{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-146350",
  "citation": "Res. 00041-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Suspensión disciplinaria de funcionaria de la CNE por omisiones en coordinación con MINAE para construcción de puente",
  "title_en": "Disciplinary suspension of CNE official for omissions in coordinating with MINAE for bridge construction",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo confirma la sanción de 8 días de suspensión impuesta por la CGR a la Directora Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Emergencias (CNE). La funcionaria fue sancionada por omitir, entre octubre de 2005 y mayo de 2006, la coordinación con el MINAE para obtener la donación de un terreno y servidumbre necesarios para construir un puente sobre el río Puerto Viejo de Mortero en Sarapiquí, declarado de emergencia. El Tribunal rechaza los alegatos de prescripción y caducidad del procedimiento sancionatorio, determina que la competencia para esa coordinación le correspondía por su cargo y por delegación expresa de la Presidencia Ejecutiva, y que su inacción negligente atrasó la obra y violó el deber de probidad. Se analizan los plazos de prescripción en materia de Hacienda Pública (5 años), la interrupción con la notificación del auto de apertura, y la naturaleza ordenatoria del plazo de dos meses del procedimiento ordinario, cuya inobservancia no anula el acto final si no hay dilaciones irrazonables.",
  "summary_en": "The Administrative Court upholds the CGR's 8-day suspension of the National Emergency Commission (CNE) Executive Director. The official was sanctioned for failing, between October 2005 and May 2006, to coordinate with MINAE to obtain a land donation and easement required to build a bridge over the Puerto Viejo de Mortero River in Sarapiquí, which was under an emergency decree. The Court rejects arguments that the disciplinary proceeding was time-barred, finds that the coordination duty fell within her competence by position and express delegation, and rules that her negligent inaction delayed the construction and violated the duty of probity. The ruling examines the five-year statute of limitations for Public Finance matters, the interruption of that period by notification of the opening decision, and the non-peremptory nature of the two-month procedural deadline, which does not void the final act absent unreasonable delays.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI",
  "date": "2013",
  "year": "2013",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "deber de probidad",
    "caducidad del procedimiento",
    "Hacienda Pública",
    "Contraloría General de la República",
    "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
    "comparecencia oral y privada",
    "justicia pronta y cumplida",
    "Unidades Ejecutoras"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 3",
      "law": "Ley 8422"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 4",
      "law": "Ley 8422"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 110",
      "law": "Ley 8131"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 112",
      "law": "Ley 8131"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 71",
      "law": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "procedimiento administrativo",
    "sanción disciplinaria",
    "CGR",
    "CNE",
    "deber de probidad",
    "prescripción",
    "caducidad",
    "hacienda pública",
    "competencia",
    "coordinación interinstitucional",
    "emergencia"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "administrative procedure",
    "disciplinary sanction",
    "CGR",
    "CNE",
    "duty of probity",
    "statute of limitations",
    "lapse of proceedings",
    "public finance",
    "competence",
    "interagency coordination",
    "emergency"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "En este tercer nivel de análisis debe indicarse que la defensa de la accionante ha girado en torno a tres aspectos. Primero, sostiene que lo relativo al diseño y construcción del puente carecía de interés actual y existencia jurídica para los efectos que interesan, porque la Licitación EMER-035-05 había sido declarada infructuosa desde el 21 de setiembre de 2005 (esto es, antes de que recibiera el oficio PRE-1342-05). (...) Si estamos frente a situaciones de emergencias, las medidas que se adoptan no son, por regla general, las ordinarias previstas. Máxime cuando ella misma conocía (porque así lo manifestó expresamente) que la necesidad y emergencia seguían latentes y debía construirse el puente para garantizar los intereses públicos superiores (como la vida de las personas) que estaban en juego. (...) Al no haber adoptado ninguna acción positiva tendente a coordinar con el MINAE la donación de la franja de terreno, la servidumbre y los permisos necesarios, omitió el ejercicio de las potestades encomendadas e incumplió el Principio de Legalidad en su vertiente positiva lo que, como explicaremos luego, repercutió negativamente en la consecución del interés público que estaba obligada a proteger.",
  "excerpt_en": "In this third level of analysis, it should be noted that the plaintiff's defense has revolved around three aspects. First, she argues that the design and construction of the bridge lacked current interest and legal existence for the purposes at hand, because Tender EMER-035-05 had been declared unsuccessful on September 21, 2005 (i.e., before she received official memo PRE-1342-05). (...) If we are facing emergency situations, the measures adopted are not, as a general rule, the ordinary ones. Even more so when she herself knew (as she expressly stated) that the need and emergency remained latent and that the bridge had to be built to guarantee superior public interests (such as people's lives) that were at stake. (...) By not taking any positive action to coordinate with MINAE the donation of the land strip, the easement, and the necessary permits, she omitted to exercise the powers entrusted to her and breached the Principle of Legality in its positive aspect, which, as will be explained later, had a negative impact on the achievement of the public interest she was obliged to protect.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The lawsuit is dismissed and the CGR's 8-day suspension sanction is upheld.",
    "summary_es": "Se rechaza la demanda y se confirma la sanción de 8 días de suspensión impuesta por la CGR a la funcionaria."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "An unreasonable duration of the proceeding may lead to the nullity of what has been processed due to a violation of the principle of swift and complete justice (which this Court must also safeguard).",
      "quote_es": "Una duración irrazonable del procedimiento puede llevar a la nulidad de lo actuado por la lesión al principio de justicia pronta y cumplida (que este Tribunal también debe tutelar)."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "According to the doctrine of Canon 59 in relation to Canon 66, both of the LGAP, public powers are granted to be exercised.",
      "quote_es": "De la doctrina del canon 59 en relación al 66, ambos de la LGAP, las competencias públicas se otorgan para ser ejercitadas."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IX",
      "quote_en": "We find that the plaintiff did indeed breach the duty of probity because, from the analysis, it is clear that she did not direct her management toward the satisfaction of the public interest.",
      "quote_es": "Estimamos que la accionante sí incurrió en una falta al deber de probidad porque de lo analizado queda claro que no orientó su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-53738",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 8422  Art. 3"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-47258",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 8131  Art. 110"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-146350",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-21629",
      "norm_num": "7428",
      "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "07/09/1994"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-47258",
      "norm_num": "8131",
      "norm_name": "Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "18/09/2001"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-49185",
      "norm_num": "8292",
      "norm_name": "Ley General de Control Interno",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "31/07/2002"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-53738",
      "norm_num": "8422",
      "norm_name": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "06/10/2004"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“IV.- Sobre la\r\nprescripción del ejercicio de la potestad sancionadora en materia de Hacienda\r\nPública. La parte actora acusa una violación al principio de\r\nseguridad jurídica toda vez que el asunto fue resuelto fuera de los plazos\r\nlegales establecidos para resolver, sea, cuando había operado tanto la\r\ncaducidad como la prescripción del procedimiento. Pese a la deficiente técnica\r\nen que se plantea el cargo, entiende el Tribunal que, en rigor, refiere a dos\r\nvicios diferentes. Por una parte, la prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad\r\nsancionadora; por otra, la prescripción y caducidad del procedimiento\r\npropiamente dicho, y será en ese orden se procederá a su análisis. En relación\r\ncon la prescripción, debe indicarse que ésta supone la\r\nconcurrencia de tres elementos fundamentales: a) inercia del titular de un\r\nderecho en su ejercicio, b) transcurso del tiempo fijado por el ordenamiento\r\njurídico en esa inercia del titular y; c) alegación o excepción del sujeto\r\npasivo de la relación jurídica de hacer valer la prescripción. Ello\r\nsupone que no existe efecto liberatorio si pese a concurrir los dos primeros\r\npresupuestos, la articulación no se formula. Ello porque la prescripción\r\natiende a un principio rogatorio y a diferencia de la caducidad (en términos\r\nprocesales), no pueda ser considerada de oficio. En cuanto al ejercicio de la\r\npotestad sancionatoria, lo expuesto implica que el titular del derecho es el\r\njerarca administrativo o quien tiene la competencia para ejercer el referido\r\npoder-deber, mientras que el sujeto pasivo es el funcionario público, quien en\r\nesa medida, se encuentra sujeto a la potestad correctiva solo por el plazo que\r\nexpresamente fije la normativa aplicable; vencido el cual, emerge su facultad\r\nde requerir el reconocimiento de la pérdida de la potestad jerárquica. Desde\r\neste plano, no hay duda que se trata de una potestad correctiva que, por\r\ncriterio de seguridad jurídica, se encuentra sujeta a plazo prescriptivo. De\r\nmanera genérica, ese plazo se regula por el mandato 603 del Código de Trabajo,\r\nnorma que fija un plazo de un mes para el ejercicio de esa potestad represiva.\r\nSin embargo,ha de advertirse que se trata de una norma que cede frente a\r\nregulaciones particulares y especiales, que incorporan reglas diversas en\r\ncuanto a ese extremo. Es el caso, por ejemplo, que se presenta en menesteres de\r\nHacienda Pública, supuesto que aquí nos ocupa. Para este tipo de\r\nprocedimientos, el plazo aplicable es el regulado por las Leyes No. 8292\r\n(artículo 43), 8422 (artículo 44) y 8131 (artículo 112). Se trata de un sistema\r\nnormativo que se constituye como un ordenamiento sectorial que contiene reglas\r\nconcretas, que en tanto especiales, prevalecen sobre la normativa general. En\r\nlo medular, estas normas remiten al régimen previsto en el precepto 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General\r\nde la República, No. 7428. Esta última norma señala en lo medular: \"La\r\nresponsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones\r\nprevistas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización\r\nsuperiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: a) En los casos\r\nen que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco\r\naños, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. b) En los casos en que el\r\nhecho irregular no sea notorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere\r\nuna indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible\r\nirregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir\r\nde la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se\r\nponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio\r\nal procedimiento respectivo. (...)\". No\r\nexiste duda de que la accionante fue sometida a un procedimiento\r\nadministrativo sancionatorio de la Hacienda Pública. De\r\nahí que resulte evidente que en la especie, el plazo de prescripción aplicable,\r\nserá el de un cinco años regulado en las normas indicadas supra. Ahora bien, es\r\nclaro que el fenecimiento del plazo conferido para ejercer la potestad\r\ncorrectiva se encuentra sujeto a las causales de interrupción que fija tanto el\r\nordinal 876 del Código Civil o bien de las previstas por el precepto 977 del\r\nCódigo de Comercio. Cabe precisar, las causales de interrupción -que hacen que\r\nel plazo prescriptivo inicie de nuevo- solo pueden producir ese efecto en la\r\nmedida en que ocurran antes del vencimiento del plazo a interrumpir, pues aún\r\nocurridas, si lo es vencido el plazo, la simple alegación de prescripción\r\nnegativa lleva a la pérdida del ejercicio del derecho precluido por inercia en\r\nsu ejercicio. Con todo, debe entenderse que la interrupción no se produce con\r\nla simple apertura del procedimiento, sino con la debida comunicación del auto\r\nque tiene por instruida la causa, de conformidad con los ordinales 140, 239,\r\n240, 243 de la Ley General\r\nde la\r\n Administración Pública (en adelante LGAP). Ahora bien, en el\r\ncaso que se analiza tenemos que a la actora se le reclaman actuaciones\r\nnegligentes y omisiones relacionadas con el diseño y construcción del puente\r\nsobre el Río Puerto Viejo de Mortero en las que, presuntamente, incurrió a\r\npartir del 5 de octubre de 2005 y hasta el 11 de mayo de 2006. Es precisamente\r\na partir de estas fechas (en las que se reclaman las actuaciones u omisiones\r\nque atentan contra la\r\n Hacienda Pública) que deben computarse los cinco años que\r\naplican en esta materia. Luego, el acto de apertura de procedimiento se dictó a\r\nlas 13 horas 30 minutos del 8 de abril del 2010, fue notificado y ya para junio\r\nde ese año se había citado a comparecencia oral y pública. Conforme a lo\r\nexpuesto supra, la comunicación de ese auto de apertura genera un efecto\r\ninterruptor de la prescripción, lo que en este caso ha sucedido, siendo que al\r\nmomento de su notificación ( e incluso al realizarse la comparecencia), no\r\nhabían pasado los cinco años fijados para la expiración de la potestad\r\ncorrectiva (que se cumplían para octubre de 2010, cuando ya el asunto estaba\r\nresuelto en fase constitutiva). Desde ese plano, es evidente que al momento de\r\nla apertura del procedimiento no había operado la prescripción del ejercicio\r\ndel derecho de sancionar faltas en materia de Hacienda Pública por parte de la\r\nCGR, lo que supone el rechazo del vicio que se alega. Cabe agregar, además, que\r\nmientras el procedimiento administrativo se tramita, los diversos actos\r\ninternos que se emiten en su curso, producen un efecto igualmente interruptor\r\nen el plazo aludido, siempre que busquen la efectiva prosecución de la causa y\r\nno meras estratagemas formales para burlar los plazos que deben ser aplicables\r\nal procedimiento. Sin embargo, si el proceso ingresa en inercia o abandono\r\natribuible a la Administración por un plazo superior a seis meses, y ante\r\npetición expresa del funcionario encausado, se dispone la caducidad de ese\r\nprocedimiento, acorde al numeral 340 inciso 3) de la LGAP. Precisamente,\r\nes menester ingresar al análisis del elemento temporal en lo que respecta a la\r\ntramitación de ese procedimiento, pues parte de lo alegado es la prescripción y\r\ncaducidad de ese procedimiento por el estado de abandono al que fue expuesto,\r\ntema que de seguido se aborda. \n\r\n\r\n\nV.- Sobre la\r\nprescripción del procedimiento. Como se dijo,\r\nla accionante reclama la prescripción del procedimiento porque éste fue\r\nresuelto fuera de los plazos establecidos legalmente para tales efectos. En\r\ncuanto a ese particular, estimamos que tampoco lleva razón la actora. En efecto, el\r\nprincipio de justicia pronta y cumplida supone, para el caso de los\r\nprocedimientos administrativos, que deben ser resueltos, en tesis de principio,\r\npor acto final, dentro de plazos razonables y proporcionales, evitando someter\r\nal destinatario a causas infundadamente largas y tediosas. Constituye, por\r\nende, una expresión de la máxima de seguridad jurídica, en la medida en que\r\nexige la definición de la causa dentro del espacio temporal debido. La\r\ncomplejidad o no del procedimiento no podría justificar procedimientos arbitrariamente\r\nlargos, pues ello supondría cohonestar una potestad incontrolable de la\r\nAdministración para ejercitar, en cualquier tiempo y bajo su propio arbitrio,\r\nla potestad de resolver el conflicto, en mengua evidente de la aludida certeza\r\ny en clara lesión del debido proceso. En esa línea, el numeral 261 inciso 1) de\r\nla LGAP señala que \"El procedimiento administrativo deberá concluirse,\r\npor acto final, dentro de los dos meses posteriores a su iniciación o, en su\r\ncaso, posteriores a la presentación de la demanda o petición del administrado,\r\nsalvo disposición en contrario de esta ley.\" Ese mismo plazo fija el\r\ncanon 32 del CPCA. Ambas normas señalan, en lo medular, que vencidos los plazos\r\nseñalados sin que la Administración emita acto final, el destinatario podrá tener\r\npor rechazada la petición, mediante silencio negativo, a fin de interponer los\r\nrecursos administrativos o bien, acudir a la tutela jurisdiccional. Es claro\r\nque la figura del silencio negativo en la actualidad ostenta una orientación\r\ngarantista para el destinatario y no un privilegio administrativo como\r\nanteriormente se manejaba. Constituye la posibilidad de entender por rechazado\r\nel reclamo para poder acudir a otras instancias y no encontrarse sujeto a que\r\nla Administración emita acto formal. Con la noción solo facultativa del\r\nagotamiento de la vía administrativa, el silencio supone una garantía para el\r\nparticular, que le posibilita acudir a otros medios jurídicos para buscar la\r\ntutela de su situación jurídica, ya no como presupuesto para contar con un acto\r\npreleable, sino para suprimir la inercia administrativa en la definición de su\r\nrelación jurídica. Ahora bien, las potestades de imperio son imprescriptibles\r\n(artículo 66 inciso 1) de la LGAP), aspecto que justifica lo enunciado por el\r\ncanon 329 inciso 3) de la\r\n citada LGAP, en cuanto a que el acto dictado fuera de plazo\r\nserá válido para todo efecto legal, salvo mención expresa de ley. Constituye\r\nejemplo claro de esas excepciones el silencio positivo (sea, acto presunto\r\n-artículos 330 ejusdem en relación al 139-), caso en el cual, correctamente\r\ndeclarado o acaecido, opera la máxima de intangibilidad de actos propios, lo\r\nque implica la imposibilidad de la Administración de desconocer ese efecto, so\r\npena de nulidad absoluta por infracción del precepto 34 constitucional. En este\r\nejemplo de silencio positivo, es precisamente por un factor temporal que se\r\npierde la competencia para emitir el acto, que no para buscar las formas de\r\nsupresión del acto presunto. Dicho esto vale aclarar, pese a su redacción en lenguaje\r\nimperativo (propio de un método normativo prescriptivo), el plazo bimensual que\r\nfija el canon 261 inciso 2 de LGAP no es perentorio, sino solo ordenatorio, lo\r\nque se desprende de lo expuesto en cuanto al deber de la Administración de\r\nejercitar sus competencias y la validez inicial de los actos dictados fuera de\r\nplazo que propugna el numeral 329 ibídem. Tal postura puede verse además en el\r\nfallo No. 34-F-S1-2011 de la\r\n Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Esto aplica tanto para\r\nlos procedimientos instaurados de oficio como los de gestión de parte. En estos\r\núltimos, pese al ejercicio de la facultad de los efectos del silencio negativo,\r\nbien puede la Administración dictar el acto, el cual, ampliaría el debate en\r\nsede recursiva, sea administrativa o jurisdiccional. Desde este plano, ni la\r\npotestad instructora del procedimiento ni el procedimiento en si, se encuentran\r\nfenecidos si el plazo en cuestión ha sido superado. Si bien la estructura del\r\nprocedimiento ordinario haría presumir que el plazo de marras debe ser siempre\r\nrespetado, es claro que la complejidad de un asunto y las vicisitudes propias\r\ndel curso, lleven a plazos superiores. Lo determinante, entonces, estriba en\r\nque el procedimiento muestre señales de actividad y no dilaciones injustificadas,\r\nacorde al principio de celeridad e impulso procesal -numerales 222 y 225 de la\r\nLGAP-, de manera tal que su duración no sea producto de un proceder o inercia\r\narbitraria, porque ello es es sancionado con figuras como la caducidad\r\n-precepto 340 ibídem-, tema que se analizará infra. No obstante lo expuesto, la\r\nnaturaleza ordenatoria -que no perentoria- del plazo aludido, no dice de la\r\nnecesaria validez de actos dictados dentro de procedimientos cuya dilación\r\nsuperan el umbral normal de razonabilidad. En efecto, una duración irrazonable\r\ndel procedimiento puede llevar a la nulidad de lo actuado por la lesión al\r\nprincipio de justicia pronta y cumplida (que este Tribunal también debe\r\ntutelar). En esta línea puede observarse lo dicho en los precedentes números 2007-3140\r\ny 2007-6758, ambos del Tribunal Constitucional. En el primero, de manera\r\ncontundente se señaló: \"Ahora bien, desde el momento en que inicia un\r\nprocedimiento administrativo, hasta la emisión del acto final, debe mediar un\r\nplazo razonable y proporcionado, tomando en cuenta la actuación de las partes,\r\nla complejidad del asunto y los plazos legales establecidos para cada caso, de\r\ntal forma, que la Administración pueda contar con un plazo prudencial, pero sin\r\nincurrir en dilaciones indebidas que entraben el procedimiento… estima este\r\nTribunal, que el tiempo utilizado por el recurrido desde el momento en que se\r\ninició el procedimiento, a la fecha, lejos de ser justificable resulta\r\nexcesivo, irrazonable y en perjuicio de los derechos fundamentales del amparado,\r\npor el retardo injustificado en el que ha incurrido la administración\r\nrecurrida.” Ese fallo es citado por la Sala Primera en la sentencia No.\r\n34-2011 ya mencionada. Así, ha de reiterarse que no todo procedimiento que\r\ntarde más de dos meses supone la nulidad de lo actuado, sino solo en la medida\r\nque el plazo sea irrazonable, lo que ha de ser ponderado en cada caso,\r\natendiendo a la tramitación y complejidad de lo actuado. En esta causa, del\r\nanálisis del cuadro fáctico expuesto y que se ha tenido por probado, se observa\r\nque el procedimiento fue instruido con observancia de los principios de\r\nceleridad e impulso procesal de oficio, que rigen en estas lides, sin que se\r\nevidencien dilaciones que ameriten declarar nulidad alguna. Nótese que el acto de apertura se dictó el 8 de abril\r\ndel 2010 (y no en enero de ese año, como erradamente afirma la actora), la\r\ncomparecencia se llevó a cabo en junio y el acto final emitió en agosto de ese\r\nmismo año. Así, la fase constitutiva dura, aproximadamente, cuatro meses; plazo\r\nque se estima razonable (si se toma en cuenta el tipo de falta que se imputa y\r\nque involucra a varios funcionarios presuntamente responsables) y\r\nproporcionado, sin que se observen espacios de abandono que quebranten el\r\nprincipio de celeridad, concentración y tutela administrativa efectiva. \n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- Sobre la\r\ncaducidad del procedimiento. La demandante reclama, también, la\r\ncaducidad del procedimiento merced de su duración superior a los plazos\r\nreglados. La figura de la caducidad se encuentra regulada en el canon 340 de la\r\nLGAP, norma que fue reformada por el canon 200 inciso 10 del CPCA. Dicha norma\r\nindica: \"1) Cuando el procedimiento se paralice por más de seis meses\r\nen virtud de causa, imputable exclusivamente al interesado que lo haya promovido\r\no a la Administración que lo haya iniciado, de oficio o por denuncia, se\r\nproducirá la caducidad y se ordenará su archivo, a menos que se trate del caso\r\nprevisto en el párrafo final del artículo 339 de este Código (se refiere\r\na la misma LGAP\r\ny no al CPCA). 2) No procederá la caducidad del procedimiento iniciado a\r\ngestión de parte, cuando el interesado haya dejado de gestionar por haberse\r\noperado el silencio positivo o negativo, o cuando el expediente se encuentre\r\nlisto para dictar el acto final. 3) La caducidad del procedimiento\r\nadministrativo no extingue el derecho de las partes; pero los procedimientos se\r\ntienen por no seguidos, para los efectos de interrumpir la prescripción.\" El\r\nanálisis de la naturaleza de esta figura permite concluir que se trata de un\r\nhecho jurídico dentro del procedimiento que se justifica, como un medio de\r\nevitar la prolongación excesiva de los procedimientos, en aras de la seguridad\r\njurídica, así como en la necesidad de garantizar la continuidad y eficiencia de\r\nla actividad administrativa. Resulta inviable\r\ncuando el asunto se encuentre listo para el dictado del acto final. Para que\r\nopere, según lo establece la norma aludida, la caducidad requiere de varios\r\nelementos. En un primer término, que el asunto haya ingresado en un estado de\r\nabandono procesal, esto es, una inactividad. Segundo, que dicho estancamiento\r\nsea producto de causas imputables al administrado, cuando haya iniciado a\r\ngestión de parte, o bien de la Administración, si fue instaurado de oficio.\r\nTercero, que ese estado se haya mantenido por un espacio de, al menos, seis\r\nmeses. Esto último exige que la inercia sea de seis meses al menos, es decir,\r\nno se constituye como un plazo máximo para actuar, sino como límite temporal\r\nmínimo de inercia, ergo, debe computarse desde la última acción dentro del\r\nexpediente y no desde la apertura del procedimiento. Ello supone que en los\r\nprocedimientos sancionatorios, instruidos de oficio, la caducidad es factible\r\ncuando concurran dichos presupuestos. Sobre esta figura, recientemente, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia, en el fallo 34-F-S1-2011 señaló en lo medular sobre el instituto de\r\ncomentario: \"En primer término, se puede observar que la norma\r\nrecién transcrita se encuentra redactada en forma imperativa, es decir, no regula\r\nuna facultad; por el contrario, una vez cumplidos los presupuestos de hecho en\r\nella contenidos, la consecuencia deviene en obligatoria para el órgano\r\nencargado de la\r\n tramitación. Esto implica que sus efectos se producen de\r\npleno derecho, y por ende su reconocimiento tiene efectos meramente\r\ndeclarativos, no constitutivos. Vale aclarar que lo anterior no debe ser\r\ninterpretado como una pérdida de competencia –la cual es, por definición,\r\nirrenunciable, intransmisible e imprescriptible según el numeral 66 LGAP-,\r\nsino, únicamente, como la imposibilidad de continuar con la tramitación del\r\nprocedimiento específico en el que se produjo la inercia. \" Empero,\r\nlos efectos procedimentales de la caducidad requiere que se haya solicitado o\r\ndeclarado dentro del procedimiento, precisamente para ponerle fin. Ello\r\nconlleva a que la decisión administrativa dictada luego de una inercia de seis\r\nmeses atribuible con exclusividad a la Administración, cuando no se haya\r\nalegado o declarado la caducidad, sea totalmente válida. De la doctrina del\r\ncanon 59 en relación al 66, ambos de la LGAP, las competencias públicas se\r\notorgan para ser ejercitadas. Solo en los supuestos en que el legislador de\r\nmanera expresa disponga un fenecimiento de esa competencia por factores\r\ntemporales, el órgano público se encuentra imposibilitado de actuar. Ya\r\nexplicamos que, por regla general, las competencias\r\nno se extinguen por el transcurso del plazo señalado para ejercerlas. La\r\nexcepción a esta regla la contempla el mismo ordinal cuando indica que habrá\r\nuna limitación de la competencia por razón del tiempo cuando expresamente el\r\nlegislador disponga que su existencia o ejercicio esté sujeto condiciones o\r\ntérminos de extinción. En este sentido, insistimos que el precepto 329 ibídem\r\nseñala con toda contundencia que el acto dictado fuera de plazo es válido para\r\ntodo efecto legal, salvo disposición expresa de ley, lo que aquí no ocurre. La\r\ncaducidad es una forma anticipada de terminar el procedimiento y como tal, debe\r\ndecretarse para generar ese efecto de cierre. Por ende, mientras no se\r\ndisponga, o al menos, no se haya solicitado (pues de haberse requerido, la\r\nemisión de un acto final sin considerar si procede o no la caducidad sería\r\nnulo), no produce esa consecuencia procedimental. En el caso concreto, estima\r\nel Tribunal que no concurren los elementos que permiten declarar la caducidad\r\ndel procedimiento. Primero, la parte actora fundamenta el cargo en que el\r\nórgano director inició el procedimiento en enero de 2010 (lo cual no es cierto,\r\nya que como se indicó supra, el auto inicial dictado contra la actora es de\r\nabril de 2010) y lo concluye en agosto de ese año. No obstante, nunca se alegó\r\nla caducidad dentro de aquella fase constitutiva. Más bien, la defensa se\r\nplantea hasta la fase recursiva, esto es, cuando ya se dictó el acto final. Al\r\nno haberse alegado en la fase constitutiva del procedimiento (momento procesal\r\noportuno para tales efectos), el acto final, aunque dictado fuera del plazo, se\r\nreputa como válido, según lo dispone el artículo 329 de la LGAP. Máxime cuando\r\nla inactividad que alega la parte actora no refiere a la fase apelativa. En\r\ntodo caso, lo cierto es que de la revisión de las distintas fases e incidencias\r\ntampoco se observa que el procedimiento haya entrado un abandono o inactividad\r\nprocesal superior a seis meses. Por ende, ha de\r\nrechazarse la caducidad alegada.\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- Sobre los vicios del\r\nprocedimiento. En este punto la demandante acusa, en lo\r\nmedular, dos infracciones. Primero, cuestiona la naturaleza de la\r\ncomparecencia. Reclama que pese a que el procedimiento debía ser privado\r\ny confidencial, se le citó a una comparecencia oral y pública, la cual fue\r\nsiempre publicitada. Lo alegado debe ser rechazado. Como señalamos supra, \r\nsi bien estamos frente a un procedimiento administrativo sancionador al que\r\nresultan aplicables, por regla general, las disposiciones de la LGAP; lo cierto\r\nes en materia de Hacienda Pública algunas de esas norma ceden frente\r\na regulaciones particulares y especiales, que incorporan reglas diversas en\r\ncuanto a extremos específicos (por ejemplo, la prescripción de la potestad\r\nsancionadora, como ya explicamos). Lo relativo a la comparecencia tiene,\r\ntambién, en esta materia matices especiales. Es cierto que el artículo 309 de\r\nla LGAP establece que el procedimiento ordinario se llevará a cabo mediante una\r\ncomparecencia oral y privada con la Administración; pero esta norma cede ante\r\nlo dispuesto en el artículo 10 de la\r\n Ley No. 8422. Dicho numeral dispone con claridad que, por\r\nregla general, las comparecencias a que se refiere\r\nla LGAP en los procedimientos administrativos que se instruyan por infracciones\r\nal Régimen de Hacienda Pública, serán orales y públicas. Admite, eso sí, que el\r\nórgano director, en resolución fundada, pueda declararlas privadas por\r\nrazones de decoro y por derecho a la intimidad de las partes o de terceros,\r\ncuando estime que se entorpece la recopilación de evidencia o peligra un\r\nsecreto cuya revelación sea castigada penalmente. Así, en el caso concreto no\r\nse observa infracción alguna en el hecho que se le hubiera citado a una\r\ncomparecencia pública (y no privada), porque así lo dispone (como regla general) la normativa especial\r\nvigente para infracciones a la Hacienda Pública. Luego,\r\nse reclama que al procedimiento se le haya dado una cobertura en medios de\r\ncomunicación. En este punto, insistimos que estamos frente a causas que se siguen\r\npor infracciones a la\r\n Hacienda Pública. Por ende, no es de extrañar que, en algunos\r\ncasos, los medios de comunicación den cobertura a estos eventos por los\r\nintereses públicos que involucran. Aunado a lo anterior, cabe destacar que los\r\nrecortes periodísticos que aporta, informan sobre la sanción cuando ya ésta ha\r\nsido impuesta (folios 243 y 244 del expediente judicial), por lo que no\r\nse observa la infracción alguna a la confidencialidad que deben guardar algunas\r\nfases (que no la comparecencia), siendo que una vez notificada la resolución\r\nfinal, se trataba de información pública a la que bien podía tener acceso la\r\nprensa. Tampoco se demuestra que el sindicato de la CNE tuviera\r\nconocimiento de la sanción antes de que se le hubiera notificado a la accionante. La\r\núnica nota del sindicato que se trae al proceso es la que consta a folio 245 y\r\n246 del expediente judicial; no obstante no permiten llegar a aquella\r\nconclusión en tanto refiere a otros temas y además se suscribe el primero de\r\nnoviembre de 2010, esto es, cuando ya el acto final había sido dictado e\r\nincluso se habían presentado los recursos en su contra. Así, el dicho de la\r\nactora no se acompaña (como\r\ncorresponde) de probanzas suficientes que permitian acreditarlo, no pasando de\r\nser simples manifestaciones subjetivas sin sustento alguno. Por otra\r\nparte, se alega violación al debido proceso. No obstante, como afirman los\r\naccionados, la actora no especifica ni detalla con claridad en qué consisten\r\nesas infracciones. En rigor, no se observa que se hayan omitido formalidades\r\nsustanciales del\r\nprocedimiento, cuya realización correcta hubiese cambiado la decisión final o\r\nque le hubiese causado indefensión. A la actora se le notificó acerca\r\ndel carácter y fines del procedimiento, con una intimación e imputación de los\r\nhechos así como la indicación de la posible sanción a aplicar; se le garantizó\r\nel derecho de audiencia, interviniendo en el proceso, fue oída y tuvo\r\noportunidad para presentar los argumentos y producir las pruebas que estimaba\r\npertinentes; se le brindó la oportunidad para preparar su alegación teniendo\r\nacceso a la información y a los antecedentes administrativos vinculados con el\r\ncaso. También se le garantizó el derecho a una defensa técnica y se hizo\r\nrepresentar y asesorar por los abogados y técnicos de su elección. Finalmente,\r\nse le notificó la decisión final que se dictó, con la expresión de los motivos\r\nen que ésta se fundamentó y tuvo derecho a recurrirla (al igual que pudo\r\nimpugnar actos preparatorios que contaban con recursos ordinarios) así como pudo presentar las\r\nincidencias que estimó necesarias para su defensa. Desde esta perspectiva, el\r\nTribunal no encuentra que se haya violado el debido proceso durante el\r\nprocedimiento, razón por la cual se ingresa al examen de las alegaciones de\r\nfondo que, contra el acto final, formula la actora. \n\r\n\r\n\n VIII.-\r\nSobre el examen de validez de la conducta formal impugnada. Son varias\r\nlas infracciones de fondo que se le endilgan a la decisión sancionatoria\r\nadoptada por la CGR contra la accionante. Como\r\nprimer aspecto, se cuestiona el elemento temporal en cual se enmarcan\r\nlos hechos que dan pie a la sanción. La actora alega que ella no estaba\r\nnombrada en la CNE durante el período señalado en los cargos que se le\r\nimputaron, específicamente en el lapso final, sea desde el 11 de mayo de 2006.\r\nPor ello, dice, no se le podían imputar ni sancionar por esos hechos. Tanto el\r\nEstado como la\r\nCGR difieren de esa posición y manifiesta que la conducta negligente que se le\r\nimputó a la actora, lo fue mientras ella estaba nombrada en su puesto. Pues\r\nbien, en este proceso se acreditó que la señora Rosales\r\nArdón fue nombrada en el puesto de Directora Ejecutiva de la CNE y se desempeñó\r\ncomo tal a partir del\r\nprimero de abril del\r\n2005 y hasta el 11 de mayo de 2006. Luego, se tiene que el acto de apertura de\r\nprocedimiento le imputa \"(...) a) Presuntamente, por haber faltado al\r\ndeber de diligencia, debido a que desde el 3 de octubre de 2005 sabía de\r\nla necesidad de coordinar con el MINAE la donación de la franja de terreno y de\r\nla servidumbre, lo cual era primordial para poder construir el puente en\r\nMortero, pero aparentemente no realizó gestión alguna hasta el 24 de mayo de\r\n2006, fecha en que finalizó su labor como Directora Ejecutiva de la CNE, es\r\ndecir por un plazo de 6 meses y 22 días calendario. b) Presuntamente por\r\natrasar el proceso de construcción del puente en Mortero dado que los permisos\r\ny la ubicación del puente se pudieron haber definido en plazos mucho menores si\r\nse hubiera realizado una gestión más ágil y como al girar la orden de\r\ninicio no se disponía de tales permisos el proyecto sufrió un retraso de 3\r\nmeses 21 días calendarios (desde el 10 de julio de 2006 (hecho11 ) hasta\r\nel primero de noviembre de 2006 (hecho 16)) (...)\". De la literalidad\r\ndel primer cargo imputado se desprende que, en efecto, la omisión que se\r\nle endilga a la actora se delimita hasta el 24 de mayo de 2006, pese a que ella\r\nhabía dejado de laborar como Directora Ejecutiva de la CNE desde el 11 de mayo\r\nde ese año. No obstante, estima el Tribunal que esa inconsistencia (en la fecha\r\nde cese) no es capaz de generar nulidad de lo actuado por las siguientes\r\nrazones. El cuadro fáctico que se plantea en el auto de apertura (y que\r\nsirve de sustento a la intimación) refiere al oficio PRE-1342-05, de 3 de\r\noctubre de 2005, mediante el cual la Presidencia de la CNE remitió\r\ncorrespondencia a la accionante y le giró instrucciones para que lleve a cabo\r\nconductas activas referidas a la necesaria donación de un terreno para\r\nconstruir un puente; y se reclama que haya concluido sus funciones en la CNE\r\nsin haber cumplido con lo que ahí se establecía. Por ende, al margen de la\r\naparente confusión o error respecto de la fecha de cese en que incurre el\r\nacto inicial del procedimiento, de su lectura integral queda claro que se\r\nreclama una omisión en cumplimiento de algunas de sus funciones específicas\r\ncomo Directora Ejecutiva de la CNE durante el período comprendido entre el 3 de\r\noctubre de 2005 hasta el día que ella cesa en sus funciones, lo que en definitiva\r\nsucedió el 11 de mayo de 2006. Luego, el acto impugnado la sanciona, entre\r\notros, por la omisión de los deberes a su cargo al no haber efectuado gestión\r\nalguna tendente a asegurar el cumplimiento de la labor encomendada en el oficio\r\nPRE-1342-05 citado, mientras fungió como Directora Ejecutiva de la CNE. Así, se\r\nle sanciona por la omisión de los deberes a su cargo mientras, claro\r\nestá, ejercía funciones en la CNE. Por ende, no es cierto que se le hayan\r\nimputado o se le haya sancionado por hechos u omisiones que ocurrieran cuando\r\nella no ejercía las funciones en comentario. Reiteramos que ese error material\r\n(y es solo eso porque el auto inicial también delimita claramente el cargo al\r\nmomento del cese de funciones) no constituye una omisión que, de conformidad\r\ncon el artículo 223 de la LGAP suponga la nulidad de lo actuado. En lo que\r\nrefiere al segundo cargo, tampoco se observa que se imputen hechos originados\r\nluego del cese del la accionante. Nótese que, en lo\r\nmedular, se le imputa atrasar el proceso de construcción del\r\npuente en Mortero, por no haber efectuado una gestión más ágil en \r\naspectos referidos con los permisos y la ubicación del puente. No es cierto que se impute\r\nhaber dictado la orden de inicio de la ejecución del\r\nproyecto, como\r\nparece entenderlo la accionante; sino solo que con su conducta omisiva al\r\nmomento de dictar esa orden de inicio no se contaba con los requerimientos\r\nnecesarios y ello ocasionó un atraso en la ejecución de la obra. Luego, el acto\r\nfinal valora ese aspecto dentro de espacio de tiempo en que la demandante\r\nfungía como\r\ndirectora de la CNE. Ahora bien, si lo que se reclama es que tanto el acto\r\ninicial como final refieran a eventos acaecidos con anterioridad o\r\nposterioridad al período en que la accionante ocupó el puesto en cuestión, lo\r\ncierto es que éstos constituyen simples referencias fácticas que permiten\r\nsituar y entender los antecedentes, así como las consecuencias de los hechos\r\nque se imputan. Pero de ninguna manera significa que se esté imputando\r\ndirectamente a ella la realización u omisión de aquellos. Insistimos que la\r\nimputación que se efectuó a la demandante fue respecto de dos hechos claramente\r\ndeterminados en el auto inicial y fue sobre éstos que, finalmente, se le\r\nsancionó. Por las razones expuestas, no se observa el vicio alegado en\r\ntanto los hechos y omisiones que se le imputaron y por los que se le sancionó\r\nacaecieron mientras ella fue Directora Ejecutiva de la CNE. Segundo,\r\nse cuestiona quien era el competente para realizar las funciones por cuya\r\nomisión se sanciona a la accionante. En su tesis, a ella no le es imputable la\r\nresponsabilidad que le endilga el órgano contralor porque no le correspondía\r\nrealizar los supuestos actos y omisiones por los que se le sancionó. Afirma que\r\naquellos eran responsabilidad de las Unidades Ejecutoras, quienes debían\r\ndesignar al encargado del proyecto, reunirse\r\ncon él, coordinar y definir el plan de trabajo así como\r\nla forma en que se presentarían los informes periódicos y el procedimiento para\r\nla ejecución del\r\ncontrato. Igualmente, correspondía al encargado del proyecto (y no a\r\nella) emitir la orden de inicio. Fundamenta sus argumentos en lo\r\ndispuesto en el Reglamento de Unidades Ejecutoras, publicado en La Gaceta 172\r\ndel 3 de setiembre de 2009. Reitera que ella no formaba parte de la Unidad\r\nEjecutora y en ese tanto no le alcanzaba la responsabilidad que pretende\r\nachacársele. Por su parte, el Estado manifiesta que la obligación que aquí se\r\nanaliza fue encomendada a la accionante atendiendo a su cargo de Directora\r\nEjecutiva de la CNE, la cual debía de cumplir de manera exclusiva y excluyente.\r\nAfirma que la función no le correspondía a las Unidades Ejecutoras porque éstas\r\nson nombradas para la administración de obras y proyectos por ellos financiados\r\ny en ese tanto se encargan de aspectos técnicos de la ejecución de\r\nproyectos y están compelidas a acatar las directrices de la CNE . Destaca\r\nque la coordinación, objeto de este litigio, era resorte exclusivo de la\r\naccionante por su condición de Directora Ejecutiva. Cita, como sustento, los\r\nartículos 6 y 8 de la Ley Nacional de Emergencias, vigente al momento de los\r\nhechos investigados. Finalmente, la CGR manifiesta que los argumentos de la\r\nactora sobre este punto son carentes de seriedad porque se fundamentan en un\r\nreglamento que no estaba vigente al momento de los hechos. Agrega que, de una\r\nlectura del Manual de funciones y procesos de la Contraloría de Unidades\r\nEjecutoras de la CNE, publicado en La Gaceta del primero de junio de 2001 se\r\ndesprende con claridad que las funciones y objetivos de esas unidades atienden\r\na funciones que se despliegan a lo interno de la CNE. Por ende, los\r\nincumplimientos por los que sanciona no son temas ajenos a la Dirección\r\nEjecutiva, porque en todo caso esa era la instancia superior jerárquica, por lo\r\nque incumbe un mayor grado de responsabilidad. Analizado el punto, debe\r\nseñalarse lo siguiente. En la especie, es fundamental tener presente que las\r\nfunciones o deberes que se estiman incumplidos y por los que se sanciona a la\r\ndemandante consisten en haber omitido la debida coordinación con el MINAET para\r\nla donación de un franja de terreno y una servidumbre, a sabiendas de la\r\nnecesidad en virtud de que era primordial para poder construir el puente en\r\nMortero, y haber atrasado el proceso de construcción del referido puente dado\r\nque los permisos y la ubicación del puente se pudieron haber definido en plazos\r\nmucho menores si se hubiera realizado una gestión más ágil ya que, como al\r\ngirar la orden de inicio no se disponía de tales permisos, el proyecto sufrió\r\nun retraso de 3 meses 21 días calendario. Teniendo claro este punto ha de\r\ndefinirse quien era el competente para realizar las conductas debidas que se\r\nomitieron. De inicio, debe descartarse la posibilidad de recurrir al Reglamento\r\nde Unidades Ejecutoras para resolver este tema. Como afirman los representantes\r\nde la CGR, se trata de una norma que se adoptó el 24 de agosto de 2009 y fue\r\npublicada en La Gaceta del 3 de setiembre de ese mismo año. Por ende, estamos\r\nfrente a normativa que no resulta aplicable porque no estaba vigente al momento\r\nen que acaecieron los hechos por los que, en definitiva, se sancionó a la\r\nactora, y que ocurrieron entre el año 2005 y 2006. Habrá, entonces, que revisar\r\nel ordenamiento jurídico vigente en esos años para determinar a quien se le atribuía\r\nlas potestades y funciones cuya omisión aquí se reclama. Para ese entonces,\r\nestaba vigente a Ley No. 7914, de 28 de setiembre de 1999 (que estuvo vigente\r\nhasta 22 de noviembre de 2005), la que en su artículo 18 establecía que la\r\nDirección Ejecutiva estaría compuesta por un Director, quien sería el\r\nresponsable de la administración operativa de la Institución; se desempeñaría\r\ncomo funcionario de régimen laboral de confianza, de libre nombramiento y\r\nremoción por la Junta Directiva y que estaría subordinado a las directrices de\r\nla Junta y la Presidencia de la Comisión. Asimismo, se señalan sus\r\natribuciones, dentro de las que interesa mencionar las siguientes: cumplir los\r\nacuerdos de la Junta Directiva, así como las decisiones, tareas o\r\nresponsabilidades que, producto de la delegación, le asignare la Presidencia de\r\nla institución, velar porque las dependencias o unidades administrativas de la\r\nComisión cumplieran sus funciones con la mayor eficiencia, eficacia y economía,\r\ndentro del uso más adecuado y racional de los recursos, según las directrices\r\nde la Junta Directiva y la Presidencia de la institución, ejecutar las medidas\r\nrequeridas que se constituyan, de la manera más efectiva, en respuestas\r\ninmediatas, adecuadas y oportunas a situaciones o estados de necesidad y\r\nurgencia, conforme a las directrices de la Junta Directiva y la Presidencia de\r\nla institución. Posteriormente, con la Ley No. 8488, de 22 de noviembre de 2005\r\nse mantiene la Dirección Ejecutiva como responsable de la administración de la\r\ninstitución, advirtiendo el artículo 20, nuevamente, sobre la subordinación a\r\nla directrices de la Junta Directiva y a las de la Presidencia de la Comisión,\r\nasí como la obligación de rendir cuentas por sus actuaciones. La misma\r\nnorma le atribuye, entre otras, las siguientes funciones: programar y\r\ncoordinar las actividades de la Comisión con las demás instituciones públicas y\r\nprivadas, para cumplir las políticas y alcanzar los objetivos de la\r\ninstitución, dentro de los lineamientos emitidos por el Poder Ejecutivo, ser\r\nresponsable de la administración general de la Comisión, por lo que tendrá a\r\ncargo los programas de la Institución y deberá velar porque las dependencias o\r\nunidades administrativas cumplan sus funciones con la mayor eficiencia,\r\neficacia y economía, dentro del uso más adecuado y racional de los recursos,\r\nsegún las directrices de la Junta Directiva y la Presidencia de la Institución,\r\nconducir y ejecutar las acciones institucionales orientadas a la articulación\r\ndel Sistema Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo, bajo las directrices de la Junta\r\nDirectiva y la Presidencia, así como cualquier otra responsabilidad que le\r\nasignaran la Junta Directiva y la Presidencia y que sea acorde con el nivel de\r\natribuciones que ostenta en razón de su cargo. Ahora bien, teniendo presente\r\neste panorama, debe indicarse que en este proceso se tuvo por acreditado que\r\nmediante acuerdo 0102004, adoptado por la Junta Directiva de la CNE en la\r\nsesión ordinaria No. 1-04, del 12 de febrero de 2004, se aprobó el Plan de\r\nInversión del MOPT y del SENARA, presentado para la atención de la emergencia\r\ndel Decreto No. 31540-MP-MOPT. En dicho acuerdo se incluyó el proyecto referido\r\na \"Puentes sobre el Río Mortero\" (folios 1 al 20 del\r\nexpediente administrativo digital aportado por la CGR ) . En\r\nese marco, mediante oficio PRE-1104-05, de 16 de agosto de 2005, el Presidente\r\nde la CNE solicitó al Ministro de Ambiente y Energía su colaboración para que\r\nesa dependencia autorizara la donación de una franja de terreno y autorizara el\r\nuso de la servidumbre que atraviesa la Oficina Subregional de ese Ministerio en\r\nel cantón de Sarapiquí. Lo anterior a efectos de construir el puente sobre el\r\nRío Puerto Viejo de Mortero. Advirtió la necesidad de esa donación para no\r\natrasar la ejecución de la obra e indicó las siguientes coordenadas geográficas\r\ndel sitio donde se construiría el puente: 539.200 (ESTE)-263.300 (NORTE) y\r\nadjuntó el plano correspondiente (folio 29 y 30 del expediente\r\nadministrativo digital aportado por la CGR ) . Luego,\r\nen oficio SD-08, de 23 de setiembre de 2005, la Subdirectora del Área de\r\nConservación Cordillera Volcánica Central del MINAE le comunicó al presidente\r\nde la CNE, en lo que interesa, sus dudas respecto de la donación requerida y el\r\nuso de la servidumbre, advirtiéndole que requerían más datos para iniciar los\r\ntrámites correspondientes (folios 31 y 32 del expediente administrativo\r\ndigital aportado por la CGR ) . Finalmente, mediante oficio\r\nPRE-1342-05, de 3 de octubre de 2005, el presidente de la CNE remitió a la\r\naccionante y al Jefe de la Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras de esa entidad\r\ncopia del oficio SD-08 citado para que lo analizaran y \"(...)\r\nresolvieran con el Viceministro Allan Flores o don Carlos Manuel, ambos del\r\nMINAE (...)\"(folios 70 al 73 del expediente administrativo digital\r\naportado por la CGR ) . De lo expuesto, es claro para el\r\nTribunal que el Presidente de la CNE delegó y asignó a la accionante una tarea\r\nespecífica, que se correspondía con labores de coordinación y que era\r\nindispensable para que otras unidades administrativas (entre ellas, la Unidad\r\nEjecutora) cumplieran sus funciones con la mayor eficiencia, eficacia y\r\neconomía, dentro del uso más adecuado y racional de los recursos, a efectos de\r\natender debidamente la emergencia referida a la construcción del puente sobre el\r\nRío Puerto Viejo de Mortero. Se trataba, además, de una coordinación con otra\r\ninstitución pública (MINAE) requerida para poder cumplir con el Decreto de\r\nEmergencia ya indicado y para poder ejecutar la construcción del puente en\r\ncuestión. Así, la coordinación con el MINAE para conseguir la donación del\r\nterreno y la servidumbre requeridos para la construcción sobre el referido\r\npuente era un deber a cargo de la actora, en su condición de Directora\r\nEjecutiva; ello no solo porque forma parte de las potestades que las normas\r\ncitadas le atribuyen, sino además porque es tarea le fue delegada o asignada\r\npor el Presidente de la CNE, y a su cumplimiento estaba subordinada, según se\r\ndesprende de las normas citadas. A diferencia de lo que expone la demandante,\r\nlas funciones atribuidas a las Unidades Ejecutoras (o su Contraloría) son\r\npropias de la ejecución del proyecto y no de la coordinación previa con otras\r\ninstituciones externas a la CNE. Reiteramos que no resulta aplicable a este\r\nsupuesto el Reglamento Unidades Ejecutoras porque esa norma no existía al\r\nmomento de los hechos que aquí se discuten. A lo sumo, podría tomarse en cuenta\r\nel Acuerdo 520-2001, dictado por la Junta Directiva de la CNE el 21 de febrero\r\nde 2001, donde se regulan las funciones y procesos de la Contraloría de\r\nUnidades Ejecutoras de la CNE, teniendo presente, eso sí, que se trata de\r\nuna norma infralegal que no podría modificar las atribuciones legales que se\r\natribuyeron a la Dirección Ejecutiva de la CNE. Aunado a lo anterior, de\r\nla revisión del acuerdo se concluye que la Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras\r\ncontrola y fiscaliza a los responsables de la ejecución de los proyectos, sin\r\nque lleve a cabo labores de coordinación que, reiteramos, son propias de la\r\nDirección Ejecutiva. Nótese que la única función que se le atribuye en ese\r\nsentido es la coordinación con los responsables de las Unidades Ejecutoras, de\r\naspectos como la visita de preoferta, procesos licitatorios, trámite de pagos,\r\nsolicitudes de compras, inspecciones de proyecto e informes de avance; y \r\nque no tienen nada que ver con deberes incumplidos que se imputan a la\r\ndemandante y que, insistimos, son previos a la ejecución de la obra y deben\r\ncoordinarse con jerarcas de otros órganos y entes estatales. Por lo expuesto,\r\nno encuentra el Tribunal que la resolución impugnada sea violatoria del\r\nPrincipio de Legalidad o de la debida seguridad jurídica, toda vez que\r\nreiteramos, los deberes sobre los que se acusa incumplimiento por parte de la\r\nactora, sí estaban dentro del marco de su competencia. Teniendo claro,\r\nentonces, que los hechos, deberes y omisiones que se reprochan lo fueron dentro\r\ndel tiempo en que la accionante fue Directora Ejecutiva de la CNE y que versan\r\nsobre aspectos propios de su competencia corresponde, ahora, conocer los\r\nargumentos que se ofrecen respecto del cumplimiento o no de aquellos\r\npropiamente. Lo anterior a efectos de poder determinar si existen o no vicios\r\nde legalidad en la sanción impuesta. \n\r\n\r\n\nIX.- En este tercer nivel de análisis\r\ndebe indicarse que la defensa de la accionante ha girado en torno a tres\r\naspectos. Primero, sostiene que lo relativo al diseño y construcción del\r\npuente carecía de interés actual y existencia jurídica para los efectos que\r\ninteresan, porque la Licitación EMER-035-05 había sido declarada infructuosa\r\ndesde el 21 de setiembre de 2005 (esto es, antes de que recibiera el oficio\r\nPRE-1342-05). En tal escenario, sostiene, no era apegado al Principio de\r\nLegalidad que ella realizara gestión alguna relativa a tal licitación, máxime\r\ncuando se trató de un período de intensa actividad en cuanto emergencia, según\r\nlo tuvo por acreditado la propia CGR. El Estado manifiesta que conforme al\r\nartículo 15 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, la\r\ndeclaratoria de infructuosidad conlleva únicamente el inicio de un nuevo\r\nprocedimiento contractual, sin que suponga la paralización de las acciones\r\nnecesarias para recabar los elementos previos requeridos antes del inicio de la\r\nobra. Por su parte, la CGR sostiene que lo ocurrido en el proceso de\r\ncontratación no afecta ni tienen incidencia alguna con las omisiones en\r\nque incurrió la actora. Agrega que esa falta al deber de diligencia se hace\r\nevidente en el momento en que la empresa adjudicataria inicia la construcción\r\nde la obra, lo que permite establecer que no existe relación alguna entre las\r\nvicisitudes de los procedimientos de contratación y los incumplimientos de la\r\nseñora Rosales Ardón. Para resolver el punto, estimamos necesario establecer\r\nque aquí se ha acreditado la existencia de un Decreto de Emergencia que\r\nestableció, como una necesidad a solventar, la construcción de un puente sobre\r\nel Río Puerto Viejo de Mortero, dotándose para ello a la CNE del\r\npresupuesto respectivo. También, que desde el mes de febrero del 2005, la\r\nDirectora del Departamento de Diseño de Puentes del MOPT recomendó el sitio\r\nidentificado como 1 (plano P-747-B), para la construcción de un puente colgante\r\nde 117 metros sobre el Río Puerto Viejo para la comunidad de Mortero, en\r\nHorquetas de Sarapiquí, ubicado en las inmediaciones de un camino público\r\nexistente anteriormente frente a las instalaciones del Ministerio de Ambiente,\r\nEnergía y Telecomunicaciones. Lo anterior por ser técnicamente el sitio más\r\nseguro y de menor costo de intervención en la solución combinada de puente con\r\ncamino nuevo (se infiere de los folios 43 al 46 del expediente\r\nadministrativo digital aportado por la CGR ) . Si bien la\r\naccionante Rosales Ardón fue nombrada en el puesto de Directora Ejecutiva de la\r\nCNE a partir del primero de abril del 2005, no cabe duda que como parte de sus\r\nresponsabilidades debió informarse de cuales eran las emergencias que, para ese\r\nentonces, requerían pronta atención y tenían asignado un presupuesto para ello.\r\nY así lo fue en tanto que mediante oficio CUE-699-GM 2005, de 7 de junio de 2005,\r\nel Jefe de la Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras de la CNE solicitó a la\r\naccionante que elevara ante la Junta Directiva de la CNE una solicitud para\r\ncomplementar presupuestariamente la obra correspondiente al diseño y\r\nconstrucción del puente sobre el Río Puerto Viejo (folios 22 al 24 del\r\nexpediente administrativo digital aportado por la CGR ) . Ahora\r\nbien, es cierto que el 21 de setiembre de 2005, la Licitación Restringida No.\r\nEMER-35-2005, correspondiente al \"Diseño y Construcción del Puente sobre\r\nel Río Puerto Viejo en Mortero\" fue declarada infructuosa; pero también lo\r\nes que ese mismo día la accionante comunicó a la Proveeduría de la CNE no\r\nsolo la declaratoria de infructuosidad en cuestión, sino que además advirtió\r\nque por la importancia de la obra y los retrasos en el proceso de contratación\r\nera necesario que se promoviera de nuevo el concurso a la mayor brevedad\r\nposible (folios 158 del expediente administrativo de la Licitación\r\nRestringida No. EMER-35-2005, correspondiente al \"Diseño y Construcción del\r\nPuente sobre el Río Puerto Viejo en Mortero). Entonces, sí existía una\r\nemergencia constatada (porque se incluyó en el Decreto respectivo) y el\r\npresupuesto para solventarla, tanto así que la propia actora manifestó la\r\nnecesidad de promover de nuevo el concurso, como en efecto sucedió. \r\nPor ello, resultan del todo improcedentes los argumentos de la demandante en el\r\nsentido la ley no la obligaba a sacar de nuevo a licitación el objeto\r\ninfructuoso y ni le fijaba un plazo específico para ello. Si estamos frente a\r\nsituaciones de emergencias, las medidas que se adoptan no son, por regla\r\ngeneral, las ordinarias previstas. Máxime cuando ella misma conocía (porque así\r\nlo manifestó expresamente) que la necesidad y emergencia seguían latentes y\r\ndebía construirse el puente para garantizar los intereses públicos superiores\r\n(como la vida de las personas) que estaban en juego. Por eso, no encuentra el\r\nTribunal que pueda justificarse el no haberle dado la atención y gestión\r\ncorrespondiente al oficio PRE-1342-05, bajo el argumento de la declaratoria de\r\ninfructuosidad. No existe un solo elemento que permita, siquiera, dudar sobre\r\nla decisión de la CNE de sacar, nuevamente, la construcción del puente a\r\nlicitación. Más bien, se acredita que siempre se tuvo claro que sí era necesario.\r\nPor ende, la demandante debía cumplir con las labores asignadas en procura de\r\nuna atención eficiente y oportuna de la emergencia en cuestión. Al no haber\r\nadoptado ninguna acción positiva tendente a coordinar con el MINAE la donación\r\nde la franja de terreno, la servidumbre y los permisos necesarios, omitió el\r\nejercicio de las potestades encomendadas e incumplió el Principio de Legalidad\r\nen su vertiente positiva lo que, como explicaremos luego, repercutió\r\nnegativamente en la consecución del interés público que estaba obligada a\r\nproteger. Una conducta diligente hubiese llevado a ir gestionando la labor\r\nencomendada por la Presidencia Ejecutiva (a la que, en todo caso, estaba\r\nsubordinada) de modo tal que al momento en que se abriera la nueva contratación\r\ny se adjudicara ésta, ya se hubiese donado el terreno sobre el cual debía\r\ntécnicamente construirse el puente o , al menos, hubiese acuerdo entre los\r\njerarcas correspondientes para ello. Lo anterior se refuerza con el hecho de\r\nque conforme a las Especificaciones Generales para la Construcción de\r\nCarreteras, Caminos y Puentes de Costa Rica, adoptadas como normas oficiales\r\npor la propia CNE en la sesión de Junta Directiva No. 01-04, el 12 de febrero\r\nde 2004, existía la obligación de la Administración interesada (en este caso la\r\nCNE) de adquirir el derecho de vía necesario, con anticipación al comienzo de\r\nla obra. En todo caso, no debe obviarse que, al fin de cuentas, la\r\nDirectora Ejecutiva estaba subordinada al cumplimiento de las tareas o\r\nresponsabilidades que le asignara la Presidencia Ejecutiva, así como a ejecutar\r\nlas medidas requeridas que se constituyan, de la manera más efectiva, en\r\nrespuestas inmediatas, adecuadas y oportunas a situaciones o estados de\r\nnecesidad y urgencia, conforme a las directrices de la Presidencia de la CNE,\r\nsegún se desprende de los incisos a) y d) del artículo 18 de la Ley No. 7914 y\r\nel artículo 20 de la Ley No. 8488. En el subjúdice, quedó demostrado que la\r\naccionante no prestó la atención debida al oficio remitido por la Presidencia\r\nEjecutiva de CNE para lo cual no es óbice, como señalamos, la declaratoria de\r\ninfructuosidad ya indicada. Nótese que ella nunca justificó las razones por las\r\ncuales no ejecutó la labor encomendada por la Presidencia ni está en el\r\nsupuesto del artículo 108 de la LGAP, que le hubiese obligado a desobedecer la\r\norden de la Presidencia de la CNE. En todo caso, aún cuando la accionante\r\nestimara que la atención de la tarea encomendada por la Presidencia era\r\ncontraria al ordenamiento jurídico (en virtud de la declaratoria de\r\ninfrctuosidad, como ha venido alegando) y violatoria al Principio de Legalidad,\r\ndebía ejecutarla y salvar su responsabilidad en los términos que lo\r\nestablece el artículo 109 de la LGAP, pero ni siquiera eso consta en el\r\nexpediente. Simple y llanamente la demandante no ejecutó ninguna acción\r\npositiva (mientras estuvo en el puesto de Directora Ejecutiva) tendente a\r\ncumplir con la tarea asignada, omisión que, en realidad, sí resulta contraria\r\nal Principio de Legalidad en su vertiente positiva y lesionó los intereses\r\npúblicos que estaban en juego. Insistimos que, luego, en enero del 2006\r\nla CNE abrió concurso para la Contratación por Emergencia No. 012-2006,\r\ncorrespondiente al \"Diseño y Construcción del Puente sobre el Río Puerto Viejo\r\nen Mortero\", con el mismo objetivo de la que anteriormente fue declarada\r\ninfructuosa. Sin embargo, producto de la desatención y omisión de la accionante\r\nrespecto de procurar con el MINAET la donación de la terrenos requeridos, las\r\nservidumbres necesarias y los permisos respectivos, lo cierto es que al momento\r\nde su adjudicación no se contaba con aquellas, lo que ya de por sí violentaba\r\nlo dispuesto en las Especificaciones Generales para la Construcción de\r\nCarreteras, Caminos y Puentes de Costa Rica, a las que se autoobligó la CNE\r\ncuando las adoptó como suyas. No es sino hasta junio de 2006, cuando ya la\r\ndemandante había dejado su puesto, que el Presidente de la CNE se vio en la\r\nnecesidad de retomar el tema y cumplir con la tarea que Rosales Ardón nunca\r\nejecutó. Entonces, mediante oficio PRE-770-2006, finalmente el Presidente de la\r\nCNEdio respuesta al oficio SD-08 citado (cuya gestión, reiteramos, se\r\nhabía encomendado desde octubre del 2005 a la demandante, sin que le diera la\r\natención debida), indicándole a la Subdirectora del Área de Conservación\r\nCordillera Volcánica Central del MINAE las acciones que la CNE podría\r\nllevar a cabo y le solicita una pronta respuesta a la gestión, considerando la\r\nemergencia que se estaba atendiendo estaría dispuesta a llevar ante la Junta\r\nDirectiva (folio 33 del expediente administrativo digital aportado por la\r\nCGR ) . Hasta aquí al Tribunal le queda claro que la actora\r\ndejó su cargo sin haber atendido del todo (durante aproximadamente siete meses)\r\nla tarea que le fue asignada mediante oficio PRE-1342-05, pese a la emergencia\r\nque le sirvió de basamento, que a consecuencia de ello la licitación para la\r\nconstrucción del puente fue adjudicada sin que se tuvieran las donaciones y\r\npermisos requeridos, y que no fue sino hasta cuando la accionante había dejado\r\nsu cargo que el Presidente de la CNE gestionó con el MINAET los insumos\r\nrequeridos para la construcción del puente. Lo anterior denota una actuación\r\nnegligente y omisiva de la actora respecto del cumplimiento de sus funciones\r\nque no encuentra justificación en el Derecho y que el Tribunal no puede pasar\r\npor alto. Pero además, la falta de diligencia de la demandante (al no\r\nhaber dado el trámite correspondiente al oficio PRE-1342-05) trajo como\r\nconsecuencia que aunque el inicio de la ejecución de la obra correspondiente al\r\ndiseño y construcción del puente sobre el Río Puerto Viejo en Mortero fue\r\ndispuesto para el 10 de julio de 2006 (folio 34 del expediente\r\nadministrativo digital aportado por la CGR ) , tuviera que\r\nser suspendida \"(...) por no contar con el derecho de vía según\r\nlo indica el artículo 107.16 del CR77. Dado que la construcción del puente se\r\nrealizará en una propiedad del MINAE y no existen las comunicaciones\r\nrespectivas con los representantes de dicho ministerio, se imposibilita el\r\ningreso de las cuadrillas y equipos necesarios para iniciar la obra (...)\"\r\n(folio 34 del expediente administrativo digital aportado por la CGR )\r\n. No fue sino hasta el 3 de agosto de agosto de 2006, cuando mediante\r\nresolución R-SINAC-DG-032-2006, el Director General del Sistema Nacional\r\nde Áreas de Conservación (en adelante SINAC) dispuso otorgar permiso de uso al\r\nMOPT sobre una franja de 331.38 metros cuadrados, en la finca matrícula\r\n4-159877-000, plano catastrado No. H-042649-1997, específicamente en su lindero\r\noeste con la margen derecha del Río Puerto Viejo, inmueble que es propiedad del\r\nMINAET. Lo anterior con el fin de instalar el anclaje número 1 del puente sobre\r\nel mencionado río. Asimismo, se instruyó a la Dirección del Área de Conservación\r\nCordillera Volcánica Central iniciar el procedimiento de donación de la franja\r\nutilizada para la construcción del anclaje sobre el referido puente (folios\r\n37 al 42 del expediente administrativo digital aportado por la CGR )\r\n. Así, cuando ya se contaba con el terreno y los permisos\r\nrequeridos, el primero de noviembre de 2006, se ordenó a la empresa\r\nadjudicataria reanudar los trabajos correspondientes a la ejecución de la obra\r\nreferida al \"Diseño y Construcción del Puente sobre el Río Puerto Viejo en\r\nMortero\" (folios 48 y 49 del expediente administrativo digital aportado\r\npor la CGR ) . Estimamos que la accionante sí incurrió en una\r\nfalta al deber de probidad porque de lo analizado queda claro que no orientó su\r\ngestión a la satisfacción del interés público, lo que se agrava si se toma en\r\ncuenta que estamos frente a una emergencia que involucraba incluso el derecho a\r\nla vida de los habitantes de la zona de Mortero y que obligaba a poner el mayor\r\nde los esfuerzos en la construcción del puente en cuestión. La demandante no\r\natendió aquella necesidad colectiva prioritaria de manera planificada, regular,\r\neficiente, continua (en tanto nunca dio trámite a la tarea asignada en el\r\noficio PRE-1342-05), ni demostró rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las\r\npotestades que le confiere la ley (en tanto no las ejerció del todo) ni\r\nadministró los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad,\r\neficacia, economía y eficiencia. Somos del criterio de que una actuación acorde\r\nal deber de probidad que establece el artículo 4 de la Ley No. 8422 suponía\r\nhaber dado prioridad a la consecución del terreno del MINAE y los permisos y\r\nservidumbres requeridos para la construcción del Puente sobre Río Puerto Viejo\r\nde Mortero. Se trataba de una labor de coordinación institucional (y no de\r\nejecución de la obra) propia de su cargo, que había sido encomendada y\r\nque, simplemente, omitió. Como segundo argumento, se señala que por el\r\nobjeto de la licitación, hasta que no estuviese concluido el diseño del puente,\r\nno podía determinarse a ciencia cierta el lugar en que se colocarían los\r\nbastiones y descansaría la estructura del puente. No obstante, el Tribunal no\r\ncomparte esa tesis. En rigor, el lugar donde se construiría el puente estaba\r\ndefinido desde el 2005, cuando la Directora del Departamento de Diseño de\r\nPuentes del MOPT remitió al Director de la Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras\r\nde la CNE los términos de referencia técnico, el plano de anteproyecto\r\nrecomendada por esa Dirección, en relación con la Licitación Diseño y\r\nConstrucción del Puente sobre el Río Puerto Viejo en Mortero, explicando porqué\r\nel sitio escogido era el técnicamente más seguro y de menor costo (folio 25\r\ndel expediente administrativo digital aportado por la CGR ) . Incluso,\r\nmediante oficio CUE-711-CP, de 8 de julio de 2005, DE-640-05, de 21 de\r\nsetiembre de 2005, la Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras le comunicó al Jefe de\r\nesa dependencia, entre otros aspectos, que en la reunión que sostuvieron con\r\nrepresentantes de la Municipalidad de Sarapiquí de Heredia, el Alcalde manifestó\r\n\"(...) que la entrada para dar acceso al puente se encuentra en\r\npropiedad del MINAE por lo que también debe adquirirse esta franja de\r\nterreno.(...)\". Se adjuntó, también, una fotografía con el sitio\r\naproximado para la construcción del puente. Así también lo reitera, en el año\r\n2009, la Directora del Departamento de Diseño de Puentes del MOPT, quien\r\nadvierte que la CNE conocía desde el 2005 no solo cuál era el lugar\r\napropiado para la construcción del puente y el plano de anteproyecto P-747-B, sino\r\nademás de la necesidad de conseguir la donación del terreno y los permisos\r\nrequeridos. Confirma, además, que la primera orden de suspensión de la\r\nobra fue dictada porque cuando la empresa constructora llegó al sitio el\r\nÁrea de Conservación del SINAC impidió el ingreso porque no existía ninguna\r\norden superior para permitir la construcción del puente. Es en ese momento,\r\nexplica, que se retoma el proceso de donación que concluye con la resolución\r\nR-SINAC-DG-032-2006 ya citada (folios43 al 46 del Tomo I del expediente\r\ndigital presentado por la CGR). Si bien el oficio de la Directora del\r\nDepartamento de Diseño de Puentes del MOPT indica que fue necesaria una\r\nmodificación para reubicar el puente aproximadamente 30 metros aguas arriba del\r\nSitio I, lo cierto es que ello fue posterior a que la accionante dejara su\r\ncargo y que, en todo caso, siempre se requirió de la donación del inmueble por\r\nparte del MINAET. Lo anterior dice de la necesidad de gestionar su trámite\r\nprevio a la construcción del puente y refleja el incumplimiento y la conducta\r\nomisiva de la demandante en ese sentido. Así, al margen de los dos procesos\r\nlicitatorios y de las otras emergencias que aquejaron al país para esas fechas\r\n(elemento último que, en todo caso, sí fue considerado como un atenuante de responsabilidad)\r\nlo cierto del caso es que el hecho de que la actora no hubiese dado al oficio\r\nPRE-1342-05 el trámite que procedía ni hubiese coordinado con MINAET la\r\ndonación del inmueble sobre el cual se construiría el puente, ni los permisos\r\nrequeridos, sí produjo atrasos en la ejecución de esta obra que, reiteramos,\r\nera prioritaria. Si la coordinación con el MINAET y los permisos se hubieran,\r\nal menos gestionado, la construcción del puente se hubiese realizado en un\r\nmenor tiempo (como era el deber de la actora) o, al menos, hubiese encontrado\r\nun obstáculo menos. Prueba de ello es que una vez que el Presidente de la CNE\r\nretoma el tema (cuando ya la accionante había dejado su puesto) le tomó\r\naproximadamente dos meses conseguir la donación respectiva; mientras que la\r\nactora tuvo siete meses aproximadamente para llevar a cabo la tarea asignada\r\nsin que, al fin de cuentas, la ejecutara. No es cierto que a la\r\ndemandante se le sancione por haber dictado la orden de inicio de la obra sin\r\ncontar con los requisitos requeridos. Se le sanciona porque fue negligente y\r\nsabiendo que debía hacerlo (porque así se lo había asignado la Presidencia\r\nEjecutiva) no coordinó (durante buena parte de su gestión) con el MINAE la\r\ndonación del terreno para la construcción del puente ni los permisos\r\ncorrespondientes y su actuación omisiva atrasó el proceso de construcción del\r\npuente. Y estima el Tribunal que lo acreditado permite confirmar que en efecto\r\nla actuación de la actora se constituye violatoria del deber de probidad en los\r\ntérminos que señalan los artículos 3 y 4 de la Ley 8422; así como que se está\r\nfrente a una omisión, retardo, negligencia o imprudencia en la preservación y\r\nsalvaguarda de los bienes o derechos del patrimonio público que sin\r\nsancionables, independientemente de que se haya consumado un daño o lesión, tal\r\ny como lo dispone el artículo 110 incisos b) y r) de la Ley No. 8131. Y el tema\r\nes importante porque la accionante alega que no hay nexo causal entre la falta\r\ny el supuesto daño ocasionado. Sobre este punto son necesarias las siguientes\r\nprecisiones. Primero, a la actora no se le está imponiendo responsabilidad\r\npatrimonial sino solo disciplinaria. Segundo, dentro de esta última y conforme\r\na las normas citadas son sancionables las faltas en los términos expuestos, aún\r\ny cuando no existiera daño. Tercero, con los elementos que constan en autos es\r\ninnegable que los atrasos en la construcción del referido puente (algunos de\r\nlos cuales derivan de la actuación negligente y omisiva de la actora, según se\r\nha explicado) repercutió negativamente no solo en la Hacienda Pública (por un\r\neventual incremento del costo en virtud de los retrasos) sino también a los\r\nintereses del colectivo en tanto, pese a la declaratoria de emergencia, la\r\nejecución de la obra no tuvo una una gestión eficiente. Sin embargo, insistimos\r\nque en este proceso no está cuantificando ni responsabilizando patrimonialmente\r\na la accionante por ello. Tampoco lleva razón la demandante cuando alega que la\r\nresolución impugnada es disímil a acto PA-66-2010, también dictado por la CGR.\r\nPor una parte, se trata de dos procedimientos diferentes (aunque relacionados\r\ncon la construcción del puente sobre el Río Puerto Viejo de Mortero): en el que\r\nse dictó la resolución PA-66-2010 se cuestiona la actuación técnica de la\r\nContraloría de Unidades de Ejecución, mientras que en éste se reclama la\r\nresponsabilidad de la accionante por la conducta omisiva que tuvo en aspectos\r\nespecíficos de la construcción de aquel mismo puente. Por demás, cabe señalar\r\nque en la resolución PA-66-2010, también se imponen sanciones de suspensión a\r\nlos funcionarios a los cuales se les acreditó faltas en su actuación. Finalmente,\r\ncomo tercer argumento la accionante alega algunos vicios referidos a la\r\nadmisión y valoración de la prueba, así como en la resolución que resuelve el\r\nrecurso de apelación. No obstante, estos también resultan improcedentes\r\npor lo siguiente. En relación con la prueba, se reclama el rechazo de prueba\r\nidónea pericial. En este sentido, cabe señalar que las probanzas que se ofrecen\r\nbien pueden ser inadmitidas cuando sean impertinentes. En el caso de marras,\r\nbasta observar los hechos que se intiman para determinar la pertinencia o no de\r\nla prueba ofrecida. A la actora se le abre el procedimiento por conductas\r\nomisivas sin que demuestre que las funciones asignadas hayan sido cumplidas y\r\nque, por ende, no existió la inactividad y conducta negligente acusada.\r\nCompartimos con el órgano decisor que, para tal acreditación era innecesaria e\r\nimpertinente la prueba pericial. La accionante tenía que cumplir con una tarea\r\nasignada por la Presidencia Ejecutiva y debía demostrar que lo hizo. Si eso no\r\nfue así, una declaración pericial no va a justificar la omisión en la que se\r\nincurrió. Tampoco es cierto que la resolución impugnada se emitan juicios propios\r\nde un perito especialista en ingeniería. La conducta formal que se examina\r\nacredita la omisión en que incurrió la actora, valiéndose para ello de las\r\npruebas que constan en autos. No se discutió en aquel procedimiento aspectos\r\ntécnicos referidos a las licitaciones o el diseño del puente, porque no son\r\npertinentes para acreditar la omisión que se imputaba y que se acreditó. \r\nEn relación con la supuesta preterición de la prueba, no detalla la accionante\r\ncuál fue la probanza que se dejó de valorar, lo que impide a este Tribunal\r\npronunciarse sobre ello. No obstante, hay que señalar que se observa un sano\r\nejercicio de las reglas de la sana crítica en tanto se explica porque se tiene\r\npor probado cada uno de los hechos que se enlistan y las razones por las cuales\r\nno se da valor probatorio a los elementos demostrativos que presenta la\r\ndemandante. En relación con las deficiencias genéricas que se trata de endilgar\r\na las resoluciones que resolvieron los recursos formulados por la actora, hay\r\nque señalar que por una parte no se detalla cuáles son los vicios que,\r\nconcretamente, se acusan. Lo anterior aunado a que la actora no impugnó\r\ndirectamente esos actos administrativos (cuando bien podía hacerlo en virtud de\r\nlo dispuesto por los artículos 33 y 36 inciso b) del CPCA), impide al Tribunal\r\ningresar a su examen con la especificidad debida. No obstante, ha de señalarse\r\nque una revisión genérica permite colegir que los agravios de los recursos\r\nfueron resueltos en forma concreta o por remisión y confirmando lo que se resolvió\r\nen el acto final. Por demás, la conducta final se encuentra motivada en los\r\ntérminos que exige el numeral 136 de la LGAP, ya que expresa l os motivos del\r\nacto, tanto los que son de derecho y que configuran la base legal, como los de\r\nhecho y que, en definitiva, provocan la actuación y decisión\r\nadministrativa. \n\r\n\r\n\n X.-\r\nEn definitiva, por las razones expuestas en los Considerandos previos\r\nestima el Tribunal que la decisión impugnada se conforma sustancialmente con el\r\nordenamiento jurídico ya que fue dictada por el órgano competente, de\r\nconformidad con la Ley Orgánica de la CGR, tiene un motivo legítimo y que\r\nexistía tal y como fue tomado en cuenta para dictar el acto final (artículos\r\n132 y 133 de la LGAP) en tanto se demostró que la actora dejó su cargo en abril\r\ndel 2006 sin que hubiese coordinado con el MINAE la donación de la franja de\r\nterreno y servidumbre requeridas para la construcción del Puente sobre el Río\r\nPuerto Viejo de Mortero, pese a que le fue requerido por la Presidencia\r\nEjecutiva de la CNE desde octubre del 2005, para solventar la emergencia que\r\nvivía aquella zona. También, se demostró que su conducta omisiva atrasó la\r\nconstrucción del\r\nreferido puente, con las consecuencias negativas para los habitantes de aquella\r\nzona. Lo anterior permite afirmar que se incurrió en falta al deber de probidad\r\nen los términos que señalan los artículos 3 y 4 de la Ley No. 8422, así como en\r\nlas conductas generadoras de responsabilidad que establece el numeral 110\r\nincisos a) y r) de la Ley No. 8131. Así, lo que se ordena es lícito, claro y\r\nposible y abarca las cuestiones de hecho y derecho surgidas del motivo. En efecto, la sanción impuesta\r\nse constituye en la consecuencia jurídica al haberse demostrado el presupuesto\r\nde hecho que establecen los numerales 3 y 4 (de la Ley No. 8422) y 110 (de la\r\nLey No. 8131) ya citados. Por demás, se trata de una sanción razonable y\r\nproporcionada a los hechos que se tuvieron por acreditados. Por una parte, su\r\nvaloración tomó en cuenta los criterios que señala el artículo 108 de la Ley\r\nNo. 8131 y que, incluso, se aplicó un atenuante (la existencia de diversas\r\nemergencias que también requerían de atención para la época de los hechos) al\r\nestablecer la sanción respectiva. Por otra parte, nótese que, en rigor, se\r\nsanciona por la falta al deber de probidad y la infracción que contempla el\r\nartículo 110 incisos a) y r) de la Ley No. 8131 (esto es, por la omisión, el retardo, la negligencia o la imprudencia en\r\nla preservación y salvaguarda de los bienes o derechos del patrimonio público o\r\nla adopción de acciones dolosas contra su protección, independientemente de que\r\nse haya consumado un daño o lesión y otras conductas u omisiones que redunden\r\nen disminución, afectación o perjuicio de la Administración Financiera del\r\nEstado o sus instituciones). Pero se aplicó, también, una norma más\r\nbenevolente, sea el artículo 113 de la referida Ley No. 8131, que establece la\r\nsuspensión con goce de salario de ocho días a un mes y no la sanción que\r\nestablece el artículo 39 de la Ley No. 8422. Y dentro de aquella norma (numeral\r\n113), insistimos, se aplicó la sanción mínima, sea ocho días de\r\nsuspensión. Por demás, se trata de un acto motivado en los términos que\r\nexige el numeral 136 de la LGAP y no se observa que en el procedimiento se\r\nhayan omitido formalidades sustanciales que hubieren cambiado la decisión final\r\no generaran indefensión. Finalmente, estima el Tribunal que el acto satisface\r\nel fin a que refiere el numeral 131 de la LGAP, ya que se tutelan los intereses\r\npúblicos que están detrás de velar porque la actuación de los funcionarios\r\npúblicos sea proba, eficiente y se ajuste al ordenamiento jurídico, máxime en\r\nsupuestos en que están de por medio situaciones de emergencia, como la que aquí\r\nnos ocupa. Por ello, luego del examen de legalidad pertinente se deben\r\ndescartar los vicios que se alegan, debiendo confirmarse lo actuado por la CGR\r\ny la sanción dispuesta contra la accionante, por estar apegada a derecho.”",
  "body_en_text": "**IV.- On the prescription of the exercise of the sanctioning power in Public Finance matters.** The plaintiff alleges a violation of the principle of legal certainty since the matter was resolved outside the legal deadlines established for resolving it, that is, when both the expiration (caducidad) and the prescription (prescripción) of the procedure had already occurred. Despite the deficient technique in which the charge is raised, the Tribunal understands that, strictly speaking, it refers to two different defects. On the one hand, the prescription of the exercise of the sanctioning power; on the other, the prescription and expiration (caducidad) of the procedure itself, and it is in that order that its analysis will proceed. Regarding prescription, it must be indicated that it presupposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise, b) lapse of the time set by the legal system in that inertia of the holder, and; c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship to assert the prescription. This means that there is no liberatory effect if, despite the concurrence of the first two presuppositions, the articulation is not formulated. This is because prescription adheres to a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. Regarding the exercise of the sanctioning power, the foregoing implies that the holder of the right is the administrative superior or whoever has the competence to exercise the aforementioned power-duty, while the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations; upon expiration of which, his or her power to request recognition of the loss of hierarchical power emerges. From this perspective, there is no doubt that it is a corrective power that, by criteria of legal certainty, is subject to a prescriptive period. Generically, that period is regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), a rule that sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power. However, it must be warned that it is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate different rules regarding this extreme. This is the case, for example, that arises in Public Finance matters, the situation that concerns us here. For this type of procedures, the applicable period is the one regulated by Laws No. 8292 (article 43), 8422 (article 44), and 8131 (article 112). It is a regulatory system constituted as a sectoral legal framework containing specific rules, which, being special, prevail over the general regulation. In essence, these rules refer to the regime provided for in precept 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428. This latter rule states in essence: \"The administrative liability of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal framework, shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious – understood as that act which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity – liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the superior or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. (...)\". There is no doubt that the plaintiff was subjected to a sanctioning administrative procedure of the Public Finance. Hence, it is evident that in this case, the applicable prescription period will be the five-year period regulated in the rules indicated supra. Now then, it is clear that the expiration of the period granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the grounds for interruption established by both ordinal 876 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) or those provided for by precept 977 of the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio). It should be specified that the grounds for interruption – which cause the prescriptive period to start anew – can only produce that effect to the extent that they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occurred, if it is after the period has expired, the simple allegation of negative prescription leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inertia in its exercise. However, it must be understood that the interruption does not occur with the simple opening of the procedure, but with the proper notification of the order (auto) that considers the case ready for judgment (auto que tiene por instruida la causa), in accordance with ordinals 140, 239, 240, 243 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, hereinafter LGAP). Now then, in the case under analysis we have that the plaintiff is accused of negligent actions and omissions related to the design and construction of the bridge over the Puerto Viejo de Mortero River in which she presumably incurred from October 5, 2005, until May 11, 2006. It is precisely from these dates (on which the actions or omissions that violate the Public Finance are claimed) that the five years applicable in this matter must be counted. Subsequently, the act (acto) opening the procedure was issued at 13:30 hours on April 8, 2010, was notified, and by June of that year, the oral and public hearing (comparecencia oral y pública) had been scheduled. According to the foregoing, the notification of that opening order (auto de apertura) generates an interrupting effect on the prescription, which in this case has occurred, given that at the time of its notification (and even at the time of the hearing), the five years set for the expiration of the corrective power had not passed (which was to be fulfilled by October 2010, when the matter had already been resolved in its constitutive phase). From that perspective, it is evident that at the time of the opening of the procedure, the prescription of the exercise of the right to sanction faults in Public Finance matters by the CGR had not occurred, which implies the rejection of the defect alleged. It is worth adding, furthermore, that while the administrative procedure is being processed, the various internal acts issued in its course produce an equally interrupting effect on the aforementioned period, provided they seek the effective prosecution of the case and are not mere formal stratagems to evade the deadlines that should be applicable to the procedure. However, if the proceeding enters into inertia or abandonment attributable to the Administration for a period exceeding six months, and upon the express request of the indicted official, the expiration (caducidad) of that procedure is ordered, in accordance with numeral 340 subsection 3) of the LGAP. Precisely, it is necessary to enter into the analysis of the temporal element with respect to the processing of that procedure, because part of what is alleged is the prescription and expiration (caducidad) of that procedure due to the state of abandonment to which it was subjected, an issue that is addressed next.\n\n**V.- On the prescription of the procedure.** As stated, the plaintiff claims the prescription of the procedure because it was resolved outside the legally established deadlines for such purposes. Regarding this particular, we consider that the plaintiff is also not correct. Indeed, the principle of prompt and complete justice presupposes, in the case of administrative procedures, that they must be resolved, in principle, by a final act, within reasonable and proportional periods, avoiding subjecting the recipient to unduly long and tedious proceedings. It therefore constitutes an expression of the maxim of legal certainty, insofar as it requires the definition of the case within the due temporal space. The complexity or non-complexity of the procedure could not justify arbitrarily long procedures, because that would mean condoning an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and under its own discretion, the power to resolve the conflict, in evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear violation of due process. In this line, numeral 261 subsection 1) of the LGAP states that \"The administrative procedure shall be concluded, by final act, within the two months following its initiation or, as applicable, following the presentation of the claim or petition of the individual, unless otherwise provided in this law.\" That same period is set by canon 32 of the CPCA. Both rules state, in essence, that if the indicated deadlines expire without the Administration issuing a final act, the recipient may consider the petition rejected, through negative silence (silencio negativo), in order to file the administrative appeals or, resort to jurisdictional protection. It is clear that the figure of negative silence currently holds a guarantee-oriented orientation for the recipient and not an administrative privilege as was previously handled. It constitutes the possibility of understanding the claim as rejected in order to be able to resort to other instances and not be subjected to the Administration issuing a formal act. With the merely optional notion of exhaustion of administrative remedies, silence constitutes a guarantee for the individual, enabling him or her to resort to other legal means to seek the protection of his or her legal situation, no longer as a prerequisite to count on an appealable act, but to suppress administrative inertia in the definition of his or her legal relationship. Now then, the powers of sovereignty are imprescriptible (article 66 subsection 1) of the LGAP), an aspect that justifies what is stated by canon 329 subsection 3) of the cited LGAP, in that the act issued out of time shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly mentioned by law. A clear example of these exceptions is positive silence (that is, a presumed act -articles 330 ejusdem in relation to 139-), in which case, correctly declared or occurred, the maxim of the intangibility of one's own acts operates, which implies the impossibility of the Administration to disregard that effect, under penalty of absolute nullity for violating Constitutional precept 34. In this example of positive silence, it is precisely due to a temporal factor that the competence to issue the act is lost, but not to seek the means of suppression of the presumed act. Having said this, it is worth clarifying, despite its drafting in imperative language (typical of a prescriptive normative method), the bimonthly period set by canon 261 subsection 2 of LGAP is not peremptory, but merely directory, which is inferred from what was stated regarding the duty of the Administration to exercise its powers and the initial validity of acts issued out of time advocated by numeral 329 ibidem. Such a position can also be seen in ruling No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice. This applies both to procedures initiated ex officio and those managed by a party. In the latter, despite the exercise of the right to the effects of negative silence, the Administration may well issue the act, which would broaden the debate in the appellate phase, whether administrative or jurisdictional. From this perspective, neither the investigative power of the procedure nor the procedure itself is expired if the deadline in question has been exceeded. Although the structure of the ordinary procedure would lead one to presume that the deadline in question must always be respected, it is clear that the complexity of a matter and the vicissitudes inherent in the course of the proceedings may lead to longer periods. The determining factor, then, lies in the procedure showing signs of activity and not unjustified delays, in accordance with the principle of celerity and procedural impulse -numerals 222 and 225 of the LGAP-, so that its duration is not the product of arbitrary conduct or inertia, because that is penalized with figures such as expiration (caducidad) -precept 340 ibidem-, an issue that will be analyzed infra. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the directory nature – and not peremptory – of the aforementioned period does not speak to the necessary validity of acts issued within procedures whose delay exceeds the normal threshold of reasonableness. Indeed, an unreasonable duration of the procedure can lead to the nullity of the proceedings due to injury to the principle of prompt and complete justice (which this Tribunal must also protect). In this line, one can observe what was said in precedents numbers 2007-3140 and 2007-6758, both from the Constitutional Tribunal. In the first, it was forcefully stated: \"Now then, from the moment an administrative procedure begins until the issuance of the final act, a reasonable and proportional period must elapse, taking into account the actions of the parties, the complexity of the matter, and the legal deadlines established for each case, so that the Administration may have a prudential period, but without incurring undue delays that hinder the procedure… this Tribunal considers that the time used by the respondent from the moment the procedure was initiated, to date, far from being justifiable, is excessive, unreasonable, and to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the petitioner, due to the unjustified delay incurred by the respondent administration.\" That ruling is cited by the First Chamber in the already mentioned judgment No. 34-2011. Thus, it must be reiterated that not every procedure that takes more than two months implies the nullity of the proceedings, but only to the extent that the period is unreasonable, which must be weighed in each case, attending to the processing and complexity of the proceedings. In this case, from the analysis of the factual framework presented and which has been taken as proven, it is observed that the procedure was instructed in observance of the principles of celerity and ex officio procedural impulse that govern in these matters, without any delays that warrant declaring any nullity being evident. Note that the opening act was issued on April 8, 2010 (and not in January of that year, as the plaintiff erroneously affirms), the hearing (comparecencia) was held in June, and the final act was issued in August of that same year. Thus, the constitutive phase lasted approximately four months; a period that is considered reasonable (if one takes into account the type of fault charged and which involves several presumably responsible officials) and proportional, without observing periods of abandonment that violate the principle of celerity, concentration, and effective administrative protection.\n\n**VI.- On the expiration of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento).** The plaintiff also claims the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure due to its duration exceeding the regulated deadlines. The figure of expiration (caducidad) is regulated in canon 340 of the LGAP, a rule that was amended by canon 200 subsection 10 of the CPCA. Said rule indicates: \"1) When the procedure is paralyzed for more than six months by virtue of a cause, exclusively attributable to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, expiration (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it concerns the case provided for in the final paragraph of article 339 of this Code (refers to the same LGAP and not to the CPCA). 2) The expiration of the procedure initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased to act because positive or negative silence has occurred, or when the file is ready for the issuance of the final act. 3) The expiration of the administrative procedure does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the procedures are considered as not having been followed, for the purposes of interrupting the prescription.\" The analysis of the nature of this figure allows concluding that it is a legal event within the procedure that is justified as a means of avoiding the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interests of legal certainty, as well as the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of the administrative activity. It is unviable when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act. For it to operate, according to the aforementioned rule, expiration (caducidad) requires several elements. In the first place, that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity. Second, that this stagnation is the product of causes attributable to the individual, when initiated at the request of a party, or else to the Administration, if it was initiated ex officio. Third, that this state has been maintained for a period of at least six months. This last point requires that the inertia be of at least six months, that is, it does not constitute a maximum period to act, but rather a minimum temporal limit of inertia, ergo, it must be computed from the last action within the file and not from the opening of the procedure. This means that in sanctioning procedures, instructed ex officio, expiration (caducidad) is feasible when those presuppositions concur. Regarding this figure, recently, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 34-F-S1-2011, stated in essence on the legal institution under discussion: \"In the first place, it can be observed that the just transcribed rule is drafted in an imperative form, that is, it does not regulate a power; on the contrary, once the factual presuppositions contained therein are met, the consequence becomes mandatory for the body in charge of the processing. This implies that its effects occur by operation of law, and therefore its recognition has merely declaratory effects, not constitutive. It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence – which is, by definition, inalienable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible according to numeral 66 LGAP – but solely as the impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific procedure in which the inertia occurred.\" However, the procedural effects of expiration (caducidad) require that it has been requested or declared within the procedure, precisely to put an end to it. This entails that the administrative decision issued after an inertia of six months exclusively attributable to the Administration, when expiration (caducidad) has not been alleged or declared, is fully valid. From the doctrine of canon 59 in relation to 66, both of the LGAP, public powers are granted to be exercised. Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for an expiration of that competence due to temporal factors, is the public body prevented from acting. We have already explained that, as a general rule, powers are not extinguished by the lapse of the period indicated for exercising them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same ordinal when it indicates that there will be a limitation of competence due to time when the legislator expressly provides that its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, we insist that precept 329 ibidem states with all force that the act issued outside the deadline is valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly provided by law, which does not occur here. Expiration (caducidad) is an early form of terminating the procedure and as such, must be decreed to generate that closing effect. Therefore, as long as it is not ordered, or at least, not requested (because had it been requested, the issuance of a final act without considering whether or not the expiration (caducidad) applies would be null), it does not produce that procedural consequence. In the specific case, the Tribunal considers that the elements that would allow declaring the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure do not concur. First, the plaintiff bases the charge on the fact that the directing body initiated the procedure in January 2010 (which is not true, since as indicated supra, the initial order (auto) issued against the plaintiff is from April 2010) and concludes it in August of that year. However, expiration (caducidad) was never alleged within that constitutive phase. Rather, the defense was not raised until the appeal phase (fase recursiva), that is, when the final act had already been issued. By not having alleged it in the constitutive phase of the procedure (the appropriate procedural moment for such purposes), the final act, although issued outside the deadline, is considered valid, as provided by article 329 of the LGAP. Especially when the inactivity alleged by the plaintiff does not refer to the appeal phase. In any case, the truth is that from the review of the different phases and incidents, it is also not observed that the procedure entered into abandonment or procedural inactivity exceeding six months. Therefore, the alleged expiration (caducidad) must be rejected.\n\n**VII.- On the procedural defects (vicios del procedimiento).** At this point, the plaintiff alleges, in essence, two infractions. First, she questions the nature of the hearing (comparecencia). She complains that even though the procedure should have been private and confidential, she was summoned to an oral and public hearing (comparecencia oral y pública), which was always publicized. What is alleged must be rejected. As we pointed out supra, although we are dealing with a sanctioning administrative procedure to which, as a general rule, the provisions of the LGAP are applicable; the truth is that in Public Finance matters, some of those rules yield to particular and special regulations, which incorporate different rules regarding specific extremes (for example, the prescription of the sanctioning power, as we already explained). What relates to the hearing (comparecencia) also has, in this matter, special nuances. It is true that article 309 of the LGAP establishes that the ordinary procedure shall be carried out by means of an oral and private hearing with the Administration; but this rule yields to what is provided in article 10 of Law No. 8422. Said numeral clearly provides that, as a general rule, the hearings referred to by the LGAP in administrative procedures that are initiated for infractions to the Public Finance Regime (Régimen de Hacienda Pública), shall be oral and public. It admits, however, that the directing body, in a reasoned resolution, may declare them private for reasons of decorum and the right to privacy of the parties or third parties, when it deems that the collection of evidence is hindered or a secret whose revelation is punishable by criminal law is endangered. Thus, in the specific case, no infraction is observed in the fact that she was summoned to a public hearing (and not a private one), because that is what the special regulation in force for infractions to the Public Finance provides (as a general rule). Then, she complains that the procedure received media coverage. On this point, we insist that we are dealing with cases followed for infractions to the Public Finance. Therefore, it is not surprising that, in some cases, the media covers these events due to the public interests they involve. Added to the above, it is noteworthy that the newspaper clippings she provides report on the sanction after it has already been imposed (folios 243 and 244 of the judicial file), so no infraction is observed regarding the confidentiality that some phases must maintain (not the hearing), given that once the final resolution was notified, it was public information to which the press could well have access. It is also not demonstrated that the CNE union had knowledge of the sanction before it had been notified to the plaintiff. The only union note brought to the process is the one found at folio 245 and 246 of the judicial file; however, they do not allow reaching that conclusion insofar as it refers to other topics and is also signed on November 1, 2010, that is, when the final act had already been issued and even the appeals against it had been filed. Thus, the plaintiff's statement is not accompanied (as appropriate) by sufficient evidence to prove it, being nothing more than simple subjective manifestations without any support. On the other hand, a violation of due process is alleged. However, as the defendants affirm, the plaintiff does not specify or detail with clarity what those infractions consist of. Strictly speaking, it is not observed that substantial formalities of the procedure were omitted, the correct performance of which would have changed the final decision or caused defenselessness. The plaintiff was notified about the character and purposes of the procedure, with a notice (intimación) and imputation of the facts as well as an indication of the possible sanction to be applied; her right to a hearing was guaranteed, she intervened in the process, was heard, and had the opportunity to present arguments and produce the evidence she deemed pertinent; she was given the opportunity to prepare her allegation having access to the information and the administrative background linked to the case. Her right to a technical defense was also guaranteed, and she was represented and advised by the lawyers and technicians of her choice. Finally, she was notified of the final decision that was issued, with the expression of the grounds on which it was based, and she had the right to appeal it (just as she could challenge preparatory acts that had ordinary appeals available) and could present the incidents she deemed necessary for her defense. From this perspective, the Tribunal does not find that due process was violated during the procedure, which is why we proceed to the examination of the substantive allegations that the plaintiff formulates against the final act.\n\n**VIII.- On the examination of the validity of the impugned formal conduct.** There are several substantive infractions attributed to the sanctioning decision adopted by the CGR against the plaintiff. As the first aspect, the temporal element in which the facts giving rise to the sanction are framed is questioned. The plaintiff alleges that she was not appointed at the CNE during the period indicated in the charges brought against her, specifically in the final period, that is, from May 11, 2006. For this reason, she says, she could not be accused or sanctioned for those facts. Both the State and the CGR differ from that position and state that the negligent conduct that was charged to the plaintiff occurred while she was appointed to her post. Well then, in this process, it was proven that Ms. Rosales Ardón was appointed to the post of Executive Director of the CNE and served as such starting from April 1, 2005, and until May 11, 2006. Then, we have that the act opening the procedure charges her with \"(...) a) Presumably, for having breached the duty of diligence, because from October 3, 2005, she knew of the need to coordinate with MINAE the donation of the strip of land and the easement (servidumbre), which was essential to be able to build the bridge in Mortero, but apparently did not carry out any action until May 24, 2006, the date on which her work as Executive Director of the CNE ended, that is, for a period of 6 months and 22 calendar days. b) Presumably for delaying the construction process of the bridge in Mortero given that the permits and the location of the bridge could have been defined in much shorter periods if a more agile process had been carried out and because upon issuing the start order, such permits were not available, the project suffered a delay of 3 months 21 calendar days (from July 10, 2006 (fact 11) until November 1, 2006 (fact 16)) (...)\". From the literal wording of the first charge brought, it follows that, in effect, the omission attributed to the plaintiff is delimited until May 24, 2006, even though she had stopped working as Executive Director of the CNE as of May 11 of that year.\n\nNevertheless, the Tribunal finds that this inconsistency (in the date of termination) is not capable of causing the nullity of the proceedings for the following reasons. The factual scenario set forth in the opening order (and which serves as the basis for the charge) refers to official communication PRE-1342-05, of October 3, 2005, through which the Presidency of the CNE sent correspondence to the plaintiff and issued instructions for her to carry out active conduct related to the necessary donation of land to build a bridge; and it is claimed that she concluded her duties at the CNE without having fulfilled what was set forth therein. Therefore, aside from the apparent confusion or error regarding the date of termination incurred in the initial act of the proceeding, from its comprehensive reading it is clear that an omission in the fulfillment of some of her specific functions as Executive Director of the CNE is being claimed, during the period between October 3, 2005, and the day she ceased her functions, which ultimately occurred on May 11, 2006. Subsequently, the challenged act sanctions her, among other things, for the omission of the duties under her charge by not having undertaken any action aimed at ensuring the fulfillment of the task entrusted in the aforementioned communication PRE-1342-05, while she served as Executive Director of the CNE. Thus, she is sanctioned for the omission of the duties under her charge while, of course, she exercised functions at the CNE. Therefore, it is not true that she was charged or sanctioned for acts or omissions that occurred when she did not exercise the functions under discussion. We reiterate that this material error (and it is only that because the initial order also clearly delimits the charge at the time of the cessation of functions) does not constitute an omission that, in accordance with Article 223 of the LGAP, entails the nullity of the proceedings. With regard to the second charge, it is not observed that acts originating after the plaintiff's termination are being charged. Note that, at its core, she is charged with delaying the bridge construction process in Mortero, for not having carried out more agile action in aspects related to the permits and the location of the bridge. It is not true that she is charged with having issued the start order for the project execution, as the plaintiff seems to understand it; but only that due to her omissive conduct at the time of issuing said start order, the necessary requirements were not available, and this caused a delay in the execution of the work. Subsequently, the final act assesses that aspect within the timeframe in which the plaintiff was serving as director of the CNE. Now then, if what is being claimed is that both the initial and final acts refer to events occurring before or after the period in which the plaintiff held the position in question, the truth is that these constitute mere factual references that allow the background to be situated and understood, as well as the consequences of the acts being charged. But this in no way means that she is being directly charged with the performance or omission of those. We insist that the charge brought against the plaintiff concerned two acts clearly determined in the initial order, and it was on these that she was ultimately sanctioned. For the reasons stated, the alleged defect is not observed, insofar as the acts and omissions with which she was charged and for which she was sanctioned occurred while she was Executive Director of the CNE. Second, the question is raised as to who was competent to perform the functions for whose omission the plaintiff is sanctioned. In her thesis, the responsibility attributed to her by the oversight body cannot be imputed to her because she was not responsible for performing the alleged acts and omissions for which she was sanctioned. She states that those were the responsibility of the Executing Units, who were responsible for designating the project manager, meeting with him, coordinating and defining the work plan as well as the manner in which the periodic reports and the procedure for contract execution would be presented. Likewise, it was the responsibility of the project manager (and not her) to issue the start order. She bases her arguments on the provisions of the Regulation of Executing Units (Reglamento de Unidades Ejecutoras), published in La Gaceta 172 of September 3, 2009. She reiterates that she was not part of the Executing Unit and, therefore, the responsibility sought to be attributed to her did not extend to her. For its part, the State states that the obligation analyzed herein was entrusted to the plaintiff in view of her position as Executive Director of the CNE, which she had to fulfill exclusively and excludingly. It states that the function did not correspond to the Executing Units because they are appointed for the administration of works and projects financed by them and, in that regard, they handle technical aspects of project execution and are compelled to abide by the directives of the CNE. It emphasizes that the coordination, the object of this litigation, was the exclusive purview of the plaintiff due to her status as Executive Director. It cites, as support, Articles 6 and 8 of the National Emergency Law (Ley Nacional de Emergencias), in force at the time of the investigated facts. Finally, the CGR states that the plaintiff's arguments on this point lack seriousness because they are based on a regulation that was not in force at the time of the facts. It adds that, from a reading of the Manual of Functions and Processes of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of the CNE (Manual de funciones y procesos de la Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras de la CNE), published in La Gaceta of June 1, 2001, it is clearly inferred that the functions and objectives of those units pertain to functions deployed internally within the CNE. Therefore, the non-compliances for which she is sanctioned are not matters alien to the Executive Directorate, because in any case that was the higher hierarchical body, thus incurring a greater degree of responsibility. Having analyzed the point, the following must be noted. In this case, it is essential to keep in mind that the functions or duties deemed unfulfilled and for which the plaintiff is sanctioned consist of having omitted the due coordination with MINAET for the donation of a strip of land and an easement (servidumbre), aware of the necessity given that it was essential to be able to build the bridge in Mortero, and having delayed the construction process of said bridge given that the permits and the location of the bridge could have been defined in much shorter timeframes if more agile action had been taken, since, as the start order was issued without such permits being available, the project suffered a delay of 3 months and 21 calendar days. With this point clear, it must be determined who was competent to perform the required conduct that was omitted. At the outset, the possibility of resorting to the Regulation of Executing Units to resolve this matter must be discarded. As the representatives of the CGR state, it is a regulation adopted on August 24, 2009, and published in La Gaceta of September 3 of that same year. Therefore, we are faced with regulations that are not applicable because they were not in force at the time the facts for which the plaintiff was ultimately sanctioned occurred, which took place between 2005 and 2006. It will be necessary, then, to review the legal system in force during those years to determine to whom the powers and functions whose omission is claimed herein were attributed. At that time, Law No. 7914, of September 28, 1999 (which was in force until November 22, 2005), was in force, which in its Article 18 established that the Executive Directorate would be composed of a Director, who would be responsible for the operative administration of the Institution; would serve as a labor regime employee of trust, freely appointed and removed by the Board of Directors, and would be subordinate to the directives of the Board and the Presidency of the Commission. Likewise, its attributions are listed, among which it is of interest to mention the following: to comply with the agreements of the Board of Directors, as well as the decisions, tasks, or responsibilities that, as a product of delegation, the Presidency of the institution assigns to it, to ensure that the dependencies or administrative units of the Commission fulfilled their functions with the greatest efficiency, efficacy, and economy, within the most adequate and rational use of resources, according to the directives of the Board of Directors and the Presidency of the institution, to execute the required measures that are constituted, in the most effective manner, as immediate, adequate, and timely responses to situations or states of necessity and urgency, in accordance with the directives of the Board of Directors and the Presidency of the institution. Subsequently, with Law No. 8488, of November 22, 2005, the Executive Directorate is maintained as responsible for the administration of the institution, Article 20 warning, again, regarding subordination to the directives of the Board of Directors and those of the Presidency of the Commission, as well as the obligation to render accounts for its actions. The same regulation attributes to it, among others, the following functions: to program and coordinate the activities of the Commission with other public and private institutions, to comply with the policies and achieve the objectives of the institution, within the guidelines issued by the Executive Branch, to be responsible for the general administration of the Commission, for which it will have charge of the Institution's programs and must ensure that the dependencies or administrative units fulfill their functions with the greatest efficiency, efficacy, and economy, within the most adequate and rational use of resources, according to the directives of the Board of Directors and the Presidency of the Institution, to conduct and execute the institutional actions oriented towards the articulation of the National System of Risk Management, under the directives of the Board of Directors and the Presidency, as well as any other responsibility assigned to it by the Board of Directors and the Presidency that is consistent with the level of attributions it holds by reason of its position. Now then, bearing this panorama in mind, it must be indicated that in this proceeding it was accredited that through agreement 0102004, adopted by the Board of Directors of the CNE in ordinary session No. 1-04, of February 12, 2004, the Investment Plan of MOPT and SENARA was approved, presented for the attention of the emergency of Decree No. 31540-MP-MOPT. Said agreement included the project referring to \"Bridges over the Mortero River\" (\"Puentes sobre el Río Mortero\") (folios 1 to 20 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Within that framework, through official communication PRE-1104-05, of August 16, 2005, the President of the CNE requested the Minister of Environment and Energy for his collaboration so that said dependency would authorize the donation of a strip of land and authorize the use of the easement (servidumbre) that crosses the Subregional Office of said Ministry in the canton of Sarapiquí. The foregoing for the purpose of building the bridge over the Puerto Viejo de Mortero River. He warned of the necessity of that donation so as not to delay the execution of the work and indicated the following geographic coordinates of the site where the bridge would be built: 539,200 (EAST)-263,300 (NORTH) and attached the corresponding plan (folio 29 and 30 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Subsequently, in official communication SD-08, of September 23, 2005, the Subdirector of the Cordillera Volcánica Central Conservation Area of MINAE communicated to the president of the CNE, in what is relevant, her doubts regarding the required donation and the use of the easement (servidumbre), warning him that they required more data to initiate the corresponding procedures (folios 31 and 32 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Finally, through official communication PRE-1342-05, of October 3, 2005, the president of the CNE sent to the plaintiff and to the Head of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of that entity a copy of the cited communication SD-08 so that they would analyze it and \"(...) resolve it with Vice Minister Allan Flores or Mr. Carlos Manuel, both from MINAE (...)\" (folios 70 to 73 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). From the foregoing, it is clear to the Tribunal that the President of the CNE delegated and assigned to the plaintiff a specific task, which corresponded to coordination work and which was indispensable for other administrative units (among them, the Executing Unit) to fulfill their functions with the greatest efficiency, efficacy, and economy, within the most adequate and rational use of resources, in order to duly attend to the emergency referring to the construction of the bridge over the Puerto Viejo de Mortero River. It was, moreover, a coordination with another public institution (MINAE) required to be able to comply with the Emergency Decree already indicated and to be able to execute the construction of the bridge in question. Thus, the coordination with MINAE to secure the donation of the land and the easement (servidumbre) required for the construction on the referred bridge was a duty under the charge of the plaintiff, in her capacity as Executive Director; this not only because it forms part of the powers that the cited regulations attribute to her, but also because it is a task that was delegated or assigned to her by the President of the CNE, and to whose fulfillment she was subordinated, as is inferred from the cited regulations. Unlike what the plaintiff asserts, the functions attributed to the Executing Units (or their Comptrollership) are specific to project execution and not to prior coordination with other institutions external to the CNE. We reiterate that the Regulation of Executing Units is not applicable to this case because that regulation did not exist at the time of the facts discussed herein. At most, Agreement 520-2001, issued by the Board of Directors of the CNE on February 21, 2001, could be taken into account, which regulates the functions and processes of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of the CNE, bearing in mind, of course, that it is an infra-legal regulation that could not modify the legal attributions conferred upon the Executive Directorate of the CNE. Added to the foregoing, from the review of the agreement it is concluded that the Comptrollership of Executing Units controls and oversees those responsible for project execution, without carrying out coordination work that, we reiterate, is specific to the Executive Directorate. Note that the only function attributed to it in that sense is coordination with the heads of the Executing Units, on aspects such as the pre-offer visit, bidding processes, payment processing, purchase requests, project inspections, and progress reports; which have nothing to do with the unfulfilled duties charged to the plaintiff and that, we insist, are prior to the execution of the work and must be coordinated with heads of other state bodies and entities. For the reasons stated, the Tribunal does not find that the challenged resolution violates the Principle of Legality or due legal certainty, given that, we reiterate, the duties for which the plaintiff is accused of non-compliance were indeed within the framework of her competence. Having it clear, then, that the reproached acts, duties, and omissions occurred within the time the plaintiff was Executive Director of the CNE and that they deal with aspects specific to her competence, it is now appropriate to address the arguments offered regarding the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of those properly. The foregoing for the purpose of being able to determine whether or not there are defects of legality in the imposed sanction.\n\nIX.- At this third level of analysis, it must be indicated that the plaintiff's defense has revolved around three aspects. First, she maintains that matters relating to the design and construction of the bridge lacked current interest and legal existence for the relevant purposes, because Tender EMER-035-05 had been declared unsuccessful since September 21, 2005 (that is, before she received communication PRE-1342-05). In such a scenario, she maintains, it was not in accordance with the Principle of Legality for her to carry out any action relating to said tender, especially when it involved a period of intense activity regarding emergencies, as the CGR itself had accredited. The State states that according to Article 15 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law, the declaration of unsuccessful tender only entails the initiation of a new contractual procedure, without implying the paralysis of the actions necessary to gather the required preliminary elements before the start of the work. For its part, the CGR maintains that what occurred in the contracting process does not affect nor has any incidence on the omissions incurred by the plaintiff. It adds that this lack of the duty of diligence becomes evident at the moment the awarded company begins the construction of the work, which allows establishing that there is no relationship between the vicissitudes of the contracting procedures and the non-compliances of Mrs. Rosales Ardón. To resolve the point, we deem it necessary to establish that the existence of an Emergency Decree has been accredited here, which established, as a need to be resolved, the construction of a bridge over the Puerto Viejo de Mortero River, providing the CNE with the respective budget for this purpose. Also, that since February 2005, the Director of the Bridge Design Department of MOPT recommended the site identified as 1 (plan P-747-B), for the construction of a 117-meter suspension bridge over the Puerto Viejo River for the community of Mortero, in Horquetas de Sarapiquí, located in the vicinity of a public road previously existing in front of the facilities of the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications. The foregoing because it is technically the safest site and of lowest intervention cost in the combined bridge and new road solution (inferred from folios 43 to 46 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Although the plaintiff Rosales Ardón was appointed to the position of Executive Director of the CNE as of April 1, 2005, there is no doubt that as part of her responsibilities she should have informed herself of what emergencies, at that time, required prompt attention and had a budget assigned for them. And so it was, in that through official communication CUE-699-GM 2005, of June 7, 2005, the Head of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of the CNE requested the plaintiff to submit to the Board of Directors of the CNE a request to supplement budgetarily the work corresponding to the design and construction of the bridge over the Puerto Viejo River (folios 22 to 24 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Now then, it is true that on September 21, 2005, Restricted Tender No. EMER-35-2005, corresponding to the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Puerto Viejo River in Mortero\" was declared unsuccessful; but it is also true that on that same day the plaintiff communicated to the Procurement Department of the CNE not only the declaration of unsuccessful tender in question, but also warned that due to the importance of the work and the delays in the contracting process, it was necessary to re-promote the competitive bidding as soon as possible (folios 158 of the administrative file of the Restricted Tender No. EMER-35-2005, corresponding to the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Puerto Viejo River in Mortero\"). Therefore, a verified emergency did exist (because it was included in the respective Decree) and the budget to resolve it, so much so that the plaintiff herself expressed the need to re-promote the competitive bidding, as indeed happened. For this reason, the arguments of the plaintiff to the effect that the law did not oblige her to re-tender the unsuccessful object nor set a specific deadline for it are entirely inappropriate. If we are facing emergency situations, the measures adopted are not, as a general rule, the ordinary ones foreseen. Especially when she herself knew (because she expressly stated so) that the need and emergency remained latent and that the bridge had to be built to guarantee the higher public interests (such as people's lives) that were at stake. Therefore, the Tribunal does not find that the failure to give the corresponding attention and action to communication PRE-1342-05 can be justified under the argument of the declaration of unsuccessful tender. There is not a single element that allows even doubting the decision of the CNE to put the bridge construction out to tender again. Rather, it is accredited that it was always clear that it was indeed necessary. Therefore, the plaintiff had to fulfill the assigned tasks in pursuit of efficient and timely attention to the emergency in question. By not having adopted any positive action aimed at coordinating with MINAE the donation of the strip of land, the easement (servidumbre), and the necessary permits, she omitted the exercise of the entrusted powers and breached the Principle of Legality in its positive aspect, which, as we will explain later, had a negative impact on the achievement of the public interest she was obliged to protect. Diligent conduct would have led to gradually carrying out the task entrusted by the Executive Presidency (to which she was, in any case, subordinated) in such a way that by the time the new contracting was opened and awarded, the land on which the bridge was technically to be built would have already been donated, or at least, an agreement would exist between the corresponding heads for this purpose. The foregoing is reinforced by the fact that, according to the General Specifications for the Construction of Highways, Roads, and Bridges of Costa Rica (Especificaciones Generales para la Construcción de Carreteras, Caminos y Puentes de Costa Rica), adopted as official standards by the CNE itself in Board of Directors session No. 01-04, on February 12, 2004, the interested Administration (in this case the CNE) had the obligation to acquire the necessary right-of-way, prior to the commencement of the work. In any case, it should not be overlooked that, ultimately, the Executive Director was subordinated to the fulfillment of the tasks or responsibilities assigned to her by the Executive Presidency, as well as to executing the required measures that are constituted, in the most effective manner, as immediate, adequate, and timely responses to situations or states of necessity and urgency, in accordance with the directives of the Presidency of the CNE, as inferred from subsections a) and d) of Article 18 of Law No. 7914 and Article 20 of Law No. 8488. In the case at hand, it was demonstrated that the plaintiff did not give due attention to the communication sent by the Executive Presidency of the CNE, for which the aforementioned declaration of unsuccessful tender is not an obstacle, as we have indicated. Note that she never justified the reasons for which she did not execute the task entrusted by the Presidency, nor is she in the scenario of Article 108 of the LGAP, which would have obliged her to disobey the order of the Presidency of the CNE. In any case, even if the plaintiff considered that attending to the task entrusted by the Presidency was contrary to the legal system (by virtue of the declaration of unsuccessful tender, as she has been alleging) and violated the Principle of Legality, she should have executed it and exempted herself from responsibility under the terms established by Article 109 of the LGAP, but not even that is recorded in the file. The plaintiff simply and plainly did not execute any positive action (while she was in the position of Executive Director) aimed at fulfilling the assigned task, an omission that, in reality, is indeed contrary to the Principle of Legality in its positive aspect and harmed the public interests that were at stake. We insist that, later, in January 2006, the CNE opened competitive bidding for Emergency Contract No. 012-2006, corresponding to the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Puerto Viejo River in Mortero\", with the same objective as the one that was previously declared unsuccessful. However, as a result of the neglect and omission by the plaintiff regarding procuring from MINAET the donation of the required lands, the necessary easements (servidumbres), and the respective permits, the truth is that at the time of its award, those were not available, which in itself already violated the provisions of the General Specifications for the Construction of Highways, Roads, and Bridges of Costa Rica, to which the CNE self-obligated when it adopted them as its own. It was not until June 2006, when the plaintiff had already left her position, that the President of the CNE saw the need to take up the matter again and fulfill the task that Rosales Ardón never executed. Then, through communication PRE-770-2006, the President of the CNE finally responded to the cited communication SD-08 (the processing of which, we reiterate, had been entrusted to the plaintiff since October 2005, without her giving it due attention), indicating to the Subdirector of the Cordillera Volcánica Central Conservation Area of MINAE the actions the CNE could carry out and requesting a prompt response to the procedure, considering the emergency being addressed, and stating he would be willing to bring it before the Board of Directors (folio 33 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Up to this point, it is clear to the Tribunal that the plaintiff left her position without having fully attended to (for approximately seven months) the task assigned to her through communication PRE-1342-05, despite the emergency that served as its foundation, that as a consequence of this, the tender for the bridge construction was awarded without the required donations and permits being available, and that it was not until the plaintiff had left her position that the President of the CNE managed with MINAET the supplies required for the bridge construction. The foregoing denotes negligent and omissive conduct on the part of the plaintiff regarding the fulfillment of her functions, which finds no justification in Law and which the Tribunal cannot overlook. But furthermore, the lack of diligence of the plaintiff (by not having given the corresponding processing to communication PRE-1342-05) resulted in the consequence that even though the start of execution of the work corresponding to the design and construction of the bridge over the Puerto Viejo River in Mortero was ordered for July 10, 2006 (folio 34 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR), it had to be suspended \"(...) because the right-of-way was not available as indicated in article 107.16 of the CR77. Given that the bridge construction will be carried out on a MINAE property and the respective communications with the representatives of said ministry do not exist, the entry of the crews and equipment necessary to begin the work is made impossible (...)\" (folio 34 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). It was not until August 3, 2006, when through resolution R-SINAC-DG-032-2006, the General Director of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, hereinafter SINAC) ordered granting a temporary use permit (permiso de uso) to MOPT over a strip of 331.38 square meters, on the property registered under folio real 4-159877-000, cadastral plan No. H-042649-1997, specifically on its western boundary with the right bank of the Puerto Viejo River, a property owned by MINAET. The foregoing for the purpose of installing anchorage number 1 of the bridge over the mentioned river. Likewise, the Directorate of the Cordillera Volcánica Central Conservation Area was instructed to initiate the procedure for the donation of the strip used for the construction of the anchorage on the referred bridge (folios 37 to 42 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Thus, when the land and the required permits were already available, on November 1, 2006, the awarded company was ordered to resume the work corresponding to the execution of the work referred to as \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Puerto Viejo River in Mortero\" (folios 48 and 49 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR).\n\nWe find that the plaintiff did indeed incur a breach of the duty of probity because from the analysis it is clear that she did not orient her management toward the satisfaction of the public interest, which is aggravated if one takes into account that we are facing an emergency that even involved the right to life of the inhabitants of the Mortero area and which obliged the utmost efforts in the construction of the bridge in question. The plaintiff did not attend to that priority collective need in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner (insofar as she never processed the task assigned in official communication PRE-1342-05), nor did she demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her by law (insofar as she did not exercise them at all), nor did she administer public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency. We are of the opinion that conduct in accordance with the duty of probity established by Article 4 of Law No. 8422 would have entailed having given priority to obtaining the MINAE property and the permits and easements (servidumbres) required for the construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero. It was a task of institutional coordination (and not of execution of the work) inherent to her position, which had been entrusted and which, simply, she omitted.\n\nAs a second argument, it is noted that due to the object of the tender, until the bridge design was completed, the precise location where the bastions would be placed and the bridge structure would rest could not be determined with certainty. However, the Tribunal does not share this thesis. Strictly speaking, the place where the bridge would be built had been defined since 2005, when the Director of the MOPT Bridge Design Department sent the Director of the CNE Comptroller’s Office for Executing Units the technical terms of reference, the preliminary draft plan recommended by that Directorate, in relation to Tender for the Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero, explaining why the chosen site was the most technically safe and lowest cost (folio 25 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Even, through official communication CUE-711-CP, dated July 8, 2005, DE-640-05, dated September 21, 2005, the Comptroller’s Office for Executing Units informed the Head of that unit, among other aspects, that in the meeting held with representatives of the Municipality of Sarapiquí de Heredia, the Mayor stated \\\"(...) that the entrance to provide access to the bridge is on property belonging to MINAE, so this strip of land must also be acquired (...)\\\". A photograph with the approximate site for the bridge construction was also attached. This is also reiterated, in 2009, by the Director of the MOPT Bridge Design Department, who warns that the CNE had known since 2005 not only what the appropriate location for the bridge construction was and the preliminary draft plan P-747-B, but also of the need to secure the donation of the land and the required permits. She confirms, furthermore, that the first order to suspend the work was issued because when the construction company arrived at the site, the SINAC Conservation Area (Área de Conservación) prevented entry because there was no superior order to allow the bridge construction. It was at that moment, she explains, that the donation process was resumed, concluding with the aforementioned resolution R-SINAC-DG-032-2006 (folios 43 to 46 of Volume I of the digital file presented by the CGR). Although the official communication from the Director of the MOPT Bridge Design Department indicates that a modification was necessary to relocate the bridge approximately 30 meters upstream from Site I, the truth is that this occurred after the plaintiff left her position and that, in any case, the donation of the property by MINAET was always required. This speaks to the necessity of processing that procedure prior to the bridge construction and reflects the non-compliance and the omission-based conduct (conducta omisiva) of the plaintiff in that regard. Thus, regardless of the two tender processes and the other emergencies that afflicted the country at that time (the latter element which, in any case, was indeed considered as a mitigating factor of responsibility), the truth of the matter is that the fact that the plaintiff did not give official communication PRE-1342-05 the processing that was due, nor coordinated with MINAET the donation of the property upon which the bridge would be built, nor the required permits, did produce delays in the execution of this work which, we reiterate, was a priority. If the coordination with MINAET and the permits had been, at least, pursued, the construction of the bridge could have been completed in less time (as was the duty of the plaintiff) or, at the very least, would have encountered one fewer obstacle. Proof of this is that once the President of the CNE resumed the matter (when the plaintiff had already left her post), it took him approximately two months to secure the respective donation; whereas the plaintiff had approximately seven months to carry out the assigned task without, ultimately, executing it.\n\nIt is not true that the plaintiff is being sanctioned for having issued the order to begin work without the required prerequisites. She is sanctioned because she was negligent and, knowing she was required to do it (because it had been assigned to her by the Executive Presidency), did not coordinate (for a good part of her term) with MINAE the donation of the land for the bridge construction nor the corresponding permits, and her omission-based conduct delayed the bridge construction process. And the Tribunal considers that what has been proven confirms that the plaintiff's actions indeed constitute a violation of the duty of probity in the terms indicated by Articles 3 and 4 of Law 8422; as well as constituting an omission, delay, negligence or imprudence in the preservation and safeguard of the assets or rights of the public patrimony that is sanctionable, regardless of whether a damage or injury has been consummated, just as provided by Article 110, subsections b) and r) of Law No. 8131. And the issue is important because the plaintiff alleges that there is no causal link between the fault and the alleged damage caused. On this point, the following clarifications are necessary. First, the plaintiff is not being held liable for damages (responsabilidad patrimonial) but only disciplinary liability. Second, within the latter and in accordance with the cited norms, faults are sanctionable in the terms set forth, even if no damage existed. Third, with the evidence in the case file, it is undeniable that the delays in the construction of said bridge (some of which derive from the negligent and omission-based conduct of the plaintiff, as has been explained) negatively impacted not only the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) (due to a possible increase in cost by virtue of the delays) but also the interests of the collective insofar as, despite the emergency declaration, the execution of the work did not have an efficient management. However, we insist that this proceeding is neither quantifying nor holding the plaintiff financially responsible for this.\n\nNor is the plaintiff correct when she alleges that the contested resolution is dissimilar to act PA-66-2010, also issued by the CGR. On the one hand, these are two different procedures (although related to the construction of the bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero): in the one where resolution PA-66-2010 was issued, the technical performance of the Comptroller’s Office for Executing Units is questioned, whereas in this one, the plaintiff's responsibility is claimed for the omission-based conduct she had in specific aspects of the construction of that same bridge. Furthermore, it should be noted that in resolution PA-66-2010, suspension sanctions are also imposed on the officials whose faults were proven.\n\nFinally, as a third argument, the plaintiff alleges certain defects related to the admission and assessment of evidence, as well as in the resolution deciding the appeal. However, these also prove unfounded for the following reasons. Regarding the evidence, she complains of the rejection of suitable expert evidence. In this sense, it should be noted that proffered evidence may well be inadmissible when it is irrelevant. In the case at hand, it is sufficient to observe the facts being charged to determine the relevance or not of the evidence offered. The proceeding was opened against the plaintiff for omission-based conduct without her demonstrating that the assigned duties were fulfilled and that, therefore, the alleged inactivity and negligent conduct did not exist. We agree with the deciding body that, for such proof, expert evidence was unnecessary and irrelevant. The plaintiff had to fulfill a task assigned by the Executive Presidency and she had to demonstrate that she did it. If that was not the case, expert testimony will not justify the omission that was incurred. Nor is it true that the contested resolution issues judgments characteristic of an expert engineering specialist. The formal conduct being examined proves the omission incurred by the plaintiff, relying for that purpose on the evidence contained in the case file. Technical aspects related to the tenders or the bridge design were not discussed in that proceeding, because they are not relevant to proving the omission that was being charged and which was proven.\n\nRegarding the alleged disregard (preterición) of evidence, the plaintiff does not detail which piece of evidence was not assessed, which prevents this Tribunal from ruling on the matter. However, it must be noted that a sound exercise of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) is observed insofar as it is explained why each of the listed facts is deemed proven and the reasons why no probative value is given to the demonstrative elements presented by the plaintiff. Regarding the generic deficiencies she seeks to attribute to the resolutions that decided the appeals filed by the plaintiff, it must be noted that, on the one hand, it is not detailed which specific defects are being claimed. This, together with the fact that the plaintiff did not directly challenge those administrative acts (when she could well have done so by virtue of the provisions of Articles 33 and 36, subsection b) of the CPCA), prevents the Tribunal from examining them with the required specificity. Nonetheless, it must be stated that a general review allows us to conclude that the grievances raised in the appeals were resolved in a specific manner or by reference and by confirming what was decided in the final act. Furthermore, the final conduct is justified (motivada) in the terms required by numeral 136 of the LGAP, as it expresses the reasons for the act, both those of law that form the legal basis, and those of fact that, in short, provoke the administrative action and decision.\n\nX.-\nIn conclusion, for the reasons set forth in the preceding Considerandos, the Tribunal finds that the contested decision substantially conforms to the legal order since it was issued by the competent body, in accordance with the Ley Orgánica of the CGR, it has a legitimate purpose which existed just as it was taken into account to issue the final act (Articles 132 and 133 of the LGAP), insofar as it was demonstrated that the plaintiff left her position in April 2006 without having coordinated with MINAE the donation of the strip of land and easement (servidumbre) required for the construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero, despite having been required to do so by the Executive Presidency of the CNE since October 2005, to resolve the emergency that area was experiencing. It was also demonstrated that her omission-based conduct delayed the construction of said bridge, with negative consequences for the inhabitants of that area. This allows the assertion that a breach of the duty of probity was incurred, in the terms indicated by Articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 8422, as well as in the conduct generating liability established by numeral 110, subsections a) and r) of Law No. 8131. Thus, what is ordered is lawful, clear, and possible and covers the questions of fact and law arising from the purpose. Indeed, the imposed sanction constitutes the legal consequence of having demonstrated the factual premise established by numerals 3 and 4 (of Law No. 8422) and 110 (of Law No. 8131) already cited. Moreover, it is a reasonable sanction, proportionate to the facts that were deemed proven. On the one hand, its assessment took into account the criteria indicated by Article 108 of Law No. 8131 and, in fact, a mitigating circumstance (the existence of various emergencies also requiring attention at the time of the facts) was applied in establishing the respective sanction. On the other hand, it should be noted that, strictly speaking, she is sanctioned for the breach of the duty of probity and the infraction contemplated in Article 110, subsections a) and r) of Law No. 8131 (that is, for omission, delay, negligence or imprudence in the preservation and safeguard of the assets or rights of the public patrimony, or the adoption of willful actions against its protection, regardless of whether a damage or injury has been consummated, and other conduct or omissions that result in a decrease, affectation, or prejudice to the Financial Administration of the State or its institutions). But a more lenient rule was also applied, namely Article 113 of the aforementioned Law No. 8131, which establishes suspension with pay from eight days to one month, and not the sanction established by Article 39 of Law No. 8422. And within that rule (numeral 113), we insist, the minimum sanction was applied, namely eight days of suspension. Furthermore, it is an act justified (motivado) in the terms required by numeral 136 of the LGAP, and it is not observed that substantial formalities were omitted in the proceeding that would have changed the final decision or generated defenselessness (indefensión). Finally, the Tribunal finds that the act satisfies the purpose referred to in numeral 131 of the LGAP, as it protects the public interests that underlie ensuring that public officials' conduct is upright, efficient, and conforms to the legal order, especially in cases involving emergency situations, like the one at hand. Therefore, after the pertinent legality review, the alleged defects must be dismissed, and the actions of the CGR and the sanction ordered against the plaintiff must be confirmed, being in accordance with the law.\"\n\nAs stated, the plaintiff claims the statute of limitations has run on the procedure because it was resolved outside the legally established timeframes for such purposes. On this point, we find that the plaintiff is also incorrect. Indeed, the principle of prompt and complete justice implies, in the case of administrative procedures, that they must be resolved, in principle, by a final act, within reasonable and proportional timeframes, avoiding subjecting the recipient to unjustifiably long and tedious proceedings. It therefore constitutes an expression of the principle of legal certainty, to the extent that it requires the matter to be defined within the proper timeframe. The complexity or lack thereof of the procedure could not justify arbitrarily long procedures, since that would imply condoning an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and at its own discretion, the power to resolve the dispute, to the evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear violation of due process. Along those lines, section 261(1) of the LGAP states that \"<i>The administrative procedure must be concluded, by final act, within two months following its initiation or, as the case may be, following the filing of the complaint or petition by the administered party, unless otherwise provided in this law.</i>\" That same timeframe is set by article 32 of the CPCA. Both rules essentially state that if the indicated deadlines expire without the Administration issuing a final act, the recipient may consider the petition denied, through negative silence (silencio negativo), in order to file the administrative appeals or, alternatively, seek judicial protection. It is clear that the concept of negative silence currently serves a protective purpose for the recipient and is not an administrative privilege as previously understood. It constitutes the possibility of understanding the claim as denied in order to be able to resort to other instances and not be subject to waiting for the Administration to issue a formal act. With the merely optional notion of exhausting administrative remedies, silence represents a guarantee for the individual, enabling them to resort to other legal means to seek protection of their legal situation, no longer as a prerequisite for having a challengeable act, but to overcome administrative inertia in defining their legal relationship. Now, the powers of authority are imprescriptible (article 66(1) of the LGAP), an aspect that justifies what is stated in section 329(3) of the cited Law (LGAP), to the effect that an act issued outside the deadline will be valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly stated otherwise by law. A clear example of these exceptions is positive silence (silencio positivo) (i.e., a presumed act -articles 330 ibid., in relation to 139-), in which case, when correctly declared or occurring, the principle of the irrevocability of one's own acts applies, implying the impossibility of the Administration disregarding that effect, under penalty of absolute nullity for infringement of Constitutional precept 34. In this example of positive silence, it is precisely due to a time factor that competence to issue the act is lost, though not the competence to seek the means of overturning the presumed act. This being said, it is worth clarifying that, despite its drafting in imperative language (typical of a prescriptive normative method), the bi-monthly deadline set by section 261(2) of the LGAP is not peremptory, but merely directory, which follows from what is stated regarding the Administration's duty to exercise its powers and the initial validity of acts issued outside the deadline, as advocated by section 329 ibid. This position can also be seen in judgment No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema). This applies both to procedures initiated ex officio and those initiated at the request of a party. In the latter, despite the exercise of the power to invoke the effects of negative silence, the Administration may well issue the act, which would broaden the debate on appeal, whether administrative or jurisdictional. From this standpoint, neither the investigative power of the procedure nor the procedure itself is deemed concluded if the deadline in question has been exceeded. Although the structure of the ordinary procedure would lead one to presume that the deadline in question must always be respected, it is clear that the complexity of a matter and the particular vicissitudes of the process lead to longer timeframes. The decisive factor, then, lies in the procedure showing signs of activity and no unjustified delays, in accordance with the principles of procedural speed and official impetus (celeridad e impulso procesal) -sections 222 and 225 of the LGAP-, in such a way that its duration is not the product of arbitrary conduct or inertia, because that is penalized by concepts such as lapse (caducidad) -precept 340 ibid.-, a topic that will be analyzed below. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the directory nature—and not peremptory nature—of the aforementioned deadline does not imply the necessary validity of acts issued within procedures whose delay exceeds the normal threshold of reasonableness. Indeed, an unreasonable duration of the procedure can lead to the nullity of the proceedings due to violation of the principle of prompt and complete justice (which this Court must also protect). In this regard, the holdings in precedents numbers 2007-3140 and 2007-6758, both from the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional), can be observed. In the first, it was forcefully stated: \"<i>Now, from the moment an administrative procedure begins until the issuance of the final act, a reasonable and proportional period must elapse, taking into account the conduct of the parties, the complexity of the matter, and the legal deadlines established for each case, in such a way that the Administration may have a prudent timeframe, but without incurring undue delays that obstruct the procedure… this Court finds that the time taken by the respondent from the moment the procedure began, to date, far from being justifiable, is excessive, unreasonable, and to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the protected party, due to the unjustified delay which the respondent administration has incurred.</i>\" This ruling is cited by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) in the aforementioned judgment No. 34-2011. Thus, it must be reiterated that not every procedure taking more than two months implies the nullity of the proceedings, but only to the extent that the timeframe is unreasonable, which must be considered in each case, taking into account the processing and complexity of the proceedings. In this case, from the analysis of the factual matrix set forth and which has been deemed proven, it is observed that the procedure was conducted in observance of the principles of procedural speed and official impetus, which govern in these matters, without any evidence of delays that would warrant declaring any nullity. Note that the opening act was issued on April 8, 2010 (and not in January of that year, as the plaintiff erroneously claims), the hearing (comparecencia) took place in June, and the final act was issued in August of that same year. Thus, the constitutive phase lasts approximately four months; a timeframe that is deemed reasonable (if one considers the type of offense charged and that it involves several allegedly responsible officials) and proportional, with no periods of abandonment observed that would violate the principles of procedural speed, concentration, and effective administrative protection.\n\n***VI.- On the lapse (caducidad) of the procedure.*** The plaintiff also claims the lapse (caducidad) of the procedure due to its duration exceeding the regulated timeframes. The concept of lapse (caducidad) is regulated in section 340 of the LGAP, a rule that was amended by section 200(10) of the CPCA. Said rule states: <i>\"1) When the procedure is stalled for more than six months due to a cause attributable exclusively to the interested party who initiated it, or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, the lapse (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it is the case provided for in the final paragraph of article 339 of this Code </i>**(this refers to the LGAP itself and not the CPCA)**<i>. 2) The lapse (caducidad) of a procedure initiated at the request of a party shall not apply when the interested party has ceased to act because positive silence (silencio positivo) or negative silence (silencio negativo) has occurred, or when the case file is ready for the issuance of the final act. 3) The lapse (caducidad) of the administrative procedure does not extinguish the rights of the parties; but the procedures are considered as not having been pursued, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations (prescripción).\" </i>Analysis of the nature of this concept allows us to conclude that it is a legal fact within the procedure that is justified as a means of avoiding the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interest of legal certainty, as well as the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It becomes unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act. For it to operate, as established by the aforementioned rule, lapse (caducidad) requires several elements. First, that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity. Second, that this stagnation is the product of causes attributable to the administered party, when initiated at their request, or to the Administration, if it was initiated ex officio. Third, that this state has been maintained for a period of at least six months. This last requirement demands that the inertia be for at least six months, meaning it is not established as a maximum period to act, but as a minimum time limit of inertia, ergo, it must be calculated from the last action in the case file and not from the opening of the procedure. This implies that in sanctioning procedures, initiated ex officio, lapse (caducidad) is feasible when these conditions concur. Regarding this concept, recently, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema), in judgment 34-F-S1-2011, stated in essence regarding the institute in question: \"</i>In the first place, it can be observed that the recently transcribed rule is drafted in an imperative form, that is, it does not regulate a power; on the contrary, once the factual prerequisites contained therein are fulfilled, the consequence becomes mandatory for the body in charge of the processing. This implies that its effects occur by operation of law, and therefore its recognition has merely declaratory effects, not constitutive ones. It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence—which is, by definition, inalienable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible according to section 66 LGAP—but solely as the impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific procedure in which the inertia occurred. </i>\" However, the procedural effects of lapse (caducidad) require that it be requested or declared within the procedure, precisely to put an end to it. This entails that the administrative decision issued after a six-month period of inertia attributable exclusively to the Administration, when lapse (caducidad) has not been alleged or declared, is entirely valid. From the doctrine of sections 59 in relation to 66, both of the LGAP, public powers are granted to be exercised. Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for the expiration of that competence due to time factors, is the public body unable to act. We have already explained that, as a general rule, powers do not expire due to the passage of the period set for exercising them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same section when it indicates that there will be a limitation of competence by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, we reiterate that precept 329 ibid. emphatically states that an act issued outside the deadline is valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly provided otherwise by law, which is not the case here. Lapse (caducidad) is an early form of terminating the procedure and as such, it must be decreed to generate that closing effect. Therefore, as long as it is not ordered, or at least not requested (since had it been requested, the issuance of a final act without considering whether the lapse (caducidad) applies would be null), it does not produce that procedural consequence. In this specific case, the Court finds that the elements that would allow declaring the lapse (caducidad) of the procedure are not present. First, the plaintiff bases the charge on the claim that the directing body initiated the procedure in January 2010 (which is not true, since as indicated supra, the initial order issued against the plaintiff is from April 2010) and concluded it in August of that year. However, lapse (caducidad) was never alleged during that constitutive phase. Rather, the defense is raised in the appellate phase, that is, once the final act had already been issued. Since it was not alleged in the constitutive phase of the procedure (the opportune procedural moment for such purposes), the final act, even if issued outside the deadline, is deemed valid, as provided by article 329 of the LGAP. Even more so when the inactivity alleged by the plaintiff does not refer to the appellate phase. In any case, the truth is that from the review of the different phases and incidents, it is also not observed that the procedure entered a period of abandonment or procedural inactivity exceeding six months. Therefore, the alleged lapse (caducidad) must be dismissed.\n\n***VII.- On the flaws (vicios) of the procedure.*** In this regard, the plaintiff essentially alleges two infractions. First, she questions the nature of the hearing (comparecencia). She claims that even though the procedure should have been private and confidential, she was summoned to an oral and public hearing (comparecencia), which was always publicized. The allegation must be dismissed. As we stated supra, although we are facing an administrative sanctioning procedure to which the provisions of the LGAP are generally applicable, the truth is that in matters of Public Finance (Hacienda Pública), some of those rules yield to specific and special regulations, which incorporate different rules regarding specific aspects (for example, the statute of limitations for the sanctioning power, as we already explained). Matters relating to the hearing (comparecencia) also have special nuances in this area. It is true that article 309 of the LGAP establishes that the ordinary procedure shall be conducted through an oral and private hearing (comparecencia oral y privada) with the Administration; but this rule yields to the provisions of article 10 of Law No. 8422. Said section clearly provides that, as a general rule, the hearings (comparecencias) referred to in the LGAP in administrative procedures conducted for infractions against the Public Finance Regime (Régimen de Hacienda Pública) shall be oral and public. It does admit that the directing body, through a reasoned resolution, may declare them private for reasons of decorum and the right to privacy of the parties or third parties, when it deems that the gathering of evidence is hindered or a secret whose disclosure is criminally punishable is jeopardized. Thus, in the specific case, no infraction is observed in the fact that she was summoned to a public (and not private) hearing (comparecencia), because that is what the special regulations in force for infractions against the Public Finance (Hacienda Pública) provide (as a general rule). Additionally, she complains that the procedure received coverage in the media. On this point, we insist that we are dealing with cases pursued for infractions against Public Finance (Hacienda Pública). Therefore, it is not surprising that, in some cases, the media cover these events due to the public interests they involve. Added to the above, it should be noted that the newspaper clippings she provides report on the sanction once it had already been imposed <i>(folios 243 and 244 of the judicial file), </i>meaning no infraction to the confidentiality that certain phases must maintain (though not the hearing (comparecencia)) is observed, and once the final resolution was notified, it was public information to which the press could well have had access. Nor is it demonstrated that the union of the National Emergency Commission (CNE) knew about the sanction before it had been notified to the plaintiff. The only union note brought to the process is the one on folios 245 and 246 of the judicial file; however, it does not allow reaching that conclusion as it refers to other matters and, furthermore, is dated November 1, 2010, that is, when the final act had already been issued and even the appeals against it had been filed. Thus, the plaintiff's claim is not accompanied (as it should be) by sufficient evidence to prove it, being merely unsupported subjective statements. Furthermore, a violation of due process is alleged. However, as the defendants assert, the plaintiff does not specify or clearly detail what those infractions consist of. Strictly speaking, we do not observe that substantive formalities of the procedure were omitted, whose correct execution would have changed the final decision or would have caused her defenselessness. The plaintiff was notified of the nature and purposes of the procedure, with a formal charge and description of the facts, as well as the indication of the possible sanction to be applied; her right to be heard was guaranteed, she intervened in the process, was heard, and had the opportunity to present arguments and produce the evidence she deemed pertinent; she was given the opportunity to prepare her arguments by having access to the information and administrative records related to the case. She was also guaranteed the right to technical defense and was represented and advised by lawyers and technicians of her choice. Finally, she was notified of the final decision issued, with the statement of the reasons on which it was based, and had the right to appeal it (just as she could challenge preparatory acts subject to ordinary appeals), and she was able to file the incidents she deemed necessary for her defense. From this perspective, the Court does not find that due process was violated during the procedure, which is why we proceed to the examination of the substantive allegations that the plaintiff makes against the final act.\n\n   ***VIII.- On the examination of the validity of the challenged formal conduct.*** Several substantive infractions are attributed to the sanctioning decision adopted by the CGR against the plaintiff. As a **first aspect**, the temporal element framing the facts giving rise to the sanction is questioned. The plaintiff alleges that she was not appointed at the CNE during the period indicated in the charges brought against her, specifically in the final period, i.e., from May 11, 2006. Therefore, she says, she could not be charged or sanctioned for those facts. Both the State and the CGR disagree with that position and state that the negligent conduct charged to the plaintiff occurred while she was appointed to her position. Now, in this process it was proven that Mrs. Rosales Ardón was appointed to the position of Executive Director of the CNE and served as such from April 1, 2005, until May 11, 2006. Furthermore, the act opening the procedure charges her with: <i>\"(...) a) Presumably, for having breached the duty of diligence, because <b>since October 3, 2005</b>, she knew of the need to coordinate with MINAE the donation of the strip of land and the easement (servidumbre), which was essential to build the bridge in Mortero, but apparently did not take any action until <b>May 24, 2006</b>, the date her work as Executive Director of the CNE ended, that is, for a period of 6 months and 22 calendar days. b) Presumably for delaying the bridge construction process in Mortero given that the permits and the location of the bridge could have been defined in much shorter timeframes if a more diligent effort had been undertaken and because, when the start order was issued, such permits were not available, causing the project a delay of 3 months 21 calendar days (from July 10, 2006 (fact 11) until November 1, 2006 (fact 16)) (...)\"</i>. From the literal wording of the first charge, it is clear that the omission attributed to the plaintiff is, in fact, delimited up to May 24, 2006, even though she had stopped working as Executive Director of the CNE on May 11 of that year. However, the Court finds that this inconsistency (in the cessation date) is not capable of generating the nullity of the proceedings for the following reasons. The factual matrix set out in the opening order (and which supports the charges) refers to official communication PRE-1342-05, of October 3, 2005, by which the Presidency of the CNE sent correspondence to the plaintiff and gave her instructions to carry out active conduct regarding the necessary donation of land to build a bridge; and it is complained that she concluded her functions at the CNE without having fulfilled what was established therein. Therefore, regardless of the apparent confusion or error regarding the cessation date incurred in the initial act of the procedure, from its comprehensive reading it is clear that it complains of an omission in complying with some of her specific functions as Executive Director of the CNE during the period from October 3, 2005, to the day she ceased her functions, which ultimately occurred on May 11, 2006. Then, the challenged act sanctions her, among other things, for the omission of her duties by not having taken any action aimed at ensuring compliance with the task entrusted in the cited official communication PRE-1342-05, while she served as Executive Director of the CNE. Thus, she is sanctioned for the omission of her duties while, it is clear, she exercised functions at the CNE. Therefore, it is not true that she was charged or sanctioned for facts or omissions that occurred when she was not performing the functions in question. We reiterate that this material error (and it is only that because the initial order also clearly delimits the charge to the time of cessation of functions) does not constitute an omission that, in accordance with article 223 of the LGAP, constitutes the nullity of the proceedings. Regarding the second charge, it is also not observed that facts originating after the plaintiff's cessation are charged. Note that, in essence, she is charged with delaying the construction process of the bridge in Mortero, for not having undertaken a more diligent effort on aspects related to the permits and the location of the bridge. It is not true that she is charged with having issued the order to start the project's execution, as the plaintiff seems to understand it; but only that with her omitted conduct at the time of issuing that start order, the necessary requirements were not in place and this caused a delay in the execution of the work. Then, the final act evaluates that aspect within the period when the plaintiff served as director of the CNE. Now, if what is complained is that both the initial and final acts refer to events occurring before or after the period when the plaintiff held the position in question, the truth is that these constitute simple factual references that allow the antecedents, as well as the consequences of the facts charged, to be placed in context and understood. But it in no way means that the performance or omission of those is being directly charged to her. We insist that the charges brought against the plaintiff were regarding two facts clearly determined in the initial order and it was for these that, finally, she was sanctioned. For the reasons stated, the alleged flaw is not observed, as the facts and omissions she was charged with and for which she was sanctioned occurred while she was Executive Director of the CNE. **Second**, it is questioned who was competent to perform the functions whose omission led to the plaintiff's sanction. In her thesis, the responsibility attributed to her by the oversight body is not chargeable to her because the supposed acts and omissions for which she was sanctioned were not her responsibility.\n\nIt maintains that those were the responsibility of the Executing Units (Unidades Ejecutoras), which were to designate the project supervisor, meet with him, coordinate and define the work plan as well as the manner in which periodic reports would be submitted and the procedure for the execution of the contract. Likewise, it was the responsibility of the project supervisor (and not her) to issue the start order. It bases its arguments on the provisions of the Executing Units Regulation (Reglamento de Unidades Ejecutoras), published in La Gaceta 172 of September 3, 2009. It reiterates that she was not part of the Executing Unit and to that extent, the responsibility sought to be attributed to her did not reach her. For its part, the State states that the obligation under analysis here was entrusted to the plaintiff in view of her position as Executive Director of CNE, which she had to fulfill in an exclusive and exclusionary manner. It affirms that the function did not belong to the Executing Units because these are appointed for the administration of works and projects financed by them, and to that extent they handle technical aspects of project execution and are compelled to abide by CNE's directives. It emphasizes that the coordination, the subject matter of this litigation, was the exclusive purview of the plaintiff due to her status as Executive Director. It cites, as support, Articles 6 and 8 of the National Emergency Law (Ley Nacional de Emergencias), in force at the time of the investigated events. Finally, the Office of the Comptroller General (CGR) states that the plaintiff's arguments on this point lack seriousness because they are based on a regulation that was not in force at the time of the events. It adds that, from a reading of the Manual of Functions and Processes of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of CNE (Manual de funciones y procesos de la Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras de la CNE), published in La Gaceta of June 1, 2001, it is clearly evident that the functions and objectives of those units address functions deployed internally within CNE. Therefore, the non-compliances for which it sanctions are not matters foreign to the Executive Directorate, because in any case, it was the superior hierarchical instance, and therefore a greater degree of responsibility is incumbent upon it. Having analyzed the point, the following must be noted. In this case, it is essential to keep in mind that the functions or duties deemed unfulfilled and for which the plaintiff is sanctioned consist of having omitted the due coordination with MINAET for the donation of a strip of land and an easement (servidumbre), knowing of the need since it was essential for building the bridge in Mortero, and having delayed the construction process of the aforementioned bridge given that the permits and the location of the bridge could have been defined in much shorter timeframes if a more agile effort had been made because, as the start order was issued without such permits being available, the project suffered a delay of 3 months and 21 calendar days. Having clarified this point, it must be defined who was competent to carry out the required conduct that was omitted. From the outset, the possibility of resorting to the Executing Units Regulation to resolve this issue must be ruled out. As the representatives of the CGR affirm, it is a regulation that was adopted on August 24, 2009, and was published in La Gaceta of September 3 of that same year. Therefore, we are faced with regulation that is not applicable because it was not in force at the time the events for which the plaintiff was ultimately sanctioned occurred, which took place between 2005 and 2006. It will be necessary, then, to review the legal system in force in those years to determine to whom the powers and functions whose omission is claimed here were attributed. At that time, Law No. 7914 of September 28, 1999, was in force (which was in force until November 22, 2005), which in its Article 18 established that the Executive Directorate would be composed of a Director, who would be responsible for the operational administration of the Institution; would serve as an official under a labor regime of trust, freely appointed and removed by the Board of Directors, and would be subordinate to the directives of the Board and the Presidency of the Commission. Likewise, its powers are indicated, among which it is relevant to mention the following: execute the agreements of the Board of Directors, as well as the decisions, tasks, or responsibilities that, as a result of delegation, the Presidency of the institution assigns to it; ensure that the dependencies or administrative units of the Commission fulfill their functions with the greatest efficiency, efficacy, and economy, within the most adequate and rational use of resources, according to the directives of the Board of Directors and the Presidency of the institution; execute the required measures that constitute, in the most effective manner, immediate, adequate, and timely responses to situations or states of necessity and urgency, in accordance with the directives of the Board of Directors and the Presidency of the institution. Subsequently, with Law No. 8488 of November 22, 2005, the Executive Directorate is maintained as responsible for the administration of the institution, with Article 20 again noting the subordination to the directives of the Board of Directors and those of the Presidency of the Commission, as well as the obligation to render accounts for its actions. The same regulation attributes to it, among others, the following functions: program and coordinate the activities of the Commission with other public and private institutions, to comply with the policies and achieve the objectives of the institution, within the guidelines issued by the Executive Branch; be responsible for the general administration of the Commission, for which it will be in charge of the Institution's programs and must ensure that the dependencies or administrative units fulfill their functions with the greatest efficiency, efficacy, and economy, within the most adequate and rational use of resources, according to the directives of the Board of Directors and the Presidency of the Institution; conduct and execute institutional actions oriented toward the articulation of the National Risk Management System (Sistema Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo), under the directives of the Board of Directors and the Presidency; as well as any other responsibility assigned to it by the Board of Directors and the Presidency and that is consistent with the level of powers it holds by reason of its position. Now, keeping this scenario in mind, it must be indicated that in this process it was proven that through Agreement 0102004, adopted by the Board of Directors of CNE in ordinary session No. 1-04 of February 12, 2004, the Investment Plan of MOPT and SENARA, presented for the attention of the emergency of Decree No. 31540-MP-MOPT, was approved. Said agreement included the project referred to as \"Bridges over the Río Mortero\" (\"Puentes sobre el Río Mortero\") (folios 1 to 20 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Within that framework, through official letter PRE-1104-05 of August 16, 2005, the President of CNE requested the Minister of Environment and Energy his collaboration so that the department would authorize the donation of a strip of land and authorize the use of the easement (servidumbre) crossing the Subregional Office of that Ministry in the canton of Sarapiquí. This was for the purpose of building the bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo de Mortero. He warned of the need for this donation to avoid delaying the execution of the work and indicated the following geographical coordinates of the site where the bridge would be built: 539.200 (EAST)-263.300 (NORTH) and attached the corresponding plan (folio 29 and 30 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Then, in official letter SD-08 of September 23, 2005, the Deputy Director of the Central Volcanic Mountain Range Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Cordillera Volcánica Central) of MINAE communicated to the president of CNE, regarding what is relevant, her doubts concerning the required donation and the use of the easement (servidumbre), warning him that they needed more data to initiate the corresponding procedures (folios 31 and 32 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Finally, through official letter PRE-1342-05 of October 3, 2005, the president of CNE sent to the plaintiff and to the Chief of the Comptrollership of Executing Units (Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras) of that entity a copy of the cited official letter SD-08 for them to analyze it and \"(…) resolve with Vice-Minister Allan Flores or Mr. Carlos Manuel, both from MINAE (…)\" (folios 70 to 73 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). From the foregoing, it is clear to the Court that the President of CNE delegated and assigned to the plaintiff a specific task, which corresponded to coordination tasks and was essential so that other administrative units (among them, the Executing Unit) could fulfill their functions with the greatest efficiency, efficacy, and economy, within the most adequate and rational use of resources, in order to duly attend to the emergency referred to the construction of the bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo de Mortero. It was, moreover, a coordination with another public institution (MINAE) required to comply with the aforementioned Emergency Decree and to execute the construction of the bridge in question. Thus, coordination with MINAE to obtain the donation of the land and the easement (servidumbre) required for the construction of the referenced bridge was a duty incumbent upon the plaintiff, in her capacity as Executive Director; this is so not only because it forms part of the powers that the cited regulations attribute to her, but also because it is a task that was delegated or assigned to her by the President of CNE, and to whose fulfillment she was subordinate, as is evident from the cited regulations. Contrary to what the plaintiff argues, the functions attributed to the Executing Units (or their Comptrollership) are specific to the execution of the project and not to the prior coordination with other institutions external to CNE. We reiterate that the Executing Units Regulation is not applicable to this case because that regulation did not exist at the time of the events discussed here. At most, Agreement 520-2001, issued by the Board of Directors of CNE on February 21, 2001, could be taken into account, wherein the functions and processes of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of CNE are regulated, keeping in mind, however, that it is an infra-legal regulation that could not modify the legal powers attributed to the Executive Directorate of CNE. Added to the above, from the review of the agreement it is concluded that the Comptrollership of Executing Units controls and supervises those responsible for project execution, without carrying out coordination tasks that, we reiterate, are specific to the Executive Directorate. It is noted that the only function attributed to it in that sense is coordination with the heads of the Executing Units, on aspects such as the pre-offer visit, bidding processes, payment processing, purchase requests, project inspections, and progress reports; and these have nothing to do with the unfulfilled duties attributed to the plaintiff and which, we insist, are prior to the execution of the work and must be coordinated with the heads of other state organs and entities. Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that the challenged resolution is a violation of the Principle of Legality or of due legal certainty, given that we reiterate, the duties for which the plaintiff is accused of non-compliance were indeed within her scope of competence. Having clearly established, then, that the facts, duties, and omissions censured occurred within the time the plaintiff was Executive Director of CNE and concern aspects within her own competence, it is now appropriate to examine the arguments offered regarding compliance or non-compliance with those duties themselves. The foregoing is for the purpose of being able to determine whether or not there are defects of legality in the sanction imposed.\n\n**IX.-** At this third level of analysis, it must be indicated that the plaintiff's defense has revolved around three aspects. **First**, she maintains that what relates to the design and construction of the bridge lacked current interest and legal existence for the purposes at hand, because the Tender EMER-035-05 had been declared unsuccessful as of September 21, 2005 (that is, before she received the official letter PRE-1342-05). In such a scenario, she argues, it was not consistent with the Principle of Legality for her to carry out any action relating to such tender, especially since it was a period of intense activity regarding emergencies, as the CGR itself had established. The State states that according to Article 15 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), the declaration of unsuccessful tender entails only the initiation of a new contractual procedure, without it implying the halting of the necessary actions to obtain the prior elements required before the start of the work. For its part, the CGR maintains that what occurred in the contracting process does not affect, nor has any incidence on, the omissions incurred by the plaintiff. It adds that this failure in the duty of diligence becomes evident at the moment the awarded company starts the construction of the work, which allows establishing that there is no relationship between the vicissitudes of the contracting procedures and the non-compliances of Ms. Rosales Ardón. To resolve this point, we deem it necessary to establish that here it has been proven that there was an Emergency Decree that established, as a need to resolve, the construction of a bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo de Mortero, for which purpose CNE was provided with the respective budget. Also, that since February 2005, the Director of the Bridge Design Department of MOPT recommended the site identified as 1 (plan P-747-B) for the construction of a 117-meter suspension bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo for the community of Mortero, in Horquetas de Sarapiquí, located in the vicinity of a public road existing previously in front of the facilities of the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications. This was because it was technically the safest site and the lowest cost of intervention in the combined solution of bridge with new road (it is inferred from folios 43 to 46 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). While the plaintiff Rosales Ardón was appointed to the position of Executive Director of CNE as of April 1, 2005, there is no doubt that as part of her responsibilities, she should have informed herself of which emergencies at that time required prompt attention and had a budget assigned for it. And it was so because through official letter CUE-699-GM 2005 of June 7, 2005, the Chief of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of CNE requested the plaintiff to submit to the Board of Directors of CNE a request to supplement the budget for the work corresponding to the design and construction of the bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo (folios 22 to 24 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Now, it is true that on September 21, 2005, the Restricted Tender No. EMER-35-2005, corresponding to the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero\" was declared unsuccessful; but it is also true that on that same day, the plaintiff communicated to the Procurement Office (Proveeduría) of CNE not only the declaration of unsuccessful tender in question, but also warned that due to the importance of the work and the delays in the contracting process, it was necessary to re-issue the tender as soon as possible (folios 158 of the administrative file for Restricted Tender No. EMER-35-2005, corresponding to the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero\"). Therefore, a verified emergency did exist (because it was included in the respective Decree) and the budget to resolve it, so much so that the plaintiff herself stated the need to re-issue the tender, as indeed happened. For this reason, the plaintiff's arguments to the effect that the law did not require her to re-tender the unsuccessful subject matter, nor set a specific deadline for it, are entirely inappropriate. If we are facing emergency situations, the measures adopted are not, as a general rule, the ordinary ones provided for. Especially when she herself knew (because she expressly stated so) that the need and emergency remained latent and the bridge had to be built to guarantee the superior public interests (such as people's lives) that were at stake. Therefore, the Court does not find that failure to give the appropriate attention and action to official letter PRE-1342-05 can be justified under the argument of the declaration of unsuccessful tender. There is not a single element that permits even doubting CNE's decision to re-tender the construction of the bridge. Rather, it is proven that it was always clear that it was indeed necessary. Therefore, the plaintiff had to fulfill the assigned tasks in pursuit of efficient and timely attention to the emergency in question. By not having adopted any positive action aimed at coordinating with MINAE the donation of the strip of land, the easement (servidumbre), and the necessary permits, she omitted the exercise of the entrusted powers and breached the Principle of Legality in its positive aspect which, as we will explain later, had a negative impact on the achievement of the public interest she was obliged to protect. Diligent conduct would have led to progressively advancing the task entrusted by the Executive Presidency (to which, in any case, she was subordinate) so that by the time the new tender was opened and awarded, the land on which the bridge was technically to be built would have already been donated, or at least there would be an agreement between the corresponding heads for it. The foregoing is reinforced by the fact that according to the General Specifications for the Construction of Roads, Highways, and Bridges of Costa Rica (Especificaciones Generales para la Construcción de Carreteras, Caminos y Puentes de Costa Rica), adopted as official standards by CNE itself in Board of Directors session No. 01-04 on February 12, 2004, there was an obligation on the part of the interested Administration (in this case CNE) to acquire the necessary right-of-way in advance of the start of the work. In any case, it should not be overlooked that, ultimately, the Executive Director was subordinate to the fulfillment of the tasks or responsibilities assigned to her by the Executive Presidency, as well as to executing the required measures that constitute, in the most effective manner, immediate, adequate, and timely responses to situations or states of necessity and urgency, in accordance with the directives of the Presidency of CNE, as is evident from subsections a) and d) of Article 18 of Law No. 7914 and Article 20 of Law No. 8488. In the case at bar, it was demonstrated that the plaintiff did not give due attention to the official letter sent by the Executive Presidency of CNE, for which the aforementioned declaration of unsuccessful tender is not an impediment, as we pointed out. Note that she never justified the reasons why she did not execute the task entrusted by the Presidency, nor is she within the assumption of Article 108 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), which would have compelled her to disobey the order of the Presidency of CNE. In any case, even if the plaintiff considered that attending to the task entrusted by the Presidency was contrary to the legal system (by virtue of the declaration of unsuccessful tender, as she has been alleging) and a violation of the Principle of Legality, she had to execute it and absolve her responsibility in the terms established by Article 109 of the LGAP, but not even that is evidenced in the file. The plaintiff simply and plainly did not execute any positive action (while she was in the position of Executive Director) aimed at fulfilling the assigned task, an omission which, in reality, does prove contrary to the Principle of Legality in its positive aspect and harmed the public interests that were at stake. We insist that later, in January 2006, CNE opened the tender for Emergency Contracting No. 012-2006, corresponding to the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero\", with the same objective as the one previously declared unsuccessful. However, as a result of the plaintiff's neglect and omission regarding the effort to secure from MINAET the donation of the required lands, the necessary easements (servidumbres), and the respective permits, the fact is that at the time of its award, these were not available, which in itself already violated the provisions of the General Specifications for the Construction of Roads, Highways, and Bridges of Costa Rica, to which CNE self-obligated when it adopted them as its own. It was not until June 2006, when the plaintiff had already left her position, that the President of CNE saw the need to retake the issue and fulfill the task that Rosales Ardón never executed. Then, through official letter PRE-770-2006, the President of CNE finally responded to the cited official letter SD-08 (the handling of which, we reiterate, had been entrusted since October 2005 to the plaintiff, without her giving it due attention), indicating to the Deputy Director of the Central Volcanic Mountain Range Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Cordillera Volcánica Central) of MINAE the actions that CNE could carry out and requesting a prompt response to the procedure, considering that the emergency being attended to, it would be willing to bring the matter before the Board of Directors (folio 33 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Up to this point, it is clear to the Court that the plaintiff left her position without having fully attended to (for approximately seven months) the task assigned to her through official letter PRE-1342-05, despite the emergency that served as its basis; that as a consequence, the tender for the construction of the bridge was awarded without the necessary donations and permits being available; and that it was not until the plaintiff had left her position that the President of CNE managed with MINAET the inputs required for the construction of the bridge. The foregoing denotes negligent and omission-based conduct by the plaintiff regarding the fulfillment of her duties, which finds no justification in Law and which the Court cannot overlook. But furthermore, the plaintiff's lack of diligence (by not having processed the corresponding official letter PRE-1342-05) resulted in the fact that although the start of execution of the work corresponding to the design and construction of the bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero was ordered for July 10, 2006 (folio 34 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR), it had to be suspended \"(…) because the right-of-way was not available, as indicated in Article 107.16 of the CR77. Given that the construction of the bridge will be carried out on a property of MINAE and the respective communications with the representatives of said ministry do not exist, the entry of the crews and equipment necessary to start the work is impossible (…)\" (folio 34 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). It was not until August 3, 2006, when through resolution R-SINAC-DG-032-2006, the Director General of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, hereinafter SINAC) ordered to grant a use permit to MOPT over a strip of 331.38 square meters, on farm registration number 4-159877-000, surveyed plan No. H-042649-1997, specifically on its western boundary with the right bank of the Río Puerto Viejo, a property owned by MINAET. This for the purpose of installing anchorage number 1 of the bridge over the mentioned river. Likewise, the Directorate of the Central Volcanic Mountain Range Conservation Area was instructed to initiate the procedure for donating the strip used for the construction of the anchorage for the referenced bridge (folios 37 to 42 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Thus, once the land and required permits were available, on November 1, 2006, the awarded company was ordered to resume the works corresponding to the execution of the work referred to as the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero\" (folios 48 and 49 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). We consider that the plaintiff did incur a failure in the duty of probity because from what has been analyzed, it is clear that she did not orient her management toward the satisfaction of the public interest, which is aggravated if one takes into account that we are facing an emergency that even involved the right to life of the inhabitants of the Mortero area and which obligated making the greatest efforts in the construction of the bridge in question. The plaintiff did not attend to that priority collective necessity in a planned, regular, efficient, and continuous manner (insofar as she never processed the task assigned in official letter PRE-1342-05), nor did she demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her by law (insofar as she did not exercise them at all), nor did she manage public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, efficacy, economy, and efficiency. We are of the opinion that an action consistent with the duty of probity established in Article 4 of Law No. 8422 would have entailed giving priority to obtaining the MINAE land and the permits and easements (servidumbres) required for the construction of the Bridge over Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero. This was a task of institutional coordination (and not of work execution) specific to her position, which had been entrusted to her and which, simply, she omitted. As a **second argument**, it is pointed out that due to the subject matter of the tender, until the bridge design was completed, the place where the buttresses would be placed and the bridge structure would rest could not be determined with certainty. However, the Court does not share that thesis. Strictly speaking, the place where the bridge would be built had been defined since 2005, when the Director of the Bridge Design Department of MOPT sent to the Director of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of CNE the technical terms of reference and the preliminary design plan recommended by that Directorate, in relation to the Tender for the Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero, explaining why the chosen site was the technically safest and lowest cost (folio 25 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR). Even through official letter CUE-711-CP of July 8, 2005, DE-640-05 of September 21, 2005, the Comptrollership of Executing Units communicated to the Chief of that department, among other aspects, that in the meeting they held with representatives of the Municipality of Sarapiquí de Heredia, the Mayor stated \"(…) that the entrance to provide access to the bridge is located on property of MINAE, so this strip of land must also be acquired. (…)\". A photograph with the approximate site for the construction of the bridge was also attached. This was also reiterated, in 2009, by the Director of the Bridge Design Department of MOPT, who warns that CNE knew since 2005 not only what the appropriate place was for the construction of the bridge and the preliminary design plan P-747-B, but also the need to obtain the donation of the land and the required permits.\n\nIt further confirms that the first order to suspend the work was issued because when the construction company arrived at the site, the SINAC Conservation Area prevented entry because there was no superior order to permit construction of the bridge. It was at that moment, he explains, that the donation process was resumed, which concluded with Resolution R-SINAC-DG-032-2006 already cited <i>(folios 43 to 46 of Volume I of the digital file submitted by the CGR).</i> Although the communication from the Director of the MOPT Bridge Design Department indicates that a modification was necessary to relocate the bridge approximately 30 meters upstream from Site I, the fact is that this occurred after the plaintiff left her position and that, in any case, the donation of the property by MINAET was always required. The foregoing speaks to the need to process that procedure prior to the construction of the bridge and reflects the plaintiff’s non-compliance and omission (conducta omisiva) in that regard. Thus, aside from the two bidding processes and the other emergencies that afflicted the country at that time (the latter element which, in any case, was indeed considered a mitigating factor for liability), the fact of the matter is that the plaintiff’s failure to give communication PRE-1342-05 the proper processing, her failure to coordinate with MINAET the donation of the property on which the bridge would be built, and her failure to secure the required permits did cause delays in the execution of this project, which we reiterate was a priority. Had the coordination with MINAET and the permits at least been processed, the construction of the bridge would have been completed in less time (as was the plaintiff’s duty) or, at least, would have encountered one fewer obstacle. Proof of this is that once the President of the CNE resumed the matter (when the plaintiff had already left her post), it took him approximately two months to secure the respective donation, whereas the plaintiff had approximately seven months to carry out the assigned task without, in the end, executing it. It is not true that the defendant is being sanctioned for having issued the work start order without having the required prerequisites in place. She is sanctioned because she was negligent and, knowing that she had to do it (because the Executive Presidency had assigned it to her), she did not coordinate (for a good part of her tenure) with MINAE the donation of the land for the construction of the bridge or the corresponding permits, and her omission delayed the bridge construction process. And the Tribunal considers that what has been proven confirms that the plaintiff’s conduct indeed constitutes a violation of the duty of probity in the terms set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of Law 8422, as well as that this involves an omission, delay, negligence, or imprudence in the preservation and safeguarding of public assets or rights, which are sanctionable, regardless of whether damage or injury has materialized, just as provided in Article 110, subsections b) and r) of Law No. 8131. And this point is important because the plaintiff alleges that there is no causal link between the fault and the alleged damage caused. On this point, the following clarifications are necessary. First, the plaintiff is not being held patrimonially liable, but only disciplinary liability. Second, within the latter and pursuant to the cited norms, faults in the terms described are sanctionable, even if no damage existed. Third, based on the evidence in the record, it is undeniable that the delays in the construction of the aforementioned bridge (some of which stem from the negligent and omission conduct of the plaintiff, as has been explained) had a negative impact not only on the Public Treasury (due to a potential increase in cost by virtue of the delays) but also on the interests of the community, insofar as, despite the emergency declaration, the project’s execution did not have efficient management. However, we insist that this proceeding is not quantifying or holding the plaintiff patrimonially liable for this. The defendant is also not correct when she alleges that the challenged resolution is dissimilar to Decision PA-66-2010, also issued by the CGR. On one hand, these are two different procedures (although related to the construction of the bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo de Mortero): the proceeding in which Resolution PA-66-2010 was issued questions the technical performance of the Execution Units Comptroller’s Office, whereas this one claims the plaintiff’s liability for the omission conduct she had in specific aspects of the construction of that same bridge. Furthermore, it should be noted that in Resolution PA-66-2010, suspension sanctions are also imposed on the officials whose faults in their performance were proven. Finally, as a **third argument**, the plaintiff alleges certain defects regarding the admission and assessment of evidence, as well as in the resolution deciding the appeal. However, these also prove unfounded for the following reasons. Regarding the evidence, the rejection of suitable expert evidence is challenged. In this regard, it should be noted that offered evidence can rightly be inadmissible when it is irrelevant. In the case at hand, it suffices to observe the facts alleged to determine the relevance or irrelevance of the offered evidence. The plaintiff had proceedings initiated against her for omission conduct, without demonstrating that the assigned duties were fulfilled and that, therefore, the alleged inactivity and negligent conduct did not exist. We share the view of the deciding body that, for such proof, expert evidence was unnecessary and irrelevant. The plaintiff had to fulfill a task assigned by the Executive Presidency and she had to demonstrate that she did so. If that was not the case, an expert statement will not justify the omission incurred. Nor is it true that the challenged resolution issues judgments typical of an engineering expert. The formal conduct examined proves the omission incurred by the plaintiff, drawing on the evidence contained in the record for that purpose. That proceeding did not discuss technical aspects related to the tenders or the bridge design, because they are not relevant to proving the omission that was alleged and which was proven. With respect to the alleged pretermission of evidence, the plaintiff does not detail which evidence was not considered, which prevents this Tribunal from ruling on that matter. However, it must be noted that a sound exercise of the rules of sound criticism is observed, in that it explains why each of the listed facts is considered proven and the reasons why no probative value is given to the evidentiary elements presented by the defendant. Regarding the generic deficiencies that one seeks to attribute to the resolutions that decided the appeals filed by the plaintiff, it must be noted, on one hand, that the defects specifically alleged are not detailed. The foregoing, coupled with the fact that the plaintiff did not directly challenge those administrative acts (when she could well have done so by virtue of the provisions of Articles 33 and 36, subsection b) of the CPCA), prevents the Tribunal from entering into their examination with the required specificity. However, it should be noted that a generic review allows for the conclusion that the grievances raised in the appeals were resolved in a concrete manner or by remission and by confirming what was decided in the final act. Moreover, the final conduct is grounded in the terms required by subsection 136 of the LGAP, as it expresses the motives for the act, both those of law that form the legal basis and those of fact that ultimately provoke the administrative action and decision.\n\n**X.-** In conclusion, for the reasons set forth in the preceding Considerandos, the Tribunal considers that the challenged decision substantially conforms to the legal system, as it was issued by the competent body, in accordance with the Organic Law of the CGR, has a legitimate motive that existed just as it was taken into account for issuing the final act (Articles 132 and 133 of the LGAP), insofar as it was demonstrated that the plaintiff left her position in April 2006 without having coordinated with MINAE the donation of the strip of land and easement required for the construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo de Mortero, even though this was required of her by the Executive Presidency of the CNE since October 2005 to resolve the emergency afflicting that area. It was also demonstrated that her omission conduct delayed the construction of the aforementioned bridge, with negative consequences for the inhabitants of that area. The foregoing allows for the affirmation that a failure in the duty of probity was incurred in the terms set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 8422, as well as the liability-generating conduct established in subsection 110, subsections a) and r) of Law No. 8131. Thus, what is ordered is lawful, clear, and possible, and covers the issues of fact and law arising from the motive. Indeed, the imposed sanction constitutes the legal consequence, as the factual premise established by subsections 3 and 4 (of Law No. 8422) and 110 (of Law No. 8131) already cited was demonstrated. Moreover, it is a reasonable and proportionate sanction relative to the facts that were deemed proven. On one hand, its assessment took into account the criteria set forth in Article 108 of Law No. 8131, and a mitigating factor (the existence of various emergencies that also required attention at the time of the events) was even applied when establishing the respective sanction. On the other hand, note that, strictly speaking, the sanction is imposed for the failure in the duty of probity and the infraction contemplated in Article 110, subsections a) and r) of Law No. 8131 (that is, for the omission, delay, negligence, or imprudence in the preservation and safeguarding of public assets or rights, or the adoption of wilful actions against their protection, regardless of whether damage or injury has materialized, and other conduct or omissions that result in the diminution, affectation, or detriment to the Financial Administration of the State or its institutions). But a more benevolent norm was also applied, namely Article 113 of the aforementioned Law No. 8131, which establishes a suspension with pay of eight days to one month, rather than the sanction established by Article 39 of Law No. 8422. And within that norm (subsection 113), we insist, the minimum sanction was applied, namely, eight days of suspension. Moreover, this is an act grounded in the terms required by subsection 136 of the LGAP, and no substantial formalities are observed to have been omitted in the proceeding that would have changed the final decision or generated defenselessness. Finally, the Tribunal considers that the act satisfies the purpose referred to in subsection 131 of the LGAP, as it safeguards the public interests behind ensuring that the actions of public officials are honest, efficient, and conform to the legal system, especially in cases involving emergency situations, such as the one before us.\n\nTherefore, following the pertinent legality review, the alleged defects must be dismissed, and the actions taken by the CGR and the sanction ordered against the plaintiff must be confirmed, as they are in accordance with the law.\n\n**IV.- On the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the exercise of sanctioning power in matters of Public Finance (Hacienda Pública).** The plaintiff alleges a violation of the principle of legal certainty, as the matter was decided outside the legal time limits established for its resolution, i.e., when both the expiration of proceedings (caducidad) and the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the proceeding had already taken effect. Despite the poor legal technique used to frame the charge, the Court understands that, strictly speaking, it refers to two different defects. On one hand, the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the exercise of sanctioning power; on the other, the statute of limitations (prescripción) and expiration of proceedings (caducidad) of the proceeding itself, and their analysis will proceed in that order. Regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), it must be noted that this requires the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inaction by the holder of a right in its exercise, b) the passage of the time period set by the legal system in that inaction by the holder, and c) the plea or objection by the passive subject of the legal relationship to assert the statute of limitations (prescripción). This means that no liberatory effect exists if, despite the occurrence of the first two prerequisites, the objection is not raised. This is because the statute of limitations (prescripción) follows a party-driven principle and, unlike the expiration of proceedings (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. Regarding the exercise of sanctioning power, the foregoing implies that the holder of the right is the administrative superior or the person with the competence to exercise the aforementioned power-duty, while the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to corrective power only for the period expressly established by the applicable regulations; once that period expires, their power to request recognition of the loss of hierarchical authority emerges. From this viewpoint, there is no doubt that this is a corrective power that, by reason of legal certainty, is subject to a statute of limitations period (plazo prescriptivo). Generically, this period is governed by Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), a rule that sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power. However, it must be noted that this is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate different rules on this matter. Such is the case, for example, that arises in affairs of Public Finance (Hacienda Pública), the situation that concerns us here. For this type of proceeding, the applicable period is that regulated by Laws No. 8292 (Article 43), 8422 (Article 44), and 8131 (Article 112). This is a regulatory system that constitutes a sectoral framework containing specific rules, which, being special, prevail over general regulations. At their core, these rules refer to the regime established in Precept 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428. This latter rule states, in its core: *\"The administrative liability of the public official for infractions established in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal framework shall be time-barred (prescribirá) according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall be time-barred in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious —understood as an act that requires an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity— liability shall be time-barred in five years, counted from the date on which the report of the respective investigation or audit is brought to the attention of the superior or the official competent to initiate the respective proceeding. (...)\"*. There is no doubt that the plaintiff was subjected to a sanctioning administrative proceeding of the Public Finance (Hacienda Pública). It is therefore evident that, in this case, the applicable statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción) is the five-year period regulated in the rules indicated above. Now, it is clear that the expiration of the period granted to exercise corrective power is subject to the interruption causes (causales de interrupción) established either by Article 876 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) or those provided for in Precept 977 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio). It is worth specifying that interruption causes (causales de interrupción)—which cause the prescriptive period to start anew—can only produce that effect insofar as they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, since even if they occur, if the period has expired, a simple plea of negative prescription leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by the inaction in its exercise.\n\nNonetheless, it must be understood that the interruption does not occur with the mere opening of the proceeding, but with the proper service of the order that deems the matter formally initiated, in accordance with articles 140, 239, 240, and 243 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, hereinafter LGAP). Now, in the case under review, the plaintiff is accused of negligent actions and omissions related to the design and construction of the bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo de Mortero, in which she allegedly incurred from October 5, 2005, until May 11, 2006. It is precisely from these dates (in which the actions or omissions that threaten the Public Treasury (la Hacienda Pública) are claimed) that the five years applicable to this matter must be calculated. Subsequently, the act initiating the proceeding was issued at 1:30 p.m. on April 8, 2010, was served, and by June of that year, an oral and public hearing had been scheduled. Pursuant to the foregoing, service of that initiating order generates an interrupting effect on the statute of limitations, which has occurred in this case, given that at the time of its service (and even when the hearing took place), the five years set for the expiration of the corrective power had not yet elapsed (which would have been completed by October 2010, when the matter was already resolved in its constitutive phase). From this perspective, it is evident that at the time of the opening of the proceeding, the statute of limitations for exercising the right to sanction offenses regarding the Public Treasury by the CGR had not yet run, which implies the rejection of the alleged defect. It should also be added that while the administrative proceeding is being processed, the various internal acts issued during its course produce an equally interrupting effect on the aforementioned period, provided they seek the effective prosecution of the matter and not mere formal stratagems to circumvent the time limits applicable to the proceeding. However, if the process falls into inertia or abandonment attributable to the Administration for a period exceeding six months, and upon the express request of the official under investigation, the expiration (caducidad) of that proceeding is decreed, in accordance with article 340, subsection 3) of the LGAP. Precisely, it is necessary to analyze the temporal element regarding the processing of this proceeding, as part of the claim is the statute of limitations and expiration of this proceeding due to the state of abandonment to which it was allegedly subjected, a topic addressed below.\n\n**V.- Regarding the statute of limitations of the proceeding.** As stated, the plaintiff claims the statute of limitations of the proceeding because it was resolved outside the time limits legally established for such purposes. On this particular point, we believe the plaintiff is also incorrect. In effect, the principle of prompt and complete justice implies, for administrative proceedings, that they must be resolved, as a general rule, by a final act, within reasonable and proportional time limits, avoiding subjecting the recipient to unduly long and tedious proceedings. It therefore constitutes an expression of the principle of legal certainty, insofar as it requires the definition of the matter within the proper temporal framework. The complexity or simplicity of the proceeding could not justify arbitrarily long proceedings, as this would condone an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and at its sole discretion, the power to resolve the dispute, clearly undermining the aforementioned certainty and clearly violating due process. In this vein, article 261, subsection 1) of the LGAP states that \"*The administrative proceeding must be concluded, by a final act, within two months of its initiation or, as the case may be, after the filing of the complaint or petition by the interested party, unless this law provides otherwise.*\" The same period is established by article 32 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (CPCA). Both rules essentially state that, once the indicated periods have expired without the Administration issuing a final act, the recipient may consider the petition rejected, by negative silence (silencio negativo), in order to file administrative appeals or seek jurisdictional protection. It is clear that the concept of negative silence currently serves a protective function for the recipient and not an administrative privilege, as was previously understood. It provides the possibility of understanding the claim as rejected in order to resort to other instances and not be subject to awaiting a formal act from the Administration. With the merely optional nature of exhausting administrative remedies, silence represents a guarantee for the individual, enabling them to resort to other legal means to seek protection of their legal situation, not as a prerequisite for obtaining an appealable act, but to overcome the administrative inertia in defining their legal relationship. Now, the powers of imperium are not subject to statutes of limitations (article 66, subsection 1) of the LGAP), an aspect that justifies what is stated in article 329, subsection 3) of the cited LGAP, in that an act issued outside the time limit shall be valid for all legal purposes, except where otherwise expressly provided by law. A clear example of these exceptions is positive silence (i.e., a presumed act - articles 330 *ejusdem* in relation to 139 -), a case in which, when correctly declared or having occurred, the principle of the irrevocability of one's own acts applies, implying the impossibility for the Administration to disregard that effect, under penalty of absolute nullity for violation of article 34 of the Constitution. In this example of positive silence, it is precisely due to a temporal factor that the competence to issue the act is lost, but not the competence to seek the means of suppressing the presumed act. Having said this, it is worth clarifying, despite its imperative wording (characteristic of a prescriptive normative method), the two-month period established by article 261, subsection 2 of the LGAP is not peremptory but merely directory (ordenatorio), which follows from what has been stated regarding the Administration's duty to exercise its powers and the initial validity of acts issued outside the time limit advocated by article 329 *ibidem*. Such a position can also be seen in Judgment No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. This applies both to proceedings initiated ex officio and those initiated at the request of a party. In the latter case, despite the exercise of the power to invoke the effects of negative silence, the Administration may well issue the act, which would broaden the debate in the appellate phase, whether administrative or jurisdictional. From this perspective, neither the investigative power of the proceeding nor the proceeding itself is extinguished if the time limit in question has been exceeded. Although the structure of the ordinary proceeding would suggest that the aforementioned time limit must always be respected, it is clear that the complexity of a matter and the vicissitudes inherent in its course may lead to longer periods. The determining factor, then, lies in the proceeding showing signs of activity and not unjustified delays, in accordance with the principles of promptness and prosecutorial impetus (principio de celeridad e impulso procesal) - articles 222 and 225 of the LGAP -, such that its duration is not the product of arbitrary conduct or inertia, because that is sanctioned by figures such as expiration (caducidad) - article 340 *ibidem* -, a topic to be analyzed below. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the directory (not peremptory) nature of the mentioned time limit does not speak to the necessary validity of acts issued within proceedings whose delay exceeds the normal threshold of reasonableness. Indeed, an unreasonable duration of the proceeding can lead to the nullity of the actions taken due to the violation of the principle of prompt and complete justice (which this Court must also protect). In this regard, one can observe what was stated in precedents No. 2007-3140 and 2007-6758, both from the Constitutional Court. In the former, it was emphatically stated: \"*Now, from the moment an administrative proceeding begins until the issuance of the final act, a reasonable and proportional period must elapse, taking into account the actions of the parties, the complexity of the matter, and the legal time limits established for each case, so that the Administration may have a prudent period, but without incurring undue delays that obstruct the proceeding… this Court finds that the time taken by the respondent from the moment the proceeding began, to date, far from being justifiable, is excessive, unreasonable, and to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the petitioner, due to the unjustified delay incurred by the respondent administration.*\" That judgment is cited by the First Chamber in Judgment No. 34-2011 already mentioned. Thus, it must be reiterated that not every proceeding lasting more than two months entails the nullity of the actions taken, but only to the extent that the period is unreasonable, which must be weighed in each case, considering the processing and complexity of the actions taken. In this matter, from the analysis of the factual scenario set forth and which has been deemed proven, it is observed that the proceeding was conducted in observance of the principles of promptness and ex officio prosecutorial impetus, which govern these matters, without evidence of delays warranting a declaration of nullity. Note that the initiating act was issued on April 8, 2010 (and not in January of that year, as the plaintiff erroneously claims), the hearing took place in June, and the final act was issued in August of that same year. Thus, the constitutive phase lasted approximately four months; a period deemed reasonable (considering the type of offense alleged and that it involves several allegedly responsible officials) and proportional, without observing any periods of abandonment that would violate the principle of promptness, concentration, and effective administrative protection.\n\n**VI.- Regarding the expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding.** The plaintiff also claims the expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding by virtue of its duration exceeding the regulated time limits. The concept of expiration (caducidad) is regulated in article 340 of the LGAP, a rule that was amended by article 200, subsection 10 of the CPCA. Said rule states: *\"1) When the proceeding is halted for more than six months by virtue of a cause exclusively attributable to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, expiration (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it concerns the case provided for in the final paragraph of article 339 of this Code* **(referring to the LGAP itself and not to the CPCA)** *. 2) Expiration (caducidad) of a proceeding initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased to act because positive or negative silence has occurred, or when the file is ready for the issuance of the final act. 3) The expiration (caducidad) of the administrative proceeding does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the proceedings are deemed not to have been pursued, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations.* \" The analysis of the nature of this concept allows us to conclude that it is a legal fact within the proceeding, justified as a means of avoiding the excessive prolongation of proceedings, in the interests of legal certainty, as well as the need to ensure the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It is unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act. For it to operate, according to the aforementioned rule, expiration (caducidad) requires several elements. First, that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity. Second, that this stagnation is the product of causes attributable to the interested party, when initiated at the request of a party, or to the Administration, if it was initiated ex officio. Third, that this state has been maintained for a period of at least six months. This last requirement demands that the inertia be for at least six months, meaning, it does not constitute a maximum time limit for acting, but rather a minimum temporal threshold of inertia, ergo, it must be calculated from the last action within the file and not from the initiation of the proceeding. This implies that in sanctioning proceedings, initiated ex officio, expiration (caducidad) is feasible when these prerequisites concur. Regarding this concept, recently, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in Judgment 34-F-S1-2011, stated essentially on the institution under discussion: \"*In the first place, it can be observed that the rule just transcribed is drafted in an imperative form, meaning it does not regulate a power; on the contrary, once the factual prerequisites contained therein are met, the consequence becomes mandatory for the body in charge of the proceeding. This implies that its effects operate by operation of law, and therefore its recognition has merely declaratory effects, not constitutive ones. It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence – which is, by definition, inalienable, nontransferable, and not subject to statutes of limitations according to article 66 of the LGAP – but solely as the impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific proceeding in which the inertia occurred.* \" However, the procedural effects of expiration (caducidad) require that it has been requested or declared within the proceeding, precisely to put an end to it. This leads to the conclusion that an administrative decision issued after six months of inertia exclusively attributable to the Administration, when expiration (caducidad) has not been alleged or declared, is fully valid. From the doctrine of article 59 in relation to article 66, both of the LGAP, public powers are granted to be exercised. Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for the extinguishment of that power due to temporal factors is the public body prevented from acting. We have already explained that, as a general rule, powers are not extinguished by the passage of the time limit set for exercising them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same article when it indicates that there will be a limitation on competence by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, we insist that article 329 *ibidem* states quite forcefully that an act issued outside the time limit is valid for all legal purposes, except where otherwise expressly provided by law, which is not the case here. Expiration (caducidad) is an early way of ending the proceeding and as such, it must be decreed to generate that closing effect. Therefore, as long as it is not decreed, or at least, has not been requested (since if it had been requested, issuing a final act without considering whether expiration (caducidad) is appropriate would be null), it does not produce that procedural consequence. In the specific case, the Court finds that the elements allowing the declaration of the expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding are not present. First, the plaintiff bases her argument on the claim that the directing body initiated the proceeding in January 2010 (which is not true, since, as indicated supra, the initial order issued against the plaintiff is from April 2010) and concluded it in August of that year. However, expiration (caducidad) was never alleged within that constitutive phase. Rather, the defense was raised only in the appellate phase, that is, when the final act had already been issued. Since it was not alleged in the constitutive phase of the proceeding (the opportune procedural moment for such purposes), the final act, even if issued outside the time limit, is deemed valid, as provided by article 329 of the LGAP. Especially when the inactivity alleged by the plaintiff does not refer to the appellate phase. In any case, the truth is that from the review of the different phases and incidents, it is also not observed that the proceeding suffered abandonment or procedural inactivity exceeding six months. Therefore, the alleged expiration (caducidad) must be rejected.\n\n**VII.- Regarding the defects of the proceeding.** On this point, the plaintiff essentially alleges two violations. First, she questions the nature of the hearing. She claims that even though the proceeding should have been private and confidential, she was summoned to an oral and public hearing, which was always publicized. The allegation must be rejected. As we indicated supra, although we are dealing with an administrative sanctioning proceeding to which, as a general rule, the provisions of the LGAP are applicable; the truth is that in matters of the Public Treasury, some of those rules yield to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding specific aspects (for example, the statute of limitations on the sanctioning power, as we already explained). Matters relating to the hearing also have special nuances in this area. It is true that article 309 of the LGAP establishes that the ordinary proceeding shall be carried out through an oral and private hearing before the Administration; but this rule yields to the provisions of article 10 of Law No. 8422. Said article clearly provides that, as a general rule, the hearings referred to in the LGAP in administrative proceedings conducted for infractions to the Public Treasury Regime shall be oral and public. It does, however, allow that the directing body, by reasoned resolution, may declare them private for reasons of decorum and the right to privacy of the parties or third parties, when it deems that the gathering of evidence is hindered or a secret whose revelation is criminally punishable is endangered. Thus, in the specific case, no violation is observed in the fact that she was summoned to a public (and not private) hearing, because that is what the special regulations currently in force for infractions to the Public Treasury provide (as a general rule). Next, she claims that the proceeding was given media coverage. On this point, we insist that we are dealing with matters prosecuted for infractions to the Public Treasury. Therefore, it is not surprising that, in some cases, the media cover these events due to the public interests involved. In addition to the foregoing, it is worth noting that the press clippings she provides report on the sanction after it had already been imposed *(folios 243 and 244 of the judicial file)*, so no violation of the confidentiality that certain phases must maintain (but not the hearing) is observed, given that once the final resolution was notified, it was public information to which the press could well have access. Neither is it demonstrated that the CNE union had knowledge of the sanction before it was notified to the plaintiff. The only union note brought to the process is the one found at folios 245 and 246 of the judicial file; however, they do not allow reaching that conclusion as they refer to other topics and, additionally, the first note is dated November 1, 2010, that is, when the final act had already been issued and even appeals against it had been filed. Thus, the plaintiff's statement is not accompanied (as appropriate) by sufficient evidence to prove it, amounting to nothing more than mere subjective, unsupported statements. On the other hand, a violation of due process is alleged. However, as the defendants affirm, the plaintiff does not specifically or clearly detail what these violations consist of. Strictly, it is not observed that substantial formalities of the proceeding were omitted, whose correct fulfillment would have changed the final decision or caused her defenselessness. The plaintiff was notified of the nature and purposes of the proceeding, with a notice of charges and imputation of the facts as well as an indication of the possible sanction to be applied; she was guaranteed the right to be heard, participating in the process, was heard, and had the opportunity to present arguments and produce the evidence she deemed pertinent; she was given the opportunity to prepare her allegations with access to information and the administrative records related to the case. She was also guaranteed the right to technical defense and was represented and advised by lawyers and experts of her choosing. Finally, she was notified of the final decision issued, with the expression of the grounds on which it was based, and had the right to appeal it (just as she could challenge preparatory acts that had ordinary remedies) and could submit the incidents she deemed necessary for her defense. From this perspective, the Court does not find that due process was violated during the proceeding, and therefore proceeds to the examination of the substantive allegations that the plaintiff formulates against the final act.\n\n**VIII.- Regarding the validity review of the formally challenged conduct.** Several substantive violations are attributed to the sanctioning decision adopted by the CGR against the plaintiff. As a **first aspect**, the temporal element framing the facts giving rise to the sanction is questioned. The plaintiff alleges that she was not appointed at the CNE during the period indicated in the charges imputed to her, specifically during the final period, that is, from May 11, 2006. For this reason, she says, she could not be charged or sanctioned for those facts. Both the State and the CGR disagree with this position and state that the negligent conduct imputed to the plaintiff occurred while she was appointed to her position. Well, in this process, it was proven that Mrs. Rosales Ardón was appointed to the position of Executive Director of the CNE and served as such from April first, 2005, until May 11, 2006. Subsequently, it is noted that the act initiating the proceeding charges her *\"(...) a) Presumedly, for having failed in her duty of diligence, because **since October 3, 2005** she knew of the need to coordinate with MINAE the donation of the strip of land and the easement (servidumbre), which was essential for building the bridge in Mortero, but apparently did not carry out any action until **May 24, 2006**, the date her work as Executive Director of the CNE ended, that is, for a period of 6 months and 22 calendar days. b) Presumedly for delaying the construction process of the bridge in Mortero given that the permits and the location of the bridge could have been defined in much shorter periods if more agile management had been carried out and because, upon issuing the start order, such permits were not available, the project suffered a delay of 3 months and 21 calendar days (from July 10, 2006 (fact 11) until November 1, 2006 (fact 16)) (...)\"*. From the literal wording of the first charge imputed, it is clear that, indeed, the omission attributed to the plaintiff is delimited up to May 24, 2006, despite her having ceased working as Executive Director of the CNE on May 11 of that year. However, the Court finds that this inconsistency (in the cessation date) is not capable of generating nullity of the actions taken, for the following reasons. The factual scenario set forth in the initiating order (and which serves as the basis for the charges) refers to official communication PRE-1342-05, dated October 3, 2005, by which the Presidency of the CNE sent correspondence to the plaintiff and instructed her to carry out active conduct related to the necessary donation of land to build a bridge; and claims that she concluded her duties at the CNE without having fulfilled what was established therein. Therefore, aside from the apparent confusion or error regarding the cessation date incurred in the initial act of the proceeding, from its comprehensive reading it is clear that an omission in complying with some of her specific functions as Executive Director of the CNE is claimed, during the period between October 3, 2005, and the day she ceased her functions, which definitively occurred on May 11, 2006. Subsequently, the challenged act sanctions her, among other things, for the omission of the duties under her charge by not having carried out any action aimed at ensuring compliance with the task entrusted in the cited communication PRE-1342-05, while she served as Executive Director of the CNE.\n\nThus, she is penalized for the omission of duties under her charge while, of course, she was exercising functions at CNE. Therefore, it is not true that she was charged with or penalized for acts or omissions that occurred when she was not exercising the functions in question. We reiterate that this material error (and it is only that because the initial order also clearly delimits the charge at the time of cessation of functions) does not constitute an omission that, in accordance with article 223 of the LGAP, entails the nullity of the proceedings. Regarding the second charge, it is also not observed that acts originating after the cessation of the plaintiff's functions were charged. Note that, at its core, she is charged with delaying the construction process of the bridge in Mortero, for not having carried out more agile management in aspects related to the permits and the location of the bridge. It is not true that she is charged with having issued the order to begin execution of the project, as the plaintiff seems to understand it; but only that her omission at the time of issuing that start order meant that the necessary requirements were not in place and this caused a delay in the execution of the work. Subsequently, the final act assesses that aspect within the timeframe in which the plaintiff was serving as director of CNE. Now, if what is claimed is that both the initial and final acts refer to events occurring before or after the period in which the plaintiff held the position in question, the truth is that these constitute simple factual references that allow situating and understanding the background, as well as the consequences of the acts that are charged. But it in no way means that the performance or omission of those acts is being directly charged to her. We insist that the charges made against the plaintiff were regarding two clearly determined acts in the initial order and it was on these that, finally, she was penalized. For the reasons stated, the alleged defect is not observed, as the acts and omissions with which she was charged and for which she was penalized occurred while she was Executive Director of CNE.\n\n**Second**, it is questioned who was competent to perform the functions for whose omission the plaintiff is penalized. In her thesis, the responsibility that the auditing body attributes to her is not attributable to her because the supposed acts and omissions for which she was penalized were not her responsibility. She affirms that those were the responsibility of the Executing Units (Unidades Ejecutoras), who were to designate the person in charge of the project, meet with him, coordinate and define the work plan as well as the manner in which periodic reports would be submitted and the procedure for the execution of the contract. Likewise, it was up to the person in charge of the project (and not to her) to issue the start order. She bases her arguments on the provisions of the Regulation of Executing Units (Reglamento de Unidades Ejecutoras), published in La Gaceta 172 of September 3, 2009. She reiterates that she was not part of the Executing Unit and to that extent, the responsibility intended to be attributed to her did not reach her. For its part, the State states that the obligation analyzed here was entrusted to the plaintiff based on her position as Executive Director of CNE, which she had to fulfill exclusively and excludively. It affirms that the function did not correspond to the Executing Units because these are appointed for the administration of works and projects financed by them and to that extent are in charge of technical aspects of project execution and are compelled to comply with the guidelines of CNE. It emphasizes that the coordination, the subject of this litigation, was the exclusive resort of the plaintiff due to her condition as Executive Director. It cites, as support, articles 6 and 8 of the National Emergency Law (Ley Nacional de Emergencias), in force at the time of the investigated events. Finally, the CGR states that the plaintiff's arguments on this point lack seriousness because they are based on a regulation that was not in force at the time of the events. It adds that, from a reading of the Manual of Functions and Processes of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of CNE (Manual de funciones y procesos de la Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras de la CNE), published in La Gaceta of June 1, 2001, it is clearly inferred that the functions and objectives of those units address functions deployed internally within CNE. Therefore, the breaches for which she is penalized are not matters unrelated to the Executive Directorate, because in any case that was the higher hierarchical instance, for which a greater degree of responsibility is incumbent. Having analyzed the point, the following must be noted. In this case, it is fundamental to keep in mind that the functions or duties deemed unfulfilled and for which the plaintiff is penalized consist of having omitted the due coordination with MINAET for the donation of a strip of land and an easement (servidumbre), knowing the necessity given that it was essential to be able to build the bridge in Mortero, and having delayed the construction process of the said bridge given that the permits and the location of the bridge could have been defined in much shorter timeframes if more agile management had been carried out since, as the necessary permits were not available when issuing the start order, the project suffered a delay of 3 months and 21 calendar days. Having clarified this point, it must be defined who was competent to perform the due conduct that was omitted. From the outset, the possibility of resorting to the Regulation of Executing Units (Reglamento de Unidades Ejecutoras) to resolve this issue must be discarded. As the representatives of the CGR affirm, it is a rule that was adopted on August 24, 2009, and was published in La Gaceta of September 3 of that same year. Therefore, we are faced with regulations that are not applicable because they were not in force at the time the events for which the plaintiff was ultimately penalized occurred, and which occurred between 2005 and 2006. It will be necessary, then, to review the legal system in force in those years to determine to whom the powers and functions whose omission is claimed here were attributed. At that time, Law No. 7914, of September 28, 1999 (which was in force until November 22, 2005), was in effect, which in its article 18 established that the Executive Directorate would be composed of a Director, who would be responsible for the operational administration of the Institution; would serve as a public employee under a labor regime of trust, freely appointed and removable by the Board of Directors and would be subordinate to the guidelines of the Board and the Presidency of the Commission. Likewise, its attributions are indicated, within which it is pertinent to mention the following: comply with the agreements of the Board of Directors, as well as the decisions, tasks or responsibilities that, as a result of delegation, the Presidency of the institution assigns to it, ensure that the dependencies or administrative units of the Commission fulfill their functions with the greatest efficiency, effectiveness and economy, within the most adequate and rational use of resources, according to the guidelines of the Board of Directors and the Presidency of the institution, execute the required measures that constitute, in the most effective way, immediate, adequate and timely responses to situations or states of necessity and urgency, in accordance with the guidelines of the Board of Directors and the Presidency of the institution. Subsequently, with Law No. 8488, of November 22, 2005, the Executive Directorate is maintained as responsible for the administration of the institution, article 20 warning, again, about subordination to the guidelines of the Board of Directors and those of the Presidency of the Commission, as well as the obligation to render accounts for its actions. The same rule attributes to it, among others, the following functions: program and coordinate the activities of the Commission with other public and private institutions, to fulfill the policies and achieve the objectives of the institution, within the guidelines issued by the Executive Branch, be responsible for the general administration of the Commission, for which it will be in charge of the Institution's programs and must ensure that the dependencies or administrative units fulfill their functions with the greatest efficiency, effectiveness and economy, within the most adequate and rational use of resources, according to the guidelines of the Board of Directors and the Presidency of the Institution, conduct and execute institutional actions aimed at the articulation of the National Risk Management System (Sistema Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo), under the guidelines of the Board of Directors and the Presidency, as well as any other responsibility assigned to it by the Board of Directors and the Presidency that is consistent with the level of attributions it holds by reason of its position. Now, keeping this panorama in mind, it must be indicated that in this process it was deemed accredited that through agreement 0102004, adopted by the Board of Directors of CNE in ordinary session No. 1-04, of February 12, 2004, the Investment Plan of MOPT and SENARA, presented for the attention of the emergency of Decree No. 31540-MP-MOPT, was approved. In said agreement, the project referring to \"Bridges over the Mortero River\" (Puentes sobre el Río Mortero) was included (*folios 1 to 20 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*). In that framework, through official letter PRE-1104-05, of August 16, 2005, the President of CNE requested the Minister of Environment and Energy for his collaboration so that that dependency would authorize the donation of a strip of land and authorize the use of the easement (servidumbre) that crosses the Subregional Office of that Ministry in the canton of Sarapiquí. The foregoing for the purposes of building the bridge over the Puerto Viejo de Mortero River. He warned of the need for this donation so as not to delay the execution of the work and indicated the following geographic coordinates of the site where the bridge would be built: 539,200 (EAST)-263,300 (NORTH) and attached the corresponding plan (*folio 29 and 30 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*). Later, in official letter SD-08, of September 23, 2005, the Deputy Director of the Central Volcanic Mountain Range Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Cordillera Volcánica Central) of MINAE communicated to the president of CNE, in what is relevant, her doubts regarding the required donation and the use of the easement (servidumbre), warning him that they required more data to initiate the corresponding procedures (*folios 31 and 32 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*). Finally, through official letter PRE-1342-05, of October 3, 2005, the president of CNE sent to the plaintiff and to the Head of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of that entity a copy of the cited official letter SD-08 so that they could analyze it and *\"(...) resolve it with Vice Minister Allan Flores or Mr. Carlos Manuel, both from MINAE (...)\"* (*folios 70 to 73 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*). From the foregoing, it is clear to the Court that the President of CNE delegated and assigned to the plaintiff a specific task, which corresponded to coordination tasks and was indispensable so that other administrative units (among them, the Executing Unit - Unidad Ejecutora) could fulfill their functions with the greatest efficiency, effectiveness and economy, within the most adequate and rational use of resources, for the purposes of duly attending to the emergency referring to the construction of the bridge over the Puerto Viejo de Mortero River. It was, moreover, a coordination with another public institution (MINAE) required to be able to comply with the Emergency Decree already indicated and to be able to execute the construction of the bridge in question. Thus, the coordination with MINAE to obtain the donation of the land and the easement (servidumbre) required for the construction of the said bridge was a duty under the charge of the plaintiff, in her condition as Executive Director; this not only because it forms part of the powers that the cited rules attribute to her, but also because it is a task delegated or assigned to her by the President of CNE, and she was subordinate to its fulfillment, as inferred from the cited rules. Unlike what the plaintiff states, the functions attributed to the Executing Units (Unidades Ejecutoras) (or their Comptrollership) are specific to the execution of the project and not to prior coordination with other institutions external to CNE. We reiterate that the Regulation of Executing Units (Reglamento de Unidades Ejecutoras) is not applicable to this case because that rule did not exist at the time of the events discussed here. At most, Agreement 520-2001, issued by the Board of Directors of CNE on February 21, 2001, which regulates the functions and processes of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of CNE, could be taken into account, keeping in mind, of course, that it is an infra-legal rule that could not modify the legal attributions that were assigned to the Executive Directorate of CNE. In addition to the above, from the review of the agreement it is concluded that the Comptrollership of Executing Units controls and oversees those responsible for the execution of projects, without carrying out coordination tasks that, we reiterate, are proper to the Executive Directorate. Note that the only function attributed to it in that sense is coordination with the heads of the Executing Units, on aspects such as the pre-offer visit, bidding processes, payment processing, purchase requests, project inspections and progress reports; and these have nothing to do with the unfulfilled duties charged to the plaintiff and which, we insist, are prior to the execution of the work and must be coordinated with heads of other state bodies and entities. For the foregoing reasons, the Court does not find that the appealed resolution is violative of the Principle of Legality (Principio de Legalidad) or of due legal certainty, since we reiterate, the duties on which non-compliance is accused on the part of the plaintiff, were indeed within the framework of her competence. Having clarified, then, that the acts, duties and omissions that are reproached occurred within the time in which the plaintiff was Executive Director of CNE and that they deal with aspects proper to her competence, it now corresponds to examine the arguments offered regarding the fulfillment or not of those duties directly. The foregoing for the purpose of being able to determine whether or not there are defects of legality in the penalty imposed.\n\n**IX.-** At this third level of analysis, it must be indicated that the defense of the plaintiff has revolved around three aspects. **First**, she maintains that the matters relating to the design and construction of the bridge lacked current interest and legal existence for the purposes of interest, because Tender EMER-035-05 had been declared unsuccessful as of September 21, 2005 (that is, before she received official letter PRE-1342-05). In such a scenario, she maintains, it was not in accordance with the Principle of Legality (Principio de Legalidad) for her to carry out any management related to said tender, especially when it was a period of intense activity in terms of emergency, as the CGR itself had deemed accredited. The State states that in accordance with article 15 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), the declaration of unsuccessful tender only entails the initiation of a new contractual procedure, without implying the paralysis of the necessary actions to gather the preliminary elements required before the start of the work. For its part, the CGR maintains that what happened in the contracting process does not affect nor has any incidence on the omissions incurred by the plaintiff. It adds that this lack of the duty of diligence becomes evident at the moment in which the awarded company begins the construction of the work, which allows establishing that there is no relationship between the vicissitudes of the contracting procedures and the non-compliance of Mrs. Rosales Ardón. To resolve the point, we deem it necessary to establish that here the existence of an Emergency Decree has been accredited that established, as a need to be resolved, the construction of a bridge over the Puerto Viejo de Mortero River, providing CNE with the respective budget for it. Also, that since the month of February 2005, the Director of the Bridge Design Department of MOPT recommended the site identified as 1 (plan P-747-B), for the construction of a 117-meter suspension bridge over the Puerto Viejo River for the community of Mortero, in Horquetas de Sarapiquí, located in the vicinity of an existing public road previously in front of the facilities of the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications. The foregoing for being technically the safest site and of the lowest intervention cost in the combined solution of a bridge with a new road (*it is inferred from folios 43 to 46 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*). Although the plaintiff Rosales Ardón was appointed to the position of Executive Director of CNE as of April 1, 2005, there is no doubt that as part of her responsibilities she should have informed herself of which emergencies, at that time, required prompt attention and had an assigned budget for it. And so it was, since through official letter CUE-699-GM 2005, of June 7, 2005, the Head of the Comptrollership of Executing Units of CNE requested the plaintiff to submit to the Board of Directors of CNE a request to supplement budgetarily the work corresponding to the design and construction of the bridge over the Puerto Viejo River (*folios 22 to 24 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*). Now, it is true that on September 21, 2005, Restricted Tender No. EMER-35-2005, corresponding to the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Puerto Viejo River in Mortero\" was declared unsuccessful; but it is also true that on that same day the plaintiff communicated to the Procurement Department of CNE not only the declaration of unsuccessful tender in question, but also warned that due to the importance of the work and the delays in the contracting process, it was necessary for the tender to be promoted again as soon as possible (*folios 158 of the administrative file of Restricted Tender No. EMER-35-2005, corresponding to the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Puerto Viejo River in Mortero\"*). Then, there indeed existed a verified emergency (because it was included in the respective Decree) and the budget to resolve it, so much so that the plaintiff herself expressed the need to promote the tender again, as indeed happened. For this reason, the plaintiff's arguments that the law did not oblige her to put the unsuccessful object out to tender again and did not set a specific deadline for it are entirely improper. If we are faced with emergency situations, the measures adopted are not, as a general rule, the ordinary ones foreseen. Especially when she herself knew (because she expressly stated it) that the need and emergency remained latent and the bridge had to be built to guarantee the superior public interests (such as people's lives) that were at stake. Therefore, the Court does not find that the failure to have given the corresponding attention and management to official letter PRE-1342-05 can be justified under the argument of the declaration of unsuccessful tender. There is not a single element that allows, even, doubting the decision of CNE to put the construction of the bridge out to tender again. Rather, it is accredited that it was always clear that it was indeed necessary. Therefore, the plaintiff had to fulfill the assigned tasks in pursuit of an efficient and timely attention to the emergency in question. By not having adopted any positive action aimed at coordinating with MINAE the donation of the strip of land, the easement (servidumbre) and the necessary permits, she omitted the exercise of the entrusted powers and breached the Principle of Legality (Principio de Legalidad) in its positive aspect which, as we will explain later, negatively impacted the achievement of the public interest she was obliged to protect. Diligent conduct would have led to progressively managing the task entrusted by the Executive Presidency (to which, in any case, she was subordinate) in such a way that at the moment the new contracting was opened and awarded, the land on which the bridge technically had to be built would have already been donated, or, at least, there would have been an agreement between the corresponding heads for it. The foregoing is reinforced by the fact that in accordance with the General Specifications for the Construction of Roads, Paths and Bridges of Costa Rica (Especificaciones Generales para la Construcción de Carreteras, Caminos y Puentes de Costa Rica), adopted as official standards by CNE itself in Board of Directors session No. 01-04, on February 12, 2004, there was an obligation on the part of the interested Administration (in this case CNE) to acquire the necessary right-of-way, in advance of the commencement of the work. In any case, it should not be overlooked that, ultimately, the Executive Director was subordinate to the fulfillment of the tasks or responsibilities assigned to her by the Executive Presidency, as well as to execute the required measures that constitute, in the most effective way, immediate, adequate and timely responses to situations or states of necessity and urgency, in accordance with the guidelines of the Presidency of CNE, as inferred from subsections a) and d) of article 18 of Law No. 7914 and article 20 of Law No. 8488. In the subjúdice, it was demonstrated that the plaintiff did not give due attention to the official letter sent by the Executive Presidency of CNE, for which the declaration of unsuccessful tender already indicated is no obstacle, as we noted. Note that she never justified the reasons why she did not execute the task entrusted by the Presidency, nor is she in the scenario of article 108 of the LGAP, which would have obliged her to disobey the order of the Presidency of CNE. In any case, even if the plaintiff considered that the attention of the task entrusted by the Presidency was contrary to the legal system (by virtue of the declaration of unsuccessful tender, as she has been alleging) and violative of the Principle of Legality (Principio de Legalidad), she had to execute it and save her responsibility in the terms established by article 109 of the LGAP, but not even that is recorded in the file. The plaintiff simply and plainly did not execute any positive action (while she was in the position of Executive Director) aimed at fulfilling the assigned task, an omission that, in reality, is indeed contrary to the Principle of Legality (Principio de Legalidad) in its positive aspect and harmed the public interests that were at stake. We insist that later, in January 2006, CNE opened a tender for Emergency Contracting No. 012-2006, corresponding to the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Puerto Viejo River in Mortero\", with the same objective as the one previously declared unsuccessful. However, as a result of the plaintiff's neglect and omission regarding procuring the donation of the required lands, the necessary easements (servidumbres) and the respective permits from MINAET, the truth is that at the time of its award, these were not available, which in itself already violated the provisions of the General Specifications for the Construction of Roads, Paths and Bridges of Costa Rica (Especificaciones Generales para la Construcción de Carreteras, Caminos y Puentes de Costa Rica), to which CNE obligated itself when it adopted them as its own. It was not until June 2006, when the plaintiff had already left her position, that the President of CNE saw the need to take up the issue again and fulfill the task that Rosales Ardón never executed. Then, through official letter PRE-770-2006, the President of CNE finally responded to the cited official letter SD-08 (the management of which, we reiterate, had been entrusted since October 2005 to the plaintiff, without her giving it due attention), indicating to the Deputy Director of the Central Volcanic Mountain Range Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Cordillera Volcánica Central) of MINAE the actions that CNE could carry out and requesting a prompt response to the management, considering the emergency being attended to, he would be willing to take it before the Board of Directors (*folio 33 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*). Up to this point, it is clear to the Court that the plaintiff left her position without having attended at all (for approximately seven months) to the task assigned to her through official letter PRE-1342-05, despite the emergency that served as its basis, that as a consequence of this, the tender for the construction of the bridge was awarded without the required donations and permits being available, and that it was not until the plaintiff had left her position that the President of CNE managed with MINAET the inputs required for the construction of the bridge. The foregoing denotes negligent and omissive conduct on the part of the plaintiff regarding the fulfillment of her functions that finds no justification in law and that the Court cannot overlook. But furthermore, the plaintiff's lack of diligence (by not having given the corresponding processing to official letter PRE-1342-05) brought as a consequence that although the start of execution of the work corresponding to the design and construction of the bridge over the Puerto Viejo River in Mortero was ordered for July 10, 2006 (*folio 34 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*), it had to be suspended *\"(...) because the right-of-way is not available as indicated in article 107.16 of CR77. Given that the construction of the bridge will be carried out on a MINAE property and the respective communications with the representatives of said ministry do not exist, the entry of the crews and equipment necessary to begin the work is impossible (...)\"* (*folio 34 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*). It was not until August 3, 2006, when through resolution R-SINAC-DG-032-2006, the Director General of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, hereinafter SINAC) ordered granting a use permit to MOPT over a strip of 331.38 square meters, in the property registered under folio 4-159877-000, cadastral plan No. H-042649-1997, specifically on its western boundary with the right bank of the Puerto Viejo River, a property owned by MINAET. The foregoing for the purpose of installing anchorage number 1 of the bridge over the mentioned river. Likewise, the Directorate of the Central Volcanic Mountain Range Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Cordillera Volcánica Central) was instructed to initiate the procedure for the donation of the strip used for the construction of the anchorage for the said bridge (*folios 37 to 42 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*). Thus, when the land and required permits were already available, on November 1, 2006, the awarded company was ordered to resume the work corresponding to the execution of the work referred to as the \"Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Puerto Viejo River in Mortero\" (*folios 48 and 49 of the digital administrative file provided by the CGR*).\n\nWe find that the plaintiff did indeed breach the duty of probity because from what has been analyzed it is clear that she did not orient her management toward satisfying the public interest, which is aggravated when one considers that we are facing an emergency that even involved the right to life of the inhabitants of the Mortero area and that obligated the greatest efforts in the construction of the bridge in question. The plaintiff did not attend to that priority collective need in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner (in that she never processed the task assigned in official letter PRE-1342-05), nor did she demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her by law (in that she did not exercise them at all), nor did she administer public resources in accordance with the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency. We are of the opinion that an action consistent with the duty of probity established in Article 4 of Law No. 8422 would have required giving priority to obtaining the MINAE land and the permits and easements (servidumbres) required for the construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero. This was a task of institutional coordination (and not of executing the work) inherent to her position, which had been entrusted and which she simply omitted. As a **second argument**, it is noted that due to the object of the tender, until the bridge design was concluded, the exact location where the abutments would be placed and the bridge structure would rest could not be determined with certainty. However, the Tribunal does not share this thesis. Strictly speaking, the place where the bridge would be built had been defined since 2005, when the Director of the Department of Bridge Design of the MOPT sent the technical terms of reference and the preliminary design drawing recommended by that Directorate to the Director of the Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras of the CNE, in relation to Tender for the Design and Construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero, explaining why the chosen site was the most technically safe and lowest cost (folio 25 of the digital administrative file submitted by the CGR). Indeed, through official letter CUE-711-CP, of July 8, 2005, and DE-640-05, of September 21, 2005, the Contraloría de Unidades Ejecutoras communicated to the Head of that unit, among other aspects, that in the meeting held with representatives of the Municipality of Sarapiquí de Heredia, the Mayor stated \"(...) that the entrance to access the bridge is on MINAE property, so this strip of land must also be acquired. (...)\". A photograph with the approximate site for the bridge construction was also attached. This is also reiterated, in the year 2009, by the Director of the Department of Bridge Design of the MOPT, who warns that the CNE had known since 2005 not only the appropriate location for the bridge construction and the preliminary design drawing P-747-B, but also the need to obtain the land donation and the required permits. She confirms, moreover, that the first work suspension order was issued because when the construction company arrived at the site, the Conservation Area of SINAC prevented entry because there was no superior order permitting the construction of the bridge. It was at that moment, she explains, that the donation process was resumed, concluding with resolution R-SINAC-DG-032-2006 already cited (folios 43 to 46 of Volume I of the digital file submitted by the CGR). While the official letter from the Director of the Department of Bridge Design of the MOPT indicates that a modification was necessary to relocate the bridge approximately 30 meters upstream from Site I, the fact is that this occurred after the plaintiff left her position and that, in any case, the donation of the property by MINAET was always required. This demonstrates the necessity of processing it prior to the bridge construction and reflects the non-compliance and the omission (conducta omisiva) of the plaintiff in that regard. Thus, apart from the two bidding processes and the other emergencies that afflicted the country at that time (the latter element which, in any case, was indeed considered as a mitigating factor of responsibility), the truth of the matter is that the fact that the plaintiff did not process official letter PRE-1342-05 as required, nor coordinated with MINAET the donation of the property on which the bridge would be built, nor the required permits, did produce delays in the execution of this work which, we reiterate, was a priority. If the coordination with MINAET and the permits had at least been processed, the bridge construction would have been completed in less time (as was the plaintiff's duty) or, at least, would have encountered one less obstacle. Proof of this is that once the President of the CNE resumed the matter (when the plaintiff had already left her position), it took him approximately two months to obtain the respective donation; whereas the plaintiff had approximately seven months to carry out the assigned task without, in the end, executing it. It is not true that the plaintiff is being sanctioned for having issued the work start order without having the required prerequisites. She is sanctioned because she was negligent and, knowing she had to do so (because the Executive Presidency had assigned it to her), she did not coordinate (during a significant part of her tenure) with MINAE the donation of the land for the bridge construction or the corresponding permits, and her omission (actuación omisiva) delayed the bridge construction process. And the Tribunal considers that what has been proven confirms that the plaintiff's conduct indeed constitutes a violation of the duty of probity under the terms set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of Law 8422; and that we are facing an omission, delay, negligence, or imprudence in the preservation and safeguarding of the assets or rights of the public patrimony, which are sanctionable regardless of whether any harm or injury occurred, as provided in Article 110, subsections b) and r) of Law No. 8131. And this issue is important because the plaintiff alleges that there is no causal link between the fault and the supposed harm caused. The following clarifications are necessary on this point. First, the plaintiff is not being held liable for damages (responsabilidad patrimonial), but rather only disciplinary responsibility. Second, within this latter and in accordance with the cited regulations, faults are sanctionable under the stated terms, even if no harm existed. Third, based on the elements in the case file, it is undeniable that the delays in the construction of said bridge (some of which stem from the negligent and omission (conducta negligente y omisiva) of the plaintiff, as has been explained) had a negative impact not only on the Public Treasury (due to a potential increase in cost by virtue of the delays) but also on the interests of the community, given that, despite the emergency declaration, the execution of the work did not have efficient management. However, we insist that in this proceeding, the plaintiff is not being quantified or held financially responsible for that. The plaintiff is also incorrect when she alleges that the challenged resolution is dissimilar to act PA-66-2010, also issued by the CGR. On the one hand, these are two different procedures (although related to the construction of the bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero): the one in which resolution PA-66-2010 was issued questions the technical conduct of the Contraloría de Unidades de Ejecución, whereas this one claims responsibility of the plaintiff for her omission (conducta omisiva) in specific aspects of the construction of that same bridge. Furthermore, it should be noted that in resolution PA-66-2010, suspension sanctions were also imposed on officials whose conduct was found to be faulty. Finally, as a **third argument**, the plaintiff alleges some defects related to the admission and assessment of evidence, as well as in the resolution deciding the appeal. However, these are also unfounded for the following reasons. Regarding the evidence, the rejection of competent expert evidence is claimed. In this regard, it is necessary to note that offered evidence may well be deemed inadmissible when it is irrelevant. In the present case, it is sufficient to observe the alleged facts to determine the relevance or not of the offered evidence. The proceeding against the plaintiff was opened for omissions (conductas omisivas) without her demonstrating that the assigned duties were fulfilled and that, therefore, the alleged inactivity and negligent conduct did not exist. We agree with the decision-making body that, for such proof, the expert evidence was unnecessary and irrelevant. The plaintiff had to comply with a task assigned by the Executive Presidency and had to demonstrate that she did so. If this was not the case, an expert statement will not justify the omission incurred. It is also not true that the challenged resolution issues judgments typical of an engineering expert. The formal conduct examined proves the omission incurred by the plaintiff, relying for this purpose on the evidence in the case file. Technical aspects referring to the tenders or the bridge design were not discussed in that procedure, because they are not relevant to proving the omission that was imputed and was proven. Regarding the alleged disregard of evidence, the plaintiff does not detail which evidence was left unassessed, which prevents this Tribunal from ruling on it. However, it must be noted that a sound exercise of the rules of sound judgment is observed, as it is explained why each of the listed facts is considered proven and the reasons why the demonstrative elements presented by the plaintiff are given no evidentiary value. In relation to the generic deficiencies sought to be attributed to the resolutions that decided the appeals filed by the plaintiff, it must be noted that, on the one hand, it is not detailed which defects are specifically alleged. This, combined with the fact that the plaintiff did not directly challenge those administrative acts (when she could well have done so under the provisions of Articles 33 and 36, subsection b) of the CPCA), prevents the Tribunal from examining them with the necessary specificity. However, it must be noted that a generic review allows one to conclude that the grievances of the appeals were decided in a concrete manner or by reference and by confirming what was decided in the final act. Furthermore, the final conduct is reasoned in the terms required by Article 136 of the LGAP, as it expresses the motives of the act, both those of law that configure the legal basis and those of fact that ultimately provoke the administrative action and decision.\n\n    X.- In conclusion, for the reasons set forth in the preceding Considerandos, the Tribunal considers that the challenged decision substantially conforms to the legal system because it was issued by the competent body, in accordance with the Organic Law of the CGR, it has a legitimate motive that existed as it was taken into account to issue the final act (Articles 132 and 133 of the LGAP), given that it was demonstrated that the plaintiff left her position in April 2006 without having coordinated with MINAE the donation of the strip of land and easement (servidumbre) required for the construction of the Bridge over the Río Puerto Viejo in Mortero, despite having been required to do so by the Executive Presidency of the CNE since October 2005, to resolve the emergency affecting that area. It was also demonstrated that her omission (conducta omisiva) delayed the construction of the aforementioned bridge, with negative consequences for the inhabitants of that area. The foregoing allows us to affirm that she incurred a breach of the duty of probity under the terms set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 8422, as well as in the conduct generating responsibility established by Article 110, subsections a) and r) of Law No. 8131. Thus, what is ordered is lawful, clear, and possible, and covers the issues of fact and law arising from the motive. Indeed, the imposed sanction constitutes the legal consequence of having proven the factual premise established by Articles 3 and 4 (of Law No. 8422) and 110 (of Law No. 8131) already cited. Moreover, it is a reasonable sanction, proportionate to the facts that were considered proven. On the one hand, its assessment took into account the criteria set forth in Article 108 of Law No. 8131, and even a mitigating factor (the existence of various emergencies that also required attention at the time of the facts) was applied when establishing the respective sanction. On the other hand, note that, strictly speaking, the sanction is for the breach of the duty of probity and the infraction contemplated in Article 110, subsections a) and r) of Law No. 8131 (that is, for the omission, delay, negligence, or imprudence in the preservation and safeguarding of the assets or rights of the public patrimony or the adoption of willful actions against its protection, regardless of whether a harm or injury occurred, and other conducts or omissions that result in the diminution, affectation, or detriment of the Financial Administration of the State or its institutions). But a more lenient rule was also applied, namely Article 113 of the aforementioned Law No. 8131, which establishes suspension with pay from eight days to one month, and not the sanction established in Article 39 of Law No. 8422. And within that rule (Article 113), we insist, the minimum sanction was applied, namely eight days of suspension. Moreover, it is a reasoned act in the terms required by Article 136 of the LGAP, and it is not observed that the proceeding omitted substantial formalities that would have changed the final decision or generated defenselessness. Finally, the Tribunal considers that the act satisfies the purpose referred to in Article 131 of the LGAP, as it protects the public interests behind ensuring that the conduct of public officials is upright, efficient, and conforms to the legal order, especially in cases where emergency situations are at stake, as is the case before us. Therefore, after the pertinent legality review, the alleged defects must be dismissed, and what was decided by the CGR and the sanction imposed against the plaintiff must be confirmed, as it is in accordance with the law.\""
}