{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-141546", "citation": "Res. 00013-2012 Sala Segunda de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Deber de la CCSS de gestionar el cobro de los aportes laborales del FCL y ROP", "title_en": "CCSS Duty to Collect Labor Capitalization and Complementary Pension Contributions", "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia resuelve un recurso contra una sentencia que condenó a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) a trasladar al Banco Popular los aportes al Fondo de Capitalización Laboral y al Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias que un empleador moroso no pagó. La CCSS alegó que no es responsable de esos aportes porque su naturaleza jurídica es distinta a la de los seguros sociales y que la supervisión corresponde a la Superintendencia de Pensiones. La Sala rechaza los argumentos y confirma la condena. Sostiene que la Ley de Protección al Trabajador impone a la CCSS, a través del SICERE, el deber de recaudar esos aportes y de realizar todas las gestiones administrativas y judiciales necesarias para controlar la evasión y recuperar lo adeudado. La omisión de ese deber genera responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración, cuyas consecuencias no pueden recaer sobre el trabajador. Además, la interpretación amplia de la seguridad social, fundada en los artículos 50 y 73 constitucionales, abarca la protección ante la pérdida del ingreso, y los aportes de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador forman parte de ese sistema ampliado.", "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice decides an appeal against a judgment ordering the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS) to transfer to Banco Popular the contributions to the Labor Capitalization Fund and the Mandatory Complementary Pension Regime that a delinquent employer did not pay. The CCSS argued it is not responsible for those contributions because their legal nature differs from social insurance, and supervision belongs to the Pension Superintendency. The Chamber rejects the arguments and upholds the ruling. It holds that the Worker Protection Law requires the CCSS, through SICERE, to collect those contributions and pursue all administrative and judicial actions to control evasion and recover the debt. Breach of this duty creates the Administration's strict liability, the consequences of which cannot fall on the worker. Furthermore, a broad interpretation of social security, grounded in Articles 50 and 73 of the Constitution, encompasses protection against loss of income, and the contributions under the Worker Protection Law are part of this expanded system.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte", "date": "2012", "year": "2012", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "Fondo de Capitalización Laboral", "Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias", "SICERE", "evasión", "subdeclaración", "morosidad", "responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración", "principio de legalidad" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 1", "law": "Ley de Protección al Trabajador" }, { "article": "Art. 9", "law": "Ley de Protección al Trabajador" }, { "article": "Art. 57", "law": "Ley de Protección al Trabajador" }, { "article": "Art. 58", "law": "Ley de Protección al Trabajador" }, { "article": "Art. 50", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 73", "law": "Constitución Política" } ], "keywords_es": [ "Fondo de Capitalización Laboral", "Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias", "CCSS", "SICERE", "aportes laborales", "recaudación", "seguridad social", "responsabilidad objetiva", "principio de legalidad" ], "keywords_en": [ "Labor Capitalization Fund", "Mandatory Complementary Pension Regime", "CCSS", "SICERE", "labor contributions", "collection", "social security", "strict liability", "principle of legality" ], "excerpt_es": "De manera que si por obligación legal los empleadores deben pagar y depositar los aportes originados en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador (los que se convierten en contribuciones al nuevo sistema ampliado de seguridad social) “simultáneamente, y en los términos, plazos y condiciones que los dispuestos para los aportes a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, de acuerdo con el artículo 31 de su ley orgánica” (ordinal 57); correspondiendo al Sistema Centralizado de Recaudación de Pensiones “ejercer el control de los aportes al Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, de Pensiones Complementarias, de Enfermedad y Maternidad; a los fondos de capitalización laboral; a las cargas sociales cuya recaudación haya sido encargada a la CCSS y cualquier otra que la ley establezca, de conformidad con el Artículo 31 de la Ley orgánica de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social” (artículo 58, ibídem); y siendo que, en este último, se establecen esas mismas obligaciones para el SICERE, y para la demandada: las de encargada de la recaudación, responsable de realizar todas las gestiones administrativas y judiciales para controlar la evasión, subdeclaración o morosidad de los empleadores y de gestionar la recuperación de los aportes indebidamente retenidos; no queda duda a esta Sala, en primer lugar, de la equiparación dada por el legislador de los distintos tipos de aportes –a la seguridad social establecida tanto en la Constitución Política como en la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, y los nuevos originados en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador-, y de la obligación de la demandada de gestionar lo necesario –en vía administrativa o judicial- para que las contribuciones originadas en esta última, fueran efectivamente canceladas por los empleadores. Al no hacerlo la CCSS de esa manera, incumpliendo con sus obligaciones, surge la responsabilidad de resarcir al actor, al que no pueden afectársele sus derechos por la negligencia o el no ejercicio oportuno por parte de la accionada, de las competencias que les fueron asignadas por ley, independientemente de que con posterioridad las operadoras de pensiones tengan otro conjunto de obligaciones y deberes con relación a los fondos que le corresponda administrar.", "excerpt_en": "Since by legal obligation employers must pay and deposit the contributions arising from the Worker Protection Law (which become contributions to the new expanded social security system) “simultaneously, and under the terms, deadlines and conditions established for contributions to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, in accordance with Article 31 of its organic law” (article 57); and it is the Centralized Pension Collection System’s duty “to exercise control over contributions to the Disability, Old Age and Death Regime, the Complementary Pensions Regime, the Sickness and Maternity Regime; to labor capitalization funds; to social charges whose collection has been entrusted to the CCSS and any other established by law, in accordance with Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund” (article 58, ibid.); and given that the latter establishes those same obligations for SICERE and for the defendant: those of being in charge of collection, responsible for carrying out all administrative and judicial actions to control evasion, under-declaration or delinquency of employers and for managing the recovery of contributions improperly retained; this Chamber has no doubt, first, of the equivalence given by the legislator to the different types of contributions —to social security established both in the Political Constitution and in the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, and the new ones arising from the Worker Protection Law— and of the defendant's obligation to take the necessary steps —administratively or judicially— so that the contributions arising from the latter are effectively paid by the employers. By failing to do so, the CCSS breaches its obligations, giving rise to the duty to compensate the plaintiff, whose rights cannot be affected by the negligence or the failure to exercise in a timely manner, on the part of the defendant, the powers assigned to it by law, regardless of the subsequent obligations and duties that pension operators may have with respect to the funds they are responsible for administering.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The Chamber denies the cassation appeal and upholds the ruling ordering the CCSS to transfer the Labor Capitalization Fund and Mandatory Complementary Pension Regime contributions improperly withheld by the employer.", "summary_es": "La Sala declara sin lugar el recurso de casación y confirma la condena a la CCSS a trasladar los aportes al Fondo de Capitalización Laboral y al Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias retenidos indebidamente por el empleador." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "By failing to do so, the CCSS breaches its obligations, giving rise to the duty to compensate the plaintiff, whose rights cannot be affected by the negligence or the failure to exercise in a timely manner, on the part of the defendant, the powers assigned to it by law, regardless of the subsequent obligations and duties that pension operators may have with respect to the funds they are responsible for administering.", "quote_es": "Al no hacerlo la CCSS de esa manera, incumpliendo con sus obligaciones, surge la responsabilidad de resarcir al actor, al que no pueden afectársele sus derechos por la negligencia o el no ejercicio oportuno por parte de la accionada, de las competencias que les fueron asignadas por ley, independientemente de que con posterioridad las operadoras de pensiones tengan otro conjunto de obligaciones y deberes con relación a los fondos que le corresponda administrar." }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "Thus, under a broad interpretation of social security, as befits the field of human rights, it is possible to state that the Costa Rican social security system was strengthened by the Worker Protection Law, which established the Labor Capitalization Fund and the Mandatory Complementary Pension Regime, to make effective the protection of the worker against the risk or contingency of dismissal or termination of the employment relationship, and the cessation of his or her salary, an indispensable means of life for him or her and his or her family, and, of course, to guarantee a more dignified old age, ensuring an additional pension to what he or she might have under other regimes.", "quote_es": "De manera que bajo una interpretación amplia de la seguridad social, como corresponde a la materia de los derechos humanos, es posible señalar que el sistema de seguridad social costarricense se vio fortalecido con la Ley de Protección al Trabajador que estableció el Fondo de Capitalización Laboral y el Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias, para hacer efectiva la protección del trabajador (a) ante el riesgo o la contingencia del despido o la terminación de la relación de trabajo, y el cese de su salario, medio indispensable de vida para él (ella) y su familia y, desde luego, para garantizar una vejez con mayor dignidad, asegurándole una pensión adicional a la que pudiere tener en razón de los otros regímenes." }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "The defendant's liability does not arise from the employers' failure to pay the contributions provided for in the Worker Protection Law, but from its own failure to fulfill its legal obligations, which are not only to collect those sums, but also to carry out all administrative and judicial actions to control evasion or delinquency, that is, to manage the recovery of those contributions improperly retained by the employers.", "quote_es": "La responsabilidad de la demandada no surge del incumplimiento de los empleadores de su obligación de pago de los aportes previstos en la Ley de Protección del Trabajador, sino de la falta de cumplimiento de sus obligaciones legales que no son solo las de recaudar dichas sumas, sino también, las de realizar todas las gestiones administrativas y judiciales para controlar la evasión o morosidad, es decir, de gestionar la recuperación de esos aportes indebidamente retenidos por los empleadores." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-141546", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-43957", "norm_num": "7983", "norm_name": "Ley de Protección al Trabajador", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "16/02/2000" }, { "doc_id": "norm-58939", "norm_num": "7523-1", "norm_name": "Régimen Privado de Pensiones Complementarias", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "07/07/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-871", "norm_num": "0", "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“V.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO CONCRETO: El actor demandó para que se obligue a la accionada al traslado al Banco Popular de los aportes hechos a su salario por sus empleadores y que no aparecen en aquella institución. La demandada reconoció que aunque el trabajador aparece en las planillas, según el reporte del SICERE, sus empleadores se encuentran morosos en el pago de los aportes establecidos en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, por lo que no han sido recaudados para ser enviados a la operadora de pensiones correspondiente. En primera instancia se declaró con lugar la demanda, al considerar que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador era responsabilidad de la demandada realizar todas las gestiones administrativas y judiciales para controlar la evasión, subdeclaración o morosidad de los empleadores y gestionar la recuperación de los aportes indebidamente retenidos por estos, lo que no cumplió (folios 5 vuelto a 7). Ante apelación de la parte demandada el tribunal confirmó lo así resuelto, señalando que la CCSS tiene el deber de fiscalización del cumplimiento de las cotizaciones obrero patronales y que la seguridad social se hace efectiva tanto al seguir los lineamientos del Estado para lograr la máxima prevención y cobertura, como mediante la obtención de los recursos necesarios para el logro de esos objetivos, sin que el incumplimiento de esa obligación pueda afectar los derechos fundamentales del trabajador (a). A lo anterior agrega la existencia de parte de la Administración de una responsabilidad objetiva, frente al actor, por su mal funcionamiento. Ante esta Sala la recurrente alega que se dio un error grave de apreciación de la naturaleza jurídica de las cuotas establecidas en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador al asumirse como parte de los seguros sociales y, que se infringió el principio de legalidad. No lleva razón en sus agravios. No se observa en la sentencia del tribunal que se haya dado una confusión en cuanto a la naturaleza de los aportes establecidos en la ley de cita. Si bien el tribunal subraya el deber de fiscalización sobre el cumplimiento de las obligaciones obrero patronales que le corresponde a la CCSS, la necesidad de cumplir los lineamientos de seguridad social fijados por el Estado y la obtención de los fondos necesarios para ese cometido, es lo cierto que no lo hace refiriéndose a la naturaleza jurídica de los aportes primeramente señalados, sino para resaltar que, en razón de eso, la demandada cuenta con un sistema de vigilancia permanente a cargo de un cuerpo de inspectores especializado cuyo funcionamiento está debidamente reglamentado. Lo anterior es más claro cuando señaló: “de no hacerlo, el asegurado, no debe correr con las consecuencias de la omisión en su perjuicio, de tal forma que le impidan el goce de un derecho fundamental de manera plena, cual es su jubilación completa, y el disfrute de los beneficios complentarios que la Ley de Protección al Trabajador le otorga a la persona cotizante.” (Folio 13 vuelto). Asimismo, a folio 14, expresó el tribunal, diferenciando entre ambos sistemas de cotización, que: “En este punto es preciso advertir, que el acceso a la seguridad social promovida por nuestra Constitución Política y desarrollada en las leyes especiales quedarían vacíos de contenido real si no se acepta la tesis de la parte actora. Concretamente en el caso bajo examen, está obligada la Caja del Seguro Social –con la creación del SICERE- a la recaudación de los aportes obrero patronales para la seguridad social y de los aportes patronales para los fondos especiales creados por la Ley de Protección al Trabajador.” (La negrita es agregada). Queda claro entonces que el Ad quem no entró a analizar la naturaleza jurídica de los aportes patronales establecidos en esta última ley, sino que se fundamentó en las obligaciones de la demandada reguladas en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, ampliamente desarrolladas en la sentencia de primera instancia que confirmó. Ahora bien, pese a que como se indicó esta Sala considera que el tribunal no entró a analizar la naturaleza jurídica de los aportes contemplados en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, conviene hacer algunas reflexiones sobre el tema. Nuestro régimen de seguridad social encuentra soporte en los artículo 11 de la Declaración Americana de Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, 9 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, y 50 y 73 constitucionales, garantizando a los costarricenses los servicios indispensables en caso de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez y muerte, ello mediante un sistema de financiamiento tripartito y forzoso (puede verse el voto 1998-7393 de la Sala Constitucional). Para la OIT “Una sociedad que brinda seguridad a sus ciudadanos, no sólo los protege de la guerra y de la enfermedad, sino también de la inseguridad relacionada con el hecho de ganarse la vida a través del trabajo. Los sistemas de seguridad social prevén unos ingresos básicos en caso de desempleo, enfermedad y accidente laboral, vejez y jubilación, invalidez, responsabilidades familiares tales como el embarazo y el cuidado de los hijos y la pérdida del sostén de la familia. Estas prestaciones no sólo son importantes para los trabajadores y sus familias, sino también para sus comunidades en general. Al proporcionar asistencia médica, seguridad de los medios de vida y servicios sociales, la seguridad social ayuda a la mejora de la productividad y contribuye a la dignidad y a la plena realización de los individuos. Los sistemas de seguridad social también promueven la igualdad de género a través de la adopción de medidas encaminadas a garantizar que las mujeres que tienen hijos gocen de las mismas oportunidades en el mercado del trabajo. Para los empleadores y las empresas, la seguridad social contribuye a mantener una mano de obra estable que se adapte a los cambios. Por último, a través de las redes de protección en los casos de crisis económica, la seguridad social actúa como elemento fundamental de cohesión social, ayudando a garantizar la paz social y un compromiso con la globalización y el desarrollo económico. A pesar de estas ventajas, sólo el 20 por ciento de la población mundial tiene una cobertura adecuada de seguridad social y más de la mitad no goza de ningún tipo de cobertura de seguridad social.” (OIT: Seguridad social: un nuevo consenso (Ginebra, 2001. Extraído de la Web de http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/social-security/lang--es/index.htm#P57_11406, el 7 de diciembre de 2011). Para la Sala Constitucional “La seguridad social consiste en los sistemas previsionales y económicos que cubre los riesgos a que se encuentran sometidas ciertas personas, principalmente los trabajadores, a fin de mitigar al menos, o reparar siendo factible los daños, perjuicios y desgracias de que puedan ser víctimas involuntarias o sin mala fe.” (Sentencia 17971-2007, Considerando IV). Por otra parte, se debe tener en cuenta que realmente lo que existe es un sistema de seguridad social, entendido como “un conjunto de normas, principios e instrumentos destinados a proteger a las personas en el momento en que surgen estados de vulnerabilidad, que le impidan satisfacer sus necesidades básicas y las de sus dependientes.” (Sala Constitucional, Ídem, y el voto 1995-5261 SC). Precisamente el sistema de seguridad social, como protector de necesidades sociales e individuales y de naturaleza económica, que se construye sobre el sistema de jubilaciones y pensiones, caracteriza al Estado Social de derecho (sentencia 1992-846 SC), y es pilar esencial del sistema democrático costarricense (sentencia de la Sala Constitucional número 2007-17971, considerando VI). La seguridad social tiene como principios la universalidad, generalidad, suficiencia de la protección y solidaridad social (voto 2001-10546), anclados sin lugar a dudas en el principio cristiano de justicia social (ordinal 74 constitucional). Asimismo, tal como lo ha expresado la jurisdicción constitucional, el derecho a la seguridad social constituye, por sí, un derecho fundamental (artículo 73 ibídem), que junto con el de la salud, crea un límite al ejercicio de otros derechos constitucionales como los contenidos en el numeral 24 Constitucional (intimidad, libertad y secreto de las comunicaciones, sentencias 1996-6497, citada en la 2007-17971). Por otra parte no es procedente afirmar, como lo hace la recurrente, que la seguridad social está constreñida a las contingencias propias de la enfermedad, invalidez, vejez y muerte, pues el mismo ordinal 73 constitucional las amplía a las “demás contingencias que la ley determine”, entendidas estas como la pérdida involuntaria por el trabajador de los ingresos o su reducción de manera que no pueda cubrir sus necesidades y las de su familia, tal como lo ha señalado la misma OIT. De manera que bajo una interpretación amplia de la seguridad social, como corresponde a la materia de los derechos humanos, es posible señalar que el sistema de seguridad social costarricense se vio fortalecido con la Ley de Protección al Trabajador que estableció el Fondo de Capitalización Laboral y el Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias, para hacer efectiva la protección del trabajador (a) ante el riesgo o la contingencia del despido o la terminación de la relación de trabajo, y el cese de su salario, medio indispensable de vida para él (ella) y su familia y, desde luego, para garantizar una vejez con mayor dignidad, asegurándole una pensión adicional a la que pudiere tener en razón de los otros regímenes (ver lo objetivos señalados en los artículos 1 y 9 de esa ley y de la declaratoria de interés social que de esa legislación se hace en los ordinales 1 y 4 b), ibídem). De manera que si por obligación legal los empleadores deben pagar y depositar los aportes originados en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador (los que se convierten en contribuciones al nuevo sistema ampliado de seguridad social) “simultáneamente, y en los términos, plazos y condiciones que los dispuestos para los aportes a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, de acuerdo con el artículo 31 de su ley orgánica” (ordinal 57); correspondiendo al Sistema Centralizado de Recaudación de Pensiones “ejercer el control de los aportes al Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, de Pensiones Complementarias, de Enfermedad y Maternidad; a los fondos de capitalización laboral; a las cargas sociales cuya recaudación haya sido encargada a la CCSS y cualquier otra que la ley establezca, de conformidad con el Artículo 31 de la Ley orgánica de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social” (artículo 58, ibídem); y siendo que, en este último, se establecen esas mismas obligaciones para el SICERE, y para la demandada: las de encargada de la recaudación, responsable de realizar todas las gestiones administrativas y judiciales para controlar la evasión, subdeclaración o morosidad de los empleadores y de gestionar la recuperación de los aportes indebidamente retenidos; no queda duda a esta Sala, en primer lugar, de la equiparación dada por el legislador de los distintos tipos de aportes –a la seguridad social establecida tanto en la Constitución Política como en la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, y los nuevos originados en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador-, y de la obligación de la demandada de gestionar lo necesario –en vía administrativa o judicial- para que las contribuciones originadas en esta última, fueran efectivamente canceladas por los empleadores. Al no hacerlo la CCSS de esa manera, incumpliendo con sus obligaciones, surge la responsabilidad de resarcir al actor, al que no pueden afectársele sus derechos por la negligencia o el no ejercicio oportuno por parte de la accionada, de las competencias que les fueron asignadas por ley, independientemente de que con posterioridad las operadoras de pensiones tengan otro conjunto de obligaciones y deberes con relación a los fondos que le corresponda administrar. Tampoco es de recibo el argumento de que la supervisión y fiscalización del fondo de capitalización laboral corresponde a la Superintendencia de pensiones, conforme con los artículos 33 y 56 de la Ley número 7523, del 7 de julio de 1995, ya que ese argumento es nuevo, pues no se opuso al trabarse la litis que era el momento procesal oportuno, por lo que se encuentra precluído. No obstante, a mayor abundamiento, si bien esta norma le otorga esas funciones (“…autorizará, regulará, supervisará y fiscalizará los planes, fondos y regímenes contemplados en esta ley, así como aquellos que le sean encomendados en virtud de otras leyes, y la actividad de las operadoras de pensiones, de los entes autorizados para administrar los fondos de capitalización laboral y de las personas físicas o jurídicas que intervengan, directa o indirectamente, en los actos o contratos relacionados con las disposiciones de esta ley”) a la SUPEN, respecto de la actividad de las operadoras de pensiones y de los entes autorizados para administrar fondos de capitalización laboral, y de las personas físicas o jurídicas que de manera directa o indirecta intervengan en los actos o contratos relacionados con lo dispuesto por esa ley, entre otros; el caso en estudio no se encuentra en esas hipótesis, pues la situación se da en el proceso de recaudación de los aportes legales para esos fines, y antes de que lleguen a los citados sujetos. Además, la Ley de Protección al Trabajador es posterior a aquella, y contempla normativa específica reguladora del supuesto de hecho en discusión. Por otra parte tampoco es de recibo el alegato de la recurrente de que quedó demostrado en el expediente las gestiones que realizó para el cobro a los empleadores morosos, pues las acciones cobratorias demostradas (hechos probados g), h) e i) de la sentencia de primera instancia aprobados por la de segunda) no pueden considerarse suficientes –en cantidad y continuidad- para eliminar la responsabilidad por el incumplimiento de sus obligaciones legales. En sentido contrario, ese argumento contiene la admisión tácita, por parte de la accionada, que sí le correspondía la gestión de cobro de los aportes a los empleadores incumplientes. Como segundo agravio de fondo expresa la recurrente que con la interpretación del tribunal se vulnera el principio de legalidad, lo que se traduce en una sentencia contra legem. Disconformidad que no es procedente. Si bien la demandada es una institución autónoma de rango constitucional, parte de la Administración Pública, encargada de la administración y gobierno de los seguros sociales, a la que alcanza la aplicación del principio de legalidad, conforme al cual el funcionario público no puede realizar actos administrativos que no encuentren respaldo en el ordenamiento jurídico, en el caso que nos ocupa no se da la infracción a dicho principio, pues las obligaciones que se establecen en sentencia surgen como consecuencia del incumplimiento de sus deberes legales, es decir, en la omisión por su parte del mismo principio cuya infracción reclama y, encuentra sustento en la decisión del órgano jurisdiccional al que le corresponde dilucidar la demanda establecida en contra del citado ente. Cabe agregar que la responsabilidad de la demandada no surge del incumplimiento de los empleadores de su obligación de pago de los aportes previstos en la Ley de Protección del Trabajador, sino de la falta de cumplimiento de sus obligaciones legales que no son solo las de recaudar dichas sumas, sino también, las de realizar todas las gestiones administrativas y judiciales para controlar la evasión o morosidad, es decir, de gestionar la recuperación de esos aportes indebidamente retenidos por los empleadores, lo que en la especie no fue cumplido, y cuyas consecuencias no tiene porqué sufrir el trabajador afectado por la negligencia o funcionamiento anormal de la Administración responsable, en este caso la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, sin que ello signifique que esta no pueda actuar contra los empleadores morosos para recuperar lo pagado, tal como lo señaló el fallo de primera instancia.”", "body_en_text": "**V.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** The plaintiff sued to compel the defendant to transfer to the Banco Popular the contributions made to his salary by his employers that do not appear in that institution. The defendant acknowledged that although the worker appears on the payrolls, according to the SICERE report, his employers are in default in the payment of the contributions established in the Worker Protection Act (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), and therefore they have not been collected to be sent to the corresponding pension operator. In the first instance, the claim was granted, considering that in accordance with the provisions of the Worker Protection Act, it was the defendant's responsibility to carry out all administrative and judicial proceedings to control the evasion, underreporting, or default of employers and to manage the recovery of the contributions unduly withheld by them, which it failed to do (folios 5 verso to 7). Upon appeal by the defendant, the court confirmed the resolution, noting that the CCSS has the duty to oversee compliance with employer and worker contributions and that social security is made effective both by following the State's guidelines to achieve maximum prevention and coverage, and by obtaining the necessary resources to achieve those objectives, without the breach of that obligation being able to affect the fundamental rights of the worker. The court added to the above the existence of strict liability on the part of the Administration, towards the plaintiff, for its malfunctioning. Before this Chamber, the appellant alleges that a serious error was made in assessing the legal nature of the quotas established in the Worker Protection Act by assuming them to be part of social insurance, and that the principle of legality was infringed. It is not correct in its grievances. There is no observation in the court's judgment of any confusion regarding the nature of the contributions established in the cited law. Although the court emphasizes the duty to oversee compliance with employer and worker obligations that corresponds to the CCSS, the need to comply with social security guidelines set by the State, and the procurement of the necessary funds for that purpose, the truth is that it does not do so while referring to the legal nature of the aforementioned contributions, but rather to highlight that, because of this, the defendant has a permanent monitoring system in charge of a specialized body of inspectors whose operation is duly regulated. The foregoing is clearer when it stated: *\"if it fails to do so, the insured person should not bear the consequences of the omission to his detriment, in such a way that they prevent him from fully enjoying a fundamental right, which is his complete retirement, and the enjoyment of the supplementary benefits that the Worker Protection Act grants to the contributing person.\"* (Folio 13 verso). Likewise, at folio 14, the court stated, differentiating between both contribution systems, that: *\"At this point, it is necessary to warn that access to social security promoted by our Political Constitution and developed in special laws would be empty of real content if the plaintiff's thesis is not accepted. Specifically, in the case under examination, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social –with the creation of SICERE– is obligated* ***to collect the employer and worker contributions for social security and the employer contributions for the special funds created by the Worker Protection Act*** *.\"* (Bold added). It is clear then that the *Ad quem* did not analyze the legal nature of the employer contributions established in this latter law, but rather based its decision on the defendant's obligations regulated in the Worker Protection Act, extensively developed in the first-instance judgment that it confirmed. Now, even though as indicated this Chamber considers that the court did not analyze the legal nature of the contributions contemplated in the Worker Protection Act, it is appropriate to make some reflections on the matter. Our social security system is supported by Articles 11 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 50 and 73 of the Constitution, guaranteeing Costa Ricans the indispensable services in case of sickness, disability, maternity, old age, and death, through a tripartite and compulsory financing system (see Constitutional Chamber vote 1998-7393). For the ILO, *\"A society that provides security to its citizens protects them not only from war and disease, but also from the insecurities related to earning a living through work. Social security systems provide basic income in case of unemployment, illness and occupational injury, old age and retirement, invalidity, family responsibilities such as pregnancy and childcare, and loss of the family breadwinner. These benefits are important not only for workers and their families but also for their communities as a whole. By providing health care, income security, and social services, social security enhances productivity and contributes to the dignity and full realization of individuals. Social security systems also promote gender equality through the adoption of measures to ensure that women with children enjoy equal opportunities in the labour market. For employers and enterprises, social security helps maintain a stable workforce adaptable to change. Finally, through safety nets in cases of economic crisis, social security acts as a fundamental element of social cohesion, helping to ensure social peace and a commitment to globalization and economic development. Despite these advantages, only 20 percent of the world's population has adequate social security coverage, and more than half lack any type of social security coverage.\"* (ILO: Social security: a new consensus (Geneva, 2001. Retrieved from the Web at http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/social-security/lang--es/index.htm#P57_11406, on December 7, 2011). For the Constitutional Chamber, *\"Social security consists of the welfare and economic systems that cover the risks to which certain persons, mainly workers, are subjected, in order to at least mitigate, or repair where feasible, the damages, injuries, and misfortunes of which they may be involuntary or good-faith victims.\"* (Judgment 17971-2007, Recital IV). On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that what really exists is a social security system, understood as *\"a set of norms, principles, and instruments intended to protect individuals when states of vulnerability arise, which prevent them from meeting their basic needs and those of their dependents.\"* (Constitutional Chamber, Idem, and vote 1995-5261 SC). Precisely the social security system, as a protector of social and individual needs of an economic nature, which is built upon the retirement and pension system, characterizes the Social State governed by the rule of law (judgment 1992-846 SC), and is an essential pillar of the Costa Rican democratic system (Constitutional Chamber judgment number 2007-17971, recital VI). Social security has as its principles universality, generality, sufficiency of protection, and social solidarity (vote 2001-10546), anchored without a doubt in the Christian principle of social justice (constitutional article 74). Likewise, as the constitutional jurisdiction has expressed, the right to social security constitutes, in itself, a fundamental right (article 73 ibidem), which, together with the right to health, creates a limit on the exercise of other constitutional rights such as those contained in Article 24 of the Constitution (intimacy, freedom, and secrecy of communications, judgments 1996-6497, cited in 2007-17971). Furthermore, it is not appropriate to affirm, as the appellant does, that social security is constrained to the contingencies of sickness, disability, old age, and death, since the same constitutional article 73 extends them to the *\"other contingencies that the law determines\"*, understood as the involuntary loss by the worker of income or its reduction such that they cannot cover their needs and those of their family, as the ILO itself has pointed out. Therefore, under a broad interpretation of social security, as corresponds to the matter of human rights, it is possible to point out that the Costa Rican social security system was strengthened with the Worker Protection Act, which established the Labor Capitalization Fund and the Mandatory Complementary Pension Regime, to make effective the protection of the worker against the risk or contingency of dismissal or termination of the employment relationship, and the cessation of their salary, an indispensable means of life for them and their family, and, of course, to guarantee an old age with greater dignity, ensuring them an additional pension to what they might have under other regimes (see the objectives indicated in Articles 1 and 9 of that law and the declaration of social interest that is made of that legislation in articles 1 and 4 b), ibidem). Consequently, if by legal obligation employers must pay and deposit the contributions originating from the Worker Protection Act (which become contributions to the new expanded social security system) *\"simultaneously, and under the same terms, deadlines, and conditions as those provided for contributions to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in accordance with Article 31 of its organic law\"* (article 57); with it being the responsibility of the Centralized Pension Collection System to *\"exercise control over the contributions to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime, Complementary Pensions, Sickness and Maternity; to the labor capitalization funds; to the social charges whose collection has been entrusted to the CCSS, and any other that the law establishes, in accordance with Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social\"* (Article 58, ibidem); and since, in the latter, these same obligations are established for the SICERE, and for the defendant: those of being in charge of collection, responsible for carrying out all administrative and judicial proceedings to control evasion, underreporting, or default of employers, and for managing the recovery of unduly withheld contributions; there is no doubt in this Chamber, first, of the equivalence given by the legislator to the different types of contributions – to the social security established both in the Political Constitution and in the Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and the new ones originating from the Worker Protection Act –, and of the defendant's obligation to manage whatever is necessary – administratively or judicially – so that the contributions originating from the latter were effectively paid by the employers. By not doing so, the CCSS breached its obligations, giving rise to the responsibility to compensate the plaintiff, whose rights cannot be affected by the negligence or the failure to timely exercise, on the part of the defendant, the powers assigned to it by law, regardless of whether subsequently the pension operators have another set of obligations and duties in relation to the funds they are responsible for administering. Nor is the argument admissible that the supervision and oversight of the labor capitalization fund corresponds to the Superintendancy of Pensions, in accordance with Articles 33 and 56 of Law Number 7523, of July 7, 1995, since that argument is new, as it was not raised when the dispute was joined, which was the appropriate procedural moment, and therefore it is precluded. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, although this norm grants those functions (\"...shall authorize, regulate, supervise, and oversee the plans, funds, and regimes contemplated in this law, as well as those entrusted to it by virtue of other laws, and the activity of the pension operators, of the entities authorized to administer the labor capitalization funds, and of the natural or legal persons that intervene, directly or indirectly, in the acts or contracts related to the provisions of this law\") to SUPEN, regarding the activity of pension operators and entities authorized to administer labor capitalization funds, and of the natural or legal persons that directly or indirectly intervene in the acts or contracts related to the provisions of that law, among others; the case under study does not fall under those hypotheses, since the situation occurs in the collection process of the legal contributions for those purposes, and before they reach the mentioned subjects. Moreover, the Worker Protection Act is subsequent to that one, and contains specific regulations governing the alleged factual situation under discussion. Furthermore, the appellant's argument that the proceedings it carried out to collect from the defaulting employers were demonstrated in the case file is also inadmissible, because the demonstrated collection actions (proven facts g), h) and i) of the first-instance judgment, approved by the second-instance court) cannot be considered sufficient – in quantity and continuity – to eliminate liability for the breach of its legal obligations. To the contrary, that argument contains the tacit admission, by the defendant, that it was indeed responsible for the collection of the contributions from the non-compliant employers. As a second substantive grievance, the appellant states that the court's interpretation violates the principle of legality, which results in a judgment contra legem. This objection is not admissible. Although the defendant is an autonomous institution of constitutional rank, part of the Public Administration, in charge of the administration and governance of social insurance, to which the application of the principle of legality applies, according to which the public official cannot carry out administrative acts that do not find support in the legal system, in the case at hand there is no infringement of said principle, because the obligations established in the judgment arise as a consequence of the breach of its legal duties, that is, in its omission of the very principle whose infringement it claims, and finds support in the decision of the jurisdictional body responsible for deciding the claim filed against the said entity. It should be added that the defendant's liability does not arise from the employers' breach of their obligation to pay the contributions provided for in the Worker Protection Act, but from the failure to comply with its own legal obligations, which are not only to collect said sums, but also to carry out all administrative and judicial proceedings to control evasion or default, that is, to manage the recovery of those contributions unduly withheld by the employers, which in this case was not fulfilled, and whose consequences should not have to be suffered by the worker affected by the negligence or abnormal functioning of the responsible Administration, in this case the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, without this meaning that it cannot proceed against the defaulting employers to recover what was paid, as the first-instance ruling noted.\n\nThus, under a broad interpretation of social security, as befits the subject of human rights, it is possible to point out that the Costa Rican social security system was strengthened by the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, which established the Labor Capitalization Fund (Fondo de Capitalización Laboral) and the Mandatory Supplementary Pension Regime (Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias), in order to make effective the protection of the worker against the risk or contingency of dismissal or termination of the employment relationship, and the cessation of their salary, an indispensable means of life for them and their family and, of course, to guarantee a more dignified old age, ensuring an additional pension to the one they might have by reason of other regimes (see the objectives stated in Articles 1 and 9 of that law and the declaration of social interest of that legislation made in Articles 1 and 4 b), ibid.). Thus, if by legal obligation employers must pay and deposit the contributions originating from the Ley de Protección al Trabajador (which become contributions to the new expanded social security system) \"simultaneously, and in the terms, deadlines, and conditions established for contributions to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in accordance with Article 31 of its organic law\" (Article 57); with the Centralized Pension Collection System (Sistema Centralizado de Recaudación de Pensiones) being responsible for \"exercising control over contributions to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime, Supplementary Pensions, Sickness and Maternity; to the labor capitalization funds; to the social charges whose collection has been entrusted to the CCSS and any other established by law, in accordance with Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social\" (Article 58, ibid.); and given that, in the latter, these same obligations are established for the SICERE, and for the defendant: those of being in charge of collection, responsible for carrying out all administrative and judicial actions to control evasion, under-declaration, or delinquency of employers and for managing the recovery of unduly withheld contributions; there is no doubt for this Chamber, first, of the equivalence given by the legislator to the different types of contributions –to the social security established both in the Political Constitution and in the Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and the new ones originating from the Ley de Protección al Trabajador–, and of the obligation of the defendant to manage whatever is necessary –administratively or judicially– so that the contributions originating from the latter were effectively paid by the employers. By not doing so in this manner, the CCSS breached its obligations, giving rise to the liability to compensate the plaintiff, whose rights cannot be affected by the negligence or the failure to exercise in a timely manner, on the part of the defendant, the powers that were assigned to them by law, regardless of the fact that subsequently the pension operators have another set of obligations and duties regarding the funds they are responsible for administering. Nor is the argument acceptable that the supervision and oversight of the labor capitalization fund corresponds to the Superintendencia de Pensiones (SUPEN), in accordance with Articles 33 and 56 of Law number 7523, of July 7, 1995, since this argument is new, as it was not raised when the litis was joined, which was the opportune procedural moment, and is therefore precluded. Nevertheless, for further clarification, although this regulation grants those functions (\"...shall authorize, regulate, supervise, and oversee the plans, funds, and regimes contemplated in this law, as well as those entrusted to it by virtue of other laws, and the activity of the pension operators, of the entities authorized to administer labor capitalization funds, and of the natural or legal persons that intervene, directly or indirectly, in the acts or contracts related to the provisions of this law\") to SUPEN, with respect to the activity of pension operators and entities authorized to administer labor capitalization funds, and the natural or legal persons that directly or indirectly intervene in acts or contracts related to what is provided by that law, among others; the case under study does not fall within these hypotheses, since the situation occurs in the process of collecting the legal contributions for these purposes, and before they reach the aforementioned subjects. Furthermore, the Ley de Protección al Trabajador is subsequent to that one, and provides specific regulations governing the factual situation under discussion. On the other hand, the appellant's claim that the actions it took to collect from delinquent employers were demonstrated in the case file is also not acceptable, since the demonstrated collection actions (proven facts g), h), and i) of the first-instance judgment approved by the second-instance one) cannot be considered sufficient –in quantity and continuity– to eliminate liability for the breach of its legal obligations. On the contrary, this argument tacitly admits, on the part of the defendant, that the management of collecting contributions from non-compliant employers was indeed its responsibility. As a second substantive grievance, the appellant states that the tribunal's interpretation violates the principle of legality (principio de legalidad), which translates into a judgment contra legem. A disagreement that is not appropriate. Although the defendant is an autonomous institution of constitutional rank, part of the Public Administration, responsible for the administration and governance of social insurance, to which the application of the principle of legality applies, according to which a public official cannot perform administrative acts that do not find support in the legal system, in the case before us there is no infringement of said principle, since the obligations established in the judgment arise as a consequence of the breach of its legal duties, that is, from its omission of the very principle whose infringement it claims, and finds support in the decision of the jurisdictional body that is responsible for resolving the claim brought against said entity. It should be added that the defendant's liability does not arise from the employers' breach of their obligation to pay the contributions provided for in the Ley de Protección del Trabajador, but from the failure to fulfill its legal obligations, which are not only to collect said sums, but also to carry out all administrative and judicial actions to control evasion or delinquency, that is, to manage the recovery of those contributions unduly withheld by employers, which in this specific case was not fulfilled, and whose consequences should not have to be suffered by the worker affected by the negligence or abnormal operation of the responsible Administration, in this case the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, without this meaning that it cannot proceed against the delinquent employers to recover what has been paid, as indicated in the first-instance ruling.\"\n\nLikewise, as constitutional jurisdiction has expressed, the right to social security constitutes, in itself, a fundamental right (article 73 *ibídem*), which together with the right to health, creates a limit on the exercise of other constitutional rights such as those contained in numeral 24 of the Constitution (privacy, freedom, and secrecy of communications, rulings 1996-6497, cited in 2007-17971). Furthermore, it is not appropriate to affirm, as the appellant does, that social security is constrained solely to the contingencies of illness, disability, old age, and death, since the same constitutional ordinal 73 extends it to *“other contingencies as determined by law”*, understood as the involuntary loss by the worker of income or its reduction such that they cannot meet their needs and those of their family, as the ILO itself has indicated. Thus, under a broad interpretation of social security, as corresponds to the field of human rights, it is possible to point out that the Costa Rican social security system was strengthened with the Worker Protection Act, which established the Labor Capitalization Fund and the Mandatory Supplementary Pension Regime, to render effective the protection of the worker against the risk or contingency of dismissal or termination of the employment relationship, and the cessation of their salary, an indispensable means of life for them and their family, and, of course, to guarantee a more dignified old age, ensuring them an additional pension to what they might have under other regimes (see the objectives indicated in articles 1 and 9 of that law and the declaration of social interest made of that legislation in ordinals 1 and 4 b), *ibídem*). Therefore, if by legal obligation employers must pay and deposit the contributions originating from the Worker Protection Act (which become contributions to the new expanded social security system) *“simultaneously, and in the terms, deadlines, and conditions as those provided for contributions to the Caja* Costarricense de Seguro Social, *in accordance with article 31 of its organic law”* (ordinal 57); with the Centralized Pension Collection System being responsible for *“exercising control over contributions to the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime, Supplementary Pensions, Sickness and Maternity; to the labor capitalization funds; to the social charges whose collection has been entrusted to the CCSS and any other as established by law,* in accordance with Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social” (article 58, *ibídem*); and given that, in this latter article, those same obligations are established for the SICERE, and for the defendant: those of being in charge of collection, responsible for carrying out all administrative and judicial actions to control evasion, underreporting, or delinquency of employers, and for managing the recovery of improperly withheld contributions; there is no doubt to this Chamber, in the first place, of the equivalence given by the legislator to the different types of contributions –to the social security established both in the Political Constitution and in the Constitutive Law of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and the new ones originating from the Worker Protection Act–, and of the obligation of the defendant to manage whatever is necessary –through administrative or judicial channels– so that the contributions originating from this latter law are effectively paid by the employers. By the CCSS not doing so in that manner, failing to comply with its obligations, the responsibility arises to compensate the plaintiff, whose rights cannot be affected by the negligence or the failure to exercise, in a timely manner, by the defendant, of the powers assigned to it by law, regardless of whether subsequently the pension operators have another set of obligations and duties in relation to the funds they are responsible for administering. Nor is the argument admissible that the supervision and oversight of the labor capitalization fund corresponds to the Superintendencia de pensiones, in accordance with articles 33 and 56 of Law number 7523, of July 7, 1995, since that argument is new, as it was not raised when the litis was joined, which was the appropriate procedural moment, and it is therefore precluded. Nevertheless, for greater abundance, although this norm grants those functions to the SUPEN (*“…shall authorize, regulate, supervise, and oversee the plans, funds, and regimes contemplated in this law, as well as those entrusted to it by virtue of other laws, and the activity of the pension operators, of the entities authorized to administer the labor capitalization funds, and of the natural or legal persons that intervene, directly or indirectly, in the acts or contracts related to the provisions of this law”*), regarding the activity of the pension operators and the entities authorized to administer labor capitalization funds, and of the natural or legal persons that directly or indirectly intervene in the acts or contracts related to what is provided by that law, among others; the case under study does not fall within these hypotheses, since the situation occurs in the collection process of the legal contributions for these purposes, and before they reach the cited subjects. Furthermore, the Worker Protection Act is subsequent to that law, and contains specific regulations governing the factual situation under discussion. Moreover, the appellant's claim that the actions it took to collect from delinquent employers were demonstrated in the expediente is also not admissible, since the demonstrated collection actions (proven facts g), h), and i) of the first-instance ruling, approved by the second-instance ruling) cannot be considered sufficient –in quantity and continuity– to eliminate the responsibility for the breach of its legal obligations. On the contrary, that argument contains the tacit admission, by the defendant, that it was indeed responsible for managing the collection of contributions from non-compliant employers. **As a second grievance on the merits**, the appellant states that the court's interpretation violates the principle of legality, which translates into a ruling *contra legem*. A disagreement that is not appropriate. Although the defendant is an autonomous institution of constitutional rank, part of the Public Administration, in charge of the administration and governance of social insurances, to which the application of the principle of legality applies, according to which a public official cannot carry out administrative acts that do not find support in the legal system, in the case at hand, there is no violation of said principle, since the obligations established in the ruling arise as a consequence of the breach of its legal duties, that is, from the omission on its part of the very principle whose violation it claims, and it finds support in the decision of the jurisdictional body responsible for resolving the claim filed against the cited entity. It should be added that the responsibility of the defendant does not arise from the employers' breach of their payment obligation for the contributions provided for in the Worker Protection Act, but rather from the lack of fulfillment of its legal obligations, which are not only to collect said sums, but also to carry out all administrative and judicial actions to control evasion or delinquency, that is, to manage the recovery of those contributions improperly withheld by the employers, which in this case was not fulfilled, and whose consequences should not have to be suffered by the worker affected by the negligence or abnormal functioning of the responsible Administration, in this case the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, without this meaning that it cannot act against the delinquent employers to recover what was paid, as indicated by the first-instance ruling.”" }