{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-131435",
  "citation": "Res. 00028-2010 Tribunal de Trabajo Sección I",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Voto salvado sobre pago de prohibición tras anulación de ley en el Banco Central",
  "title_en": "Dissenting vote on prohibition payment after law annulled at the Central Bank",
  "summary_es": "Este voto salvado resuelve una apelación en un proceso laboral ordinario. Un exfuncionario del Banco Central de Costa Rica reclamó el pago de un plus salarial conocido como \"prohibición\", que había percibido durante su relación laboral, con fundamento en las leyes de presupuesto 6982, 7015 y 7018. Esas leyes fueron declaradas inconstitucionales por la Sala Constitucional en 1999, aunque se respetaron los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. La jueza disidente confirma la sentencia desestimatoria de primera instancia, argumentando que en el sector público rige el principio de legalidad presupuestaria (artículos 176 y 180 de la Constitución), por lo que ningún gasto puede ejecutarse sin respaldo normativo y presupuestario. Al desaparecer la base legal del beneficio, no existe obligación del empleador de continuar pagándolo, pues los efectos de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad impiden generar derechos adquiridos hacia el futuro. El voto cita extensamente jurisprudencia de la Sala Segunda y de la Sala Constitucional sobre el concepto de derecho adquirido, que exige una situación jurídica plenamente consolidada y no meras expectativas. Además, enfatiza que los conflictos que impliquen gasto público deben analizarse con criterios restrictivos y de austeridad, priorizando la satisfacción de las necesidades sociales. En consecuencia, se rechaza el reclamo del trabajador.",
  "summary_en": "This dissenting vote resolves an appeal in an ordinary labor proceeding. A former employee of the Central Bank of Costa Rica claimed payment of a salary supplement called \"prohibition,\" which he had received during his employment, based on budget laws 6982, 7015, and 7018. These laws were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber in 1999, although rights acquired in good faith were respected. The dissenting judge confirms the lower court's dismissal, arguing that the public sector is governed by the principle of budgetary legality (Article 176 and 180 of the Constitution), meaning no expenditure can be made without normative and budgetary backing. Since the legal basis for the benefit disappeared after the unconstitutionality ruling, the employer has no obligation to continue paying it, as the ruling prevents the creation of future acquired rights. The opinion extensively cites jurisprudence from the Second Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber on the concept of acquired rights, which requires a fully consolidated legal situation, not mere expectations. It also stresses that disputes involving public spending must be analyzed with restrictive criteria and austerity, prioritizing social needs. Consequently, the worker's claim is denied.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Trabajo Sección I",
  "date": "29/01/2010",
  "year": "2010",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "voto salvado",
    "prohibición (plus salarial)",
    "legalidad presupuestaria",
    "derechos adquiridos",
    "inconstitucionalidad",
    "empleo público"
  ],
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    {
      "law": "Constitución Política",
      "article": "11",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política 0",
      "article": "11",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política",
      "article": "176",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política 0",
      "article": "176",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política",
      "article": "180",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política 0",
      "article": "180",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
      "article": "11",
      "doc_id": "norm-13231",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 6227",
      "article": "11",
      "doc_id": "norm-13231",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
      "article": "13",
      "doc_id": "norm-13231",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 6227",
      "article": "13",
      "doc_id": "norm-13231",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley de Presupuesto para 1985",
      "article": "14",
      "doc_id": "norm-8561",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 6982",
      "article": "14",
      "doc_id": "norm-8561",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario(Ver Fe de Erratas en La Gaceta Nº2 del 03.01.1986)(Ver Fe de Erratas en La Gaceta Nº11 del 16.01.1986)",
      "article": "101",
      "doc_id": "norm-8912",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 7015",
      "article": "101",
      "doc_id": "norm-8912",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley de Presupuesto 1986 (ordinario y extraordinario)(Ver Fe de Erratas en La Gaceta Nº7 de 10 de enero de 1986)",
      "article": "14",
      "doc_id": "norm-36522",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 7018",
      "article": "14",
      "doc_id": "norm-36522",
      "source": "metadata"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "voto salvado",
    "prohibición salarial",
    "principio de legalidad presupuestaria",
    "derechos adquiridos",
    "declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad",
    "empleo público",
    "Banco Central",
    "plus salarial"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "dissenting vote",
    "salary supplement prohibition",
    "budgetary legality principle",
    "acquired rights",
    "declaration of unconstitutionality",
    "public employment",
    "Central Bank",
    "salary supplement"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "A partir del momento en que adquirió eficacia la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, los funcionarios que habían estado percibiendo la prohibición, tenían derecho a conservar bajo su dominio, e incorporados de pleno derecho en sus patrimonios, los dineros pagados en tal concepto, mas no a seguir percibiendo prohibición, porque ya no existía motivo legal ni real para que la Administración Pública incurriera en esa erogación. Sea, no existía la obligación lícita y efectiva del empleador, de seguir cubriendo un plus salarial que no resultaba de una ley ni de otra fuente de derecho.",
  "excerpt_en": "From the moment the declaration of unconstitutionality became effective, officials who had been receiving the prohibition were entitled to keep under their domain, and fully incorporated into their assets, the amounts paid under that concept, but not to continue receiving the prohibition, because there was no longer any legal or real reason for the Public Administration to incur that expenditure. That is, there was no lawful and effective obligation of the employer to continue covering a salary supplement that did not arise from a law or any other source of law.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Dissenting vote — Confirms dismissal",
    "label_es": "Voto salvado — Confirma sentencia desestimatoria",
    "summary_en": "The dissenting vote confirms the dismissal of the worker's claim for payment of a salary prohibition, holding that after the declaration of unconstitutionality of the supporting laws, there is no legal or budgetary obligation to pay it.",
    "summary_es": "El voto salvado confirma la sentencia que desestimó el reclamo del trabajador por el pago de una prohibición salarial, al considerar que tras la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de las leyes que la sustentaban, no existe obligación legal ni presupuestaria para su pago."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando II",
      "quote_en": "The plaintiff cannot claim an acquired right to the unpaid prohibitions, because what the former employer must respect are the material consequences of the norms that authorized that benefit—the consummated effects—not the content or substance of the rule itself, which, it must be emphasized, is null and void ab initio for having contravened the Fundamental Norm from its legislative origin.",
      "quote_es": "No puede el actor alegar un derecho adquirido a las prohibiciones no pagadas, porque lo que debe respetar el antiguo empleador, son las consecuencias materiales de las normas que autorizaron ese beneficio, los efectos consumados, no al contenido o sustancia de la regla en sí, que de todas formas, cabe recalcar, es nula de pleno derecho, por haber contravenido desde su origen legislativo, la Norma Fundamental."
    },
    {
      "context": "Voto Nº 258-2008 transcrito",
      "quote_en": "An acquired right does not admit uncertainty or contingency; it is not an expectation, but rather the clear, secure and definite certainty of a fully consolidated legal situation.",
      "quote_es": "El derecho adquirido no admite incertidumbre ni eventualidad; no es una expectativa, sino más bien la clara, segura y definida certeza, de una situación jurídica plenamente consolidada."
    },
    {
      "context": "Voto N° 5500-2000 transcrito",
      "quote_en": "Every budget line item, by the distinctive feature of being a mere authorization, does not obligate the expenditure.",
      "quote_es": "Toda partida presupuestaria, por la nota distintiva de ser una mera autorización, no obliga al gasto."
    }
  ],
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      "citation": "Constitución Política 0 (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 07/11/1949)",
      "title_en": "Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment — Article 50 of the Political Constitution",
      "title_es": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política",
      "doc_type": "constitution",
      "date": "07/11/1949",
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      "id": "norm-13231",
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      "date": "02/05/1978",
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  "temas_y_subtemas": [
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Concepto y fundamento en el empleo público"
        },
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          "id": 2,
          "nombre": "Análisis con respecto al establecido en laudo arbitral declarado inconstitucional"
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      "id": 1,
      "nombre": "Beneficio salarial por prohibición"
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  "body_es_text": "VOTO SALVADO DE LA JUEZ [Nombre1] \n\n \n\n “I. La suscrita integrante disiente del voto de mayoría y confirma la sentencia venida en alzada, con fundamento en las consideraciones que de seguido se exponen, sin que ello implique desconocimiento de las recientes sentencias de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, dictadas en juicios que tiene pretensiones aparentemente similares a las del presente. Esos mismos pronunciamientos contienen Votos de minoría, en los que se exponen consideraciones importantes que la suscrita juzgadora comparte (ver folios 712 a 734). Por esos, y otros motivos que se consignan a continuación, debe confirmarse la sentencia desestimatoria de primera instancia. \n\n II. El conflicto trabado exige determinar si el actor tiene derecho a una prestación o plus salarial, por haberlo percibido durante un período de su relación laboral con el Banco Central de Costa Rica, como componente de su salario, con fundamento en las leyes números 6982 de diecinueve de diciembre de 1984 artículo 14; 7015 del veintidós de noviembre de 1985, artículo 101 y 7018 de veinte de diciembre de 1985, artículo 14 inciso 17. Estas normas fueron declaradas inconstitucionales en Voto de la Cámara respectiva, Nº 4647 del dieciséis de junio de 1999, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe, como lo es el caso del actor, que no tuvo intervención volitiva alguna en la viciado proceso de elaboración de dichas leyes. No obstante, en tratándose de relaciones de empleo en el sector público, impera el principio de legalidad, con ocasión del cual, lo que no está permitido está prohibido (numerales 11 de la Carta Magna y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de Administración Pública). Como inevitable consecuencia de esa aplicación, está el principio de legalidad presupuestaria (artículos 176 y 180 de la Carta Magna), conforme al cual, ninguna entidad pública puede hacer gastos sin el debido respaldo normativo y dinerario, que aplicado a este caso concreto, determina que la petición de la atribución patrimonial antes percibida, carezca de causa legítima. A partir del momento en que adquirió eficacia la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, los funcionarios que habían estado percibiendo la prohibición, tenían derecho a conservar bajo su dominio, e incorporados de pleno derecho en sus patrimonios, los dineros pagados en tal concepto, mas no a seguir percibiendo prohibición, porque ya no existía motivo legal ni real para que la Administración Pública incurriera en esa erogación. Sea, no existía la obligación lícita y efectiva del empleador, de seguir cubriendo un plus salarial que no resultaba de una ley ni de otra fuente de derecho. Téngase presente que incluso en el ordenamiento ius laboral básico, se ordena la interpretación del Código de Trabajo, de sus Reglamentos y leyes conexas, tomando en cuenta fundamentalmente, el interés de los trabajadores y la conveniencia social (artículo 17 del Código laboral). Por lo tanto, no puede alegarse el derecho adquirido a seguir percibiendo un beneficio que ni siquiera puede definirse como salario en la actualidad, porque la base normativa que generó su pago, fue eliminada del ordenamiento (artículo 88 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). El artículo 162 del Código citado, define el salario como la retribución que debe pagar el patrono al trabajador en virtud del contrato de trabajo, y por las circunstancias apuntadas, es un hecho irrefutable que la relación de empleo público aquí reseñada, a partir de la eficacia de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, no comprendía obligación de pago de prohibición a cargo del empleador, y a favor del accionante. Si el acto legislativo que dio causa en su momento a dichas erogaciones, fue declarado inválido, consecuentemente es ineficaz. Luego, el hecho de haber percibido por un plazo determinado el rubro demandado, no tiene el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del administrado, a plazo indefinido, y menos, cuando no existe real disponibilidad presupuestaria para seguir pagando ese rubro, porque no hay norma positiva, que así lo ordene. De ahí que el Banco Central está en imposibilidad material de continuar cancelando el componente en cuestión, que en la actualidad es ajeno absolutamente a las estructuras salariales comprendidas en el presupuesto de esa entidad. No puede el actor alegar un derecho adquirido a las prohibiciones no pagadas, porque lo que debe respetar el antiguo empleador, son las consecuencias materiales de las normas que autorizaron ese beneficio, los efectos consumados, no al contenido o sustancia de la regla en sí, que de todas formas, cabe recalcar, es nula de pleno derecho, por haber contravenido desde su origen legislativo, la Norma Fundamental. Menos aún puede alegarse derecho adquirido a efectos no producidos, como eran a fin de cuentas, los pagos en concepto de prohibición, que no fueron cancelados al actor. Una interpretación contraria podría generar proposiciones absurdas, como que aún cuando el trabajador no estuviera en la condición requerida para que se le pague prohibición, tiene derecho a seguir percibiendo esa remuneración, porque se le había pagado durante determinado período. A fin de dar mayor respaldo a las consideraciones aquí vertidas, procede transcribir parcialmente, el Voto Nº 258 de las diez horas treinta minutos del veintiocho de marzo del 2008, de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, que analizó extensamente, con claridad y buen tino, los temas de los derechos adquiridos respecto de beneficios salariales, y el principio de legalidad presupuestaria, en relaciones de empleo público: \n\n “IV.- EN CUANTO A LOS DERECHOS ADQUIRIDOS. (…) el derecho adquirido no admite incertidumbre ni eventualidad; no es una expectativa, sino más bien la clara, segura y definida certeza, de una situación jurídica plenamente consolidada. La situación de certidumbre o firmeza, genera para el destinatario del derecho, la garantía ineludible del ordenamiento administrativo de satisfacer sus necesidades, en el curso de la relación de servicio que les vincula y, específicamente, aquellos cuyo efecto sea un determinado beneficio patrimonial. En este sentido, La Sala Constitucional ha entendido por derechos adquiridos: “...aquella circunstancia consumada en la que una cosa -material o inmaterial, trátese de un bien previamente ajeno o de un derecho antes inexistente- ha ingresado en (o incidido sobre) la esfera patrimonial de la persona, de manera que esta experimenta una ventaja o beneficio constatable\" (Ver su voto número 2765, de las 15:03 horas, del 20 de mayo de 1997). Un derecho se entiende adquirido, una vez realizados los presupuestos de hecho, necesarios y suficientes para su nacimiento o adquisición, de conformidad con la ley vigente en la época en que se cumplieron, de modo que, en su virtud se haya incorporado inmediatamente al patrimonio del titular. (Consultar la Enciclopedia Jurídica Omeba. Editorial Bibliográfica, Buenos Aires, 1958, Tomo VIII, pág. 284). De esta forma, los derechos adquiridos son aquellos que ingresan en forma definitiva y permanente en el patrimonio de su titular. \n\n V.- SOBRE EL RECONOCIMIENTO DE UNA HORA ADICIONAL EN LA JORNADA ORDINARIA DE LOS DEMANDANTES: En el caso de los recurrentes, para poder exigir el pago del plus salarial de una hora adicional, sin laborarla, se requería necesariamente una norma, que así lo dispusiera, situación que está claramente establecida, no se dio (…) Sobre este punto específico, ya esta Sala se había pronunciado en el voto número 2007-986 de las 9:55 horas del 14 de diciembre del 2007, indicando que: “En términos generales, se puede decir que funcionarios públicos son aquellas personas que prestan un servicio a nombre y por cuenta de un ente público, o bien, quienes legalmente se hallan encargados de ejercer las competencias públicas. Como bien lo expone Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz: “… se trata casi siempre de servidores contratados para el desarrollo de actividades materiales, cuyo régimen jurídico está dado en reglamentos autónomos de organización y de servicio”. (Tesis de Derecho Administrativo. San José, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A., 2000, volumen II, p. 107). En la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el legislador ensayó un concepto de “servidor público”, definiéndolo como “la persona que presta servicios a la Administración o a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva. A este efecto, considérense equivalentes los términos ‘funcionario público’, ‘servidor público’, ‘empleado público’, ‘encargado de servicio público’ y demás similares, y el régimen de sus relaciones será el mismo para todos, salvo que la naturaleza de la situación indique lo contrario. No se consideran servidores públicos los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común.” (Artículo 111). De seguido, el numeral 112 agrega: “1. El derecho administrativo será aplicable a las relaciones de servicio entre la Administración y sus servidores públicos. / 2. Las relaciones de servicios con obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración, de conformidad con el párrafo 3 del artículo 111, se regirán por el derecho laboral o mercantil, según los casos. / 3. Sin embargo, se aplicarán también a estos últimos las disposiciones legales o reglamentarias de derecho público que resulten necesarias para garantizar la legalidad y moralidad administrativa, conforme lo determine por decreto el Poder Ejecutivo. / 4. Para efectos penales, dichos servidores se reputarán como públicos.”. Por otra parte, el artículo 188 de la Constitución Política, reformado por la Ley N° 4123, del 31 de mayo de 1968, establece: “Las instituciones autónomas del Estado gozan de independencia administrativa y están sujetas a la ley en materia de gobierno. Sus directores responden por su gestión.” Por su parte, el numeral 189 constitucional dispone: “Son instituciones autónomas: 1) Los Bancos del Estado; 2) Las instituciones aseguradoras del Estado; 3) Las que esta Constitución establece, y los nuevos organismos que creare la Asamblea Legislativa por votación no menor de los dos tercios del total de sus miembros.” Hechas las anteriores precisiones conceptuales y normativas, conviene destacar que, en el presente asunto, se ha tenido como acreditado que los actores (…) gozan de una naturaleza de empleados públicos, por lo que sus relaciones de servicio se hallan sujetas al principio de legalidad en todas sus dimensiones. Uno de los elementos de dichas relaciones que está sometido a ese principio es precisamente el salario, el cual, en materia de empleo público, es pagado con recursos del Estado, por lo que se halla regido por el denominado principio de legalidad presupuestaria, de conformidad con el cual, el uso y disposición de los recursos se encuentra supeditado al presupuesto del ente público respectivo, de manera que todo gasto, debe estar autorizado presupuestariamente”. Sobre este principio, también esta misma Sala en el voto número 394, de las 15:04 horas del 31 de mayo del 2006, dispuso: “Las estructuras salariales adquieren carácter normativo, al formar parte de un presupuesto público, en el cual habrá un código para cada destino. Por eso, las modificaciones de las situaciones particulares -la condición de un determinado empleado- se hacen sujetas a una real disponibilidad presupuestaria, y siempre hacia el futuro, a partir de determinado momento, que ya está reglado. Dicho conjunto de herramientas, más las que provengan de una ley o de otra disposición normativa aplicable, funcionan como parte del denominado bloque de legalidad, para el caso, sectorial, y, del que la Administración específica, no puede apartarse (artículo 11 de la Constitución Política, en relación con los numerales 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública)”. Sobre este tema, pueden consultarse, entre otras, las sentencias de esta Sala, números 134, de las 11:20 horas del 3 de marzo; 160, de las 10:20 horas del 15 de marzo; y 984, de las 10:10 horas del 25 de octubre; todas del 2006). Sobre este particular, la Sala Constitucional, también se ha referido en el voto N° 5.500, de las 14:33 horas del 5 de julio del 2000, en el cual indicó: “El principio de legalidad presupuestaria se deriva del contenido de los artículos 176 y 180 constitucionales, fundamentalmente de este último. […] Tal como se señala en la acción, como autorización limitativa, el presupuesto determina la legalidad de los gastos públicos, de tal suerte que la Administración puede disponer de los fondos únicamente en la forma y medida contemplados en la correspondiente norma presupuestaria. Si dicha norma es la que habilita al Estado para la realización del gasto, cualquier variación que se pretenda hacer en el destino asignado a los fondos, igualmente debe satisfacer este principio constitucional, de ahí que sea indispensable tramitar la respectiva modificación presupuestaria. En este sentido, lleva razón tanto el accionante como la Procuraduría al rendir su informe, cuando afirman que existe una diferencia entre crear una obligación y autorizar su pago, toda vez que la ley ordinaria puede ser fuente creadora de obligaciones o gastos -en este caso, el pago de un subsidio- mas no puede autorizar en forma automática el pago de dicha obligación. Lo anterior, por cuanto esa autorización sólo puede proceder de una norma presupuestaria: el ente público sólo puede ejecutar un pago dentro de las previsiones presupuestarias vigentes, para las cuales, ciertamente, sirve de fundamento la legislación ordinaria. En consecuencia, no puede perderse de vista que la norma presupuestaria habilitante es un requisito para hacer efectivo cualquier gasto que derive de la legislación ordinaria. Asimismo, la Sala ha entendido que este principio rige tanto para la formulación original del presupuesto anual, como para cualquier cambio que se pretenda introducir durante el ejercicio económico respectivo, sobre lo cual se ha señalado que: ‘...la competencia o legitimación que constitucionalmente se atribuye a la Asamblea Legislativa sobre tan importante materia, es para fijar en los presupuestos los ingresos probables y los gastos autorizados de la Administración Pública con las modalidades que para su modificación y para presupuestos extraordinarios la misma Constitución señala’ (resolución número 1971-96, otras 5602-94, 6215-93, 121-89; énfasis agregado). […] De allí, entonces, que la Administración solamente puede gastar lo que expresamente le autorice la Ley de Presupuesto y, además, que le sea imposible, jurídicamente hablando, sobrepasar los montos expresamente autorizados. Ahora bien, es un hecho notorio, y por tanto, no requiere de una acreditación específica, que sea cual fuere el ámbito de la Administración Pública en que nos encontremos, toda partida presupuestaria, por la nota distintiva de ser una mera autorización, no obliga al gasto.” En el caso que se conoce, (…) no se demostró la existencia de una norma de contenido presupuestario que autorizara la inclusión de esa suma adicional en el salario de los funcionarios. En ese sentido, la práctica de reconocer económicamente ese período diario carecía de sustento legal y presupuestario, al no existir norma alguna de tal naturaleza que respaldara la erogación para el pago de ese reconocimiento, por lo que se estima improcedente el reclamo en cuanto a la cancelación del monto y el restablecimiento a futuro de ese beneficio, en virtud de haber sido otorgado ilegítimamente.” (fin de la transcripción). Sobre el tema de los derechos adquiridos, por oposición a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento jurídico, de aplicación analógica al tratarse en la especie de la eliminación de una norma del ordenamiento, aunque no sea por derogatoria, puede complementarse con la lectura de los Votos de la Sala Constitucional, números 17294 de las catorce horas cuarenta y siete minutos del diecinueve de noviembre del 2008, y 2996 del ocho de marzo del 2006. III. Con los parámetros sentados, y teniendo presente que los conflictos judiciales que eventualmente puedan acarrear incremento del gasto público, a cargo de los contribuyentes, deben analizarse con criterios restrictivos y de austeridad, así como de conveniencia social y oportunidad, teniendo como fin prioritario la satisfacción de las necesidades sociales, se concluye que la juez a quo resolvió conforme a Derecho y al mérito de los autos esta querella, por lo que se confirma en todos sus extremos la sentencia venida en alzada. POR TANTO: No se aprecian vicios que generen nulidad o indefensión. Se confirma la sentencia apelada.”",
  "body_en_text": "DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE [Nombre1]\n\n“I. The undersigned panel member dissents from the majority vote and upholds the judgment (sentencia) subject to appeal (venida en alzada), based on the considerations set forth below, without this implying ignorance of the recent judgments (sentencias) of the Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, issued in cases with claims apparently similar to those in the present one. Those same rulings contain minority votes (Votos de minoría), which set forth important considerations that the undersigned judge shares (see folios 712 to 734). For these, and other reasons set forth below, the dismissive judgment of first instance must be upheld.\n\nII. The dispute at hand requires determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to a benefit or salary supplement (plus salarial), having received it for a period during his employment relationship with the Banco Central de Costa Rica, as a component of his salary, based on laws numbers 6982 of December 19, 1984, Article 14; 7015 of November 22, 1985, Article 101; and 7018 of December 20, 1985, Article 14, subsection 17. These provisions were declared unconstitutional in Voto of the respective Chamber, No. 4647 of June 16, 1999, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, as is the case of the plaintiff, who had no volitional intervention in the flawed process of drafting said laws. However, in the case of employment relationships in the public sector, the principle of legality prevails, under which, what is not permitted is prohibited (articles 11 of the Carta Magna and 11 and 13 of the Ley General de Administración Pública). As an inevitable consequence of that application, there is the principle of budgetary legality (principio de legalidad presupuestaria) (articles 176 and 180 of the Carta Magna), according to which, no public entity may make expenditures without the proper regulatory and monetary backing, which, applied to this specific case, determines that the claim for the pecuniary attribution previously received lacks legitimate cause. From the moment the declaration of unconstitutionality became effective, the officials who had been receiving the prohibition (prohibición) had the right to keep under their dominion, and incorporated as a matter of law into their assets, the monies paid under that concept, but not to continue receiving the prohibition (prohibición), because there no longer existed a legal or real reason for the Public Administration to incur that outlay. That is, there was no lawful and effective obligation on the part of the employer to continue covering a salary supplement (plus salarial) that did not result from a law or another source of law. It should be kept in mind that even in the basic labor law system, the interpretation of the Código de Trabajo, its Reglamentos and related laws is ordered, taking fundamentally into account the interest of the workers and social convenience (conveniencia social) (Article 17 of the Labor Code (Código laboral)). Therefore, one cannot claim an acquired right to continue receiving a benefit that cannot even be defined as salary (salario) at present, because the normative basis that generated its payment was eliminated from the legal system (Article 88 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Article 162 of the cited Code defines salary (salario) as the remuneration that the employer must pay the worker by virtue of the employment contract, and due to the circumstances noted, it is an irrefutable fact that the public employment relationship described here, as of the effectiveness of the declaration of unconstitutionality, did not include an obligation to pay the prohibition (prohibición) on the part of the employer, in favor of the plaintiff. If the legislative act that originally gave cause to said expenditures was declared invalid, it is consequently ineffective. Therefore, the fact of having received the claimed item for a certain period does not have the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the administered individual, for an indefinite period, and even less so, when there is no real budgetary availability to continue paying that item, because there is no positive provision that so orders. Hence, the Banco Central is materially unable to continue paying the component in question, which is currently completely foreign to the salary structures included in that entity's budget. The plaintiff cannot claim an acquired right to the unpaid prohibitions (prohibiciones), because what the former employer must respect are the material consequences of the provisions that authorized that benefit, the completed effects, not the content or substance of the rule itself, which in any case, it bears emphasizing, is void as a matter of law, for having contravened the Fundamental Norm (Norma Fundamental) from its legislative origin. Even less can one claim an acquired right to effects not produced, as were, ultimately, the payments under the concept of prohibition (prohibición), which were not paid to the plaintiff. A contrary interpretation could generate absurd propositions, such as that even when the worker was not in the required condition to be paid the prohibition (prohibición), he is entitled to continue receiving that remuneration, because he had been paid it for a certain period. In order to give greater support to the considerations set forth here, it is appropriate to partially transcribe Voto No. 258 of ten hours thirty minutes of March 28, 2008, of the Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, which extensively analyzed, with clarity and good judgment, the issues of acquired rights regarding salary benefits, and the principle of budgetary legality (principio de legalidad presupuestaria), in public employment relationships:\n\n“IV.- REGARDING ACQUIRED RIGHTS. (…) an acquired right does not admit uncertainty or eventuality; it is not an expectation, but rather the clear, secure, and definite certainty of a legal situation fully consolidated. The situation of certainty or firmness generates for the recipient of the right the inescapable guarantee of the administrative system to satisfy their needs, in the course of the service relationship that binds them and, specifically, those whose effect is a certain pecuniary benefit. In this sense, the Sala Constitucional has understood acquired rights to be: “...that consummated circumstance in which a thing -material or immaterial, be it a previously alien good or a previously non-existent right- has entered (or had an impact on) the patrimonial sphere of the person, such that the person experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit\" (See its voto number 2765, of 15:03 hours, of May 20, 1997). A right is understood to be acquired once the necessary and sufficient factual conditions for its birth or acquisition have been fulfilled, in accordance with the law in force at the time they were fulfilled, so that, by virtue thereof, it has been immediately incorporated into the holder's assets. (Consult the Enciclopedia Jurídica Omeba. Editorial Bibliográfica, Buenos Aires, 1958, Volume VIII, p. 284). In this way, acquired rights are those that enter definitively and permanently into the assets of their holder.\n\nV.- ON THE RECOGNITION OF AN ADDITIONAL HOUR IN THE PLAINTIFFS' ORDINARY WORKING DAY: In the case of the appellants, in order to demand payment of the salary supplement (plus salarial) of an additional hour, without working it, a provision was necessarily required that so ordered, a situation that is clearly established, did not occur (…) On this specific point, this Chamber (Sala) had already ruled in voto number 2007-986 of 9:55 hours of December 14, 2007, stating that: “In general terms, it can be said that public officials (funcionarios públicos) are those persons who provide a service in the name of and on behalf of a public entity, or those who are legally charged with exercising public powers. As Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz well states: “… these are almost always servants hired for the development of material activities, whose legal regime is provided in autonomous regulations of organization and service”. (Tesis de Derecho Administrativo. San José, Editorial Stradtmann, S.A., 2000, volume II, p. 107). In the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the legislator essayed a concept of “public servant” (servidor público), defining it as “the person who provides services to the Administration or in the name of and on behalf thereof, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. To this effect, the terms 'public official' (funcionario público), 'public servant' (servidor público), 'public employee' (empleado público), 'person in charge of public service' (encargado de servicio público) and similar others shall be considered equivalent, and the regime of their relations shall be the same for all, unless the nature of the situation indicates otherwise. Employees of State enterprises or economic services engaged in activities subject to common law are not considered public servants (servidores públicos).” (Article 111). Following this, article 112 adds: “1. Administrative law shall be applicable to the service relations between the Administration and its public servants (servidores públicos). / 2. The service relations with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be. / 3. However, the legal or regulatory provisions of public law that are necessary to guarantee administrative legality and morality shall also apply to the latter, as determined by decree by the Poder Ejecutivo. / 4. For penal purposes, said servants shall be considered as public.” On the other hand, Article 188 of the Constitución Política, amended by Ley N° 4123, of May 31, 1968, establishes: “The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of government. Their directors are responsible for their management.” For its part, constitutional article 189 provides: “Are autonomous institutions: 1) The State Banks (Bancos del Estado); 2) The State insurance institutions; 3) Those that this Constitution establishes, and the new bodies that the Asamblea Legislativa may create by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the total of its members.” Having made the foregoing conceptual and regulatory clarifications, it is worth highlighting that, in the present matter, it has been held as accredited that the plaintiffs (…) enjoy a nature as public employees (empleados públicos), so their service relations are subject to the principle of legality in all its dimensions. One of the elements of said relations that is subject to that principle is precisely the salary (salario), which, in matters of public employment, is paid with State resources, so it is governed by the so-called principle of budgetary legality (principio de legalidad presupuestaria), according to which, the use and disposition of resources is subject to the budget of the respective public entity, so that every expenditure must be budgetarily authorized”. Regarding this principle, this same Chamber (Sala) also provided in voto number 394, of 15:04 hours of May 31, 2006: “Salary structures acquire a regulatory nature, forming part of a public budget, in which there will be a code for each position. Therefore, modifications to particular situations -the condition of a specific employee- are made subject to real budgetary availability, and always for the future, from a certain moment that is already regulated. Said set of tools, plus those coming from a law or another applicable regulatory provision, function as part of the so-called block of legality (bloque de legalidad), in this case, sectorial, and from which the specific Administration cannot depart (Article 11 of the Constitución Política, in relation to articles 11 and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública)”. On this topic, consult, among others, the judgments (sentencias) of this Chamber (Sala), numbers 134, of 11:20 hours of March 3; 160, of 10:20 hours of March 15; and 984, of 10:10 hours of October 25; all of 2006). On this particular, the Sala Constitucional has also referred in Voto No. 5.500, of 14:33 hours of July 5, 2000, in which it indicated: “The principle of budgetary legality (principio de legalidad presupuestaria) is derived from the content of constitutional articles 176 and 180, fundamentally from the latter. […] As stated in the action, as a limiting authorization, the budget determines the legality of public expenditures, such that the Administration may dispose of funds only in the manner and measure contemplated in the corresponding budget provision. If said provision is what enables the State to make the expenditure, any change that is intended in the destination assigned to the funds must equally satisfy this constitutional principle, hence it is essential to process the respective budget modification. In this sense, both the plaintiff and the Procuraduría are correct in submitting their report, when they affirm that there is a difference between creating an obligation and authorizing its payment, since ordinary law can be a source creating obligations or expenses -in this case, the payment of a subsidy (subsidio)- but it cannot automatically authorize the payment of said obligation. The foregoing, because that authorization can only proceed from a budget provision: the public entity can only execute a payment within the current budgetary provisions, for which, certainly, the ordinary legislation serves as a basis. Consequently, it cannot be lost sight of that the enabling budget provision is a requirement to make effective any expenditure deriving from ordinary legislation. Likewise, the Chamber (Sala) has understood that this principle governs both for the original formulation of the annual budget and for any change that is intended to be introduced during the respective fiscal year, on which it has been noted that: ‘...the competence or legitimacy constitutionally attributed to the Asamblea Legislativa over such important matter, is to establish in the budgets the probable income and the authorized expenditures of the Public Administration with the modalities that the Constitution itself indicates for their modification and for extraordinary budgets’ (resolution number 1971-96, others 5602-94, 6215-93, 121-89; emphasis added). […] Hence, therefore, that the Administration can only spend what the Budget Law (Ley de Presupuesto) expressly authorizes and, furthermore, that it is impossible for it, legally speaking, to exceed the expressly authorized amounts. Now, it is a notorious fact, and therefore, does not require specific proof, that whatever the area of the Public Administration in which we find ourselves, every budget line item, by the distinctive note of being a mere authorization, does not obligate the expenditure.” In the case at hand, (…) the existence of a provision of budgetary content that authorized the inclusion of that additional sum in the officials' salary (salario) was not demonstrated. In that sense, the practice of economically recognizing that daily period lacked legal and budgetary support, as there was no provision whatsoever of such nature that backed the expenditure for the payment of that recognition, so the claim regarding the payment of the amount and the future restoration of that benefit is deemed improper, by virtue of having been granted illegitimately.” (end of transcription). On the topic of acquired rights, as opposed to the immutability of the legal system, of analogous application since it concerns the elimination of a provision from the legal system, even if not by repeal, it can be complemented by reading the Votos of the Sala Constitucional, numbers 17294 of fourteen hours forty-seven minutes of November 19, 2008, and 2996 of March 8, 2006.\n\nIII. With the established parameters, and keeping in mind that judicial conflicts that may eventually entail an increase in public spending, borne by taxpayers, must be analyzed with restrictive and austerity criteria, as well as social convenience (conveniencia social) and opportunity, having as a priority goal the satisfaction of social needs, it is concluded that the lower court judge (juez a quo) resolved this complaint in accordance with the Law and the merits of the case file, therefore, the judgment (sentencia) subject to appeal (venida en alzada) is upheld in all its terms. POR TANTO: No defects generating nullity or defenselessness are observed. The appealed judgment (sentencia apelada) is upheld.”\n\nTo this effect, the terms 'public official' (funcionario público), 'public servant' (servidor público), 'public employee' (empleado público), 'person in charge of a public service' (encargado de servicio público), and other similar terms shall be considered equivalent, and the regime governing their relations shall be the same for all, unless the nature of the situation indicates otherwise. Employees of State enterprises or economic services tasked with operations subject to common law are not considered public servants.\" (Article 111). Following this, numeral 112 adds: \"1. Administrative law (derecho administrativo) shall be applicable to the service relations between the Administration and its public servants. / 2. The service relations of laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labor law (derecho laboral) or commercial law, as the case may be. / 3. However, the legal or regulatory provisions of public law (derecho público) necessary to guarantee administrative legality and morality, as determined by decree by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), shall also apply to the latter. / 4. For criminal law purposes, such servants shall be deemed as public servants.\" On the other hand, Article 188 of the Constitución Política, amended by Law No. 4123 of May 31, 1968, establishes: \"The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of government. Their directors are responsible for their management.\" For its part, constitutional numeral 189 provides: \"The following are autonomous institutions: 1) The State Banks; 2) The State insurance institutions; 3) Those established by this Constitution, and the new bodies that the Legislative Assembly may create by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total members.\" Having made the foregoing conceptual and normative clarifications, it is pertinent to note that, in the present matter, it has been established that the plaintiffs (...) possess the nature of public employees, and therefore their service relations are subject to the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) in all its dimensions.\n\nOne of the elements of those relationships subject to that principle is precisely the salary, which, in public employment matters, is paid with State resources and is therefore governed by the so-called principle of budgetary legality (principio de legalidad presupuestaria), according to which the use and disposition of resources is subordinated to the budget of the respective public entity, such that every expenditure must be budgetarily authorized.” Regarding this principle, this same Chamber, in Voto number 394, of 15:04 hours on May 31, 2006, also held: “Salary structures acquire a normative character, forming part of a public budget, in which there will be a code for each purpose. For that reason, modifications to particular situations—the condition of a specific employee—are made subject to real budgetary availability, and always toward the future, from a specific, already regulated moment. Said set of tools, plus those stemming from a law or another applicable normative provision, function as part of the so-called block of legality (bloque de legalidad), in this case, sectoral, and from which the specific Administration cannot depart (Article 11 of the Constitución Política, in relation to numerals 11 and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública).” On this subject, one may consult, among others, the judgments of this Chamber, numbers 134, of 11:20 hours on March 3; 160, of 10:20 hours on March 15; and 984, of 10:10 hours on October 25; all of 2006). On this particular, the Sala Constitucional has also referred, in Voto N° 5.500, of 14:33 hours on July 5, 2000, in which it indicated: “The principle of budgetary legality derives from the content of Articles 176 and 180 of the Constitution, fundamentally from the latter. […] As noted in the action, as a limiting authorization, the budget determines the legality of public expenditures, such that the Administration may dispose of funds only in the form and measure contemplated in the corresponding budgetary norm. If said norm is what enables the State to carry out the expenditure, any variation sought to be made in the assigned destination of the funds must equally satisfy this constitutional principle; hence, it is indispensable to process the respective budget modification (modificación presupuestaria). In this sense, both the plaintiff and the Procuraduría are correct in their report when they assert that there is a difference between creating an obligation and authorizing its payment, since an ordinary law may be the creating source of obligations or expenditures—in this case, the payment of a subsidy—but may not automatically authorize the payment of said obligation. The foregoing, because that authorization can only proceed from a budgetary norm: the public entity can only execute a payment within the current budgetary provisions, for which ordinary legislation certainly serves as the foundation. Consequently, it cannot be lost sight of that the enabling budgetary norm is a requirement to make effective any expenditure deriving from ordinary legislation. Likewise, the Chamber has understood that this principle governs both the original formulation of the annual budget and any change sought to be introduced during the respective fiscal year, regarding which it has been stated that: ‘...the competence or legitimation constitutionally attributed to the Asamblea Legislativa over such important matter is to fix in the budgets the probable revenues and authorized expenditures of the Public Administration with the modalities that the Constitution itself establishes for their modification and for extraordinary budgets’ (resolution number 1971-96, others 5602-94, 6215-93, 121-89; emphasis added). […] Hence, then, that the Administration may only spend what the Ley de Presupuesto expressly authorizes it to and, additionally, that it is legally impossible for it to exceed the expressly authorized amounts. Now, it is a notorious fact, and therefore requires no specific accreditation, that whatever the sphere of the Public Administration in which we find ourselves, every budget line item, by the distinguishing note of being a mere authorization, does not obligate expenditure.” In the case under review, (…) the existence of a norm of budgetary content authorizing the inclusion of that additional sum in the officials’ salary was not demonstrated. In that sense, the practice of economically recognizing that daily period lacked legal and budgetary support, as no norm of such nature existed to back the disbursement for the payment of that recognition, for which the claim regarding the cancellation of the amount and the future reinstatement of that benefit is deemed improper, by virtue of having been granted illegitimately.” (end of transcription). On the subject of acquired rights, as opposed to the immutability of the legal order, of analogical application when dealing in this instance with the elimination of a norm from the order, even if not by repeal, it may be complemented by the reading of the Votos of the Sala Constitucional, numbers 17294 of fourteen hours forty-seven minutes on November 19, 2008, and 2996 of March 8, 2006.\n\nIII. With the parameters laid out, and bearing in mind that judicial disputes that may eventually entail an increase in public expenditure, at the expense of taxpayers, must be analyzed with restrictive criteria and austerity, as well as social convenience and opportuneness, having as a priority purpose the satisfaction of social needs, it is concluded that the lower-court judge resolved this complaint in accordance with Law and the merits of the case file, for which the judgment brought on appeal is confirmed in all its extremes.\n\nPOR TANTO:\n\nNo defects causing nullity or defenselessness are appreciated. The appealed judgment is confirmed.”"
}