{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-138682", "citation": "Res. 00128-2011 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Terminación anticipada de arrendamiento por ente público sin rescisión unilateral", "title_en": "Early Termination of Lease by Public Entity Without Unilateral Rescission", "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI analiza la reclamación de MAGOSE M.G.S. S.A. contra el ICE por la terminación anticipada de un contrato de arrendamiento del Edificio Cocorí en San Pedro de Montes de Oca. La demandante alegaba que el ICE debió seguir el procedimiento de rescisión unilateral previsto en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y reclamaba daños y perjuicios. El Tribunal determina que, tras la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del artículo 77 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (que permitía plazos indefinidos), el contrato remitía expresamente su plazo a la Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos (LGAUS). Con fundamento en los artículos 2, 6 y 72 de la LGAUS, el ICE, como arrendatario, podía extinguir el contrato mediante aviso con tres meses de anticipación, sin necesidad de invocar causas de rescisión unilateral. Al haber cumplido con el preaviso legal, se declara sin lugar la demanda, tanto en la pretensión principal como en la indemnizatoria.", "summary_en": "The Administrative Litigation Court, Section VI, analyzes the claim by MAGOSE M.G.S. S.A. against ICE for the early termination of a lease contract for the Cocorí Building in San Pedro de Montes de Oca. The plaintiff argued that ICE should have followed the unilateral rescission procedure under the Administrative Contracting Law and sought damages. The Court finds that, after the unconstitutionality of Article 77 of the Administrative Contracting Law (which allowed indefinite terms), the contract expressly referred its term to the General Urban and Suburban Leases Law (LGAUS). Based on Articles 2, 6, and 72 of the LGAUS, ICE, as lessee, could terminate the contract by giving three months' notice without needing to invoke unilateral rescission grounds. Since the legal notice was given, the claim is dismissed, both on the main plea and for damages.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "date": "25/05/2011", "year": "2011", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "rescisión unilateral", "arrendamiento", "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos", "preaviso", "potestad exorbitante" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "article": "159", "doc_id": "norm-58314", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411", "article": "159", "doc_id": "norm-58314", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "article": "206", "doc_id": "norm-58314", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411", "article": "206", "doc_id": "norm-58314", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "article": "11", "doc_id": "norm-24284", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7494", "article": "11", "doc_id": "norm-24284", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "article": "76", "doc_id": "norm-24284", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7494", "article": "76", "doc_id": "norm-24284", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "article": "77", "doc_id": "norm-24284", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7494", "article": "77", "doc_id": "norm-24284", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "article": "2", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7527", "article": "2", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "article": "6", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7527", "article": "6", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "article": "70", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7527", "article": "70", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "article": "72", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7527", "article": "72", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "rescisión unilateral", "arrendamiento", "contratación administrativa", "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos", "terminación anticipada", "preaviso", "potestad exorbitante", "inconstitucionalidad artículo 77 LCA" ], "keywords_en": [ "unilateral rescission", "lease", "administrative contracting", "Administrative Contracting Law", "General Urban and Suburban Leases Law", "early termination", "notice", "exorbitant power", "unconstitutionality Article 77 LCA" ], "excerpt_es": "De lo expuesto considera este Tribunal que no es posible afirmar que la finalización anticipada del contrato resulte ilegal, dado que fue al amparo del artículo 72 de la LGAUS, aplicable en este caso a la entidad demandada en su condición de arrendataria. Tampoco es posible considerar como incumplimiento contractual, por la inactividad por no rescisión, como lo plantea la parte actora, el hecho de que la entidad demandada decidiera terminar el contrato con anticipación, ya que el ordenamiento jurídico se lo permite al ICE en su condición de arrendatario, de acuerdo con lo que la LGAUS dispone. Es criterio de este Tribunal que en su condición de arrendatario del bien inmueble propiedad de MAGOSE M.G.S. S.A., el Instituto demandado no se encontraba actuando con potestades exorbitantes... Los artículos 6 y 72, ambos de la LGAUS, permiten dejar sin efecto el contrato administrativo a todo arrendatario, lo que incluye al Estado, los entes públicos descentralizados, las municipalidades o los particulares, razón por la cual no es posible considerarla como una cláusula o potestad exorbitante de derecho público en favor de la Administración.", "excerpt_en": "This Court finds that it is impossible to hold that the early termination of the contract is unlawful, since it was done under Article 72 of the LGAUS, applicable here to the defendant entity as a lessee. Nor can it be considered a breach of contract, for inactivity due to lack of rescission, as argued by the plaintiff, that the defendant entity decided to terminate the contract early, since the legal order allows ICE, as lessee, to do so, under the provisions of the LGAUS. This Court finds that, in its capacity as lessee of the property owned by MAGOSE M.G.S. S.A., the defendant institution was not acting with exorbitant powers... Articles 6 and 72, both of the LGAUS, allow any lessee to terminate the administrative contract, which includes the State, decentralized public entities, municipalities, or private parties, so it cannot be considered an exorbitant public-law clause in favor of the Administration.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The lawsuit by MAGOSE M.G.S. S.A. against ICE is dismissed since it is proven that the early termination of the lease contract complied with the law under Article 72 of the General Urban and Suburban Leases Law, with no breach or obligation for unilateral rescission.", "summary_es": "Se desestima la demanda de MAGOSE M.G.S. S.A. contra el ICE al acreditarse que la terminación anticipada del contrato de arrendamiento se ajustó a derecho aplicando el artículo 72 de la Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos, sin mediar incumplimiento ni obligación de rescisión unilateral." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "Articles 6 and 72, both of the LGAUS, allow any lessee to terminate the administrative contract, which includes the State, decentralized public entities, municipalities, or private parties, so it cannot be considered an exorbitant public-law clause in favor of the Administration.", "quote_es": "Los artículos 6 y 72, ambos de la LGAUS, permiten dejar sin efecto el contrato administrativo a todo arrendatario, lo que incluye al Estado, los entes públicos descentralizados, las municipalidades o los particulares, razón por la cual no es posible considerarla como una cláusula o potestad exorbitante de derecho público en favor de la Administración." }, { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "It is impossible to hold that the early termination of the contract is unlawful, since it was done under Article 72 of the LGAUS, applicable here to the defendant entity as a lessee.", "quote_es": "No es posible afirmar que la finalización anticipada del contrato resulte ilegal, dado que fue al amparo del artículo 72 de la LGAUS, aplicable en este caso a la entidad demandada en su condición de arrendataria." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-58314", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411", "title_en": "Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "27/09/2006", "year": "2006" }, { "id": "norm-24284", "citation": "Ley 7494", "title_en": "Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-23655", "citation": "Ley 7527", "title_en": "General Law on Urban and Suburban Leases", "title_es": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "doc_type": "law", "date": "10/07/1995", "year": "1995" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-23655", "citation": "Ley 7527", "title_en": "General Law on Urban and Suburban Leases", "title_es": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "doc_type": "law", "date": "10/07/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-24284", "citation": "Ley 7494", "title_en": "Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/05/1995", "year": "1995" }, { "id": "norm-58314", "citation": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411", "title_en": "Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law", "title_es": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "doc_type": "executive_decree", "date": "27/09/2006", "year": "2006" } ], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-58314", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa" }, { "target_id": "norm-24284", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa" }, { "target_id": "norm-23655", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)" } ], "external": [ { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-104137", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0007-104137" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-264693", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0007-264693" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-239367", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-239367" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-380665", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-380665" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-504663", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-504663" } ] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-138682", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": false, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [ { "art_num": "159", "art_scij": "160", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-58314", "norm_fecha": "27 Sep 2006", "norm_name": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "norm_num": "33411", "norm_ver": "76416", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo" }, { "art_num": "206", "art_scij": "207", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-58314", "norm_fecha": "27 Sep 2006", "norm_name": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "norm_num": "33411", "norm_ver": "76416", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo" }, { "art_num": "11", "art_scij": "120726", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-24284", "norm_fecha": "02 May 1995", "norm_name": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "norm_num": "7494", "norm_ver": "83882", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "76", "art_scij": "120791", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-24284", "norm_fecha": "02 May 1995", "norm_name": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "norm_num": "7494", "norm_ver": "83882", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "77", "art_scij": "120792", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-24284", "norm_fecha": "02 May 1995", "norm_name": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "norm_num": "7494", "norm_ver": "83882", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "2", "art_scij": "118690", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "norm_fecha": "10 Jul 1995", "norm_name": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "norm_num": "7527", "norm_ver": "25051", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "6", "art_scij": "118694", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "norm_fecha": "10 Jul 1995", "norm_name": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "norm_num": "7527", "norm_ver": "25051", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "70", "art_scij": "118758", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "norm_fecha": "10 Jul 1995", "norm_name": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "norm_num": "7527", "norm_ver": "25051", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "72", "art_scij": "118760", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-23655", "norm_fecha": "10 Jul 1995", "norm_name": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "norm_num": "7527", "norm_ver": "25051", "tipo_norma": "Ley" } ], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-23655", "norm_num": "7527", "norm_name": "Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos ( Inquilinato)", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "10/07/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-24284", "norm_num": "7494", "norm_name": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-58314", "norm_num": "33411", "norm_name": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "norm_fecha": "27/09/2006" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [ "sen-1-0007-104137", "sen-1-0007-264693", "sen-1-0034-239367", "sen-1-0034-380665", "sen-1-0034-504663" ], "temas_y_subtemas": [ { "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Análisis sobre el plazo de vigencia y rescisión unilateral de arrendamiento en relación con la normativa aplicable" } ], "id": 1, "nombre": "Contratación administrativa" }, { "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Rescisión unilateral de bien inmueble en contrato de arrendamiento" } ], "id": 3, "nombre": "Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad" }, { "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Análisis sobre la rescisión unilateral de arrendamiento en relación con la normativa aplicable" } ], "id": 2, "nombre": "Rescisión de contrato administrativo" } ], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“V.- SOBRE EL FONDO. En el sub lite, la\r\npromovente esgrime una doble pretensión en contra del ICE: de una parte reclama\r\nque la forma en la que terminó con el contrato de arrendamiento no se ajusta a\r\nlo que dispone el ordenamiento de la contratación administrativa; y, de otra,\r\nformula –accesoriamente– un reclamo indemnizatorio de daños y perjuicios por\r\nlas consecuencias de aquella conducta administrativa ilegítima. Ambos extremos\r\ndeben ser examinados separadamente, sin perjuicio de adelantar desde ya que, en\r\nnuestra opinión, resultan improcedentes, por lo que de seguido se explica. Así\r\nplanteadas las cosas, en el considerando VI que sigue, se desarrolla el tema\r\ndel plazo del contrato de arrendamiento y la normativa aplicable al caso, en\r\nrelación con la conducta desplegada por la Administración para\r\ndejarla sin efecto. En el considerando VII se tratará\r\nel tema de la figura de la rescisión contractual y las razones por las cuales\r\nno se aplica en el presente caso. Finalmente, en el considerando VIII se\r\ndesarrollará el tema de los daños y perjuicios solicitados y \r\nsu improcedencia.\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.-SOBRE EL PLAZO DEL CONTRATO DE ARRENDAMIENTO. \n\r\n\r\n\nEl artículo 76 de la\r\n Ley de Contratación Administrativa, establece que para\r\nefectos de tomar en arrendamiento bienes inmuebles, con construcciones o sin\r\nellas, la\r\n Administración deberá acudir al procedimiento de licitación\r\npública, licitación abreviada o contratación directa, según corresponda, de\r\nacuerdo con el monto. Este mismo precepto lo desarrolla el artículo 159 del\r\nReglamento a la Ley\r\nde Contratación Administrativa vigente, Decreto Ejecutivo nº 33411-H. Resulta\r\nimportante mencionar que la Ley\r\nnº 7494 del 2 de mayo de 1995, establecía que el plazo del contrato de\r\narrendamiento era por tiempo indefinido en favor de la Administración, la\r\nque tenía la posibilidad de ponerle término en cualquier tiempo, sin\r\nresponsabilidad de su parte, dando aviso con tres meses de anticipación por lo\r\nmenos. Dicha ordenanza se encontraba en el artículo 77, que fue declarado\r\ninconstitucional mediante la sentencia 11398-03 de las 14:44 horas del 8 de octubre del 2003, de la Sala Constitucional. \r\nEn dicho voto la Sala\r\nconsideró que la prolongación de la vigencia del contrato de arrendamiento impide al\r\npropietario su libre disposición y el ejercicio pleno del dominio sobre el inmueble. Consideró\r\nademás que dicha norma polariza uno de los elementos de ese tipo de contratos,\r\nprovocando un rompimiento del vínculo creado entre las partes, y transformando\r\nla relación bilateral, en unilateral, propia de otro círculo de actuación de la Administración Pública.\r\nFinalmente en sus argumentos para declarar inconstitucional el artículo 77 de la LCA, se consideró que la norma\r\nimpone una limitación excesiva a la propiedad privada, una carga que el\r\npropietario no debe tolerar en un contrato de arrendamiento con la Administración que\r\nno proviene del propio cartel, lo que lo privó de tener pleno conocimiento\r\nacerca de las condiciones del contrato antes de decidir participar en el\r\nprocedimiento licitatorio. Según lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional,\r\nla norma impugnada permite a la Administración\r\npermanecer en un inmueble aún después de vencido el plazo convenido,\r\ndebilitando en forma inaceptable el derecho de propiedad del arrendante. De lo expuesto por la Sala Constitucional,\r\nen la sentencia mencionada, se puede concluir que a partir de dicha\r\ndeclaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del artículo 77 de la Ley de Contratación\r\nAdministrativa, el plazo del contrato de arrendamiento de bienes inmuebles debe\r\nser por tiempo determinado. En el caso bajo análisis, en lo que respecta al\r\nplazo del contrato suscrito entre el ICE y la parte actora, la cláusula\r\nmodificada por addendum, aprobada por la Contraloría General\r\nde la República,\r\na la letra dispone lo siguiente: \"CLÁUSULA QUINTA: PLAZO. El\r\ninmueble debe estar disponible un mes después de la\r\nnotificación de la orden de servicio por parte de la Dirección de\r\nProveeduría. El contrato de alquiler tendrá una vigencia inicial de tres años,\r\nprorrogables automáticamente por períodos iguales adicionales a partir de su\r\nvencimiento, de acuerdo a lo estipulado en la Ley General de\r\nArrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos.\" ( ver\r\nhecho probado 4). El contrato administrativo de\r\narrendamiento, objeto de esta litis, que es ley entre las partes, en lo que respecta\r\nal plazo, remite expresamente a la\r\n Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos, en adelante\r\nLGAUS. Resulta importante destacar que el artículo 2 de ese cuerpo\r\nnormativo, indica, de manera literal, que la naturaleza de la ley es de orden\r\npúblico, dicha imperatividad la regula de la siguiente manera: \"Esta\r\nley es de orden público. Todo convenio contrario a sus\r\ndisposiciones imperativas o prohibitivas es nulo de pleno derecho y se tendrá\r\npor no escrito. El acuerdo de partes es válido ante las disposiciones\r\npermisivas o facultativas de esta ley o en ausencia de norma\r\nexpresa, de no ser que el pacto viole otra disposición imperativa o prohibitiva\r\ndel\r\nordenamiento jurídico costarricense.\" De lo dispuesto por la norma citada se entiende que las normas de la LGAUS con carácter\r\ndispositivo, pueden ser obviadas por las partes, lo que no puede ocurrir con\r\nlas que son de orden público. Por otro lado, la LGAUS en su artículo 6\r\ncontiene una norma que resulta de importancia para el\r\ncaso bajo análisis: \"El Estado, los entes públicos descentralizados y\r\nlas municipalidades, en calidad de arrendadores o arrendatarios, están sujetos\r\na esta ley, salvo disposición expresa de su propio ordenamiento jurídico. El procedimiento de licitación se rige por las disposiciones\r\nlegales y reglamentarias de la contratación administrativa.\" \r\nDe lo regulado por la norma transcrita se desprende\r\nque la normativa es de aplicación al ICE, que en este caso fungió como arrendatario en el\r\ncontrato bajo examen. En lo que respecta al plazo del contrato de arrendamiento, el artículo 70\r\nde la LGAUS\r\ndispone lo siguiente: \"La duración del arrendamiento no podrá ser inferior a\r\ntres años. Se entenderán convenidos por el plazo de tres\r\naños, los arrendamientos para los que se haya estipulado una duración inferior\r\no no se haya fijado el plazo de duración. El plazo se\r\ncontará a partir del\r\ndía en que el arrendatario recibe el bien.\" La norma transcrita es una de las típicas de orden público, como se mencionó anteriormente y que se estipula en\r\nfavor del\r\narrendatario, nunca en su perjuicio. Por otro lado, dentro del mismo capítulo\r\nVIII de la LGAUS,\r\nque se refiere al plazo del contrato, se ubica el artículo 72, que regula la\r\nextinción de este por parte del arrendatario, dicha norma es clara en disponer\r\nque \"salvo pacto en contrario\", surte efecto la extinción con el\r\npreaviso que le dé el arrendatario al arrendador con 3 meses de anticipación,\r\nla norma bajo análisis señala: \"ARTICULO 72.-\r\nExtinción del contrato por el arrendatario. Salvo pacto escrito en contrario, el\r\ncontrato de arrendamiento se extingue cuando el arrendatario avisa al\r\narrendador, con tres meses de anticipación, su voluntad de terminar el\r\narrendamiento. La extinción del\r\ncontrato no altera las responsabilidades de las partes en cuanto a los demás\r\nderechos y obligaciones nacidos del\r\narrendamiento.\" De conformidad con lo anterior, la frase\r\n\"salvo pacto en contrario\", apunta a la posibilidad de aumentar o\r\ndisminuir este plazo, por la vía convencional entre partes, en tal sentido la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia ha dictado lo siguiente: \"Al integrar sistemáticamente esta\r\nregla con lo dispuesto en el numeral 3 de la Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos, debe\r\nconcluirse que el arrendatario tiene el derecho irrenunciable de extinguir la relación\r\njurídica dando aviso con tres meses de anticipación. El pacto en contra se\r\nadmite únicamente en cuanto al plazo con que debe darse esa noticia. En la\r\nespecie, las partes omitieron ampliar o disminuir el plazo con que debía\r\nnotificarse la extinción previa del negocio, por lo cual, siendo éste, un\r\nderecho del arrendatario, que no admite mengua, podía ejercerlo aplicando el\r\ntiempo definido por el artículo 72 ibídem, como en efecto procedió, lo cual fue\r\nbien apreciado por los jueces de instancia. El recurrente cuestiona que la\r\nregla es inaplicable porque el negocio tenía un plazo\r\nde vigencia definido. Empero, tal aclaración no se encuentra\r\nen la norma y no puede distinguirse donde la ley no lo hace, por lo\r\ncual, esa regla se actúa tanto a los arrendamientos con plazo definido, como aquéllos que no lo\r\ntienen. En este último caso cabe recordar que ninguna\r\nde estas relaciones podrán tener una vigencia menor a tres años, tiempo que ha\r\nsido previsto a favor del arrendatario\r\n(doctrina del\r\nartículo 3 ibídem), por lo cual, éste sí podría darlo por terminado, aún antes\r\nde ese tiempo.\" (ver la sentencia nº 000399-F-03 , de Sala\r\nPrimera de la Corte\r\n Suprema de Justicia de las 9:40 horas del 11 de julio de\r\n2003, en igual sentido, la\r\n Sala Primera ha considerado lo siguiente: \"De lo\r\nanterior, logra colegirse que la norma cuya vulneración se acusa es considerada\r\nimperativa o de orden público. Sin embargo, en el laudo no se resolvió en\r\ncontra de lo dispuesto en ese ordinal, sino más bien conforme a él, pues al no\r\nacreditarse la existencia de un pacto en contrario que autorizara la\r\ndesaplicación de ese precepto legal (...) ...se determinó que el contrato\r\nde arrendamiento que vinculaba a las partes, fue extinguido por la demandada\r\nconforme a derecho. En este asunto, ante la ausencia del “pacto escrito en\r\ncontrario” para extinguir el contrato, pues no logró acreditarse, los árbitros\r\ndebieron aceptar su conclusión con el aviso oportuno al arrendador de la\r\nvoluntad del arrendatario de dar por terminado el arrendamiento, conforme lo\r\ndispone el artículo 72 de comentario. A mayor abundamiento de razones, es\r\nimportante señalar que se hubiera resuelto en contra del precepto enunciado, si\r\nse hubiera dado por terminado el contrato, sin observar lo pactado por las\r\npartes, pero en este asunto, se reitera, no logró acreditarse ningún convenio\r\nde esa índole; situación que esta Sala no puede variar, ya que implicaría el\r\nexamen de los elementos probatorios, análisis vedado a esta Sala, tratándose\r\ndel recurso de nulidad dentro de un proceso arbitral.\" (ver la\r\nsentencia nº 000005-S1-2011, de Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia de las 10:40 horas del 13 de enero de 2011.) De lo anterior, se\r\ninfiere que por la vía contractual y por escrito las partes pueden pactar un preaviso mayor o menor a los tres meses indicados. \r\nEn el análisis de la norma en cuestión, resulta importante hacer mención que\r\neste plazo para dar el aviso anticipado es en favor del arrendatario,\r\nsobre el particular la\r\n Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia también indicó lo\r\nsiguiente: \"Ese trienio, según se dijo, está pactado en beneficio del\r\nlocatario, y no en su perjuicio, de modo tal que, si deseara poner término al\r\ncontrato antes de tiempo, podrá hacerlo. Asimismo, si el plazo de vigencia es\r\nmenor, debe tenerse por no puesto, e interpretarle por un\r\nmínimo de tres años. Con todo, aún cuando la normativa de inquilinato busca\r\nproteger los derechos del\r\narrendatario, ello no puede suponer, en modo alguno, conculcar los del arrendante, ni las\r\nexigencias de la buena fe. El plazo de aviso previo con que debe señalarse el\r\ntérmino final del contrato, tiene por objeto que tanto el arrendante como el\r\narrendatario tomen las previsiones del caso, y no se vean de manera\r\nintempestiva y apresurada, en la obligación de desalojar y buscar un nuevo\r\ninmueble, o con el bien desocupado, pudiendo arrendarlo de nuevo.\"\r\n(ver la sentencia nº 000378-F-2007, de Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia de las 9:00 horas del 24 de mayo de 2007.) De lo expuesto se colige\r\nque el arrendatario tiene la posibilidad de terminar la relación contractual\r\nantes de que expiren los tres años, siempre y cuando de aviso al arrendador con\r\ntres meses de anticipación, de acuerdo con lo que dispone el artículo 72 de la LGAUS visto. En\r\nel caso de marras, se ha tenido por demostrado que el 6 de abril del 2010, la\r\nparte demandada, mediante el oficio 5122-0135-2010 del 25 de marzo de\r\n2010, le comunicó a la empresa actora, lo siguiente: \"Asunto:\r\nNotificación de 'Extinción de contrato por Arrendamiento' Licitación Pública Nº\r\n2006 LN 0000-46-PROV. De acuerdo al artículo Nº 72 de la Ley General de\r\nArrendamiento Urbanos y Suburbanos 'Extinción del contrato por el arrendatario'\r\nque dice: 'ARTÍCULO 72 Extinción del contrato por arrendatario. Salvo pacto escrito en contrario, el contrato de arrendamiento\r\nse extingue cuando el arrendatario, avisa al arrendador con tres meses de\r\nanticipación, su voluntad de terminar el arrendamiento. La\r\nextinción del\r\ncontrato no altera las responsabilidades de las partes en cuanto a los demás derechos\r\ny obligaciones nacidos del\r\narrendamiento.' Por lo antes expuesto, le notifico que el local arrendado en\r\nSan Pedro de Monte de Oca, denominado Edificio Cocori, tiene programada su\r\ndevolución para el próximo 18 de julio del 2010 De esta forma se respetan los\r\ntres meses que el ICE debe cumplir, según se indica en la Ley General de\r\nArrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos (Ley de Inquilinato). En\r\nvista de que representamos a una entidad pública, nos vemos en la obligación de\r\nretirar todas las mejoras realizadas por nuestra parte en el citado inmueble.\r\nAcuerdo aceptado por las partes en el contrato, específicamente en la cláusula\r\nsexta 'OBLIGACIONES DEL ICE: el artículo B) Al finalizar el contrato el I.C.E.\r\ndesmantelará las remodelaciones bajo su propio costo y estructuras que haya\r\nconstruido por su cuenta o podrá negociar con la arrendante, el costo de esas\r\nobras siempre que la remodelación de las mismas no cause daño estructural al\r\nbien arrendado, caso contrario, ellas acrecerán al dicho inmueble. (ver hecho probado nº 5). Por otro lado, la cláusula\r\nquinta del\r\ncontrato, citada anteriormente, que regula el plazo, remite a la LGAUS (hecho probado nº4) . Del cuadro fáctico\r\nexpuesto a juicio de esta Cámara, la parte demandada cumplió con las\r\ndisposiciones contractuales y legales, para efectos de extinguir el contrato de\r\narrendamiento. Lo anterior, en primer término en virtud de que la\r\ncláusula contractual que regula el plazo, remite de manera expresa a la LGAUS; en segundo término,\r\nporque al no existir \"pacto en contrario\", esto significa, de acuerdo\r\ncon las sentencias de la\r\n Sala Primera citadas, que no fue pactado un plazo mayor o\r\nmenor a los 3 meses para dar aviso al arrendador, era de plena aplicación el\r\nnumeral 72 de la LGAUS. El\r\nICE se encontraba facultado, de acuerdo con los artículos 2, 6 y 72 de la LGAUS para dejar sin efecto\r\nel contrato de arrendamiento, avisando con 3 meses de anticipación, tal y como\r\nse ha tenido por demostrado en la presente causa. Por lo expuesto, la LGAUS era de aplicación a la\r\ncontratación porque una de sus cláusulas que regulaban el plazo remitían a\r\ndicho cuerpo normativo, aunado al hecho de que por la naturaleza de este\r\ncontrato existe una regulación especial, aplicable, de acuerdo con los\r\nartículos 2 y 6 a\r\nla entidad demandada. De lo expuesto considera este Tribunal que no es posible afirmar que la finalización anticipada del contrato resulte ilegal, dado que fue al amparo del artículo 72 de la LGAUS, aplicable en este\r\ncaso a la entidad demandada en su condición de arrendataria. Tampoco es posible\r\nconsiderar como\r\nincumplimiento contractual, por la inactividad por no rescisión, como lo plantea la parte\r\nactora, el hecho de que la entidad demandada decidiera terminar el contrato con\r\nanticipación, ya que el ordenamiento jurídico se lo permite al ICE en su\r\ncondición de arrendatario, de acuerdo con lo que la LGAUS dispone. Es criterio\r\nde este Tribunal que en su condición de arrendatario del bien inmueble\r\npropiedad de MAGOSE M.G.S. S.A., el Instituto demandado no se encontraba\r\nactuando con potestades exorbitantes, como se mencionó antes, la posibilidad\r\nque tenía la\r\n Administración de contar con un plazo indefinido (potestad\r\nexorbitante) fue declarada inconstitucional, mediante la sentencia 11398-03.\r\nLos artículos 6 y 72, ambos de la\r\n LGAUS, permiten dejar sin efecto el contrato administrativo a\r\ntodo arrendatario, lo que incluye al Estado, los entes públicos\r\ndescentralizados, las municipalidades o los particulares, razón por la cual no\r\nes posible considerarla como una cláusula o potestad exorbitante de derecho\r\npúblico en favor de la\r\n Administración. En vista de que se ha tenido por demostrado\r\nque la entidad demandada dio aviso con tres meses de anticipación, no es dable\r\nconsiderar que se deban reconocer los perjuicios, tal y como lo plantea la\r\nparte actora, que consisten en las 13 mensualidades dejadas de percibir, que\r\nascienden a un monto de $22.500 (veintidós mil quinientos dólares) cada\r\nmensualidad, para un total de $292.500 (doscientos noventa y dos mil quinientos\r\ndólares), extremo petitorio que debe ser rechazado al no existir una actuación\r\nreprochable a la entidad demandada, contraria al ordenamiento jurídico.\r\nFinalmente, resulta imposible jurídicamente calificar la salida de la parte\r\ndemandada del inmueble como abandono, dado que avisó al arrendador su salida,\r\ncon la anticipación indicada por la ley, tópico que será desarrollado en el\r\nconsiderando IX de la presente resolución.\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.-SOBRE LA RESCISIÓN UNILATERAL.\r\nLos\r\ncontratos administrativos normalmente se extinguen cuando se cumplen las\r\nprestaciones pactadas, sin embargo, es posible el surgimiento de situaciones\r\nque se pueden calificar como \"anormales\" y causan su conclusión, tal\r\nes el caso de la rescisión unilateral. Dicha figura\r\nconstituye una de las formas de extinción de los contratos administrativos.\r\nSe califica como\r\n\"anormal\" pues se produce por hechos o circunstancias advertidos o\r\nsurgidos con posterioridad a la validez, perfeccionamiento, formalización y\r\neficacia del\r\ncontrato. Cabe mencionar que etimológicamente rescindir\r\nproviene del\r\nlatín scindere, que significa rasgar, romper, hacer pedazos. La Sala Constitucional,\r\nen la sentencia 1205-96 de las 9:00 horas del 15 de marzo de\r\n1996, dispuso que la rescisión contractual puede ser unilateral o bilateral. En el caso bajo estudio interesa analizar la rescisión unilateral,\r\nque es el tema que plantea la parte actora. Del artículo 11 de la Ley de Contratación\r\nAdministrativa, referente a los derechos y obligaciones de la Administración, se\r\ninfiere que los supuestos para que la Administración pueda ejercer el derecho de\r\nrescindir en forma unilateral sus relaciones contractuales, son el caso\r\nfortuito, la fuerza mayor o el interés público, todo con apego al debido\r\nproceso. De encontrarse bajo estos supuestos el ordenamiento jurídico de la\r\ncontratación administrativa establece que cuando se pone término al contrato\r\npor causas que no se imputen al contratista (rescisión unilateral), se le debe\r\nliquidar la parte que haya sido efectivamente ejecutada, así como los daños y\r\nperjuicios ocasionados. En los supuestos de caso fortuito o fuerza mayor, se le\r\nliquida al contratista en forma exclusiva la parte efectivamente ejecutada y\r\nlos gastos en que haya incurrido razonablemente el contratista en previsión de\r\nla ejecución total del\r\ncontrato. Por su parte el Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (RLCA), en el\r\nartículo 206 se refiere a la rescisión unilateral de la siguiente forma: \"Artículo 206.—Rescisión. La Administración\r\npodrá rescindir unilateralmente sus contratos, no iniciados o en curso de\r\nejecución, por razones de interés público, caso fortuito o fuerza mayor,\r\ndebidamente acreditadas. Para ello deberá emitir una resolución razonada en\r\ndonde señale la causal existente y la prueba en que se apoya, la cual será\r\npuesta en conocimiento del contratista por el plazo de\r\nquince días hábiles. La entidad deberá cancelar al contratista la parte\r\nefectivamente ejecutada del contrato, en el evento de que\r\nno lo hubiera hecho con anterioridad y los gastos en que ese contratista haya\r\nincurrido para la completa ejecución, siempre que estén debidamente probados.\r\nCuando la rescisión se origine por motivos de interés público, además se podrá\r\nreconocer al contratista cualquier daño o perjuicio que la terminación del\r\ncontrato le causare, previa invocación y comprobación. El lucro cesante\r\ncorrespondiente a la parte no ejecutada podrá reconocerse siempre dentro de\r\ncriterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, valorando aspectos tales como el\r\nplazo de ejecución en descubierto, grado de avance de la ejecución del\r\ncontrato, complejidad del objeto. Cuando la utilidad no haya sido declarada se\r\nconsiderará que es un 10% del monto total cotizado.\" De conformidad con la normativa mencionada, aplicable al\r\ncaso concreto, desde un punto de vista técnico jurídico no es posible afirmar\r\nque la conducta desplegada por la entidad demandada y que en esta sede se\r\nreprocha, obedece a la rescisión unilateral del contrato de la LCA y su Reglamento, dado que\r\nla actuación del Instituto demandado se encontraba amparada en lo que dispone\r\nen los artículos 6 y 72 de la\r\n LGAUS, que le permite avisar al arrendador con 3 meses de\r\nanticipación su voluntad de dar por terminado el contrato, razón por la\r\ncual la\r\n Administración en su condición de arrendataria no tenía la\r\nobligación rescindir de manera unilateral el contrato, llevando a cabo el\r\nprocedimiento que dispone el artículo 208 del RLCA. Al amparo de la LGAUS si se cumple con este\r\nrequisito de dar el aviso con 3 meses de antelación, no existe obligación de\r\ninvocar la causa de rescisión y la determinación de daños y perjucios, que es\r\nuno de los aspectos medulares de la aplicación de esta figura jurídica en el\r\nmarco de la contratación administrativa. Lo anterior en virtud de que el\r\nesquema jurídico del\r\ncontrato de arrendamiento así lo prevé en favor de la parte arrendataria.\r\nDistinto es el caso de otro tipo de daños o perjuicios que tengan un nexo de\r\ncausalidad diverso a la conducta de dejarlo sin efecto aplicando el artículo 72\r\nde la LGAUS,\r\ncomo los son los que se pretenden en esta causa, dado que se solicita el\r\nresarcimiento de los daños causados al inmueble a la hora del desalojo, para\r\ndevolver el inmueble en el estado de conservación en el que se encontraba en el\r\nmomento de la entrega y los perjuicios que consisten en las mensualidades\r\ndejadas de pagar hasta la finalización del plazo contractual, tema que se va a\r\ndesarrollar en el considerando VIII. Es por lo expuesto\r\nanteriormente que la parte demandada no tenía que llevar a cabo ningún\r\nprocedimiento para rescindir el contrato de arrendamiento. Lo anterior\r\ntiene sustento no solo en la cláusula quinta del contrato y en las normas de la LGAUS citadas en este\r\nconsiderando y en el anterior, si no en la misma cláusula novena del contrato suscrito\r\nentre la parte actora y el ICE. La cláusula dicha resulta armónica con el\r\ncontrato y normativa mencionadas, ya que dispone lo siguiente: \"CLÁUSULA\r\nNOVENA: TERMINACIÓN ANTICIPADA DEL\r\nCONTRATO. En caso de que el ICE deba rescindir o resolver este\r\ncontrato, deberá cumplir con lo establecido en los artículos 11 de la Ley de Contratación\r\nAdministrativa y 204, 205 y 206 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación\r\nAdministrativa.\" (lo subrayado no es del original, ver hecho\r\nprobado nº 3) . Como se puede leer con claridad, dicho precepto aplica en\r\nel caso de que el ICE \"deba\" rescindir el contrato por las\r\ncausales del artículo 206 del RLCA, a saber caso fortuito, fuerza mayor o\r\ninterés público. En el caso bajo estudio, como se ha dicho, la parte demandada\r\nno estaba en la obligación de rescindir el contrato de forma unilateral, para\r\ndejarlo sin efectos, pues la cláusula contractual remitía a la normativa de la LGAUS en lo que al plazo\r\nrespecta. Dicha normativa, tal y como se ha mencionado establece un plazo\r\nde 3 años, obligatorio para el arrendador, pero como mínimo en favor del\r\narrendatario, por lo que puede dejar sin efecto el contrato si avisa con 3\r\nmeses de anticipación, lo cual considera este Tribunal, ocurrió en el asunto\r\nque nos ocupa, pues quedó demostrado que en el mes de abril del 2010 el ICE\r\nnotificó, mediante el oficio 5122-0135-2010 del 25 de marzo de 2010, que\r\ndejaría el inmueble a partir de julio de ese mismo año, informando las razones\r\ny cumpliendo así con el aviso de ley de los tres meses de anticipación (ver\r\nhechos probados nº 5 y nº 6.) Con fundamento en el análisis expuesto, es\r\ncriterio de este Órgano Colegiado que no ha existido ningún incumplimiento de\r\nlas cláusulas contractuales por parte del Instituto demandado, en lo que\r\nrespecta a la forma en la que dejó sin efecto el contrato, dado que el oficio\r\nrecién mencionado, se ajusta a lo que dispone la LGAUS en su artículo 72,\r\nincluso, el oficio citó textualmente éste último artículo (ver hecho probado\r\nnº5).”", "body_en_text": "V.- ON THE MERITS. In the case at bar, the plaintiff raises a twofold claim against ICE: on the one hand, she argues that the manner in which the lease contract was terminated does not conform to the provisions of the administrative contracting legal framework; and, on the other hand, she formulates—accessorily—a claim for damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) for the consequences of that illegitimate administrative conduct. Both aspects must be examined separately, without prejudice to stating in advance that, in our opinion, they are unfounded, as explained below. Having framed matters thus, the following considerando VI will develop the issue of the lease contract term and the regulations applicable to the case, in relation to the conduct undertaken by the Administration to render it without effect. Considerando VII will address the issue of the concept of contract rescission (rescisión contractual) and the reasons why it does not apply in the present case. Finally, considerando VIII will develop the issue of the damages and losses requested and their unfoundedness.\n\nVI.- ON THE LEASE CONTRACT TERM.\n\nArticle 76 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa, LCA) establishes that, for the purposes of leasing real property, with or without constructions, the Administration must resort to the public bidding (licitación pública), abbreviated bidding (licitación abreviada), or direct contracting (contratación directa) procedure, as applicable, according to the amount. This same precept is developed by Article 159 of the current Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), Executive Decree No. 33411-H. It is important to mention that Law No. 7494 of May 2, 1995, established that the term of the lease contract was for an indefinite period in favor of the Administration, which had the possibility of terminating it at any time, without liability on its part, by giving at least three months' notice. Said ordinance was found in Article 77, which was declared unconstitutional by judgment 11398-03 of 14:44 hours on October 8, 2003, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). In that ruling, the Chamber considered that the prolongation of the lease contract's validity prevents the owner from freely disposing of the property and fully exercising ownership rights over it. It also considered that said norm polarizes one of the elements of such contracts, causing a rupture of the bond created between the parties, and transforming the bilateral relationship into a unilateral one, typical of another sphere of Public Administration action. Finally, in its arguments for declaring Article 77 of the LCA unconstitutional, it was considered that the norm imposes an excessive limitation on private property, a burden that the owner should not have to tolerate in a lease contract with the Administration that does not originate from the solicitation documents (cartel) itself, which deprived him of having full knowledge of the contract conditions before deciding to participate in the bidding procedure. According to what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, the challenged norm allows the Administration to remain on a property even after the agreed term has expired, unacceptably weakening the lessor's (arrendante) property right. From the foregoing, as set forth by the Constitutional Chamber in the aforementioned judgment, it can be concluded that, as of that declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 77 of the Administrative Contracting Law, the term of a real estate lease contract must be for a fixed period. In the case under analysis, regarding the term of the contract signed between ICE and the plaintiff, the clause modified by addendum, approved by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), literally provides as follows: “FIFTH CLAUSE: TERM. The property must be available one month after the notification of the service order (orden de servicio) by the Procurement Directorate (Dirección de Proveeduría). The rental contract shall have an initial duration of three years, automatically renewable for additional equal periods from its expiration, in accordance with the provisions of the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases (Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos).” (see proven fact 4). The administrative lease contract, the subject of this litigation, which is law between the parties, regarding its term, expressly refers to the Law of Urban and Suburban Leases, hereinafter LGAUS. It is important to highlight that Article 2 of that body of law indicates, in a literal manner, that the nature of the law is one of public policy, its mandatory nature regulated as follows: “This law is of public policy. Any agreement contrary to its imperative or prohibitive provisions is null and void and shall be deemed unwritten. The parties' agreement is valid in the face of permissive or facultative provisions of this law or in the absence of an express norm, provided the agreement does not violate another imperative or prohibitive provision of the Costa Rican legal system.” From the provisions of the cited norm, it is understood that the provisions of the LGAUS of a dispositive nature can be set aside by the parties, which cannot occur with those that are of public policy. On the other hand, the LGAUS in its Article 6 contains a norm of importance for the case under analysis: “The State, decentralized public entities, and municipalities, in their capacity as lessors or lessees (arrendatarios), are subject to this law, unless there is an express provision in their own legal framework. The bidding procedure is governed by the legal and regulatory provisions of administrative contracting.” From what is regulated by the transcribed norm, it follows that the regulations apply to ICE, which in this case acted as lessee in the contract under examination. Regarding the term of the lease contract, Article 70 of the LGAUS provides as follows: “The duration of the lease may not be less than three years. Leases for which a shorter duration has been stipulated or for which no duration term has been fixed shall be deemed agreed for a term of three years. The term shall be counted from the day the lessee receives the property.” The transcribed norm is one of the typical public policy norms, as mentioned above, and is stipulated in favor of the lessee, never to his detriment. On the other hand, within the same Chapter VIII of the LGAUS, which refers to the contract term, is located Article 72, which regulates its extinction by the lessee. Said norm is clear in providing that, “unless otherwise agreed in writing,” the extinction takes effect with the notice given by the lessee to the lessor three months in advance. The norm under analysis states: “ARTICLE 72.- Extinction of the contract by the lessee. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the lease contract is extinguished when the lessee notifies the lessor, three months in advance, of his intention to terminate the lease. The extinction of the contract does not alter the liabilities of the parties with respect to the other rights and obligations arising from the lease.” In accordance with the foregoing, the phrase “unless otherwise agreed in writing” points to the possibility of increasing or decreasing this period by way of conventional agreement between the parties. In this regard, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has ruled as follows: “By systematically integrating this rule with the provisions of numeral 3 of the Law of Urban and Suburban Leases, it must be concluded that the lessee has the inalienable right to extinguish the legal relationship by giving three months' notice. An agreement to the contrary is admitted only regarding the period within which such notice must be given. In the present case, the parties omitted to extend or reduce the period within which the prior extinction of the business was to be notified, therefore, this being a right of the lessee that admits no diminution, he could exercise it by applying the time defined by Article 72 ibidem, as indeed he proceeded, which was correctly appreciated by the trial judges. The appellant questions that the rule is inapplicable because the business had a defined term of validity. However, such a clarification is not found in the norm, and one cannot distinguish where the law does not do so, meaning that rule applies both to leases with a defined term and to those that do not have one. In this latter case, it is worth recalling that none of these relationships may have a duration of less than three years, a time period that has been provided for the benefit of the lessee (doctrine of Article 3 ibidem), for which reason he could terminate it, even before that time.” (see judgment No. 000399-F-03, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 9:40 a.m. on July 11, 2003; in the same sense, the First Chamber has considered the following: “From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the norm whose violation is alleged is considered imperative or of public policy. However, the award did not rule against the provisions of that ordinal law, but rather in accordance with it, since, by not proving the existence of an agreement to the contrary that would authorize the non-application of that legal precept (...) it was determined that the lease contract that bound the parties was extinguished by the defendant in accordance with the law. In this matter, in the absence of a ‘written agreement to the contrary’ for extinguishing the contract, since it could not be proven, the arbitrators had to accept its conclusion upon timely notice to the lessor of the lessee's intention to terminate the lease, as provided by Article 72 under analysis. As further reasoning, it is important to note that a ruling against the stated precept would have been issued if the contract had been terminated without observing what was agreed by the parties, but in this matter, we reiterate, no such convention was proven; a situation this Chamber cannot alter, as it would involve the examination of evidentiary elements, an analysis forbidden to this Chamber, concerning the remedy of annulment within an arbitration process.” (see judgment No. 000005-S1-2011, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 10:40 a.m. on January 13, 2011.) From the foregoing, it is inferred that, contractually and in writing, the parties may agree on a notice period longer or shorter than the indicated three months. In the analysis of the norm in question, it is important to mention that this period for giving advance notice is in favor of the lessee; on this point, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice also stated the following: “That three-year period, as indicated, is agreed upon for the benefit of the tenant (locatario), and not to his detriment, so that, if he wishes to terminate the contract before its time, he may do so. Likewise, if the validity period is shorter, it must be deemed not written and interpreted as a minimum of three years. However, even though the tenancy regulations seek to protect the rights of the lessee, this cannot suppose, in any way, undermining those of the lessor, nor the requirements of good faith. The period of prior notice with which the end date of the contract must be indicated is intended to allow both the lessor and the lessee to make the necessary arrangements for the case, and not to find themselves abruptly and hastily in the obligation to vacate and seek a new property, or with the property vacant, being able to lease it again.” (see judgment No. 000378-F-2007, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 9:00 a.m. on May 24, 2007.) From the foregoing, it is gathered that the lessee has the possibility of terminating the contractual relationship before the three years expire, provided he gives the lessor three months' advance notice, in accordance with the provisions of Article 72 of the LGAUS cited. In the case at hand, it has been proven that on April 6, 2010, the defendant, through official letter 5122-0135-2010 of March 25, 2010, notified the plaintiff company of the following: “Subject: Notification of 'Extinction of Lease Contract' Public Bidding No. 2006 LN 0000-46-PROV. According to Article No. 72 of the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases, 'Extinction of the contract by the lessee,' which reads: 'ARTICLE 72 Extinction of the contract by the lessee. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the lease contract is extinguished when the lessee notifies the lessor, three months in advance, of his intention to terminate the lease. The extinction of the contract does not alter the liabilities of the parties regarding the other rights and obligations arising from the lease.' Based on the foregoing, I notify you that the premises leased in San Pedro de Montes de Oca, called Edificio Cocorí, is scheduled for return on July 18, 2010. In this manner, the three months that ICE must observe, as indicated in the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases (Tenancy Law), are respected. Given that we represent a public entity, we are obligated to remove all improvements made by us to the mentioned property. Agreement accepted by the parties in the contract, specifically in the sixth clause, 'OBLIGATIONS OF ICE: subclause B) At the end of the contract, I.C.E. shall dismantle the remodeling at its own cost and structures it has built on its own account or may negotiate with the lessor the cost of those works, provided that the remodeling thereof does not cause structural damage to the leased property; otherwise, they shall accrue to said property.' (see proven fact No. 5). On the other hand, the contract's fifth clause, cited above, which regulates the term, refers to the LGAUS (proven fact No. 4). From the factual picture presented, in the judgment of this Chamber, the defendant complied with the contractual and legal provisions for the purpose of extinguishing the lease contract. The foregoing, in the first place, by virtue of the fact that the contractual clause regulating the term expressly refers to the LGAUS; in the second place, because since there is no “agreement to the contrary,” this means, according to the judgments of the First Chamber cited, that a period greater or lesser than the 3 months for notifying the lessor was not agreed upon, numeral 72 of the LGAUS was fully applicable. ICE was empowered, according to Articles 2, 6, and 72 of the LGAUS, to render the lease contract without effect by giving three months' advance notice, just as has been proven in the present case. Based on the foregoing, the LGAUS was applicable to the contract because one of its clauses regulating the term referred to that body of law, coupled with the fact that, due to the nature of this contract, there is a special regulation, applicable according to Articles 2 and 6 to the defendant entity. From what has been set forth, this Tribunal considers that it is not possible to affirm that the early termination of the contract is illegal, given that it was done under the protection of Article 72 of the LGAUS, applicable in this case to the defendant entity in its capacity as lessee. Nor is it possible to consider the fact that the defendant entity decided to terminate the contract early as a contractual breach, or as inactivity for not rescinding, as the plaintiff contends, given that the legal system permits ICE, in its capacity as lessee, to do so, according to what the LGAUS provides. It is the criterion of this Tribunal that, in its capacity as lessee of the real property owned by MAGOSE M.G.S. S.A., the defendant Institute was not acting with exorbitant powers (potestades exorbitantes). As mentioned before, the possibility that the Administration had of having an indefinite term (an exorbitant power) was declared unconstitutional by judgment 11398-03. Articles 6 and 72, both of the LGAUS, allow any lessee to render the administrative contract without effect, which includes the State, decentralized public entities, municipalities, or private individuals, which is why it cannot be considered an exorbitant clause or power of public law in favor of the Administration. Given that it has been proven that the defendant entity gave three months' advance notice, it is not possible to consider that the damages, as argued by the plaintiff, which consist of the 13 monthly payments not received, amounting to $22,500 (twenty-two thousand five hundred dollars) per month, for a total of $292,500 (two hundred ninety-two thousand five hundred dollars), must be recognized. This petition must be rejected as there is no reprehensible conduct by the defendant entity contrary to the legal system. Finally, it is legally impossible to classify the departure of the defendant from the property as abandonment, given that it notified the lessor of its departure with the advance notice indicated by law, a topic that will be developed in considerando IX of this judgment.\n\nVII.- ON UNILATERAL RESCISSION.\nAdministrative contracts are normally extinguished when the agreed-upon obligations are fulfilled; however, the emergence of situations that can be classified as “abnormal” and cause their conclusion is possible, such is the case of unilateral rescission. Said figure constitutes one of the forms of extinction of administrative contracts. It is classified as “abnormal” because it is produced by events or circumstances noticed or arising after the contract's validity, perfection, formalization, and effectiveness. It is worth mentioning that, etymologically, “rescindir” comes from the Latin scindere, which means to tear, to break, to make pieces. The Constitutional Chamber, in judgment 1205-96 of 9:00 a.m. on March 15, 1996, ruled that contractual rescission can be unilateral or bilateral. In the case under study, it is pertinent to analyze unilateral rescission, which is the topic raised by the plaintiff. From Article 11 of the Administrative Contracting Law, referring to the rights and obligations of the Administration, it is inferred that the circumstances under which the Administration may exercise the right to unilaterally rescind its contractual relationships are act of God (caso fortuito), force majeure (fuerza mayor), or public interest (interés público), all in accordance with due process. If found under these circumstances, the legal framework of administrative contracting establishes that when the contract is terminated for reasons not attributable to the contractor (unilateral rescission), the contractor must be paid for the part that has been effectively executed, as well as for the damages and losses caused. In cases of act of God or force majeure, the contractor is paid exclusively for the part effectively executed and the expenses reasonably incurred by the contractor in anticipation of the total execution of the contract. For its part, the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law (RLCA), in Article 206, refers to unilateral rescission as follows: “Article 206.—Rescission. The Administration may unilaterally rescind its contracts, whether not initiated or in the course of execution, for duly substantiated reasons of public interest, act of God, or force majeure. To do so, it must issue a reasoned resolution stating the existing grounds and the supporting evidence, which shall be made known to the contractor for a period of fifteen business days. The entity must pay the contractor for the effectively executed part of the contract, in the event it had not already done so, and for the expenses that contractor incurred toward its complete execution, provided they are duly proven. When the rescission originates from reasons of public interest, the contractor may also be recognized for any damage or loss that the termination of the contract caused him, upon prior invocation and verification. The lost profits corresponding to the unexecuted portion may always be recognized within criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, evaluating aspects such as the outstanding execution period, degree of advancement of the contract execution, and complexity of the object. When the profit has not been declared, it shall be considered as 10% of the total quoted amount.” In accordance with the mentioned regulations, applicable to the specific case, from a technically legal point of view, it is not possible to affirm that the conduct deployed by the defendant entity, which is reproached in this venue, corresponds to the unilateral rescission of the contract under the LCA and its Regulation, given that the actions of the defendant Institute were covered by the provisions of Articles 6 and 72 of the LGAUS, which allow the lessee to notify the lessor three months in advance of its intention to terminate the contract. For that reason, the Administration, in its condition as lessee, had no obligation to unilaterally rescind the contract by carrying out the procedure provided in Article 208 of the RLCA. Under the protection of the LGAUS, if this requirement of giving three months' advance notice is met, there is no obligation to invoke a ground for rescission or the determination of damages and losses, which is one of the core aspects of the application of this legal figure within the framework of administrative contracting. The foregoing, by virtue of the fact that the legal framework of the lease contract so provides in favor of the lessee. This is distinct from other types of damages or losses that have a causal link different from the conduct of rendering the contract without effect by applying Article 72 of the LGAUS, such as those sought in this case, given that compensation is requested for damages caused to the property at the time of eviction, to return the property in the state of conservation it was in at the time of delivery, and for the losses consisting of the monthly payments left unpaid until the end of the contractual term, a topic to be developed in considerando VIII. Based on the foregoing, the defendant did not have to carry out any procedure to rescind the lease contract. This is supported not only by the fifth clause of the contract and the norms of the LGAUS cited in this considerando and the previous one, but also by the ninth clause itself of the contract entered into between the plaintiff and ICE. Said clause is harmonious with the contract and regulations mentioned, as it provides as follows: “NINTH CLAUSE: EARLY TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT. In the event that ICE must rescind or resolve this contract, it must comply with the provisions of articles 11 of the Administrative Contracting Law and 204, 205, and 206 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law.” (the underlining is not in the original; see proven fact No. 3). As can be clearly read, said precept applies in the event that ICE “must” rescind the contract for the grounds listed in Article 206 of the RLCA, namely act of God, force majeure, or public interest. In the case under study, as has been stated, the defendant was not under the obligation to rescind the contract unilaterally to render it without effect, since the contractual clause referred to the LGAUS regulations regarding the term.\n\nSaid regulation, as has been mentioned, establishes a period of 3 years, obligatory for the lessor, but as a minimum in favor of the lessee, meaning the contract can be terminated if notice is given 3 months in advance, which this Tribunal considers occurred in the matter before us, as it was proven that in April 2010, ICE notified, via official communication 5122-0135-2010 of March 25, 2010, that it would vacate the property starting in July of that same year, informing the reasons and thus complying with the statutory three-month advance notice (see proven facts 5 and 6). Based on the foregoing analysis, it is the opinion of this Collegiate Body that there has been no breach of the contractual clauses by the defendant Institute with respect to the manner in which it terminated the contract, given that the aforementioned official communication conforms to the provisions of Article 72 of the LGAUS; indeed, the communication even cited that last article verbatim (see proven fact 5).\"\n\n\"V.- ON THE MERITS. In the sub lite, the plaintiff raises a dual claim against ICE: on one hand, it claims that the manner in which the lease contract was terminated does not conform to the provisions of the administrative procurement legal system (ordenamiento de la contratación administrativa); and, on the other, it formulates—accessorily—a claim for damages (daños y perjuicios) for the consequences of that illegitimate administrative conduct. Both points must be examined separately, without prejudice to stating from the outset that, in our opinion, they are inadmissible, for the reasons explained below. Thus, the matter having been framed in this way, in the following Considerando VI, the issue of the term of the lease contract and the regulations applicable to the case are developed, in relation to the conduct displayed by the Administration to terminate it. In Considerando VII, the issue of the figure of contractual rescission and the reasons why it does not apply in the present case will be addressed. Finally, in Considerando VIII, the issue of the damages requested and their inadmissibility will be developed.\n\nVI.- ON THE TERM OF THE LEASE CONTRACT. Article 76 of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) establishes that for purposes of leasing real property, with or without buildings, the Administration must resort to a public bidding (licitación pública), abbreviated bidding (licitación abreviada), or direct procurement (contratación directa) procedure, as applicable, according to the amount. This same provision is developed in Article 159 of the Regulation to the current Administrative Procurement Law, Executive Decree No. 33411-H. It is important to mention that Law No. 7494 of May 2, 1995, established that the term of the lease contract was for an indefinite period in favor of the Administration, which had the possibility of terminating it at any time, without liability on its part, by giving at least three months' prior notice. Said ordinance was found in Article 77, which was declared unconstitutional by judgment 11398-03 at 2:44 p.m. on October 8, 2003, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). In said ruling (voto), the Chamber considered that the extension of the validity of the lease contract prevents the owner's free disposition and the full exercise of ownership (dominio) over the property. It further considered that said norm polarizes one of the elements of this type of contract, causing a rupture of the bond created between the parties, and transforming the bilateral relationship into a unilateral one, characteristic of another sphere of action of the Public Administration. Finally, in its arguments for declaring Article 77 of the LCA unconstitutional, it was considered that the norm imposes an excessive limitation on private property, a burden that the owner should not have to tolerate in a lease contract with the Administration that does not arise from the tender specifications (cartel) itself, which deprived him of having full knowledge of the contract conditions before deciding to participate in the bidding procedure. According to the resolution of the Constitutional Chamber, the challenged norm allows the Administration to remain in a property even after the agreed term has expired, unacceptably weakening the lessor's right of ownership. From the exposition of the Constitutional Chamber in the aforementioned judgment, it can be concluded that from said declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 77 of the Administrative Procurement Law, the term of a real property lease contract must be for a determined period. In the case under analysis, regarding the term of the contract signed between ICE and the plaintiff, the clause modified by addendum, approved by the General Comptroller (Contraloría General) of the Republic, literally provides as follows: \"FIFTH CLAUSE: TERM. The property must be available one month after the notification of the service order by the Supply Directorate (Dirección de Proveeduría). The lease contract will have an initial validity of three years, automatically renewable for equal additional periods from its expiration, in accordance with the stipulations of the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases (Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos).\" (see proven fact 4). The administrative lease contract, the subject of this litigation, which is law between the parties, with respect to the term, expressly refers to the Law of Urban and Suburban Leases, hereinafter LGAUS. It is important to emphasize that Article 2 of that regulatory body indicates, literally, that the nature of the law is one of public order; this imperative nature is regulated as follows: \"This law is of public order. Any agreement contrary to its imperative or prohibitive provisions is null and void and shall be deemed unwritten. The agreement of the parties is valid in the face of the permissive or facultative provisions of this law or in the absence of an express norm, provided that the agreement does not violate another imperative or prohibitive provision of the Costa Rican legal system.\" From the provisions of the cited norm, it is understood that the norms of the LGAUS of a dispositve nature can be waived by the parties, which cannot occur with those that are of public order. On the other hand, the LGAUS in its Article 6 contains a norm that is important for the case under analysis: \"The State, decentralized public entities, and municipalities, in their capacity as lessors or lessees, are subject to this law, unless expressly provided otherwise by their own legal system. The bidding procedure is governed by the legal and regulatory provisions on administrative procurement.\" From the rules set forth in the transcribed norm, it follows that the regulation is applicable to ICE, which in this case acted as the lessee in the contract under review. Regarding the term of the lease contract, Article 70 of the LGAUS provides as follows: \"The duration of the lease may not be less than three years. Leases for which a shorter duration has been stipulated or for which no duration term has been fixed shall be understood to have been agreed for a term of three years. The term shall be counted from the day the lessee receives the property.\" The transcribed norm is one of the typical public order norms, as previously mentioned, and it is stipulated in favor of the lessee, never to his detriment. On the other hand, within the same Chapter VIII of the LGAUS, which refers to the term of the contract, Article 72 is located, regulating its termination by the lessee. This norm is clear in providing that \"unless otherwise agreed in writing,\" the termination takes effect with the notice given by the lessee to the lessor three months in advance. The norm under analysis states: \"ARTICLE 72.- Termination of the contract by the lessee. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the lease contract is terminated when the lessee notifies the lessor, three months in advance, of his desire to terminate the lease. The termination of the contract does not alter the responsibilities of the parties regarding the other rights and obligations arising from the lease.\" In accordance with the foregoing, the phrase \"unless otherwise agreed in writing\" points to the possibility of increasing or decreasing this period, through conventional agreement between the parties; in this regard, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice has held the following: \"Upon systematically integrating this rule with the provisions of numeral 3 of the Law of Urban and Suburban Leases, it must be concluded that the lessee has the inalienable right to terminate the legal relationship by giving notice three months in advance. An agreement to the contrary is admitted only regarding the period with which such notice must be given. In the present case, the parties omitted to extend or reduce the period with which the early termination of the business should be notified; therefore, as this is a right of the lessee that admits no curtailment, he could exercise it by applying the time defined by Article 72 ibidem, as indeed he proceeded to do, which was correctly appreciated by the trial court judges. The appellant questions that the rule is inapplicable because the business had a defined term of validity. However, such a clarification is not found in the norm, and no distinction can be made where the law does not make one; therefore, this rule applies both to leases with a defined term and to those that do not have one. In this latter case, it is worth recalling that none of these relationships may have a validity of less than three years, a period that has been established in favor of the lessee (doctrine of Article 3 ibidem); therefore, the lessee could indeed terminate it, even before that time.\" (see judgment No. 000399-F-03, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice at 9:40 a.m. on July 11, 2003; in the same vein, the First Chamber has considered the following: \"From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the norm whose violation is alleged is considered imperative or of public order. However, the award did not rule against the provisions of that article, but rather in accordance with it, since, in the absence of proof of the existence of an agreement to the contrary that would authorize the non-application of that legal precept (...) ... it was determined that the lease contract binding the parties was lawfully terminated by the defendant. In this matter, given the absence of the 'written agreement to the contrary' to terminate the contract, as it could not be proven, the arbitrators had to accept its conclusion upon timely notice to the lessor of the lessee's desire to terminate the lease, in accordance with the provisions of Article 72 under discussion. For the sake of further reasoning, it is important to point out that a ruling would have been contrary to the stated precept if the contract had been terminated without observing what had been agreed by the parties, but in this matter, it is reiterated, no agreement of that nature could be proven; a situation that this Chamber cannot vary, as it would imply the examination of evidentiary elements, an analysis forbidden to this Chamber, dealing with an appeal for annulment within an arbitration process.\" (see judgment No. 000005-S1-2011, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice at 10:40 a.m. on January 13, 2011.) From the foregoing, it is inferred that through contractual means and in writing, the parties may agree on a period of advance notice longer or shorter than the indicated three months. In analyzing the norm in question, it is important to mention that this period for giving advance notice is in favor of the lessee; on this point, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice also indicated the following: \"That three-year period, as stated, is agreed for the benefit of the lessee, and not to his detriment, so that if he wished to terminate the contract early, he may do so. Likewise, if the validity period is shorter, it must be deemed not written and interpreted as a minimum of three years. Even so, although the tenancy regulations seek to protect the rights of the lessee, this may in no way imply the infringement of those of the lessor, nor the requirements of good faith. The period of prior notice with which the final end of the contract must be indicated has the purpose of allowing both the lessor and the lessee to make the necessary provisions, and not find themselves suddenly and hastily obliged to evict and seek a new property, or with the property vacated, being able to lease it again.\" (see judgment No. 000378-F-2007, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice at 9:00 a.m. on May 24, 2007.) From the foregoing, it is deduced that the lessee has the possibility of terminating the contractual relationship before the three years expire, provided that he gives the lessor three months' prior notice, in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned Article 72 of the LGAUS. In the instant case, it has been proven that on April 6, 2010, the defendant party, via official communication 5122-0135-2010 of March 25, 2010, communicated the following to the plaintiff company: \"Subject: Notification of 'Termination of Lease Contract' Public Tender No. 2006 LN 0000-46-PROV. In accordance with Article No. 72 of the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases 'Termination of the contract by the lessee' which states: 'ARTICLE 72 Termination of the contract by the lessee. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the lease contract is terminated when the lessee notifies the lessor, three months in advance, of his desire to terminate the lease. The termination of the contract does not alter the responsibilities of the parties regarding the other rights and obligations arising from the lease.' Due to the foregoing, I hereby notify you that the property leased in San Pedro de Montes de Oca, called Edificio Cocori, is scheduled for return on the upcoming July 18, 2010. In this way, the three months that ICE must comply with is respected, as indicated in the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases (Tenancy Law). Given that we represent a public entity, we are obligated to remove all improvements made by us on said property. Agreement accepted by the parties in the contract, specifically in the sixth clause 'OBLIGATIONS OF ICE: article B) Upon completion of the contract, the I.C.E. shall dismantle the remodeling works at its own cost and the structures it has built on its own, or it may negotiate with the lessor the cost of said works provided that the remodeling thereof does not cause structural damage to the leased property; otherwise, they shall accrue to said property.\" (see proven fact 5). On the other hand, the fifth clause of the contract, cited previously, which regulates the term, refers to the LGAUS (proven fact 4). From the factual scenario presented, in the judgment of this Chamber, the defendant party complied with the contractual and legal provisions for purposes of terminating the lease contract. The foregoing is, firstly, by virtue of the fact that the contractual clause regulating the term expressly refers to the LGAUS; secondly, because since there was no \"agreement to the contrary,\" this means, according to the cited judgments of the First Chamber, that since a period longer or shorter than 3 months for giving notice to the lessor was not agreed upon, Article 72 of the LGAUS was fully applicable. ICE was empowered, in accordance with Articles 2, 6, and 72 of the LGAUS, to terminate the lease contract, giving 3 months' prior notice, as has been proven in the present case. Therefore, the LGAUS was applicable to the procurement because one of its clauses regulating the term referred to said regulatory body, coupled with the fact that due to the nature of this contract, there is a special regulation applicable, according to Articles 2 and 6, to the defendant entity. From the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that it is not possible to assert that the early termination of the contract is illegal, given that it was under the protection of Article 72 of the LGAUS, applicable in this case to the defendant entity in its capacity as lessee. Nor is it possible to consider as a contractual breach, due to inactivity by non-rescision, as the plaintiff argues, the fact that the defendant entity decided to terminate the contract early, since the legal system permits ICE to do so in its capacity as lessee, in accordance with what the LGAUS provides. It is the criterion of this Tribunal that in its capacity as lessee of the real property owned by MAGOSE M.G.S. S.A., the defendant Institute was not acting with exorbitant powers; as mentioned before, the possibility that the Administration had of having an indefinite term (an exorbitant power) was declared unconstitutional by judgment 11398-03. Articles 6 and 72, both of the LGAUS, allow any lessee to terminate the administrative contract, which includes the State, decentralized public entities, municipalities, or private parties, which is the reason why it cannot be considered an exorbitant clause or power of public law in favor of the Administration.\n\nGiven that it has been held as proven that the defendant entity gave three months' prior notice, it is not possible to consider that damages should be awarded, as the plaintiff argues, consisting of the 13 monthly payments not received, which amount to $22,500 (twenty-two thousand five hundred dollars) each month, for a total of $292,500 (two hundred ninety-two thousand five hundred dollars), a claim that must be rejected as there was no conduct attributable to the defendant entity that was contrary to the legal system. Finally, it is legally impossible to classify the defendant's departure from the property as abandonment, given that it notified the landlord of its departure with the advance notice indicated by law, a topic that will be developed in Considerando IX of this ruling.\n\n**VII.- ON UNILATERAL RESCISSION.** Administrative contracts normally terminate when the agreed-upon obligations are fulfilled; however, situations may arise that can be classified as \"abnormal\" and cause their conclusion, such is the case of unilateral rescission. This figure constitutes one of the forms of termination of administrative contracts. It is classified as \"abnormal\" because it is produced by facts or circumstances noticed or arising after the validity, perfection, formalization, and effectiveness of the contract. It is worth mentioning that etymologically, \"rescind\" comes from the Latin *scindere*, which means to tear, break, or shred. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in judgment 1205-96 of 9:00 a.m. on March 15, 1996, ruled that contractual rescission can be unilateral or bilateral. In the case under study, it is of interest to analyze unilateral rescission, which is the issue raised by the plaintiff. From Article 11 of the Law of Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), regarding the rights and obligations of the Administration (la Administración), it is inferred that the assumptions under which the Administration can exercise the right to unilaterally rescind its contractual relationships are fortuitous event (caso fortuito), force majeure (fuerza mayor), or public interest, all in compliance with due process. Under these assumptions, the legal framework of administrative procurement establishes that when a contract is terminated for reasons not attributable to the contractor (unilateral rescission), the Administration must settle the portion that has been effectively executed, as well as the damages caused. In cases of fortuitous event or force majeure, the contractor is paid exclusively for the portion effectively executed and the expenses reasonably incurred by the contractor in anticipation of the contract's total execution. For its part, the Regulation to the Law of Administrative Procurement (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, RLCA), in Article 206, refers to unilateral rescission as follows: *\"Article 206.—**Rescission**. The Administration may unilaterally rescind its contracts, whether not yet commenced or in the course of execution, for reasons of public interest, fortuitous event, or force majeure, duly accredited. To do so, it must issue a reasoned resolution stating the existing cause and the supporting evidence, which will be communicated to the contractor for a period of fifteen business days. The entity must pay the contractor for the portion of the contract effectively executed, in the event it had not done so previously, and the expenses that the contractor has incurred for complete execution, provided they are duly proven. When the rescission originates from reasons of public interest, any damage that the termination of the contract causes the contractor may also be recognized, upon prior invocation and proof. The loss of profit corresponding to the unexecuted portion may always be recognized within criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, evaluating aspects such as the outstanding execution period, the degree of progress in the execution of the contract, and the complexity of the object. When the profit has not been declared, it will be considered to be 10% of the total quoted amount.\"* In accordance with the regulations mentioned, applicable to the specific case, from a technical-legal point of view it is not possible to affirm that the conduct displayed by the defendant entity and challenged in this venue constitutes the unilateral rescission of the contract under the LCA and its Regulation, given that the defendant Institute's action was protected by the provisions of Articles 6 and 72 of the LGAUS, which allows it to notify the landlord of its intention to terminate the contract with 3 months' prior notice. For this reason, the Administration, in its capacity as lessee, was not obliged to unilaterally rescind the contract by carrying out the procedure established in Article 208 of the RLCA. Under the protection of the LGAUS, if this requirement of providing 3 months' advance notice is met, there is no obligation to invoke a cause for rescission or to determine damages, which is one of the core aspects of applying this legal figure within the framework of administrative procurement. The foregoing is because the legal scheme of the lease contract provides for this in favor of the lessee. The case is different for other types of damage that have a causal link different from the act of terminating the contract by applying Article 72 of the LGAUS, such as those sought in this case, given that the plaintiff requests compensation for the damages caused to the property at the time of the eviction, to return the property in the state of conservation it was in at the time of delivery, and damages consisting of the monthly payments not made until the end of the contractual term, a topic that will be developed in Considerando VIII. It is for the reasons set forth above that the defendant did not have to carry out any procedure to rescind the lease contract. The foregoing is supported not only by clause five of the contract and the rules of the LGAUS cited in this Considerando and the previous one, but also by clause nine itself of the contract signed between the plaintiff and ICE. Said clause is harmonious with the contract and the regulations mentioned, as it provides the following: *\"**CLAUSE NINE: EARLY TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT.** In the event that ICE *must* rescind or terminate this contract, it must comply with the provisions of Articles 11 of the Law of Administrative Procurement and 204, 205, and 206 of the Regulation to the Law of Administrative Procurement.\" (*emphasis is not original, see proven fact No. 3)*. As can be clearly read, said provision applies if ICE \"*must*\" rescind the contract for the causes listed in Article 206 of the RLCA, namely, fortuitous event, force majeure, or public interest. In the case under study, as has been stated, the defendant was not obliged to rescind the contract unilaterally to terminate it, as the contractual clause referred to the regulations of the LGAUS concerning the term.  Such regulations, as has been mentioned, establish a term of 3 years, mandatory for the landlord, but as a minimum in favor of the lessee, meaning the lessee can terminate the contract by giving 3 months' prior notice, which this Court considers occurred in the matter before us, as it was proven that in April 2010, ICE notified, through official letter **5122-0135-2010** of March 25, 2010, that it would vacate the property starting July of that same year, informing the reasons and thus complying with the legal notice of three months in advance (see proven facts No. 5 and No. 6). Based on the analysis set forth, it is the opinion of this Collegiate Body that there has been no breach of the contractual clauses by the defendant Institute with respect to the manner in which it terminated the contract, given that the aforementioned official letter complies with the provisions of Article 72 of the LGAUS; indeed, the official letter textually cited the latter article (see proven fact No. 5).\n\nThe rental contract shall have an initial term of three years, automatically renewable for additional equal periods upon its expiration, in accordance with the provisions of the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases (Ley General de Arrendamientos Urbanos y Suburbanos).\" (see proven fact 4). The administrative lease contract, the subject of this litigation, which is law between the parties, with respect to the term, expressly refers to the Law of Urban and Suburban Leases, hereinafter LGAUS. It is important to highlight that Article 2 of that regulatory body indicates, literally, that the nature of the law is one of public order; said mandatory nature regulates it as follows: \"This law is of public order. Any agreement contrary to its imperative or prohibitive provisions is null and void and shall be considered unwritten. The agreement of the parties is valid in the face of permissive or facultative provisions of this law or in the absence of an express rule, unless the agreement violates another imperative or prohibitive provision of the Costa Rican legal system.\" From the provisions of the cited rule, it is understood that the rules of the LGAUS of a dispositive nature may be disregarded by the parties, which cannot occur with those that are of public order. On the other hand, the LGAUS in its Article 6 contains a rule that is of importance for the case under analysis: \"The State, decentralized public entities, and municipalities, in their capacity as lessors or lessees, are subject to this law, unless there is an express provision in their own legal system. The bidding procedure is governed by the legal and regulatory provisions of administrative contracting.\" From what is regulated by the transcribed rule, it follows that the regulations are applicable to ICE, which in this case acted as lessee in the contract under examination. Regarding the term of the lease contract, Article 70 of the LGAUS provides the following: \"The duration of the lease shall not be less than three years. Leases for which a shorter duration has been stipulated or for which the duration term has not been fixed shall be understood as agreed for a term of three years. The term shall be counted from the day on which the lessee receives the property.\" The transcribed rule is one of the typical rules of public order, as mentioned above, and is stipulated in favor of the lessee, never to their detriment. On the other hand, within the same Chapter VIII of the LGAUS, which refers to the term of the contract, Article 72 is located, which regulates its extinction by the lessee; said rule is clear in providing that \"unless otherwise agreed in writing,\" the extinction takes effect with the notice given by the lessee to the lessor three months in advance. The rule under analysis states: \"ARTICLE 72.- Extinction of the contract by the lessee. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the lease contract is extinguished when the lessee notifies the lessor, three months in advance, of their intention to terminate the lease. The extinction of the contract does not alter the responsibilities of the parties regarding the other rights and obligations arising from the lease.\" In accordance with the foregoing, the phrase \"unless otherwise agreed in writing\" points to the possibility of increasing or decreasing this period, through a conventional agreement between the parties; in this regard, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has ruled the following: \"By systematically integrating this rule with the provisions of numeral 3 of the Law of Urban and Suburban Leases, it must be concluded that the lessee has the inalienable right to extinguish the legal relationship by giving notice three months in advance. An agreement to the contrary is only admitted regarding the period with which such notice must be given. In the present case, the parties omitted to extend or reduce the period with which the early extinction of the business should be notified; therefore, this being a right of the lessee, which does not admit diminution, they could exercise it by applying the time defined by Article 72 ibidem, as indeed they proceeded, which was well appreciated by the trial judges. The appellant questions that the rule is inapplicable because the business had a defined term of validity. However, such clarification is not found in the rule, and one cannot distinguish where the law does not; therefore, this rule applies both to leases with a defined term and to those that do not have one. In this last case, it is worth remembering that none of these relationships may have a term of less than three years, a period that has been provided in favor of the lessee (doctrine of Article 3 ibidem); therefore, the lessee could terminate it, even before that time.\" (see judgment No. 000399-F-03, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 9:40 a.m. on July 11, 2003. In the same sense, the First Chamber has considered the following: \"From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the rule whose violation is alleged is considered imperative or of public order. However, the award did not resolve against the provisions of that ordinal, but rather in accordance with it, since, not having proven the existence of an agreement to the contrary that authorized the non-application of that legal precept (...) ...it was determined that the lease contract that bound the parties was extinguished by the defendant in accordance with the law. In this matter, given the absence of the 'written agreement to the contrary' to extinguish the contract, since it could not be proven, the arbitrators had to accept its conclusion with the timely notice to the lessor of the lessee's intention to terminate the lease, as provided in Article 72 under commentary. For greater abundance of reasons, it is important to point out that a decision would have been made against the stated precept if the contract had been terminated without observing what was agreed by the parties, but in this matter, it is reiterated, no agreement of that nature could be proven; a situation that this Chamber cannot vary, as it would imply the examination of the evidentiary elements, an analysis forbidden to this Chamber, dealing with the appeal for annulment within an arbitration process.\" (see judgment No. 000005-S1-2011, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 10:40 a.m. on January 13, 2011.) From the foregoing, it is inferred that, through the contractual route and in writing, the parties may agree on a longer or shorter notice period than the three months indicated. In the analysis of the rule in question, it is important to mention that this period for giving advance notice is in favor of the lessee; on this point, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice also indicated the following: \"That three-year period, as stated, is agreed upon for the benefit of the lessee, and not to their detriment, such that, if they wished to terminate the contract before time, they could do so. Likewise, if the validity period is shorter, it must be considered as not written, and interpreted as a minimum of three years. However, even though the tenancy regulations seek to protect the rights of the lessee, this cannot suppose, in any way, violating those of the lessor, nor the requirements of good faith. The prior notice period with which the final end of the contract must be indicated is intended so that both the lessor and the lessee can take the necessary precautions, and are not abruptly and hastily placed in the obligation to vacate and seek a new property, or with the property vacant, being able to lease it again.\" (see judgment No. 000378-F-2007, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 9:00 a.m. on May 24, 2007.) From the foregoing, it is collated that the lessee has the possibility of terminating the contractual relationship before the three years expire, provided they give notice to the lessor three months in advance, in accordance with the provisions of Article 72 of the LGAUS, as seen. In the case at hand, it has been proven that on April 6, 2010, the defendant, through official letter 5122-0135-2010 dated March 25, 2010, communicated the following to the plaintiff company: \"Subject: Notification of 'Extinction of contract by Lease' Public Tender No. 2006 LN 0000-46-PROV. According to Article No. 72 of the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases 'Extinction of the contract by the lessee' which states: 'ARTICLE 72 Extinction of the contract by the lessee. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the lease contract is extinguished when the lessee notifies the lessor, three months in advance, of their intention to terminate the lease. The extinction of the contract does not alter the responsibilities of the parties regarding the other rights and obligations arising from the lease.' Based on the foregoing, I notify you that the premises leased in San Pedro de Montes de Oca, called Edificio Cocorí, is scheduled for return on July 18, 2010. In this way, the three months that ICE must comply with are respected, as indicated in the General Law of Urban and Suburban Leases (Tenancy Law). Given that we represent a public entity, we are obliged to remove all improvements made by us in the cited property. Agreement accepted by the parties in the contract, specifically in clause six 'OBLIGATIONS OF ICE: article B) At the end of the contract, the I.C.E. will dismantle the remodeling at its own cost and structures that it has built on its own account or may negotiate with the lessor the cost of those works provided that the remodeling thereof does not cause structural damage to the leased property; otherwise, they will accrue to said property.\" (see proven fact No. 5). On the other hand, the fifth clause of the contract, cited above, which regulates the term, refers to the LGAUS (proven fact No. 4). From the factual framework set forth, in the judgment of this Chamber, the defendant complied with the contractual and legal provisions for the purpose of extinguishing the lease contract. The foregoing, firstly, by virtue of the fact that the contractual clause regulating the term expressly refers to the LGAUS; secondly, because in the absence of an \"agreement to the contrary,\" this means, according to the judgments of the First Chamber cited, that no period longer or shorter than 3 months was agreed upon to give notice to the lessor; numeral 72 of the LGAUS was fully applicable. ICE was empowered, in accordance with Articles 2, 6, and 72 of the LGAUS, to terminate the lease contract, giving 3 months' notice, as has been proven in this case. Therefore, the LGAUS was applicable to the contracting because one of its clauses regulating the term referred to said regulatory body, coupled with the fact that, due to the nature of this contract, there is a special regulation, applicable, in accordance with Articles 2 and 6, to the defendant entity. From the foregoing, this Court considers that it is not possible to affirm that the early termination of the contract is illegal, given that it was under the protection of Article 72 of the LGAUS, applicable in this case to the defendant entity in its capacity as lessee. Nor is it possible to consider as a contractual breach, due to inactivity for non-rescission, as the plaintiff proposes, the fact that the defendant entity decided to terminate the contract early, since the legal system allows ICE, in its condition as lessee, to do so, in accordance with what the LGAUS provides. It is the criterion of this Court that, in its condition as lessee of the real estate property of MAGOSE M.G.S. S.A., the defendant Institute was not acting with exorbitant powers; as mentioned before, the possibility that the Administration (Administración) had of having an indefinite term (exorbitant power) was declared unconstitutional through Judgment 11398-03. Articles 6 and 72, both of the LGAUS, allow any lessee to terminate the administrative contract, which includes the State, decentralized public entities, municipalities, or private individuals, which is why it is not possible to consider it as an exorbitant clause or power of public law in favor of the Administration (Administración). Given that it has been proven that the defendant entity gave three months' advance notice, it is not feasible to consider that damages should be recognized, as the plaintiff proposes, which consist of the 13 monthly payments not received, amounting to $22,500 (twenty-two thousand five hundred dollars) each monthly payment, for a total of $292,500 (two hundred ninety-two thousand five hundred dollars), a claim that must be rejected as there is no reprehensible action on the part of the defendant entity contrary to the legal system. Finally, it is legally impossible to classify the departure of the defendant from the property as abandonment, given that they notified the lessor of their departure with the advance notice indicated by law, a topic that will be developed in Considerando IX of this resolution.\n\n**VII.- ON THE UNILATERAL RESCISSION (RESCISIÓN UNILATERAL).**\nAdministrative contracts are normally extinguished when the agreed-upon services are fulfilled; however, the emergence of situations that can be classified as \"abnormal\" and cause their conclusion is possible, such as the case of unilateral rescission (rescisión unilateral). This figure constitutes one of the forms of extinction of administrative contracts. It is classified as \"abnormal\" because it occurs due to facts or circumstances noticed or arising after the validity, perfection, formalization, and effectiveness of the contract. It is worth mentioning that etymologically, rescindir comes from the Latin scindere, which means to tear, break, shatter. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in Judgment 1205-96 at 9:00 a.m. on March 15, 1996, provided that contractual rescission (rescisión contractual) can be unilateral or bilateral. In the case under study, it is relevant to analyze the unilateral rescission, which is the issue raised by the plaintiff. From Article 11 of the Law on Administrative Contracting (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), referring to the rights and obligations of the Administration (Administración), it is inferred that the assumptions under which the Administration (Administración) may exercise the right to unilaterally rescind its contractual relationships are fortuitous event, force majeure, or public interest, all in compliance with due process. If these assumptions are met, the legal system of administrative contracting establishes that when the contract is terminated for causes not attributable to the contractor (unilateral rescission), they must be paid for the part that has been effectively executed, as well as the damages and losses caused. In the cases of fortuitous event or force majeure, the contractor is exclusively paid for the part effectively executed and the expenses reasonably incurred by the contractor in anticipation of the total execution of the contract. For its part, the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Contracting (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, RLCA), in Article 206, refers to unilateral rescission as follows: \"Article 206.—Rescission. The Administration (Administración) may unilaterally rescind its contracts, not started or in the course of execution, for reasons of public interest, fortuitous event, or force majeure, duly substantiated. To do this, it must issue a reasoned resolution indicating the existing cause and the evidence on which it relies, which will be brought to the attention of the contractor for a period of fifteen business days. The entity must pay the contractor the part of the contract effectively executed, in the event it has not done so previously, and the expenses that the contractor has incurred for the complete execution, provided they are duly proven. When the rescission originates from reasons of public interest, any damage or loss that the termination of the contract causes the contractor may also be recognized, upon prior invocation and verification. The lost profits corresponding to the unexecuted part may always be recognized within criteria of reasonableness and proportionality, evaluating aspects such as the outstanding execution period, the degree of progress of the contract execution, and the complexity of the object. When the profit has not been declared, it shall be considered as 10% of the total quoted amount.\" In accordance with the mentioned regulations, applicable to the specific case, from a technical legal point of view, it is not possible to affirm that the conduct displayed by the defendant entity and reproached in this venue corresponds to the unilateral rescission of the contract under the LCA and its Regulation, given that the action of the defendant Institute was protected by the provisions of Articles 6 and 72 of the LGAUS, which allow it to notify the lessor three months in advance of its intention to terminate the contract, which is why the Administration (Administración), in its capacity as lessee, was not obliged to unilaterally rescind the contract, carrying out the procedure provided in Article 208 of the RLCA. Under the protection of the LGAUS, if this requirement of giving three months' advance notice is met, there is no obligation to invoke the cause for rescission and the determination of damages, which is one of the core aspects of the application of this legal figure within the framework of administrative contracting. The foregoing because the legal scheme of the lease contract provides for it in favor of the lessee. The case is different for other types of damages or losses that have a causal link other than the conduct of terminating it by applying Article 72 of the LGAUS, such as those claimed in this case, since compensation is requested for the damages caused to the property at the time of eviction, to return the property in the state of conservation in which it was at the time of delivery, and the losses consisting of the monthly payments not paid until the end of the contractual term, a topic that will be developed in Considerando VIII. It is for the reasons set forth above that the defendant did not have to carry out any procedure to rescind the lease contract. The foregoing is supported not only by the fifth clause of the contract and the rules of the LGAUS cited in this and the previous considerando, but also by the ninth clause of the contract signed between the plaintiff and ICE. Said clause is harmonious with the contract and the mentioned regulations, as it provides the following: \"CLAUSE NINE: EARLY TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT. In the event that ICE must rescind or resolve this contract, it must comply with the provisions of Articles 11 of the Law on Administrative Contracting and 204, 205, and 206 of the Regulation to the Law on Administrative Contracting.\" (the underline is not from the original, see proven fact No. 3). As can be clearly read, said precept applies in the case that ICE \"must\" rescind the contract based on the grounds of Article 206 of the RLCA, namely fortuitous event, force majeure, or public interest. In the case under study, as has been stated, the defendant was not obliged to unilaterally rescind the contract to terminate it, because the contractual clause referred to the regulations of the LGAUS regarding the term. Said regulations, as has been mentioned, establish a 3-year term, mandatory for the lessor, but as a minimum in favor of the lessee, so they can terminate the contract if they give three months' advance notice, which this Court considers occurred in the matter at hand, since it was demonstrated that in the month of April 2010, ICE notified, through official letter 5122-0135-2010 dated March 25, 2010, that it would vacate the property starting in July of that same year, informing the reasons and thus complying with the legal notice of three months in advance (see proven facts No. 5 and No. 6). Based on the analysis set forth, it is the criterion of this Collegiate Body that there has been no breach of the contractual clauses by the defendant Institute regarding the manner in which it terminated the contract, given that the recently mentioned official letter conforms to the provisions of the LGAUS in its Article 72; indeed, the official letter cited this last article verbatim (see proven fact No. 5).”" }