{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-135322", "citation": "Res. 01078-2010 Sala Segunda de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Improcedencia del pago de prohibición tras declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de normas presupuestarias", "title_en": "Non-viability of prohibition pay after declaration of unconstitutionality of budget norms", "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia resuelve un recurso de casación en un proceso laboral ordinario, donde se discutía la procedencia del pago del beneficio salarial denominado 'prohibición' a favor de exfuncionarios bancarios. La controversia surge tras la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de varias normas presupuestarias que extendían este beneficio al personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos. La Sala Constitucional había anulado dichas normas por ser 'atípicas', es decir, por regular materia ajena al presupuesto, pero dejó a salvo los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. La Sala Segunda, siguiendo su propio precedente, determina que no puede existir un derecho adquirido o situación jurídica consolidada cuando el pago contraviene el principio de legalidad. Los únicos derechos protegidos son las sumas efectivamente percibidas antes de la sentencia de inconstitucionalidad. En consecuencia, declara improcedente el pago del sobresueldo a futuro, pues las normas anuladas nunca formaron parte del ordenamiento jurídico y no pueden proyectar efectos posteriores.", "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court resolves a cassation appeal in an ordinary labor proceeding, concerning the viability of paying a salary benefit called 'prohibition' to former bank employees. The dispute arises after the Constitutional Chamber declared unconstitutional several budget norms that extended this benefit to the technical staff of the General Audit Office of Banks. The Constitutional Chamber had annulled those norms for being 'atypical'—regulating non-budgetary matters—but preserved good-faith acquired rights. The Second Chamber, following its own precedent, holds that there can be no acquired right or consolidated legal situation when the payment contravenes the principle of legality. The only protected rights are the sums actually received before the unconstitutionality ruling. Consequently, it declares the future payment of the bonus unenforceable, as the annulled norms never formed part of the legal system and cannot produce future effects.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte", "date": "2010", "year": "2010", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "prohibición como beneficio salarial", "normas atípicas en leyes de presupuesto", "principio de legalidad Art. 11 LGAP", "Art. 34 Constitución Política irretroactividad", "derechos adquiridos de buena fe", "situación jurídica consolidada", "voto 4647-1999 Sala Constitucional" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 34", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 11", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 101", "law": "Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario n° 7015" }, { "article": "Art. 14", "law": "Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República de 1985 n° 6982" }, { "article": "Art. 14 inciso 17", "law": "Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986 n° 7018" } ], "keywords_es": [ "beneficio salarial por prohibición", "derechos adquiridos", "inconstitucionalidad", "ley de presupuesto", "principio de legalidad", "situación jurídica consolidada", "Sala Constitucional", "Banco Central", "normas atípicas" ], "keywords_en": [ "prohibition salary benefit", "acquired rights", "unconstitutionality", "budget law", "principle of legality", "consolidated legal situation", "Constitutional Chamber", "Central Bank", "atypical norms" ], "excerpt_es": "La supervivencia o continuidad del pago de la 'prohibición' solo podría sostenerse si se acepta que se trata de un derecho adquirido, o de una situación jurídica consolidada garantizados por el artículo 34 Constitucional, sin embargo, no es posible pensar en un derecho adquirido o una situación jurídica consolidada, cuando tal situación contraviene el principio de legalidad. [...] Por ello, la Sala considera que en este caso, los derechos adquiridos de buena fe son los sobresueldos percibidos por concepto de 'prohibición' durante la vigencia jurídica de ese régimen, sin que se puedan amparar aquellos futuros, por no haber norma expresa que autorice el pago.", "excerpt_en": "The survival or continuity of the 'prohibition' pay could only be sustained if it is accepted as an acquired right or a consolidated legal situation guaranteed by Article 34 of the Constitution; however, it is not possible to conceive of an acquired right or a consolidated legal situation when such situation contravenes the principle of legality. [...] Therefore, the Chamber considers that in this case, the good-faith acquired rights are the bonuses received under the 'prohibition' concept during the legal validity of that regime, while future ones cannot be protected, as there is no express norm authorizing the payment.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Unenforceable", "label_es": "Improcedente", "summary_en": "The future payment of the 'prohibition' salary benefit is ruled unenforceable as the authorizing norms were annulled, protecting only the sums already received in good faith before the unconstitutionality ruling.", "summary_es": "Se declara improcedente el pago futuro del beneficio salarial por 'prohibición' al haberse anulado las normas que lo autorizaban, protegiendo únicamente las sumas ya percibidas de buena fe antes de la sentencia de inconstitucionalidad." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando IV (criterio reiterado de la Sala Constitucional)", "quote_en": "Therefore, the Legislative Branch, under the budgetary power referred to, cannot regulate matters of a different nature or content from that specialty.", "quote_es": "No puede en consecuencia, el Poder Legislativo bajo la potestad presupuestaria que se apunta, regular materias de diferente naturaleza o contenido de esa especialidad." }, { "context": "Considerando VI (criterio de la Sala)", "quote_en": "The survival or continuity of the 'prohibition' pay could only be sustained if it is accepted as an acquired right or a consolidated legal situation guaranteed by Article 34 of the Constitution; however, it is not possible to conceive of an acquired right or a consolidated legal situation when such situation contravenes the principle of legality.", "quote_es": "La supervivencia o continuidad del pago de la 'prohibición' solo podría sostenerse si se acepta que se trata de un derecho adquirido, o de una situación jurídica consolidada garantizados por el artículo 34 Constitucional, sin embargo, no es posible pensar en un derecho adquirido o una situación jurídica consolidada, cuando tal situación contraviene el principio de legalidad." }, { "context": "Considerando VI (criterio de la Sala Constitucional)", "quote_en": "The concepts of 'acquired right' and 'consolidated legal situation' are closely related in constitutional doctrine. [...] Thus, what the person is entitled to is the consequence, not the rule.", "quote_es": "Los conceptos de 'derecho adquirido' y 'situación jurídica consolidada' aparecen estrechamente relacionados en la doctrina constitucionalista. [...] De este modo, a lo que la persona tiene derecho es a la consecuencia, no a la regla." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-8912", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario n° 7015 Art. 101" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-135322", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-36522", "norm_num": "7018", "norm_name": "Ley de Presupuesto de la República para 1986", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "20/12/1985" }, { "doc_id": "norm-7331", "norm_num": "", "norm_name": "Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa", "tipo_norma": "", "norm_fecha": "" }, { "doc_id": "norm-8561", "norm_num": "6982", "norm_name": "Ley de Presupuesto para 1985", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "19/12/1984" }, { "doc_id": "norm-8912", "norm_num": "7015", "norm_name": "Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "22/11/1985" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“IV.- RESPECTO DE LA DECLARATORIA DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LAS NORMAS PRESUPUESTARIAS: La Sala Constitucional en la resolución 4647-1999 de las 16:12 horas del 16 de junio de 1999 determinó la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 101 de la Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, n° 7015 del 22 de noviembre de 1985, 14 de la Ley de Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República de 1985 n° 6982 del 19 de diciembre de 1984 y 14 inciso 17) de la Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986 n° 7018 del 20 de diciembre de 1985. Además, retrotrajo los efectos de esa declaración a la fecha de entrada en vigencia de las normas anuladas, dejando a salvo los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. Para arribar a esa conclusión se argumentó lo siguiente: “Ha sido criterio reiterado de esta Sala, que la Ley de Presupuesto, no puede válidamente contener normas de carácter general, ajenas a la materia de presupuesto. Es decir, no es válida la inclusión de normas \"atípicas\" que versen sobre materia propia de la legislación ordinaria, ya sea para la creación o modificación de ésta. Según el texto expreso de las normas impugnadas, cuya transcripción se hace de seguido, se nota claramente, que la materia que regulan no es materia presupuestaria, y por lo tanto su inconstitucionalidad resulta evidente. Las normas impugnadas señalan: / \"Artículo 14 Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, número 6982 de 19 diciembre 1984. Agréguese un párrafo al artículo 1 de la Ley 5867 que diga: / \"Los beneficios y prohibiciones que se indican en este artículo, incluyen al personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos\".- / \"Artículo 101 Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, número 7015 del 22 noviembre 1985.- / El personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos recibirá los beneficios económicos de la Ley 5867 de 15 de diciembre de 1975 y sus reformas sujeto a las prohibiciones de dicha ley.\" / \"Artículo 14 Ley de Presupuesto para 1986 número 7018 de 20 de diciembre de 1985.- / 1. ... / 17. Las prohibiciones y beneficios contenidos en el artículo 1 de la Ley No. 5867 15 de diciembre de 1975, son aplicables a las Auditorías del Sistema Bancario Nacional.\" / En efecto, desde el antecedente dado en sentencia número 000121-89 la jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha sido uniforme en señalar que la Ley de Presupuesto no puede modificar la legislación ordinaria. Al respecto la Sala consideró: / \"... el presupuesto de la República es una ley formal y material pero especial por la materia que la constituye y por el procedimiento ya comentado. De los textos antes citados se desprende que la competencia o legitimación que constitucionalmente se atribuye a la Asamblea Legislativa sobre tan importante materia, es para fijar en los presupuestos los ingresos probables y los gastos autorizados de la Administración Pública con las modalidades que para sus modificaciones y para presupuestos extraordinarios la misma Constitución señala. No puede en consecuencia, el Poder Legislativo bajo la potestad presupuestaria que se apunta, regular materias de diferente naturaleza o contenido de esa especialidad. Lo expresado es congruente con la atribución exclusiva del Poder Ejecutivo de elaboración del proyecto de presupuesto ordinario y la iniciativa de sus modificaciones y de los extraordinarios, así como la de la Asamblea Legislativa en cuanto a su dictado, además con la modalidad ya analizada de que el Poder Ejecutivo no tiene atribución de veto sobre su aprobación, a tenor del numeral 125 de la Carta Fundamental...\" / No existiendo motivos para variar de criterio o razones de interés público que justifiquen reconsiderar la cuestión, procede acoger la inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por la Procuraduría General de la República”. Luego, la Procuraduría General de la República solicitó que se aclarara la parte dispositiva del fallo, con el objeto de dilucidar los alcances del criterio vertido, toda vez que a lo interno del Banco demandado, se construyeron dos puntos de vista, el primero que los funcionarios no debían devolver el dinero recibido, pero a partir de la publicación del voto cesaba el disfrute del beneficio y, el segundo que no sólo los servidores no estaban exentos de devolver el importe salarial brindado, sino que además debía pagarse la prohibición a futuro. Esa gestión del Estado se denegó por medio de la resolución 6327 de las 10:03 horas del 13 de agosto de 1999, puesto que la Sala Constitucional consideró que la determinación de los alcances de los derechos adquiridos escapaba a las labores de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Así, concretamente se expuso: “Sobre la gestión del Procurador General, se estima que no existe una omisión o ambigüedad en la sentencia número 4647-99 de las 16:12 horas del 16 de junio de 1999 que deba adicionarse o aclararse. La resolución es palmariamente clara en cuanto a que, a pesar de que la nulidad pronunciada por la inconstitucionalidad de las normas es absoluta y, por ende, retroactiva a la fecha en que ellas entraron en vigencia, tal efecto de la declaratoria no puede perjudicar los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. Definir si los derechos de los funcionarios vinculados a las normas son o no adquiridos, y la acción que debe tomar la Administración frente a una conclusión de esa índole, escapa a la labor que corresponde a la Jurisdicción Constitucional, por lo que la gestión debe rechazarse”. Bajo este panorama, la parte actora endilga como puntos primordiales de su recurso que posterior a la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, la administración utilizó un procedimiento ilegal para suprimir el pago del rubro por antigüedad y que en sede administrativa no se resolviera el tema de los derechos adquiridos.\n\n[…]\n\n VI.- RESPECTO DE LA EXISTENCIA DE UN DERECHO ADQUIRIDO EN EL CASO CONCRETO: Con relación al tema de los derechos adquiridos la Sala Constitucional en su voto 2765-1997 de las 15:03 horas del 20 de mayo de 1997 explicó: “Los conceptos de \"derecho adquirido\" y \"situación jurídica consolidada\" aparecen estrechamente relacionados en la doctrina constitucionalista. Es dable afirmar que, en términos generales, el primero denota a aquella circunstancia consumada en la que una cosa –material o inmaterial, trátese de un bien previamente ajeno o de un derecho antes inexistente– ha ingresado en (o incidido sobre) la esfera patrimonial de la persona, de manera que ésta experimenta una ventaja o beneficio constatable. Por su parte, la \"situación jurídica consolidada\" representa no tanto un plus patrimonial, sino un estado de cosas definido plenamente en cuanto a sus características jurídicas y a sus efectos, aun cuando éstos no se hayan extinguido aún. Lo relevante en cuanto a la situación jurídica consolidada, precisamente, no es que esos efectos todavía perduren o no, sino que –por virtud de mandato legal o de una sentencia que así lo haya declarado– haya surgido ya a la vida jurídica una regla, clara y definida, que conecta a un presupuesto fáctico (hecho condicionante) con una consecuencia dada (efecto condicionado). Desde esta óptica, la situación de la persona viene dada por una proposición lógica del tipo «si..., entonces...»; vale decir: si se ha dado el hecho condicionante, entonces la \"situación jurídica consolidada\" implica que, necesariamente, deberá darse también el efecto condicionado. En ambos casos (derecho adquirido o situación jurídica consolidada), el ordenamiento protege –tornándola intangible– la situación de quien obtuvo el derecho o disfruta de la situación, por razones de equidad y de certeza jurídica. En este caso, la garantía constitucional de la irretroactividad de la ley se traduce en la certidumbre de que un cambio en el ordenamiento no puede tener la consecuencia de sustraer el bien o el derecho ya adquirido del patrimonio de la persona, o de provocar que si se había dado el presupuesto fáctico con anterioridad a la reforma legal, ya no surja la consecuencia (provechosa, se entiende) que el interesado esperaba de la situación jurídica consolidada. Ahora bien, específicamente en punto a ésta última, se ha entendido también que nadie tiene un \"derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento\", es decir, a que las reglas nunca cambien. Por eso, el precepto constitucional no consiste en que, una vez nacida a la vida jurídica, la regla que conecta el hecho con el efecto no pueda ser modificada o incluso suprimida por una norma posterior; lo que significa es que –como se explicó– si se ha producido el supuesto condicionante, una reforma legal que cambie o elimine la regla no podrá tener la virtud de impedir que surja el efecto condicionado que se esperaba bajo el imperio de la norma anterior. Esto es así porque, se dijo, lo relevante es que el estado de cosas de que gozaba la persona ya estaba definido en cuanto a sus elementos y a sus efectos, aunque éstos todavía se estén produciendo o, incluso, no hayan comenzado a producirse. De este modo, a lo que la persona tiene derecho es a la consecuencia, no a la regla”. Esta Sala por medio de la resolución 0740-2008 de las 11:00 horas del 8 de mayo de 2009 determinó en la oportunidad del análisis de un caso con igualdad de razón y causa, la no procedencia del extremo salarial por prohibición en el Banco demandado, ya que ante la anulación de la norma que autorizaba su pago por inconstitucionalidad, se creo un obstáculo insalvable para su reconocimiento a la luz del principio de legalidad. Por esta razón, los derechos adquiridos de buena fe únicamente alcanzaran las sumas que hubieran ingresado efectivamente al patrimonio de los trabajadores previo a la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional. Así, en esa oportunidad se argumentó: “La supervivencia o continuidad del pago de la “prohibición” solo podría sostenerse si se acepta que se trata de un derecho adquirido, o de una situación jurídica consolidada garantizados por el artículo 34 Constitucional, sin embargo, no es posible pensar en un derecho adquirido o una situación jurídica consolidada, cuando tal situación contraviene el principio de legalidad. De esta forma las condiciones del “Convenio de Partes” no podían mantenerse inalterables en el tiempo, hasta la extinción de la relación obrero-patronal, a pesar de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de las normas citadas. Creer lo contrario, sería quebrantar el principio de legalidad ya antes mencionado y por lo tanto el mismo artículo 34 de la Constitución Política. (…). / En el caso en estudio, el “Convenio de Partes” que permitía el pago de “prohibición” al actor, perdió vigencia al anularse mediante voto número 04647 de las 16:12 del 16 de junio de 1999 de la Sala Constitucional, y en consecuencia, el Banco Central no podía continuar pagando el sobresueldo por prohibición, por impedirlo el principio de legalidad (artículo 11 de la Ley General de Administración Pública), según el cual en materia de empleo público, donde los salarios se pagan con recursos públicos, el presupuesto del ente público es un límite para el uso y disposición de los recursos del Estado, y todo gasto, debe estar autorizado por disposiciones normativas y presupuestarias. Incluso el mismo recurrente ha sostenido la tesis de que dicho plus salarial, se le otorgó con base en una ley para funcionarios de la Auditoría del Banco, el cual se le mantuvo en un puesto de proveedor, de Auditoría Interna y de último como Director del Departamento de Seguridad. Por ello, la Sala considera que en este caso, los derechos adquiridos de buena fe son los sobresueldos percibidos por concepto de “prohibición” durante la vigencia jurídica de ese régimen, sin que se puedan amparar aquellos futuros, por no haber norma expresa que autorice el pago”. Analizadas las circunstancias del caso concreto, no observa esta Sala motivación suficiente para variar el criterio vertido en esa oportunidad. Nótese además, que las normas anuladas bajo ninguna circunstancia podrían proyectar efectos a futuro, toda vez que con su declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad formalmente nunca fueron parte del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense.”", "body_en_text": "**IV.- REGARDING THE DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BUDGETARY NORMS:** The Constitutional Chamber, in resolution 4647-1999 of 4:12 p.m. on June 16, 1999, determined the unconstitutionality of articles 101 of the Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, No. 7015 of November 22, 1985, 14 of the Ley de Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República de 1985 No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and 14 subsection 17) of the Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario para 1986 No. 7018 of December 20, 1985. Furthermore, it retroacted (retrotrajo) the effects of that declaration to the date the annulled norms entered into force, safeguarding rights acquired in good faith. To reach that conclusion, the following was argued: *“It has been the reiterated criterion of this Chamber that the Budget Law cannot validly contain norms of a general nature, foreign to budgetary matters. That is, the inclusion of ‘atypical’ norms that deal with matters pertaining to ordinary legislation, whether for its creation or modification, is not valid. According to the express text of the challenged norms, transcribed below, it is clearly noted that the matter they regulate is not a budgetary matter, and therefore their unconstitutionality is evident. The challenged norms state: / ‘Article 14 Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, number 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to article 1 of Law 5867 that reads: / “The benefits and prohibitions indicated in this article include the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos.”- / ‘Article 101 Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, number 7015 of November 22, 1985.- / The technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos shall receive the economic benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, and its reforms, subject to the prohibitions of said law.’ / ‘Article 14 Ley de Presupuesto para 1986 number 7018 of December 20, 1985.- / 1. ... / 17. The prohibitions and benefits contained in article 1 of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Audit Departments of the National Banking System.’ / Indeed, since the precedent set in judgment number 000121-89, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been uniform in pointing out that the Budget Law cannot modify ordinary legislation. In this regard, the Chamber considered: / ‘... the budget of the Republic is a formal and material law, but special due to the matter that constitutes it and the procedure already commented upon. From the texts cited above, it follows that the competence or legitimacy constitutionally attributed to the Legislative Assembly over such an important matter is to set, in the budgets, the probable revenues and the authorized expenditures of the Public Administration, with the modalities that the Constitution itself indicates for its modifications and for extraordinary budgets. Consequently, the Legislative Power cannot, under the budgetary authority noted, regulate matters of a different nature or content from that specialty. The foregoing is consistent with the exclusive authority of the Executive Power to draft the ordinary budget bill and the initiative for its modifications and for extraordinary budgets, as well as that of the Legislative Assembly regarding its enactment, in addition to the already analyzed modality that the Executive Power has no veto power over its approval, pursuant to numeral 125 of the Carta Fundamental...’ / There being no reasons to vary the criterion or reasons of public interest that justify reconsidering the issue, it is appropriate to uphold the unconstitutionality claim filed by the Procuraduría General de la República.”* Subsequently, the Procuraduría General de la República requested that the operative part of the ruling be clarified, in order to elucidate the scope of the opinion rendered, given that within the defendant Bank, two points of view were constructed: the first, that the officials did not have to return the money received, but that enjoyment of the benefit ceased upon publication of the vote; and the second, that not only were the employees not exempt from returning the salary amounts provided, but also that the prohibition should be paid in the future. That petition by the State was denied through resolution 6327 of 10:03 a.m. on August 13, 1999, since the Constitutional Chamber considered that determining the scope of the rights acquired fell outside the tasks of the Constitutional Jurisdiction. Thus, it was specifically stated: “Regarding the petition of the Procurador General, it is considered that there is no omission or ambiguity in judgment number 4647-99 of 4:12 p.m. on June 16, 1999, that must be added to or clarified. The resolution is patently clear in that, although the nullity pronounced due to the unconstitutionality of the norms is absolute and, therefore, retroactive to the date on which they entered into force, such effect of the declaration cannot prejudice rights acquired in good faith. Defining whether the rights of the officials linked to the norms are acquired or not, and the action that the Administration must take in the face of such a conclusion, falls outside the work corresponding to the Constitutional Jurisdiction, for which reason the petition must be rejected.” Under this panorama, the plaintiff points out as primary points of its appeal that subsequent to the declaration of unconstitutionality, the administration used an illegal procedure to suppress the payment of the seniority item and that the matter of rights acquired was not resolved at the administrative level.\n\n[…]\n\n**VI.- REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACQUIRED RIGHT IN THE SPECIFIC CASE:** In relation to the topic of acquired rights, the Constitutional Chamber, in its vote 2765-1997 of 3:03 p.m. on May 20, 1997, explained: “The concepts of ‘acquired right’ (derecho adquirido) and ‘consolidated legal situation’ (situación jurídica consolidada) appear closely related in constitutional doctrine. It can be stated that, in general terms, the former denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing—material or immaterial, whether a previously alien good or a previously non-existent right—has entered into (or had an impact on) the person's patrimonial sphere, so that the person experiences a verifiable advantage or benefit. For its part, the ‘consolidated legal situation’ represents not so much a patrimonial addition, but rather a state of things fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and its effects, even if these have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still persist or not, but that—by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared—a clear and defined rule has already emerged in legal life, connecting a factual premise (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect). From this perspective, the person's situation is given by a logical proposition of the type ‘if..., then...’; that is to say: if the conditioning fact has occurred, then the ‘consolidated legal situation’ implies that, necessarily, the conditioned effect must also occur. In both cases (acquired right or consolidated legal situation), the legal system protects—making it intangible—the situation of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty. In this case, the constitutional guarantee of the non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of removing the good or already acquired right from the person's patrimony, or of causing that, if the factual premise had occurred prior to the legal reform, the consequence (beneficial, it is understood) that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation no longer arises. Now, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a ‘right to the immutability of the legal system,’ that is, that the rules never change. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not consist of the rule that connects the fact with the effect not being modifiable or even suppressible by a later norm once it has come into legal life; what it means is that—as explained—if the conditioning premise has occurred, a legal reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot have the virtue of preventing the conditioned effect that was expected under the rule of the prior norm from arising. This is so because, it was said, what is relevant is that the state of things the person enjoyed was already defined in terms of its elements and its effects, even though these are still occurring or have not even begun to occur. In this way, what the person has a right to is the consequence, not the rule.” This Chamber, through resolution 0740-2008 of 11:00 a.m. on May 8, 2009, determined, at the time of analyzing a case with equality of reasoning and cause, the non-applicability of the salary component for prohibition (prohibición) at the defendant Bank, since, given the annulment of the norm that authorized its payment due to unconstitutionality, an insurmountable obstacle was created for its recognition in light of the principle of legality. For this reason, rights acquired in good faith shall only cover the sums that had effectively entered the workers' patrimony prior to the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber. Thus, on that occasion it was argued: *“The survival or continuity of the payment of the ‘prohibition’ (prohibición) could only be sustained if it is accepted that it is an acquired right, or a consolidated legal situation guaranteed by Article 34 of the Constitution, however, it is not possible to think of an acquired right or a consolidated legal situation when such a situation contravenes the principle of legality. In this way, the conditions of the ‘Parties’ Agreement’ could not remain unalterable over time, until the extinction of the worker-employer relationship, despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of the cited norms. To believe otherwise would be to violate the principle of legality already mentioned and, therefore, Article 34 of the Political Constitution itself. (…). / In the case under study, the ‘Parties’ Agreement’ that allowed the payment of ‘prohibition’ (prohibición) to the plaintiff lost validity upon being annulled by vote number 04647 at 4:12 p.m. on June 16, 1999, of the Constitutional Chamber, and consequently, the Banco Central could not continue paying the salary supplement for prohibition, because it was prevented by the principle of legality (article 11 of the Ley General de Administración Pública), according to which, in matters of public employment, where salaries are paid with public resources, the public entity's budget is a limit for the use and disposal of State resources, and all expenditure must be authorized by normative and budgetary provisions. Even the appellant himself has maintained the thesis that said salary supplement was granted to him based on a law for officials of the Bank's Audit Department, which was maintained for him in a position of supplier, of Internal Audit, and lastly as Director of the Security Department. Therefore, the Chamber considers that in this case, the rights acquired in good faith are the salary supplements received for the concept of ‘prohibition’ (prohibición) during the legal validity of that regime, without those future ones being able to be protected, for lack of an express norm that authorizes the payment.”* Having analyzed the circumstances of the specific case, this Chamber does not observe sufficient motivation to vary the criterion rendered on that occasion. Note also that the annulled norms could under no circumstances project effects into the future, since with their declaration of unconstitutionality they were formally never part of the Costa Rican legal system.\n\n**IV.- REGARDING THE DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BUDGETARY NORMS**: The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in resolution 4647-1999 of 4:12 p.m. on June 16, 1999, determined the unconstitutionality of Articles 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law No. 7015 of November 22, 1985, 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic for 1985 No. 6982 of December 19, 1984, and 14 subsection 17) of the Ordinary Budget Law for 1986 No. 7018 of December 20, 1985. Furthermore, it made the effects of that declaration retroactive to the date the annulled norms entered into force, safeguarding rights acquired in good faith. To reach that conclusion, the following was argued: *“It has been the reiterated criterion of this Chamber that the Budget Law cannot validly contain norms of a general nature, extraneous to budgetary matters. That is, the inclusion of ‘atypical’ norms that deal with matters proper to ordinary legislation, whether for the creation or modification thereof, is not valid. According to the express text of the challenged norms, transcribed below, it is clearly noted that the matter they regulate is not budgetary matter, and therefore their unconstitutionality is evident. The challenged norms state: / ‘Article 14 Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic for 1985, number 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to Article 1 of Law 5867 that reads: / “The benefits and prohibitions indicated in this article include the technical personnel of the General Audit Office of Banks.” / ‘Article 101 Extraordinary Budget Law, number 7015 of November 22, 1985.- / The technical personnel of the General Audit Office of Banks shall receive the economic benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, and its amendments, subject to the prohibitions of said law.’ / ‘Article 14 Budget Law for 1986 number 7018 of December 20, 1985.- / 1. ... / 17. The prohibitions and benefits contained in Article 1 of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Audits of the National Banking System.’ / In effect, from the precedent set in judgment number 000121-89, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been uniform in pointing out that the Budget Law cannot modify ordinary legislation. In this regard, the Chamber considered: / ‘... the budget of the Republic is a formal and material law, but special due to the matter it constitutes and the procedure already commented upon. From the texts cited above, it is deduced that the competence or legitimacy constitutionally attributed to the Legislative Assembly over such an important matter is to fix in the budgets the probable income and authorized expenses of the Public Administration, with the modalities that the Constitution itself indicates for their modifications and for extraordinary budgets. Consequently, the Legislative Power cannot, under the budgetary power indicated, regulate matters of a different nature or content from that specialty. The foregoing is consistent with the exclusive attribution of the Executive Power to draft the ordinary budget project and the initiative for its modifications and extraordinary ones, as well as that of the Legislative Assembly regarding its enactment, in addition to the already analyzed modality that the Executive Power does not have veto power over its approval, pursuant to numeral 125 of the Fundamental Charter...’ / There being no reasons to vary the criterion or reasons of public interest that justify reconsidering the issue, it is appropriate to uphold the unconstitutionality filed by the Attorney General’s Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República).”* Subsequently, the Attorney General’s Office of the Republic requested clarification of the operative part of the ruling, with the purpose of elucidating the scope of the opinion given, since internally within the defendant Bank, two points of view were constructed: the first, that the officials should not return the money received, but that from the publication of the vote, the enjoyment of the benefit would cease; and the second, that not only were the employees not exempt from returning the salary amount provided, but also that the prohibition should be paid in the future. That action by the State was denied by means of resolution 6327 at 10:03 a.m. on August 13, 1999, since the Constitutional Chamber considered that determining the scope of acquired rights was beyond the duties of the Constitutional Jurisdiction. Thus, it was specifically stated: “*Regarding the action of the Attorney General, it is deemed that there is no omission or ambiguity in judgment number 4647-99 at 4:12 p.m. on June 16, 1999, that needs to be added to or clarified. The resolution is clearly explicit that, even though the nullity pronounced due to the unconstitutionality of the norms is absolute and, therefore, retroactive to the date on which they entered into force, such effect of the declaration cannot harm rights acquired in good faith. Defining whether the rights of the officials linked to the norms are acquired or not, and the action that the Administration must take in light of such a conclusion, is beyond the work corresponding to the Constitutional Jurisdiction, so the action must be rejected.*” Under this panorama, the plaintiff identifies as primary points of its appeal that subsequent to the declaration of unconstitutionality, the administration used an illegal procedure to suppress the payment of the seniority item, and that the issue of acquired rights was not resolved in the administrative forum.\n\n[…]\n\n**VI.- REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACQUIRED RIGHT IN THE SPECIFIC CASE**: Regarding the issue of acquired rights, the Constitutional Chamber, in its vote 2765-1997 at 3:03 p.m. on May 20, 1997, explained: “*The concepts of ‘acquired right’ and ‘consolidated legal situation’ are closely related in constitutional doctrine. It is possible to affirm that, in general terms, the former denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing –material or immaterial, whether a previously foreign good or a previously non-existent right– has entered into (or impacted upon) the person’s patrimonial sphere, such that the person experiences an ascertainable advantage or benefit. For its part, the ‘consolidated legal situation’ represents not so much a patrimonial plus, but a state of things defined fully in terms of its legal characteristics and its effects, even if those effects have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation is precisely not whether those effects still endure or not, but rather that –by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared– a clear and defined rule has already emerged in legal life, connecting a factual premise (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect). From this viewpoint, the person’s situation is given by a logical proposition of the type ‘if..., then...’; that is to say: if the conditioning fact has occurred, then the ‘consolidated legal situation’ implies that the conditioned effect must necessarily also occur. In both cases (acquired right or consolidated legal situation), the legal system protects –rendering it intangible– the situation of the person who obtained the right or enjoys the situation, for reasons of equity and legal certainty. In this case, the constitutional guarantee of the non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of removing the good or already acquired right from the person’s patrimony, or of causing that, if the factual premise had occurred prior to the legal reform, the (understandably advantageous) consequence that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation no longer arises. Now, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a ‘right to the immutability of the legal system,’ that is, that the rules never change. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not consist in that, once the rule connecting the fact with the effect has emerged in legal life, it cannot be modified or even suppressed by a subsequent norm; what it means is that –as explained– if the conditioning premise has occurred, a legal reform that changes or eliminates the rule cannot have the virtue of preventing the conditioned effect that was expected under the rule of the prior norm from arising. This is so because, as stated, what is relevant is that the state of things enjoyed by the person was already defined in terms of its elements and effects, even if these are still being produced or have not even begun to be produced. In this way, what the person has a right to is the consequence, not the rule.*” This Chamber, by means of resolution 0740-2008 at 11:00 a.m. on May 8, 2009, determined at the time of analyzing a case with equal reasoning and cause, the non-applicability of the salary item for prohibition in the defendant Bank, since with the annulment of the norm that authorized its payment due to unconstitutionality, an insurmountable obstacle was created for its recognition in light of the principle of legality. For this reason, the rights acquired in good faith only cover the sums that had effectively entered the patrimony of the workers prior to the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber. Thus, on that occasion it was argued: “*The survival or continuity of the payment of the ‘prohibition’ could only be sustained if it is accepted that it is an acquired right, or a consolidated legal situation guaranteed by Article 34 Constitutional, however, it is not possible to think of an acquired right or a consolidated legal situation when such a situation contravenes the principle of legality. In this way, the conditions of the ‘Agreement of Parties’ could not remain unalterable in time, until the extinction of the worker-employer relationship, despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of the cited norms. To believe the contrary would be to violate the principle of legality already mentioned above and, therefore, Article 34 of the Political Constitution itself. (...). / In the case under study, the ‘Agreement of Parties’ that allowed the payment of ‘prohibition’ to the plaintiff lost validity upon being annulled by vote number 04647 at 4:12 p.m. on June 16, 1999 of the Constitutional Chamber, and consequently, the Banco Central could not continue paying the extra salary for prohibition, as it is prevented by the principle of legality (Article 11 of the General Law of Public Administration), according to which in matters of public employment, where salaries are paid with public resources, the budget of the public entity is a limit for the use and disposal of State resources, and all expenses must be authorized by normative and budgetary provisions. Even the appellant himself has sustained the thesis that said salary bonus was granted to him based on a law for officials of the Bank’s Audit Office, which was maintained for him in a position of provider, of Internal Audit, and finally, as Director of the Security Department. Therefore, the Chamber considers that in this case, the rights acquired in good faith are the extra salaries received for the concept of ‘prohibition’ during the legal validity of that regime, without being able to protect future ones, as there is no express norm that authorizes the payment.*” Having analyzed the circumstances of the specific case, this Chamber does not observe sufficient motivation to vary the criterion expressed on that occasion. Note, furthermore, that under no circumstances could the annulled norms project effects into the future, given that with their declaration of unconstitutionality they were formally never part of the Costa Rican legal system.”" }