r\nrecogido en la “Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente y el\r\nDesarrollo”, o “Declaración de Río”: “Principio 15.- Con el fin de\r\nproteger el medio ambiente, los Estados deberán aplicar ampliamente el criterio\r\nde precaución conforme a sus capacidades. Cuando haya peligro de daño grave e\r\nirreversible, la falta de certeza científica absoluta no deberá utilizarse como\r\nrazón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces en función de los \r\ncostos para impedir la degradación del medio ambiente”. Por su\r\nparte, la Ley de\r\nBiodiversidad, número 7788 del 30 de abril de 1998, dispone: “ARTÍCULO\r\n7.- Definiciones. … Biodiversidad: variabilidad\r\nde organismos vivos de cualquier fuente, ya sea que se encuentren en\r\necosistemas terrestres, aéreos, marinos, acuáticos o en otros complejos\r\necológicos. Comprende la diversidad dentro de cada especie, así como\r\nentre las especies y los ecosistemas de los que forma parte. / Para los efectos\r\nde esta ley, se entenderán como comprendidos en el término biodiversidad, los\r\nelementos intangibles, como son: el conocimiento, la innovación y la\r\npráctica tradicional, individual o colectiva, con valor real o potencial\r\nasociado a recursos bioquímicos y genéricos, protegidos o no por los sistemas\r\nde propiedad intelectual o sistemas sui generis de registro. … ARTÍCULO 11.-\r\nCriterios para aplicar esta ley. Son criterios para\r\naplicar esta ley: 1.- Criterio preventivo: Se reconoce que es de vital\r\nimportancia anticipar, prevenir y atacar las causas de la pérdida de\r\nbiodiversidad o sus amenazas. 2.- Criterios precautorio o indubio pro natura: Cuando exista peligro o amenaza de\r\ndaños graves o inminentes a los elementos de la biodiversidad y al conocimiento\r\nasociado con estos, la ausencia de certeza científica no deberá utilizarse como\r\nrazón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces de protección. 3.-\r\nCriterio de interés público ambiental: El uso de los elementos de la\r\nbiodiversidad deberá garantizar las opciones de desarrollo de las futuras\r\ngeneraciones, la seguridad alimentaria, la conservación de los ecosistemas, la\r\nprotección de la salud humana y el mejoramiento de la calidad de vida de los\r\nciudadanos. …” En este sentido, la Sala Constitucional,\r\nen el voto 1250-99 de las 11 horas 24 minutos del 19 de febrero de 1999,\r\nseñaló: “... La prevención pretende anticiparse a los efectos negativos, y\r\nasegurar la protección, conservación y adecuada gestión de los recursos.\r\nConsecuentemente, el principio rector de prevención se fundamenta en la\r\nnecesidad de tomar y asumir todas las medidas precautorias para\r\nevitar contener la posible afectación del ambiente o la salud de las\r\npersonas. De esta forma, en caso de que exista un riesgo de daño grave o\r\nirreversible –o una duda al respecto-, se debe adoptar una medida de precaución\r\ne inclusive posponer la actividad de que se trate. Lo anterior debido\r\na que en materia ambiental la coacción a posteriori resulta ineficaz, por\r\ncuanto de haberse producido ya las consecuencias biológicas socialmente\r\nnocivas, la represión podrá tener una trascendencia moral, pero difícilmente\r\ncompensará los daños ocasionados en el ambiente”.(Lo subrayado no es del\r\noriginal. También, pueden consultarse, entre otros, los fallos de ese\r\nórgano jurisdiccional 9773-00 de las 9 horas 44 minutos del 3 de noviembre de\r\n2000 y 1711-01 de las 16 horas 32 minutos del 27 de febrero de 2001). Luego, en\r\nel voto 3480-03 de las 14 horas 2 minutos del 2 de mayo de 2003, precisó aún\r\nmás dicho concepto: “Bien entendido el principio precautorio, el mismo se\r\nrefiere a la adopción de medidas no ante el desconocimiento de hechos\r\ngeneradores de riesgo, sino ante la carencia de certeza respecto de que tales\r\nhechos efectivamente producirán efectos nocivos en el ambiente.”(Lo\r\nsubrayado es suplido). De igual manera, en el fallo 6322-2003 de las 14\r\nhoras 14 minutos del 3 de julio de 2003, indicó: “...4.- Principio\r\nprecautorio : … El término prevención deriva del latín ‘praeventio’,\r\nque alude a la acción y efecto de prevenir, a aquellas preparaciones y\r\ndisposiciones que se hacen anticipadamente para evitar un riesgo o ejecutar una\r\ncosa. La prevención pretende anticiparse a los efectos negativos, y asegurar\r\nla protección, conservación y adecuada gestión de los recursos.\r\nConsecuentemente, el principio rector de prevención se fundamenta en la\r\nnecesidad de tomar y asumir todas las medidas precautorias para evitar o\r\ncontener la posible afectación del ambiente o la salud de las personas. De esta\r\nforma, en caso de que exista un riesgo de daño grave o irreversible -o una duda\r\nal respecto-, se debe adoptar una medida de precaución e inclusive posponer la\r\nactividad de que se trate. Lo anterior debido a que en materia ambiental la\r\ncoacción a posteriori resulta ineficaz, por cuanto de haberse producido ya las\r\nconsecuencias biológicas y socialmente nocivas, la represión podrá tener una\r\ntrascendencia moral, pero difícilmente compensará los daños ocasionados al\r\nambiente.”(En igual sentido, puede consultarse el voto 2008-17618 de las 11\r\nhoras 51 minutos del 5 de diciembre de 2008 de dicha Sala). La\r\ntuberculosis es una enfermedad zoonótica, que\r\nconstituye un peligro para la ganadería y la salud pública. Por ende, se\r\nestá ante una situación que pone en peligro o amenaza de daños graves no solo a\r\nelementos de la biodiversidad (hatos lecheros vecinos de la propiedad de la\r\nempresa actora), sino también al ser humano (salud pública). En el sub júdice, a la luz del cuadro\r\nfáctico antes expuesto, resulta evidente la existencia de una duda razonable\r\n–al no existir certeza científica debido a la falta del certificado de control\r\nde calidad y eficacia de la tuberculina- que le imponía a la Administración Pública\r\nel deber, en acato del principio precautorio, de actuar como lo hizo. \r\nEsta duda razonable surge por cuanto, en tres ocasiones diferentes (primero en\r\nel matadero El Valle, luego en los resultados de los estudios de laboratorio\r\ndel LANASEVE; y, por último, en las pruebas\r\npracticadas por la Dirección\r\nde Salud Animal del MAG), se determinó la existencia de tuberculosis en\r\nanimales de la empresa actora. Incluso, la propia accionante\r\nacepta esta circunstancia –la duda respecto a la existencia de la tuberculosis\r\nen el hato-, al afirmar en el acápite de la demanda denominado “argumentación\r\njurídica”: “CUARTO: … ya que la imperfección de los\r\nelementos señalados impiden la realización del fin conforme con el ordenamiento\r\njurídico, por el cual fue dictado, pues la orden sanitaria se dicta para\r\ncombatir un brote de tuberculosis bovina, no pudiéndose saber del todo,\r\ncategóricamente de la existencia de éste en todos los animales presuntamente\r\ninfectados por lo que abajo se indicará. / En este\r\nsentido, el motivo no existe tal y como ha sido tomado en cuenta para dictar el\r\nacto impugnado, en virtud que no se puede concluir categóricamente, y sin\r\ntemor a equívocos, de la existencia de tuberculosis bovina en todos los\r\nanimales sacrificados en la finca de mi representada ...”(lo subrayado\r\nes suplido). En autos consta, a folios 468 y 469, el informe\r\nrendido por la doctora María Cecilia Matamoros, Jefa del Centro Nacional de\r\nReferencia para Tuberculosis del Instituto Costarricense de Investigación y\r\nEnseñanza en Nutrición y Salud (INCIENSA), el cual, a tenor de lo dispuesto en\r\nel numeral 301 inciso 2) de la LGAP reviste el carácter de prueba\r\ntestimonial. La doctora Matamoros, en lo de interés, manifiesta: “1. \r\nNo tengo en mis manos el oficio D.Z.S./RHN 05-00, del 11 de enero del 2000, denominado “Informe\r\nsobre brote de tuberculosis en San Gerardo de Ciudad Quesada”. Sin\r\nembargo ante las interrogantes planteadas y en cuanto a lo que me compete,\r\naclaro lo siguiente, “el descubrimiento de Mycobacterium\r\nterrae en bovinos eutanasiados\r\nde la finca de Sucesores de Clemente Marín S.A. en el caso de que dicho bacilo\r\nprodujera alguna enfermedad, las manifestaciones clínicas y patológicas de ésta\r\nserían similares a las que se producen con la infección de M. tuberculosis o M.\r\nBoris. M. terrae es un bacilo alcohol-ácido\r\nresistente de manera que la tinción de Ziehl-Neelsen puede ser positiva y la PPD\r\npuede dar reacción cruzada” es correcto, como lo afirmé en el oficio CNRTB-196-2000. Si ante la situación descrita\r\npodríamos concluir fehacientemente en la existencia de tuberculosis bovina en\r\nel hato de la empresa. Sólo se puede concluir desde el punto de vista\r\nmicrobiológico, que hay tuberculosis bovina en un animal cuando se aisla ese microorganismo de los tejidos de ese\r\nanimal. Los animales eutanasiados de los que se\r\naisló M. terrae, no son evidencia de la presencia de\r\ntuberculosis bovina. Por lo tanto persiste la duda sobre la presencia de\r\ntuberculosis bovina en el ato (sic).” Esa Sala concuerda\r\ncon lo señalado por el Tribunal en el apartado VII de\r\nla sentencia impugnada. Con dicha probanza no se logra eliminar la duda\r\nen torno a la existencia de la tuberculosis. En primer término, la parte\r\nactora solicitó dicho informe (folio 142 vuelto) para que se analizara el\r\noficio D.Z.S./RHN 05-00 del\r\n11 de enero de 2000; empero, la doctora Matamoros es clara al señalar que no lo\r\ntuvo a la vista. En segundo lugar, a pesar de que se basa en la\r\ninformación que señaló la actora en su demanda, de manera expresa indica que “Por\r\nlo tanto persiste la duda sobre la presencia de tuberculosis bovina en el ato (sic).” \r\nEs decir, no desvanece la nebulosa en torno a la existencia del brote de dicha\r\nenfermedad. Por ende, a esta lite le resulta aplicable el aludido\r\nprincipio precautorio. En definitiva, con el actuar de la Administración se\r\nprotegió el fin público involucrado (artículo 113 LGAP): \r\nla salud humana, animal –hatos vecinos-, el ambiente, así como la producción\r\nlechera de la zona en donde se ubica la finca de la actora –San Gerardo de\r\nCiudad Quesada, San Carlos-. Ergo, al amparo de las razones expuestas, se\r\nimpone el rechazo del presente motivo de\r\ndisconformidad. \n\r\n\r\n\n[…]\n\r\n\r\n\nXIV.- \r\nEn primer lugar, debe observarse que lo manifestado por el recurrente a folio\r\n701, respecto de “dos tópicos de especial y esencial trascendencia en el\r\ncaso bajo examen”, no fue propuesto y debatido oportunamente en el recurso\r\nde apelación. Ergo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 608 del Código Procesal\r\nCivil, esta Sala tiene vedado efectuar análisis alguno en torno a ello. \r\nEn segundo término, el quid de lo recriminado por el casacionista\r\nconsiste en que, en su entender, los juzgadores de instancia incurrieron en\r\nerror de derecho al valorar la probanza señalada, al invertir, de manera\r\nilegítima, la carga de la prueba, en torno del alegado incumplimiento de las\r\nmedidas técnicas al aplicarse las pruebas de tuberculina; y respecto de la\r\ndemostración de la existencia o inexistencia de un protocolo, bitácora, acta o\r\nregistro que garantice el correcto cumplimiento de las medidas técnicas de cómo\r\nse realizó esa prueba. El afirmar la inexistencia de ese registro,\r\nseñala, no encierra ningún aserto que produzca la inversión de la carga de la\r\nprueba en contra de la empresa actora. Al respecto, precisa indicar, el\r\ntema de la carga de la prueba –artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil- es un\r\naspecto de orden procesal. Así lo ha señalado reiteradamente este órgano\r\njurisdiccional desde vieja data. Al respecto, pueden consultarse, entre\r\notras, las resoluciones 31 de las 9 horas 20 minutos del 20 de marzo de 1992,\r\n1020-F-2005 de las 16 horas 28 minutos del 21 de diciembre de 2005 y\r\n908-A-S1-09 de las 11 horas del 10 de septiembre de 2009. Sin embargo, no\r\nse encuentra regulado en las causales taxativas del canon 594 íbid, como causal de casación por ese motivo. En\r\nconsecuencia, se impone el rechazo del agravio de mérito. Sin perjuicio\r\nde lo anterior, y a mayor abundamiento de razones, ha de indicarse que en el considerando\r\nXII de esta sentencia se analizó la pertinencia de\r\naplicar, a esta lite, el principio precautorio, derivado de los numerales 46 y\r\n50 de la\r\n Constitución Política, y expresamente regulado en el canon 11\r\nde la Ley de\r\nBiodiversidad. Ante la duda razonable existente, en torno al brote de\r\ntuberculosis en la propiedad de la empresa actora, la Administración Pública,\r\nconcretamente, la Dirección\r\nde Salud Animal del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (conforme lo\r\ndispuesto en el artículo 7 de la\r\n Ley número 6243, Ley de Salud Animal, vigente cuando\r\nsucedieron los hechos analizados en el sub júdice), estaba legitimada para adoptar todas aquellas\r\nmedidas en resguardo no solo de la salud humana, sino también de la animal y\r\ndel ambiente. Con el agravio de mérito se pretende establecer la\r\ninvalidez de los actos cuestionados, en virtud de la ausencia de certeza\r\ncientífica en cuanto a los resultados de las pruebas de tuberculina aplicadas\r\nen el hato de la demandante. Empero, tal requerimiento, como se indicó en\r\ndicho apartado de este fallo, no resultaba necesario para que la Administración Pública\r\nactuara en la forma como lo hizo. En consecuencia, lo esgrimido por el casacionista no resulta útil para modificar lo resuelto en\r\nla sentencia impugnada. \n\r\n\r\n\n[…]\n\r\n\r\n\nXVI.- \r\nEl aspecto medular de lo alegado por el casacionista,\r\nconsiste en que el Ad quem valoró indebidamente el\r\ninforme CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible a folios 468 a 469, al no aceptar que\r\nsolo puede concluirse la existencia de tuberculosis en un semoviente, desde el\r\npunto de vista microbiológico, cuando se aísla de los tejidos del animal. \r\nEs decir, no bastaba la aplicación de las pruebas intradérmicas o de\r\ntuberculina por parte de los funcionarios del MAG en el hato de la empresa\r\nactora. En primer lugar, debe indicarse, según se expuso en el\r\nconsiderando XI de esta sentencia, el informe rendido\r\npor la doctora María Cecilia Matamoros, en su condición de Jefa del Centro\r\nNacional de Referencia para Tuberculosis del INCISENSA,\r\nreviste la naturaleza de testimonio, conforme lo dispuesto en el canon 301\r\ninciso 2) de la LGAP, no de prueba documental de carácter\r\ncientífico como lo afirma el recurrente, y menos aún, de acto\r\nadministrativo. En segundo lugar, señala el casacionista: \r\n“Adicionalmente, en lo que a la indebida valoración de la prueba se refiere,\r\nno tomó en cuenta el Tribunal que en zonas o regiones donde se han realizado\r\ncampañas de control de la tuberculosis bovina, con (sic) en el caso de\r\nla empresa actora, es frecuente la presentación de un porcentaje considerable\r\nde animales reaccionantes, detectados con la\r\naplicación de las pruebas intradérmicas simples de rutina, ni se tomó en cuenta\r\nla gestación como posible factor de respuesta a la tuberculina, en animales\r\nentre el 6to. y 8avo. mes de gravidez, entre otras cosas. En este\r\nsentido, en relación con las especificaciones técnicas del fabricante de la\r\nprueba intradérmica con tuberculina bovina de las clases PPD\r\nAVIAR y PPD BOVINO, visibles a folio 30 del\r\nexpediente, según las reglas de la sana crítica racional (arts.\r\n298.1 y 16 LGAP) se violan específicamente las reglas\r\nde la ciencia y de la lógica, pues el fabricante de estas pruebas, en la\r\nsección de “contraindicaciones” indica que: “No deberá usarse en hembras\r\npróximas al parte o post-parto…”, esto por cuanto la gestación (entre el 6to y\r\n8avo mes de gravidez) es un posible factor de respuesta a la tuberculina,\r\nmientras que, en la sección de “advertencia” se indica que: “… La Tuberculinización\r\nno deberá repetirse si no existe un intervalo mínimo de 60 días a la prueba\r\nanterior …”, básicamente por la misma razón técnica, toda vez que, no demostró la Administración\r\nrecurrida haber cumplido con tales especificaciones al momento de practicarse\r\nla tuberculinización al hato de la empresa actora.” \r\nLos juzgadores de las instancias no tuvieron por demostrado que se hubiesen\r\nefectuado campañas de control de de la tuberculosis bovina en el hato de la\r\ncompañía actora, ni tampoco que las pruebas de tuberculina se le hubiesen\r\naplicado a hembras entre el sexto y octavo mes de gestación. Empero, el casacionista no indica con cuál prueba se demuestran esos\r\nhechos y, por ende, resulta conculcada en la sentencia recurrida. Se\r\nlimita a señalar el documento visible a folio 30 del expediente principal, en\r\ndonde solo constan las indicaciones del fabricante. Distinto a lo\r\nalegado, la carga de la prueba le incumbía a su patrocinada, a la luz de lo\r\npreceptuado en el ordinal 317 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Civil. Nótese\r\nque no se trata de un hecho negativo, sino de una afirmación que constituye el\r\nfundamento de las pretensiones anulatoria y resarcitoria\r\nesgrimidas. Luego, agrega: “En otro orden de ideas, y en lo que\r\na la indebida aplicación del principio precautorio … al caso bajo examen se\r\nrefiere, debe acotarse previamente que, las normas jurídicas aplicables al\r\npresente caso, lo son las que estaban vigentes al momento de realizarse los\r\nactos administrativos impugnados. Así, el presente proceso se rige por\r\nlas hoy derogadas Leyes de Tuberculosis Bovina No 1207 y la Ley Sobre Salud Animal No\r\n6243, con sus consecuentes reglamentos también derogados. Con fundamento\r\nen lo anterior, es dable concluir con claridad meridiana, que el\r\nprincipio precautorio, derivado del artículo 4 la Ley General del\r\nServicio Nacional de Salud Animal (sic) No 8495 de 6 de abril\r\nde 2006, publicada en La\r\n Gaceta No 93 de 16 de mayo de 2006, no tiene\r\naplicación al caso en cuestión, por ser de vigencia y/o promulgación muy\r\nposterior al acaecimiento de los actos administrativos aquí recurridos. Note\r\nla Honorable Sala\r\nde casación que el A Quo, en la sentencia de primera instancia, expresa e\r\nindebidamente aplicó dicha Ley General del Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal No\r\n8495 de 6 de abril de 2006, al caso bajo examen, situación que solapadamente\r\nprohijó el Tribunal de Alzada, en la sentencia recurrida. …” \r\nDistinto a lo afirmado por el casacionista, el A quo,\r\nni de manera solapada el Ad quem, aplicaron la Ley número 8495 del 6 de abril\r\nde 2006, Ley General del Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal. Al respecto,\r\nen la sentencia de primera instancia, en lo de interés, se indica: “Sétimo:\r\n… En esta materia, deben adoptarse medidas inmediatas, por estar de por medio\r\nla salud humana, la animal y el medio ambiente, dirigidas a la protección de\r\ncada uno de ellos, conforme se anticipó en las resoluciones que decidieron el\r\nincidente de suspensión, No 56-2001 de 10.00 horas de 13 de enero,\r\nconsiderando Vo (folios 351 a 354), y No\r\n216-2001 de 11.45 horas de 20 de julio (folios 377 a 389). Rigen\r\nprincipios como el de análisis o valoración de riesgos, precautorio o cautela,\r\nprotección de los intereses del consumidor, equivalencia, transparencia e\r\ninformación, los cuales tienen raigambre constitucional (artículos 46 y 50 de la Constitución Política),\r\ny están hoy expresamente reconocidos por el legislador ordinario (Ley No\r\n8495, artículo 4o). Conforme al principio precautorio, la\r\nfalta de certeza científica no es excusa para adoptar decisiones a favor de la\r\nsalud y el ambiente. En este sentido el Juzgado encuentra que las decisiones\r\nadoptadas y medidas aplicadas, se fundan en la prueba de tuberculina realizada,\r\nque es la prueba establecida para estos casos, sin que la falta de pruebas\r\nconfirmatorias o complementarias, impida proceder de esta manera. Los\r\nactos por tanto no son fruto de la voluntad desnuda de quien los emitió, sino\r\nmedidas adecuadas fundadas en criterios técnicos médicos, dirigidas a proteger\r\nbienes de superior linaje.”(Lo subrayado no es del original). Se\r\ncomprueba con facilidad que lo afirmado por el juzgador es la aplicación de\r\nprincipios de linaje constitucional; los que, al momento del dictado de ese\r\nfallo, fueron plasmados, además, en la\r\n Ley 8495 (comentario que se hace para efectos de aclarativos,\r\nmas no con la intención de aplicar esa ley), pero antes de eso subyacían en la Constitución Política\r\n–numerales 46 y 50-. Por su parte, en el fallo cuestionado, en lo\r\nconducente, el Tribunal señala: “VI.- TERCER AGRAVIO. RESPECTO DEL\r\nALEGADO INCUMPLIMIENTO DE LAS MEDIDAS TÉCNICAS AL APLICAR LAS PRUEBAS TUBERCULINAS.\r\n… Debe tenerse en cuenta que el acto administrativo impugnado, en última\r\ninstancia, ha tenido como finalidad la protección de la salud humana (interés\r\ncolectivo), y en ese sentido, lleva razón el A-quo en advertir que ante tal\r\nescenario, rigen los principios recogidos en los artículos 46 y 50 de la Constitución Política,\r\nen tanto procuran la protección de la salud y el ambiente sano y ecológicamente\r\nequilibrado, siendo uno de ellos efectivamente el principio “precautorio”,\r\nsegún el cual, la ausencia de certeza científica no debe utilizarse como\r\njustificación para no adoptar medidas eficaces de protección, como en este\r\ncaso, en donde la\r\n Administración se vio obligada a sacrificar los bovinos de la\r\nactora, con el fin de evitar una epidemia que pudiera constituir un peligro\r\ngrave para la salud de los habitantes y del ambiente. … VII.-\r\nCUARTO AGRAVIO. SOBRE EL FUNDAMENTO TÉCNICO DEL ACTO IMPUGNADO Y LA VALORACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA EN SU CONJUNTO.\r\n… De cualquier manera, el informe de la doctora Matamoros, construido con base\r\nen la información expuesta por el actor en su demanda, plantea la posibilidad\r\nde “duda sobre la presencia de tuberculosis bovina en el ato” (sic), y en ese\r\nsentido, se reitera que en aplicación del principio precautorio, la duda no\r\nes motivo para no adoptar las medidas de protección a favor de la salud y el\r\nambiente. …”(Lo subrayado es suplido). Sin lugar a dudas, se\r\ncolige que ni en forma expresa ni vedada el Tribunal aplicó la Ley número 8495 de 6 de abril\r\nde 2006, sino un principio constitucional –el precautorio- que yace en los\r\nnumerales 46 y 50 de la\r\n Carta Magna. En esta línea de pensamiento, en el\r\nconsiderando XII, de manera prolija, se expusieron\r\nlas razones por las cuales esta Sala estima que, al amparo de ese postulado\r\n(previsto, cuando acontecieron los hechos analizados en esta lite, no solo en la Constitución Política,\r\nsino también en el numeral 11 de la\r\n Ley número 7788 del 30 de abril de 1998, Ley de\r\nBiodiversidad, la cual resulta aplicable al sub júdice), en virtud de la duda razonable existente en torno\r\nal brote de tuberculosis en el hato de la empresa actora, la Administración se\r\nencontraba legitimada para actuar como lo hizo. El casacionista,\r\npara negar la aplicación de dicho principio, señala a folio 707: “Con\r\nfundamento en tales probanzas, contrario a lo aseverado por el Tribunal en el\r\nconsiderando sétimo de la sentencia recurrida, es dable concluir que no\r\nexisten elementos objetivos para afirmar que la ejecución de las medidas\r\nadministrativas se ajustaron a las reglas de la ciencia, lógica y conveniencia,\r\nno apreciándose que la decisión se haya adoptado dentro de los límites de\r\nracionalidad y razonabilidad implícitos en el\r\nordenamiento jurídico, en tanto la realización de la prueba de tuberculina no\r\nconstituye un elemento (motivo del acto administrativo) técnico médico\r\nveterinario idóneo para dictar medidas de ese género (sacrificio y/o exterminio\r\nde bovinos) a favor de la salud humana, animal y del medio ambiente (fin),\r\npues, según se indicó supra, la ausencia de\r\npruebas complementarias o confirmatorias de carácter laboratorial,\r\nviciaría el contenido del acto. …”(Lo subrayado es\r\nsuplido). Como se determina con claridad, el recurrente, una vez más,\r\npretende establecer la invalidez de los actos cuestionados en la ausencia de\r\ncerteza científica en cuanto a los resultados de las pruebas de tuberculina\r\naplicadas en el hato de la empresa demandante. No obstante, se reitera,\r\nen aplicación del aludido principio precautorio, ante la duda razonable\r\nexistente, esa seguridad no resultaba necesaria para que la Dirección de Salud\r\nAnimal del MAG actuara como lo hizo. De igual manera, en el susodicho\r\napartado de esta sentencia, se analizó el informe rendido por la doctora\r\nMatamoros, visible a folios 468-469. Se concluyó que no lograba desvirtuar\r\nesa duda y, por ende, que el actuar de la Administración\r\ndeviniera en ilegítimo. Por otro lado, cuando el indicado órgano del MAG\r\ndictó la resolución de las 9 horas del 12 de enero de 2000, e incluso, al\r\nmomento de ejecutarse las medidas ahí contenidas (véase los hechos probados 4,\r\n5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, no cuestionados por el casacionista),\r\nla normativa vigente era la contenida en: 1) Ley número 1207 del 9 de\r\noctubre de 1950, conocida como Ley de Tuberculosis Bovina; 2) Decreto Ejecutivo\r\n10120-A del 9 de mayo de 1979, “Reglamento sobre el Control de la Tuberculosis Bovina”;\r\ny 3) la Ley sobre\r\nSalud Animal, número 6243, del 2 de mayo de 1978. En lo de interés,\r\ndispone el primer cuerpo normativo: “Artículo 2º Se\r\ndeclara obligatoria la prueba de tuberculina para todos los animales vacunos,\r\nlas veces que se considere conveniente, la cual será aplicada por los\r\nfuncionarios debidamente capacitados que designen los Ministerios de\r\nAgricultura e Industria y Salubridad Pública. Artículo 3º Los\r\nanimales vacunos en los cuales la prueba de tuberculina hubiese dado resultado\r\npositivo serán aislados inmediatamente y sacrificados una vez llenados los\r\nrequisitos a que se refieren los artículos siguientes. Artículo 4o \r\nTan pronto se compruebe que un animal está infectado de tuberculosis, se\r\nsolicitará al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica el envío de dos peritos, que serán\r\npreferentemente ingenieros agrónomos colegiados, quienes procederán a valorar\r\nel animal enfermo en presencia de un médico veterinario oficial, para cuyo\r\nefecto no se tomará en cuenta la tuberculosis del mismo. El Banco\r\nNacional dará primacía siempre a tal solicitud.”(Lo subrayado no aparece en\r\nel original). Por su parte, el Reglamento a esa Ley, Decreto Ejecutivo\r\n10120-A, en lo conducente, preceptúa: “Artículo 5º. Cuando\r\nla Dirección\r\ndel Programa Nacional de Salud Animal reciba la información a que hacen mención\r\nlos artículos tercero y cuarto de este Reglamento, procederán inmediatamente a\r\nrealizar el estudio epidemiológico del hato afectado y a hacer la prueba de\r\ntuberculina a la totalidad del ganado existente en el mismo. Artículo\r\n6º. La prueba de tuberculina realizada en hatos con problemas o en\r\nanimales reaccionantes podrá ser hecha, por\r\nmédicos veterinarios privados, previo conocimiento del procedimiento legal a\r\nseguir con animales reaccionantes y adiestramiento en\r\nlas técnicas usadas oficialmente, a quienes se les extenderá una credencial\r\notorgada por la Dirección\r\ndel Programa de Salud Animal, llevándose un registro en los (sic)\r\nMédicos Veterinarios acreditados para ello. En caso de incumplimiento de\r\nlos procedimientos aquí señalados, la Dirección del Programa estará facultada para\r\nsuspender la credencial otorgada, comunicándolo al Colegio de Médicos\r\nVeterinarios. Artículo 7º. Los animales que fueren\r\nclasificados como reaccionantes, serán debidamente\r\nidentificados, marcados a fuego, evaluados e inmediatamente sacrificados, esto\r\nde conformidad con la Ley No\r\n1207. Artículo 8º . Se establecerá en un área de\r\nproducción lechera, como plan piloto, un programa de certificación de hatos\r\nlibres de tuberculosis, estableciéndose un registro de propietarios que se\r\nacojan voluntariamente a dicho Programa, para que posteriormente se puedan\r\ndeclarar áreas libres. Artículo 9º . Sólo se permitirá el\r\ningreso al área del plan piloto a los animales que resultaren negativos a la\r\nprueba de la tuberculina. Artículo 10º . Los\r\npropietarios que se sometan al plan voluntario del área piloto someterán la\r\ntotalidad de su hato a la prueba de la tuberculina, eliminarán sus\r\nanimales reaccionantes de acuerdo con la Ley No 1207. \r\nLos rebaños que tuvieren animales reaccionantes\r\nrepartirán sus pruebas de tuberculina cada 60 días hasta que se obtenga un\r\nresultado negativo de la totalidad del hato. A partir de ese momento\r\nse harán dos controles al año (uno por semestre). Artículo 11º . \r\nLos hatos que en el área del plan piloto resultaren negativos a la prueba de\r\nla tuberculina, serán sometidos a otra prueba seis meses después y si\r\nvolviera a resultar negativa, se considerarán hatos libres, debiendo ser\r\nsometidos a control una vez al año. Artículo 12º . Una\r\nvez eliminados los animales reaccionantes, se\r\nprocederá a hacer una limpieza y desinfectación total de las estructuras de los\r\nestablos, corrales, etc. Utilizándose para ello desinfectantes\r\nrecomendados por las autoridades del Programa.”(Lo subrayado no es del\r\noriginal). Por último, la\r\n Ley 6243 del 2 de mayo de 1978, Ley sobre Salud Animal, en su\r\nartículo séptimo señala: “El Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, por\r\nmedio de las autoridades sanitarias correspondientes y de aquellas que designe exprofeso, queda facultado para tomar cualquier medida cuarentenaria o de destrucción que la Dirección de Salud\r\nAnimal recomiende, en el caso de brotes de enfermedades que pongan en peligro\r\nla salud pública o la salud animal. / Estas medidas podrán ser el sacrificio,\r\nel aislamiento, la retención o el tratamiento de animales o la destrucción por\r\nincineración o desnaturalización de los productos o subproductos o desechos que\r\nse consideren, a juicio de la\r\n Dirección de Salud Animal, un peligro de contagio o de\r\ndifusión de enfermedades o de condiciones morbosas, similares, en perjuicio de\r\nla salud pública o la salud animal. Las autoridades competentes quedan\r\nfacultadas para realizar las visitas de inspección dentro de la propiedad\r\nprivada u oficial, en procura de inspección, de información, de pruebas, de\r\nobjetos, de muestras de animales, etc. Los respectivos dueños, previa\r\nidentificación de la autoridad, están obligados a permitir su entrada.” A la\r\nluz de las disposiciones antes transcritas, resulta evidente que la tesis del casacionista, en el sentido de que la aplicación de\r\ntuberculina no era suficiente, sino que resultaba indispensable efectuar\r\npruebas complementarias o confirmatorias de carácter laboratorial,\r\nno es de recibo. La única prueba prevista en la legislación –entiéndase\r\nley y reglamento- aplicable a esta lite, para detectar la tuberculosis bovina,\r\nera la tuberculina. En este sentido, una vez practicada, los animales con\r\nresultado positivo, eran debidamente clasificados, marcados a fuego, evaluados\r\ne inmediatamente sacrificados, siendo el competente para ordenar tales medidas la Dirección de Salud\r\nAnimal del MAG. El artículo noveno del Decreto Ejecutivo 28515-MAG,\r\n“Reglamento sobre el Control de la Tuberculosis Bovina”,\r\nfue el que estableció la prueba complementaria de laboratorio, al\r\nseñalar: “Los animales que fueren clasificados como reaccionantes, serán claramente marcados en forma indeleble\r\ny visible en el masetero derecho con una \"S\", acción que debe\r\nejecutar el técnico o profesional oficial o privado acreditado que realizó las\r\npruebas, dentro de los tres días hábiles siguientes a partir del recibido de\r\nla confirmación laboratorial.”(Lo subrayado\r\nno es del original). Empero, no es aplicable al sub\r\nlítem. Fue emitido el 25 de noviembre de 1999,\r\npero publicado y, por ende, vigente, hasta el 17 de marzo de 2000; esto es,\r\nluego de haberse dictado y ejecutado la resolución administrativa que se\r\nimpugna en este proceso, vale decir, la de la Dirección de Salud\r\nAnimal del MAG de las 9 horas del 12 de enero de 2000. Conforme con lo\r\nexpuesto, el agravio en estudio debe desestimarse. \n\r\n\r\n\nXVII.- \r\nEn el séptimo reparo, denominado por el recurrente “octavo motivo de\r\ncasación por razones de fondo por violación indirecta de la ley” alega\r\nindebida valoración de los elementos de prueba que constan en el proceso\r\nconforme a las reglas de la sana crítica racional. Ello por cuanto, según\r\nmanifiesta, el Tribunal, a contrapelo de toda evidencia estableció, para\r\nefectos de atribución de la responsabilidad patrimonial, que la Administración\r\nactuó en forma lícita y normal. Copia lo expuesto por el Ad quem en el Considerando VIII de\r\nla sentencia impugnada. Para efectos patrimoniales y/o indemnizatorios,\r\ncomenta, es de capital importancia la calificación del funcionamiento\r\nadministrativo, para así determinar la amplitud de la responsabilidad.\r\nTratándose de conducta ilícita o funcionamiento anormal, se debe reparar el\r\ndaño y los perjuicios; mas si la responsabilidad deriva de actos lícitos o\r\nconducta normal, solo procede la indemnización del daño. En este orden de\r\nideas, apunta, para efectos resarcitorios, distinto a\r\nlo afirmado por el Tribunal, la ruptura del tope indemnizatorio fijado por el\r\nartículo 7 de la Ley\r\nde Tuberculosis Bovina, número l207, tiene utilidad y es de la mayor\r\nimportancia. Lo anterior, porque si se demuestra fehacientemente la\r\nenfermedad del bovino eutanasiado procede, como indemnización,\r\núnicamente el 50% de su valor pericialmente determinado. Pero, añade, si\r\nexiste duda respecto a si el animal está enfermo o se encuentra sano, debe\r\nreconocerse el 100% de su valor, según se extrae del canon 194.2 de la LGAP,\r\nhabida cuenta que, sobre el punto en particular, habría una colisión de dos\r\nleyes especiales en materia indemnizatoria, donde la ley posterior deroga la\r\nanterior. Es decir, arguye, la\r\n LGAP en torno a este aspecto\r\nderoga, para esta lite, lo hoy derogada Ley de Tuberculosis Bovina. De un\r\nanálisis armónico y en conjunto de la totalidad de los elementos de prueba que\r\nobran en el proceso, conforme con las reglas de la sana crítica racional,\r\nindica, se obtiene que, para diagnosticar la tuberculosis bovina en un hato, no\r\nes suficiente practicar la prueba de tuberculina o de diagnóstico, sino que es\r\nnecesario realizar pruebas confirmatorias de carácter laboratorial. \r\nLo anterior, agrega, por cuanto, a la luz de los ordinales 9 in fine del Reglamento sobre\r\nel Control de la\r\n Tuberculosis Bovina (Decreto Ejecutivo 28515-MAG del 25 de\r\nnoviembre de 1999), 4 inciso g) y 33 inciso a) del Reglamento General del\r\nInstituto Costarricense de Investigación y Enseñanza en Nutrición y Salud,\r\nINCIENSA (Decreto Ejecutivo 26656-S del 9 de enero de 1998), en relación con el\r\ninforme CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible a folios 468-469\r\ndel expediente judicial, solo se puede concluir, desde el punto de vista\r\nmicrobiológico, que hay tuberculosis bovina en un animal cuando se aisla ese microorganismo de los tejidos de ese\r\nsemoviente. No basta la aplicación de las pruebas intradérmicas o\r\ntuberculinas practicadas por los funcionarios del MAG en el hato de la empresa\r\nactora. En este orden de ideas, prosigue, al ser la actuación desplegada\r\npor la Administración\r\nuna de aquellas que causan perjuicio grave a los derechos subjetivos o\r\nintereses legítimos del administrado, le resultaba obligatorio verificar la\r\nverdad real de los hechos que sirvieron de motivo al acto impugnado en este\r\nproceso, en la forma más fiel y completa posible, lo cual se echa de\r\nmenos. Consecuentemente, se conculcan los numerales 214.2, 221 y 308,1\r\ninciso a) de la LGAP. Por otro lado, reitera,\r\nla realización de la prueba de tuberculina no constituye un elemento (motivo\r\ndel acto administrativo) técnico médico veterinario idóneo para dictar medidas\r\nde ese género (sacrificio y/o exterminio de bovinos) a favor de la salud\r\nhumana, animal y del medio ambiente (fin). La ausencia de pruebas\r\ncomplementarias o confirmatorias de carácter laboratorial,\r\nvicia el contenido del acto. De esta manera, agrega, con fundamento en las\r\nprobanzas, concretamente en los documentos de carácter científico visibles a\r\nfolios 72 a\r\n76, 146, 303, 305, 468-469 del expediente judicial, así como de los documentos\r\nvisibles a folios 303, 304, 313\r\n a 317 del administrativo, contrario a lo aseverado por\r\nel Tribunal en el considerando séptimo de la sentencia recurrida, es dable\r\nconcluir que no existen elementos objetivos para afirmar que la ejecución de\r\nlas medidas administrativas se ajustaron a las reglas unívocas de la ciencia o\r\nde la técnica, o a principios elementales de justicia, lógica o\r\nconveniencia. Estos conceptos, dice, se resumen en la razonabilidad\r\ny proporcionalidad de la norma como parámetros de constitucionalidad, artículo\r\n16 de la LGAP,\r\nno apreciándose que la decisión se haya adoptado dentro de los límites de\r\nracionalidad y razonabilidad implícitos en el\r\nordenamiento jurídico. En lo que a la extensión de la indemnización del\r\ndaño material se refiere, afirma, lo resuelto por el Tribunal es\r\ntendenciosamente parcial y concomitantemente omiso. Se limitó a\r\nconsiderar el daño material proveniente del sacrificio o matanza total del hato\r\nde la empresa actora, lo cual, si bien es el más ostensible, no es el único\r\ncausado y sufrido ilegítimamente por su poderdante. El daño y \r\nperjuicio se miden en función de la productividad de los animales, cuyo\r\nexterminio coadyuvó en la crisis financiera de la empresa. En este\r\nsentido, arguye, una lechería es un negocio y debe analizarse como tal. \r\nUna unidad productiva o empresa tiene un valor de conformidad con sus\r\nutilidades, que están en función de su inversión representada por sus activos\r\nfijos o inmovilizados y por sus activos circulantes. A mayor riesgo o\r\ninversión, mayor debe ser la utilidad y su valor. El Tribunal, señala el casacionista, de manera indebida dejó de analizar el daño\r\nconcerniente a la desnaturalización o destrucción de la leche fluida; el valor\r\nde la pureza genética del hato en sí, pues los bovinos aniquilados eran ganado\r\ncon pedigrí (genealogía de un animal de raza) y registrados tanto por la Asociación de Criadores\r\nde Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica, como por la Asociación Costarricense\r\nde Criadores de Ganado Jersey (folios 183 a 223, ambos inclusive,\r\ndel expediente administrativo); la prohibición de venta de la leche; la no\r\nventa de animales machos de desecho para la actividad, así como de las hembras\r\nno idóneas; el crecimiento esperado y la utilidad en el desarrollo del hato, el\r\ncrecimiento y producción del hato. Se debieron analizar también, apunta,\r\nlos costos fijos de operación de la empresa, donde se mantuvo todo el activo\r\nfijo existente (la finca, las instalaciones, el equipo, etc.), que al afectarse\r\nlos ingresos, involucró los activos circulantes, que, desde luego, al existir\r\nun flujo de caja negativo, inevitablemente se perjudicaron los pasivos\r\ncirculantes, lo que generó una cadena de inestabilidad financiera en la\r\ncompañía, pues se inmovilizaron parte de sus recursos o haberes al mermar sus\r\ningresos o producción; la merma en la continuidad de la producción por la no\r\nocupación de la capacidad instalada; la pérdida operacional a falta de\r\nproducción; los costos de carácter financiero referidos tanto a\r\napalancamientos, como a los de inversión (ya estaba la finca, las instalaciones\r\nde mejoras o construcciones, el equipo, los potreros, las cercas, los apartos, los caminos internos, y toda la infraestructura en\r\ngeneral); los costos indirectos de producción y administrativos que tuvo que\r\nsoportar la compañía, etc. Situación jurídico procesal evidenciada,\r\nmanifiesta, que provoca la nulidad del fallo recurrido. En consecuencia,\r\nse echa de menos un análisis en conjunto de la prueba existente, acorde con las\r\nreglas de la sana crítica racional. A manera de ejemplo, apunta, el\r\ninforme CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible a folios 468-469\r\ndel expediente judicial, a pesar de ser prueba documental de carácter\r\ncientífico, fue desdeñado su valor probatorio por el Tribunal. A la vez\r\nque, teniendo el informe emanado de un funcionario de la Administración, una\r\nsuerte de carácter sustitutivo de la absolución de posiciones (artículo 54.1 de\r\nla LRJCA),\r\ny/o la de constituir un testimonio (artículo 301.2 de la LGAP),\r\ncomenta, el rendido por el Dr. José Joaquín Oreamuno\r\nToledo, Director de Salud Animal, visible a folios 506 a 508 del expediente,\r\nsegún el cual, la tuberculina utilizada por la Administración para\r\ndiagnosticar la tuberculosis bovina en el hato de la empresa actora, estaba\r\namparada a un certificado de control de calidad, muy a pesar de que el mismo se\r\nconsidera dado bajo juramento, no lo trastoca en un peritaje o en una prueba de\r\ncarácter o naturaleza técnico-científica, razón por la cual carece de respaldo\r\nfáctico que sustente lo ahí afirmado. Contrario a lo sostenido por el\r\nTribunal, que ilegítimamente le concedió carácter o condición de peritaje y/o\r\nde prueba de carácter o naturaleza técnico-científica. En lo que a la extensión\r\ndel daño material se refiere, comenta, el Ad quem fue\r\nomiso en considerar el acta de desnaturalización y destrucción de 2315 kilogramos de\r\nleche fluida (folio 31 del expediente judicial); la de cuarentena (folio 32);\r\nla constancia de visita No. 2635-A, donde se destruyen 4790 kilogramos de\r\nleche fluida y otros (folio 33); la de visita No. 2636-A, cuando se destruyen 1.458,5 kilogramos\r\nde leche fluida y otros (folio 34); el acta de decomiso No. 4171 de 417 kilogramos de\r\nleche fluida (folio 35); la constancia de visita No. 2638-A donde consta, entre\r\notras cosas, la destrucción de 2.773,6 kilogramos\r\nde leche fluida (folio 37); la certificación notarial de los oficios DZS/RH 009-00 y 007-00 DZS/RHN del 13 de enero de 2000,\r\nindicándole a la\r\n Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L., la obligación de no recolectar leche fluida (folios\r\n39 y 40); cinco actas notariales de destrucción de leche fluida (folios 229 a 233) del expediente\r\nprincipal; así como las experticias actuariales matemáticas realizadas por los\r\nlicenciados Salvador Hernández Araya y Leonel Centeno Madrigal (respectivamente a folios 234 a 255 y 513 a 529). En conclusión,\r\nanota, se trasgredieron, por aplicación indebida, los cánones 11, 33, 41, 45,\r\n50 de la\r\n Constitución Política; 190.2, 194.1.2.3 de la LGAP;\r\n3, 7 de la hoy derogada Ley de Tuberculosis Bovina, número 1207; por falta de\r\nactuación, los numerales 190.1, 191, 192 y 196 de la LGAP. \r\nAdemás, como normas de valor, se trasgredieron los artículos 298.2 de la LGAP\r\ny 330 del Código Procesal Civil.\n\r\n\r\n\nXVIII.- \r\nA la luz de la formulación, el presente agravio se subdivide en dos\r\npuntos. En el primero, afirma el casacionista,\r\nla indemnización por concepto del sacrificio de los semovientes propiedad de su\r\nrepresentada debió ser del 100% y no solo del 50%. Ello por cuanto, no\r\nexistió certeza de la infección de tuberculosis, debido a que la prueba de\r\ntuberculina no resultaba suficiente, sino que debieron practicarse pruebas\r\ncomplementarias de laboratorio, pues solo así se podía diagnosticar, a ciencia\r\ncierta, la tuberculosis bovina. Al respecto, precisa señalar lo\r\nsiguiente. Como se indicó en el considerando XI\r\nde esta sentencia, lo consignado en el hecho demostrado antecedido con el\r\nnúmero 20, en cuanto a que las tuberculinas utilizadas y aplicadas a los\r\nanimales de la parte actora se encontraban amparadas a un certificado de\r\ncontrol de calidad y eficacia, es equívoco, pues resulta ayuno de prueba idónea\r\ncon la cual se demuestre esa situación fáctica. Sin embargo, como harto\r\nse ha expuesto, entre otros, en el apartado XII, esa\r\ncircunstancia no conlleva la quiebra del fallo. En tres ocasiones,\r\ndistintas personas o instituciones, determinaron la existencia de tuberculosis\r\nen los animales de la empresa actora: primero fue el veterinario del\r\nmatadero El Valle, doctor Ricardo Aguilar Jiménez; luego, los estudios de\r\nlaboratorio efectuados por el LANASEVE; y, por\r\núltimo, las pruebas de tuberculina aplicadas por los funcionarios del\r\nMAG. Debido a esos resultados positivos coincidentes, y ante la ausencia\r\ndel certificado de control de calidad y eficacia, surge una duda razonable en\r\ncuanto al brote de tuberculosis, lo cual, al amparo del principio precautorio\r\n(derivado, a nivel constitucional, de los cánones 46 y 50; y expresamente\r\nregulado en la Ley\r\nde Biodiversidad en su numeral 11), obligaba a la Administración Pública,\r\nen concreto, a la Dirección\r\nde Salud Animal del MAG, a actuar de la manera como lo hizo. Por otro\r\nlado, en el considerando XVI se analizó el por qué, a\r\njuicio de esta Sala, no lleva razón el casacionista\r\nen su alegato de que no era suficiente el resultado de la aplicación de la\r\ntuberculina, sino que se imponía realizar, además, pruebas confirmatorias o de\r\ncarácter laboratorial. Consecuentemente,\r\nal amparo de lo expuesto, y como bien lo indicaron los juzgadores de las\r\ninstancias, la\r\n Administración Pública actuó de manera lícita y normal al\r\nordenar, entre otras medidas, el sacrificio de los animales que reaccionaron\r\npositivamente a las pruebas aplicadas. En este sentido, se reitera, el\r\nmotivo lo constituye la duda razonable en torno a la existencia del brote de\r\ntuberculosis en la finca de la empresa actora, a fin de proteger la salud\r\nhumana, animal y el ambiente. En cuanto al aspecto indemnizatorio por ese tipo\r\nde actuar administrativo, dispone el numeral 194 de la LGAP: \r\n“1. La\r\n Administración será responsable por sus actos lícitos y por\r\nsu funcionamiento normal cuando los mismos causen daño a los derechos del\r\nadministrado en forma especial, por la pequeña proporción de afectados o por la\r\nintensidad excepcional de la lesión. / 2. En este caso la indemnización\r\ndeberá cubrir el valor de los daños al momento de su pago, pero no el lucro\r\ncesante. / 3. El Estado será responsable por los daños causados\r\ndirectamente por una ley, que sean especiales de conformidad con el presente\r\nartículo.”(Lo subrayado es suplido). Sin embargo, tratándose de la\r\nreparación pecuniaria ante el sacrificio de semovientes por estar enfermos de\r\ntuberculosis, contrario a lo afirmado por el casacionista,\r\nla anterior disposición no resulta aplicable. Existe normativa\r\nespecial: la contenida en la\r\n Ley número 1207 del 9 de octubre de 1950. Se trata de\r\nuna ley específica en torno a esa materia –tuberculosis bovina-, no general\r\ncomo lo dispuesto en la LGAP. En este sentido, el canon\r\nséptimo dispone: “Con base en el peritazgo ha (sic)\r\nque se ha hecho referencia, el dueño del animal sacrificado, tan pronto\r\npresente su reclamación, será indemnizado por el Estado con el 50% del valor\r\nfijado por los peritos del Banco Nacional. No obstante lo dicho en\r\neste artículo, el Estado, en caso de animales asegurados, solo estará obligado\r\na pagar al dueño de los mismos la diferencia que resultare en su contra entre\r\nel seguro y el 50% a que se refiere este artículo.”(Lo subrayado es\r\nsuplido). Lo afirmado por el recurrente, en el sentido de que “… si se\r\ndemuestra fehacientemente la enfermedad del bovino eutanasiado,\r\nprocede como indemnización, únicamente el 50% de su valor pericialmente\r\ndeterminado (artículo 7 ibídem) … pero si hay duda\r\nsobre si el animal está enfermo o éste se encuentra sano, debe pagarse el 100%\r\ndel valor de tal animal …” no es de recibo. Como se apuntó, la\r\nausencia de certeza científica no era óbice para que la Administración Pública\r\nactuara de la manera como lo hizo, ya que el principio precautorio así lo\r\nexigía. Por su parte, la ley en comentario solo prevé, como\r\nindemnización, el pago del 50% del valor, pericialmente fijado, de los animales\r\nsacrificados, tal y como fue resarcida la sociedad demandante (véanse los\r\nhechos probados 17 y 19, no cuestionados por el casacionista),\r\nno el 100% en caso de duda. Por tanto, al haber sido indemnizada la\r\nempresa actora, en cuanto al sacrificio de sus semovientes, según lo dispuesto\r\nen la normativa aplicable al sub júdice,\r\nse colige la improcedencia del reclamo de mérito.\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nXIX.- \r\nEn el segundo punto del reproche, manifiesta el recurrente que lo resuelto por\r\nel Tribunal es omiso, ya que, de manera indebida, se limitó a considerar el\r\ndaño material proveniente del sacrificio del hato de su poderdante, el cual,\r\naunque es el más ostensible, no es el único. Lleva razón el casacionista. Al respecto, como ya se ha indicado, el\r\nnumeral séptimo de la Ley\r\n6243 del 2 de mayo de 1978, Ley sobre Salud Animal, faculta al MAG a tomar\r\ncualquier medida cuarentenaria o de destrucción que la Dirección de Salud\r\nAnimal recomiende, en el caso de brotes de enfermedades que pongan en peligro\r\nla salud pública o animal. Esas medidas, distintas a la del sacrificio de\r\nlos animales, también pueden generar daños resarcibles, según lo dispuesto en\r\nel ordinal 194 de la LGAP; siempre y cuando sea efectivo –a\r\nconsecuencia de las medidas tomadas-, evaluable e individualizable\r\nen relación con una persona o grupo, conforme lo dispone el artículo 196 ibídem. En relación, afirma el\r\nrecurrente: “Así, el Tribunal indebidamente dejó de analizar el daño\r\nconcerniente a la desnaturalización o destrucción de la leche fluida; el valor\r\nde la pureza genética del hato en sí, puesto que los bovinos aniquilados eran\r\nganado con pedigrí (genealogía de un animal de raza) y/o registrado, tanto por la Asociación de Criadores\r\nde Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica como por la Asociación Costarricense\r\nde Criadores de Ganado Jersey (Ver folios 183 a 223, ambos inclusive\r\ndel expediente administrativo); la prohibición de venta de la leche; la no venta\r\nde animales machos de desecho para la actividad así como de las hembras no\r\nidóneas; el crecimiento esperado y la utilidad en el desarrollo del hato, el\r\ncrecimiento y producción del hato; se debieron analizar también los costos\r\nfijos de operación de la empresa, donde se mantuvo todo el activo fijo\r\nexistente (la finca, las instalaciones, el equipo, etc.), que al afectarse los\r\ningresos, se afectaron también los activos circulantes, que, desde luego, al\r\nexistir un flujo de caja negativo, inevitablemente se afectaron los pasivos\r\ncirculantes, lo que generó una cadena de inestabilidad financiera en la\r\nempresa, pues se inmovilizaron parte de sus recursos o haberes al mermar sus\r\ningresos de producción; la pérdida de la continuidad de la producción por la no\r\nocupación de la capacidad instalada; la pérdida operacional a falta de\r\nproducción; los costos de carácter financiero referidos tanto a apalancamientos\r\ncomo a los costos de inversión (ya estaba la finca, ya estaban las\r\ninstalaciones de mejoras o construcciones, ya estaba el equipo, ya estaban los\r\npotreros, las cercas, los apartos, los caminos\r\ninternos y toda la infraestructura en general); los costos indirectos de\r\nproducción y costos administrativos que tuvo que soportar la empresa; etc, situación jurídico procesal evidenciada que provoca la\r\nnulidad del fallo recurrido.” En torno al valor de la pureza genética\r\ndel hato en sí, al referirse a los animales sacrificados, está comprendido en\r\nla indemnización analizada en el apartado anterior. En relación al resto\r\nde las afirmaciones del casacionista, excepto a la\r\nleche fluida, el sustento probatorio lo constituyen los dictámenes efectuados\r\npor el licenciado Salvador Hernández Araya (folios 233 a 254) y por el ingeniero\r\nLeonel Centeno Madrigal (folios 513 a 529). Ambas\r\nexperticias, a la luz de las reglas de la sana crítica, no le merecen fe a esta\r\nSala. La primera, por cuanto fue confeccionada a solicitud del gerente de\r\nla empresa actora, Osman Marín Rojas, sin que se le\r\nhubiese dado la oportunidad a la parte contraria de objetarla o solicitar\r\nadiciones y aclaraciones. Además, como lo indica el licenciado Hernández Araya, el informe lo realizó solo con la información y\r\ndocumentos que le proporcionó la parte interesada. Por tanto, de darle algún\r\ntipo de valor, se pondría en estado de indefensión a la parte demandada. \r\nLa segunda, por cuanto está ayuna del debido fundamento. El experto omite\r\nindicar cuáles fueron los métodos y las fórmulas utilizadas, amén de su\r\nsustento fáctico, doctrinal o científico, para arribar a las conclusiones a las\r\nque llegó. Se limita a señalar “Para la realización del estudio solicitado\r\nse realizó un estudio de las piezas que componen el expediente judicial y se\r\naplicaron las normas profesionales que rigen la materia.” Por lo\r\ntanto, las afirmaciones efectuadas parecen meras opiniones subjetivas. En\r\neste sentido, por ejemplo, afirma: “De lo anterior los cuarenta y\r\nsiete animales promedio, estaban en capacidad de producir leche en el período\r\nindicado, solo que los de menor edad se integrarían a la producción en años\r\nposteriores al inicial. Por efecto de simplicidad en la exposición y en\r\nel cálculo, para obviar el problema de la variable adicional de edades y sin\r\ndesmeritar el resultado final del estudio, se procederá a calcular una media de\r\nproducción, no lineal exacta, sino más bien de intensidades. De otra manera, se\r\neliminan los valores mayores y menores que son de una cantidad de tres, de lo\r\nque queda se observa que una población de diez animales está entre 6 y 24 meses\r\ny 11 animales tienen 4 lactancias. Eliminado lo anterior nos quedan tres\r\ngrupos que van ascendentemente y en orden de una a tres lactancias con un\r\nnúmero parecido de miembros. Por lo anterior se colige que la media se\r\nubica en dos lactancias y de aquí se partirá para hacer los cálculos de la\r\nproducción de leche. Esto por cuanto como es sabido y de dominio público,\r\nlas vacas van aumentando su producción desde que inician su producción hasta la\r\nedad adulta y por ello no sería real tomar todas como adultas o todas como novillas. \r\nAclarado lo anterior y para efecto de reproducción, como las primeras no se\r\nreproducen en el primer año, se tomará un promedio de cuarenta y cinco vacas en\r\nproducción. … Por lo tanto, se ha deducido un modelo general de análisis que\r\npuede ser aplicado a diferentes cantidades de animales, cuyo límite estará\r\ndeterminado por la escala o plataforma productiva del negocio, o por lo que\r\ntambién se conoce como su capacidad instalada.” No aclara de dónde y\r\npor qué obtiene esos datos. En algunos casos, también, se realizan\r\napreciaciones y suposiciones carentes de pruebas reales o estudios en la finca\r\nque desbordan su competencia, no solo al referirse a hechos futuros,\r\nverbigracia, “Con este análisis se determinarán los vientres nuevos que\r\ndebieron entrar al proceso productivo y los de desecho.”; sino, al incluir\r\naspectos que no le fueron solicitados, por ejemplo, al referirse a los daños y\r\nperjuicios por la matanza de 75 animales, ya que únicamente se le solicitó\r\ncriterio por el sacrificio de los 47 semovientes restantes. Tampoco se\r\nhace mención a los documentos consultados, especialmente, los de carácter\r\nfinanciero-contable de la empresa actora, para efectuar el informe. Al\r\nrespecto, por ejemplo, se indica “Luego se establecerá un precio de la leche\r\na la fecha de la demanda y se determinará un ingreso por este concepto. \r\nLuego se establecerán los ingresos por otros conceptos y del ingreso total, se\r\ninferirá una utilidad, que será normal en cualquier tipo de actividad\r\nproductiva, que estará limitada por la máxima financiera de que todo negocio\r\ndebe tener una rentabilidad mayor al producto del usufructo del dinero en el\r\nmercado de valores.” Empero, no indica de dónde se obtienen esos\r\ndatos. En consecuencia, al desacreditarse ambos estudios, los daños\r\nalegados carecen de sustento probatorio. Ergo, no se demostró que fueran\r\nproducto directo (nexo de causalidad) de las medidas tomadas por la\r\nadministración, en especial, la cuarentena de la finca de la empresa actora,\r\nante el surgimiento del brote de tuberculosis. Por lo tanto, no procede\r\nsu reconocimiento (numerales 194 y 196 de la LGAP). En cuanto\r\na la prohibición de venta de la leche, tal aspecto no alude a un daño en sí\r\nmismo, sino, más bien, a la eventual ganancia dejada de percibir, esto es, al\r\nlucro cesante, lo cual, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el inciso 2) del\r\nartículo 194 ibídem, no resulta resarcible. Por\r\núltimo, en torno a la destrucción o desnaturalización de leche fluida, el casacionista invoca, como indebidamente valorados, entre\r\notros medios de convicción, cinco actas notariales, visibles a folios 228 a 232. De\r\nconformidad con el canon 101 del Código Notarial, esa probanza configura un\r\ninstrumento público, sin embargo, no cita su norma de valor. Por ello, respecto\r\na esa probanza, el agravio resulta informal. Por otro lado, esa\r\ndestrucción es un hecho debidamente demostrado. Al respecto, pueden\r\nconsultarse los hechos probados antecedidos con los números 6, 7, 8 y\r\n11. No obstante, estima esta Sala, no es resarcible. La Ley General de Salud,\r\nnúmero 5395 del 30 de octubre de 1973, de manera expresa prohíbe la\r\ncomercialización de alimentos alterados, deteriorados, contaminados,\r\nadulterados o falsificados. En lo de interés, preceptúa ese cuerpo\r\nnormativo: “ARTICULO 196.- La nutrición adecuada y la\r\ningestión de alimentos de buena calidad y en condiciones sanitarias, son\r\nesenciales para la salud y por lo tanto, las personas naturales y jurídicas que\r\nse ocupen en actividades relacionadas con alimentos, destinados al consumo de\r\nla población, deberán poner el máximo de su diligencia y evitar omisiones en el\r\ncumplimiento de las disposiciones legales y reglamentarias pertinentes y de las\r\nórdenes especiales que la autoridad de salud pueda dictar, dentro de sus\r\nfacultades, en resguardo de la salud. … ARTICULO 200.-\r\nQueda estrictamente prohibido importar, elaborar, usar, poseer para vender,\r\ncomerciar, traspasar a título gratuito, manipular, distribuir y almacenar\r\nalimentos alterados o deteriorados, contaminados, adulterados o\r\nfalsificados. ARTICULO 201.- Se entiende por alimento alterado o\r\ndeteriorado, para los efectos de esta ley y sus reglamentos, aquel que por\r\ncualquier causa natural ha sufrido perjuicio o cambio en sus características\r\nbásicas, químicas o biológicas. ARTICULO 202.- Se considera alimento contaminado,\r\npara los efectos legales y reglamentarios, aquel que contenga microorganismos\r\npatógenos, toxinas o impurezas de origen orgánico o mineral repulsivas,\r\ninconvenientes o nocivas para la salud. / Se presumirá contaminado el alimento\r\nque sea producto de una elaboración, envase o manipulación realizados en\r\ncondiciones sanitarias defectuosas o en contravención a las disposiciones\r\nlegales o reglamentarias. … ARTICULO 223.- Todo fabricante de\r\nproductos alimenticios deberá emplear en la elaboración de éstos, materias\r\nprimas que reúnan condiciones sanitarias. / Queda prohibido, por tanto, el uso\r\nde materias, productos o subproductos, que contengan sustancias descompuestas,\r\ntóxicas o entrañas (sic) no susceptibles de ser eliminadas, de las\r\ncarnes y subproductos que provengan de animales sacrificados en lugares no\r\nautorizados y en forma antirreglamentaria y, en especial, la reincorporación a\r\nla producción de alimentos añejos, adulterados, contaminados o sospechosos de\r\nestarlo o que hayan sido devueltos por el comercio.” No obstante las\r\nanteriores disposiciones, esa misma legislación faculta la comercialización de\r\ncualquier subproducto de animales afectados de zoonosis, como sucede en esta\r\nlite, siempre y cuando el hecho no constituya delito, y se cuente con la\r\nautorización previa y expresa del Ministerio de Salud. En este sentido,\r\nel numeral 375 señala: “Será reprimido con diez a sesenta días multa el que\r\nimportaré a sabiendas, elaborare, comerciare, distribuyere o suministrare a\r\ncualquier título, manipulare o tuviere para esos mismos fines, medicamentos o\r\nalimentos deteriorados, contaminados, adulterados o falsificados, cuando el\r\nhecho no constituya delito. / Igual pena sufrirá el que conservare,\r\ndistribuyere, entregare o comerciare en cualquier forma, la carne o\r\nsubproductos de animales afectados de zoonosis, si no hubiere autorización\r\nprevia y expresa del Ministerio, cuando el hecho no constituya delito.”(Lo\r\nsubrayado no consta en el original). Por consiguiente, el MAG podía\r\nordenar la destrucción de la leche de la propiedad de la empresa actora, tal y\r\ncomo lo hizo –artículo 7 de la Ley\r\nsobre Salud Animal-, sin perjuicio de la indemnización respectiva, en el caso\r\nde que pudiera ser comercializada, en los términos previstos en este último\r\nnumeral de la Ley General\r\nde Salud. Sin embargo, en autos constan los oficios números UAA-RHN-072-2000, del 11 de\r\nseptiembre de 2000, del Jefe de la\r\n Unidad de Atención al Ambiente del Ministerio de Salud,\r\nRegión Huetar Norte (folio 301) y DR-RHN-1271-2000, del 7 de diciembre de 2000, del Director\r\nRegional del Ministerio de Salud (folios 309-310), mediante los cuales se niega\r\nesa autorización. En consecuencia, al no poderse comercializar la leche\r\ndestruida, no existe daño alguno indemnizable. \r\nAl amparo de las razones expuestas, se impone, también, desestimar este segundo\r\nalegato formulado en el presente reparo. \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nXX.- En el octavo,\r\ndenominado por el casacionista como “noveno motivo\r\nde casación por razones de fondo por violación indirecta de la ley”, arguye\r\nla existencia de un error de derecho por el indebido rechazo del daño moral, al\r\nvalorarse indebidamente los siguientes medios de convicción: a) los\r\ntestimonios de Osman, Antonio, ambos Marín Rojas,\r\nMáximo Pacheco Paniagua, y Flor de Liz Hernández\r\nAstorga; b) el estudio actuarial matemático, efectuado por el licenciado\r\nSalvador Hernández Araya, folios 233 a 254; c) oficios DZS/RH 009-00 y DZS/RHN 007-00 del 13 de enero de\r\n2000, donde la\r\n Administración recurrida le indica a la Cooperativa de\r\nProductores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L., la obligación de\r\nno recolectar leche fluida proveniente del hato de la empresa actora, folios 39\r\ny 40; d) experticia del Ingeniero Leonel Centeno\r\nMadrigal, folios 513 a\r\n529; e) oficios UAA-RHN-072-2000,\r\nfirmado por el Jefe de la\r\n Unidad de Atención al Ambiente del Ministerio de Salud, folio\r\n301; CNRTB-196-92000, suscrito por la doctora\r\nMaría Cecilia Matamoros, Jefa del Centro Nacional de Referencias para TBC del INCIENCIA, folio 302; oficio\r\nCART-80-2000, suscrito por el señor Mario Azofeifa Solano, Coordinador de Operaciones de San Carlos\r\nde la Cooperativa\r\nde Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., folio 303;\r\nlos tres, con fecha 11 de septiembre de 2000; CNRTB-206-92000\r\nde 13 de septiembre de 2000, de la doctora María Cecilia Matamoros, Jefe del\r\nCentro Nacional de Referencias para TBC del INCIENCIA,\r\nfolio 304; UAA-RHN\r\n076-2000, de la jefatura de la\r\n Unidad de Atención al Ambiente del Ministerio de Salud, folio\r\n305; 121-2000 DZS-RHN de la\r\njefatura de Defensa Zoosanitaria de la Región Huetar\r\nNorte del MAG, los dos del 14 de septiembre de 2000; DR-RHN-1271-2000, del 7 de diciembre de 2000, suscrito por el\r\nDirector Regional del Ministerio de Salud, folios 309-310; y f) nota de la\r\nempresa actora del 27 de noviembre de 2000, folio 308. Trascribe lo expuesto por el Tribunal en el considerando IX de la sentencia impugnada. De conformidad con lo\r\nresuelto por tal órgano decisor, afirma, se está ante\r\nla dicotomía de la demostración o no del daño moral objetivo, por un lado, y su\r\ncuantificación por el otro. Pareciera ser que el Ad quem,\r\ncomenta, se decantó tanto por la falta de prueba para tener por acreditados los\r\nsupuestos para reconocer su indemnización, como también por la no\r\ncuantificación de sus consecuencias económicas y valuables. Aún y cuando\r\nse aceptare que no fueron cuantificadas, en la fase de conocimiento, las\r\nconsecuencias económicas valuables del daño moral, no es óbice para declarar su\r\nexistencia. En este sentido, apunta, el haber resuelto el Tribunal que la\r\nsociedad actora no demostró el daño moral objetivo que le irrogó la Administración, es\r\nconsecuencia de una indebida apreciación, conforme a las reglas de la sana\r\ncritica racional, de los elementos de convicción indicados. El daño moral\r\nobjetivo acaecido en esta lite, afirma, radica en el deterioro o menoscabo\r\nsufrido por la empresa demandante en su imagen, prestigio, credibilidad para\r\nimplementar negocios en el mercado de la actividad comercial realizada, en su\r\nbuen nombre y solvencia empresarial. Ello, por cuanto no sólo era una\r\ncompañía sujeta de crédito con el Sistema Bancario Nacional; sino también, su\r\nhato tenía pedigrí, registrado tanto por la Asociación de Criadores\r\nde Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica, como por la Asociación Costarricense\r\nde Criadores de Ganado Jersey (folios 183 a 223, ambos inclusive\r\ndel expediente administrativo). Afectación que se dio por la\r\ntrascendencia de los hechos acaecidos en el medio empresarial, el entorno, el\r\ngremio, la comunidad, las diversas entidades públicas y privadas \r\nrelacionadas con el giro de la empresa, así como por su indebida difusión a\r\ntravés de los medios de comunicación colectiva, especialmente el Canal 14 de la Zona Norte. \r\nRespecto a los errores en la apreciación de los elementos de prueba indicados,\r\nseñala, en lo tocante a la valoración del testimonio del señor Osman Marín Rojas, el solo hecho que haya indicado tener\r\ninterés en el resultado del proceso, no es razón suficiente (reglas de la sana\r\ncrítica) para desecharlo. Si tal conclusión no deriva y/o es producto de\r\nun análisis en conjunto de la totalidad del elenco probatorio recabado en el\r\nproceso, que delaten su desproporción y/o incongruencia en lo manifestado bajo\r\nla fe de juramento. A la vez, indica, lo manifestado por dicho testigo,\r\nsea o no útil a los efectos de la valuación o cuantificación del daño moral, es\r\nirrelevante para desacreditarlo, pues tal determinación puede ser reservada\r\npara la etapa de ejecución de sentencia. Tarea que, en todo caso,\r\ncomenta, no le corresponde, ni mucho menos le compete, a un testigo. En\r\nlo concerniente a la apreciación del documento visible a folio 303 del\r\nexpediente, que es el oficio CART-80-2000 del 11 de\r\nseptiembre de 2000, suscrito por el señor Mario Azofeifa\r\nSolano, Coordinador de Operaciones de San Carlos de la Cooperativa de\r\nProductores de Leche Dos Pinos RL, contrario a lo\r\nsostenido por el Tribunal, afirma, en el sentido de que con tal documento no se\r\nhace patente un desprestigio o afectación en el nombre de la empresa actora\r\nproducto del actuar administrativo, sí denotaría o, se derivaría (reglas de la\r\nsana crítica) del mismo, cuando mínimo, una afectación en su solvencia\r\nempresarial, como también en su credibilidad para implementar negocios en el\r\nmercado de la actividad comercial realizada; dada la trascendencia de los\r\nhechos acaecidos al medio empresarial, al entorno, al gremio, a las diversas\r\nentidades públicas y privadas relacionadas con el giro de la empresa\r\nactora. En lo que atañe a la apreciación del estudio actuarial matemático\r\nrealizado por el Lic. Hernández Araya (folios 234 a 255 del expediente), de\r\nigual manera, comenta, el hecho que haya sido gestionado por la actora en forma\r\nprivada, no es razón suficiente (reglas de la sana crítica) para desdeñarlo o\r\nnegarle el valor probatorio que razonablemente tiene, pues aún y cuando no se\r\nllegare a aceptar como un peritaje, sí conservaría su valor como medio de\r\nprueba, propiamente como documento o informe técnico (artículo 318 inciso 3 del\r\nCódigo Procesal Civil). No siendo atinada tampoco su desvaloración, con\r\nel argumento de que solo hace una recomendación en lo que toca al extremo del\r\ndaño moral, pues esa, alega, es precisamente la naturaleza jurídica de\r\ncualquier prueba técnica respecto del daño moral, dado que corresponde al\r\nadministrador de justicia, en definitiva, la fijación de su monto. El Ad quem, comenta, guarda silencio respecto de la experticia\r\nactuarial matemática rendida por el ingeniero Centeno Madrigal (folios 513 a 529). Probanza que\r\npodría haber suplido cualquier carencia o reparo realizado al estudio\r\nanterior. Se echa de menos un estudio comparativo de ambos elementos\r\ntécnicos de prueba. El indebido rechazo de la indemnización por concepto\r\nde daño moral, manifiesta, deriva, a parte de los reparos efectuados a la\r\nprobanza, a una indebida valoración, por omisión de análisis, de los\r\ntestimonios de Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, Antonio Marín Rojas y Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga, en relación con los documentos\r\nvisibles a folios 39 y 40, que son copia certificada notarialmente de los\r\noficios DZS/RH 009-00 y 007\r\nDZS/RHN, de fecha 13 de enero\r\nde 2000; en ellos, la\r\n Administración recurrida le indica a la Cooperativa de\r\nProductores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L., la\r\nobligación de no recolectar leche fluida proveniente del hato de la\r\nsociedad actora; del peritaje actuarial matemático del ingeniero Centeno\r\nMadrigal; así como de los oficios UAA-RHN 072-2000, CNRTB-196-92000, CART-80-2000, CNRTB-206-92000, UAA-RHN 076-2000, el oficio\r\nnúmero 121-2000 DZS-RHN, DR-RHN-1271-2000, el escrito de\r\nfecha 27 de noviembre de 2000, suscrito por Sucesores de Clemente Marín\r\nS.A. Elementos de prueba con los que se obtiene, afirma, cuando mínimo,\r\nla indubitable acreditación de la existencia del daño moral objetivo. De\r\nacuerdo con lo anterior, concluye, lo resuelto por el Ad quem\r\nviola, por aplicación indebida, los cánones 11, 33, 41, 45, 50 de la Constitución Política;\r\n190.2, 194.1.2.3 de la LGAP; 3 Y 7 de la hoy derogada Ley de\r\nTuberculosis Bovina, número 1207 y, por falta de actuación, los numerales\r\n190.1, 191, 192, 196 y 197 de la\r\n LGAP. Respecto al valor de la\r\nprobanza indebidamente apreciada, apunta, se conculcaron los ordinales 298.2 de\r\nla LGAP;\r\n318 inciso 3), 330 y 357 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Civil.\n\r\n\r\n\nXXI.- \r\nLa parte demandante es una persona jurídica. Ergo, como bien lo señaló el\r\nTribunal, el daño moral pretendido es el objetivo. Esta Sala ha indicado\r\nque se produce cuando se lesiona la esfera de interés extrapatrimonial. \r\nEs decir, produce consecuencias económicamente valuables. Verbigracia, el caso\r\ndel profesional que, por el hecho atribuido, pierde su clientela en todo o en\r\nparte. Cabe diferenciarlo del daño moral subjetivo o de afección. “Esta\r\ndistinción sirve para deslindar el daño sufrido por el individuo en su\r\nconsideración social (buen nombre, honor, honestidad, etc.) del padecido en el\r\ncampo individual (aflicción por la muerte de un pariente), así uno refiere a la\r\nparte social y el otro a la afectiva del patrimonio.”(Sentencia número 127\r\nde las 11 horas 25 minutos del 21 de febrero de 2007. En igual sentido,\r\npueden consultarse los fallos 151 de las 15 horas 20 minutos del 14 de febrero\r\nde 2001 y 729 de las 10 horas del 29 de septiembre de 2005). Dicha\r\ndiferenciación surgió para determinar el ámbito del daño moral\r\nresarcible. En un inicio, la doctrina se mostró reacia a indemnizar el\r\ndaño moral puro o subjetivo, por su difícil cuantificación. En el caso\r\ndel objetivo, debe hacerse la demostración correspondiente como acontece con el\r\ndaño patrimonial. “…VI.- En punto a la resarcibilidad\r\ndel daño moral, cabe indicar que no es válido el argumento conforme al cual el\r\nresarcimiento del daño moral implica la dificultad de lograr una equivalencia\r\nentre el daño y la indemnización pecuniaria (\"pecunia doloris\");\r\npor cuanto en el supuesto del daño moral objetivo la reparación resulta ser más\r\nfácil de cuantificar …”(Sentencia 928 de ls 9\r\nhoras 15 minutos del 24 de noviembre de 2006. En este mismo sentido, pueden\r\nconsultarse las resoluciones 527-F-S1-2008 de las 14 horas 10 minutos del 1 de\r\nfebrero de 2008 y 206-F-S1-2009 de las 16 horas 20 minutos del 26 de febrero de\r\n2009).\n\r\n\r\n\nXXII.- \r\nEn el hecho cuarto del escrito de demanda, el apoderado de la compañía actora\r\nafirma: “Que a pesar de ser la orden sanitaria impugnada un acto\r\nabsolutamente nulo e ineficaz en forma concomitante, la Administración\r\nrecurrida (arts. 146.1.3.4, 150.1 y 169 LGAP) abusando del poder, de sus potestades de imperio y en\r\nforma arbitraria, ordenó y puso en ejecución ésta, causándole a mi representada\r\ndaños (material y moral) y perjuicios de reparación imposible o difícil. \r\nAsí, se ordenó la cuarentena de la finca propiedad de mi representada, sus\r\nanimales, productos y subproductos, insumos y equipos, ocasionándole serias y\r\ncuantiosas pérdidas económicas, pues prima facie, se\r\nle ordenó a la Cooperativa\r\nde Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L., suprimir la\r\nrecolección de leche de mi representada, sin embargo al día de hoy se está\r\npermitiendo nuevamente a la\r\n Cooperativa Dos Pinos recolectar la leche; se difundió\r\nindebidamente el presunto brote de tuberculosis bovina en la finca de mi\r\nrepresentada a través de los medios de comunicación colectiva de la Zona Norte,\r\nespecialmente Canal 14, ocasionándole un daño moral inconmensurable a mi\r\nrepresentada así como a toda mi familia; y finalmente, se han sacrificado\r\nal día de hoy 123 bovinos, casi la totalidad del hato, perdiéndose la genética\r\nmismo, ya que era ganado registrado en las Asociaciones Holstein\r\ny Jersey de Costa Rica, sin haberse comprobado\r\nfehacientemente el brote de tuberculosis bovina en todos los animales eutanasiados, lo cual tiene a mi representada al borde de\r\nla quiebra a ruina económica, no obstante la situación administrativa\r\nfinanciera difícil por la cual está atravesando el Estado, según lo reconoce\r\nexpresamente la\r\n Administración en el oficio SUBDSA\r\nNo. 183-00, de fecha 26 de julio del 2000.”(Lo subrayado es suplido). Luego, en el acápite\r\ndenominado “argumentación jurídica”, punto quinto, folio 138 vuelto,\r\nratifica lo anterior, al señalar, en lo de interés: “… causándole a mi\r\nrepresentada daños y perjuicios de reparación imposible o difícil. Así,\r\nse ordenó la cuarentena de la finca propiedad de mi representada, sus animales,\r\nproductos y subproductos, insumos y equipos, ocasionándole serias y cuantiosas\r\npérdidas económicas, pues prima facie, se le ordenó a\r\nla Cooperativa\r\nde Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L., suprimir la\r\nrecolección de leche de mi representada a partir del días 13 de enero de los\r\ncorrientes, siendo que se desnaturalizaron para la posterior destrucción\r\naproximadamente la cantidad de 12.522,7 kilogramos\r\nde leche fluida, al día 17 de enero pasado, lo cual representa una pérdida\r\neconómica alrededor de 800.000.00 colones, sin embargo al día de hoy se está\r\npermitiendo nuevamente a la\r\n Cooperativa Dos Pinos recolectar la leche; se difundió\r\nindebidamente el presunto brote de tuberculosis bovina en la finca de mi\r\nrepresentada a través de los medios de comunicación colectiva de la Zona Norte,\r\nespecialmente Canal 14, ocasionándole un daño moral inconmensurable a mi\r\nrepresentada así como a toda mi familia …”(lo subrayado no es del\r\noriginal). De acuerdo a lo anteriormente transcrito,\r\nes claro que la causa de pedir el daño moral se origina en las publicaciones\r\nefectuadas por los medios de comunicación colectiva de la Zona Norte del país,\r\nespecialmente, en el Canal 14. El casacionista,\r\npara demostrar la existencia de este daño, invoca como conculcados: 1)\r\nlos estudios efectuados tanto por el licenciado Salvador Hernández Araya (folios 233\r\n a 254), como por el ingeniero Leonel\r\nCenteno Madrigal (folios 513 a\r\n529). En el considerando XIX de esta sentencia\r\nse apuntaron las razones por las cuales, ambos estudios, no le merecen\r\ncredibilidad a este órgano jurisdiccional. 2) la siguiente prueba\r\ndocumental: i) oficios a) DZS/RH\r\n009-00, folio 39; b) 007-00 DZS/RHZ,\r\nfolio 40, ambos de la jefatura de Defensa Zoosanitaria\r\nde la Región Huetar Norte del MAG, del 13 de enero de\r\n2000; c) UAA-RHN-072-2000,\r\nfirmado por el Jefe de la\r\n Unidad de Atención al Ambiente del Ministerio de Salud, folio\r\n301; d) CNRTB-196-92000, suscrito por la doctora\r\nMaría Cecilia Matamoros, Jefe del Cetro Nacional de Referencias para TBC del INCIENCIA, folio 302; e) oficio CART-80-2000, firmado por el señor\r\nMario Azofeifa Solano, Coordinador de Operaciones de\r\nSan Carlos de la\r\n Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., folio 303; los tres, con fecha 11 de septiembre de\r\n2000; f) CNRTB-206-92000 de 13 de septiembre de 2000,\r\nde la doctora María Cecilia Matamoros, Jefe del Cetro Nacional de Referencias\r\npara TBC del INCIENCIA, folio 304; g) UAA-RHN 076-2000, de la jefatura\r\nde la Unidad\r\nde Atención al Ambiente del Ministerio de Salud, folio 305; h) 121-2000 DZS-RHN de la jefatura de Defensa\r\nZoosanitaria de la Región Huetar\r\nNorte del MAG, los dos del 14 de septiembre de 2000; i) DR-RHN-1271-2000, del 7 de diciembre\r\nde 2000, suscrito por el Director Regional del Ministerio de Salud, folios\r\n309-310; y ii) nota de la empresa actora del 27 de\r\nnoviembre de 2000, folio 308. Toda esa probanza alude a la prohibición\r\npara que la actora comercializara la leche producida por el hato de su\r\npropiedad. Esa situación fáctica difiere del motivo (causa petendi) que origina la solicitud de indemnización\r\ndel daño moral (el cual, según se anotó, se circunscribe a las publicaciones\r\nperiodísticas, en especial, las efectuadas por el Canal 14 de la Zona Norte del país),\r\npor lo que no resulta de recibo. De accederse a su análisis y,\r\neventualmente, acogerse lo argumentado por el casacionista,\r\nharía que el fallo fuese incongruente, por variación de la causa de\r\npedir. En todo caso, a mayor abundamiento de razones, como la propia\r\nparte actora lo confiesa –hecho cuarto de la demanda y punto quinto del acápite\r\nde “argumentación jurídica”, antes transcritos- esa circunstancia no le\r\nirrogó ninguna consecuencia negativa en el prestigio y buen nombre de la\r\nempresa, ni tampoco fue objeto de exclusión de parte de sus clientes. Al\r\nrespecto, según indicó, la prohibición de venta de la leche fue una\r\ncircunstancia temporal, siendo que, al momento de la formalización de la\r\ndemanda, la Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L.,\r\nhabía reanudado la compra de la leche. De igual manera, en la nota CART-80-2000 del 11 de septiembre de 2000, suscrita por el\r\nCoordinador de Operaciones de San Carlos de esa Cooperativa,\r\nexpresamente se indica que: “El reinicio de las entregas quedará\r\nsujeto a la autorización de la entidad gubernamental competente.” Es\r\ndecir, la prohibición de venta de la leche, no le generó a la accionante consecuencia negativa en su consideración\r\nsocial. 3) También invoca como transgredidos los testimonios de Osman Gerardo y Antonio Marín Rojas, Máximo Pacheco\r\nPaniagua y Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga. \r\nTocante a las declaraciones de los hermanos Marín Rojas, resultan evidentemente\r\nparcializadas. Son hijos del apoderado de la sociedad actora, don Antonio\r\nMarín Barrientos. Tienen, por ende, interés en\r\nel resultado del proceso, al estar de por medio la empresa familiar. \r\nAdemás, el primero es el administrador de la finca. Lo anterior, al\r\namparo de las reglas de la sana crítica, distinto a lo manifestado por el casacionista, descalifica ambos testimonios. No\r\nobstante, de lo dicho por ellos, no se infiere el daño alegado. Don Osman Gerardo, folios 421 a 431, en lo de interés afirmó: “Sobre\r\nel manejo por parte del señor Orlando Jara del M.A.G.\r\ncreemos que no fue el correcto, por lo que quedó en evidencia que la parte\r\ntécnica no la manejó en forma adecuada, además, el criterio de privacidad y\r\nética tampoco lo respeto (sic), por cuanto en los resultados que se\r\nleyeron al principio de enero, este señor informó primero a canal 14 a que a la (sic) compañía\r\n(actora), también se actuó en forma muy apresurada, no dándonos tiempo a\r\nprepararnos para las medidas que nos impusieron. … En la parte moral, se tuvo\r\nun gran impacto negativo, por cuanto a tráves (sic)\r\ndel M.A.G., los medios de comunicación, hicieron\r\npúblicos y regulares los informes de este caso en especial. Tuvimos, una\r\nespecie de desprestigio general, ante la comunidad, el gremio, y los vecinos,\r\npues mientras tratábamos de defendernos y de convencer a las autoridades de que\r\nse corrigieran los procedimientos y se hicieran las pruebas\r\ncomplementarias, la opinión pública nos juzgaba de estar poniendo en peligro la\r\nsalud pública y la sanidad animal de la zona. … Con respecto a las informaciones\r\nde los medios de comunicación, lo que se hizo fue solicitar a este canal los\r\nvideos que transmitieron, para tenerlos como prueba y al final tratamos por el\r\nmismo medio dar nuestro parecer y tratar de contrarrestar un poco la imagen\r\nnegativa que se transmitía.” Lo afirmado por don Osman\r\nGerardo no pasa de ser meras opiniones subjetivas. No concretiza en qué\r\nconsistió el juzgamiento que la opinión pública les hizo. Se tratan, más\r\nbien, de aseveraciones de carácter general, que requieren de otra prueba\r\ncomplementaria para demostrarla. Por ejemplo, señala que solicitaron los\r\nvideos para tenerlos como prueba, sin embargo, no los apartaron a este\r\nproceso. En suma, no se logra acreditar la incidencia negativa en la\r\nesfera social de la empresa actora. Por su parte, lo dicho por don\r\nAntonio, folios 432 a\r\n438, resulta intrascendente a efectos de acreditar el daño moral, pues\r\nafirma: “No recuerdo a que se referían los medios que\r\npublicitaban, porque me afectaba psicológicamente escucharlas.” \r\nPor su parte, la testigo Flor de Liz Hernández\r\nAstorga, folios 439 a\r\n441, en lo conducente, señaló: “En Ciudad Quesada, parecía como una\r\npersecución, porque salió en el Canal 14 y en el periódico, en donde la gente\r\ndel M.A.G. informaba que lo que había era un brote de\r\ntuberculosis y manifestaron que los animales con esa enfermedad se ponían\r\nflacos, jalados y mocosos y en donde en una ocasión yo me presente (sic)\r\na la finca a que me firmaran unos documentos y el noticiero estaba presente,\r\nhabían dos lotes separados, donde uno era supuesto ganado contaminado y\r\nel otro era el ganado sano y escuche (sic) le preguntaron al\r\nadministrador que cual (sic) de los lotes era el ganado a sacrificar, no\r\nrecuerdo quien (sic) fue el que pregunto (sic) eso, eso indica\r\nque los dos lotes estaban iguales.” Sin embargo, no precisa de qué\r\nmanera perjudicó a la empresa actora esas publicaciones. En consecuencia,\r\nlo dicho por la testigo no resulta útil a efecto de determinar la existencia\r\ndel daño moral. Igual sucede con lo manifestado por el último testigo\r\nMáximo Pacheco Paniagua, folios 412\r\n a 420. Solo señala que “A mí llamó (sic) mucho\r\nla atención, que las cámaras de radio y televisión siempre estaban presentes\r\nsobre todo cuando hacían las matanzas en torno a este proceso.” No\r\nseñala de qué manera afectó esas publicaciones, desde el punto de vista social,\r\na la empresa actora. De acuerdo con lo expuesto, con la prueba\r\ntestimonial evacuada en autos, no se logra determinar la existencia del daño\r\nmoral reclamado. En todo caso, el hecho de que la Dos Pinos reiniciara el\r\nrecibo de la leche, y que la empresa donde labora la testigo Hernández Astorga\r\nle preste servicios a la actora, demuestra que no sufrió menoscabo o daño en su\r\nimagen o prestigio como empresa. Vale decir, no tuvo consecuencias\r\nnegativas desde la perspectiva social. Al amparo de las razones\r\nexpuestas, se impone el rechazo del presente motivo de disconformidad.¨",
  "body_en_text": "**XI.** The crux of what the appellant alleges is that, in his understanding, the lower-court judges erred in their assessment of the indicated evidence, by considering that the tuberculin applied to the plaintiff company's cattle to diagnose tuberculosis was covered by quality control certificates, which, he indicates, is not true. In this regard, it is necessary to point out the following. In the first place, the tuberculin test reports contained in the documents identified as 12 and 15, being originals, have the nature of public documents (article 369 of the Civil Procedure Code); however, the appellant omitted to cite the rule governing the evidentiary value of that type of proof as being violated, which prevents this Chamber from issuing a pronouncement regarding those means of conviction. Secondly, Law No. 1207 of October 9, 1950, known as “Ley de Tuberculosis Bovina,” although repealed, provides, as relevant: “Article 2 The tuberculin test is declared mandatory for all bovine animals, as many times as deemed convenient, which shall be applied by duly trained officials designated by the Ministries of Agriculture and Industry and Public Health. Article 3 Bovine animals in which the tuberculin test has yielded a positive result shall be isolated immediately and sacrificed once the requirements referred to in the following articles are met. … Article 15 Only the State may prepare or import tuberculin for veterinary use.” For its part, Decreto Ejecutivo 10120-A of May 9, 1979, “Reglamento sobre el Control de la Tuberculosis Bovina,” provides: “Article 1 Tuberculin or any other biological product used to diagnose tuberculosis in domestic animals may only be imported by the Animal Health Program MAG-BID. Article 2 The National Animal Health Program has the exclusive authority to control the quality and efficacy of the tuberculin used for diagnosis in animals. Article 5 When the Directorate of the National Animal Health Program receives the information mentioned in articles three and four of this Reglamento, they shall immediately proceed to conduct the epidemiological study of the affected herd and to perform the tuberculin test on all existing cattle therein. Article 7 The animals that are classified as reactors shall be duly identified, fire-branded, evaluated, and immediately sacrificed, this in accordance with Ley No. 1207.” (The underlining is added). The means of controlling the quality and efficacy of the tuberculin by the Directorate of Animal Health (today Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal –SENASA-) is with the respective quality control certificate. Therefore, it constitutes a necessary requirement for said test to be applicable to cattle. In the case at bar, the plaintiff, from the outset – third fact of the complaint – stated that the tuberculin used in its herd was not certified. For its part, in the proven fact preceded by number 20, it is established: “that the tuberculins used and applied to the animals of the plaintiff, are imported from Mexico for the exclusive use of the Dirección de Salud Animal of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, the official tuberculosis control program, under the protection and authorization of Ley No. 1207 of October 4, 1950; they come from the Productora Nacional de Biológicos Veterinarios, covered by a quality control certificate, establishing in them the potency of the dose, in order to verify its compliance with the standards of the International Office of Epizootics (see the written complaint and its answer, and report signed by Dr. José Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, Director of Animal Health, folios 506 to 508).” (The underlining is added). Regarding this point, in Section V of the appealed judgment, the Tribunal considered the following: “V.- SECOND GRIEVANCE. REGARDING THE ALLEGED ABSENCE OF QUALITY CONTROL OF THE TUBERCULIN TESTS. As limits to the exercise of administrative discretion, articles 16.1 and 160 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, expressly forbid the Administration from issuing acts contrary to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience. In order to determine in each specific case whether or not those rules are complied with, it is necessary to analyze the technical or scientific evidence that has been provided in the proceeding. In the case under examination, at the plaintiff's request, a report was requested from the Dirección Nacional de Salud Animal of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, in order for it to ‘indicate whether the tuberculins and/or biological products from the lot used to diagnose the presumed existence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd of the company Sucesores Clemente Marín S.A., are duly registered, and both their quality and efficacy certified, at a national or international level, as well as the diagnostic methods used, and if affirmative, to provide a certified copy thereof.’ (see folio 143 verso). In its report number DSA.128-2004, visible at folio 506, Dr. Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, Director of Animal Health, of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, was very clear in pointing out that the tuberculins used and applied to the animals of the company Sucesores Clemente Marín S.A., like all those used in the country, are imported from Mexico and come from the Productora Nacional de Biológicos Veterinarios, which are covered by a quality control certificate, which establishes the potency of the dose, in order to verify its compliance with the standards established by the International Office of Epizootics, an international body, which establishes these values worldwide, in the Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines. Taking the above into account, this Tribunal agrees with what was established by the Trial Judge, in the sense that, since the plaintiff is the one formulating the claim for annulment of the challenged administrative act, it undoubtedly bore the burden of proof in relation to the facts that support that claim (317 Civil Procedure Code). Despite the above, it is obvious that the plaintiff did not bring any proof to discredit the technical report rendered by Dr. Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, in order to demonstrate that the tuberculin tests used in its herd did not have a quality certificate, as it merely limited itself to raising questions about the content of that report. This being the case, this Tribunal has no reason not to grant the corresponding value to that technical evidence, and given that the plaintiff does not provide proof that discredits its content, the decision of the Trial Judge must be confirmed. For the same reasons, the questions raised by the plaintiff regarding the documents contained in the file of evidence provided by the state representation, corresponding to the ‘tuberculin test reports’ conducted on the plaintiff company's farm (documents numbers 3, 4, 10, 11, 12 and 15), are inadmissible, since the plaintiff likewise did not present any evidence aimed at refuting that they were carried out without quality control. Consequently, a breach of the unequivocal rules of science and technique (article 16 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) is not observed for the specific case, and the decision must be upheld.-“ This Chamber does not share the opinion of the lower-court judges. In the first place, in accordance with canon 301, subsection 2) of the LGAP, in relation to numeral 54 of the LRJCA, the declarations or reports rendered by representatives or servants of the Public Administration shall be deemed as testimony for all legal purposes. Therefore, what was affirmed by Doctor Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo in his report visible at folios 506 to 508 has that character, not that of technical evidence as was indicated by the Tribunal. Secondly, this means of conviction is not suitable to demonstrate the existence of the quality control certificate for the tuberculin. The only way to prove it was held was by its contribution to the case file. The plaintiff company, it bears repeating, from the outset, has indicated its non-existence (see third fact of the complaint), therefore, demanding that it prove its assertion, as the Ad quem indicates, implies placing it in a defenseless state, since it is a negative fact, thereby violating canon 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, fundamentally, the provisions of its first subsection. It should be taken into account that, when it requested that the report be ordered from the Dirección Nacional de Salud Animal of the MAG, it expressly requested that, if the existence of the quality and efficacy certificate was affirmed, a duly certified copy be provided. Along this line of thought, the state representation, when answering the aforementioned third fact of the complaint, states as relevant: “These tuberculins are imported from Mexico and come from the Productora Nacional de Biológicos Veterinarios, covered by a Quality Control Certificate, in which the potency of the dose is established in order to verify that it conforms to the standards established by the International Office of Epizootics in its Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines. (See Document No. 10).” (The highlighting is from the original). By virtue of what is indicated in the second subsection of the referred numeral 317 of the cited Code, by opposing the plaintiff company's claim, and affirming a fact that extinguishes its right, it bore the burden of proving it. For those purposes, it refers to document no. 10 in the file of evidence it provided. However, there are only photocopies of two quality control certificates, issued by the Mexican company Productora Nacional de Biológicos Veterinarios, corresponding, the first to lot 2420048 of bovine tuberculin P.P.D. type and, the second to lot 2320307 of avian tuberculin P.P.D. type. However, they are not duly legalized, as stipulated in numeral 294, subsection a) of the LGAP. This implies that they could not have legal effect in Costa Rica, as both the Sala Constitucional of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 76-92 of 4:30 p.m. on January 15, 1992, and this jurisdictional body, in judgment 715-F-2006 of 11:20 a.m. on September 27, 2006, have indicated. Furthermore, in documents numbers 3, 4, and 11, from that same file of evidence, there is a series of tuberculin test reports that do not coincide with those series or lot numbers, and without their corresponding quality and efficacy certificates appearing in the case file. Under the protection of the foregoing, the appellant is correct in pointing out the error the Tribunal incurred by endorsing the proven fact preceded by number 20. There is no suitable evidentiary element in the case file to support it. However, the foregoing does not entail the quashing of the judgment, for the reasons set forth below.\n\n\n**XII.** It is appropriate to consider the factual picture that occurred in this litigation. On July 9, 1999, the veterinarian from the El Valle slaughterhouse, Doctor Ricardo Aguilar Jiménez, detected a case with symptoms compatible with tuberculosis at the slaughter level, coming from the farm of the plaintiff company. Samples were sent to the Laboratorio Nacional de Servicios Veterinarios (LANASEVE). The result was positive by Ziehl Neelsen stain. Due to this, the Oficina de Defensa Zoosanitaria Nacional, Región Huetar Norte, of the Dirección Nacional de Salud Animal of the MAG, carried out a sampling of 10% of the plaintiff's herd – 15 female Holstein breed cattle, chosen at random. The bovine tuberculin test was performed on them in the anocaudal fold for the diagnosis of this disease. Four animals resulted as reactors. For this reason, on October 26 of the same year, the comparative cervical test was performed on the reactors as a differential diagnosis, using PPD bovis and PPD avium. Again, they were positive for bovine PPD. Consequently, the entire herd was tuberculinized. Animals from three months of age and older were included. Of the 179 subjected to the anocaudal test, 89 were reactors. Then, on January 4, 2000, comparative cervical tests were performed at the level of the neck table, for which PPD bovis and PPD avium were used. Of the 179 animals, 90 were positive to the anocaudal test, 84 to the cervical bovine PPD –one negative–, 73 to the cervical PPD avium –12 negative–. By virtue of the foregoing, the Dirección de Salud Animal, in a resolution of 9 a.m. on January 12, 2000, ordered the farm be quarantined, the animals be marked with an “S” for sacrifice, all reactor animals be separated from the herd, the positive tuberculosis animals be appraised by an expert from the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, the animals be sacrificed, safeguarding biosecurity conditions, the sanitation of the rest of the plaintiff's livestock continue, and monitoring and surveillance on neighboring farms commence. As was pointed out by the judges of both instances, one of the guiding principles of Environmental Law, underlying numerals 46 and 50 of the Constitución Política, is the precautionary principle or principle of prudent avoidance. According to doctrine, in this matter, there are not only certain risks, but there may also be scientific uncertainty regarding the scope of some damages. This postulate, then, requires that, when a reasonable doubt arises in relation to the dangerousness of any activity with environmental repercussions or repercussions on human health, it be avoided, or the pertinent measures be taken so that said eventual damage, not yet scientifically proven, does not come to occur. Its two prerequisites are: lack of scientific certainty and the threat of damage. It is explicitly contained in the “United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,” or “Rio Declaration”: “Principle 15.- In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” For its part, the Ley de Biodiversidad, number 7788 of April 30, 1998, provides: “ARTICLE 7.- Definitions. … Biodiversity: variability of living organisms from any source, whether found in terrestrial, aerial, marine, aquatic ecosystems, or in other ecological complexes. It comprises diversity within each species, as well as between species and the ecosystems of which they are part. / For the purposes of this law, the term biodiversity shall be understood to include intangible elements, such as: knowledge, innovation, and traditional practice, individual or collective, with real or potential value associated with biochemical and generic resources, protected or not by intellectual property systems or sui generis registration systems. … ARTICLE 11.- Criteria for applying this law. The criteria for applying this law are: 1.- Preventive criterion: It is recognized that it is vitally important to anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of biodiversity loss or its threats. 2.- Precautionary or indubio pro natura criterion: When there is danger or threat of serious or imminent damage to the elements of biodiversity and the knowledge associated with them, the absence of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of effective protective measures. 3.- Criterion of public environmental interest: The use of the elements of biodiversity must guarantee the development options of future generations, food security, the conservation of ecosystems, the protection of human health, and the improvement of citizens' quality of life. …” In this sense, the Sala Constitucional, in vote 1250-99 of 11:24 a.m. on February 19, 1999, stated: “... Prevention aims to anticipate negative effects, and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid containing the possible impact on the environment or people's health. In this way, in the event that there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage –or a doubt in this regard–, a precautionary measure must be adopted and even the activity in question be postponed. The foregoing is because in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, as once the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance, but will hardly compensate for the damages caused to the environment.” (The underlining is not from the original. Also, among others, rulings 9773-00 of 9:44 a.m. on November 3, 2000, and 1711-01 of 4:32 p.m. on February 27, 2001, from that jurisdictional body can be consulted). Later, in vote 3480-03 of 2:02 p.m. on May 2, 2003, it further specified said concept: “With the precautionary principle well understood, it refers to the adoption of measures not in the face of ignorance of facts generating risk, but in the face of a lack of certainty that such facts will indeed produce harmful effects on the environment.” (The underlining is added). Likewise, in ruling 6322-2003 of 2:14 p.m. on July 3, 2003, it indicated: “...4.- Precautionary principle : … The term prevention derives from the Latin ‘praeventio’, which alludes to the action and effect of preventing, to those preparations and dispositions made in advance to avoid a risk or execute something. Prevention aims to anticipate negative effects, and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible impact on the environment or people's health. In this way, in the event that there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage -or a doubt in this regard-, a precautionary measure must be adopted and even the activity in question be postponed. The foregoing is because in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, as once the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance, but will hardly compensate for the damages caused to the environment.” (In the same sense, vote 2008-17618 of 11:51 a.m. on December 5, 2008, from said Chamber can be consulted). Tuberculosis is a zoonotic disease, which constitutes a danger to livestock farming and public health. Therefore, we are facing a situation that endangers or threatens serious damage not only to elements of biodiversity (neighboring dairy herds of the plaintiff company's property), but also to human beings (public health). In the case at bar, in light of the factual picture set out above, the existence of a reasonable doubt is evident –given the lack of scientific certainty due to the absence of the quality and efficacy control certificate for the tuberculin– which imposed on the Public Administration the duty, in compliance with the precautionary principle, to act as it did. This reasonable doubt arises because, on three different occasions (first at the El Valle slaughterhouse, then in the results of the laboratory studies from LANASEVE; and, finally, in the tests conducted by the Dirección de Salud Animal of the MAG), the existence of tuberculosis was determined in animals of the plaintiff company. Even the plaintiff itself accepts this circumstance –the doubt regarding the existence of tuberculosis in the herd–, by affirming in the section of the complaint called “legal argumentation”: “FOURTH: … since the imperfection of the indicated elements prevents the realization of the purpose in accordance with the legal system, for which it was issued, because the sanitary order is issued to combat an outbreak of bovine tuberculosis, and it cannot be known entirely, categorically, that it exists in all the presumably infected animals due to what will be indicated below. / In this sense, the reason does not exist as it has been taken into account to issue the challenged act, by virtue of the fact that one cannot categorically conclude, and without fear of being mistaken, that bovine tuberculosis exists in all the animals sacrificed on my represented party's farm ...” (the underlining is added). In the case record, at folios 468 and 469, is the report rendered by Doctor María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the Centro Nacional de Referencia para Tuberculosis of the Instituto Costarricense de Investigación y Enseñanza en Nutrición y Salud (INCIENSA), which, by virtue of the provisions of numeral 301, subsection 2) of the LGAP, has the character of testimonial evidence. Doctor Matamoros, regarding what is relevant, states: “1. I do not have in my hands the official communication D.Z.S./RHN 05-00, of January 11, 2000, called “Informe sobre brote de tuberculosis en San Gerardo de Ciudad Quesada”. However, in light of the questions raised and regarding what concerns me, I clarify the following, “the discovery of Mycobacterium terrae in euthanized cattle from the farm of Sucesores de Clemente Marín S.A., in the event that said bacillus produced any disease, the clinical and pathological manifestations of it would be similar to those produced by the infection of M. tuberculosis or M. Boris. M. terrae is an acid-alcohol resistant bacillus so that Ziehl-Neelsen staining can be positive and PPD can give a cross-reaction” is correct, as I stated in official communication CNRTB-196-2000. Whether in light of the described situation we could conclusively conclude the existence of bovine tuberculosis in the company's herd. It can only be concluded from a microbiological point of view that there is bovine tuberculosis in an animal when that microorganism is isolated from the tissues of that animal. The euthanized animals from which M. terrae was isolated are not evidence of the presence of bovine tuberculosis. Therefore, the doubt regarding the presence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd (sic) persists.” This Chamber agrees with what the Tribunal indicated in Section VII of the appealed judgment. With said evidence, it is not possible to eliminate the doubt regarding the existence of tuberculosis. In the first instance, the plaintiff party requested said report (folio 142 verso) so that official communication D.Z.S./RHN 05-00 of January 11, 2000, could be analyzed; however, Doctor Matamoros is clear in pointing out that she did not have it in view. Secondly, despite being based on the information that the plaintiff pointed out in its complaint, she expressly indicates that “Therefore, the doubt regarding the presence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd (sic) persists.” That is to say, it does not dispel the cloud surrounding the existence of the outbreak of said disease. Therefore, the aforementioned precautionary principle is applicable to this litigation. In short, the Administration's actions protected the public purpose involved (article 113 LGAP): human health, animal health –neighboring herds–, the environment, as well as the dairy production of the area where the plaintiff's farm is located –San Gerardo de Ciudad Quesada, San Carlos–. Therefore, under the protection of the reasons set forth, the rejection of the present ground of disagreement is warranted.\n\n\n[...]\n\n\n**XIV.** In the first place, it must be observed that what the appellant stated at folio 701, regarding “two topics of special and essential significance in the case under examination,” was not proposed and debated in a timely manner in the appeal. Therefore, by virtue of the provisions of article 608 of the Civil Procedure Code, this Chamber is prohibited from conducting any analysis thereof. Secondly, the core of what is reproached by the appellant is that, in his understanding, the lower-court judges committed an error of law in assessing the indicated evidence, by illegitimately reversing the burden of proof, regarding the alleged failure to comply with the technical measures when applying the tuberculin tests; and regarding the demonstration of the existence or non-existence of a protocol, logbook, record, or register that guarantees the correct fulfillment of the technical measures of how that test was performed. Affirming the non-existence of that register, he indicates, does not contain any assertion that would produce a reversal of the burden of proof against the plaintiff company. In this regard, it is necessary to state that the issue of the burden of proof –article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code– is a procedural matter. This has been repeatedly indicated by this jurisdictional body since long ago. In this regard, resolutions 31 of 9:20 a.m. on March 20, 1992, 1020-F-2005 of 4:28 p.m. on December 21, 2005, and 908-A-S1-09 of 11:00 a.m. on September 10, 2009, among others, can be consulted. However, it is not regulated in the exhaustive grounds of canon 594 ibid, as a ground for cassation for that reason. Consequently, the rejection of the grievance under consideration is warranted. Without prejudice to the foregoing, and for the sake of having a greater abundance of reasons, it must be indicated that in consideration XII of this judgment, the relevance of applying the precautionary principle, derived from numerals 46 and 50 of the Constitución Política, and expressly regulated in canon 11 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, to this litigation was analyzed. In the face of the existing reasonable doubt, regarding the tuberculosis outbreak on the plaintiff company's property, the Public Administration, specifically, the Dirección de Salud Animal of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (as stipulated in article 7 of Law No. 6243, Ley de Salud Animal, in force when the events analyzed in the case at bar occurred), was empowered to adopt all those measures in safeguarding not only human health, but also animal health and the environment. This grievance under consideration seeks to establish the invalidity of the challenged acts, by virtue of the absence of scientific certainty regarding the results of the tuberculin tests applied to the plaintiff's herd. However, such a requirement, as indicated in said section of this ruling, was not necessary for the Public Administration to act in the manner it did. Consequently, what is argued by the appellant is not useful for modifying what was decided in the appealed judgment.\n\n\n[...]\n\n\n**XVI.** The central aspect of what is alleged by the appellant is that the Ad quem unduly assessed the report CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible at folios 468 to 469, by not accepting that the existence of tuberculosis in a head of livestock can only be concluded, from a microbiological point of view, when it is isolated from the animal's tissues. That is, the application of intradermal or tuberculin tests by MAG officials on the plaintiff company's herd was not sufficient.\n\nFirst, it must be noted, as stated in Considerando XI of this judgment, that the report rendered by Dr. María Cecilia Matamoros, in her capacity as Head of the National Reference Center for Tuberculosis of INCISENSA, has the nature of testimony, pursuant to the provisions of canon 301 subsection 2) of the LGAP, not of documentary evidence of a scientific nature as claimed by the appellant, and even less so, of an administrative act. Second, the cassation appellant states: “Additionally, regarding the improper assessment of evidence, the Court did not take into account that in zones or regions where bovine tuberculosis control campaigns have been carried out, as (sic) in the case of the plaintiff company, the presentation of a considerable percentage of reacting animals, detected through the application of routine simple intradermal tests, is frequent, nor was gestation taken into account as a possible factor for tuberculin response, in animals between the 6th and 8th month of pregnancy, among other things. In this regard, concerning the technical specifications of the manufacturer of the intradermal test with bovine tuberculin of the PPD AVIAR and PPD BOVINO classes, visible at folio 30 of the expediente, according to the rules of sound rational criticism (arts. 298.1 and 16 LGAP), the rules of science and logic are specifically violated, because the manufacturer of these tests, in the ‘contraindications’ section, indicates that: ‘It should not be used in females close to parturition or post-partum…’, this is because gestation (between the 6th and 8th month of pregnancy) is a possible factor for tuberculin response, while in the ‘warning’ section it is indicated that: ‘… Tuberculinization should not be repeated unless there is a minimum interval of 60 days from the previous test…’, basically for the same technical reason, since the Respondent Administration did not demonstrate having complied with such specifications at the time of performing the tuberculinization on the herd of the plaintiff company.” The lower court judges did not find it proven that bovine tuberculosis control campaigns had been carried out in the herd of the plaintiff company, nor that the tuberculin tests had been applied to females between the sixth and eighth month of gestation. However, the cassation appellant fails to indicate with which evidence these facts are demonstrated and, therefore, are violated in the appealed judgment. He merely points to the document visible at folio 30 of the main expediente, where only the manufacturer's instructions appear. Contrary to what is alleged, the burden of proof rested with his client, in light of the provisions of ordinal 317 subsection 1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Note that this is not a negative fact, but an assertion that constitutes the basis of the annulment and compensation claims put forth. Then, he adds: “In another line of thought, and regarding the improper application of the precautionary principle… to the case under examination, it must be noted previously that the legal norms applicable to the present case are those that were in force at the time the challenged administrative acts were carried out. Thus, this proceeding is governed by the now-repealed Bovine Tuberculosis Law No. 1207 and the Animal Health Law No. 6243, with their consequent regulations also repealed. Based on the foregoing, it is possible to conclude with crystal clarity that the precautionary principle, derived from Article 4 of the General Law of the National Animal Health Service (sic) No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, published in La Gaceta No. 93 of May 16, 2006, has no application to the case in question, as its validity and/or enactment occurred long after the administrative acts appealed herein occurred. Let the Honorable Cassation Chamber note that the A Quo, in the first-instance judgment, expressly and improperly applied said General Law of the National Animal Health Service No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, to the case under examination, a situation which the Court of Appeals tacitly endorsed in the appealed judgment. …” Contrary to what the cassation appellant asserts, neither the A quo, nor tacitly the Ad quem, applied Law No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, the General Law of the National Animal Health Service. In this respect, in the first-instance judgment, regarding the matter of interest, it is stated: “Seventh: … In this matter, immediate measures must be adopted, as human health, animal health, and the environment are at stake, aimed at the protection of each one, as anticipated in the resolutions that decided the suspension incident, No. 56-2001 at 10:00 a.m. on January 13, Considerando Vo (folios 351 to 354), and No. 216-2001 at 11:45 a.m. on July 20 (folios 377 to 389). Principles such as risk analysis or assessment, precautionary or caution, protection of consumer interests, equivalence, transparency, and information govern, which have constitutional roots (articles 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution), and are today expressly recognized by the ordinary legislator (Law No. 8495, Article 4o). According to the precautionary principle, the lack of scientific certainty is no excuse for adopting decisions in favor of health and the environment. In this sense, the Court finds that the decisions adopted and measures applied are based on the tuberculin test performed, which is the test established for these cases, without the lack of confirmatory or complementary tests preventing proceeding in this manner. The acts therefore are not the fruit of the naked will of whoever issued them, but rather adequate measures based on technical medical criteria, aimed at protecting assets of superior lineage.” (The underlining is not from the original). It is easily verified that what the judge affirms is the application of principles of constitutional lineage; which, at the time said judgment was issued, were also embodied in Law No. 8495 (a comment made for purposes of clarification, but not with the intention of applying that law), but before that, they underlay the Political Constitution – articles 46 and 50 -. For its part, in the challenged judgment, regarding the pertinent part, the Court states: “VI.- THIRD GRIEVANCE. REGARDING THE ALLEGED BREACH OF TECHNICAL MEASURES WHEN APPLYING THE TUBERCULIN TESTS. … It must be borne in mind that the challenged administrative act, ultimately, had as its purpose the protection of human health (collective interest), and in that sense, the A-quo is right in warning that given such a scenario, the principles enshrined in articles 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution govern, as they seek the protection of health and a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, one of them indeed being the ‘precautionary’ principle, according to which, the absence of scientific certainty should not be used as a justification for not adopting effective protection measures, as in this case, where the Administration was forced to slaughter the plaintiff's cattle, in order to prevent an epidemic that could constitute a serious danger to the health of the inhabitants and the environment. … VII.- FOURTH GRIEVANCE. ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS OF THE CHALLENGED ACT AND THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE AS A WHOLE. … In any case, Dr. Matamoros's report, constructed based on the information set forth by the plaintiff in its lawsuit, raises the possibility of ‘doubt about the presence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd’ (sic), and in that sense, it is reiterated that in application of the precautionary principle, doubt is not a reason for not adopting protective measures in favor of health and the environment. …” (The underlining is supplied). Without a doubt, it is inferred that the Court neither expressly nor covertly applied Law No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, but rather a constitutional principle – the precautionary one – which lies in articles 46 and 50 of the Carta Magna. Along this line of thought, in Considerando XII, the reasons for which this Chamber considers that, under the protection of that postulate (provided for, when the facts analyzed in this lite occurred, not only in the Political Constitution, but also in numeral 11 of Law No. 7788 of April 30, 1998, Biodiversity Law, which is applicable to the sub júdice), by virtue of the reasonable doubt existing regarding the tuberculosis outbreak in the herd of the plaintiff company, the Administration was authorized to act as it did were set forth in a detailed manner. The cassation appellant, to deny the application of said principle, indicates at folio 707: “Based on such evidence, contrary to what the Court asserted in Considerando Seventh of the appealed judgment, it is possible to conclude that there are no objective elements to affirm that the execution of the administrative measures conformed to the rules of science, logic, and convenience, and it is not observed that the decision was adopted within the limits of rationality and reasonableness implicit in the legal system, as far as performing the tuberculin test does not constitute a suitable technical medical-veterinary element (grounds for the administrative act) for dictating measures of that type (slaughter and/or extermination of cattle) in favor of human health, animal health, and the environment (purpose), because, as indicated supra, the absence of complementary or confirmatory laboratory tests would vitiate the content of the act. …” (The underlining is supplied). As is clearly determined, the appellant, once again, seeks to establish the invalidity of the challenged acts on the absence of scientific certainty regarding the results of the tuberculin tests applied to the herd of the plaintiff company. However, it is reiterated, in application of the aforementioned precautionary principle, given the existing reasonable doubt, that certainty was not necessary for the Animal Health Directorate of the MAG to act as it did. Likewise, in the aforementioned section of this judgment, the report rendered by Dr. Matamoros, visible at folios 468-469, was analyzed. It was concluded that it could not dispel that doubt and, therefore, that the Administration's actions did not become illegitimate. On the other hand, when the indicated MAG body issued the resolution at 9:00 a.m. on January 12, 2000, and even at the moment of executing the measures contained therein (see proven facts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, not challenged by the cassation appellant), the regulatory framework in force was contained in: 1) Law No. 1207 of October 9, 1950, known as the Bovine Tuberculosis Law; 2) Decreto Ejecutivo 10120-A of May 9, 1979, “Reglamento sobre el Control de la Tuberculosis Bovina”; and 3) the Animal Health Law, No. 6243, of May 2, 1978. In relevant part, the first regulatory body provides: “Article 2 The tuberculin test is declared mandatory for all bovine animals, as many times as deemed convenient, which shall be applied by duly trained officials designated by the Ministries of Agriculture and Industry and Public Health. Article 3 Bovine animals in which the tuberculin test has yielded a positive result shall be immediately isolated and slaughtered once the requirements referred to in the following articles are fulfilled. Article 4o As soon as it is proven that an animal is infected with tuberculosis, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica will be requested to send two experts, who shall preferably be licensed agricultural engineers, who will proceed to assess the sick animal in the presence of an official veterinarian, for which purpose the animal's tuberculosis shall not be taken into account. The Banco Nacional shall always give priority to such a request.” (The underlining does not appear in the original). For its part, the Regulation to that Law, Decreto Ejecutivo 10120-A, in relevant part, stipulates: “Article 5. When the Directorate of the National Animal Health Program receives the information mentioned in articles three and four of this Regulation, they will immediately proceed to carry out the epidemiological study of the affected herd and to perform the tuberculin test on the totality of the cattle existing therein. Article 6. The tuberculin test performed on herds with problems or on reacting animals may be carried out by private veterinary doctors, with prior knowledge of the legal procedure to follow with reacting animals and training in the officially used techniques, to whom a credential granted by the Directorate of the Animal Health Program will be issued, maintaining a registry of the Veterinary Doctors accredited for this purpose. In case of non-compliance with the procedures indicated herein, the Program Directorate shall be empowered to suspend the credential granted, notifying the Colegio de Médicos Veterinarios. Article 7. Animals that are classified as reacting shall be duly identified, fire-branded, assessed, and immediately slaughtered, in accordance with Law No. 1207. Article 8. A certification program for tuberculosis-free herds will be established in a dairy production area as a pilot plan, establishing a registry of owners who voluntarily submit to said Program, so that later areas can be declared free. Article 9. Entry into the pilot plan area will only be allowed for animals that test negative to the tuberculin test. Article 10. Owners who submit to the voluntary plan of the pilot area will subject their entire herd to the tuberculin test and will eliminate their reacting animals in accordance with Law No. 1207. Herds that have reacting animals will repeat their tuberculin tests every 60 days until a negative result is obtained for the entire herd. From that moment on, two controls will be carried out per year (one per semester). Article 11. Herds that in the pilot plan area test negative to the tuberculin test will be subjected to another test six months later, and if they test negative again, they will be considered free herds, and must be subjected to control once a year. Article 12. Once the reacting animals have been eliminated, a complete cleaning and disinfection of the structures of the barns, corrals, etc., will proceed, using for this purpose disinfectants recommended by the Program authorities.” (The underlining is not from the original). Finally, Law No. 6243 of May 2, 1978, Animal Health Law, in its seventh article states: “The Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, through the corresponding sanitary authorities and those specifically designated, is empowered to take any quarantine or destruction measure that the Animal Health Directorate recommends, in the case of disease outbreaks that endanger public health or animal health. / These measures may be the slaughter, isolation, retention, or treatment of animals or the destruction by incineration or denaturing of products or by-products or waste that are considered, in the judgment of the Animal Health Directorate, a danger of contagion or dissemination of diseases or similar morbid conditions, to the detriment of public health or animal health. The competent authorities are empowered to carry out inspection visits within private or official property, in pursuit of inspection, information, tests, objects, animal samples, etc. The respective owners, upon prior identification of the authority, are obliged to allow their entry.” In light of the provisions transcribed above, it is evident that the cassation appellant's thesis, in the sense that the application of tuberculin was not sufficient, but that it was essential to carry out complementary or confirmatory laboratory tests, is unacceptable. The only test provided for in the legislation – meaning law and regulation – applicable to this lite, to detect bovine tuberculosis, was tuberculin. In this sense, once performed, animals with a positive result were duly classified, fire-branded, assessed, and immediately slaughtered, with the Animal Health Directorate of the MAG being the competent body to order such measures. Article nine of Decreto Ejecutivo 28515-MAG, “Reglamento sobre el Control de la Tuberculosis Bovina”, was the one that established the complementary laboratory test, by stating: “Animals that are classified as reacting shall be clearly marked in an indelible and visible form on the right masseter with an 'S', an action that must be executed by the official or accredited private technician or professional who performed the tests, within the three working days following receipt of the laboratory confirmation.” (The underlining is not from the original). However, it is not applicable to the sub lítem. It was issued on November 25, 1999, but published and, therefore, in force, until March 17, 2000; that is, after the administrative resolution challenged in this proceeding had been issued and executed, that is to say, that of the Animal Health Directorate of the MAG at 9:00 a.m. on January 12, 2000. In accordance with the foregoing, the grievance under study must be dismissed. \n\nXVII.- In the seventh objection, called by the appellant “eighth ground of cassation for reasons of substance due to indirect violation of the law,” he alleges improper assessment of the evidentiary elements in the proceeding according to the rules of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional). This is because, as he states, the Court, against all evidence, established, for purposes of attributing patrimonial liability, that the Administration acted lawfully and normally. He quotes what the Ad quem stated in Considerando VIII of the challenged judgment. For patrimonial and/or compensatory purposes, he comments, the classification of the administrative operation is of capital importance, in order to determine the extent of liability. In the case of illicit conduct or abnormal operation, the damage and lost profits must be repaired; but if the liability derives from licit acts or normal conduct, only compensation for the damage is appropriate. In this line of thought, he points out, for compensatory purposes, contrary to what the Court affirmed, the breaking of the compensation cap established by Article 7 of the Bovine Tuberculosis Law, No. 1207, has utility and is of the utmost importance. The foregoing, because if the disease of the euthanized bovine is conclusively demonstrated, only 50% of its expertly determined value is payable as compensation. But, he adds, if there is doubt as to whether the animal is sick or healthy, 100% of its value must be recognized, as extracted from canon 194.2 of the LGAP, given that, on this particular point, there would be a collision of two special laws on compensation matters, where the later law repeals the earlier one. That is, he argues, the LGAP regarding this aspect repeals, for this lite, the now-repealed Bovine Tuberculosis Law. From a harmonious and joint analysis of all the evidentiary elements in the proceeding, according to the rules of sound rational criticism, he indicates that it is obtained that, to diagnose bovine tuberculosis in a herd, performing the tuberculin or diagnostic test is not enough, but rather confirmatory laboratory tests must be carried out. The foregoing, he adds, because, in light of ordinals 9 in fine of the Reglamento sobre el Control de la Tuberculosis Bovina (Decreto Ejecutivo 28515-MAG of November 25, 1999), 4 paragraph g) and 33 paragraph a) of the Reglamento General del Instituto Costarricense de Investigación y Enseñanza en Nutrición y Salud, INCIENSA (Decreto Ejecutivo 26656-S of January 9, 1998), in relation to report CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible at folios 468-469 of the judicial expediente, one can only conclude, from a microbiological point of view, that there is bovine tuberculosis in an animal when that microorganism is isolated from the tissues of that animal. It is not enough just to apply the intradermal or tuberculin tests performed by officials of the MAG on the herd of the plaintiff company. In this line of thought, he continues, as the action taken by the Administration is one that causes serious harm to the subjective rights or legitimate interests of the administered party, it was mandatory for it to verify the material truth of the facts that served as grounds for the act challenged in this proceeding, in the most faithful and complete manner possible, which is lacking. Consequently, articles 214.2, 221, and 308.1 paragraph a) of the LGAP are violated. On the other hand, he reiterates, performing the tuberculin test does not constitute a suitable technical medical-veterinary element (grounds for the administrative act) for dictating measures of that type (slaughter and/or extermination of cattle) in favor of human health, animal health, and the environment (purpose). The absence of complementary or confirmatory laboratory tests vitiates the content of the act. In this way, he adds, based on the evidence, specifically the scientific documents visible at folios 72 to 76, 146, 303, 305, 468-469 of the judicial expediente, as well as the documents visible at folios 303, 304, 313 to 317 of the administrative one, contrary to what the Court asserted in Considerando Seventh of the appealed judgment, it is possible to conclude that there are no objective elements to affirm that the execution of the administrative measures conformed to the univocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience. These concepts, he says, are summarized in the reasonableness and proportionality of the norm as parameters of constitutionality, Article 16 of the LGAP, and it is not observed that the decision was adopted within the limits of rationality and reasonableness implicit in the legal system. Regarding the extent of the compensation for material damage, he affirms, what the Court resolved is tendentiously partial and concomitantly omitted. It limited itself to considering the material damage arising from the sacrifice or total slaughter of the plaintiff company’s herd, which, although it is the most ostensible, is not the only damage caused and illegitimately suffered by his client. The damage and lost profits are measured based on the productivity of the animals, whose extermination contributed to the company’s financial crisis. In this sense, he argues, a dairy farm is a business and must be analyzed as such. A productive unit or company has a value according to its profits, which are a function of its investment represented by its fixed or immobilized assets and by its current assets. The greater the risk or investment, the greater the profit and its value must be. The Court, the cassation appellant points out, improperly failed to analyze the damage concerning the denaturing or destruction of the fluid milk; the value of the genetic purity of the herd itself, as the slaughtered cattle were pedigree livestock (genealogy of a purebred animal) and registered by both the Asociación de Criadores de Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica and the Asociación Costarricense de Criadores de Ganado Jersey (folios 183 to 223, both inclusive, of the administrative expediente); the prohibition of milk sales; the non-sale of cull male animals for the activity, as well as of unsuitable females; the expected growth and profit in herd development, herd growth and production. They should also have analyzed, he points out, the company’s fixed operating costs, where all existing fixed assets (the farm, facilities, equipment, etc.) were maintained, which, when income was affected, involved current assets, which, of course, as negative cash flow existed, inevitably impaired current liabilities, generating a chain of financial instability in the company, as part of its resources or assets were immobilized when its income or production diminished; the reduction in production continuity due to non-utilization of installed capacity; the operational loss due to lack of production; the financial costs referring both to leverage and to investment (the farm, improvement facilities or constructions, equipment, paddocks, fences, corrals, internal roads, and all the infrastructure in general were already there); the indirect production and administrative costs that the company had to bear, etc. A procedural legal situation evidenced, he states, which causes the nullity of the appealed judgment. Consequently, a joint analysis of the existing evidence, in accordance with the rules of sound rational criticism, is lacking. As an example, he points out, report CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible at folios 468-469 of the judicial expediente, despite being documentary evidence of a scientific nature, its probative value was disdained by the Court. At the same time that, having the report emanating from an Administration official, a sort of substitutive character for the confession of the party (artículo 54.1 of the LRJCA), and/or that of constituting a testimony (artículo 301.2 of the LGAP), he comments, the one rendered by Dr. José Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, Director of Animal Health, visible at folios 506 to 508 of the expediente, according to which, the tuberculin used by the Administration to diagnose bovine tuberculosis in the plaintiff company’s herd was covered by a quality control certificate, even though the same is considered given under oath, does not transform it into an expert report or evidence of a technical-scientific character or nature, which is why it lacks factual support that sustains what is affirmed therein. Contrary to what the Court held, which illegitimately granted it the character or condition of an expert report and/or evidence of a technical-scientific character or nature. Concerning the extent of the material damage, he comments, the Ad quem failed to consider the record of denaturing and destruction of 2315 kilograms of fluid milk (folio 31 of the judicial expediente); the quarantine record (folio 32); the visit record No. 2635-A, where 4790 kilograms of fluid milk and others are destroyed (folio 33); visit record No. 2636-A, when 1,458.5 kilograms of fluid milk and others are destroyed (folio 34); the seizure record No. 4171 for 417 kilograms of fluid milk (folio 35); the visit record No. 2638-A where, among other things, the destruction of 2,773.6 kilograms of fluid milk is recorded (folio 37); the notarial certification of official letters DZS/RH 009-00 and 007-00 DZS/RHN of January 13, 2000, indicating to the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. the obligation not to collect fluid milk (folios 39 and 40); five notarial records of destruction of fluid milk (folios 229 to 233) of the main expediente; as well as the actuarial mathematical expert reports carried out by Licenciados Salvador Hernández Araya and Leonel Centeno Madrigal (respectively at folios 234 to 255 and 513 to 529). In conclusion, he notes, canons 11, 33, 41, 45, 50 of the Political Constitution; 190.2, 194.1.2.3 of the LGAP; 3, 7 of the now-repealed Bovine Tuberculosis Law, No. 1207, were violated, due to improper application; due to lack of action, articles 190.1, 191, 192, and 196 of the LGAP were violated. Furthermore, as valuation norms, articles 298.2 of the LGAP and 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure were violated.\n\nXVIII.- In light of the formulation, this grievance is subdivided into two points. In the first, the cassation appellant affirms, the compensation for the sacrifice of the animals owned by his represented party should have been 100% and not just 50%. This is because there was no certainty of tuberculosis infection, since the tuberculin test was insufficient, and complementary laboratory tests should have been performed, as only thus could bovine tuberculosis be diagnosed with certainty. In this regard, it is pertinent to state the following.\n\nAs indicated in Considerando XI of this judgment, the statement in proven fact number 20, to the effect that the tuberculins used and applied to the plaintiff's animals were covered by a quality and efficacy control certificate, is equivocal, as it is devoid of suitable evidence to demonstrate that factual situation. However, as has been extensively set forth, among others, in Section XII, that circumstance does not entail the breaking of the ruling. On three occasions, different persons or institutions determined the existence of tuberculosis in the plaintiff company's animals: first, the veterinarian of the El Valle slaughterhouse, Doctor Ricardo Aguilar Jiménez; then, the laboratory studies carried out by the LANASEVE; and, lastly, the tuberculin tests applied by the MAG officials. Due to these coinciding positive results, and in the absence of the quality and efficacy control certificate, a reasonable doubt arises regarding the tuberculosis outbreak, which, under the protection of the precautionary principle (principio precautorio) (derived, at the constitutional level, from canons 46 and 50; and expressly regulated in the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad) in its numeral 11), obligated the Public Administration (Administración Pública), specifically, the Animal Health Directorate (Dirección de Salud Animal) of the MAG, to act as it did. On the other hand, in Considerando XVI, the reason why, in the opinion of this Chamber, the appellant is not correct in his argument that the result of the tuberculin application was not sufficient, but that confirmatory or laboratory tests were also required, was analyzed. Consequently, under the protection of the foregoing, and as the instance judges correctly indicated, the Public Administration (Administración Pública) acted lawfully and normally when ordering, among other measures, the slaughter of the animals that reacted positively to the applied tests. In this sense, it is reiterated, the reason is the reasonable doubt regarding the existence of the tuberculosis outbreak on the plaintiff company's farm, in order to protect human and animal health and the environment. Regarding the compensatory aspect for this type of administrative action, numeral 194 of the LGAP provides: \"1. The Administration (Administración) shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal operation when they cause damage to the rights of the administered party in a special manner, due to the small proportion of affected parties or the exceptional intensity of the injury. / 2. In this case, the indemnity shall cover the value of the damages at the time of payment, but not lost profits. / 3. The State shall be liable for damages caused directly by a law, which are special in accordance with this article.\" (Underlining supplied). However, in the case of pecuniary reparation for the slaughter of livestock for being sick with tuberculosis, contrary to what was stated by the appellant, the previous provision is not applicable. There is special regulation: that contained in Law number 1207 of October 9, 1950. This is a specific law regarding that matter –bovine tuberculosis–, not a general one like the provisions in the LGAP. In this sense, the seventh canon provides: \"Based on the appraisal referred to, the owner of the slaughtered animal, as soon as he submits his claim, shall be compensated by the State with 50% of the value set by the experts of the Banco Nacional. Notwithstanding what is stated in this article, the State, in the case of insured animals, shall only be obliged to pay the owner the difference resulting against him between the insurance and the 50% referred to in this article.\" (Underlining supplied). The appellant's assertion that \"... if the disease of the euthanized bovine is conclusively proven, only 50% of its expertly determined value is payable as compensation (article 7 ibidem) ... but if there is doubt as to whether the animal is sick or if it is healthy, 100% of the value of such animal must be paid ...\" is not acceptable. As noted, the absence of scientific certainty was not an obstacle for the Public Administration (Administración Pública) to act as it did, since the precautionary principle (principio precautorio) so required. For its part, the law in question only provides, as compensation, the payment of 50% of the expertly determined value of the slaughtered animals, just as the plaintiff company was compensated (see proven facts 17 and 19, not challenged by the appellant), not 100% in case of doubt. Therefore, since the plaintiff company was compensated for the slaughter of its livestock, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations applicable to the sub júdice, the inadmissibility of the claim in merit is inferred.\n\nXIX.- In the second point of the reproach, the appellant states that what was resolved by the Tribunal is silent, since it improperly limited itself to considering the material damage arising from the slaughter of his principal's herd, which, although the most ostensible, is not the only one. The appellant is correct. In this regard, as already indicated, the seventh numeral of Law 6243 of May 2, 1978, Animal Health Law (Ley sobre Salud Animal), empowers the MAG to take any quarantine or destruction measure recommended by the Animal Health Directorate (Dirección de Salud Animal), in the case of outbreaks of diseases that endanger public or animal health. These measures, other than the slaughter of the animals, can also generate compensable damages, according to the provisions of ordinal 194 of the LGAP; provided they are effective –as a consequence of the measures taken–, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group, as provided in article 196 ibidem. In relation, the appellant states: \"Thus, the Tribunal improperly failed to analyze the damage concerning the denaturation or destruction of the fluid milk; the value of the genetic purity of the herd itself, since the annihilated bovines were pedigree livestock (with genealogy of a purebred animal) and/or registered, both by the Asociación de Criadores de Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica and by the Asociación Costarricense de Criadores de Ganado Jersey (See folios 183 to 223, both inclusive of the administrative file); the prohibition on the sale of milk; the non-sale of cull male animals for the activity as well as unsuitable females; the expected growth and utility in the development of the herd, the growth and production of the herd; the fixed operating costs of the company should also have been analyzed, where all existing fixed assets were maintained (the farm, the facilities, the equipment, etc.), which, upon affecting income, also affected current assets, which, of course, with a negative cash flow, inevitably affected current liabilities, generating a chain of financial instability in the company, as part of its resources or assets were immobilized by reducing its production income; the loss of production continuity due to the non-utilization of installed capacity; the operational loss due to lack of production; the financial costs referring both to leverage and investment costs (the farm was already there, the improvement facilities or constructions were already there, the equipment was already there, the paddocks, the fences, the chutes, the internal roads, and all the general infrastructure were already there); the indirect production costs and administrative costs that the company had to bear; etc., evidenced procedural legal situation that causes the nullity of the appealed ruling.\" Regarding the value of the genetic purity of the herd itself, when referring to the slaughtered animals, it is included in the compensation analyzed in the previous section. In relation to the rest of the appellant's statements, except for the fluid milk, the evidentiary support consists of the opinions issued by Licentiate Salvador Hernández Araya (folios 233 to 254) and by Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal (folios 513 to 529). Both expert reports, in light of the rules of sound judgment, do not deserve faith from this Chamber. The first, because it was prepared at the request of the plaintiff company's manager, Osman Marín Rojas, without the opposing party having been given the opportunity to object to it or request additions and clarifications. Furthermore, as Licentiate Hernández Araya indicates, he prepared the report solely with the information and documents provided by the interested party. Therefore, if any value were given to it, the defendant party would be placed in a state of defenselessness. The second, because it lacks due foundation. The expert omits indicating what methods and formulas were used, besides their factual, doctrinal, or scientific support, to arrive at the conclusions reached. He merely points out: \"To carry out the requested study, a study of the pieces that make up the judicial file was carried out and the professional standards governing the matter were applied.\" Therefore, the statements made seem to be mere subjective opinions. In this sense, for example, he states: \"From the above, the forty-seven average animals were capable of producing milk in the indicated period, except that the younger ones would join production in years subsequent to the initial one. For the sake of simplicity in the exposition and calculation, to avoid the problem of the additional variable of ages and without detracting from the final result of the study, we will proceed to calculate a production average, not exact linear, but rather of intensities. Otherwise, the highest and lowest values, which are a quantity of three, are eliminated; from what remains, it is observed that a population of ten animals is between 6 and 24 months and 11 animals have 4 lactations. Having eliminated the above, we are left with three groups that go ascendingly and in order from one to three lactations with a similar number of members. From the above, it is inferred that the average is located at two lactations and from here we will start to make the milk production calculations. This is because, as is known and in the public domain, cows increase their production from when they start producing until adulthood, and therefore it would not be realistic to consider all as adults or all as heifers. Having clarified the above, and for reproduction purposes, since the first ones do not reproduce in the first year, an average of forty-five cows in production will be taken. … Therefore, a general analysis model has been deduced that can be applied to different quantities of animals, whose limit will be determined by the scale or productive platform of the business, or by what is also known as its installed capacity.\" He does not clarify from where and why he obtains these data. In some cases, assessments and assumptions lacking real evidence or studies on the farm are also made, which exceed his competence, not only by referring to future events, for example, \"With this analysis, the new breeding females that should have entered the productive process and the cull ones will be determined,\" but also by including aspects that were not requested of him, for example, when referring to the damages caused by the slaughter of 75 animals, since his opinion was only requested for the slaughter of the remaining 47 livestock. No mention is made of the documents consulted, especially those of a financial-accounting nature of the plaintiff company, to carry out the report. In this regard, for example, it is indicated: \"Next, a milk price will be established as of the date of the lawsuit, and an income for this concept will be determined. Next, income from other concepts will be established, and from the total income, a profit will be inferred, which will be normal in any type of productive activity, which will be limited by the financial maxim that any business must have a profitability greater than the product of the usufruct of money in the stock market.\" However, it does not indicate where these data are obtained from. Consequently, by discrediting both studies, the alleged damages lack evidentiary support. Ergo, it was not proven that they were a direct product (causal link) of the measures taken by the administration, especially the quarantine of the plaintiff company's farm, given the emergence of the tuberculosis outbreak. Therefore, their recognition does not proceed (numerals 194 and 196 of the LGAP). Regarding the prohibition on the sale of milk, this aspect does not allude to a damage in itself, but rather to the eventual gain not received, that is, to lost profits, which, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 2) of article 194 ibidem, is not compensable. Finally, regarding the destruction or denaturation of fluid milk, the appellant invokes, as improperly assessed, among other means of conviction, five notarial records, visible at folios 228 to 232. In accordance with canon 101 of the Notarial Code (Código Notarial), this evidence constitutes a public instrument; however, he does not cite its evidentiary value rule. For this reason, regarding that evidence, the grievance is informal. On the other hand, that destruction is a duly proven fact. In this regard, proven facts preceded by numbers 6, 7, 8, and 11 can be consulted. However, this Chamber considers that it is not compensable. The General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), number 5395 of October 30, 1973, expressly prohibits the commercialization of altered, deteriorated, contaminated, adulterated, or falsified foods. In what is of interest, this regulatory body prescribes: \"ARTICLE 196.- Adequate nutrition and the ingestion of good quality food under sanitary conditions are essential for health, and therefore, natural and legal persons engaged in activities related to food intended for consumption by the population must exercise maximum diligence and avoid omissions in complying with the pertinent legal and regulatory provisions and the special orders that the health authority may issue, within its powers, in safeguarding health. … ARTICLE 200.- It is strictly prohibited to import, process, use, possess for sale, trade, transfer free of charge, handle, distribute, and store altered or deteriorated, contaminated, adulterated, or falsified foods. ARTICLE 201.- Altered or deteriorated food is understood, for the purposes of this law and its regulations, as that which for any natural cause has suffered damage or change in its basic, chemical, or biological characteristics. ARTICLE 202.- Contaminated food is considered, for legal and regulatory purposes, as that which contains pathogenic microorganisms, toxins, or impurities of organic or mineral origin that are repulsive, inconvenient, or harmful to health. / Food that is the product of processing, packaging, or handling carried out under defective sanitary conditions or in contravention of legal or regulatory provisions shall be presumed contaminated. … ARTICLE 223.- Every manufacturer of food products must use, in their processing, raw materials that meet sanitary conditions. / It is therefore prohibited to use materials, products, or by-products containing decomposed or toxic substances or offal not susceptible to elimination, meats and by-products from animals slaughtered in unauthorized places and in a non-regulatory manner, and, especially, the reincorporation into food production of stale, adulterated, contaminated, or suspected of being so, or products returned by commerce.\" Notwithstanding the previous provisions, that same legislation empowers the commercialization of any by-product of animals affected by zoonosis, as occurs in this litigation, provided that the act does not constitute a crime and with the prior and express authorization of the Ministry of Health. In this sense, numeral 375 states: \"Whoever knowingly imports, processes, trades, distributes, or supplies by any title, handles, or holds for these same purposes, deteriorated, contaminated, adulterated, or falsified drugs or food, when the act does not constitute a crime, shall be punished with a fine of ten to sixty days. / The same penalty shall be incurred by whoever preserves, distributes, delivers, or trades in any form the meat or by-products of animals affected by zoonosis, if there is no prior and express authorization from the Ministry, when the act does not constitute a crime.\" (The underlining is not in the original). Consequently, the MAG could order the destruction of the milk from the plaintiff company's property, as it did –article 7 of the Animal Health Law (Ley sobre Salud Animal)–, without prejudice to the respective compensation, in the event that it could be commercialized, under the terms provided in this last numeral of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud). However, in the case file, official letters numbers UAA-RHN-072-2000, dated September 11, 2000, from the Head of the Environment Attention Unit (Unidad de Atención al Ambiente) of the Ministry of Health, Huetar Norte Region (folio 301), and DR-RHN-1271-2000, dated December 7, 2000, from the Regional Director of the Ministry of Health (folios 309-310), are recorded, through which that authorization is denied. Consequently, since the destroyed milk could not be commercialized, there is no compensable damage whatsoever. Under the protection of the reasons set forth, it is also imperative to dismiss this second argument formulated in the present reproach.\n\nXX.- In the eighth, denominated by the appellant as the \"ninth ground of cassation for substantive reasons due to indirect violation of the law,\" he argues the existence of an error of law due to the improper rejection of moral damages, by improperly assessing the following means of conviction: a) the testimonies of Osman Marín Rojas, Antonio Marín Rojas, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, and Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga; b) the mathematical actuarial study carried out by Licentiate Salvador Hernández Araya, folios 233 to 254; c) official letters DZS/RH 009-00 and DZS/RHN 007-00 of January 13, 2000, where the appealed Administration (Administración recurrida) indicates to the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. the obligation not to collect fluid milk from the plaintiff company's herd, folios 39 and 40; d) expert report by Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal, folios 513 to 529; e) official letters UAA-RHN-072-2000, signed by the Head of the Environment Attention Unit (Unidad de Atención al Ambiente) of the Ministry of Health, folio 301; CNRTB-196-92000, signed by Doctor María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 302; official letter CART-80-2000, signed by Mr. Mario Azofeifa Solano, San Carlos Operations Coordinator of the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., folio 303; all three dated September 11, 2000; CNRTB-206-92000 of September 13, 2000, from Doctor María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 304; UAA-RHN 076-2000 from the headship of the Environment Attention Unit (Unidad de Atención al Ambiente) of the Ministry of Health, folio 305; 121-2000 DZS-RHN from the headship of Zoosanitary Defense of the Huetar Norte Region of the MAG, both dated September 14, 2000; DR-RHN-1271-2000, dated December 7, 2000, signed by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Health, folios 309-310; and f) note from the plaintiff company dated November 27, 2000, folio 308. He transcribes what was set forth by the Tribunal in Considerando IX of the contested judgment. In accordance with what was resolved by said deciding body, he affirms, we are faced with the dichotomy of the proof or lack thereof of objective moral damage, on one hand, and its quantification on the other. It would seem that the Ad quem, he comments, opted both for the lack of evidence to consider the assumptions for recognizing its compensation as accredited, as well as for the non-quantification of its assessable economic consequences. Even if it were accepted that the assessable economic consequences of the moral damage were not quantified during the cognizance phase, it is no obstacle to declaring its existence. In this sense, he points out, the Tribunal's ruling that the plaintiff company did not demonstrate the objective moral damage that the Administration (Administración) caused it is a consequence of an improper assessment, in accordance with the rules of rational sound judgment, of the indicated elements of conviction. The objective moral damage that occurred in this litigation, he asserts, lies in the deterioration or impairment suffered by the plaintiff company in its image, prestige, credibility to implement business in the market of the commercial activity carried out, in its good name, and business solvency. This is because it was not only a creditworthy company with the National Banking System, but also its herd had pedigree, registered both by the Asociación de Criadores de Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica and by the Asociación Costarricense de Criadores de Ganado Jersey (folios 183 to 223, both inclusive of the administrative file). This affectation occurred due to the transcendence of the events that occurred in the business environment, the surroundings, the guild, the community, the various public and private entities related to the company's line of business, as well as their improper dissemination through the mass media, especially Channel 14 of the Zona Norte. Regarding errors in the assessment of the indicated evidence, he points out, concerning the evaluation of Mr. Osman Marín Rojas's testimony, the mere fact that he indicated having an interest in the outcome of the process is not sufficient reason (rules of sound judgment) to discard it, unless such a conclusion does not derive from and/or is not the product of a joint analysis of the entire evidentiary array gathered in the process, which reveals its disproportion and/or incongruence in what was stated under oath. At the same time, he indicates, what was stated by said witness, whether or not useful for the purposes of the valuation or quantification of the moral damage, is irrelevant to discredit him, as such determination can be reserved for the judgment execution stage. A task that, in any case, he comments, does not correspond, much less is the responsibility of, a witness. Concerning the assessment of the document visible at folio 303 of the file, which is official letter CART-80-2000 dated September 11, 2000, signed by Mr. Mario Azofeifa Solano, San Carlos Operations Coordinator of the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos RL, contrary to what was held by the Tribunal, he asserts, in the sense that such document does not make evident a discredit or affectation to the plaintiff company's name as a product of the administrative action, it would denote or, would be derived (rules of sound judgment) from it, at a minimum, an affectation to its business solvency, as well as to its credibility to implement business in the market of the commercial activity carried out; given the transcendence of the events that occurred to the business environment, the surroundings, the guild, the various public and private entities related to the plaintiff company's line of business. Regarding the assessment of the mathematical actuarial study carried out by Lic. Hernández Araya (folios 234 to 255 of the file), likewise, he comments, the fact that it was commissioned by the plaintiff privately is not sufficient reason (rules of sound judgment) to disdain it or deny it the evidentiary value it reasonably has, because even if it were not accepted as an expert report, it would still retain its value as a means of proof, properly as a document or technical report (article 318 subsection 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil)). Its devaluation is not apt either, with the argument that it only makes a recommendation regarding the extreme of moral damage, because that, he alleges, is precisely the legal nature of any technical evidence regarding moral damage, given that it corresponds to the administrator of justice, ultimately, to set its amount. The Ad quem, he comments, remains silent regarding the mathematical actuarial expert report rendered by Engineer Centeno Madrigal (folios 513 to 529). Evidence that could have supplied any lack or objection made to the previous study. A comparative study of both technical elements of proof is missed. The improper rejection of the compensation for moral damages, he states, derives, apart from the objections made to the evidence, from an improper assessment, due to omission of analysis, of the testimonies of Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, Antonio Marín Rojas, and Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga, in relation to the documents visible at folios 39 and 40, which are a notarially certified copy of official letters DZS/RH 009-00 and 007 DZS/RHN, dated January 13, 2000; in them, the appealed Administration (Administración recurrida) indicates to the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L., the obligation not to collect fluid milk from the plaintiff company's herd; of the mathematical actuarial expert report by Engineer Centeno Madrigal; as well as official letters UAA-RHN 072-2000, CNRTB-196-92000, CART-80-2000, CNRTB-206-92000, UAA-RHN 076-2000, official letter number 121-2000 DZS-RHN, DR-RHN-1271-2000, the document dated November 27, 2000, signed by Sucesores de Clemente Marín S.A. Evidence with which, he affirms, at minimum, the indubitable accreditation of the existence of objective moral damage is obtained. In accordance with the above, he concludes, what was resolved by the Ad quem violates, by improper application, canons 11, 33, 41, 45, 50 of the Political Constitution; 190.2, 194.1.2.3 of the LGAP; 3 and 7 of the now repealed Bovine Tuberculosis Law (Ley de Tuberculosis Bovina), number 1207 and, for lack of action, numeras 190.1, 191, 192, 196, and 197 of the LGAP. Regarding the value of the improperly assessed evidence, he points out, ordinals 298.2 of the LGAP; 318 subsection 3), 330 and 357 subsection 4) of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) were infringed.\n\nXXI.- The plaintiff is a legal entity. Ergo, as the Tribunal correctly pointed out, the moral damage sought is objective. This Chamber has indicated that it occurs when the sphere of extra-patrimonial interest is injured. That is, it produces economically assessable consequences. For example, the case of the professional who, due to the attributed fact, loses his clientele in whole or in part. It is necessary to differentiate it from subjective or affective moral damage. \"This distinction serves to demarcate the damage suffered by the individual in his social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual sphere (grief for the death of a relative), thus one refers to the social part and the other to the affective part of the estate.\" (Judgment number 127 at 11 hours 25 minutes of February 21, 2007. In the same sense, rulings 151 at 15 hours 20 minutes of February 14, 2001, and 729 at 10 hours of September 29, 2005, may be consulted). This differentiation arose to determine the scope of compensable moral damage. Initially, the doctrine was reluctant to compensate pure or subjective moral damage, due to its difficult quantification. In the case of objective damage, the corresponding demonstration must be made, as occurs with patrimonial damage. \"...VI. Regarding the compensability of moral damage, it should be noted that the argument according to which the compensation of moral damage implies the difficulty of achieving an equivalence between the damage and pecuniary compensation ('pecunia doloris') is not valid; because in the case of objective moral damage, reparation turns out to be easier to quantify …\" (Judgment 928 at 9 hours 15 minutes of November 24, 2006. In this same sense, resolutions 527-F-S1-2008 at 14 hours 10 minutes of February 1, 2008, and 206-F-S1-2009 at 16 hours 20 minutes of February 26, 2009, may be consulted).\n\nXXII.- In the fourth fact of the lawsuit, the attorney of the plaintiff company states: \"That despite the impugned sanitary order being an act that is concomitantly absolutely null and ineffective, the appealed Administration (Administración recurrida) (arts. 146.1.3.4, 150.1 and 169 LGAP) abusing power, its sovereign powers, and in an arbitrary manner, ordered and executed it, causing my represented party damages (material and moral) and losses of impossible or difficult reparation.\"\n\nThus, the quarantine was ordered of the farm owned by my client, its animals, products and by-products, supplies and equipment, causing serious and substantial economic losses, since prima facie, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. was ordered to cease the collection of milk from my client, however, as of today the Cooperativa Dos Pinos is again being allowed to collect the milk; the alleged outbreak of bovine tuberculosis on my client's farm was improperly disseminated through the mass media of the Zona Norte, especially Canal 14, causing immeasurable moral damage (daño moral) to my client as well as to my entire family; and finally, 123 bovines have been sacrificed as of today, almost the entirety of the herd, losing its genetics, as it was cattle registered with the Holstein and Jersey Associations of Costa Rica, without the outbreak of bovine tuberculosis having been reliably proven in all the euthanized animals, which has my client on the verge of bankruptcy and economic ruin, notwithstanding the difficult administrative financial situation the State is undergoing, as expressly acknowledged by the Administration in official letter SUBDSA No. 183-00, dated July 26, 2000.” (The underlining is supplied). Later, in the section called “legal argumentation,” point five, folio 138 verso, it ratifies the foregoing, by stating, as relevant: “… causing my client damages of impossible or difficult reparation. Thus, the quarantine was ordered of the farm owned by my client, its animals, products and by-products, supplies and equipment, causing serious and substantial economic losses, since prima facie, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. was ordered to cease the collection of milk from my client as of January 13 of the current year, with approximately 12,522.7 kilograms of fluid milk being denatured for subsequent destruction as of last January 17, which represents an economic loss of around 800,000.00 colones, however, as of today the Cooperativa Dos Pinos is again being allowed to collect the milk; the alleged outbreak of bovine tuberculosis on my client's farm was improperly disseminated through the mass media of the Zona Norte, especially Canal 14, causing immeasurable moral damage to my client as well as to my entire family …” (the underlining is not from the original). According to the foregoing transcription, it is clear that the cause of action (causa de pedir) for the moral damage originates from the publications made by the mass media of the Zona Norte of the country, especially, on Canal 14. The appellant, to demonstrate the existence of this damage, invokes as violated: 1) the studies carried out both by Licentiate Salvador Hernández Araya (folios 233 to 254), and by Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal (folios 513 to 529). In the nineteenth Whereas Clause (considerando XIX) of this judgment, the reasons were noted why both studies do not merit credibility from this jurisdictional body. 2) the following documentary evidence: i) official letters a) DZS/RH 009-00, folio 39; b) 007-00 DZS/RHZ, folio 40, both from the head of Zoosanitary Defense (Defensa Zoosanitaria) of the Huetar Norte Region of the MAG, dated January 13, 2000; c) UAA-RHN-072-2000, signed by the Head of the Environmental Assistance Unit of the Ministry of Health, folio 301; d) CNRTB-196-92000, signed by Doctor María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 302; e) official letter CART-80-2000, signed by Mr. Mario Azofeifa Solano, Operations Coordinator for San Carlos of the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., folio 303; all three, dated September 11, 2000; f) CNRTB-206-92000 of September 13, 2000, from Doctor María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 304; g) UAA-RHN 076-2000, from the head of the Environmental Assistance Unit of the Ministry of Health, folio 305; h) 121-2000 DZS-RHN from the head of Zoosanitary Defense of the Huetar Norte Region of the MAG, both dated September 14, 2000; i) DR-RHN-1271-2000, of December 7, 2000, signed by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Health, folios 309-310; and ii) note from the plaintiff company of November 27, 2000, folio 308. All this evidence alludes to the prohibition against the plaintiff commercializing the milk produced by its herd. This factual situation differs from the ground (causa petendi) that gives rise to the claim for compensation for moral damage (which, as noted, is confined to the journalistic publications, especially those made by Canal 14 of the Zona Norte of the country), and is therefore not admissible. If its analysis were to be granted and, eventually, the appellant's arguments were to be accepted, it would render the ruling incongruent, due to a change in the cause of action. In any case, for further abundance of reasons, as the plaintiff itself confesses – fact four of the complaint and point five of the “legal argumentation” section, transcribed above – this circumstance did not cause any negative consequence to the prestige and good name of the company, nor was it subject to exclusion by its clients. In this regard, as indicated, the prohibition on milk sales was a temporary circumstance, as at the time of filing the complaint, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., had resumed the purchase of the milk. Likewise, in note CART-80-2000 of September 11, 2000, signed by the Operations Coordinator for San Carlos of that Cooperative, it is expressly stated that: “The resumption of deliveries will be subject to the authorization of the competent governmental entity.” That is, the prohibition on milk sales did not generate a negative consequence for the plaintiff in its social standing. 3) It also invokes as violated the testimonies of Osman Gerardo and Antonio Marín Rojas, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua and Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga. Regarding the statements of the Marín Rojas brothers, they are evidently biased. They are sons of the representative of the plaintiff company, Mr. Antonio Marín Barrientos. Therefore, they have an interest in the outcome of the proceeding, as the family business is at stake. Moreover, the first is the administrator of the farm. The foregoing, under the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica), unlike what was stated by the appellant, disqualifies both testimonies. However, from what they said, the alleged damage is not inferred. Mr. Osman Gerardo, folios 421 to 431, affirmatively stated: “Regarding the handling by Mr. Orlando Jara of the M.A.G., we believe it was not correct, as it became evident that the technical side was not handled adequately, furthermore, he also did not respect the criteria of privacy and ethics (sic), because in the results that were read at the beginning of January, this gentleman informed Canal 14 before informing the (plaintiff) company, they also acted very hastily, not giving us time to prepare for the measures imposed on us. … In the moral aspect, there was a great negative impact, since through the M.A.G., the media made the reports of this particular case public and regular. We suffered a kind of general discredit, before the community, the guild, and the neighbors, because while we were trying to defend ourselves and convince the authorities that the procedures be corrected and complementary tests be done, public opinion judged us as endangering public health and the animal health of the zone. … With respect to the information from the media, what was done was to request from this channel the videos they broadcast, to have them as proof, and at the end we tried by the same means to give our opinion and try to counteract somewhat the negative image that was being broadcast.” What Mr. Osman Gerardo stated does not go beyond mere subjective opinions. He does not specify what the judgment by public opinion consisted of. Rather, they are general assertions that require other complementary evidence to prove them. For example, he points out that they requested the videos to have them as proof, however, they did not incorporate them into this proceeding. In short, the negative impact on the social sphere of the plaintiff company is not proven. Meanwhile, what Mr. Antonio said, folios 432 to 438, is irrelevant for the purpose of proving moral damage, as he states: “I do not remember what the media that were broadcasting were referring to, because it affected me psychologically to hear them.” For her part, the witness Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga, folios 439 to 441, as relevant, stated: “In Ciudad Quesada, it seemed like a persecution, because it appeared on Canal 14 and in the newspaper, where people from the M.A.G. reported that what there was was an outbreak of tuberculosis and they stated that animals with that disease became skinny, runny-nosed and with mucus, and on one occasion I showed up (sic) at the farm to have some documents signed and the news program was present, there were two separate lots, where one was supposedly contaminated cattle and the other was healthy cattle and I heard (sic) they asked the administrator which (sic) of the lots was the cattle to be sacrificed, I do not remember who (sic) it was who asked (sic) that, that indicates that the two lots were the same.” However, she does not specify how those publications harmed the plaintiff company. Consequently, what the witness said is not useful for the purpose of determining the existence of moral damage. The same applies to what was stated by the last witness, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, folios 412 to 420. He only points out that “It called (sic) my attention a lot, that the radio and television cameras were always present, especially when they carried out the killings regarding this process.” He does not point out how those publications affected the plaintiff company from a social point of view. In accordance with the foregoing, with the testimonial evidence presented in the case file, it is not possible to determine the existence of the claimed moral damage. In any case, the fact that Dos Pinos resumed receiving the milk, and that the company where the witness Hernández Astorga works provides services to the plaintiff, demonstrates that it did not suffer impairment or damage to its image or prestige as a company. That is, it did not have negative consequences from the social perspective. Based on the reasons set forth, the rejection of this ground of disagreement is warranted.\"\n\nThus, the quarantine was ordered of the farm owned by my client, its animals, products and by-products, supplies and equipment, causing serious and substantial economic losses, since prima facie, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. was ordered to cease the collection of milk from my client, however, as of today the Cooperativa Dos Pinos is again being allowed to collect the milk; the alleged outbreak of bovine tuberculosis on my client's farm was improperly disseminated through the mass media of the Zona Norte, especially Canal 14, causing immeasurable moral damage (daño moral) to my client as well as to my entire family; and finally, 123 bovines have been sacrificed as of today, almost the entirety of the herd, losing its genetics, as it was cattle registered with the Holstein and Jersey Associations of Costa Rica, without the outbreak of bovine tuberculosis having been reliably proven in all the euthanized animals, which has my client on the verge of bankruptcy and economic ruin, notwithstanding the difficult administrative financial situation the State is undergoing, as expressly acknowledged by the Administration in official letter SUBDSA No. 183-00, dated July 26, 2000.” (The underlining is supplied). Later, in the section called “legal argumentation,” point five, folio 138 verso, it ratifies the foregoing, by stating, as relevant: “… causing my client damages of impossible or difficult reparation. Thus, the quarantine was ordered of the farm owned by my client, its animals, products and by-products, supplies and equipment, causing serious and substantial economic losses, since prima facie, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. was ordered to cease the collection of milk from my client as of January 13 of the current year, with approximately 12,522.7 kilograms of fluid milk being denatured for subsequent destruction as of last January 17, which represents an economic loss of around 800,000.00 colones, however, as of today the Cooperativa Dos Pinos is again being allowed to collect the milk; the alleged outbreak of bovine tuberculosis on my client's farm was improperly disseminated through the mass media of the Zona Norte, especially Canal 14, causing immeasurable moral damage to my client as well as to my entire family …” (the underlining is not from the original). In accordance with the foregoing transcription, it is clear that the cause of action (causa de pedir) for the moral damage originates from the publications made by the mass media of the Zona Norte of the country, especially on Canal 14.\n\nThe appellant, to demonstrate the existence of this damage, invokes as violated: 1) the studies carried out by Licentiate Salvador Hernández Araya (folios 233 to 254) and by Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal (folios 513 to 529). In the nineteenth Whereas Clause (considerando XIX) of this judgment, the reasons why both studies do not merit credibility from this jurisdictional body were noted. 2) the following documentary evidence: i) official letters a) DZS/RH 009-00, folio 39; b) 007-00 DZS/RHZ, folio 40, both from the head of Zoosanitary Defense (Defensa Zoosanitaria) of the Huetar Norte Region of the MAG, dated January 13, 2000; c) UAA-RHN-072-2000, signed by the Head of the Environmental Assessment Unit (Unidad de Atención al Ambiente) of the Ministry of Health, folio 301; d) CNRTB-196-92000, signed by Doctor María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 302; e) official letter CART-80-2000, signed by Mr. Mario Azofeifa Solano, Operations Coordinator for San Carlos of the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., folio 303; all three, dated September 11, 2000; f) CNRTB-206-92000 of September 13, 2000, from Doctor María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 304; g) UAA-RHN 076-2000, from the head of the Environmental Assessment Unit of the Ministry of Health, folio 305; h) 121-2000 DZS-RHN from the head of Zoosanitary Defense of the Huetar Norte Region of the MAG, both dated September 14, 2000; i) DR-RHN-1271-2000, of December 7, 2000, signed by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Health, folios 309-310; and ii) a note from the plaintiff company of November 27, 2000, folio 308. All this evidence refers to the prohibition against the plaintiff commercializing the milk produced by its herd. This factual situation differs from the ground (causa petendi) giving rise to the claim for compensation for moral damage (which, as noted, is confined to the journalistic publications, especially those made by Canal 14 of the Zona Norte of the country), and is therefore not admissible. If its analysis were to be granted and, eventually, the appellant's arguments were to be accepted, it would render the ruling incongruent due to a change in the cause of action. In any case, for further abundance of reasons, as the plaintiff itself confesses – fact four of the complaint and point five of the “legal argumentation” section, transcribed above – this circumstance did not cause any negative consequence to the prestige and good name of the company, nor was it subject to exclusion by its clients. In this regard, as indicated, the prohibition on milk sales was a temporary circumstance, as at the time of filing the complaint, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., had resumed purchasing the milk. Likewise, in note CART-80-2000 of September 11, 2000, signed by the Operations Coordinator for San Carlos of that Cooperative, it is expressly stated that: “The resumption of deliveries will be subject to the authorization of the competent governmental entity.” That is, the prohibition on milk sales did not generate a negative consequence for the plaintiff in its social standing. 3) It also invokes as violated the testimonies of Osman Gerardo and Antonio Marín Rojas, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, and Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga. Regarding the statements of the Marín Rojas brothers, they are evidently biased. They are sons of the representative of the plaintiff company, Mr. Antonio Marín Barrientos. Therefore, they have an interest in the outcome of the proceeding, as the family business is at stake. Moreover, the first is the administrator of the farm. The foregoing, under the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica), unlike what was stated by the appellant, disqualifies both testimonies. However, from what they said, the alleged damage is not inferred. Mr. Osman Gerardo, folios 421 to 431, affirmatively stated: “Regarding the handling by Mr. Orlando Jara of the M.A.G., we believe it was not correct, as it became evident that the technical side was not handled adequately, furthermore, he also did not respect the criteria of privacy and ethics (sic), because in the results that were read at the beginning of January, this gentleman informed Canal 14 before informing the (plaintiff) company, they also acted very hastily, not giving us time to prepare for the measures imposed on us. … In the moral aspect, there was a great negative impact, since through the M.A.G., the media made the reports of this particular case public and regular. We suffered a kind of general discredit, before the community, the guild, and the neighbors, because while we were trying to defend ourselves and convince the authorities that the procedures be corrected and complementary tests be done, public opinion judged us as endangering public health and the animal health of the zone. … With respect to the information from the media, what was done was to request from this channel the videos they broadcast, to have them as proof, and at the end we tried by the same means to give our opinion and try to counteract somewhat the negative image that was being broadcast.” What Mr. Osman Gerardo stated does not go beyond mere subjective opinions. He does not specify what the judgment by public opinion consisted of. Rather, they are general assertions that require other complementary evidence to prove them. For example, he points out that they requested the videos to have them as proof, but they did not incorporate them into this proceeding. In short, the negative impact on the social sphere of the plaintiff company is not proven. Meanwhile, what Mr. Antonio said, folios 432 to 438, is irrelevant for the purpose of proving moral damage, as he states: “I do not remember what the media that were broadcasting were referring to, because it affected me psychologically to hear them.” For her part, the witness Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga, folios 439 to 441, as relevant, stated: “In Ciudad Quesada, it seemed like a persecution, because it appeared on Canal 14 and in the newspaper, where people from the M.A.G. reported that what there was was an outbreak of tuberculosis and they stated that animals with that disease became skinny, runny-nosed and with mucus, and on one occasion I showed up (sic) at the farm to have some documents signed and the news program was present, there were two separate lots, where one was supposedly contaminated cattle and the other was healthy cattle and I heard (sic) they asked the administrator which (sic) of the lots was the cattle to be sacrificed, I do not remember who (sic) it was who asked (sic) that, that indicates the two lots were the same.” However, she does not specify how those publications harmed the plaintiff company. Consequently, what the witness said is not useful for the purpose of determining the existence of moral damage. The same applies to what was stated by the last witness, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, folios 412 to 420. He only points out that “It called (sic) my attention a lot, that the radio and television cameras were always present, especially when they carried out the killings regarding this process.” He does not point out how those publications affected the plaintiff company from a social point of view. In accordance with the foregoing, with the testimonial evidence presented in the case file, it is not possible to determine the existence of the claimed moral damage. In any case, the fact that Dos Pinos resumed receiving the milk, and that the company where the witness Hernández Astorga works provides services to the plaintiff, demonstrates that it did not suffer impairment or damage to its image or prestige as a company. That is, it did not have negative consequences from the social perspective. Based on the reasons set forth, the rejection of this ground of disagreement is warranted.\"\n\nto that of lot 2320307 of avian tuberculin type P.P.D. However, they are not duly legalized, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 294 subsection a) of the LGAP. This implies that they could not have legal effect in Costa Rica, as indicated by both the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling 76-92 at 16:30 on January 15, 1992; and this jurisdictional body in judgment 715-F-2006 at 11:20 on September 27, 2006. Furthermore, in documents numbers 3, 4, and 11, from that same body of evidence, there exist a series of tuberculin test reports that do not match those series or lot numbers, and without their corresponding quality control and efficacy certificates being recorded in the case file. In light of the foregoing, the appellant (casacionista) is correct in pointing out the error incurred by the Court in endorsing the proven fact preceded by number 20. There is no suitable evidentiary element in the case file to support it. However, the foregoing does not entail the quashing of the judgment, for the reasons set forth below.\n\n**XII.-** It is appropriate to review the factual background that occurred in this litigation. On July 9, 1999, the veterinarian of the El Valle slaughterhouse, Dr. Ricardo Aguilar Jiménez, detected a case with symptomatology compatible with tuberculosis at the slaughter level, originating from the plaintiff company's farm. Samples were sent to the National Laboratory of Veterinary Services (LANASEVE). The result was positive by Ziehl Neelsen staining. Because of this, the National Zoosanitary Defense Office, Huetar Norte Region, of the National Directorate of Animal Health of the MAG, performed a sampling of 10% of the plaintiff's herd—15 female Holstein breed cattle, chosen at random. They underwent the bovine tuberculin test in the anocaudal fold for the diagnosis of that disease. Four animals were reactors. For that reason, on October 26 of the same year, the comparative cervical test was performed on the reactors as a differential diagnosis, using PPD bovis and PPD avium. Again, they were positive for bovine PPD. Consequently, the entire herd was tuberculinized. Animals three months of age and older were included. Of the 179 subjected to the anocaudal test, 89 were reactors. Then, on January 4, 2000, comparative cervical tests were performed at the level of the neck table, for which the PPD bovis and the PPD avium were used. Of the 179 animals, 90 were positive to the anocaudal test, 84 to the cervical bovine PPD—one negative—, 73 to the cervical PPD avium—12 negative. By virtue of the foregoing, the Directorate of Animal Health, in a resolution at 9:00 on January 12, 2000, ordered that the farm be quarantined, the animals be marked with the “S” for slaughter, all reactor animals be separated from the herd, the appraisal of animals positive for tuberculosis be carried out by an expert from the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, the animals be slaughtered, safeguarding biosafety (bioseguridad) conditions, sanitation of the rest of the plaintiff's livestock continue, and monitoring and surveillance on neighboring farms commence. As pointed out by the judges of both instances, one of the guiding principles of Environmental Law, which underlies numerals 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution, is the principle of precaution or prudent avoidance. In accordance with doctrine, in this field not only do certain risks exist, but there may also be scientific uncertainty regarding the scope of some damages. This postulate, then, demands that, when reasonable doubt arises regarding the danger of any activity with environmental repercussions or to human health, it be avoided, or the pertinent measures be taken so that that potential damage, not yet scientifically proven, does not occur. Its two premises are: lack of scientific certainty and the threat of damage. It is explicitly enshrined in the “United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,” or “Rio Declaration”: *“**Principle 15.-** In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”* For its part, the Biodiversity Law, number 7788 of April 30, 1998, provides: “***ARTICLE 7.-*** * **Definitions.** … **Biodiversity**: variability of living organisms from any source, whether found in terrestrial, aerial, marine, aquatic, or other ecological complexes. It includes diversity within each species, as well as between species and the ecosystems of which they are a part. / For the purposes of this law, the term biodiversity shall be understood to include intangible elements, such as: knowledge, innovation, and traditional practice, individual or collective, with real or potential value associated with biochemical and generic resources, protected or not by intellectual property systems or sui generis registration systems. … **ARTICLE 11.-** **Criteria for applying this law.** The criteria for applying this law are: 1.- Preventive criterion: It is recognized that it is vitally important to anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of biodiversity loss or its threats. 2.- Precautionary criterion or in dubio pro natura: Where there is danger or threat of serious or imminent damage to the elements of biodiversity and the knowledge associated with them, the absence of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of effective protection measures. 3.- Criterion of public environmental interest: The use of the elements of biodiversity must guarantee the development options of future generations, food security, the conservation of ecosystems, the protection of human health, and the improvement of citizens' quality of life. …*” In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in vote 1250-99 at 11:24 on February 19, 1999, stated: *“... Prevention seeks to anticipate negative effects, and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible affectation of the environment or the health of people. Thus, in the event that there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage – or a doubt in this regard – a precautionary measure must be adopted and even the activity in question be postponed. The foregoing is because in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, insofar as once biological and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance, but will hardly compensate for the damages caused to the environment.”* (The underlining is not from the original. Also, consult, among others, the rulings of that jurisdictional body 9773-00 at 9:44 on November 3, 2000 and 1711-01 at 16:32 on February 27, 2001). Later, in vote 3480-03 at 14:02 on May 2, 2003, it further clarified this concept: “*The precautionary principle being well understood, the same refers to the adoption of measures not in the face of ignorance of risk-generating facts, but in the face of a lack of certainty regarding whether such facts will actually produce harmful effects on the environment.*” (The underlining is supplied). Likewise, in ruling 6322-2003 at 14:14 on July 3, 2003, it indicated: “*...**4.- Precautionary principle**: … The term prevention derives from the Latin ‘praeventio,’ which alludes to the action and effect of preventing, to those preparations and dispositions made in advance to avoid a risk or execute something. Prevention seeks to anticipate negative effects, and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible affectation of the environment or the health of people. Thus, in the event that there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage - or a doubt in this regard - a precautionary measure must be adopted and even the activity in question be postponed. The foregoing is because in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, insofar as once biological and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance, but will hardly compensate for the damages caused to the environment.*” (In the same sense, consult vote 2008-17618 at 11:51 on December 5, 2008 of said Chamber). Tuberculosis is a zoonotic (zoonótica) disease, which constitutes a danger to livestock and public health. Therefore, this is a situation that endangers or threatens serious damage not only to elements of biodiversity (neighboring dairy herds of the plaintiff company's property), but also to the human being (public health). In the sub judice (sub júdice), in light of the factual background set forth above, the existence of a reasonable doubt is evident – there being no scientific certainty due to the lack of a quality control and efficacy certificate for the tuberculin – which imposed upon the Public Administration the duty, in compliance with the precautionary principle, to act as it did. This reasonable doubt arises because, on three different occasions (first at the El Valle slaughterhouse, then in the laboratory study results from LANASEVE; and, finally, in the tests performed by the Directorate of Animal Health of the MAG), the existence of tuberculosis was determined in animals of the plaintiff company. The plaintiff herself even accepts this circumstance – the doubt regarding the existence of tuberculosis in the herd – when stating in the section of the lawsuit called “*legal argument*”: “***FOURTH:*** *… since the imperfection of the indicated elements prevents the realization of the purpose in accordance with the legal order, for which it was issued, because the sanitary order is issued to combat an outbreak of bovine tuberculosis, it not being possible to know completely, categorically, of its existence in all presumably infected animals as will be indicated below. / In this sense, the reason does not exist as it has been taken into account to issue the challenged act, by virtue of the fact that it cannot be concluded categorically, and without fear of error, of the existence of bovine tuberculosis in all the animals slaughtered on my client's farm...*” (the underlining is supplied). In the court record, at folios 468 and 469, appears the report rendered by Dr. María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the National Reference Center for Tuberculosis of the Costa Rican Institute for Research and Teaching in Nutrition and Health (INCIENSA), which, according to the provisions of numeral 301 subsection 2) of the LGAP, has the character of testimonial evidence. Dr. Matamoros, in what is of interest, states: “***1.*** * I do not have in my hands the official letter D.Z.S./RHN 05-00, of January 11, 2000, called ‘Report on tuberculosis outbreak in San Gerardo de Ciudad Quesada.’ However, before the questions raised and regarding what pertains to me, I clarify the following, ‘the discovery of Mycobacterium terrae in euthanized (eutanasiados) bovines from the farm of Sucesores de Clemente Marín S.A., in the event that said bacillus produced any disease, the clinical and pathological manifestations thereof would be similar to those produced with M. tuberculosis or M. Boris infection. M. terrae is an acid-alcohol resistant bacillus so Ziehl-Neelsen staining can be positive and the PPD can give cross-reaction’ is correct, as I stated in official letter CNRTB-196-2000. If in light of the described situation we could conclusively conclude the existence of bovine tuberculosis in the company's herd. **From a microbiological standpoint, it can only be concluded that there is bovine tuberculosis in an animal when that microorganism is isolated from the tissues of that animal. The euthanized (eutanasiados) animals from which M. terrae was isolated are not evidence of the presence of bovine tuberculosis. Therefore, the doubt persists about the presence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd** (sic)*.*” This Chamber agrees with what was indicated by the Court in section VII of the appealed judgment. With said evidence, the doubt regarding the existence of tuberculosis cannot be eliminated. First, the plaintiff party requested said report (folio 142 verso) so that official letter D.Z.S./RHN 05-00 of January 11, 2000 would be analyzed; however, Dr. Matamoros is clear in pointing out that she did not have it in sight. Second, despite being based on the information indicated by the plaintiff in her lawsuit, she expressly indicates that “*Therefore, the doubt persists about the presence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd* (sic).” That is, it does not dispel the cloud surrounding the existence of the outbreak of said disease. Therefore, the aforementioned precautionary principle is applicable to this litigation. In short, with the actions of the Administration, the public purpose involved (article 113 LGAP) was protected: human health, animal health – neighboring herds –, the environment, as well as the dairy production of the area where the plaintiff's farm is located – San Gerardo de Ciudad Quesada, San Carlos –. Ergo, under the protection of the reasons set forth, the rejection of this ground of challenge is imposed.\n\n**[…]**\n\n**XIV.-** First, it must be noted that what the appellant stated at folio 701, regarding “*two topics of special and essential significance in the case under examination*”, was not proposed and timely debated in the appeal. Therefore, according to the provisions of article 608 of the Civil Procedure Code, this Chamber is barred from conducting any analysis regarding it. Secondly, the crux of what is reproached by the appellant (casacionista) consists of the fact that, in his understanding, the judges of the instance incurred in an error of law when evaluating the indicated evidence, by illegitimately reversing the burden of proof, regarding the alleged non-compliance with technical measures when applying the tuberculin tests; and regarding the demonstration of the existence or non-existence of a protocol, logbook, report, or record that guarantees the correct fulfillment of the technical measures of how that test was performed. To assert the non-existence of that record, he points out, does not contain any assertion that produces a reversal of the burden of proof against the plaintiff company. In this regard, it is necessary to indicate that the topic of the burden of proof – article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code – is a procedural matter. This has been repeatedly indicated by this jurisdictional body for a long time. In this regard, consult, among others, resolutions 31 at 9:20 on March 20, 1992, 1020-F-2005 at 16:28 on December 21, 2005, and 908-A-S1-09 at 11:00 on September 10, 2009. However, it is not regulated in the exhaustive grounds of canon 594 ibid., as a ground for cassation on this basis. Consequently, the rejection of the complaint on its merits is imposed. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and for greater abundance of reasons, it must be indicated that in considering (considerando) XII of this judgment, the pertinence of applying the precautionary principle to this litigation was analyzed, a principle derived from numerals 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution, and expressly regulated in canon 11 of the Biodiversity Law. Given the reasonable doubt existing, regarding the outbreak of tuberculosis on the plaintiff company's property, the Public Administration, specifically, the Directorate of Animal Health of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (in accordance with the provisions of article 7 of Law number 6243, Animal Health Law, in force when the facts analyzed in the sub judice (sub júdice) occurred), was legitimized to adopt all those measures in protection not only of human health, but also of animal health and the environment. The complaint on its merits seeks to establish the invalidity of the challenged acts, by virtue of the absence of scientific certainty regarding the results of the tuberculin tests applied to the plaintiff's herd. However, such a requirement, as indicated in said section of this ruling, was not necessary for the Public Administration to act in the manner it did. Consequently, what is argued by the appellant (casacionista) is not useful to modify what was resolved in the appealed judgment.\n\n**[…]**\n\n**XVI.-** The core aspect of what is alleged by the appellant (casacionista) consists of the fact that the Ad quem improperly valued the report CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible at folios 468 to 469, by not accepting that the existence of tuberculosis in a bovine can only be concluded, from a microbiological standpoint, when it is isolated from the animal's tissues. That is, the application of the intradermal or tuberculin tests by MAG officials on the plaintiff company's herd was not sufficient. First, it must be indicated, as set forth in considering (considerando) XI of this judgment, that the report rendered by Dr. María Cecilia Matamoros, in her capacity as Head of the National Reference Center for Tuberculosis of INCIENSA, has the nature of testimony, in accordance with the provisions of canon 301 subsection 2) of the LGAP, and not of documentary evidence of a scientific nature as claimed by the appellant, much less of an administrative act. Secondly, the appellant (casacionista) points out: “*Additionally, regarding the improper evaluation of the evidence, the Court did not take into account that in zones or regions where campaigns for the control of bovine tuberculosis have been carried out, with (sic) in the case of the plaintiff company, the presentation of a considerable percentage of reacting (reaccionantes) animals, detected with the application of routine simple intradermal tests, is frequent, nor was pregnancy taken into account as a possible factor of response to tuberculin, in animals between the 6th and 8th.*\n\nmonth of pregnancy, among other things.&nbsp; In this regard, with respect to the manufacturer’s technical specifications for the intradermal test using bovine tuberculin of the classes PPD AVIAR and PPD BOVINO, visible at folio 30 of the case file, according to the rules of sound rational criticism (arts. 298.1 and 16 LGAP), the rules of science and logic are specifically violated, because the manufacturer of these tests, in the “contraindications” section, indicates that:&nbsp; “It should not be used in females close to calving or post-partum…”, this because pregnancy (between the 6th and 8th month of pregnancy) is a possible factor of response to tuberculin, while in the “warning” section it indicates that:&nbsp; “… Tuberculin testing should not be repeated unless there is a minimum interval of 60 days from the previous test …”, basically for the same technical reason, given that the respondent Administration did not demonstrate having complied with such specifications at the time of performing the tuberculin testing on the plaintiff company’s herd.</i>”&nbsp; The lower-court judges did not find it proven that bovine tuberculosis control campaigns had been carried out on the plaintiff company’s herd, nor that the tuberculin tests had been applied to females between the sixth and eighth month of pregnancy.&nbsp; However, the cassation appellant does not indicate with which piece of evidence those facts are proven and, consequently, they are violated in the appealed judgment.&nbsp; He merely points to the document visible at folio 30 of the main case file, where only the manufacturer’s instructions appear.&nbsp; Contrary to what is alleged, the burden of proof fell upon his client, in light of the provisions of Article 317(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.&nbsp; Note that this is not a negative fact, but rather an affirmation constituting the basis of the claims for annulment and damages asserted.&nbsp; He then adds:&nbsp; “<i>In another vein, and regarding the improper application of the precautionary principle … to the case under examination, it must first be noted that the legal norms applicable to this case are those that were in force at the time the challenged administrative acts were carried out.&nbsp; Thus, this proceeding is governed by the now-repealed Bovine Tuberculosis Laws No. 1207 and the Animal Health Law No. 6243, with their consequent also-repealed regulations.&nbsp; Based on the foregoing, it is possible to conclude with absolute clarity that the precautionary principle, derived from Article 4 of the General Law of the National Animal Health Service </i>(sic)<i> No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, published in La Gaceta No. 93 of May 16, 2006, has no application to the case in question, as its entry into force and/or enactment was well after the occurrence of the administrative acts appealed here.&nbsp; <b><u>Let the Honorable Cassation Chamber note that the A Quo, in the first-instance judgment, expressly and improperly applied said General Law of the National Animal Health Service No.</u></b> <b>8495 of April 6, 2006, to the case under examination, a situation which the Trial Chamber implicitly endorsed in the appealed judgment.</b> …</i>”&nbsp; Contrary to the cassation appellant’s assertion, neither the A quo, nor implicitly the Ad quem, applied Law number 8495 of April 6, 2006, the General Law of the National Animal Health Service.&nbsp; In this regard, the first-instance judgment, in the relevant part, states:&nbsp; “<b><i><u>Seventh:</u></i></b><i> … In this matter, immediate measures must be adopted, because human health, animal health, and the environment are at stake, aimed at the protection of each of them, as anticipated in the rulings that decided the suspension incident, No. 56-2001 of 10:00 a.m. on January 13, Considerando V<sup>o</sup> (folios 351 to 354), and No. 216-2001 of 11:45 a.m. on July 20 (folios 377 to 389).&nbsp; <u>Principles such as risk analysis or assessment, precautionary or caution, protection of consumer interests, equivalence, transparency, and information govern, which have constitutional roots (Articles 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution), and are today expressly recognized by the ordinary legislator (Law No. 8495, Article 4<sup>th</sup>)</u>.&nbsp; Pursuant to the precautionary principle, the lack of scientific certainty is no excuse for adopting decisions in favor of health and the environment.&nbsp; In this sense, the Court finds that the decisions adopted and measures applied are based on the tuberculin test performed, which is the established test for these cases, without the lack of confirmatory or complementary tests preventing proceeding in this manner.&nbsp; The acts are therefore not the product of the bare will of the person who issued them, but rather adequate measures based on technical medical criteria, aimed at protecting goods of a higher lineage.</i>”(The underlining is not in the original).&nbsp; It is easily verified that the judge’s assertion is the application of principles of constitutional lineage; which, at the time of issuing that ruling, were, moreover, embodied in Law 8495 (a comment made for purposes of clarification, but not with the intention of applying that law), but before that they underlay the Political Constitution – Articles 46 and 50.&nbsp; For its part, in the contested ruling, in the relevant part, the Trial Chamber states:&nbsp; “<b><i>VI.- THIRD GRIEVANCE. REGARDING THE ALLEGED BREACH OF TECHNICAL MEASURES WHEN APPLYING THE TUBERCULIN TESTS.</i></b><i> … It must be borne in mind that the impugned administrative act, ultimately, has had as its purpose the protection of human health (collective interest), and in that sense, the A-quo is correct in noting that in light of such a scenario, <u>the principles enshrined in Articles 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution govern</u>, insofar as they seek the protection of health and a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, one of them effectively being the “precautionary” principle, according to which, the absence of scientific certainty must not be used as a justification for not adopting effective protective measures, as in this case, where the Administration was forced to sacrifice the plaintiff’s cattle, in order to avoid an epidemic that could constitute a serious danger to the health of the inhabitants and the environment. … <b>VII</b><b>.- FOURTH GRIEVANCE.&nbsp; ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS OF THE IMPUGNED ACT AND THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE AS A WHOLE.</b> … In any event, Dr. Matamoros’ report, built based on the information set forth by the plaintiff in its complaint, raises the possibility of “doubt about the presence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd” (sic), and in that sense<u>, it is reiterated that in application of the precautionary principle, doubt is not a reason for not adopting protective measures in favor of health and the environment. </u>…</i>”(The underlining is supplied).&nbsp; Without a doubt, it is inferred that the Trial Chamber neither expressly nor covertly applied Law number 8495 of April 6, 2006, but rather a constitutional principle –the precautionary principle– which lies in Articles 46 and 50 of the Magna Carta.&nbsp; Along this line of thought, in Considerando XII, the reasons why this Chamber considers that, under the shelter of that postulate (provided for, when the facts analyzed in this litigation occurred, not only in the Political Constitution, but also in Article 11 of Law number 7788 of April 30, 1998, Biodiversity Law, which is applicable to the sub júdice matter) were extensively set forth.&nbsp; By virtue of the reasonable doubt existing concerning the tuberculosis outbreak in the plaintiff company’s herd, the Administration was empowered to act as it did.&nbsp; The cassation appellant, to deny the application of that principle, states at folio 707:&nbsp; “<i>Based on such evidence, contrary to the Trial Chamber’s assertion in the seventh considerando of the appealed judgment, it is possible to conclude that <u>there are no objective elements to affirm that the execution of the administrative measures conformed to the rules of science, logic, and convenience, and it is not evident that the decision was adopted within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness implicit in the legal system, insofar as performing the tuberculin test does not constitute a suitable (grounds for the administrative act) veterinary medical technical element to dictate measures of that kind (sacrifice and/or extermination of cattle) in favor of human and animal health and the environment (purpose)</u>, because, as indicated supra, <u>the absence of complementary or confirmatory laboratory-type tests would vitiate the content of the act.</u>&nbsp; …</i>”(The underlining is supplied).&nbsp; As is clearly determined, the appellant once again seeks to establish the invalidity of the challenged acts based on the absence of scientific certainty regarding the results of the tuberculin tests applied to the plaintiff company’s herd.&nbsp; Nonetheless, it is reiterated that, in application of the aforementioned precautionary principle, given the existing reasonable doubt, that certainty was not necessary for the MAG’s Animal Health Directorate to act as it did.&nbsp; Likewise, in the aforementioned section of this judgment, the report rendered by Dr. Matamoros, visible at folios 468-469, was analyzed.&nbsp; It was concluded that it did not manage to dispel that doubt and, therefore, that the Administration’s actions became illegitimate.&nbsp; On the other hand, when the indicated MAG body issued the resolution of 9 a.m. on January 12, 2000, and even at the time of executing the measures contained therein (see proven facts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, not challenged by the cassation appellant), the applicable legislation was that contained in:&nbsp; 1) Law number 1207 of October 9, 1950, known as the Bovine Tuberculosis Law; 2) Executive Decree 10120-A of May 9, 1979, “Regulation on the Control of Bovine Tuberculosis”; and 3) Law on Animal Health, number 6243, of May 2, 1978.&nbsp; In the relevant part, the first legal body provides:&nbsp; “<b><i>Article 2</i></b><i><u> The tuberculin test is declared mandatory for all bovine animals</u>, <u>as many times as deemed convenient</u>, which shall be applied by the duly trained officials designated by the Ministries of Agriculture and Industry and Public Health.&nbsp; <b>Article 3</b> <u>Bovine animals in which the tuberculin test has yielded a positive result will be immediately isolated and sacrificed once the requirements referred to in the following articles have been fulfilled</u>.&nbsp; <b>Article 4<sup>th</sup>&nbsp; </b>As soon as it is verified that an animal is infected with tuberculosis, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica shall be requested to send two experts, preferably licensed agricultural engineers, who shall proceed to appraise the sick animal in the presence of an official veterinary doctor, for which purpose its tuberculosis shall not be taken into account.&nbsp; The Banco Nacional shall always give priority to such a request.”</i>(The underlining does not appear in the original).&nbsp; For its part, the Regulation to that Law, Executive Decree 10120-A, in the relevant part, prescribes:&nbsp;<i> “<b>Article 5.&nbsp; </b>When the National Animal Health Program Directorate receives the information referred to in the third and fourth articles of this Regulation, they shall immediately proceed to carry out the epidemiological study of the affected herd <u>and to perform the tuberculin test on the entirety of the livestock existing therein.</u>&nbsp; <b>Article 6. </b><u>The tuberculin test performed on problem herds or on reacting animals </u>may be done by private veterinary doctors, with prior knowledge of the legal procedure to follow with reacting animals and training in the techniques officially used, to whom a credential granted by the Animal Health Program Directorate will be issued, keeping a registry of the </i>(sic)<i> Veterinary Doctors accredited for this purpose.&nbsp; In case of non-compliance with the procedures indicated herein, the Program Directorate shall be empowered to suspend the granted credential, notifying the Veterinary Doctors’ Association.&nbsp; <b>Article 7.</b>&nbsp; <u>Animals that are classified as reacting shall be duly identified, branded, evaluated, and immediately sacrificed, this in accordance with Law No. 1207.&nbsp; </u><b>Article 8 .&nbsp; </b>A certification program for tuberculosis-free herds shall be established in a dairy production area as a pilot plan, establishing a registry of owners who voluntarily join said Program, so that areas may later be declared free.&nbsp; <b>Article 9 .</b>&nbsp; <u>Entry into the pilot plan area shall only be permitted for animals that test negative to the tuberculin test.&nbsp; </u><b>Article 10 .</b>&nbsp; Owners who submit to the voluntary pilot area plan <u>shall subject the entirety of their herd to the tuberculin test, eliminate their reacting animals in accordance with Law No. 1207.</u>&nbsp; <u>Herds that have reacting animals shall repeat their tuberculin tests every 60 days until a negative result is obtained for the entire herd.&nbsp; </u>From that moment on, two controls shall be done per year (one per semester).&nbsp;&nbsp; <b>Article 11 .</b>&nbsp; <u>Herds that test negative to the tuberculin test in the pilot plan area</u>, <u>shall be subjected to another test six months later and if it again tests negative, they shall be considered free herds, and must be subjected to control once a year</u>.&nbsp; <b>Article 12 .</b>&nbsp; Once the reacting animals have been eliminated, a total cleaning and disinfection of the stable structures, corrals, etc., shall be carried out, using for this purpose disinfectants recommended by the Program authorities.</i>”(The underlining is not in the original).&nbsp; Finally, Law 6243 of May 2, 1978, Law on Animal Health, in its seventh Article states:&nbsp; “<i>The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, through the corresponding health authorities and those it appoints specifically, is empowered to take any quarantine or destruction measure that the Animal Health Directorate recommends, in the case of disease outbreaks that endanger public health or animal health. / These measures may be the sacrifice, isolation, retention, or treatment of animals or the destruction by incineration or denaturation of products or by-products or waste that are considered, in the judgment of the Animal Health Directorate, a danger of contagion or spread of diseases or similar morbid conditions, to the detriment of public health or animal health. The competent authorities are empowered to carry out inspection visits on private or official property, in pursuit of inspection, information, tests, objects, animal samples, etc. The respective owners, upon the authority’s identification, are obligated to permit their entry.</i>”&nbsp; In light of the provisions transcribed above, it is evident that the cassation appellant’s thesis, to the effect that the application of tuberculin was not sufficient, but rather that conducting complementary or confirmatory laboratory-type tests was indispensable, is not acceptable.&nbsp; The only test provided for in the legislation –meaning law and regulation– applicable to this litigation, to detect bovine tuberculosis, was tuberculin.&nbsp; In this sense, once performed, animals with a positive result were duly classified, branded, evaluated, and immediately sacrificed, the competent authority to order such measures being the MAG’s Animal Health Directorate.&nbsp; It was Article 9 of Executive Decree 28515-MAG, “Regulation on the Control of Bovine Tuberculosis,” that established the complementary laboratory test, by stating:&nbsp; “<i>Animals that are classified as reacting shall be clearly marked in an indelible and visible manner on the right masseter with an &quot;S&quot;, an action that must be executed by the official or accredited private technician or professional who performed the tests, <u>within the three business days following receipt of the laboratory confirmation.</u></i>”(The underlining is not in the original).&nbsp; However, it is not applicable to the sub lítem.&nbsp; It was issued on November 25, 1999, but published and, therefore, in force, only until March 17, 2000; that is, after the administrative resolution challenged in this proceeding had been issued and executed, namely, that of the MAG’s Animal Health Directorate of 9 a.m. on January 12, 2000. Pursuant to the foregoing, the grievance under study must be dismissed.&nbsp;&nbsp;\n\n**XVII.-**&nbsp; In the **seventh** objection, termed by the appellant “*eighth ground of cassation on the merits for indirect violation of the law*,” he alleges improper assessment of the evidentiary elements in the record according to the rules of sound rational criticism.&nbsp; This is because, as he states, the Trial Chamber, against all evidence, established, for purposes of attributing patrimonial liability, that the Administration acted in a lawful and normal manner.&nbsp; He copies what was stated by the Ad quem in Considerando VIII of the impugned judgment.&nbsp; For patrimonial and/or indemnification purposes, he comments, the classification of the administrative functioning is of paramount importance, in order to determine the scope of liability. In the case of unlawful conduct or abnormal functioning, the damage and the losses must be repaired; but if liability derives from lawful acts or normal conduct, only compensation for damage is appropriate.&nbsp; In this vein, he points out, for compensation purposes, contrary to what the Trial Chamber affirmed, breaking the compensation cap set by Article 7 of the Bovine Tuberculosis Law, number 1207, has utility and is of the greatest importance.&nbsp; The foregoing, because if the disease of the euthanized bovine is convincingly demonstrated, only 50% of its expertly determined value is appropriate as compensation.&nbsp; But, he adds, if there is doubt as to whether the animal is sick or healthy, 100% of its value must be acknowledged, as is drawn from Article 194.2 of the LGAP, given that, on this particular point, there would be a collision of two special laws on indemnification matters, where the later law repeals the earlier one.&nbsp; That is, he argues, the LGAP regarding this aspect repeals, for this litigation, the now-repealed Bovine Tuberculosis Law.&nbsp; From a harmonious and joint analysis of the totality of the evidentiary elements in the record, in accordance with the rules of sound rational criticism, he indicates, it follows that, to diagnose bovine tuberculosis in a herd, performing the tuberculin or diagnostic test is not sufficient; rather, it is necessary to conduct confirmatory laboratory-type tests.&nbsp; The foregoing, he adds, because, in light of Articles 9 in fine of the Regulation on the Control of Bovine Tuberculosis (Executive Decree 28515-MAG of November 25, 1999), 4(g) and 33(a) of the General Regulation of the Costa Rican Institute for Research and Education in Nutrition and Health, INCIENSA (Executive Decree 26656-S of January 9, 1998), in relation to Report CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible at folios 468-469 of the judicial file, one can only conclude, from a microbiological point of view, that there is bovine tuberculosis in an animal when that microorganism is isolated from that animal’s tissues.&nbsp; The application of the intradermal or tuberculin tests performed by MAG officials on the plaintiff company’s herd is not sufficient.&nbsp; In this vein, he continues, since the action taken by the Administration was one of those that cause serious harm to the subjective rights or legitimate interests of the administered party, it was obligated to verify the material truth of the facts that served as the grounds for the act impugned in this proceeding, in the most faithful and complete manner possible, which is lacking.&nbsp; Consequently, Articles 214.2, 221, and 308.1(a) of the LGAP are violated.&nbsp; On the other hand, he reiterates, performing the tuberculin test does not constitute a suitable (grounds for the administrative act) veterinary medical technical element to dictate measures of that kind (sacrifice and/or extermination of cattle) in favor of human and animal health and the environment (purpose).&nbsp; The absence of complementary or confirmatory laboratory-type tests vitiates the content of the act. In this way, he adds, based on the evidence, specifically the scientific documents visible at folios 72 to 76, 146, 303, 305, 468-469 of the judicial file, as well as the documents visible at folios 303, 304, 313 to 317 of the administrative file, contrary to what the Trial Chamber asserted in the seventh considerando of the appealed judgment, it is possible to conclude that there are no objective elements to affirm that the execution of the administrative measures conformed to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience.&nbsp; These concepts, he says, are summarized in the reasonableness and proportionality of the norm as parameters of constitutionality, Article 16 of the LGAP, and it is not evident that the decision was adopted within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness implicit in the legal system.&nbsp; Regarding the extent of the compensation for material damage, he asserts, the Trial Chamber’s decision is tendentiously partial and concomitantly silent.&nbsp; It limited itself to considering the material damage arising from the sacrifice or total slaughter of the plaintiff company’s herd, which, while the most ostensible, is not the only damage illegitimately caused and suffered by its principal.&nbsp; The damage and loss are measured based on the productivity of the animals, whose extermination contributed to the company’s financial crisis.&nbsp; In this sense, he argues, a dairy farm is a business and should be analyzed as such.&nbsp; A productive unit or company has a value in accordance with its profits, which are a function of its investment represented by its fixed or immovable assets and by its current assets.&nbsp; The greater the risk or investment, the greater its profit and value should be.\n\nThe appellant (casacionista) points out that the Court improperly failed to analyze the damage concerning the denaturing or destruction of the fluid milk; the value of the genetic purity of the herd itself, since the slaughtered cattle were pedigree livestock (genealogy of a purebred animal) and registered both by the Holstein Cattle Breeders Association of Costa Rica (Asociación de Criadores de Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica) and by the Costa Rican Jersey Cattle Breeders Association (Asociación Costarricense de Criadores de Ganado Jersey) (folios 183 to 223, both inclusive, of the administrative file); the prohibition on selling milk; the non-sale of cull male animals for the activity, as well as unsuitable females; the expected growth and profit in the herd's development, the herd's growth and production. It should also have analyzed, they note, the company's fixed operating costs, where all existing fixed assets were maintained (the farm, the facilities, the equipment, etc.), which, by affecting income, involved current assets, which, of course, by having a negative cash flow, inevitably harmed current liabilities, which generated a chain of financial instability in the company, as part of its resources or assets were immobilized when its income or production diminished; the decrease in production continuity due to the non-use of installed capacity; the operational loss due to lack of production; the financial costs referring both to leverage and to investment costs (the farm, the improvement or construction facilities, the equipment, the pastures, the fences, the corrals (apartos), the internal roads, and all the infrastructure in general were already there); the indirect production and administrative costs that the company had to bear, etc. A procedural legal situation evidenced, they state, which causes the nullity of the appealed judgment. Consequently, a joint analysis of the existing evidence, in accordance with the rules of sound rational criticism, is missing. As an example, they point out, the report CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible at folios 468-469 of the judicial file, despite being documentary evidence of a scientific nature, its evidentiary value was dismissed by the Court. At the same time, having the report issued by an official of the Administration (la Administración), a sort of substitutive character for the confession of judgment (absolución de posiciones) (article 54.1 of the LRJCA), and/or that of constituting a testimony (article 301.2 of the LGAP), they comment, the one rendered by Dr. José Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, Director of Animal Health, visible at folios 506 to 508 of the file, according to which the tuberculin used by the Administration to diagnose bovine tuberculosis in the plaintiff company's herd was covered by a quality control certificate, even though it is considered given under oath, does not turn it into an expert opinion or evidence of a technical-scientific character or nature, which is why it lacks factual support to sustain what is affirmed therein. Contrary to what the Court maintained, which illegitimately granted it the character or status of an expert opinion and/or evidence of a technical-scientific character or nature. Regarding the extent of the material damage, they comment, the Ad quem was remiss in considering the act of denaturing and destruction of 2315 kilograms of fluid milk (folio 31 of the judicial file); the quarantine act (folio 32); the visit record No. 2635-A, where 4790 kilograms of fluid milk and others are destroyed (folio 33); the visit record No. 2636-A, when 1,458.5 kilograms of fluid milk and others are destroyed (folio 34); the seizure act No. 4171 for 417 kilograms of fluid milk (folio 35); the visit record No. 2638-A where, among other things, the destruction of 2,773.6 kilograms of fluid milk is recorded (folio 37); the notarial certification of official letters DZS/RH 009-00 and 007-00 DZS/RHN of January 13, 2000, indicating to the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L., the obligation not to collect fluid milk (folios 39 and 40); five notarial acts of destruction of fluid milk (folios 229 to 233) of the main file; as well as the mathematical actuarial expert reports carried out by licensed professionals Salvador Hernández Araya and Leonel Centeno Madrigal (respectively at folios 234 to 255 and 513 to 529). In conclusion, they point out, canons 11, 33, 41, 45, 50 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política); 190.2, 194.1.2.3 of the LGAP; 3, 7 of the now repealed Bovine Tuberculosis Law (Ley de Tuberculosis Bovina), number 1207; were violated, by improper application; due to lack of action, numerals 190.1, 191, 192 and 196 of the LGAP. In addition, as value norms, articles 298.2 of the LGAP and 330 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) were violated.\n\nXVIII.- In light of the formulation, this grievance is subdivided into two points. In the first, the appellant affirms, the indemnity for the sacrifice of the livestock (semovientes) owned by their represented party should have been 100% and not only 50%. This is because there was no certainty of tuberculosis infection, since the tuberculin test was not sufficient, but rather complementary laboratory tests should have been performed, as only in this way could bovine tuberculosis be diagnosed with certainty. In this regard, it is necessary to point out the following. As indicated in Considerando XI of this judgment, what is recorded in proven fact number 20, in that the tuberculins used and applied to the plaintiff's animals were covered by a quality and efficacy control certificate, is erroneous, as it lacks suitable evidence to demonstrate that factual situation. However, as has been extensively stated, among others, in section XII, that circumstance does not entail the breaking of the ruling. On three occasions, different people or institutions determined the existence of tuberculosis in the plaintiff company's animals: first it was the veterinarian of the El Valle slaughterhouse, Dr. Ricardo Aguilar Jiménez; then, the laboratory studies carried out by LANASEVE; and, finally, the tuberculin tests applied by MAG officials. Due to those coinciding positive results, and in the absence of the quality and efficacy control certificate, a reasonable doubt arises regarding the tuberculosis outbreak, which, under the protection of the precautionary principle (derived, at the constitutional level, from canons 46 and 50; and expressly regulated in the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad) in its numeral 11), obligated the Public Administration (la Administración Pública), specifically, the MAG's Directorate of Animal Health (Dirección de Salud Animal), to act in the manner it did. On the other hand, in Considerando XVI, the reason why, in this Chamber's judgment, the appellant is not correct in their argument that the result of the tuberculin application was not sufficient, but that confirmatory or laboratory-type tests also needed to be performed, was analyzed. Consequently, under the protection of the foregoing, and as the judges of the instances correctly indicated, the Public Administration acted in a lawful and normal manner when ordering, among other measures, the sacrifice of the animals that reacted positively to the applied tests. In this sense, it is reiterated, the reason is the reasonable doubt regarding the existence of the tuberculosis outbreak on the plaintiff company's farm, in order to protect human and animal health and the environment. Regarding the indemnity aspect for that type of administrative action, numeral 194 of the LGAP provides: \"1. The Administration (la Administración) shall be responsible for its lawful acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the rights of the administered party in a special way, due to the small proportion of those affected or the exceptional intensity of the injury. / 2. In this case, the indemnity shall cover the value of the damages at the time of their payment, but not the lost profits (lucro cesante). / 3. The State shall be responsible for damages directly caused by a law, which are special in accordance with this article.\" (The underlining is supplied). However, in the case of pecuniary reparation for the sacrifice of livestock for being sick with tuberculosis, contrary to what the appellant affirms, the previous provision is not applicable. Special regulations exist: that contained in Law number 1207 of October 9, 1950. This is a specific law regarding that matter –bovine tuberculosis–, not a general one like the provisions in the LGAP. In this sense, the seventh canon provides: \"Based on the appraisal (peritazgo) has (sic) that reference has been made, the owner of the sacrificed animal, as soon as they present their claim, shall be indemnified by the State with 50% of the value set by the experts of the National Bank (Banco Nacional). Notwithstanding what is stated in this article, the State, in the case of insured animals, shall only be obligated to pay the owner thereof the difference that would result against them between the insurance and the 50% referred to in this article.\" (The underlining is supplied). What the appellant affirms, in the sense that \"... if the illness of the euthanized bovine is conclusively proven, only 50% of its expertly determined value is appropriate as indemnity (article 7 ibidem) ... but if there is doubt as to whether the animal is sick or healthy, 100% of the value of such animal must be paid ...\" is not admissible. As pointed out, the absence of scientific certainty was no obstacle for the Public Administration to act in the manner it did, since the precautionary principle so required. For its part, the law in comment only provides, as indemnity, the payment of 50% of the expertly determined value of the sacrificed animals, just as the plaintiff company was compensated (see proven facts 17 and 19, not challenged by the appellant), not 100% in case of doubt. Therefore, as the plaintiff company was indemnified regarding the sacrifice of its livestock, according to the provisions of the regulations applicable to the sub júdice, the inadmissibility of the claim of merit is inferred.\n\nXIX.- In the second point of the reproach, the appellant states that what the Court resolved is remiss, since it improperly limited itself to considering the material damage arising from the sacrifice of their principal's herd, which, although the most obvious, is not the only one. The appellant is correct. In this regard, as has already been indicated, numeral seven of Law 6243 of May 2, 1978, Law on Animal Health (Ley sobre Salud Animal), empowers the MAG to take any quarantine (cuarentenaria) or destruction measure that the Directorate of Animal Health recommends, in the case of disease outbreaks that endanger public or animal health. These measures, other than the sacrifice of animals, may also generate compensable damages, as provided in ordinal 194 of the LGAP; as long as it is effective –as a result of the measures taken–, evaluable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group, as provided in article 196 ibidem. In this regard, the appellant affirms: \"Thus, the Court improperly failed to analyze the damage concerning the denaturing or destruction of the fluid milk; the value of the genetic purity of the herd itself, since the slaughtered cattle were pedigree livestock (genealogy of a purebred animal) and/or registered, both by the Holstein Cattle Breeders Association of Costa Rica and by the Costa Rican Jersey Cattle Breeders Association (See folios 183 to 223, both inclusive of the administrative file); the prohibition on selling milk; the non-sale of cull male animals for the activity as well as unsuitable females; the expected growth and profit in the herd's development, the herd's growth and production; the company's fixed operating costs should also have been analyzed, where all existing fixed assets were maintained (the farm, the facilities, the equipment, etc.), which, by affecting income, also affected current assets, which, of course, by having a negative cash flow, inevitably affected current liabilities, which generated a chain of financial instability in the company, as part of its resources or assets were immobilized when its production income diminished; the loss of production continuity due to the non-use of installed capacity; the operational loss due to lack of production; the financial costs referring both to leverage and to investment costs (the farm was already there, the improvement or construction facilities were already there, the equipment was already there, the pastures, the fences, the corrals (apartos), the internal roads and all the infrastructure in general were already there); the indirect production costs and administrative costs that the company had to bear; etc., a procedural legal situation evidenced that causes the nullity of the appealed judgment.\" Regarding the value of the genetic purity of the herd itself, when referring to the sacrificed animals, it is included in the indemnity analyzed in the previous section. In relation to the rest of the appellant's affirmations, except for the fluid milk, the evidentiary support consists of the opinions made by licensed professional Salvador Hernández Araya (folios 233 to 254) and by engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal (folios 513 to 529). Both expert reports, in light of the rules of sound rational criticism, do not merit this Chamber's faith. The first, because it was prepared at the request of the plaintiff company's manager, Osman Marín Rojas, without the opposing party having been given the opportunity to object to it or request additions and clarifications. Furthermore, as licensed professional Hernández Araya indicates, he prepared the report only with the information and documents provided to him by the interested party. Therefore, to give it any type of value would place the defendant in a state of defenselessness. The second, because it is devoid of due foundation. The expert fails to indicate what methods and formulas were used, besides their factual, doctrinal, or scientific support, to arrive at the conclusions reached. It is limited to indicating \"To carry out the requested study, a study of the pieces that make up the judicial file was carried out and the professional norms governing the matter were applied.\" Therefore, the affirmations made seem like mere subjective opinions. In this sense, for example, it affirms: \"From the foregoing, the forty-seven average animals were capable of producing milk in the indicated period, only that the younger ones would join production in years after the initial one. For the sake of simplicity in the exposition and the calculation, to obviate the problem of the additional age variable and without detracting from the final result of the study, we will proceed to calculate a production average, not exactly linear, but rather of intensities. Otherwise, the higher and lower values, which are of a quantity of three, are eliminated; from what remains, it is observed that a population of ten animals is between 6 and 24 months and 11 animals have 4 lactations. Eliminating the foregoing, we are left with three groups that go ascendingly and in order from one to three lactations with a similar number of members. From the foregoing, it is inferred that the average is located at two lactations, and from here the milk production calculations will be made. This is because, as is well known and in the public domain, cows increase their production from when they begin until adulthood, and therefore it would not be realistic to take all as adults or all as heifers. Having clarified the foregoing and for reproduction purposes, as the first ones do not reproduce in the first year, an average of forty-five cows in production will be taken. ... Therefore, a general analysis model has been deduced that can be applied to different quantities of animals, the limit of which will be determined by the scale or productive platform of the business, or by what is also known as its installed capacity.\" It does not clarify where and why it obtains that data. In some cases, too, appreciations and assumptions lacking real evidence or studies on the farm are made that exceed its competence, not only when referring to future events, for example, \"With this analysis, the new wombs that should have entered the productive process and the cull ones will be determined.\"; but also, by including aspects that were not requested, for example, when referring to the damages and losses for the killing of 75 animals, since its opinion was only requested for the sacrifice of the remaining 47 livestock (semovientes). Nor is mention made of the documents consulted, especially, those of a financial-accounting nature of the plaintiff company, to carry out the report. In this regard, for example, it is indicated \"Then a milk price will be established as of the date of the claim and an income for this concept will be determined. Then the income for other concepts will be established and from the total income, a profit will be inferred, which will be normal in any type of productive activity, which will be limited by the financial maxim that every business must have a profitability greater than the product of the usufruct of money in the stock market.\" However, it does not indicate where this data is obtained. Consequently, by discrediting both studies, the alleged damages lack evidentiary support. Ergo, it was not demonstrated that they were a direct product (causal nexus) of the measures taken by the administration, especially, the quarantine of the plaintiff company's farm, upon the emergence of the tuberculosis outbreak. Therefore, their recognition is not appropriate (numerals 194 and 196 of the LGAP). Regarding the prohibition on selling milk, this aspect does not allude to a damage in itself, but rather to the eventual lost earnings, that is, to lost profits (lucro cesante), which, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 2) of article 194 ibidem, is not compensable. Finally, regarding the destruction or denaturing of fluid milk, the appellant invokes, as improperly valued, among other means of conviction, five notarial acts, visible at folios 228 to 232. In accordance with canon 101 of the Notarial Code (Código Notarial), this evidence constitutes a public instrument, however, they do not cite its value norm. Therefore, regarding this evidence, the grievance is informal. On the other hand, this destruction is a duly proven fact. In this regard, proven facts numbered 6, 7, 8, and 11 can be consulted. However, this Chamber considers it is not compensable. The General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), number 5395 of October 30, 1973, expressly prohibits the commercialization of altered, deteriorated, contaminated, adulterated, or falsified food. Regarding the matter of interest, that regulatory body prescribes: \"ARTICLE 196.- Adequate nutrition and the ingestion of good quality food under sanitary conditions are essential for health, and therefore, natural and legal persons engaged in activities related to food intended for population consumption must exercise the utmost diligence and avoid omissions in compliance with the pertinent legal and regulatory provisions and the special orders that the health authority may issue, within its powers, in protection of health. … ARTICLE 200.- It is strictly prohibited to import, elaborate, use, possess for sale, trade, transfer gratuitously, handle, distribute, and store altered or deteriorated, contaminated, adulterated, or falsified foods. ARTICLE 201.- Altered or deteriorated food is understood, for the purposes of this law and its regulations, as that which by any natural cause has suffered damage or change in its basic, chemical, or biological characteristics. ARTICLE 202.- Contaminated food is considered, for legal and regulatory purposes, that which contains pathogenic microorganisms, toxins, or impurities of organic or mineral origin that are repulsive, inconvenient, or harmful to health. / Food that is the product of an elaboration, packaging, or handling carried out under defective sanitary conditions or in contravention of legal or regulatory provisions shall be presumed contaminated. … ARTICLE 223.- Every manufacturer of food products must use, in their elaboration, raw materials that meet sanitary conditions. / Therefore, the use of materials, products, or byproducts containing decomposed, toxic substances, or entrails (sic) not susceptible to being eliminated, is prohibited, as well as meats and byproducts from animals sacrificed in unauthorized places and in an anti-regulatory manner and, especially, the reincorporation into the production of stale, adulterated, contaminated, or suspected of being so foods, or those that have been returned by the trade.\" Notwithstanding the previous provisions, that same legislation empowers the commercialization of any byproduct from animals affected by zoonoses, as occurs in this litigation (lite), provided the fact does not constitute a crime, and with the prior and express authorization of the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud). In this sense, numeral 375 states: \"Whoever knowingly imports, elaborates, trades, distributes, or supplies under any title, handles, or possesses for those same purposes, deteriorated, contaminated, adulterated, or falsified medicines or food, when the fact does not constitute a crime, shall be punished with a fine of ten to sixty days.\"\n\n**XX.-** In the **eighth**, termed by the appellant (casacionista) as “*ninth ground of cassation on the merits for indirect violation of law*”, it argues the existence of an error of law due to the improper rejection of non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), by improperly evaluating the following pieces of evidence: a) the testimony of Osman, Antonio, both Marín Rojas, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, and Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga; b) the mathematical actuarial study, prepared by Lic. Salvador Hernández Araya, folios 233 to 254; c) official letters (oficios) DZS/RH 009-00 and DZS/RHN 007-00 of January 13, 2000, where the respondent Administration informed the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. of the obligation not to collect fluid milk from the plaintiff company’s herd, folios 39 and 40; d) expert report (experticia) of Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal, folios 513 to 529; e) official letters UAA-RHN-072-2000, signed by the Chief of the Unidad de Atención al Ambiente of the Ministry of Health, folio 301; CNRTB-196-92000, authored by Dr. María Cecilia Matamoros, Chief of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 302; official letter CART-80-2000, authored by Mr. Mario Azofeifa Solano, Operations Coordinator of San Carlos of the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., folio 303; all three, dated September 11, 2000; CNRTB-206-92000 of September 13, 2000, from Dr. María Cecilia Matamoros, Chief of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 304; UAA-RHN 076-2000, from the head of the Unidad de Atención al Ambiente of the Ministry of Health, folio 305; 121-2000 DZS-RHN from the head of Defensa Zoosanitaria of the Región Huetar Norte of the MAG, both dated September 14, 2000; DR-RHN-1271-2000, of December 7, 2000, authored by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Health, folios 309-310; and f) note of the plaintiff company dated November 27, 2000, folio 308. It transcribes what the Court set forth in Considerando IX of the challenged judgment. According to what was decided by that adjudicative body, it affirms, one is faced with the dichotomy of the demonstration or not of objective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral objetivo), on one hand, and its quantification on the other. It would seem that the Ad quem, it comments, opted both for the lack of proof to consider the premises for recognizing its compensation as accredited, and also for the non-quantification of its economic and valuable consequences. Even if it were accepted that the valuable economic consequences of the non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) were not quantified in the cognizance phase, this is no obstacle to declaring its existence. In this sense, it points out, the Court’s having decided that the plaintiff company did not demonstrate the objective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral objetivo) inflicted upon it by the Administration is the consequence of an improper assessment, according to the rules of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional), of the indicated elements of conviction. The objective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral objetivo) that occurred in this litigation, it affirms, lies in the deterioration or impairment suffered by the plaintiff company in its image, prestige, credibility to implement business in the market of the commercial activity carried out, in its good name and business solvency. This is because it was not only a company with credit eligibility with the National Banking System, but also its herd had pedigree, registered both by the Asociación de Criadores de Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica and by the Asociación Costarricense de Criadores de Ganado Jersey (folios 183 to 223, both inclusive of the administrative file). Affectation that occurred due to the transcendence of the events that took place in the business environment, the setting, the trade association, the community, the various public and private entities related to the company’s line of business, as well as due to their improper dissemination through the mass media, especially Channel 14 of the Zona Norte. Regarding the errors in the assessment of the indicated evidentiary elements, it indicates, concerning the evaluation of the testimony of Mr. Osman Marín Rojas, the mere fact that he indicated having an interest in the outcome of the proceeding is not sufficient reason (rules of sound rational criticism) to dismiss it. Unless such a conclusion does not derive from and/or is not the product of an analysis of the totality of the evidentiary array collected in the proceeding, which would betray its disproportion and/or incongruity in what was stated under oath. At the same time, it indicates, what was stated by said witness, whether or not it is useful for the purposes of the valuation or quantification of the non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), is irrelevant to discredit it, as such determination can be reserved for the sentence execution stage. A task that, in any case, it comments, does not correspond to, much less is within the competence of, a witness. Concerning the assessment of the document visible on folio 303 of the file, which is official letter CART-80-2000 of September 11, 2000, authored by Mr. Mario Azofeifa Solano, Operations Coordinator of San Carlos of the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos RL, contrary to what was held by the Court, it affirms, in the sense that such a document does not make evident a loss of prestige or affectation to the name of the plaintiff company resulting from the administrative action, it would denote or, would be derived (rules of sound rational criticism) from it, at the very least, an affectation of its business solvency, as well as its credibility to implement business in the market of the commercial activity carried out; given the transcendence of the events that occurred to the business environment, the setting, the trade association, the various public and private entities related to the plaintiff company’s line of business. As regards the assessment of the mathematical actuarial study prepared by Lic. Hernández Araya (folios 234 to 255 of the file), likewise, it comments, the fact that it was arranged for by the plaintiff privately is not sufficient reason (rules of sound rational criticism) to disdain it or to deny it the probative value it reasonably holds, because even if it were not accepted as an expert report (peritaje), it would still retain its value as a means of proof, properly as a document or technical report (article 318, subsection 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Código Procesal Civil). Its devaluation is also not appropriate, with the argument that it only makes a recommendation regarding the extreme of non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), because that, it alleges, is precisely the legal nature of any technical evidence regarding non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), given that it corresponds to the administrator of justice to definitively fix its amount. The Ad quem, it comments, remains silent regarding the mathematical actuarial expert report (experticia) rendered by Engineer Centeno Madrigal (folios 513 to 529). Proof that could have supplied any deficiency or objection made to the previous study. A comparative study of both technical evidentiary elements is missed. The improper rejection of compensation for non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), it states, derives, apart from the objections made to the proof, from an improper assessment, by omission of analysis, of the testimonies of Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, Antonio Marín Rojas, and Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga, in relation to the documents visible on folios 39 and 40, which are notarially certified copies of official letters DZS/RH 009-00 and 007 DZS/RHN, dated January 13, 2000; in them, the respondent Administration informed the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. of the obligation not to collect fluid milk from the plaintiff company’s herd; of the mathematical actuarial expert report (peritaje) of Engineer Centeno Madrigal; as well as official letters UAA-RHN 072-2000, CNRTB-196-92000, CART-80-2000, CNRTB-206-92000, UAA-RHN 076-2000, official letter number 121-2000 DZS-RHN, DR-RHN-1271-2000, the writing dated November 27, 2000, authored by Sucesores de Clemente Marín S.A. Evidentiary elements with which, it affirms, at the very least, the indubitable accreditation of the existence of objective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral objetivo) is obtained. In accordance with the above, it concludes, what was decided by the Ad quem violates, by improper application, canons 11, 33, 41, 45, 50 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política); 190.2, 194.1.2.3 of the LGAP; 3 and 7 of the now repealed Law of Bovine Tuberculosis, number 1207 and, by lack of application, numerals 190.1, 191, 192, 196 and 197 of the LGAP. Regarding the value of the improperly assessed proof, it points out, the articles 298.2 of the LGAP; 318 subsection 3), 330 and 357 subsection 4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) were violated.\n\n**XXI.-** The plaintiff is a legal entity. Ergo, as the Court correctly pointed out, the non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) sought is objective. This Chamber has indicated that it occurs when the sphere of extra-patrimonial interest is injured. That is, it produces economically valuable consequences. For example, the case of the professional who, because of the attributed act, loses their clientele in whole or in part. It must be differentiated from subjective or emotional non-pecuniary damage (daño moral subjetivo). “*This distinction serves to demarcate the damage suffered by the individual in their social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual realm (grief over the death of a relative), thus one refers to the social part and the other to the affective part of the patrimony.*” (Judgment number 127 of 11 hours 25 minutes of February 21, 2007. In the same sense, see rulings 151 of 15 hours 20 minutes of February 14, 2001 and 729 of 10 hours of September 29, 2005). This differentiation arose to determine the scope of compensable non-pecuniary damage (daño moral). Initially, doctrine was reluctant to compensate pure or subjective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), due to its difficult quantification. In the case of objective damage, the corresponding demonstration must be made, as occurs with patrimonial damage. “*… **VI.-** Regarding the compensability of non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), it should be noted that the argument is not valid according to which the compensation of non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) implies the difficulty of achieving an equivalence between the damage and the pecuniary compensation (\"pecunia doloris\"); because in the case of objective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral objetivo) the reparation turns out to be easier to quantify* …” (Judgment 928 of 9 hours 15 minutes of November 24, 2006. In this same sense, see resolutions 527-F-S1-2008 of 14 hours 10 minutes of February 1, 2008 and 206-F-S1-2009 of 16 hours 20 minutes of February 26, 2009).\n\n**XXII.-** In the fourth fact of the statement of claim (escrito de demanda), the attorney for the plaintiff company affirms: “*That despite the challenged sanitary order being an absolutely null and ineffective act concomitantly, the respondent Administration (arts. 146.1.3.4, 150.1 and 169 LGAP) abusing its power, its sovereign powers, and arbitrarily, ordered and executed it, causing my client damages (material and non-pecuniary/moral) and losses of impossible or difficult reparation. Thus, the quarantine of the farm owned by my client, its animals, products and by-products, inputs and equipment was ordered, causing serious and substantial economic losses, since prima facie, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. was ordered to suppress the collection of milk from my client, however, today the Cooperativa Dos Pinos is again being allowed to collect the milk; the alleged outbreak of bovine tuberculosis on my client’s farm was improperly disseminated through the mass media of the Zona Norte, especially Channel 14, causing immeasurable non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) to my client as well as to my entire family; and finally, to date, 123 bovines have been slaughtered, almost the entirety of the herd, losing its genetics, since it was cattle registered in the Holstein and Jersey Associations of Costa Rica, without having conclusively proven the outbreak of bovine tuberculosis in all the euthanized animals, which has my client on the verge of bankruptcy to economic ruin, despite the difficult administrative financial situation through which the State is going, as expressly recognized by the Administration in official letter SUBDSA No. 183-00, dated July 26, 2000.*” (The underlining is supplied). Then, in the section called “*legal argumentation*”, fifth point, folio 138 verso, it ratifies the above, when indicating, as relevant: “*… causing my client damages and losses of impossible or difficult reparation. Thus, the quarantine of the farm owned by my client, its animals, products and by-products, inputs and equipment was ordered, causing serious and substantial economic losses, since prima facie, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. was ordered to suppress the collection of milk from my client starting January 13 of the current year, with approximately 12,522.7 kilograms of fluid milk being denatured for subsequent destruction as of January 17 last, which represents an economic loss around 800,000.00 colones, however, today the Cooperativa Dos Pinos is again being allowed to collect the milk; the alleged outbreak of bovine tuberculosis on my client’s farm was improperly disseminated through the mass media of the Zona Norte, especially Channel 14, causing immeasurable non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) to my client as well as to my entire family* …” (the underlining is not from the original). According to what was previously transcribed, it is clear that the cause of action for claiming non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) originates from the publications made by the mass media of the Zona Norte of the country, especially on Channel 14. The appellant (casacionista), to demonstrate the existence of this damage, invokes as violated: 1) the studies conducted by both Lic. Salvador Hernández Araya (folios 233 to 254) and Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal (folios 513 to 529). In Considerando XIX of this judgment, the reasons why both studies do not deserve credibility from this jurisdictional body were pointed out. 2) the following documentary evidence: i) official letters (oficios) a) DZS/RH 009-00, folio 39; b) 007-00 DZS/RHZ, folio 40, both from the head of Defensa Zoosanitaria of the Región Huetar Norte of the MAG, dated January 13, 2000; c) UAA-RHN-072-2000, signed by the Chief of the Unidad de Atención al Ambiente of the Ministry of Health, folio 301; d) CNRTB-196-92000, authored by Dr. María Cecilia Matamoros, Chief of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 302; e) official letter CART-80-2000, signed by Mr. Mario Azofeifa Solano, Operations Coordinator of San Carlos of the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., folio 303; all three, dated September 11, 2000; f) CNRTB-206-92000 of September 13, 2000, from Dr. María Cecilia Matamoros, Chief of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 304; g) UAA-RHN 076-2000, from the head of the Unidad de Atención al Ambiente of the Ministry of Health, folio 305; h) 121-2000 DZS-RHN from the head of Defensa Zoosanitaria of the Región Huetar Norte of the MAG, both dated September 14, 2000; i) DR-RHN-1271-2000, of December 7, 2000, authored by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Health, folios 309-310; and ii) note of the plaintiff company dated November 27, 2000, folio 308. All this evidence alludes to the prohibition for the plaintiff to commercialize the milk produced by its herd. This factual situation differs from the reason (causa petendi) that originates the request for compensation for non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) (which, as noted, is limited to the journalistic publications, especially those made by Channel 14 of the Zona Norte of the country), so it is not admissible. If its analysis were to be agreed to and, eventually, what is argued by the appellant (casacionista) were to be accepted, it would make the judgment incongruent, due to a variation of the cause of action. In any case, with a greater abundance of reasons, as the plaintiff party itself confesses – fourth fact of the claim and fifth point of the “*legal argumentation*” section, previously transcribed – this circumstance did not inflict any negative consequence on the company’s prestige and good name, nor was it subject to exclusion by its clients. In this regard, as indicated, the prohibition on the sale of milk was a temporary circumstance, and at the time of filing the claim, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., had resumed the purchase of milk. Similarly, in note CART-80-2000 of September 11, 2000, authored by the Operations Coordinator of San Carlos of that Cooperative, it is expressly stated that: “*The resumption of deliveries will be subject to authorization from the competent governmental entity.*” That is, the prohibition on the sale of milk did not generate any negative consequence for the plaintiff (accionante) in its social consideration. 3) It also invokes as violated the testimonies of Osman Gerardo and Antonio Marín Rojas, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua and Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga. Regarding the statements of the Marín Rojas brothers, they are evidently biased. They are children of the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff company, Mr. Antonio Marín Barrientos. They therefore have an interest in the outcome of the proceeding, as the family business is at stake. Furthermore, the former is the farm administrator. The foregoing, under the rules of sound rational criticism (sana crítica), contrary to what was stated by the appellant (casacionista), disqualifies both testimonies. Nevertheless, from what they said, the alleged damage is not inferred. Mr. Osman Gerardo, folios 421 to 431, as relevant, affirmed: “*Regarding the management by Mr. Orlando Jara of the M.A.G. we believe it was not correct, as it became evident that the technical part did not handle it properly, furthermore, he did not respect the criterion of privacy and ethics either* (sic), *since in the results that were read at the beginning of January, this man first informed channel 14 than the* (sic) *company (plaintiff), they also acted very hastily, not giving us time to prepare for the measures they imposed on us. … On the moral side, there was a great negative impact, since through* (sic) *the M.A.G., the media made the reports of this case in particular public and regular. We had a kind of general loss of prestige, before the community, the trade association, and the neighbors, because while we tried to defend ourselves and convince the authorities to correct the procedures and carry out the complementary tests, public opinion judged us to be endangering public health and the animal health of the zone.*\n\n... Regarding the media reports, what was done was to request from this channel the videos they broadcast, to have them as evidence and in the end we tried through the same medium to give our opinion and try to counteract somewhat the negative image that was being broadcast.” What Mr. Osman Gerardo stated amounts to nothing more than mere subjective opinions. He does not specify what the public opinion’s judging of them consisted of. Rather, they are general assertions, which require other complementary evidence to demonstrate them. For example, he indicates that they requested the videos to have them as evidence; however, they did not submit them to this case file. In sum, a negative impact on the plaintiff company’s social sphere is not proven. For his part, what Mr. Antonio stated, folios 432 to 438, is inconsequential for the purposes of proving moral damages (daño moral), since he affirms: “I do not remember what the media outlets were referring to, because it affected me psychologically to listen to them.” In turn, the witness Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga, folios 439 to 441, pertinently stated: “In Ciudad Quesada, it seemed like a persecution, because it appeared on Channel 14 and in the newspaper, where the people from the M.A.G. reported that there was a tuberculosis outbreak and stated that the animals with that disease became skinny, drawn, and snotty, and where on one occasion I went (sic) to the farm to have some documents signed and the news program was present, there were two separate lots, where one was supposedly contaminated cattle and the other was healthy cattle and I heard (sic) they asked the administrator which (sic) of the lots was the cattle to be slaughtered, I don’t remember who (sic) asked that, that indicates that the two lots were the same.” However, she does not specify how those publications harmed the plaintiff company. Consequently, what the witness stated is not useful for the purpose of determining the existence of moral damages. The same applies to what the last witness, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, stated, folios 412 to 420. He only points out that “It greatly caught (sic) my attention that the radio and television cameras were always present, especially when they did the slaughters regarding this process.” He does not indicate how those publications affected the plaintiff company from a social standpoint. In accordance with the foregoing, with the testimonial evidence produced in the case file, the existence of the claimed moral damages cannot be determined. In any case, the fact that la Dos Pinos resumed receiving the milk, and that the company where the witness Hernández Astorga works provides services to the plaintiff, demonstrates that it did not suffer detriment or damage to its image or prestige as a company. That is to say, it had no negative consequences from a social perspective. Based on the reasons set forth, the rejection of this ground of disagreement is warranted.” \n\n\n\n**Article 15** Only the State may prepare or import tuberculin for veterinary use. For its part, Executive Decree 10120-A of May 9, 1979, “Regulation on the Control of Bovine Tuberculosis,” provides: “**Article 1** Tuberculin or any other biological product used to diagnose tuberculosis in domestic animals may only be imported by the Animal Health Program MAG-BID. **Article 2** It is exclusively the responsibility of the National Animal Health Program to control the quality and efficacy of the tuberculin used for diagnosis in animals. **Article 5** When the Directorate of the National Animal Health Program receives the information referred to in articles three and four of this Regulation, it shall immediately proceed to carry out the epidemiological study of the affected herd and administer the tuberculin test to all the livestock existing on the premises. **Article 7** Animals that are classified as reactors shall be duly identified, branded, evaluated, and immediately slaughtered, in accordance with Law No. 1207.” (The underlining is supplied). The manner of controlling the quality and efficacy of tuberculin by the Directorate of Animal Health (now Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal –SENASA-) is through the respective quality control certificate. Therefore, this constitutes a necessary requirement for said test to be applied to bovines. In the sub-júdice, the plaintiff, from the outset—third fact of the complaint—indicated that the tuberculin used in its herd was not certified. For its part, in the proven fact preceded by number 20, it is established: “*that the tuberculins used and applied to the plaintiff’s animals are imported from Mexico for the exclusive use of the Directorate of Animal Health of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, official tuberculosis control program, under the protection and authorization of Law No. 1207 of October 4, 1950; they come from the Productora Nacional de Biológicos Veterinarios, covered by a quality control certificate, establishing in them the potency of the dose, in order to verify its adjustment to the standards of the International Office of Epizootics (see complaint document and its response, and report signed by Dr. José Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, Director of Animal Health, folios 506 to 508).*” (The underlining is supplied). On this point, in Section V of the appealed judgment, the Court considered the following: “**V.- SECOND GRIEVANCE. REGARDING THE ALLEGED ABSENCE OF QUALITY CONTROL OF THE TUBERCULIN TESTS.** *As limits on the exercise of administrative discretion, articles 16.1 and 160 of the General Law of Public Administration expressly prohibit the Administration from issuing acts contrary to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience. To determine compliance or non-compliance with these rules in each specific case, it is necessary to analyze the technical or scientific evidence submitted to the process. In the case under examination, at the request of the plaintiff, a report was requested from the National Directorate of Animal Health of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, in order that it “indicate whether the tuberculins and/or biological products from the lot used to diagnose the presumed existence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd of the company Sucesores Clemente Marín S.A., are duly registered, and both their quality and efficacy certified, at a national or international level, as well as the diagnostic methods used, and in the affirmative case, that a certified copy of the same be provided.” (see folio 143 verso). In its report number DSA.128-2004, visible at folio 506, Dr. Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, Director of Animal Health, of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, was very clear in stating that the tuberculins used and applied to the animals of the company Sucesores Clemente Marín S.A., just like all those used in the country, are imported from Mexico and come from the Productora Nacional de Biológicos Veterinarios, which come covered by a quality control certificate, which establishes the potency of the dose, in order to verify its adjustment to the standards established by the International Office of Epizootics, an international body, which establishes these values worldwide, in the Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines. Taking the above into account, this Court agrees with the finding of the lower court Judge, in the sense that, since it is the plaintiff who formulates the annulment claim against the challenged administrative act, the burden of proof regarding the facts supporting that claim fell to it, without a doubt (317 Civil Procedure Code). Despite the above, it is evident that the plaintiff did not bring any evidence that discredited the technical report issued by Dr. Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, in order to demonstrate that the tuberculin tests used in its herd lacked a quality certificate, since it merely limited itself to raising questions regarding the content of that opinion. Thus, this Court has no reason not to grant the corresponding value to that technical evidence, and since the plaintiff does not provide evidence discrediting its content, the decision of the A-quo Judge must be confirmed. For the same reasons, the questions raised by the plaintiff regarding the documents contained in the body of evidence provided by the state representation, corresponding to the “tuberculin test reports” performed on the plaintiff company’s farm (documents numbers 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, and 15), are not admissible, since the plaintiff likewise did not present any evidence aimed at disproving that they were performed without quality control. Consequently, a breach of the unequivocal rules of science and technique (article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration) for the specific case is not observed, and the decision must be upheld.-*” This Chamber does not share the criterion of the lower court judges. In the first place, in accordance with canon 301 subsection 2) of the LGAP, in relation to numeral 54 of the LRJCA, declarations or reports given by representatives or servants of the Public Administration shall be deemed as testimony for all legal purposes. Ergo, what was affirmed by Doctor Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo in his report visible at folios 506 to 508 bears that character, not that of technical evidence as indicated by the Court. In the second place, this means of conviction is not suitable to demonstrate the existence of the quality control certificate for the tuberculin. The only way to prove that it existed was by providing it to the case file. The plaintiff company, it is repeated, has from the outset indicated its non-existence (see third fact of the complaint), therefore, requiring it to demonstrate its claim, as stated by the Ad quem court, places it in a state of defenselessness, as it involves a negative fact, furthermore violating canon 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, fundamentally, what is prescribed in its first subsection. Keep in mind that, when it requested that the report be ordered from the National Directorate of Animal Health of the MAG, it expressly requested that, should the existence of the quality and efficacy certificate be affirmed, a duly certified copy be provided. Within this line of thought, the state representation, when responding to the aforementioned third fact of the complaint, in what is of interest, states: “*These tuberculins are imported from Mexico and come from the Productora Nacional de Biológicos Veterinarios, covered by a Quality Control Certificate, in which the potency of the dose is established in order to verify its adjustment to the standards established by the International Office of Epizootics in its Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines.* **(See Document No. 10)**.” (The highlighting is from the original). Pursuant to what is indicated in the second subsection of the cited numeral 317 of the Code of Citations, by opposing the plaintiff company’s claim, affirming a fact extinguishing its right, it was responsible for demonstrating it. For these effects, it refers to document no. 10 of the body of evidence it provided. However, there are only photostatic copies of two quality control certificates, issued by the Mexican company Productora Nacional de Biológicos Veterinarios, corresponding, the first to lot 2420048 of bovine tuberculin type P.P.D. and, the second to lot 2320307 of avian tuberculin type P.P.D. Yet, they are not duly legalized, as provided by numeral 294 subsection a) of the LGAP. This implies that they could not produce legal effects in Costa Rica, as stated by both the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling 76-92 of 16:30 hours on January 15, 1992; and this jurisdictional body in judgment 715-F-2006 of 11:20 hours on September 27, 2006. Furthermore, in documents numbers 3, 4, and 11, from that same body of evidence, there are a series of tuberculin test reports that do not match those series or lot numbers, and without their corresponding quality and efficacy control certificates being included in the case file. In light of the foregoing, the appellant is correct in pointing out the error incurred by the Court in endorsing the proven fact preceded by number 20. There is no suitable evidentiary element in the case file supporting it. However, the above does not lead to the failure of the judgment, for the reasons set forth below.\n\n**XII.-** It is opportune to review the factual situation that occurred in this lite. On July 9, 1999, the veterinary doctor of the El Valle slaughterhouse, Doctor Ricardo Aguilar Jiménez, detected a case with symptomatology compatible with tuberculosis at the slaughter level, originating from the plaintiff company’s farm. Samples were sent to the National Laboratory of Veterinary Services (LANASEVE). The result was positive by Ziehl Neelsen staining. Due to this, the National Zoosanitary Defense Office, Huetar Norte Region, of the National Directorate of Animal Health of the MAG, conducted a sampling of 10% of the plaintiff’s herd—15 female Holstein breed bovines, chosen at random. The bovine tuberculin test was performed on the anocaudal fold for the diagnosis of that disease. Four animals resulted as reactors. For this reason, on October 26 of the same year, the comparative cervical test was performed on the reactors as a differential diagnosis, using PPD bovis and PPD avium. Again, they tested positive for the bovine PPD. Consequently, the entire herd was tuberculin-tested. Animals three months of age and older were included. Of the 179 subjected to the anocaudal test, 89 were reactors. Then, on January 4, 2000, comparative cervical tests were performed at the level of the neck table, for which the PPD bovis and the PPD avium were used. Of the 179 animals, 90 tested positive to the anocaudal test, 84 to the cervical bovine PPD –one negative-, 73 to the cervical PPD avium -12 negative-. By virtue of the foregoing, the Directorate of Animal Health, in a resolution at 9:00 a.m. on January 12, 2000, ordered the farm to be placed under quarantine, the animals branded with the “S” for slaughter, all reactor animals separated from the herd, the appraisal of the tuberculosis-positive animals performed by the expert of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, the animals slaughtered safeguarding biosecurity conditions, the sanitation of the rest of the plaintiff’s livestock continued, and monitoring and surveillance to begin on neighboring farms. As indicated by the judges of both instances, one of the guiding principles of Environmental Law, which underlies numerals 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution, is the precautionary principle or principle of prudent avoidance. In accordance with doctrine, in this matter not only certain risks exist, but scientific uncertainty may also exist regarding the scope of some damages. This postulate, then, requires that, when a reasonable doubt arises in relation to the dangerousness of any activity with environmental repercussions or for human health, it be avoided, or pertinent measures be taken so that this potential damage, not yet scientifically proven, does not come to occur. Its two presuppositions are: lack of scientific certainty and the threat of damage. It is explicitly included in the “United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,” or “Rio Declaration”: *“**Principle 15.-** In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”*. On its part, the Biodiversity Law, number 7788 of April 30, 1998, provides: “**ARTICLE 7.-** * **Definitions.** … **Biodiversity**: variability of living organisms from any source, whether found in terrestrial, aerial, marine, aquatic, or other ecological complexes. It comprises diversity within each species, as well as between species and the ecosystems of which they form a part. / For the purposes of this law, the term biodiversity shall be understood to include intangible elements, such as: knowledge, innovation, and traditional practice, individual or collective, with real or potential value associated with biochemical and genetic resources, protected or not by intellectual property systems or sui generis registration systems. … **ARTICLE 11.-** **Criteria for applying this law.** The criteria for applying this law are: 1.- Preventive criterion: It is recognized that it is of vital importance to anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of biodiversity loss or its threats. 2.- Precautionary or indubio pro natura criterion: Where there is danger or threat of serious or imminent damage to the elements of biodiversity and the knowledge associated with them, the absence of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing the adoption of effective protection measures. 3.- Criterion of public environmental interest: The use of the elements of biodiversity shall guarantee the development options of future generations, food security, the conservation of ecosystems, the protection of human health, and the improvement of citizens’ quality of life. …*” In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber, in vote 1250-99 of 11:24 hours on February 19, 1999, stated: *“… Prevention aims to anticipate negative effects and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible impact on the environment or the health of people. In this way, in the event there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage—or a doubt in this regard—a precautionary measure must be adopted and even the activity in question postponed. The foregoing is due to the fact that in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, since if the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, the repression may have moral significance, but it will hardly compensate for the damages caused to the environment.*” (The underlining is not from the original. Also, among others, rulings 9773-00 of 9:44 hours on November 3, 2000 and 1711-01 of 16:32 hours on February 27, 2001 of that jurisdictional body can be consulted). Then, in vote 3480-03 of 14:02 hours on May 2, 2003, it further clarified said concept: “*Well understood, the precautionary principle refers to the adoption of measures not in the face of ignorance of risk-generating facts, but in the face of a lack of certainty that such facts will effectively produce harmful effects on the environment.*” (The underlining is supplied). Similarly, in ruling 6322-2003 of 14:14 hours on July 3, 2003, it indicated: “*… **4.- Precautionary principle** : … The term prevention derives from the Latin ‘praeventio’, which alludes to the action and effect of preventing, to those preparations and dispositions made in advance to avoid a risk or execute a thing. Prevention aims to anticipate negative effects and ensure the protection, conservation, and adequate management of resources. Consequently, the guiding principle of prevention is based on the need to take and assume all precautionary measures to avoid or contain the possible impact on the environment or the health of people. In this way, in the event there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage—or a doubt in this regard—a precautionary measure must be adopted and even the activity in question postponed. The foregoing is due to the fact that in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, since if the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, the repression may have moral significance, but it will hardly compensate for the damages caused to the environment.*” (In the same sense, vote 2008-17618 of 11:51 hours on December 5, 2008 of said Chamber can be consulted). Tuberculosis is a zoonotic disease, which constitutes a danger to livestock and public health. Therefore, we are faced with a situation that endangers or threatens serious damage not only to elements of biodiversity (dairy herds neighboring the plaintiff company’s property), but also to human beings (public health). In the sub júdice, in light of the factual situation set forth above, the existence of a reasonable doubt is evident—in the absence of scientific certainty due to the lack of the quality and efficacy control certificate for the tuberculin—which imposed upon the Public Administration the duty, in compliance with the precautionary principle, to act as it did. This reasonable doubt arises because, on three different occasions (first at the El Valle slaughterhouse, then in the results of the laboratory studies from LANASEVE; and, finally, in the tests performed by the Directorate of Animal Health of the MAG), the existence of tuberculosis was determined in animals belonging to the plaintiff company. Even the plaintiff itself accepts this circumstance—the doubt regarding the existence of tuberculosis in the herd—by affirming in the section of the complaint called “*legal argumentation*”: “**FOURTH:** *… since the imperfection of the indicated elements prevents the fulfillment of the purpose in accordance with the legal system, for which it was issued, given that the sanitary order is issued to combat a bovine tuberculosis outbreak, not being able to know categorically, in its entirety, of the existence of this in all the presumably infected animals as will be indicated below. In this sense, the motive does not exist as it has been taken into account to issue the challenged act, by virtue of the fact that one cannot conclude categorically, and without fear of error, of the existence of bovine tuberculosis in all the animals slaughtered on my principal’s farm.*” (the underlining is supplied). The case file contains, at folios 468 and 469, the report issued by Doctor María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the National Reference Center for Tuberculosis of the Costa Rican Institute for Research and Teaching in Nutrition and Health (INCIENSA), which, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 301 subsection 2) of the LGAP bears the character of testimonial evidence. Doctor Matamoros, in what is of interest, states: “* **1.** I do not have in my hands the official communication D.Z.S./RHN 05-00, of January 11, 2000, called “Report on tuberculosis outbreak in San Gerardo de Ciudad Quesada”. However, regarding the questions raised and as far as it concerns me, I clarify the following, “the discovery of Mycobacterium terrae in euthanized bovines from the farm of Sucesores de Clemente Marín S.A. in the event that said bacillus produced any disease, the clinical and pathological manifestations of this would be similar to those produced by infection with M. tuberculosis or M. Bovis. M. terrae is an alcohol-acid resistant bacillus so that Ziehl-Neelsen staining can be positive and the PPD can give cross-reaction” is correct, as I affirmed in official communication CNRTB-196-2000. If given the described situation we could conclusively conclude the existence of bovine tuberculosis in the company’s herd. **One can only conclude from a microbiological point of view that there is bovine tuberculosis in an animal when that microorganism is isolated from the tissues of that animal. The euthanized animals from which M.*\n\nterrae, are not evidence of the presence of bovine tuberculosis. Therefore, doubt persists regarding the presence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd </b></i>(sic)<i>.</i>” This Chamber agrees with what was stated by the lower court in section <span class=SpellE>VII</span> of the challenged judgment. With that evidence, it is not possible to eliminate the doubt regarding the existence of tuberculosis. First, the plaintiff requested that report (folio 142 verso) so that official communication <span class=SpellE>D.Z.S</span>./<span class=SpellE>RHN</span> 05-00 of January 11, 2000, could be analyzed; however, Dr. Matamoros clearly states that she did not have it in view. Second, despite being based on the information the plaintiff stated in its complaint, she expressly indicates that “<i>Therefore, doubt persists regarding the presence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd </i>(sic).” That is, it does not dissipate the cloud surrounding the existence of an outbreak of that disease. Therefore, the aforementioned precautionary principle applies to this dispute. In short, by the actions of the Administration, the public interest involved was protected (article 113 LGAP): human and animal health –neighboring herds–, the environment, as well as the dairy production of the area where the plaintiff's farm is located –San Gerardo de Ciudad Quesada, San Carlos–. Ergo, under the protection of the reasons presented, the rejection of this present ground of disagreement is required.\n\n<b>[…]</b>\n\n<span class=SpellE><b>XIV</b></span><b>.-</b> First, it must be noted that what was stated by the appellant at folio 701, regarding “<i>two topics of special and essential importance in the case under examination</i>”, was not proposed and debated timely in the appeal. Ergo, pursuant to the provisions of article 608 of the Civil Procedure Code, this Chamber is barred from conducting any analysis regarding it. Secondly, the crux of the appellant's complaint is that, in its understanding, the trial judges incurred in an error of law in evaluating the indicated evidence, by illegitimately reversing the burden of proof regarding the alleged non-compliance with technical measures when applying the tuberculin tests; and regarding the demonstration of the existence or non-existence of a protocol, logbook, record, or registry guaranteeing the correct fulfillment of the technical measures for how that test was performed. Asserting the non-existence of that registry, it states, does not contain any assertion that would produce a reversal of the burden of proof against the plaintiff company. In this regard, it is necessary to indicate that the topic of burden of proof –article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code– is a procedural matter. This very jurisdictional body has repeatedly stated so for a long time. In this regard, one may consult, among others, resolutions 31 of 9 hours 20 minutes of March 20, 1992, 1020-F-2005 of 16 hours 28 minutes of December 21, 2005, and 908-A-S1-09 of 11 hours of September 10, 2009. However, it is not regulated in the exhaustive grounds of canon 594 íbid, as a ground for appeal through cassation on that basis. Consequently, the rejection of the substantive grievance is required. Without prejudice to the foregoing, and for greater abundance of reasons, it must be indicated that in Considerando <span class=SpellE>XII</span> of this judgment, the appropriateness of applying the precautionary principle to this dispute was analyzed, derived from numerals 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution, and expressly regulated in canon 11 of the Biodiversity Law. Given the reasonable doubt existing regarding the outbreak of tuberculosis on the plaintiff company’s property, the Public Administration, specifically, the Animal Health Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (according to the provisions of article 7 of Law number 6243, Animal Health Law, in force when the facts analyzed in the sub júdice occurred), was empowered to adopt all those measures safeguarding not only human health, but also animal health and the environment. The substantive grievance seeks to establish the invalidity of the questioned acts by virtue of the absence of scientific certainty regarding the results of the tuberculin tests applied to the plaintiff's herd. However, such a requirement, as indicated in said section of this ruling, was not necessary for the Public Administration to act in the manner it did. Consequently, what was argued by the appellant is not useful to modify what was decided in the challenged judgment.\n\n<b>[…]</b>\n\n<span class=SpellE><b>XVI</b></span><b>.-</b> The core aspect of what was alleged by the appellant consists of the claim that the Ad quem improperly evaluated report <span class=SpellE>CNRTB</span>-149-07-2003, visible at folios 468 to 469, by not accepting that the existence of tuberculosis in a bovine can only be concluded, from a microbiological point of view, when it is isolated from the animal's tissues. That is, the application of intradermal or tuberculin tests by MAG officials on the plaintiff company's herd was not sufficient. First, it must be indicated that, as stated in Considerando <span class=SpellE>XI</span> of this judgment, the report rendered by Dr. María Cecilia Matamoros, in her capacity as Head of the National Reference Center for Tuberculosis of <span class=SpellE>INCISENSA</span>, has the nature of testimony, according to the provisions of canon 301 subsection 2) of the LGAP, not of documentary evidence of a scientific nature as the appellant claims, and even less so, of an administrative act. Secondly, the appellant states: “<i>Additionally, regarding the improper evaluation of evidence, the lower court did not take into account that in zones or regions where bovine tuberculosis control campaigns have been carried out, as </i>(sic)<i> in the case of the plaintiff company, the presentation of a considerable percentage of reactor animals, detected with the application of routine simple intradermal tests, is frequent, nor was gestation taken into account as a possible factor for response to tuberculin, in animals between the 6th and 8th month of pregnancy, among other things. In this sense, in relation to the technical specifications of the manufacturer of the intradermal test with bovine tuberculin of classes PPD AVIAR and PPD BOVINO, visible at folio 30 of the expediente, according to the rules of sound rational judgment (arts. 298.1 and 16 LGAP), the rules of science and logic are specifically violated, since the manufacturer of these tests, in the “contraindications” section indicates that: “It should not be used in females close to parturition or post-partum…”, this is because gestation (between the 6th and 8th month of pregnancy) is a possible factor for response to tuberculin, while, in the “warning” section it is indicated that: “… Tuberculinization should not be repeated if a minimum interval of 60 days from the previous test has not elapsed …”, basically for the same technical reason, given that the respondent Administration did not demonstrate compliance with such specifications at the time the tuberculinization was performed on the plaintiff company’s herd.</i>” The judges of the lower instances did not take as proven that bovine tuberculosis control campaigns had been carried out on the plaintiff company’s herd, nor that the tuberculin tests had been applied to females between the sixth and eighth month of gestation. However, the appellant does not indicate with what evidence these facts are proven and, therefore, were infringed upon in the appealed judgment. It limits itself to pointing out the document visible at folio 30 of the main case file, where only the manufacturer's indications are recorded. Contrary to what was alleged, the burden of proof fell upon its client, in light of the provisions of ordinal 317 subsection 1) of the Civil Procedure Code. Note that this is not a negative fact, but an affirmation that constitutes the basis of the claims for annulment and damages argued. Then, it adds: “<i>In another order of ideas, and regarding the improper application of the precautionary principle … to the case under examination, it must be noted beforehand that the legal norms applicable to the present case are those that were in force at the time the challenged administrative acts were carried out. Thus, this process is governed by the now repealed Bovine Tuberculosis Laws No. 1207 and the Law on Animal Health No. 6243, with their consequent regulations also repealed. Based on the foregoing, it is possible to conclude with absolute clarity that the precautionary principle, derived from article 4 of the General Law of the National Animal Health Service </i>(sic)<i> No. 8495 of April 6, 2006, published in La Gaceta No. 93 of May 16, 2006, does not apply to the case in question, because its effective date and/or enactment was long after the occurrence of the administrative acts appealed here. <b><u>Note, Honorable Chamber of Cassation, that the A Quo, in the first-instance judgment, expressly and improperly applied said General Law of the National Animal Health Service No.</u></b> <b>8495 of April 6, 2006, to the case under examination, a situation that the Appellate Court surreptitiously endorsed in the appealed judgment.</b> …</i>” Contrary to what was stated by the appellant, neither the A quo, nor the Ad quem in a surreptitious manner, applied Law number 8495 of April 6, 2006, General Law of the National Animal Health Service. In this regard, in the first-instance judgment, in what is of interest, it is indicated: “<b><i><u>Seventh:</u></i></b><i> … In this matter, immediate measures must be adopted, as human and animal health and the environment are at stake, aimed at protecting each of them, as anticipated in the resolutions that decided the suspension incident, No. 56-2001 of 10:00 a.m. of January 13, Considerando V<sup>o</sup> (folios 351 to 354), and No. 216-2001 of 11:45 a.m. of July 20 (folios 377 to 389). <u>Principles such as risk analysis or assessment, precautionary or caution, consumer interest protection, equivalence, transparency, and information govern, which have constitutional roots (articles 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution), and are today expressly recognized by the ordinary legislator (Law No. 8495, article 4<sup>o</sup>)</u>. According to the precautionary principle, the lack of scientific certainty is no excuse for adopting decisions in favor of health and the environment. In this sense, the Court finds that the decisions adopted and measures applied are based on the tuberculin test performed, which is the test established for these cases, without the lack of confirmatory or complementary tests preventing proceeding in this manner. The acts are therefore not the fruit of the naked will of whoever issued them, but rather appropriate measures based on technical medical criteria, aimed at protecting assets of a higher nature.</i>”(The underlining is not in the original). It is easily verified that what the judge affirmed is the application of principles of constitutional lineage; which, at the time of issuing that ruling, were also embodied in Law 8495 (a comment made for clarifying effects, but not with the intention of applying that law), but prior to that they underlay the Political Constitution –numerals 46 and 50–. For its part, in the challenged ruling, in the relevant part, the lower court states: “<b><i>VI.- THIRD GRIEVANCE. REGARDING THE ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL MEASURES WHEN APPLYING THE TUBERCULIN TESTS.</i></b><i> … It must be taken into account that the challenged administrative act, ultimately, was intended to protect human health (collective interest), and in that sense, the A-quo is correct in pointing out that before such a scenario, <u>the principles enshrined in articles 46 and 50 of the Political Constitution govern</u>, as they seek the protection of health and a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, one of them effectively being the “precautionary” principle, according to which, the absence of scientific certainty should not be used as justification for not adopting effective protective measures, as in this case, where the Administration was forced to sacrifice the plaintiff's bovines, in order to prevent an epidemic that could constitute a serious danger to the health of the inhabitants and the environment. … <span class=SpellE><b>VII</b></span><b>.- FOURTH GRIEVANCE. ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS OF THE CHALLENGED ACT AND THE WEIGHING OF THE EVIDENCE AS A WHOLE.</b> … In any event, Dr. Matamoros’ report, built based on the information presented by the plaintiff in its complaint, raises the possibility of “doubt about the presence of bovine tuberculosis in the herd” (sic), and in that sense<u>, it is reiterated that in application of the precautionary principle, doubt is not a reason for failing to adopt protective measures in favor of health and the environment. </u>…</i>”(The underlining is supplied). Without a doubt, it is inferred that the lower court applied neither expressly nor covertly Law number 8495 of April 6, 2006, but rather a constitutional principle –the precautionary one– that lies in numerals 46 and 50 of the Magna Carta. In this line of thought, in Considerando <span class=SpellE>XII</span>, the reasons why this Chamber considers that, under the protection of that postulate (provided for, when the facts analyzed in this dispute occurred, not only in the Political Constitution, but also in numeral 11 of Law number 7788 of April 30, 1998, Biodiversity Law, which is applicable to the sub júdice), by virtue of the reasonable doubt existing regarding the outbreak of tuberculosis in the plaintiff company’s herd, the Administration was empowered to act as it did were neatly set forth. The appellant, to deny the application of said principle, points out at folio 707: “<i>Based on such evidence, contrary to what the lower court stated in the seventh Considerando of the appealed judgment, it is possible to conclude that <u>there are no objective elements to affirm that the execution of the administrative measures conformed to the rules of science, logic, and convenience, it not being appreciated that the decision was adopted within the limits of rationality and reasonableness implicit in the legal system, insofar as the performance of the tuberculin test does not constitute a suitable (motive of the administrative act) technical medical veterinary element to dictate measures of that kind (slaughter and/or extermination of bovines) in favor of human health, animal health, and the environment (purpose)</u>, since, as indicated supra, <u>the absence of complementary or confirmatory laboratory tests would vitiate the content of the act.</u> …</i>”(The underlining is supplied). As is clearly determined, the appellant, once again, seeks to establish the invalidity of the questioned acts in the absence of scientific certainty regarding the results of the tuberculin tests applied to the plaintiff company's herd. However, it is reiterated, in application of the aforementioned precautionary principle, given the reasonable doubt existing, that certainty was not necessary for the Animal Health Directorate of MAG to act as it did. Likewise, in the aforementioned section of this judgment, the report rendered by Dr. Matamoros, visible at folios 468-469, was analyzed. It was concluded that it did not manage to dispel that doubt and, therefore, that the actions of the Administration did not become illegitimate. On the other hand, when the indicated MAG body issued the resolution of 9:00 a.m. of January 12, 2000, and even at the time the measures contained therein were executed (see proven facts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, not questioned by the appellant), the legislation in force was that contained in: 1) Law number 1207 of October 9, 1950, known as the Bovine Tuberculosis Law; 2) Executive Decree 10120-A of May 9, 1979, “Regulation on the Control of Bovine Tuberculosis”; and 3) the Law on Animal Health, number 6243, of May 2, 1978. In the relevant part, the first body of law provides: “<b><i>Article 2º </i></b><i><u>The tuberculin test is declared mandatory for all bovine animals</u>, <u>as many times as it is deemed convenient</u>, which shall be applied by duly trained officials designated by the Ministries of Agriculture and Industries and Public Health. <b>Article 3º </b><u>Bovine animals in which the tuberculin test has yielded a positive result shall be immediately isolated and slaughtered once the requirements referred to in the following articles have been met</u>. <b>Article 4<sup>o</sup> </b>As soon as it is proven that an animal is infected with tuberculosis, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica shall be requested to send two appraisers, preferably licensed agricultural engineers, who shall proceed to value the sick animal in the presence of an official veterinarian, for which purpose the animal's tuberculosis shall not be taken into account. The Banco Nacional shall always give priority to such request.</i>”(The underlining does not appear in the original). For its part, the Regulation to that Law, Executive Decree 10120-A, in the relevant part, prescribes: <i> “<b>Article 5º. </b>When the Directorate of the National Animal Health Program receives the information mentioned in articles three and four of this Regulation, they shall immediately proceed to conduct the epidemiological study of the affected herd <u>and to perform the tuberculin test on all existing livestock therein.</u> <b>Article 6º. </b><u>The tuberculin test performed on herds with problems or on reactor animals </u>may be done by private veterinarians, with prior knowledge of the legal procedure to follow with reactor animals and training in the officially used techniques, who will be issued a credential granted by the Directorate of the Animal Health Program, keeping a registry of the </i>(sic)<i> Veterinarians accredited for this purpose. In case of non-compliance with the procedures outlined herein, the Directorate of the Program shall be empowered to suspend the granted credential, communicating it to the College of Veterinary Physicians. <b>Article 7º.</b> <u>Animals that are classified as reactors shall be duly identified, branded, assessed, and immediately slaughtered, all in accordance with Law No. 1207. </u><b>Article 8º . </b>A free-herd tuberculosis certification program shall be established in a dairy production area, as a pilot plan, establishing a registry of owners who voluntarily join said Program, so that subsequently areas can be declared free. <b>Article 9º .</b> <u>Only animals that test negative to the tuberculin test shall be allowed entry into the pilot plan area. </u><b>Article 10º .</b> Owners who submit to the voluntary plan of the pilot area <u>shall submit their entire herd to the tuberculin test, shall eliminate their reactor animals in accordance with Law No. 1207.</u> <u>Herds that have reactor animals shall repeat their tuberculin tests every 60 days until a negative result is obtained for the entire herd. </u>From that moment on, two controls per year (one per semester) shall be carried out. <b>Article 11º .</b> <u>Herds that in the pilot plan area test negative to the tuberculin test</u>, <u>shall be subjected to another test six months later and if it is negative again, they shall be considered free herds, requiring control once a year</u>. <b>Article 12º .</b> Once the reactor animals have been eliminated, a total cleaning and disinfection of the structures of the stables, corrals, etc., shall be carried out. Using for this purpose disinfectants recommended by the Program authorities.</i>”(The underlining is not in the original). Finally, Law 6243 of May 2, 1978, Law on Animal Health, in its seventh article states: “<i>The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, through the corresponding sanitary authorities and those it designates for the specific purpose, is empowered to take any quarantine or destruction measure that the Animal Health Directorate recommends, in the case of disease outbreaks that endanger public health or animal health. / These measures may be the slaughter, isolation, retention, or treatment of animals or the destruction by incineration or denaturation of products, by-products, or wastes that are considered, in the judgment of the Animal Health Directorate, a danger of contagion or dissemination of diseases or similar morbid conditions, to the detriment of public health or animal health. The competent authorities are empowered to carry out inspection visits within private or official property, in pursuit of inspection, information, tests, objects, animal samples, etc.\n\nThe respective owners, upon identification to the authority, are obligated to allow their entry.” In light of the provisions transcribed above, it is evident that the appellant's thesis, in the sense that the application of tuberculin was not sufficient, but that it was essential to carry out complementary or confirmatory laboratory tests, is not acceptable. The only test provided for in the legislation—understood as law and regulation—applicable to this dispute, to detect bovine tuberculosis, was the tuberculin. In this regard, once performed, the animals with a positive result were duly classified, marked with a branding iron, evaluated, and immediately slaughtered, with the competent authority to order such measures being the Dirección de Salud Animal of the MAG. Article nine of Decreto Ejecutivo 28515-MAG, “Reglamento sobre el Control de la Tuberculosis Bovina,” was the one that established the complementary laboratory test, by stating: “Animals that are classified as reactors shall be clearly marked in an indelible and visible manner on the right masseter with an \"S\", an action that must be executed by the accredited official or private technician or professional who performed the tests, within the three business days following receipt of the laboratory confirmation.” (The underlining is not from the original). However, it is not applicable to the sub litem. It was issued on November 25, 1999, but published and, therefore, in force, only until March 17, 2000; that is, after the administrative resolution challenged in this proceeding had been issued and executed, namely, that of the Dirección de Salud Animal of the MAG at 9 a.m. on January 12, 2000. In accordance with the foregoing, the grievance under study must be dismissed.\n\nXVII.- In the seventh objection, named by the appellant “eighth ground of cassation for substantive reasons due to indirect violation of the law,” they allege improper assessment of the evidence in the case file according to the rules of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional). This is because, as they state, the Tribunal, against all evidence, established, for purposes of attributing patrimonial liability, that the Administration acted lawfully and normally. They copy what was set forth by the Ad quem in Considerando VIII of the contested judgment. For patrimonial and/or indemnity purposes, they comment, the characterization of the administrative operation is of capital importance, in order to determine the scope of liability. In the case of unlawful conduct or abnormal operation, the damage and losses must be compensated; but if the liability derives from lawful acts or normal conduct, only compensation for the damage is appropriate. In this line of reasoning, they note, for compensation purposes, contrary to what the Tribunal affirmed, the breach of the compensation cap set by Article 7 of the Ley de Tuberculosis Bovina, number 1207, is useful and of the greatest importance. The foregoing, because if the disease of the euthanized bovine is reliably demonstrated, only 50% of its expertly determined value is appropriate as compensation. But, they add, if there is doubt as to whether the animal is sick or healthy, 100% of its value must be recognized, as is inferred from canon 194.2 of the LGAP, taking into account that, on this particular point, there would be a collision of two special laws on compensation matters, where the later law repeals the earlier one. That is, they argue, the LGAP, regarding this aspect, repeals, for this dispute, the now-repealed Ley de Tuberculosis Bovina. From a harmonious and joint analysis of all the evidence in the case file, according to the rules of sound rational criticism, they indicate, it follows that, to diagnose bovine tuberculosis in a herd, it is not sufficient to perform the tuberculin or diagnostic test, but it is necessary to carry out confirmatory laboratory tests. The foregoing, they add, because, in light of ordinal 9 in fine of the Reglamento sobre el Control de la Tuberculosis Bovina (Decreto Ejecutivo 28515-MAG of November 25, 1999), 4 subsection g) and 33 subsection a) of the Reglamento General del Instituto Costarricense de Investigación y Enseñanza en Nutrición y Salud, INCIENSA (Decreto Ejecutivo 26656-S of January 9, 1998), in relation to report CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible on folios 468-469 of the judicial file, one can only conclude, from a microbiological point of view, that there is bovine tuberculosis in an animal when that microorganism is isolated from the tissues of that livestock. The application of the intradermal or tuberculin tests performed by MAG officials on the plaintiff company's herd is not sufficient. In this line of reasoning, they continue, since the action taken by the Administration is one of those that cause serious harm to the subjective rights or legitimate interests of the administered party, it was obligatory for it to verify the real truth of the facts that served as the basis for the act challenged in this proceeding, in the most faithful and complete manner possible, which is lacking. Consequently, numerals 214.2, 221, and 308, 1 subsection a) of the LGAP are violated. Furthermore, they reiterate, performing the tuberculin test does not constitute a suitable technical-medical-veterinary element (ground for the administrative act) to dictate measures of that kind (slaughter and/or extermination of bovines) in favor of human and animal health and the environment (purpose). The absence of complementary or confirmatory laboratory tests vitiates the content of the act. Thus, they add, based on the evidence, specifically on the scientific documents visible on folios 72 to 76, 146, 303, 305, 468-469 of the judicial file, as well as the documents visible on folios 303, 304, 313 to 317 of the administrative file, contrary to what the Tribunal asserted in Considerando VII of the appealed judgment, it is possible to conclude that there are no objective elements to affirm that the execution of the administrative measures conformed to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elemental principles of justice, logic, or convenience. These concepts, they say, are summarized in the reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality of the norm as parameters of constitutionality, Article 16 of the LGAP, not appreciating that the decision was adopted within the limits of rationality and reasonableness implicit in the legal system. Regarding the extent of the compensation for material damages, they affirm, the Tribunal's decision is tendentiously partial and concomitantly omitted. It limited itself to considering the material damage from the total slaughter or culling of the plaintiff company's herd, which, while the most ostensible, is not the only one caused and suffered illegitimately by its principal. The damage and loss are measured in terms of the animals' productivity, whose extermination contributed to the company's financial crisis. In this regard, they argue, a dairy farm is a business and must be analyzed as such. A productive unit or company has a value according to its profits, which are a function of its investment represented by its fixed or immobilized assets and its current assets. The greater the risk or investment, the greater the profit and its value must be. The Tribunal, the appellant indicates, improperly failed to analyze the damage concerning the denaturing or destruction of the fluid milk; the value of the herd's genetic purity itself, since the annihilated bovines were pedigree cattle (genealogy of a purebred animal) and registered both by the Asociación de Criadores de Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica and by the Asociación Costarricense de Criadores de Ganado Jersey (folios 183 to 223, both inclusive, of the administrative file); the prohibition on selling milk; the non-sale of cull male and unsuitable female animals for the activity; the expected growth and profit in the herd's development; the herd's growth and production. They should also have analyzed, they point out, the company's fixed operating costs, where all existing fixed assets were maintained (the farm, the facilities, the equipment, etc.), which, by affecting income, involved the current assets, which, of course, with a negative cash flow, inevitably harmed the current liabilities, generating a chain of financial instability in the company, as part of its resources or assets were immobilized when its income or production diminished; the decrease in production continuity due to the non-utilization of installed capacity; the operational loss due to lack of production; the financial costs related both to leverage and to investment (the farm, the improvement facilities or constructions, the equipment, the pastures, the fences, the pens (apartos), the internal roads, and all the infrastructure in general were already there); the indirect production and administrative costs that the company had to bear, etc. A procedural legal situation evidenced, they state, that causes the nullity of the appealed decision. Consequently, a joint analysis of the existing evidence is lacking, in accordance with the rules of sound rational criticism. By way of example, they point out, report CNRTB-149-07-2003, visible on folios 468-469 of the judicial file, despite being documentary evidence of a scientific nature, its probative value was disdained by the Tribunal. At the same time, having the report issued by an Administration official a sort of substitute character for the answering of interrogatories (Article 54.1 of the LRJCA), and/or of constituting testimony (Article 301.2 of the LGAP), they comment, the one rendered by Dr. José Joaquín Oreamuno Toledo, Director de Salud Animal, visible on folios 506 to 508 of the file, according to which the tuberculin used by the Administration to diagnose bovine tuberculosis in the plaintiff company's herd was covered by a quality control certificate, despite it being considered given under oath, does not transform it into an expert report or evidence of a technical-scientific nature, for which reason it lacks factual support to sustain what is affirmed therein. Contrary to what was held by the Tribunal, which illegitimately granted it the nature or condition of an expert report and/or evidence of a technical-scientific nature. Regarding the extent of the material damage, they comment, the Ad quem was omitted in considering the act of denaturing and destruction of 2315 kilograms of fluid milk (folio 31 of the judicial file); the quarantine act (folio 32); the visit record No. 2635-A, where 4790 kilograms of fluid milk and others are destroyed (folio 33); visit record No. 2636-A, when 1,458.5 kilograms of fluid milk and others are destroyed (folio 34); seizure act No. 4171 of 417 kilograms of fluid milk (folio 35); visit record No. 2638-A where, among other things, the destruction of 2,773.6 kilograms of fluid milk is recorded (folio 37); the notarial certification of official communications DZS/RH 009-00 and 007-00 DZS/RHN of January 13, 2000, indicating to Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. the obligation not to collect fluid milk (folios 39 and 40); five notarial acts of destruction of fluid milk (folios 229 to 233) of the main file; as well as the mathematical actuarial expert reports performed by Licenciados Salvador Hernández Araya and Leonel Centeno Madrigal (respectively on folios 234 to 255 and 513 to 529). In conclusion, they note, canons 11, 33, 41, 45, 50 of the Constitución Política were violated by improper application; 190.2, 194.1.2.3 of the LGAP; 3, 7 of the now-repealed Ley de Tuberculosis Bovina, number 1207; due to lack of action, numerals 190.1, 191, 192, and 196 of the LGAP. Furthermore, as valuation norms, Articles 298.2 of the LGAP and 330 of the Código Procesal Civil were violated.\n\nXVIII.- In light of the formulation, the present grievance is subdivided into two points. In the first, the appellant asserts that the compensation for the slaughter of the livestock owned by their represented party should have been 100% and not only 50%. This is because there was no certainty of the tuberculosis infection, due to the fact that the tuberculin test was not sufficient, but rather complementary laboratory tests should have been performed, as only thus could bovine tuberculosis be diagnosed with certainty. In this regard, it is necessary to point out the following. As indicated in Considerando XI of this judgment, what is stated in the proven fact preceded by number 20, regarding that the tuberculins used and applied to the plaintiff's animals were covered by a quality and efficacy control certificate, is equivocal, as it lacks suitable evidence demonstrating that factual situation. However, as has been amply stated, among others, in section XII, that circumstance does not lead to the collapse of the decision. On three occasions, different persons or institutions determined the existence of tuberculosis in the plaintiff company's animals: first was the veterinarian of the Matadero El Valle, Dr. Ricardo Aguilar Jiménez; then, the laboratory studies performed by LANASEVE; and lastly, the tuberculin tests applied by MAG officials. Due to these coinciding positive results, and in the absence of the quality and efficacy control certificate, a reasonable doubt arises regarding the tuberculosis outbreak, which, under the protection of the precautionary principle (derived, at the constitutional level, from canons 46 and 50; and expressly regulated in the Ley de Biodiversidad in its numeral 11), obligated the Public Administration, specifically, the Dirección de Salud Animal of the MAG, to act as it did. Furthermore, in Considerando XVI, the reason was analyzed why, in this Chamber's judgment, the appellant is not correct in their argument that the result of the tuberculin application was not sufficient, but that it was imperative also to perform confirmatory or laboratory tests. Consequently, under the protection of the foregoing, and as the instance judges rightly indicated, the Public Administration acted lawfully and normally in ordering, among other measures, the slaughter of the animals that reacted positively to the applied tests. In this sense, it is reiterated, the reason is the reasonable doubt regarding the existence of the tuberculosis outbreak on the plaintiff company's farm, in order to protect human and animal health and the environment. Regarding the compensation aspect for that type of administrative action, numeral 194 of the LGAP provides: “1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal operation when they cause damage to the rights of the administered party in a special manner, due to the small proportion of those affected or the exceptional intensity of the injury. / 2. In this case, the compensation shall cover the value of the damages at the time of their payment, but not lost profits. / 3.\n\n\"The State shall be liable for damages caused directly by a law, provided they are special in accordance with this article. </i>\" (The underlined text is supplied).&nbsp; However, in the case of pecuniary reparation for the sacrifice of livestock due to tuberculosis, contrary to what was asserted by the appellant (casacionista), the foregoing provision is not applicable.&nbsp; Special regulations exist: those contained in Law (Ley) number 1207 of October 9, 1950.&nbsp; This is a specific law on this matter –bovine tuberculosis–, not a general one like the provisions in the LGAP.&nbsp; In this regard, the seventh provision states: \"<i>Based on the appraisal (peritazgo) to which reference has been made, <u>the owner of the sacrificed animal, as soon as they submit their claim, shall be compensated by the State with 50% of the value determined by the experts of the Banco Nacional</u>.&nbsp; Notwithstanding what is stated in this article, the State, in the case of insured animals, shall only be obligated to pay the owner the difference resulting against them between the insurance and the 50% referred to in this article.</i>\" (The underlined text is supplied).&nbsp; The appellant's assertion that \"... <i>if the illness of the euthanized bovine is conclusively proven, only 50% of its expertly determined value is applicable as compensation (article 7 ibid.) ... but if there is doubt as to whether the animal was sick or if it was healthy, 100% of the value of such animal must be paid ...</i>\" is not acceptable.&nbsp; As noted, the lack of scientific certainty was no impediment for the Public Administration (Administración Pública) to act in the manner it did, since the precautionary principle so required.&nbsp; For its part, the law under discussion only provides, as compensation, the payment of 50% of the expertly determined value of the sacrificed animals, just as the plaintiff company was compensated (see proven facts 17 and 19, not challenged by the appellant), not 100% in case of doubt.&nbsp; Therefore, since the plaintiff company was compensated for the sacrifice of its livestock according to the provisions of the regulations applicable to the matter under judicial review (sub júdice), the impropriety of the claim on its merits is inferred.\n\n**XIX.-**&nbsp; In the second point of the objection, the appellant states that the ruling by the lower court (Tribunal) is incomplete, as it improperly limited itself to considering the material damage arising from the sacrifice of its principal's herd, which, although the most obvious, is not the only one.&nbsp; The appellant is correct.&nbsp; In this respect, as has already been indicated, provision seven of Law (Ley) 6243 of May 2, 1978, the Animal Health Law (Ley sobre Salud Animal), empowers the MAG to take any quarantine (cuarentenaria) measure or destruction measure recommended by the Animal Health Directorate (Dirección de Salud Animal), in the event of outbreaks of diseases that endanger public or animal health.&nbsp; These measures, distinct from the sacrifice of animals, may also generate compensable damages, pursuant to section 194 of the LGAP; provided they are effective –as a consequence of the measures taken–, assessable, and attributable to a specific person or group, as provided in article 196 ibid.&nbsp;&nbsp; In relation, the appellant states: \"<i>Thus, the lower court improperly failed to analyze the damage concerning the denaturing or destruction of the fluid milk; the value of the genetic purity of the herd itself, since the annihilated bovines were pedigree livestock (genealogy of a purebred animal) and/or registered, both by the Holstein Cattle Breeders Association of Costa Rica (Asociación de Criadores de Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica) and by the Costa Rican Jersey Cattle Breeders Association (Asociación Costarricense de Criadores de Ganado Jersey) (See pages 183 to 223, both inclusive, of the administrative file); the prohibition on milk sales; the non-sale of cull male animals for the activity as well as unsuitable females; the expected growth and profit in the development of the herd; the herd's growth and production; the fixed operating costs of the company should also have been analyzed, where all existing fixed assets were maintained (the farm, the facilities, the equipment, etc.), and as revenues were affected, current assets were also affected, which, of course, since there was a negative cash flow, inevitably affected current liabilities, which generated a chain of financial instability in the company, as part of its resources or assets were immobilized by reducing its production income; the loss of production continuity due to the non-use of installed capacity; the operational loss due to lack of production; the financial costs referring both to leverage and to investment costs (the farm was already there, the improved facilities or constructions were already there, the equipment was already there, the paddocks, the fences, the corrals (apartos), the internal roads and all the infrastructure in general were already there); the indirect production costs and administrative costs that the company had to bear; etc., a demonstrated procedural legal situation that causes the nullity of the appealed ruling.</i>\"&nbsp; Regarding the value of the genetic purity of the herd itself, when referring to the sacrificed animals, it is included in the compensation analyzed in the previous section.&nbsp; In relation to the rest of the appellant's assertions, except for the fluid milk, the evidentiary basis consists of the reports made by the graduate Salvador Hernández Araya (pages 233 to 254) and by the engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal (pages 513 to 529).&nbsp; Both expert reports, in light of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica), do not merit the belief of this Chamber.&nbsp; The first, because it was prepared at the request of the manager of the plaintiff company, Osman Marín Rojas, without the opposing party having been given the opportunity to object to it or request additions and clarifications.&nbsp; Furthermore, as indicated by the graduate Hernández Araya, he prepared the report solely with the information and documents provided to him by the interested party. Therefore, to give it any type of value would place the defendant in a state of defenselessness.&nbsp; The second, because it lacks proper foundation.&nbsp; The expert omits indicating what methods and formulas were used, in addition to their factual, doctrinal, or scientific basis, to reach the conclusions he did. He merely points out \"<i>To carry out the requested study, a study of the pieces that make up the judicial file was conducted and the professional standards governing the matter were applied.</i>\"&nbsp; Therefore, the assertions made appear to be mere subjective opinions.&nbsp; In this regard, for example, he states: \"<i>From the above, the forty-seven average animals were capable of producing milk in the indicated period, except that the younger ones would join production in the years following the initial one.&nbsp; For the sake of simplicity in the presentation and calculation, to avoid the problem of the additional variable of ages and without detracting from the final result of the study, we will proceed to calculate a non-linear exact production average, but rather one of intensities. In another way, the highest and lowest values, which are three in number, are eliminated; from what remains, it is observed that a population of ten animals is between 6 and 24 months old and 11 animals have 4 lactations.&nbsp; Eliminated the above, we are left with three groups that go ascendingly and in order of one to three lactations with a similar number of members.&nbsp; From the foregoing, it is inferred that the average is located at two lactations, and from here calculations for milk production will be made.&nbsp; This is because, as is well known and public knowledge, cows increase their production from when they begin production until adulthood, and therefore it would not be realistic to consider all as adult cows or all as heifers.&nbsp; Having clarified the above and for reproduction purposes, as the first ones do not reproduce in the first year, an average of forty-five cows in production will be taken. … Therefore, a general analysis model has been deduced that can be applied to different quantities of animals, the limit of which will be determined by the scale or productive platform of the business, or what is also known as its installed capacity.</i>\"&nbsp; He does not clarify where and why he obtains these data.&nbsp; In some cases, also, assessments and assumptions are made lacking real evidence or studies on the farm that exceed his competence, not only when referring to future events, for example, \"<i>With this analysis, the new breeding females that should have entered the productive process and the cull animals will be determined.</i>\"; but also, by including aspects that were not requested of him, for example, when referring to the damages and losses for the slaughter of 75 animals, since he was only asked for his opinion on the sacrifice of the remaining 47 livestock.&nbsp; Nor is mention made of the documents consulted, especially those of a financial-accounting nature of the plaintiff company, to prepare the report.&nbsp; In this respect, for example, he indicates \"<i>Subsequently, a milk price will be established as of the date of the lawsuit, and an income for this concept will be determined.&nbsp; Then, the income from other concepts will be established, and from the total income, a profit will be inferred, which will be normal in any type of productive activity, which will be limited by the financial maxim that any business must have a profitability greater than the product of the usufruct of money in the stock market.</i>\"&nbsp; However, he does not indicate where these data are obtained from.&nbsp; Consequently, as both studies are discredited, the alleged damages lack evidentiary support. Ergo, it was not demonstrated that they were a direct product (causal link) of the measures taken by the administration, especially the quarantine of the plaintiff company's farm, due to the emergence of the tuberculosis outbreak.&nbsp; Therefore, their recognition is not appropriate (sections 194 and 196 of the LGAP).&nbsp; As for the prohibition on the sale of milk, this aspect does not allude to damage in itself, but rather to the eventual lost earnings, that is, lost profit (lucro cesante), which, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 2) of article 194 ibid., is not compensable.&nbsp; Finally, regarding the destruction or denaturing of fluid milk, the appellant invokes, as improperly assessed, among other items of evidence, five notarial deeds, visible on pages 228 to 232.&nbsp; In accordance with canon 101 of the Notarial Code, this evidence constitutes a public instrument; however, its rule of value is not cited. Therefore, with respect to this evidence, the grievance is procedurally informal.&nbsp; On the other hand, that destruction is a duly proven fact.&nbsp; In this respect, the proven facts preceded by numbers 6, 7, 8, and 11 can be consulted.&nbsp; However, this Chamber considers it is not compensable.&nbsp; The General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), number 5395 of October 30, 1973, expressly prohibits the commercialization of altered, deteriorated, contaminated, adulterated, or falsified foods.&nbsp; For what is of interest, that regulatory body prescribes:&nbsp; \"<b><i>ARTICLE 196.-</i></b><i> Adequate nutrition and the ingestion of good quality food under sanitary conditions are essential for health, and therefore, natural and legal persons engaged in activities related to food intended for public consumption must exercise the utmost diligence and avoid omissions in complying with the pertinent legal and regulatory provisions and the special orders that the health authority may dictate, within its faculties, to safeguard health.</i> …<i>&nbsp; <b>ARTICLE 200.-</b> It is strictly prohibited to import, process, use, possess for sale, trade, transfer free of charge, handle, distribute, and store altered or deteriorated, contaminated, adulterated, or falsified foods.&nbsp; <b>ARTICLE 201.-</b> For the purposes of this law and its regulations, altered or deteriorated food is understood as that which, for any natural cause, has suffered damage or change in its basic, chemical, or biological characteristics. <b>ARTICLE 202.-</b> For legal and regulatory purposes, contaminated food is considered that which contains pathogenic microorganisms, toxins, or impurities of organic or mineral origin that are repulsive, inconvenient, or harmful to health. / Food that is the product of processing, packaging, or handling carried out under defective sanitary conditions or in contravention of legal or regulatory provisions shall be presumed contaminated. </i>…<i> <b>ARTICLE 223.-</b> Every manufacturer of food products must use raw materials that meet sanitary conditions in their processing. / The use of materials, products, or by-products containing decomposed, toxic substances, or offal [sic] not capable of being eliminated, from meats and by-products coming from animals slaughtered in unauthorized places and in an irregular manner, and, in particular, the reincorporation into food production of aged, adulterated, contaminated, or suspicious foods or those that have been returned by commerce, is therefore prohibited.</i>\"&nbsp; Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, that same legislation authorizes the commercialization of any by-product from animals affected by zoonosis, as occurs in this dispute (lite), provided the act does not constitute a crime and prior and express authorization is obtained from the Ministry of Health.&nbsp; In this sense, section 375 states: \"</span><i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Tahoma; mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>Whoever knowingly imports, processes, trades, distributes, or supplies in any capacity, handles, or possesses for these same purposes, medicines or deteriorated, contaminated, adulterated, or falsified foods, when the act does not constitute a crime, shall be punished with a fine of ten to sixty days. / <u>The same penalty shall apply to whoever retains, distributes, delivers, or trades in any form, the meat or by-products from animals affected by zoonosis, if they did not have prior and express authorization from the Ministry, when the act does not constitute a crime</u>.</span></i><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>\" (The underlined text is not in the original).&nbsp; Consequently, the MAG could order the destruction of the milk from the property of the plaintiff company, just as it did –Article 7 of the Animal Health Law (Ley sobre Salud Animal)–, without prejudice to the respective compensation, in the event that it could have been commercialized, under the terms provided in this latter section of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud).&nbsp; However, in the records, there are official letters numbers UAA-RHN-072-2000, of September 11, 2000, from the Head of the Environmental Attention Unit of the Ministry of Health, Huetar Norte Region (folio 301) and DR-RHN-1271-2000, of December 7, 2000, from the Regional Director of the Ministry of Health (folios 309-310), by which that authorization is denied.&nbsp; Consequently, as the destroyed milk could not be commercialized, there is no compensable damage whatsoever.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Under the protection of the reasons stated, it is also necessary to dismiss this second argument formulated in the present objection.&nbsp;\n\n**XX.-**&nbsp; In the **eighth**, termed by the appellant as \"<i>ninth ground for appeal on the merits for indirect violation of the law</i>\", they argue the existence of an error of law due to the improper rejection of non-material damage (daño moral), by improperly assessing the following items of evidence:&nbsp; a) the testimonies of Osman, Antonio, both Marín Rojas, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, and Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga;&nbsp; b) the actuarial mathematical study, carried out by the graduate Salvador Hernández Araya, pages 233 to 254; c) official letters DZS/RH 009-00 and DZS/RHN 007-00 of January 13, 2000, where the appealed Administration (Administración) instructs the Dos Pinos R.L. Milk Producers Cooperative (Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L.), of the obligation not to collect fluid milk from the herd of the plaintiff company, pages 39 and 40; d) expert report of Engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal, pages 513 to 529; e) official letters UAA-RHN-072-2000, signed by the Head of the Environmental Attention Unit of the Ministry of Health, page 301;&nbsp; CNRTB-196-92000, signed by doctor María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, page 302; official letter CART-80-2000, signed by Mr. Mario Azofeifa Solano, Operations Coordinator of San Carlos of the Dos Pinos R.L. Milk Producers Cooperative (Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L.), page 303; all three, dated September 11, 2000; CNRTB-206-92000 of September 13, 2000, from doctor María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the National Reference Center for TBC of INCIENCIA, page 304; UAA-RHN 076-2000, from the headship of the Environmental Attention Unit of the Ministry of Health, page 305; 121-2000 DZS-RHN from the headship of Zoosanitary Defense of the Huetar Norte Region of the MAG, the latter two of September 14, 2000; DR-RHN-1271-2000, of December 7, 2000, signed by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Health, pages 309-310; and f) note from the plaintiff company of November 27, 2000, page 308.&nbsp; He transcribes what was stated by the lower court in recital (considerando) IX of the appealed judgment.&nbsp; According to what was resolved by such deciding body (órgano decisor), he affirms, one is faced with the dichotomy of the demonstration or not of objective non-material damage (daño moral objetivo), on one hand, and its quantification on the other.&nbsp; It would seem that the appellate court (Ad quem), he comments, opted both for the lack of evidence to consider the assumptions accredited to recognize its compensation, as well as for the non-quantification of its economic and valuable consequences.&nbsp; Even if it were accepted that the valuable economic consequences of non-material damage were not quantified in the merits phase, this is no impediment to declaring its existence.&nbsp; In this sense, he points out, the lower court's resolution that the plaintiff company did not prove the objective non-material damage caused to it by the Administration is a consequence of an improper appreciation, according to the rules of sound rational judgment (sana crítica racional), of the indicated elements of conviction.&nbsp; The objective non-material damage occurring in this dispute, he affirms, lies in the deterioration or impairment suffered by the plaintiff company in its image, prestige, credibility for implementing business in the market of the commercial activity carried out, in its good name and business solvency.&nbsp; This, because it was not only a creditworthy company with the National Banking System; but also, its herd had pedigree, registered both by the Holstein Cattle Breeders Association of Costa Rica (Asociación de Criadores de Ganado Holstein de Costa Rica), and by the Costa Rican Jersey Cattle Breeders Association (Asociación Costarricense de Criadores de Ganado Jersey) (pages 183 to 223, both inclusive, of the administrative file).&nbsp; An affectation that occurred due to the significance of the events that transpired in the business environment, the surroundings, the trade, the community, the various public and private entities related to the company's line of business, as well as through their improper dissemination through mass media, especially Channel 14 of the Northern Zone.&nbsp; Regarding the errors in the appreciation of the indicated evidence, he points out, concerning the assessment of the testimony of Mr. Osman Marín Rojas, the mere fact that he indicated having an interest in the outcome of the process is not sufficient reason (rules of sound judgment) to dismiss it.&nbsp; Unless such a conclusion does not derive from and/or is not the product of a joint analysis of the entirety of the evidentiary lineup gathered in the process, revealing its disproportion and/or incongruity in what was stated under oath.&nbsp; At the same time, he indicates, what is stated by said witness, whether or not useful for the purposes of valuation or quantification of non-material damage, is irrelevant to discredit him, since such determination can be reserved for the judgment execution phase.&nbsp; A task that, in any case, he comments, does not correspond to, much less is the competence of, a witness.&nbsp; Concerning the appreciation of the document visible on page 303 of the file, which is official letter CART-80-2000 of September 11, 2000, signed by Mr. Mario Azofeifa Solano, Operations Coordinator of San Carlos of the Dos Pinos RL Milk Producers Cooperative (Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos RL), contrary to what was held by the lower court, he affirms, in the sense that such a document does not reveal a discredit or affectation of the name of the plaintiff company as a result of the administrative action, it would denote or, it would be derived (rules of sound judgment) from it, at a minimum, an affectation of its business solvency, as well as its credibility for implementing business in the market of the commercial activity carried out; given the significance of the events that transpired to the business environment, the surroundings, the trade, the various public and private entities related to the line of business of the plaintiff company.&nbsp; In what pertains to the appreciation of the actuarial mathematical study carried out by Mr. Hernández Araya (pages 234 to 255 of the file), in the same way, he comments, the fact that it was commissioned by the plaintiff privately is not sufficient reason (rules of sound judgment) to disdain it or deny it the probative value it reasonably has, since even if it were not accepted as an expert appraisal, it would retain its value as a means of proof, properly as a document or technical report (article 318, subsection 3 of the Civil Procedure Code).&nbsp; Its devaluation is not apposite either, with the argument that it only makes a recommendation regarding the extent of the non-material damage, since that, he alleges, is precisely the legal nature of any technical evidence regarding non-material damage, given that it corresponds to the administrator of justice, ultimately, to set its amount.&nbsp; The appellate court, he comments, remains silent regarding the actuarial mathematical expert report rendered by engineer Centeno Madrigal (pages 513 to 529).\n\nEvidence that could have remedied any deficiency or objection raised regarding the previous study. A comparative study of both technical evidentiary elements is noticeably lacking. The improper rejection of compensation for moral damages (daño moral) clearly stems, apart from the objections raised to the evidence, from an improper valuation, due to omission of analysis, of the testimonies of Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, Antonio Marín Rojas, and Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga, in relation to the documents visible at folios 39 and 40, which are notarially certified copies of official letters DZS/RH 009-00 and 007 DZS/RHN, dated January 13, 2000; in them, the Respondent Administration indicates to the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L., the obligation not to collect fluid milk originating from the plaintiff company's herd; the mathematical actuarial expert opinion of engineer Centeno Madrigal; as well as official letters UAA-RHN 072-2000, CNRTB-196-92000, CART-80-2000, CNRTB-206-92000, UAA-RHN 076-2000, official letter number 121-2000 DZS-RHN, DR-RHN-1271-2000, the writing dated November 27, 2000, subscribed by Sucesores de Clemente Marín S.A. Evidentiary elements with which, it affirms, the undoubted accreditation of the existence of objective moral damages is obtained, at a minimum. In accordance with the foregoing, it concludes, what was resolved by the Ad quem violates, by improper application, canons 11, 33, 41, 45, 50 of the Constitución Política; 190.2, 194.1.2.3 of the LGAP; 3 and 7 of the now repealed Ley de Tuberculosis Bovina, number 1207 and, for lack of action, numerals 190.1, 191, 192, 196, and 197 of the LGAP. Regarding the value of the improperly appreciated evidence, it notes, ordinals 298.2 of the LGAP; 318 subsection 3), 330 and 357 subsection 4) of the Código Procesal Civil were violated.\n\n**XXI.-** The plaintiff is a legal entity. Ergo, as the Tribunal rightly pointed out, the moral damages (daño moral) sought are objective. This Chamber has indicated that this occurs when the sphere of non-pecuniary interest (extrapatrimonial) is injured. That is, it produces economically valuable consequences. For example, the case of the professional who, due to the attributed act, loses their clientele in whole or in part. It must be differentiated from subjective or emotional moral damages. “*This distinction serves to delineate the damage suffered by the individual in their social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual field (affliction for the death of a relative), one referring to the social part and the other to the affective part of the patrimony.*” (Judgment number 127 of 11 hours 25 minutes of February 21, 2007. In the same sense, rulings 151 of 15 hours 20 minutes of February 14, 2001, and 729 of 10 hours of September 29, 2005, can be consulted). This differentiation arose to determine the scope of compensable moral damages. Initially, doctrine was reluctant to compensate pure or subjective moral damages, due to their difficult quantification. In the case of objective moral damages, the corresponding demonstration must be made, as occurs with pecuniary damage. “*…**VI.-** On the point of the compensability of moral damages, it should be noted that the argument according to which the compensation for moral damages implies the difficulty of achieving an equivalence between the damage and the monetary compensation (\"pecunia doloris\") is not valid; because in the case of objective moral damages, the reparation turns out to be easier to quantify* …” (Judgment 928 of 9 hours 15 minutes of November 24, 2006. In this same sense, resolutions 527-F-S1-2008 of 14 hours 10 minutes of February 1, 2008, and 206-F-S1-2009 of 16 hours 20 minutes of February 26, 2009, can be consulted).\n\n**XXII.-** In the fourth fact of the complaint, the legal representative of the plaintiff company states: “*That despite the challenged sanitary order being an absolutely null and concomitantly ineffective act, the Respondent Administration (arts. 146.1.3.4, 150.1 and 169 LGAP), abusing power and its sovereign powers arbitrarily, ordered and executed it, causing my represented party damages (material and moral) and losses of impossible or difficult reparation. Thus, the quarantine was ordered for the farm owned by my represented party, its animals, products and by-products, supplies and equipment, causing it serious and substantial economic losses, since prima facie, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. was ordered to cease the collection of milk from my represented party; however, as of today, Cooperativa Dos Pinos is being allowed to collect the milk again; <u>the presumed outbreak of bovine tuberculosis on my represented party’s farm was unduly disseminated through the mass media of the Zona Norte, especially Canal 14, causing immeasurable moral damages to my represented party as well as to my entire family</u>; and finally, 123 bovines have been sacrificed as of today, almost the entirety of the herd, losing its genetics, since it was livestock registered with the Holstein and Jersey Associations of Costa Rica, without the outbreak of bovine tuberculosis having been reliably proven in all the euthanized animals, which has my represented party on the verge of bankruptcy and economic ruin, despite the difficult administrative financial situation the State is going through, as expressly acknowledged by the Administration in official letter SUBDSA No. 183-00, dated July 26, 2000.*” (The underlining is supplied). Then, in the section called “*legal argumentation*”, fifth point, folio 138 verso, it ratifies the foregoing, by stating, in what is of interest: “*… causing my represented party damages and losses of impossible or difficult reparation. Thus, the quarantine was ordered for the farm owned by my represented party, its animals, products and by-products, supplies and equipment, causing it serious and substantial economic losses, since prima facie, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche Dos Pinos R.L. was ordered to cease the collection of milk from my represented party as of the 13th day of January of the current year, with approximately 12,522.7 kilograms of fluid milk being denatured for subsequent destruction as of January 17th last, which represents an economic loss of around 800,000.00 colones; however, as of today, Cooperativa Dos Pinos is being allowed to collect the milk again; <u>the presumed outbreak of bovine tuberculosis on my represented party’s farm was unduly disseminated through the mass media of the Zona Norte, especially Canal 14, causing immeasurable moral damages to my represented party as well as to my entire family</u>* …” (the underlining is not from the original). According to the foregoing transcribed, it is clear that the cause of action for moral damages originates in the publications made by the mass media of the Zona Norte of the country, especially, on Canal 14. The appellant, to demonstrate the existence of this damage, invokes as violated: 1) the studies carried out both by licentiate Salvador Hernández Araya (folios 233 to 254), and by engineer Leonel Centeno Madrigal (folios 513 to 529). In Considerando XIX of this judgment, the reasons why both studies do not deserve credibility before this jurisdictional body were noted. 2) the following documentary evidence: i) official letters a) DZS/RH 009-00, folio 39; b) 007-00 DZS/RHZ, folio 40, both from the headship of Defensa Zoosanitaria of the Región Huetar Norte of the MAG, dated January 13, 2000; c) UAA-RHN-072-2000, signed by the Head of the Unidad de Atención al Ambiente of the Ministry of Health, folio 301; d) CNRTB-196-92000, subscribed by Dr. María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the Centro Nacional de Referencias para TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 302; e) official letter CART-80-2000, signed by Mr. Mario Azofeifa Solano, Operations Coordinator of San Carlos of the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., folio 303; the three, dated September 11, 2000; f) CNRTB-206-92000 of September 13, 2000, by Dr. María Cecilia Matamoros, Head of the Centro Nacional de Referencias para TBC of INCIENCIA, folio 304; g) UAA-RHN 076-2000, from the headship of the Unidad de Atención al Ambiente of the Ministry of Health, folio 305; h) 121-2000 DZS-RHN from the headship of Defensa Zoosanitaria of the Región Huetar Norte of the MAG, both dated September 14, 2000; i) DR-RHN-1271-2000, of December 7, 2000, subscribed by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Health, folios 309-310; and ii) note from the plaintiff company of November 27, 2000, folio 308. All of that evidence alludes to the prohibition for the plaintiff to market the milk produced by its herd. That factual situation differs from the reason (causa petendi) that originates the claim for moral damages compensation (which, as noted, is circumscribed to the journalistic publications, especially, those made by Canal 14 of the country's Zona Norte), and therefore it is not admissible. If its analysis were to be granted and, eventually, what was argued by the appellant were accepted, it would make the ruling incongruent, due to a variation of the cause of action. In any case, for further abundance of reasons, as the plaintiff party itself confesses –fourth fact of the complaint and fifth point of the “*legal argumentation*” section, previously transcribed– that circumstance did not cause it any negative consequence in the prestige and good name of the company, nor was it subject to exclusion by its clients. In this regard, according to what was indicated, the prohibition of milk sales was a temporary circumstance, such that, at the time of the formalization of the complaint, the Cooperativa de Productores de Leche, Dos Pinos R.L., had resumed purchasing the milk. Likewise, in note CART-80-2000 of September 11, 2000, subscribed by the Operations Coordinator of San Carlos of that Cooperativa, it is expressly indicated that: “*The restart of deliveries will be subject to authorization from the competent governmental entity.*” That is, the prohibition of milk sales did not generate a negative consequence for the claimant in its social consideration. 3) It also invokes as transgressed the testimonies of Osman Gerardo and Antonio Marín Rojas, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, and Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga. Concerning the declarations of the Marín Rojas brothers, they are evidently biased. They are the sons of the legal representative of the plaintiff company, Mr. Antonio Marín Barrientos. They have, therefore, an interest in the outcome of the process, as the family business is at stake. Furthermore, the first is the farm administrator. The foregoing, under the protection of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica), unlike what was stated by the appellant, disqualifies both testimonies. However, from what was said by them, the alleged damage cannot be inferred. Mr. Osman Gerardo, folios 421 to 431, stated in what is of interest: “*Regarding the handling by Mr. Orlando Jara of the M.A.G., we believe it was not correct, for which it became evident that the technical part did not handle it adequately, in addition, he did not respect the criterion of privacy and ethics* (sic)*, because in the results that were read at the beginning of January, this man informed channel 14 first rather than the* (sic) *company (plaintiff), and they also acted very hastily, not giving us time to prepare for the measures they imposed on us. … Morally, there was a great negative impact, because through* (sic) *the M.A.G., the media made the reports of this case in particular public and regular. We had a kind of general discredit, before the community, the guild, and the neighbors, because while we tried to defend ourselves and convince the authorities to correct the procedures and* *complementary tests be done, public opinion judged us as putting public health and animal health in the area at risk. … Regarding the media information, what we did was request the videos they broadcasted from this channel, to have them as evidence, and at the end, we tried through the same medium to give our opinion and try to counteract a little the negative image that was being transmitted.*” What was stated by Mr. Osman Gerardo amounts to nothing more than mere subjective opinions. He does not specify what the judgment that public opinion made of them consisted of. They are, rather, general assertions that require other complementary evidence to demonstrate them. For example, he indicates they requested the videos to have them as evidence, however, they did not append them to this process. In sum, the negative impact on the social sphere of the plaintiff company is not successfully accredited. For his part, what was said by Mr. Antonio, folios 432 to 438, is inconsequential for purposes of accrediting moral damages, since he states: “*I do not remember what the media that publicized it were referring to, because it affected me psychologically to listen to them.*” For her part, the witness Flor de Liz Hernández Astorga, folios 439 to 441, pertinently, indicated: “*In Ciudad Quesada, it seemed like a persecution, because it appeared on Canal 14 and in the newspaper, where the people from the M.A.G. informed that there was a tuberculosis outbreak, and they stated that animals with that disease became skinny, drawn, and snotty, and on one occasion I showed up* (sic) *at the farm to have some documents signed, and the news was present; there were two separate lots, where one was supposedly contaminated cattle* *and the other was healthy cattle, and I heard* (sic)*, they asked the administrator which* (sic) *of the lots was the cattle to be sacrificed, I do not remember who* (sic) *asked that, that indicates both lots were the same.*” However, she does not specify in what way those publications harmed the plaintiff company. Consequently, what was said by the witness is not useful for the purpose of determining the existence of moral damages. The same applies to what was stated by the last witness, Máximo Pacheco Paniagua, folios 412 to 420. He only points out that “*It greatly caught my attention that the radio and television cameras were always present, especially when they carried out the slaughters in the context of this process.*” He does not point out in what way those publications affected the plaintiff company from the social point of view. In accordance with the foregoing, with the testimonial evidence taken in the case file, the existence of the claimed moral damages cannot be determined. In any case, the fact that Dos Pinos resumed receiving the milk, and that the company where witness Hernández Astorga works provides services to the plaintiff, demonstrates that it did not suffer any impairment or damage to its image or prestige as a company. That is to say, it had no negative consequences from a social perspective. Under the protection of the reasons stated, the rejection of this present ground of disagreement is required. "
}