{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-134343", "citation": "Res. 00927-2010 Sala Segunda de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria en servidores bancarios públicos", "title_en": "Statute of limitations on disciplinary power for public bank employees", "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia confirma el despido sin responsabilidad patronal de un analista de crédito de un banco estatal, por graves y reiteradas omisiones en la tramitación de once solicitudes de crédito. El trabajador alegaba la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria del empleador, argumentando que el banco conocía los hechos desde 1998 y solo lo despidió en 2004. La Sala rechaza el argumento y establece que, tratándose de un servidor de la hacienda pública (quien maneja fondos públicos), el plazo de prescripción aplicable es de dos años según el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Determina que el inicio del cómputo del plazo es cuando el órgano competente adquiere conocimiento comprobado de la falta —en este caso, con el informe de Auditoría Interna de junio de 2001—, y que el plazo se suspende durante la tramitación del procedimiento disciplinario. Como la imputación de cargos ocurrió en diciembre de 2002 y la decisión de despido se comunicó en octubre de 2004, la potestad sancionatoria fue ejercida oportunamente. La Sala también valora la especial rigurosidad con que deben ser sancionadas las faltas de empleados bancarios, dado el manejo de fondos públicos y la confianza depositada en ellos.", "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court upholds the dismissal without employer liability of a credit analyst from a state bank, due to serious and repeated omissions in the processing of eleven loan applications. The employee argued that the employer's disciplinary power had expired, claiming the bank knew of the facts since 1998 but only dismissed him in 2004. The Chamber rejects the argument and holds that, for a public treasury employee (one who handles public funds), the applicable statute of limitations is two years under Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General. It determines that the statute begins to run when the competent body has proven knowledge of the misconduct — in this case, with the Internal Audit report of June 2001 — and that the period is suspended during the disciplinary procedure. Since the formal charges were brought in December 2002 and the dismissal decision was communicated in October 2004, the disciplinary power was exercised timely. The Chamber also stresses that faults of bank employees must be assessed with particular strictness, given their handling of public funds and the trust placed in them.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte", "date": "2010", "year": "2010", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "potestad sancionatoria", "servidor de la hacienda pública", "despido sin responsabilidad patronal", "prescripción", "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR)", "Código de Trabajo", "analista de crédito", "grupo de interés económico" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 71", "law": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República" }, { "article": "Art. 603", "law": "Código de Trabajo" }, { "article": "Art. 45 inciso a", "law": "Ley General de Control Interno" }, { "article": "Art. 1", "law": "Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional" }, { "article": "Art. 2", "law": "Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional" }, { "article": "Art. 8", "law": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República" }, { "article": "Art. 9", "law": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República" }, { "article": "Art. 81 inciso l", "law": "Código de Trabajo" } ], "keywords_es": [ "prescripción potestad sancionatoria", "servidor de la hacienda pública", "analista de crédito bancario", "despido sin responsabilidad patronal", "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República", "Código de Trabajo", "cómputo del plazo", "procedimiento disciplinario", "falta grave", "confianza en empleado bancario" ], "keywords_en": [ "statute of limitations disciplinary power", "public treasury employee", "bank credit analyst", "dismissal without employer liability", "Organic Law of the Comptroller General", "Labor Code", "computation of period", "disciplinary procedure", "serious misconduct", "trust in bank employee" ], "excerpt_es": "Esta Sala, de manera reiterada ha establecido que en el caso de que el empleador (público o privado) deba cumplir, de previo a disciplinar a sus trabajadores, con un determinado procedimiento o investigación, ese plazo fijado para la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria (en el caso concreto dos años), se contará a partir del momento en que el resultado de la respectiva investigación sea puesto en conocimiento del funcionario u órgano competente para resolver.\n\nComo quedó debidamente acreditado en autos (ver folio 87 del expediente), el actor fue intimado por una serie de irregularidades [...] que sólo fueron de conocimiento de la administración del banco hasta que se elaboró el informe de la Auditoría Interna el 4 de junio de 2001, con lo cual el plazo de prescripción se debe computar a partir de ese momento y no antes.\n\nEn consecuencia, sus faltas deben ser valoradas con mayor rigor, dado que está de por medio el prestigio y la imagen de la entidad, en relación con terceros que ocupan sus servicios, para el manejo y custodia de dineros y de títulos.", "excerpt_en": "This Chamber has repeatedly held that when the employer (public or private) must first comply with a specific procedure or investigation before disciplining its workers, the period established for the statute of limitations on disciplinary power (in this case, two years) shall be counted from the moment the result of the respective investigation is made known to the official or body competent to decide.\n\nAs duly proven in the record (see folio 87 of the file), the plaintiff was charged with a series of irregularities [...] which only became known to the bank's management when the Internal Audit report was prepared on June 4, 2001, and therefore the statute of limitations must be computed from that moment and not before.\n\nConsequently, his faults must be assessed with greater rigor, given the prestige and image of the entity at stake, in relation to third parties who use its services for handling and custody of money and securities.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The Chamber denied the appeal and upheld the dismissal without employer liability, holding that the disciplinary power had not expired and that the serious misconduct justified the termination of the employment relationship.", "summary_es": "La Sala declaró sin lugar el recurso del trabajador y confirmó el despido sin responsabilidad patronal, al considerar que la potestad sancionatoria no había prescrito y que las faltas graves justificaban la terminación de la relación laboral." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "The interpretation of the concept of public treasury employee must be restricted to one who is in charge of handling public funds.", "quote_es": "La interpretación del concepto de servidor de la hacienda pública debe restringirse a aquel que tiene a su cargo el manejo de fondos públicos." }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "The statute of limitations is suspended when the Administration must carry out a disciplinary procedure in order to sanction the misconduct.", "quote_es": "El plazo de prescripción se ve suspendido cuando la Administración deba llevar a cabo un procedimiento disciplinario para poder sancionar la falta." }, { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "A bank employee, by performing functions that require handling considerable sums of money, is obligated even more than any other worker to act transparently, to be upright, faultless, loyal, and trustworthy.", "quote_es": "El empleado bancario, por realizar funciones que requieren el manejo de sumas considerables de dinero, está obligado aún más que cualquier otro trabajador a actuar en forma transparente, a ser probo, intachable, leal y confiable." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-134343", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-21629", "norm_num": "7428", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "07/09/1994" }, { "doc_id": "norm-49185", "norm_num": "8292", "norm_name": "Ley General de Control Interno", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "31/07/2002" }, { "doc_id": "norm-9925", "norm_num": "1644", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "26/09/1953" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“V.- SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD SANCIONATORIA ADMINISTRATIVA EN EL CASO CONCRETO: Los servidores públicos, o aquellos trabajadores que laboren para la Administración, estarán sujetos a distintos tipos de responsabilidad, según la naturaleza de su cargo o las funciones atribuidas. Así en materia de prescripción se entiende que existen dos regímenes distintos: El primero, aquel que se le aplica al servidor común, que remite a lo dispuesto por el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, y que establece un plazo de prescripción para sancionar la falta de un mes, contabilizado desde el momento en que el jerarca encargado de sancionar al funcionario adquiere plena certeza de la existencia de la conducta reprochable. El segundo, el que rige para el denominado “servidor de la hacienda pública” quien se encuentra sujeto a los plazos de prescripción regulados en el numeral 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Previamente a la reforma introducida por el inciso a) del artículo 45 de la Ley n° 8292 de 31 de julio de 2002, Ley de Control Interno (donde se estableció un plazo de prescripción de cinco años), esta norma disponía: “La responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor de la Hacienda Pública, prescribirá en el plazo de dos años, contados a partir del conocimiento comprobado de la falta por parte del órgano competente, para iniciar el respectivo procedimiento sancionatorio. Para estos efectos, quedan reformados, respecto de los funcionarios o de los servidores públicos, el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, y cualesquiera otras disposiciones jurídicas que se le opongan”. Sobre los alcances de dicha norma, la Sala Constitucional en el voto n° 6750 de las 11:12 horas del 17 de octubre de 1997 señaló: “En efecto, considera esta Sala que si bien el artículo 8 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría define la “Hacienda Pública”, como “...la organización formada por los entes y órganos públicos, incluyendo los no estatales, propietarios o encargados, por cualquier título, de la administración del patrimonio público”, y que éste último es “...la universalidad constituida por los fondos públicos, y por los pasivos a cargo de la Hacienda Pública”, tales conceptos deben entenderse y aplicarse con relación a lo que constituye el objetivo principal de la Ley, vale decir, el establecimiento de la esfera de competencia de la Contraloría. Sin embargo, cuando se trata de temas ajenos en general a dicho órgano tal y como es el caso del artículo 71 cuestionado, lo cierto es que la interpretación del concepto de servidor de la hacienda pública debe restringirse a aquel que tiene a su cargo el manejo de fondos públicos. Para la Sala, esta interpretación es necesaria, pues solo de esa forma resulta justificada y explicable la diferencia de los plazos de prescripción para la aplicación de sanciones disciplinarias. Dicho de otra forma, el plazo de dos años establecido en el artículo cuestionado resulta constitucionalmente adecuado solo si se entiende que con él se pretende posibilitar al Estado un control mayor sobre sus funciones que están directamente relacionados con el manejo y disposición de los fondos públicos, ello por indudable relevancia del tema y la gran necesidad de asegurar el manejo más sano y limpio posible de los fondos públicos”. Por su parte, el numeral 9 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República indica que los fondos públicos son los recursos, valores, bienes y derechos propiedad del Estado, de órganos, de empresas o de entes públicos. Consta en el informe preparado por la Auditoría Interna de la entidad demandada y que motivó el inicio del proceso disciplinario seguido en contra del actor, que éste ocupaba el puesto de “analista de crédito profesional” y como tal dentro de sus responsabilidades se encontraba: “Ejecutar estudios y análisis de proyectos de inversión tendientes a lograr el financiamiento del Banco (…) Organizar y efectuar estudios de diversa índole como parte del proceso de otorgar créditos por parte del Banco (…) Estudiar, preparar y evaluar proyectos… propiedades y construcción y prestar asesoría para el adecuado desarrollo de los mismos. (…) Efectuar estudios de solicitudes de préstamos para determinar la capacidad de pago del solicitante y la recuperación del crédito y rendir los informes respectivos. (…) Realizar visitas de inspección para determina el cumplimiento de los planes de inversión. (….) Recomendar la aprobación de los préstamos. (…) Atender consultas de los niveles superiores, otras dependencias del Banco y empleados relacionados con su cargo (…) Realizar otras labores técnico-profesionales que deriven de su función”. (Folio 396). Estas tareas, no sólo resultan de vital trascendencia dentro del giro normal de la actividad del banco demandado, sino además, por la naturaleza jurídica de esta entidad (institución autónoma de derecho público de conformidad con lo dispuesto por los artículos 1 y 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, n° 1644, del 26 de setiembre de 1953), con sus actuaciones puede comprometer el buen resguardo de fondos públicos, por lo que encaja en ese concepto restringido de servidor de la Hacienda Pública, a que hace referencia el fallo de la Sala Constitucional parcialmente citado. La norma es expresa, al mencionar el momento a partir del cual corre el mencionado plazo para disciplinar la falta del servidor, indicando que éste se computará a partir del conocimiento comprobado de la falta por parte del órgano competente para iniciar el respectivo procedimiento sancionatorio. En el caso bajo estudio, la subgerencia del banco fue informada de la existencia de la presunta falta cometida por el actor, mediante nota de fecha 4 de junio de 2001, n° AUD-384/01 (folio 84 a 148); y el señor subgerente solicitó al órgano competente (Comisión Mixta de Relaciones Laborales) la apertura del procedimiento respecto de la falta que se tuvo por comprobada a través de la necesaria investigación previa, mediante nota de fecha 29 de noviembre de 2002, cuando aún no había transcurrido el término de prescripción de dos años establecido para sancionar la falta cometida por el señor [Nombre1] . Ahora bien, esta Sala, de manera reiterada ha establecido que en el caso de que el empleador (público o privado) deba cumplir, de previo a disciplinar a sus trabajadores, con un determinado procedimiento o investigación, ese plazo fijado para la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria (en el caso concreto dos años), se contará a partir del momento en que el resultado de la respectiva investigación sea puesto en conocimiento del funcionario u órgano \n\ncompetente para resolver. (Al respecto, pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras, las sentencias n°s. 36, de las 9:50 horas del 5 de febrero; 92, de las 9:40 horas del 28 de febrero; 153, de las 9:30 horas del 28 de marzo; 184, de las 14:20 horas del 24 de abril, las tres de 2003; 89, de las 10:10 horas del 13 de febrero de 2004; 360, de las 10:15 del 13 de mayo de 2005; 544, de las 9:35 horas del 28 de junio y 561, de las 9:48 horas del 30 de junio, ambas de 2006). En el caso que se analiza, el actor ha invocado la prescripción del poder disciplinario (agravio que al ser expresado ante el tribunal corrió la misma suerte que el referido a la caducidad, por lo que al respecto nos remitimos a lo dicho en el considerando anterior), señalando que el plazo dentro del cual la entidad empleadora podía ejercer esa potestad había fenecido por el transcurso del tiempo; por ende, el derecho para poderlo sancionar también sucumbió, pues el banco tuvo conocimiento de la existencia del “grupo de interés económico San Antonio” desde el año 1998, y el actor fue despedido hasta el año 2004, cuando ya había transcurrido sobradamente -según su criterio- el término de prescripción de dos años establecido por el numeral 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Este agravio no puede ser de recibo. Como quedó debidamente acreditado en autos (ver folio 87 del expediente), el actor fue intimado por una serie de irregularidades que se presentaron en la tramitación de 11 créditos en los que tuvo participación como “analista de crédito”, y que fueron formalizados entre el 23 de enero de 1997 y el 31 de mayo de 1999. Tales hechos no guardan ninguna relación (directa), con la llamada de atención que se le efectúo al actor en el mes de diciembre de 1998. (Ver al respecto acta n° 154/98 del 2 de diciembre de 1998, artículo II, inciso 2-A, de la Junta Directiva Local de la entidad demandada, folios 59 a 63). Lo anterior en razón de que la llamada de atención se debió al incumplimiento de sus deberes en la tramitación de un crédito que no se aprobó, solicitado por “Estación de Servicio San Antonio S.A.”, mientras que los hechos investigados se refieren a créditos aprobados, en los que ninguno de los solicitantes es dicha sociedad, con lo cual, es más que evidente, que el proceso disciplinario seguido contra el actor, se funda en presupuestos de hecho distintos, que sólo fueron de conocimiento de la administración del banco hasta que se elaboró el informe de la Auditoría Interna el 4 de junio de 2001, con lo cual el plazo de prescripción se debe computar a partir de ese momento y no antes. Ahora bien, como se indicó supra, el cómputo del plazo de prescripción se ve suspendido cuando la Administración deba llevar a cabo un procedimiento disciplinario para poder sancionar la falta -como ocurre en el caso concreto-; por ende, a partir de la imputación de cargos al señor [Nombre1] , efectuada el 11 de diciembre de 2002, este plazo se ve interrumpido, reiniciándose nuevamente su cómputo, a partir del día 6 de octubre de 2004, fecha en que la comisión comunicó los resultados del procedimiento disciplinario y su recomendación de despido sin responsabilidad patronal a la subgerencia de la entidad accionada. De conformidad con lo anterior, al haberse comunicado, por parte de las autoridades del banco, la decisión de despido al actor en fecha 12 de octubre de 2004, mediante oficio GG 145 (folio 383), es decir, menos de una semana después de tener conocimiento de la existencia de la falta, se concluye por parte de esta Sala que la decisión de despedir al demandante fue adoptada oportunamente, por lo que la aplicación del instituto de la prescripción no resulta procedente en el sub lite y, por lo tanto, se considera que no medió inercia alguna de parte de la Administración. \n\nVI.- RESPECTO DEL EXPEDIENTE DONDE CONSTA LA EXISTENCIA DEL GRUPO DE INTERÉS ECONÓMICO: Como último motivo de agravio, reprocha el recurrente que la sanción impuesta al actor se efectuó sin contar con el expediente de solicitud de crédito de la “Estación de Servicio San Antonio S.A.”, prueba que -en su criterio- resultaba esencial para poder adoptar tal decisión. Este agravio no puede ser de recibo. Si bien es cierto, en ese expediente se realizó un análisis por parte de la Junta Local de Crédito de la entidad demandada, en el que se arribó a la conclusión, de que las empresas “Estación de Servicio San Antonio S.A.” y “Maderas y Materiales San Antonio S.A.”, configuraban un grupo de interés económico por existir personas que ocupaban cargos en ambas sociedades y a su vez existir vínculos de parentesco entre algunos de sus personeros, esta circunstancia no guarda relación directa con la falta atribuida al señor [Nombre1] . El hecho de que pueda llegar a discutirse si tales vinculaciones realmente se encuadran dentro del concepto legal de “grupo de interés económico”, en nada atañen al trabajador, quien no se beneficia o perjudica de ello, pues los únicos interesados en que eventualmente el banco modificara su criterio, son los propios empresarios a los que se les negó el crédito. Para efectos del actor, lo que cuenta es que él tenía conocimiento de la posición del banco respecto a la existencia del grupo (pues el mismo reconoce que se le llamó la atención en una ocasión por no evidenciar los posibles nexos entre estas empresas al estudiar la solicitud de crédito de una de ellas). Por lo que al tramitar nuevos créditos de personas con vínculos cercanos de parentesco con los personeros de estas empresas, debió advertirlo a sus superiores, para que éstos a la hora de tomar la decisión final de aprobar el crédito, contaran con todos los elementos objetivos para adoptar la mejor decisión. Sin embargo, como se acreditó en el proceso administrativo, el actor obvió informar de esta circunstancia en once solicitudes de crédito, a sabiendas de que el banco ya había rechazado otra solicitud en circunstancias similares. Aunado a lo anterior, esta no fue la única falta atribuida al actor, sino que como consta en la relación de hechos imputados al señor [Nombre1] , este infringió una serie de procedimientos exigidos por las políticas bancarias, en la tramitación de los once créditos referidos en el auto de imputación de cargos; lo cual a la larga desencadenó, que se otorgaran créditos cuya recuperación por vías ordinarias (el pago del deudor) no resultara posible, y por vía de ejecución forzosa no se lograra recuperar el total de la deuda, produciéndose una pérdida de varios millones de colones para el banco (ver informe de auditoría de folios 84 a 148 y declaración de [Nombre2] de folios 703 a 707). Estas faltas por si solas resultan de una gravedad tal que impidieron la continuidad de la relación laboral, ya que por lo trascendente de las tareas encomendadas al actor, la confianza es un elemento objetivo que debe mantenerse durante toda la relación laboral, y una entidad bancaria no puede confiar en un analista de crédito, que en once operaciones bancarias, omitió referir en su informe elementos de vital importancia para que los encargados de autorizar el crédito pudieran adoptar una decisión que garantizara la seguridad del patrimonio de la entidad accionada. Esta Sala, en reiteradas ocasiones ha señalado que el empleado bancario, por realizar funciones que requieren el manejo de sumas considerables de dinero, está obligado aún más que cualquier otro trabajador a actuar en forma transparente, a ser probo, intachable, leal y confiable; cumpliendo de buena fe las labores que le son encomendadas (ver votos n° 79 de las nueve horas diez minutos del diecisiete de agosto de mil novecientos ochenta y ocho; 114 de las catorce horas del primero de agosto de mil novecientos ochenta y nueve; 40 de las nueve horas cincuenta minutos del doce de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y tres; 202 de las dieciséis horas cinco minutos del tres de julio de mil novecientos noventa y seis; 416 de las once horas del veintisiete de julio del año dos mil uno; y 326 de las nueve horas diez minutos del once de mayo del año dos mil cinco). En consecuencia, sus faltas deben ser valoradas con mayor rigor, dado que está de por medio el prestigio y la imagen de la entidad, en relación con terceros que ocupan sus servicios, para el manejo y custodia de dineros y de títulos. Cuando un funcionario bancario -en este caso el demandante- se conduce de una forma abiertamente cuestionable, es suficiente para considerar desde el punto de vista de la actividad del Banco y de los intereses que éste debe tutelar, como un funcionario no confiable (vid voto número 202, de las dieciséis horas cinco minutos del tres de julio de mil novecientos noventa y seis). Así las cosas, los hechos endilgados al accionante, desde cualquier punto que se miren son graves, suficientes para fundar su despido sin responsabilidad patronal (inciso l), del artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo), conclusión a la cual se arribó acertadamente en la resolución final del procedimiento administrativo, hechos con los cuales se conformó el actor pues en ningún momento -ni durante el procedimiento administrativo ni en el judicial- negó su participación en los mismos y su defensa se centró en aducir la caducidad y la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria, argumentos que, como quedó definido en los considerandos anteriores, resultan improcedentes y por ende no queda más que avalar la decisión de la accionada de sancionar las faltas atribuidas al actor con el despido sin responsabilidad patronal.”", "body_en_text": "**V.- REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONING POWER IN THE SPECIFIC CASE:** Public servants, or those workers who work for the Administration, are subject to different types of liability, depending on the nature of their position or the assigned functions. Thus, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), it is understood that two distinct regimes exist: The first, that which applies to the ordinary servant, which refers to the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and which establishes a statute of limitations (prescripción) period for sanctioning the misconduct of one month, counted from the moment in which the superior (jerarca) responsible for sanctioning the official acquires full certainty of the existence of the reprehensible conduct. The second, that which governs the so-called “public treasury servant (servidor de la hacienda pública)” who is subject to the statute of limitations (prescripción) periods regulated in section 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República). Prior to the reform introduced by subsection a) of Article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno) (where a five-year statute of limitations period was established), this rule provided: “*The disciplinary liability of the public treasury servant (servidor de la Hacienda Pública) shall prescribe (prescribirá) within the term of two years, counted from the proven knowledge of the misconduct by the competent body to initiate the respective sanctioning procedure. For these purposes, Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and any other opposed legal provisions, are hereby reformed with respect to officials or public servants*”. Regarding the scope of said rule, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in Vote (Voto) No. 6750 of 11:12 hours on October 17, 1997, stated: “*In effect, this Chamber considers that although Article 8 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller defines the ‘Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública)’ as ‘...the organization formed by public entities and bodies, including non-state ones, owners or in charge, by any title, of the administration of public patrimony’, and that the latter is ‘...the universality constituted by public funds, and by the liabilities charged to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública)’, such concepts must be understood and applied in relation to what constitutes the main objective of the Law, that is, the establishment of the sphere of competence of the Comptroller. However, when it concerns matters generally alien to said body, as is the case of the questioned Article 71, the truth is that the interpretation of the concept of public treasury servant (servidor de la hacienda pública) must be restricted to that person who is in charge of handling public funds. For this Chamber, this interpretation is necessary, because only in this way is the difference in the statute of limitations (prescripción) periods for the application of disciplinary sanctions justified and explainable. In other words, the two-year term established in the questioned article is constitutionally adequate only if it is understood that it seeks to enable the State to have greater control over its functions that are directly related to the handling and disposal of public funds, due to the undeniable relevance of the matter and the great need to ensure the soundest and cleanest possible handling of public funds*”. Meanwhile, section 9 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic indicates that public funds are the resources, securities, assets, and rights owned by the State, by bodies, by companies, or by public entities. The report prepared by the Internal Audit of the defendant entity, which motivated the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff, shows that he held the position of “professional credit analyst” and as such, his responsibilities included: “*Execute studies and analyses of investment projects aimed at achieving financing from the Bank (…) Organize and carry out diverse studies as part of the credit granting process by the Bank (…) Study, prepare, and evaluate projects… properties and construction and provide advice for the adequate development of the same. (…) Carry out studies of loan applications to determine the applicant’s payment capacity and loan recovery and render the respective reports. (…) Conduct inspection visits to determine compliance with investment plans. (…) Recommend the approval of loans. (…) Attend to inquiries from higher levels, other Bank departments, and employees related to his position (…) Perform other technical-professional tasks derived from his function*”. (Folio 396). These tasks are not only of vital importance within the normal course of the defendant bank’s activity, but also, due to the legal nature of this entity (a self-governing institution of public law (institución autónoma de derecho público) in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional), No. 1644, of September 26, 1953), its actions can compromise the proper safeguarding of public funds, thus fitting within that restricted concept of public treasury servant (servidor de la Hacienda Pública), to which the partially cited ruling of the Constitutional Chamber refers. The rule is explicit when mentioning the moment from which the mentioned period for disciplining the servant’s misconduct runs, indicating that it shall be computed from the proven knowledge of the misconduct by the competent body to initiate the respective sanctioning procedure. In the case under study, the assistant management of the bank was informed of the existence of the alleged misconduct committed by the plaintiff, through note dated June 4, 2001, No. AUD-384/01 (folios 84 to 148); and the assistant manager requested the competent body (Joint Labor Relations Commission) to open the procedure regarding the misconduct that was considered proven through the necessary prior investigation, by note dated November 29, 2002, when the two-year statute of limitations (prescripción) term established for sanctioning the misconduct committed by Mr. [Nombre1] had not yet elapsed. Now then, this Chamber has repeatedly established that in the event that the employer (public or private) must, prior to disciplining its workers, comply with a specific procedure or investigation, that period set for the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning power (in this specific case, two years), shall be counted from the moment in which the result of the respective investigation is brought to the attention of the official or body\n\ncompetent to decide. (In this regard, among many others, see judgments Nos. 36, of 9:50 hours on February 5; 92, of 9:40 hours on February 28; 153, of 9:30 hours on March 28; 184, of 14:20 hours on April 24, all three from 2003; 89, of 10:10 hours on February 13, 2004; 360, of 10:15 hours on May 13, 2005; 544, of 9:35 hours on June 28 and 561, of 9:48 hours on June 30, both from 2006). In the case being analyzed, the plaintiff has invoked the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power (a grievance that, when expressed before the tribunal, suffered the same fate as the one referring to the lapse (caducidad), for which we refer in this regard to what was stated in the previous whereas clause), pointing out that the period within which the employing entity could exercise that power had expired due to the passage of time; therefore, the right to sanction him also perished, since the bank had knowledge of the existence of the “San Antonio economic interest group” since the year 1998, and the plaintiff was not dismissed until the year 2004, when the two-year statute of limitations (prescripción) term established by section 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic had already—according to his criteria—more than elapsed. This grievance cannot be accepted. As was duly accredited in the record (see folio 87 of the case file), the plaintiff was charged (intimado) with a series of irregularities that arose in the processing of 11 loans in which he participated as a “credit analyst,” and which were formalized between January 23, 1997, and May 31, 1999. Such facts bear no (direct) relationship to the warning that was given to the plaintiff in the month of December 1998. (See in this regard minute No. 154/98 of December 2, 1998, Article II, subsection 2-A, of the Local Board of Directors of the defendant entity, folios 59 to 63). The foregoing because the warning was due to the breach of his duties in the processing of a loan that was not approved, requested by “Estación de Servicio San Antonio S.A.,” whereas the investigated facts refer to approved loans, in which none of the applicants is said company, thereby making it more than evident that the disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff is based on different factual assumptions, which only became known to the bank’s administration when the Internal Audit report was prepared on June 4, 2001, with which the statute of limitations (prescripción) period must be computed from that moment and not before. Now then, as indicated supra, the computation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) period is suspended when the Administration must carry out a disciplinary procedure to sanction the misconduct—as occurs in this specific case—; therefore, from the notification of charges (imputación de cargos) to Mr. [Nombre1], made on December 11, 2002, this period is interrupted, restarting its computation from October 6, 2004, the date on which the commission communicated the results of the disciplinary procedure and its recommendation of dismissal without employer liability to the assistant management of the defendant entity. In accordance with the foregoing, since the decision of dismissal was communicated to the plaintiff by the bank authorities on October 12, 2004, via official letter GG 145 (folio 383), that is, less than a week after having knowledge of the existence of the misconduct, this Chamber concludes that the decision to dismiss the plaintiff was adopted in a timely manner, and therefore the application of the institute of the statute of limitations (prescripción) is not appropriate in the sub lite and, consequently, it is considered that there was no inertia whatsoever on the part of the Administration.\n\n**VI.- REGARDING THE CASE FILE WHERE THE EXISTENCE OF THE ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUP IS RECORDED:** As a final ground of grievance, the appellant reproaches that the sanction imposed on the plaintiff was carried out without having the loan application file for “Estación de Servicio San Antonio S.A.,” evidence that—in his opinion—was essential to be able to adopt such a decision. This grievance cannot be accepted. While it is true, in that case file an analysis was performed by the Local Credit Board of the defendant entity, in which it reached the conclusion that the companies “Estación de Servicio San Antonio S.A.” and “Maderas y Materiales San Antonio S.A.” constituted an economic interest group due to the existence of persons holding positions in both companies and, in turn, the existence of kinship ties among some of their representatives, this circumstance bears no direct relation to the misconduct attributed to Mr. [Nombre1]. The fact that it might be debated whether such linkages truly fit within the legal concept of “economic interest group” in no way concerns the worker, who neither benefits from nor is harmed by it, since the only interested parties in the bank eventually modifying its criterion are the businesspersons themselves to whom the loan was denied. For purposes of the plaintiff, what matters is that he was aware of the bank’s position regarding the existence of the group (since he acknowledges having been warned on one occasion for not evidencing the possible links between these companies when studying the loan application for one of them). Therefore, when processing new loans for persons with close kinship ties to the representatives of these companies, he should have advised his superiors, so that they, at the time of making the final decision to approve the loan, would have all the objective elements to adopt the best decision. However, as was accredited in the administrative process, the plaintiff omitted to report this circumstance in eleven loan applications, knowing that the bank had already rejected another application under similar circumstances. In addition to the foregoing, this was not the only misconduct attributed to the plaintiff, but rather, as recorded in the statement of facts charged to Mr. [Nombre1], he violated a series of procedures required by banking policies in the processing of the eleven loans referenced in the order setting forth charges; which ultimately triggered that loans were granted whose recovery through ordinary means (debtor payment) was not possible, and through forced execution it was not possible to recover the total debt, resulting in a loss of several million colones for the bank (see audit report folios 84 to 148 and statement of [Nombre2] folios 703 to 707). These misconducts alone are of such gravity that they prevented the continuity of the employment relationship, since due to the transcendent nature of the tasks entrusted to the plaintiff, trust (confianza) is an objective element that must be maintained throughout the employment relationship, and a banking entity cannot trust a credit analyst who, in eleven banking operations, omitted to include in his report elements of vital importance so that those in charge of authorizing the loan could adopt a decision guaranteeing the security of the defendant entity’s patrimony. This Chamber has repeatedly pointed out that the bank employee, by performing functions that require the handling of considerable sums of money, is obligated even more so than any other worker to act transparently, to be honest, unimpeachable, loyal, and trustworthy; faithfully performing the tasks assigned to him (see votes Nos. 79 of nine hours ten minutes on August seventeen, nineteen eighty-eight; 114 of fourteen hours on August first, nineteen eighty-nine; 40 of nine hours fifty minutes on March twelve, nineteen ninety-three; 202 of sixteen hours five minutes on July three, nineteen ninety-six; 416 of eleven hours on July twenty-seven, two thousand one; and 326 of nine hours ten minutes on May eleven, two thousand five). Consequently, his misconducts must be evaluated with greater rigor, given that the prestige and image of the entity, in relation to third parties who use its services for the handling and custody of money and securities, are at stake. When a bank official—in this case the plaintiff—conducts himself in an openly questionable manner, it is sufficient to consider him, from the viewpoint of the Bank’s activity and the interests it must protect, as an unreliable official (cf. vote number 202, of sixteen hours five minutes on July three, nineteen ninety-six). Thus, the facts imputed to the plaintiff, no matter how you look at them, are serious, sufficient to justify his dismissal without employer liability (subsection l), of Article 81 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)), a conclusion which was correctly reached in the final resolution of the administrative procedure, facts with which the plaintiff concurred since at no time—neither during the administrative procedure nor the judicial one—did he deny his participation in them; his defense focused on alleging the lapse (caducidad) and the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning power, arguments that, as established in the previous whereas clauses, are inappropriate and therefore there is no choice but to endorse the defendant’s decision to sanction the misconducts attributed to the plaintiff with dismissal without employer liability.\n\n**V.- REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER IN THE SPECIFIC CASE:** Public servants, or those workers who work for the Administration, shall be subject to different types of liability, depending on the nature of their position or the duties assigned. Thus, in matters of statute of limitations (prescripción), it is understood that two distinct regimes exist: The first, that which applies to the common servant, which refers to the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and establishes a one-month statute of limitations period to sanction the misconduct, counted from the moment the head responsible for sanctioning the official acquires full certainty of the existence of the reprehensible conduct. The second, that which governs the so-called \"public treasury servant (servidor de la hacienda pública),\" who is subject to the statute of limitations periods regulated in numeral 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República). Prior to the reform introduced by subsection a) of Article 45 of Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, the Law of Internal Control (Ley de Control Interno) (where a five-year statute of limitations period was established), this norm provided: \"The disciplinary liability of the Public Treasury Servant shall prescribe within a period of two years, counted from the proven knowledge of the misconduct by the competent body to initiate the respective disciplinary proceeding. For these purposes, Article 603 of the Labor Code, and any other legal provisions that oppose it, are hereby reformed with respect to public officials or servants.\" Regarding the scope of said norm, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in ruling Voto 6750 of 11:12 a.m. on October 17, 1997, stated: \"Indeed, this Chamber considers that although Article 8 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller defines the 'Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública)' as '...the organization formed by public entities and organs, including non-state ones, owners or managers, by any title, of the administration of public assets,' and that the latter is '...the universality constituted by public funds and the liabilities borne by the Public Treasury,' such concepts must be understood and applied in relation to what constitutes the main objective of the Law, that is, the establishment of the sphere of competence of the Comptroller's Office. However, when dealing with matters generally unrelated to said organ, such as the challenged Article 71, the truth is that the interpretation of the concept of a public treasury servant must be restricted to one who is in charge of managing public funds. For the Chamber, this interpretation is necessary, because only in this way is the difference in the statute of limitations periods for applying disciplinary sanctions justified and explicable. In other words, the two-year period established in the challenged article is constitutionally adequate only if it is understood that it is intended to enable the State to have greater control over its functions that are directly related to the management and disposal of public funds, due to the undeniable relevance of the matter and the great need to ensure the soundest and cleanest possible management of public funds.\" For its part, numeral 9 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic indicates that public funds are the resources, securities, goods, and rights owned by the State, by organs, by companies, or by public entities. The report prepared by the Internal Audit of the defendant entity, which motivated the start of the disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff, states that he held the position of \"professional credit analyst (analista de crédito profesional)\" and as such, his responsibilities included: \"Executing studies and analyses of investment projects aimed at securing the Bank's financing (...) Organizing and carrying out studies of various kinds as part of the process of granting credits by the Bank (...) Studying, preparing, and evaluating projects... properties and construction and providing advice for their proper development. (...) Carrying out studies of loan applications to determine the applicant's payment capacity and the recovery of the credit, and rendering the respective reports. (...) Conducting inspection visits to determine compliance with investment plans. (...) Recommending the approval of loans. (...) Attending consultations from higher levels, other Bank dependencies, and employees related to his position (...) Performing other technical-professional tasks derived from his function.\" (Folio 396). These tasks, not only are of vital importance within the normal course of the defendant bank's activity, but also, given the legal nature of this entity (autonomous institution of public law in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System, No. 1644, of September 26, 1953), his actions could jeopardize the proper safeguarding of public funds, and therefore he fits into that restricted concept of a public treasury servant, to which the partially cited ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) refers. The norm is express in mentioning the moment from which the aforementioned period runs to discipline the servant's misconduct, indicating that it shall be computed from the proven knowledge of the misconduct by the competent body to initiate the respective disciplinary proceeding. In the case under study, the sub-management of the bank was informed of the existence of the alleged misconduct committed by the plaintiff, by note dated June 4, 2001, No. AUD-384/01 (folio 84 to 148); and the sub-manager requested the competent body (Joint Labor Relations Commission, Comisión Mixta de Relaciones Laborales) to open the proceeding regarding the misconduct that was taken as proven through the necessary prior investigation, by note dated November 29, 2002, when the two-year statute of limitations period established to sanction the misconduct committed by Mr. [Name1] had not yet elapsed. Now then, this Chamber, in a reiterated manner, has established that in the event that the employer (public or private) must complete a specific procedure or investigation prior to disciplining its workers, that period set for the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power (in the specific case, two years) will be counted from the moment the result of the respective investigation is made known to the official or body competent to decide. (In this regard, one may consult, among many others, judgments Nos. 36, of 9:50 a.m. on February 5; 92, of 9:40 a.m. on February 28; 153, of 9:30 a.m. on March 28; 184, of 2:20 p.m. on April 24, all three from 2003; 89, of 10:10 a.m. on February 13, 2004; 360, of 10:15 a.m. on May 13, 2005; 544, of 9:35 a.m. on June 28 and 561, of 9:48 a.m. on June 30, both from 2006). In the case being analyzed, the plaintiff has invoked the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power (a grievance which, when expressed before the tribunal, suffered the same fate as the one referring to the expiration (caducidad), and therefore we refer on this point to what was said in the preceding recital), pointing out that the period within which the employing entity could exercise that power had expired due to the passage of time; consequently, the right to sanction him also succumbed, because the bank became aware of the existence of the “San Antonio economic interest group (grupo de interés económico)” since 1998, and the plaintiff was dismissed until 2004, when the two-year statute of limitations period established by numeral 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic had already – in his opinion – amply elapsed. This grievance cannot be accepted. As was duly accredited in the record (see folio 87 of the expediente), the plaintiff was charged with a series of irregularities that occurred in the processing of 11 credits in which he participated as a “credit analyst,” and which were formalized between January 23, 1997, and May 31, 1999. Such facts bear no (direct) relationship to the warning (llamada de atención) given to the plaintiff in December 1998. (See in this regard minute No. 154/98 of December 2, 1998, Article II, subsection 2-A, of the Local Board of Directors of the defendant entity, folios 59 to 63). The foregoing because the warning was due to the breach of his duties in the processing of a credit, which was not approved, requested by “Estación de Servicio San Antonio S.A.,” whereas the investigated facts refer to approved credits, in which none of the applicants is that company, thereby making it more than evident that the disciplinary proceeding followed against the plaintiff is based on different factual assumptions, which only became known to the bank administration when the Internal Audit report was prepared on June 4, 2001, and therefore the statute of limitations period must be computed from that moment and not before. Now then, as indicated above, the computation of the statute of limitations period is suspended when the Administration must carry out a disciplinary proceeding to be able to sanction the misconduct – as occurs in the specific case –; therefore, as of the notification of charges (imputación de cargos) to Mr. [Name1], made on December 11, 2002, this period is interrupted, restarting its computation again as of October 6, 2004, the date on which the commission communicated the results of the disciplinary proceeding and its recommendation of dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal) to the sub-management of the defendant entity. In accordance with the foregoing, since the decision to dismiss the plaintiff was communicated by the bank authorities on October 12, 2004, by official communication GG 145 (folio 383), that is, less than a week after becoming aware of the existence of the misconduct, this Chamber concludes that the decision to dismiss the claimant was adopted in a timely manner, and therefore the application of the legal concept of the statute of limitations (prescripción) is not applicable in the sub lite and, consequently, it is considered that there was no inertia whatsoever on the part of the Administration.\n\n**VI.- REGARDING THE EXPEDIENTE WHERE THE EXISTENCE OF THE ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUP IS RECORDED:** As a final ground for grievance, the appellant reproaches that the sanction imposed on the plaintiff was carried out without having the credit application expediente of “Estación de Servicio San Antonio S.A.”, evidence which – in his opinion – was essential to be able to adopt such a decision. This grievance cannot be accepted. While it is true that in that expediente an analysis was made by the Local Credit Board of the defendant entity, in which the conclusion was reached that the companies “Estación de Servicio San Antonio S.A.” and “Maderas y Materiales San Antonio S.A.” constituted an economic interest group (grupo de interés económico) because there were individuals holding positions in both companies and in turn there were kinship ties (vínculos de parentesco) among some of their representatives, this circumstance bears no direct relationship with the misconduct attributed to Mr. [Name1]. The fact that it might be debatable whether such links really fit within the legal concept of “economic interest group,” in no way concerns the worker, who neither benefits nor is harmed by it, since the only ones interested in the bank eventually modifying its criteria are the very businesspersons to whom the credit was denied.\n\nFor the plaintiff, what matters is that he was aware of the bank's position regarding the existence of the group (since he himself acknowledges that his attention was called on one occasion for failing to disclose the possible links between these companies when reviewing the credit application of one of them). Therefore, when processing new loans for individuals with close kinship ties to the officers of these companies, he should have alerted his superiors, so that they, when making the final decision to approve the credit, would have all the objective elements to make the best decision. However, as demonstrated in the administrative proceeding, the plaintiff omitted to report this circumstance in eleven credit applications, knowing that the bank had already rejected another application under similar circumstances. In addition to the foregoing, this was not the only misconduct attributed to the plaintiff, since, as recorded in the statement of facts imputed to Mr. [Name1], he violated a series of procedures required by banking policies in the processing of the eleven credits referred to in the order of formal charges; which ultimately resulted in the granting of credits whose recovery through ordinary means (payment by the debtor) was not possible, and through forced execution the total debt could not be recovered, producing a loss of several million colones for the bank (see audit report at folios 84 to 148 and statement of [Name2] at folios 703 to 707). These misconducts, on their own, are of such gravity that they prevented the continuation of the employment relationship, since given the importance of the tasks entrusted to the plaintiff, trust is an objective element that must be maintained throughout the employment relationship, and a banking institution cannot trust a credit analyst who, in eleven banking transactions, omitted to include in his report elements of vital importance so that those responsible for authorizing the credit could make a decision that would guarantee the security of the defendant entity's assets. This Chamber has repeatedly stated that a bank employee, because he performs functions that require handling considerable sums of money, is obligated even more than any other worker to act transparently, to be honest, blameless, loyal, and trustworthy; performing the tasks entrusted to him in good faith (see decisions No. 79 of nine hours ten minutes of August seventeenth, nineteen eighty-eight; 114 of fourteen hours of August first, nineteen eighty-nine; 40 of nine hours fifty minutes of March twelfth, nineteen ninety-three; 202 of sixteen hours five minutes of July third, nineteen ninety-six; 416 of eleven hours of July twenty-seventh, two thousand one; and 326 of nine hours ten minutes of May eleventh, two thousand five). Consequently, his misconduct must be assessed with greater rigor, given that the prestige and image of the entity, in relation to third parties who use its services for the management and custody of money and securities, are at stake. When a bank official—in this case the plaintiff—conducts himself in an openly questionable manner, it is sufficient to consider him, from the standpoint of the Bank's activity and the interests it must safeguard, as an untrustworthy official (see decision number 202, of sixteen hours five minutes of July third, nineteen ninety-six). Thus, the facts attributed to the plaintiff, from any perspective, are serious, sufficient to support his dismissal without employer liability (subsection l) of Article 81 of the Labor Code), a conclusion rightly reached in the final resolution of the administrative proceeding, facts with which the plaintiff agreed since at no time—neither during the administrative proceeding nor in the judicial one—did he deny his participation in them, and his defense focused on alleging expiration and the statute of limitations of the disciplinary power, arguments that, as defined in the preceding recitals, are without merit and therefore nothing remains but to endorse the defendant's decision to sanction the misconducts attributed to the plaintiff with dismissal without employer liability." }