{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-144850", "citation": "Res. 00811-2012 Sala Primera de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Disolución de federaciones por pérdida del mínimo de asociados", "title_en": "Dissolution of Federations for Falling Below the Minimum Membership", "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, mediante la Resolución 00811-2012, analizó la disolución de una federación deportiva en el contexto de la Ley de Asociaciones (Ley 218) y la Ley 7800 (ICODER). La cuestión central consistió en determinar si procedía la extinción de una federación que, habiéndose constituido con dos asociaciones miembro, se quedó con una sola tras la renuncia de una de ellas. El Tribunal de instancia había decretado la disolución por considerar que ello contradecía la exigencia mínima de pluralidad de asociados que subyace en toda figura asociativa. La Federación apeló, argumentando que las causales de extinción son taxativas y no incluyen dicho supuesto. La Sala Primera, sin embargo, confirmó la decisión, razonando que, si bien la Ley 218 no contempla explícitamente ese supuesto extintivo para federaciones, por principio y en aplicación análoga del inciso a) del artículo 13, la personalidad jurídica de una federación se extingue cuando se reduce a un solo miembro, ya que desaparece la pluralidad de personas que constituye su esencia. El fallo desestimó el recurso de casación y confirmó la disolución de la Federación T.", "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through Resolution 00811-2012, analyzed the dissolution of a sports federation under the Associations Law (Law 218) and Law 7800 (ICODER). The central question was whether a federation that was formed by two member associations could be dissolved when one association withdrew, leaving only one member. The trial court had ordered dissolution, reasoning that this contravened the minimum requirement of plurality of members inherent in any associative figure. The Federation appealed, arguing that the causes for extinction are exhaustively listed and do not include this scenario. The First Chamber upheld the decision, reasoning that although Law 218 does not explicitly provide for this cause of extinction for federations, by principle and analogous application of subsection a) of Article 13, the legal personality of a federation is extinguished when it is reduced to a single member, as the plurality of persons essential to its existence disappears. The Chamber dismissed the cassation appeal and confirmed the dissolution of Federation T.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte", "date": "2012", "year": "2012", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "Ley de Asociaciones", "federación", "confederación", "personería jurídica", "casación", "Sala Primera de la Corte", "ICODER" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 13", "law": "Ley 218" }, { "article": "Art. 1", "law": "Ley 218" }, { "article": "Art. 18", "law": "Ley 218" }, { "article": "Art. 30", "law": "Ley 218" }, { "article": "Art. 31", "law": "Ley 218" }, { "article": "Art. 27", "law": "Ley 218" }, { "article": "Art. 51", "law": "Ley 7800" }, { "article": "Art. 52", "law": "Ley 7800" } ], "keywords_es": [ "asociación", "disolución de federación", "Ley 218", "Ley 7800", "extinción persona jurídica", "renuncia de asociado", "federación deportiva", "Sala Primera de la Corte" ], "keywords_en": [ "association", "dissolution of federation", "Law 218", "Law 7800", "extinction of legal entity", "withdrawal of member", "sports federation", "First Chamber of the Supreme Court" ], "excerpt_es": "En las hipótesis federativas o confederativas, el origen o nacimiento se produce con la participación de al menos dos personas (jurídicas). Si por cualquier motivo una de ellas se retira, y por consiguiente, no subsiste la agrupación de sujetos (se reduce a uno solo), la personalidad ha de concluirse, pues se elimina la razón que la originó: la unión de los sujetos. Así las cosas, aún cuando en la Ley 218 no esté contemplada en forma explícita la extinción de federaciones y confederaciones por reducirse el número de sujetos asociados, por principio (que a su vez encuentra sustento en el inciso a) del artículo 13), este efecto ha de producirse cuando permanece una sola persona o asociación en calidad de asociada.", "excerpt_en": "In federative or confederative scenarios, the origin or birth occurs with the participation of at least two (legal) persons. If for any reason one of them withdraws, and consequently the grouping of subjects does not subsist (it is reduced to one), the legal personality must be concluded, since the reason that originated it—the union of the subjects—is eliminated. Therefore, even though Law 218 does not explicitly provide for the extinction of federations and confederations due to a reduction in the number of associated subjects, by principle (which in turn finds support in subsection a) of Article 13), this effect must occur when only one person or association remains as a member.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Cassation appeal denied", "label_es": "Recurso de casación denegado", "summary_en": "The First Chamber confirmed the dissolution of the federation because, upon being reduced to a single member, it ceased to meet the essential requirement of plurality of members, applying by analogy Article 13(a) of the Associations Law.", "summary_es": "La Sala Primera confirmó la disolución de la federación porque, al quedar reducida a una sola asociada, dejó de cumplir con el requisito esencial de pluralidad de miembros, aplicando por analogía el artículo 13 inciso a) de la Ley de Asociaciones." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "In every associative form, what is essential is the union of different persons, whose purpose is to more easily achieve the goals on which they voluntarily agree.", "quote_es": "En toda figura asociativa, lo esencial es la unión de distintas personas, cuyo propósito es alcanzar con mayor facilidad los fines en los que voluntariamente coinciden." }, { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "Without concurrence, there is no reason to create a new, distinct entity; hence, it is required for its birth, and therefore, for its existence or validity.", "quote_es": "Sin la concurrencia no hay motivo para originar una entidad nueva, distinta; por ello, es que se exige para su nacimiento, y por ende, para su existencia o vigencia." }, { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "If, once constituted, the plurality of subjects ceases, the entity must also cease.", "quote_es": "Si una vez constituidas, la pluralidad de sujetos cesa, también habrá de cesar la entidad." }, { "context": "Considerando VII", "quote_en": "This is precisely the determination contested by the Federation in its appeal, who, in addition to arguing that this cause is improper (which—as noted—is not acceptable), alleges that, in any case, the record contains evidence showing that it is composed of other associations.", "quote_es": "Esta determinación es la que precisamente adversa la Federación en su recurso, quien además de argumentar que dicha causal es improcedente (lo cual –como se apuntó- no es de recibo), alega que, en todo caso, en el expediente hay probanzas donde consta que está conformada por otras asociaciones." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-33570", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 218 Art. 13" }, { "target_id": "norm-26290", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7800 Art. 51" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-144850", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-26290", "norm_num": "7800", "norm_name": "Ley de Creación del ICODER y Régimen Jurídico del Deporte", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/04/1998" }, { "doc_id": "norm-32764", "norm_num": "", "norm_name": "Ley de Asociaciones", "tipo_norma": "", "norm_fecha": "" }, { "doc_id": "norm-66148", "norm_num": "8765", "norm_name": "Código Electoral", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "19/08/2009" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“VI.-Sobre el derecho de asociación y las distintas\r\nfiguras asociativas. El\r\nfenómeno asociativo obedece o pretende la unión de esfuerzos, en diversos\r\naspectos, y por parte de distintas personas, para facilitar el cumplimiento de los\r\npropósitos que ellas comparten. En reconocimiento de esa manifestación, la Constitución\r\n Política, en el mandato 25, establece el derecho a agruparse\r\npara la consecución de fines lícitos. Asimismo, y en respeto de esa misma\r\nautonomía de la voluntad, dispone que nadie podrá ser\r\nobligado a formar parte de asociación alguna. Lo que ha de entenderse como un\r\nimpedimento para imponer a los sujetos la conformación de agrupaciones y el\r\ndeber de mantenerse en ellas. Las agrupaciones de personas, pueden tener diversos\r\nfines, entre otros, políticos, económicos y de bienestar social. La Ley de Asociaciones regula\r\naquellas cuyo objeto no es (única y exclusivamente) obtener lucro o ganancia,\r\nentre ellas, las que tengan fines científicos, artísticos, deportivos, benéficos\r\ny de recreo. En concreto las denomina “asociaciones” (artículo 1). En este\r\npunto, es importante aclarar que este específico tipo de agrupación (las\r\nasociaciones en sentido técnico), se caracterizan por tender a lograr\r\npropósitos distintos a la obtención de ganancia. La actividad lucrativa no les\r\nes incompatible, en el tanto se le conceda el carácter instrumental, es decir,\r\ncomo medio para la consecución de su finalidad; sin embargo –y en esos términos\r\ndebe entenderse el mandato primero de la norma legal-, el desarrollo de\r\nactividades lucrativas no puede formar parte de su razón de existencia, de sus\r\nfines. También –conviene aclarar- estas entidades (las asociaciones puras y\r\nsimples), se distinguen de las agrupaciones o asociaciones de índole política,\r\npues así lo dispone expresamente el artículo 3 de la Ley 218, y éstas se rigen por\r\nnorma especial, que las define como asociaciones voluntarias de ciudadanos, sin\r\nintención de lucro y con el objeto de participar activamente en la política\r\nnacional, provincial o cantonal (disposición 49 del Código Electoral, Ley n.°\r\n8765, en concordancia con el precepto 98 de la Constitución\r\n Política). En particular, las asociaciones que poseen\r\npropósitos deportivos encuentran regulación especial en la Ley 7800. Su finalidad es\r\npromover el deporte, la recreación, o bien, una o varias disciplinas deportivas\r\n(cánones 51 y 52). En lo que a este caso interesa, conforme al mandato 55 ibídem, para lo no contemplado expresamente en ese cuerpo,\r\nse remite a la Ley\r\n218. En dicha norma legal, la constitución de asociaciones está prevista en el\r\nprecepto 18, que exige la voluntad de al menos “diez personas mayores de\r\nedad”, quienes habrán de comparecer en escritura pública, o bien en\r\ndocumento donde conste la sesión inaugural. Además, en el artículo 30, se\r\ncontempla la posibilidad de que dos o más asociaciones constituyan asociaciones\r\n“especiales”, a las que se les denomina “liga”, “federación” o “unión”. Estas\r\núltimas, a su vez, pueden configurar asociaciones “confederales”.\r\nEn ambas formas especiales de asociación, nace una persona jurídica distinta a\r\nlas entidades que acuerdan conformarlas. Las formalidades para su constitución\r\nson las mismas que se exigen para las asociaciones en sentido estricto (canon\r\n31). Ahora bien, tratándose de asociaciones deportivas, hay norma similar: se\r\nles reconoce de primer grado, es decir, aquellas integradas “por un máximo\r\nde diez personas” (artículo 51); o bien de segundo grado, en las que se\r\nrequiere la concurrencia de dos o más asociaciones de primer grado para su\r\nnacimiento (mandato 52). Para efectos extintivos de las asociaciones en general\r\n(y por ende, también de las deportivas, ya que no hay norma especial), el\r\nmandato 13 de la Ley\r\n218 versa: “La asociación se extingue: [.-] a) Cuando el número de\r\nasociados elegibles sea inferior al necesario para integrar el órgano\r\ndirectivo. [.-] b) Si fuere disuelta por la autoridad por haberse\r\ncomprobado alguno de los extremos señalados en el artículo 27. [.-] c)\r\nUna vez conseguido el fin temporal o transitorio para el cual fue fundada, o\r\nimposibilitada legal o materialmente dicha consecución. Y [.-] d) Por\r\nprivación de su capacidad jurídica como consecuencia de la declaratoria de\r\ninsolvencia o concurso; de variación en el objeto perseguido; del cambio de su\r\nnaturaleza en su personería jurídica o por no haber renovado el órgano\r\ndirectivo en el año siguiente al término señalado en los estatutos para el\r\nejercicio del mismo.” Por su parte, el mandato 27 señala “La autoridad\r\njudicial será la única competente para decretar, antes de la expiración del\r\ntérmino natural, la disolución de las asociaciones constituidas con arreglo a\r\nesta ley, cuando se lo pidan los dos tercios o más de los asociados o cuando\r\nconcurran las circunstancias que indican los incisos a), c) y d), del artículo\r\n13. Decretada la disolución se procederá en la forma que indica el artículo 14\r\ny el Tribunal lo comunicará al Registro de Asociaciones para la inscripción de\r\nesa circunstancia.” Por último, el canon 34 establece “Serán tenidas\r\ncomo asociaciones ilícitas y en consecuencia se decretará su disolución,\r\ncuando: [.-] 1º.- En forma repetida sus dirigentes hayan sido\r\napercibidos por la\r\n Gobernación de que están en el caso del inciso 2º del\r\nartículo anterior, sin que tales requerimientos hayan sido atendidos. [.-] 2º.-\r\nAparezca que se dedican a actividades sancionadas por las leyes represivas o\r\ncontrarias a la moral o a las buenas costumbres o fueren subversivas. [.-] 3º.-\r\nAparezca que la asociación se formó para encubrir fines distintos de los\r\nconsignados en los estatutos”. En lo que interesa, el mandato 33, párrafo\r\nsegundo inciso 2) y el 23, refieren el destino de fondos a fines distintos a\r\nlos previstos y a actos ilícitos, contrarios a la moral, las buenas costumbres\r\no al orden. De la relación de las normas mencionadas, se tiene que las\r\nasociaciones se extinguen en nueve supuestos, a saber, cuando: 1) el número de\r\nasociados elegibles sea inferior al necesario para integrar el órgano directivo\r\n(menor a cinco según el ordinal 10.1 ibídem); 2) se\r\nha conseguido el fin para el que se constituyó o hay imposibilidad legal o\r\nmaterial para alcanzarlo; 3) se haya perdido la capacidad jurídica por\r\ninsolvencia o concurso; 4) se modifique el objeto perseguido o su naturaleza;\r\n5) no se haya renovado el órgano directivo dentro del año siguiente al término\r\nde su ejercicio; 6) dos tercios o más de los asociados así lo soliciten; 7) sus\r\ndirigentes hayan sido apercibidos repetidamente sobre el destino de fondos a\r\nfines distintos al dispuesto estatutariamente o sobre la realización de actos\r\nilícitos, contrarios a la moral, las buenas costumbres o al orden; 8) se\r\ndedique a actividades sancionadas por las leyes represivas, contrarias a la\r\nmoral y a las buenas costumbres, o bien, subversivas; y 9) se hayan formado\r\npara disfrazar o encubrir fines distintos de los consignados en los estatutos.\r\nA ello han de sumarse las condiciones extintivas que estatutariamente se hayan\r\nincorporado (apartado i) del ordinal 7 ejúsdem). Por\r\nsu parte, a las federaciones y confederaciones (así como, a las deportivas\r\nde segundo grado), ante la falta de regulación expresa, y por paridad de motivo\r\n(como ocurre con la conformación según el artículo 31 ibídem),\r\nles aplican las mismas causales de extinción de las asociaciones, en lo que les\r\nsean compatibles, claro está. Por los requisitos propios para su constitución,\r\nla falta de asociados para integrar el órgano directivo, no resulta aplicable,\r\npues éstas –como se vio- se forman por el acuerdo de al menos dos asociaciones.\r\nAl constituirse por ese mínimo (dos asociaciones), para mantenerles vigentes no\r\npodría exigirse –sin entrar en contrasentido- al menos cinco asociados (número\r\nrequerido para conformar el órgano directivo, y por ende personas físicas).\r\nAhora bien, tanto para las asociaciones simples, como para las federaciones\r\ny confederaciones (y por ende, para las deportivas de segundo grado), al\r\nmargen de los supuestos extintivos que expresamente contempla la Ley 218, es necesario\r\nreconocer una hipótesis adicional, que varía –como se precisa de seguido-\r\nen lo que al quantum de asociados se refiere, según se trate de las primeras o\r\nbien, de las restantes. En toda figura asociativa –tal y como se explicó-, lo\r\nesencial es la unión de distintas personas, cuyo propósito es alcanzar con\r\nmayor facilidad los fines en los que voluntariamente coinciden. De esta forma,\r\nla pluralidad de sujetos es consustancial a toda agrupación de individuos o\r\nentidades, a la que el ordenamiento le atribuye personalidad. Es decir, su nacimiento\r\ny existencia obedece a esa pluralidad de personas (físicas o jurídicas),\r\nque intentan lograr, en conjunto, un determinado propósito. Si no existe o\r\ndesaparece la agrupación de personas, no habría justificante para atribuir o\r\nmantener la personalidad. Se estaría ante una persona física o jurídica, que\r\nindividualmente buscará alcanzar el objetivo, en ejercicio de su capacidad de\r\nactuar, sin que para ello requiera un nuevo ente al que se atribuyan derechos y\r\nobligaciones. Esa razón (alcanzar una finalidad específica) es la que reúne a\r\nlos sujetos; y en virtud de ella es que se atribuye personalidad. Sin la\r\nconcurrencia no hay motivo para originar una entidad nueva, distinta; por ello,\r\nes que se exige para su nacimiento, y por ende, para su existencia o vigencia.\r\nEsta concatenación lógica, está excepcionada legalmente en materia comercial,\r\nprimero, en la figura de la empresa de responsabilidad individual, y segundo,\r\nen el caso de las sociedades anónimas, en las que, conforme al precepto 202 del\r\nCódigo de Comercio, la participación puede recaer en una sola persona. De más\r\nestá decir, que en ambos casos de salvedad, la ficción creada responde\r\nprecisamente a la actividad generadora de riqueza, que bien puede ser\r\ndesplegada por un solo individuo, pero al que conviene dar la posibilidad de\r\nabstraer su patrimonio, de las consecuencias que podría acarrear el desarrollo\r\nde la actividad comercial. Fuera de las excepciones legales, la concurrencia\r\nes la regla lógica que subyace en toda agrupación o figura asociativa. En\r\neste orden de ideas, es que la Ley,\r\nen el supuesto de la asociación simple, requiere la participación mínima de 10\r\npersonas físicas; en un segundo, para las federaciones (entre ellas, las\r\ndeportivas de segundo grado), la concurrencia de al menos dos asociaciones\r\nsimples. Por último, para confederaciones, la de dos federaciones. Si una\r\nvez constituidas, la pluralidad de sujetos cesa, también habrá de cesar la\r\nentidad. En esa línea, en tesis de inicio, tratándose de asociaciones\r\nsimples, en tanto para conformarlas se exige la voluntad de 10 individuos, la\r\ndisminución en ese número mínimo original de asociados, tendría por\r\nconsecuencia lógica la extinción de la persona jurídica; sin embargo, el\r\nlegislador limitó el mínimo de asociados a cinco miembros, según se desprende\r\ndel inciso a) del artículo 13. Con lo cual, si los asociados se reducen a\r\ncuatro o menos, podrá peticionarse al órgano jurisdiccional competente la\r\ndisolución. Dicho de otro modo, en el caso de las asociaciones simples o\r\nde “primer grado”, el legislador estimó que la reunión de cinco sujetos es suficiente\r\npara mantener la atribución de personalidad. En las hipótesis federativas o\r\nconfederativas, el origen o nacimiento se produce con la participación de\r\nal menos dos personas (jurídicas). Si por cualquier motivo una de ellas se\r\nretira, y por consiguiente, no subsiste la agrupación de sujetos (se reduce\r\na uno solo), la personalidad ha de concluirse, pues se elimina la razón que la\r\noriginó: la unión de los sujetos. Así las cosas, aún cuando en la Ley 218 no esté contemplada en\r\nforma explícita la extinción de federaciones y confederaciones por reducirse el\r\nnúmero de sujetos asociados, por principio (que a su vez encuentra sustento en\r\nel inciso a) del artículo 13), este efecto ha de producirse cuando permanece\r\nuna sola persona o asociación en calidad de asociada. \n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- Así las cosas, la disolución de una asociación\r\nfederativa o confederativa, procede en los casos en\r\nque la entidad cuente con un solo asociado (al margen de lo dispuesto por el\r\nartículo 27 en relación con la voluntad de las personas asociadas, que es una\r\nhipótesis distinta). En el sub lite, tal fue la\r\nconclusión a la que arribó el Tribunal. En esa línea, y para el caso concreto,\r\nprohijó los hechos del Juzgado, entre los que se contempla que la Asociación, el\r\n28 de noviembre de 2005, puso en conocimiento de la Junta Directiva de\r\nla Federación\r\nque, por decisión de su Asamblea General, renunciaba a su condición de\r\nasociado. Estableció además el Tribunal que “Particularmente la “Federación\r\nT.” solo estaba integrada por dos asociaciones: “La Asociación T.\r\nD.” y la “Asociación C.” […] En el caso concreto, aprecia el\r\nTribunal que efectivamente el mínimo legal de la Federación T.\r\ncorresponde a 2 asociaciones de primer orden. […] Lo anterior determina\r\nimposibilidad legal de una Asociación deportiva inferior a 10 asociados Similar\r\nplanteamiento deberá ser aplicable en caso de Federaciones, con la modificación\r\nde disminuir el quantum descrito a solo 2 miembros –número que corresponde a la\r\nconstitución y por ende, a la disolución-. El panorama descrito presenta\r\narmonía respecto del entramado legal examinado: Ley 218 de Asociaciones, Ley\r\n7800 y su Reglamento, donde no es perceptible posibilidad de continuación de\r\nuna Federación con un solo miembro […]”. Esta determinación es la que\r\nprecisamente adversa la\r\n Federación en su recurso, quien además de argumentar que\r\ndicha causal es improcedente (lo cual –como se apuntó- no es de recibo), alega\r\nque, en todo caso, en el expediente hay probanzas donde consta que está\r\nconformada por otras asociaciones. Sostiene la Federación que a\r\nfolio 258 se demuestra que además de las dos asociaciones que originalmente la\r\nconstituyeron, está conformada por otras cuatro distintas a C..\r\nSe observa que dicho documento es una fotocopia emitida por el Registro Público\r\nde la protocolización presentada del acta de la Asamblea General\r\nOrdinaria de Asociados de la Federación, celebrada el 17 de noviembre de 2006,\r\ny que fue adjuntada por C. como fundamento de la solicitud que planteó a fin de\r\nque se ordenara al Registro suspender la inscripción de documentos, en concreto\r\nde cualquier modificación de estatutos o nombramiento de Junta Directiva (folio\r\n262). Esta gestión fue denegada por el Juzgado en auto de las 10 horas 20\r\nminutos del 29 de mayo de 2007 (folio 264). De esta suerte, el pliego no es una\r\nprobanza respecto de la pretensión ofrecida por las partes en los momentos\r\nprocesales oportunos, tampoco lo fue en calidad de mejor proveer. Fue\r\npresentada por C. a fin de sustentar una solicitud de medida cautelar atípica,\r\nque fue rechazada. En ese tanto, Juzgado y Tribunal no la consideraron para\r\nadoptar la decisión final. No indica la casacionista\r\notros elementos de convicción sobre el número de asociaciones afiliadas que\r\nafirma tener. Nótese que en la contestación, en lo relativo al argumento de disolución\r\npor mantenerse conformada por una sola asociación (T. D.), la Federación\r\núnicamente indica que no procede, pues no existe “capacidad legisladora\r\n[…] las causales de disolución están taxativamente numeradas en el artículo\r\n27 y artículo 13 de la ley (sic) de Asociaciones, y en momento alguno\r\nprevió el legislador una causal adicional por vía de interpretación”, sin\r\nque haya ofrecido probanzas para desvirtuar esa aseveración, conforme le\r\ncorrespondía según el precepto 317.2 del CPC. De esa\r\nmanera no negó el hecho, únicamente combatió el efecto que pretendió atribuir\r\nla parte actora. Así las cosas, esta Sala concuerda con el Tribunal en el\r\nsentido de que solo la\r\n Asociación de T. D. se mantiene como asociada de la Federación, y en\r\nese tanto procede la disolución de la última, tal y como se concluyó supra. Por este motivo, procederá desestimar el agravio. A\r\nmás de lo anterior, no se desconoce que la razones que brindó el Juzgado para\r\ndisolver la\r\n Federación son poco precisas, y relacionadas con un vicio\r\ndesde la constitución. Pero en parecer del juzgador ese defecto (a saber, una\r\nsola asociación afiliada) implica decretar la extinción (no la invalidez). El\r\nTribunal, aún cuando compartió el elenco fáctico del Juzgado, precisó que la Federación\r\nestaba integrada por C. y la Asociación T. D., sin precisar sobre el yerro en\r\nla constitución. No obstante, ello no incide sobre la determinación de los\r\njuzgadores: la\r\n Federación únicamente contaba con una asociada, pues C. había\r\nrenunciado, que en última instancia es el mismo motivo que halló el Juzgado\r\n(aunque desde la conformación, no desde la renuncia). En todo caso, este\r\nargumento de la sentencia de segunda instancia, no resultó sorpresivo para la\r\ndemandada como alega en esta fase de casación. Así lo expuso C. desde la\r\ndemanda como un motivo para fundar su pretensión, tan es así que, en ejercicio\r\nde su derecho de defensa, la Federación lo combatió al contestarla, e insistió\r\ncon el mismo razonamiento en el recurso extraordinario que se conoce.”", "body_en_text": "**VI.—Regarding the right of association and the distinct\nassociative figures.** The\nassociative phenomenon serves or seeks the union of efforts, in diverse\naspects, and by different persons, to facilitate the fulfillment of the\npurposes they share. In recognition of that manifestation, the Political Constitution\n(Constitución Política), in mandate 25, establishes the right to group together\nfor the achievement of lawful purposes. Likewise, and in respect of that same\nautonomy of will, it provides that no one may be\ncompelled to form part of any association. This is to be understood as an\nimpediment to imposing on subjects the formation of groups and the\nduty to remain in them. Groupings of persons may have diverse\npurposes, among others, political, economic, and social welfare. The Associations Law regulates\nthose whose purpose is not (solely and exclusively) to obtain profit or gain,\namong them, those that have scientific, artistic, sports, charitable,\nand recreational purposes. Specifically, it calls them “associations” (article 1). At this\npoint, it is important to clarify that this specific type of grouping (associations\nin the technical sense) is characterized by tending to achieve\npurposes other than obtaining profit. Lucrative activity is not\nincompatible with them, insofar as it is granted an instrumental character, that is,\nas a means for the achievement of its purpose; however—and in those terms\nthe first mandate of the legal norm must be understood—the development of\nlucrative activities cannot form part of its reason for existence, of its\npurposes. Also—it is fitting to clarify—these entities (pure and\nsimple associations) are distinguished from groups or associations of a political nature,\nas expressly provided by article 3 of Law 218, and the latter are governed by\na special norm, which defines them as voluntary associations of citizens, without\nlucrative intent and with the purpose of actively participating in national,\nprovincial, or cantonal politics (provision 49 of the Electoral Code, Law No.\n8765, in concordance with precept 98 of the Political Constitution\n(Constitución Política)). In particular, associations that possess\nsports purposes find special regulation in Law 7800. Their purpose is\nto promote sport, recreation, or one or several sports disciplines\n(canons 51 and 52). For what is relevant to this case, in accordance with mandate 55 ibidem, for what is not expressly contemplated in that body,\nit refers to Law\n218. In said legal norm, the constitution of associations is provided for in\nprecept 18, which requires the will of at least “ten persons of legal age,”\nwho shall appear in a public deed, or in\na document recording the inaugural session. In addition, in article 30, the\npossibility is contemplated that two or more associations may constitute “special” associations,\nwhich are called “league,” “federation,” or “union.” These\nlatter, in turn, may form “confederal” associations.\nIn both special forms of association, a legal entity (persona jurídica) distinct from\nthe entities that agree to form them is born. The formalities for their constitution\nare the same as those required for associations in the strict sense (canon\n31). Now then, in the case of sports associations, there is a similar norm: they\nare recognized as first-degree, that is, those composed “of a maximum\nof ten persons” (article 51); or second-degree, in which the\nconcurrence of two or more first-degree associations is required for their\ncreation (mandate 52). For the termination effects of associations in general\n(and therefore, also of sports associations, since there is no special norm),\nmandate 13 of Law\n218 states: “The association is extinguished: [.-] a) When the number of\neligible associates is less than that necessary to constitute the governing\nbody. [.-] b) If it is dissolved by the authority for having\nproven any of the grounds indicated in article 27. [.-] c)\nOnce the temporary or transitory purpose for which it was founded has been achieved, or\nsaid achievement has been legally or materially impossible. And [.-] d) By\ndeprivation of its legal capacity as a consequence of the declaration of\ninsolvency or insolvency proceedings (concurso); of variation in the purpose pursued; of the change of its\nnature in its legal personality or for not having renewed the governing\nbody in the year following the term indicated in the bylaws for the\nexercise thereof.” For its part, mandate 27 indicates: “The judicial\nauthority shall be the only one competent to decree, before the expiration of the\nnatural term, the dissolution of associations constituted in accordance with\nthis law, when so requested by two-thirds or more of the associates or when\nthe circumstances indicated in subparagraphs a), c), and d) of article\n13 concur. Once dissolution is decreed, it shall be proceeded in the manner indicated in article 14\nand the Court shall communicate it to the Associations Registry for the registration of\nthat circumstance.” Lastly, canon 34 establishes: “They shall be considered\nas illicit associations and consequently their dissolution shall be decreed,\nwhen: [.-] 1º.- Repeatedly their leaders have been\nwarned by the\nGovernorship that they are in the case of subparagraph 2º of the\npreceding article, without such requirements having been met. [.-] 2º.-\nIt appears that they engage in activities sanctioned by repressive laws or\ncontrary to morality or good customs or are subversive. [.-] 3º.-\nIt appears that the association was formed to conceal purposes other than those\nset forth in the bylaws.” In what is relevant, mandate 33, second\nparagraph, subparagraph 2), and 23, refer to the allocation of funds to purposes other\nthan those provided for and to illicit acts, contrary to morality, good customs,\nor order. From the relationship of the aforementioned norms, it is understood that\nassociations are extinguished in nine scenarios, namely, when: 1) the number of\neligible associates is less than that necessary to constitute the governing body\n(less than five according to ordinal 10.1 ibidem); 2) the\npurpose for which it was constituted has been achieved or there is legal or\nmaterial impossibility of achieving it; 3) legal capacity has been lost due to\ninsolvency or insolvency proceedings (concurso); 4) the purpose pursued or its nature is modified;\n5) the governing body has not been renewed within the year following the term\nof its exercise; 6) two-thirds or more of the associates so request; 7) its\nleaders have been repeatedly warned regarding the allocation of funds to\npurposes other than that provided in the bylaws or regarding the performance of\nillicit acts, contrary to morality, good customs, or order; 8) it\nengages in activities sanctioned by repressive laws, contrary to\nmorality and good customs, or subversive; and 9) it was formed\nto disguise or conceal purposes other than those set forth in the bylaws.\nTo this must be added the terminating conditions that may have been incorporated in the bylaws\n(subparagraph i) of ordinal 7 ejusdem). For\ntheir part, for federations and confederations (as well as for second-degree sports associations),\nin the absence of express regulation, and by parity of reason\n(as occurs with their formation according to article 31 ibidem),\nthe same grounds for extinction of associations apply to them, in what is\ncompatible with them, of course. Due to the specific requirements for their constitution,\nthe lack of associates to constitute the governing body is not applicable,\nsince these—as seen—are formed by the agreement of at least two associations.\nBeing constituted by that minimum (two associations), to keep them valid one could\nnot require—without falling into contradiction—at least five associates (the number\nrequired to form the governing body, and therefore natural persons).\n\nNow then, both for simple associations, and for federations\nand confederations (and therefore, for second-degree sports associations), apart\nfrom the terminating scenarios that Law 218 expressly contemplates, it is necessary\nto recognize an additional hypothesis, which varies—as specified below—\nin terms of the quantum of associates, depending on whether it concerns the former or\nthe latter. In every associative figure—as explained—what\nis essential is the union of different persons, whose purpose is to achieve with\ngreater ease the purposes in which they voluntarily coincide. In this way,\nthe plurality of subjects is consubstantial to every grouping of individuals or\nentities, to which the legal system attributes personality. That is, its creation\nand existence is due to that plurality of persons (natural or legal),\nwho attempt to achieve, jointly, a determined purpose. If the\ngrouping of persons does not exist or disappears, there would be no justification for attributing or\nmaintaining the personality. One would be dealing with a natural or legal person, who\nindividually will seek to achieve the objective, in the exercise of their capacity to\nact, without requiring a new entity to which rights and\nobligations are attributed. That reason (achieving a specific purpose) is what brings the\nsubjects together; and by virtue of it, personality is attributed. Without\nconcurrence, there is no motive to originate a new, distinct entity; for this reason,\nit is required for its creation, and therefore, for its existence or validity.\nThis logical chain is legally excepted in commercial matters,\nfirst, in the figure of the individual responsibility company, and second,\nin the case of corporations (sociedades anónimas), in which, in accordance with precept 202 of the\nCommercial Code, the participation may fall on a single person. Needles\nto say, that in both exceptional cases, the created fiction responds\nprecisely to the wealth-generating activity, which may well be\ncarried out by a single individual, but whom it is convenient to give the possibility of\nseparating his assets, from the consequences that the development\nof the commercial activity could entail. Outside the legal exceptions, concurrence\nis the logical rule that underlies every grouping or associative figure. In\nthis line of reasoning, the Law,\nin the case of the simple association, requires the minimum participation of 10\nnatural persons; in a second case, for federations (among them, second-degree sports\nassociations), the concurrence of at least two simple associations.\nLastly, for confederations, that of two federations. If, once\nconstituted, the plurality of subjects ceases, the\nentity shall also cease. Along these lines, as an initial thesis, in the case of\nsimple associations, since the will of 10 individuals is required to form them,\nthe decrease below that original minimum number of associates would have as its\nlogical consequence the extinction of the legal entity; however, the\nlegislator limited the minimum of associates to five members, as can be inferred\nfrom subparagraph a) of article 13. Whereby, if the associates are reduced to\nfour or fewer, the dissolution may be petitioned from the competent jurisdictional body.\nIn other words, in the case of simple or\n“first-degree” associations, the legislator considered that the gathering of five subjects is sufficient\nto maintain the attribution of personality. In the federative or\nconfederative hypotheses, the origin or creation occurs with the participation of\nat least two (legal) persons. If for any reason one of them\nwithdraws, and consequently, the grouping of subjects does not subsist (it is reduced\nto a single one), the personality must be concluded, because the reason that\noriginated it is eliminated: the union of the subjects.\nThis being the case, even though Law 218 does not\nexplicitly contemplate the extinction of federations and confederations for reducing the\nnumber of associated subjects, by principle (which in turn finds support in\nsubparagraph a) of article 13), this effect must occur when a\nsingle person or association remains as an associate.\n\nVII.—This being the case, the dissolution of a federative\nor confederative association is proper in cases\nwhere the entity has a single associate (apart from the provisions of\narticle 27 in relation to the will of the associated persons, which is\na distinct hypothesis). In the sub lite matter, that was the\nconclusion reached by the Court. Along those lines, and for the specific case,\nit adopted the facts found by the Trial Court, among which it is contemplated that the Association, on\nNovember 28, 2005, informed the Board of Directors of\nthe Federation\nthat, by decision of its General Assembly, it renounced its condition of\nassociate. The Court further established that: “Particularly the ‘Federation\nT.’ was only composed of two associations: ‘The Association T.\nD.’ and the ‘Association C.’ […] In the specific case, the\nCourt finds that indeed the legal minimum for the Federation T.\ncorresponds to 2 first-order associations. […] The foregoing determines\nthe legal impossibility of a sports Association with fewer than 10 associates. A similar\napproach must be applied in the case of Federations, with the modification\nof reducing the described quantum to only 2 members—a number corresponding to the\nconstitution, and therefore, to the dissolution—. The described panorama presents\nharmony with respect to the examined legal framework: Law 218 on Associations, Law\n7800 and its Regulations, where the possibility of continuation of\na Federation with a single member is not perceptible […].” This determination is precisely what the\nFederation challenges in its appeal, who, besides arguing that\nsaid ground is improper (which—as noted—is not acceptable), alleges\nthat, in any case, the record contains evidence showing that it is\nformed by other associations. The Federation argues that at\nfolio 258 it is demonstrated that besides the two associations that originally\nconstituted it, it is formed by four others distinct from C..\nIt is observed that said document is a photocopy issued by the Public Registry\nof the filed protocolization of the minutes of the Ordinary General\nAssembly of Associates of the Federation, held on November 17, 2006,\nand which was attached by C. as the basis for the petition it filed to\nrequest the Registry to suspend the registration of documents, specifically\nany modification of bylaws or appointment of Board of Directors (folio\n262). This petition was denied by the Trial Court in a ruling at 10 hours 20\nminutes on May 29, 2007 (folio 264). Thus, the document is not\nevidence regarding the claim offered by the parties at the appropriate\nprocedural moments, nor was it admitted as a measure for better provision. It was\nsubmitted by C. to support a request for an atypical precautionary measure,\nwhich was rejected. In this regard, the Trial Court and the Court did not consider it to\nadopt the final decision. The appellant (casacionista) does not indicate\nother elements of conviction regarding the number of affiliated associations it\nclaims to have. It is noted that in the response, regarding the argument of dissolution\nfor remaining formed by a single association (T. D.), the Federation\nonly indicates that it is not proper, since there is no “legislative capacity\n[…] the grounds for dissolution are exhaustively enumerated in article\n27 and article 13 of the law (sic) on Associations, and at no time\ndid the legislator provide for an additional ground by way of interpretation,” without\nhaving offered evidence to refute that assertion, as it\ncorresponded to do according to precept 317.2 of the CPC. In that\nway, it did not deny the fact, it only contested the effect that the plaintiff\nsought to attribute. This being the case, this Chamber agrees with the Court in the\nsense that only the\nAssociation of T. D. remains as an associate of the Federation, and in\nthat regard, the dissolution of the latter is proper, as concluded supra. For this reason, the grievance shall be dismissed. In\naddition to the foregoing, it is not unknown that the reasons provided by the Trial Court to\ndissolve the\nFederation are imprecise, and related to a defect\nfrom its constitution. But in the opinion of the adjudicator, that defect (namely, a\nsingle affiliated association) implies decreeing the extinction (not the invalidity). The\nCourt, although it shared the factual findings of the Trial Court, specified that the Federation\nwas composed of C. and the Association T. D., without specifying the error in\nthe constitution. However, this does not affect the determination of the\njudges: the\nFederation only had one associate, because C. had\nresigned, which ultimately is the same reason found by the Trial Court\n(although based on the formation, not on the resignation). In any case, this\nargument of the second-instance judgment did not come as a surprise to the\ndefendant as it alleges in this cassation phase. C. set it out from the\ncomplaint as a ground to base its claim, so much so that, in the exercise\nof its right of defense, the Federation contested it when answering, and insisted\nwith the same reasoning in the extraordinary appeal under consideration.”\n\nFrom the relationship of the aforementioned norms, it is understood that associations are extinguished in nine scenarios, namely, when: 1) the number of eligible associates is less than that necessary to form the governing body (fewer than five according to ordinal 10.1 ibidem); 2) the purpose for which it was constituted has been achieved or there is a legal or material impossibility of achieving it; 3) legal capacity has been lost due to insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings; 4) the pursued object or its nature is modified; 5) the governing body has not been renewed within the year following the end of its term; 6) two-thirds or more of the associates so request; 7) its leaders have been repeatedly warned about the allocation of funds to purposes other than those established in the bylaws or about the performance of illicit acts, contrary to morality, good customs, or public order; 8) it engages in activities punishable by repressive laws, contrary to morality and good customs, or subversive activities; and 9) it was formed to disguise or conceal purposes different from those stated in the bylaws. To these must be added the extinguishing conditions that have been incorporated into the bylaws (subsection i) of ordinal 7 ejúsdem). For their part, in the case of federations (federaciones) and confederations (confederaciones) (as well as second-degree sports federations), given the lack of express regulation, and by parity of reasoning (as occurs with their formation according to Article 31 ibidem), the same grounds for extinction of associations apply to them, insofar as they are compatible, of course. Due to the specific requirements for their constitution, the lack of associates to form the governing body is not applicable, since these—as has been seen—are formed by the agreement of at least two associations. Having been constituted by that minimum (two associations), to keep them valid, one could not require—without falling into contradiction—at least five associates (the number required to form the governing body, and therefore natural persons). Now then, both for simple associations and for federations and confederations (and therefore, for second-degree sports federations), aside from the extinguishing scenarios expressly contemplated by Law 218, it is necessary to recognize an additional hypothesis, which varies—as specified below—regarding the quantum of associates, depending on whether it concerns the former or the latter. In every associative figure—as has been explained—the essential element is the union of different persons, whose purpose is to more easily achieve the goals on which they voluntarily agree. Thus, the plurality of subjects is consubstantial to any grouping of individuals or entities to which the legal system attributes personality. That is, its birth and existence derives from that plurality of persons (natural or legal), who attempt to achieve, jointly, a specific purpose. If the grouping of persons does not exist or disappears, there would be no justification to attribute or maintain personality. One would be dealing with a natural or legal person who will individually seek to achieve the objective, in the exercise of their capacity to act, without requiring a new entity to which rights and obligations are attributed. That reason (achieving a specific purpose) is what brings the subjects together; and by virtue of it, personality is attributed. Without the concurrence, there is no reason to create a new, distinct entity; therefore, it is required for its birth, and consequently, for its existence or validity. This logical chain is legally excepted in commercial matters, first, in the figure of the sole proprietorship (empresa de responsabilidad individual), and second, in the case of corporations (sociedades anónimas), in which, pursuant to precept 202 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio), ownership may fall to a single person. It goes without saying that in both excepted cases, the created fiction responds precisely to wealth-generating activity, which may well be carried out by a single individual, but whom it is convenient to give the possibility of abstracting their patrimony from the consequences that the development of the commercial activity could entail. Outside of the legal exceptions, concurrence is the logical rule underlying every grouping or associative figure. In this line of thought, Law, in the scenario of the simple association, requires the minimum participation of 10 natural persons; in a second scenario, for federations (among them, second-degree sports federations), the concurrence of at least two simple associations. Finally, for confederations, that of two federations. If, once constituted, the plurality of subjects ceases, the entity must also cease. Along these lines, as an initial thesis, in the case of simple associations, insofar as forming them requires the will of 10 individuals, the decrease below that original minimum number of associates would have the logical consequence of the extinction of the legal person; however, the legislator limited the minimum number of associates to five members, as can be inferred from subsection a) of Article 13. Consequently, if the associates are reduced to four or fewer, dissolution may be petitioned from the competent jurisdictional body. In other words, in the case of \"first-degree\" or simple associations, the legislator deemed that the gathering of five subjects is sufficient to maintain the attribution of personality. In the federative or confederative hypotheses, the origin or birth occurs with the participation of at least two persons (legal entities). If for any reason one of them withdraws, and consequently, the grouping of subjects does not subsist (it is reduced to a single one), the personality must be concluded, since the reason that originated it—the union of the subjects—is eliminated. Thus, even though Law 218 does not explicitly contemplate the extinction of federations and confederations due to the reduction in the number of associated subjects, by principle (which in turn finds support in subsection a) of Article 13), this effect must occur when only one person or association remains as an associate.\n\n**VII.-** Thus, the dissolution of a federative or confederative association is appropriate in cases where the entity has a single associate (aside from the provisions of Article 27 in relation to the will of the associated persons, which is a different hypothesis). In the sub lite case, this was the conclusion reached by the Tribunal. Along these lines, and for the specific case, it adopted the facts found by the Trial Court, among which it is contemplated that the Association, on November 28, 2005, informed the Board of Directors of the Federation that, by decision of its General Assembly, it was renouncing its status as an associate. The Tribunal also established that \"Particularly the 'Federación T.' was only composed of two associations: 'La Asociación T. D.' and the 'Asociación C.' […] In the specific case, the Tribunal appreciates that the legal minimum for the Federación T. indeed corresponds to 2 first-order associations. […] The foregoing determines the legal impossibility of a Sports Association with fewer than 10 associates. A similar approach should be applicable in the case of Federations, with the modification of reducing the quantum described to only 2 members—a number that corresponds to constitution and, therefore, to dissolution. The described scenario presents harmony with respect to the examined legal framework: Law 218 on Associations, Law 7800 and its Regulation, where the possibility of continuing a Federation with a single member is not perceivable […].\" This determination is precisely what the Federation challenges in its appeal, and in addition to arguing that said ground is improper (which—as noted—is not acceptable), it alleges that, in any case, the case file contains evidence showing that it is composed of other associations. The Federation maintains that at page 258 it is demonstrated that, in addition to the two associations that originally constituted it, it is composed of four others distinct from C. It is observed that said document is a photocopy issued by the Public Registry of the filed protocolization of the minutes of the Ordinary General Assembly of Associates of the Federation, held on November 17, 2006, and which was attached by C. as the basis for the request it made so that the Registry be ordered to suspend the registration of documents, specifically any modification of bylaws or appointment of a Board of Directors (page 262). This request was denied by the Trial Court in an order issued at 10:20 a.m. on May 29, 2007 (page 264). Thus, the document is not evidence regarding the claim offered by the parties at the opportune procedural moments, nor was it offered as a measure for better provision (mejor proveer). It was presented by C. to support a request for an atypical interim measure, which was rejected. To that extent, the Trial Court and the Tribunal did not consider it for adopting the final decision. The cassation appellant does not indicate other elements of conviction regarding the number of affiliated associations it claims to have. It should be noted that in the response, regarding the argument of dissolution for remaining composed of a single association (T. D.), the Federation only indicates that it is not appropriate, since there is no \"legislative capacity\" […] \"the grounds for dissolution are exhaustively listed in Article 27 and Article 13 of the Law (sic) on Associations, and at no time did the legislator provide for an additional ground by way of interpretation,\" without having offered evidence to refute that assertion, as it was required to do according to precept 317.2 of the CPC. In this way, it did not deny the fact; it only contested the effect that the plaintiff sought to attribute. Thus, this Chamber agrees with the Tribunal in the sense that only the Association of T. D. remains as an associate of the Federation, and to that extent, the dissolution of the latter is appropriate, as concluded supra. For this reason, the grievance will be dismissed. In addition to the foregoing, it is not unknown that the reasons provided by the Trial Court for dissolving the Federation are imprecise and related to a defect from its constitution. But in the judge's view, that defect (namely, a single affiliated association) implies decreeing the extinction (not the invalidity). The Tribunal, even though it shared the factual findings of the Trial Court, specified that the Federation was composed of C. and La Asociación T. D., without specifying the error in the constitution. However, this does not affect the determination of the judges: the Federation only had one associate, since C. had resigned, which ultimately is the same reason the Trial Court found (although based on the formation, not the resignation). In any case, this argument of the second-instance judgment was not surprising for the defendant, as it alleges in this cassation phase. C. stated this from the complaint as a reason to support its claim; so much so that, in exercise of its right of defense, the Federation contested it when answering the complaint, and insisted with the same reasoning in the extraordinary appeal that is being heard.\"\n\nAs relevant to this case, pursuant to mandate 55 ibidem, for matters not expressly provided for in that body, reference is made to Law 218. In said legal norm, the incorporation of associations is provided for in precept 18, which requires the will of at least “*ten adults*”, who must appear in a public deed, or in a document recording the inaugural session. In addition, Article 30 provides for the possibility that two or more associations may constitute “special” associations, which are called “league”, “federation” or “union”. These latter, in turn, can form “confederal” associations. In both special forms of association, a legal entity (persona jurídica) distinct from the entities that agree to form them comes into being. The formalities for their incorporation are the same as those required for associations in the strict sense (canon 31). Now, in the case of sports associations, there is a similar norm: they are recognized as first-degree, that is, those composed of “*a maximum of ten persons*” (Article 51); or as second-degree, in which the concurrence of two or more first-degree associations is required for their creation (mandate 52). For purposes of the extinction of associations in general (and therefore, also of sports associations, since there is no special norm), mandate 13 of Law 218 states: “*The association is extinguished:* [.-] *a) When the number of eligible associates is less than that necessary to form the directive body.* [.-] *b) If it is dissolved by the authority upon verification of any of the grounds set forth in Article 27.* [.-] *c) Once the temporary or transitory purpose for which it was founded has been achieved, or if such achievement is legally or materially impossible. And* [.-] *d) By deprivation of its legal capacity as a consequence of a declaration of insolvency or bankruptcy (concurso); of a variation in the pursued purpose; of a change in its nature in its legal personality (personería jurídica), or for not having renewed the directive body within the year following the term set forth in the bylaws for its exercise.*” For its part, mandate 27 states “*The judicial authority shall be the only one competent to decree, before the expiration of the natural term, the dissolution of associations incorporated under this law, when requested by two-thirds or more of the associates or when the circumstances indicated in subsections a), c) and d) of Article 13 concur. Once dissolution is decreed, proceedings shall be conducted in the manner indicated in Article 14, and the Court shall communicate it to the Registry of Associations for the inscription of that circumstance.*” Finally, canon 34 establishes: “*They shall be considered unlawful associations and consequently their dissolution shall be decreed, when:* [.-] *1º.- Their leaders have been repeatedly warned by the Governorate that they are in the case of subsection 2º of the preceding article, without such requirements having been heeded.* [.-] *2º.- It appears that they engage in activities sanctioned by repressive laws or contrary to morality or good customs or are subversive.* [.-] *3º.- It appears that the association was formed to conceal purposes different from those stated in the bylaws.*” In what is relevant, mandate 33, second paragraph, subsection 2) and 23, refer to the allocation of funds to purposes different from those provided for and to unlawful acts, contrary to morality, good customs, or public order. From the relationship of the aforementioned norms, it follows that associations are extinguished in nine scenarios, namely, when: 1) the number of eligible associates is less than that necessary to form the directive body (fewer than five according to ordinal 10.1 ibidem); 2) the purpose for which it was constituted has been achieved or there is legal or material impossibility to achieve it; 3) legal capacity has been lost due to insolvency or bankruptcy (concurso); 4) the pursued purpose or its nature is modified; 5) the directive body has not been renewed within the year following the end of its term of office; 6) two-thirds or more of the associates so request; 7) its leaders have been repeatedly warned about the allocation of funds to purposes different from that established in the bylaws or about the performance of unlawful acts, contrary to morality, good customs, or public order; 8) it engages in activities sanctioned by repressive laws, contrary to morality and good customs, or subversive; and 9) it was formed to disguise or conceal purposes different from those stated in the bylaws. To this must be added the extinctive conditions that have been incorporated by the bylaws (subsection i) of ordinal 7 ejusdem). For their part, to **federations and confederations** (as well as to second-degree sports ones), in the absence of express regulation, and by parity of reasoning (as occurs with their formation according to Article 31 ibidem), the same causes of extinction of associations apply to them, insofar as they are compatible, of course. Due to the specific requirements for their incorporation, the lack of associates to form the directive body is not applicable, since these –as seen– are formed by the agreement of at least **two associations**. Being incorporated by that minimum (two associations), to maintain their validity, one could not require –without falling into a contradiction– at least five associates (the number required to form the directive body, and therefore, natural persons). Now, **for simple associations, as well as for federations and confederations** (and therefore, for second-degree sports ones), **regardless of the extinctive scenarios expressly provided for by Law 218, it is necessary to recognize an additional hypothesis**, which varies –as detailed below– with respect to the quantum of associates, depending on whether it involves the former or the latter. In every associative figure –as was explained–, the essential element is the union of different persons, whose purpose is to more easily achieve the ends upon which they voluntarily coincide. In this way, the plurality of subjects is consubstantial to any grouping of individuals or entities, to which the legal system attributes legal personality (personalidad). That is, its **creation and existence** is due to that plurality of persons (natural or legal), who attempt to jointly achieve a specific purpose. If the grouping of persons does not exist or disappears, there would be no justification for attributing or maintaining legal personality. One would be facing a natural or legal person (persona física o jurídica) who would individually seek to achieve the objective, in exercise of their capacity to act, without requiring a new entity to which rights and obligations are attributed. That reason (achieving a specific purpose) is what brings the subjects together; and by virtue of it, legal personality is attributed. **Without the concurrence, there is no reason to create a new, distinct entity; therefore, it is required for its creation, and hence, for its existence or validity**. This logical chain is legally excepted in commercial matters, first, in the figure of the sole proprietorship with limited liability (empresa de responsabilidad individual), and second, in the case of stock corporations (sociedades anónimas), in which, pursuant to precept 202 of the Commercial Code, ownership can be held by a single person. It goes without saying that in both cases of exception, the created fiction responds precisely to wealth-generating activity, which can certainly be carried out by a single individual, but whom it is convenient to give the possibility of abstracting his assets from the consequences that the development of the commercial activity could entail. Outside of the legal exceptions, **concurrence is the logical rule underlying every grouping or associative figure**. In this order of ideas, Law, in the case of a simple association, requires the minimum participation of 10 natural persons; in a second scenario, for federations (among them, second-degree sports ones), the concurrence of at least two simple associations. Finally, for confederations, that of two federations. **If, once incorporated, the plurality of subjects ceases, the entity must also cease**. In this line, as an initial thesis, in the case of simple associations, since the will of 10 individuals is required to form them, a decrease in that original minimum number of associates would logically result in the extinction of the legal entity (persona jurídica); however, the legislator limited the minimum of associates to five members, as can be inferred from subsection a) of Article 13. Consequently, if the associates are reduced to four or fewer, dissolution may be petitioned from the competent jurisdictional body. Stated otherwise, in the case of **simple associations** or “first-degree” ones, the legislator considered that the gathering of five subjects is sufficient to maintain the attribution of legal personality. **In the federative or confederative hypotheses**, the origin or creation occurs with the participation of at least two persons (legal entities). If for any reason one of them withdraws, and consequently, **the grouping of subjects does not subsist (it is reduced to a single one), the legal personality must be concluded, since the reason that gave rise to it – the union of the subjects – is eliminated**. Thus, even though Law 218 does not expressly provide for the extinction of federations and confederations due to the reduction of the number of associated subjects, by principle (which in turn finds support in subsection a) of Article 13), this effect must occur when a single person or association remains as an associate.\n\n**VII.-** Thus, the dissolution of a federative or confederative association is appropriate in cases where the entity has a single associate (regardless of the provisions of Article 27 in relation to the will of the associated persons, which is a different hypothesis). In the sub lite, such was the conclusion reached by the Court. In that line, and for the specific case, it endorsed the facts found by the Trial Court, among which it is contemplated that the Association, on November 28, 2005, notified the Board of Directors of the Federation that, by decision of its General Assembly, it was resigning its status as an associate. The Court also established that “*Particularly, the ‘Federación T.’ was composed of only two associations: ‘La Asociación T. D.’ and ‘Asociación C.’* […] *In the specific case, the Court considers that effectively the legal minimum for Federación T. corresponds to 2 first-order associations.* […] *The foregoing determines a legal impossibility of a Sports association with fewer than 10 associates. A similar approach must be applicable in the case of Federations, with the modification of reducing the described quantum to only 2 members –a number that corresponds to the incorporation and therefore, to the dissolution-. The described panorama presents harmony with respect to the examined legal framework: Law 218 on Associations, Law 7800 and its Regulation, where the possibility of the continuation of a Federation with a single member is not perceivable* […]”. It is precisely this determination that the Federation challenges in its appeal, which, besides arguing that said cause is inadmissible (which –as noted– is not acceptable), alleges that, in any case, there is evidence in the case file showing that it is composed of other associations. The Federation maintains that at folio 258 it is demonstrated that in addition to the two associations that originally constituted it, it is composed of four others distinct from C.. It is observed that said document is a photocopy issued by the Public Registry of the filed protocolization of the minutes of the Ordinary General Assembly of Associates of the Federation, held on November 17, 2006, and which was attached by C. as the basis for the request it filed so that the Registry be ordered to suspend the registration of documents, specifically any modification of bylaws or appointment of the Board of Directors (folio 262). This action was denied by the Trial Court in a resolution at 10:20 a.m. on May 29, 2007 (folio 264). In this way, the document is not evidence regarding the claim offered by the parties at the opportune procedural moments, nor was it admitted as a measure for better provision. It was presented by C. in order to support an atypical precautionary measure request, which was rejected. To that extent, the Trial Court and the Court did not consider it to adopt the final decision. The appellant does not indicate other elements of conviction regarding the number of affiliated associations it claims to have. Note that in the answer to the complaint, regarding the argument of dissolution due to remaining composed of a single association (T. D.), the Federation only indicates that it is not appropriate, as there is no “*legislative capacity*” […] “*the causes for dissolution are exhaustively listed in Article 27 and Article 13 of the law* (sic) *on Associations, and at no time did the legislator provide for an additional cause by way of interpretation*”, without having offered evidence to refute that assertion, as it was required to do according to precept 317.2 of the CPC. In that manner, it did not deny the fact; it only contested the effect that the plaintiff intended to attribute. Thus, this Chamber agrees with the Court in the sense that only the Association of T. D. remains as an associate of the Federation, and to that extent, the dissolution of the latter is appropriate, as was concluded supra. For this reason, the grievance will be dismissed. In addition to the foregoing, it is not unknown that the reasons provided by the Trial Court to dissolve the Federation are somewhat imprecise, and related to a defect since incorporation. But in the opinion of the adjudicator, that defect (namely, a single affiliated association) implies decreeing the extinction (not the invalidity). The Court, even though it shared the factual findings of the Trial Court, specified that the Federation was composed of C. and the Asociación T. D., without specifying the error in the incorporation. However, that does not affect the determination of the adjudicators: the Federation only had one associate, because C. had resigned, which is ultimately the same reason found by the Trial Court (although from the formation, not from the resignation). In any case, this argument of the second-instance judgment was not surprising for the defendant as it alleges in this cassation phase. C. presented it in the complaint as a ground to support its claim, so much so that, in exercise of its right of defense, the Federation contested it when answering the complaint, and insisted with the same reasoning in the extraordinary appeal under consideration.”" }