{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-146750", "citation": "Res. 00380-2012 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Guanacaste", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Restitución de bien demanial en zona marítimo terrestre pese a absolutoria penal", "title_en": "Restitution of public-domain property in maritime-terrestrial zone despite criminal acquittal", "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Guanacaste rechaza un recurso de apelación contra una sentencia que, a pesar de absolver penalmente a la acusada, ordenó la restitución al Estado de un terreno ubicado en la zona pública de la zona marítimo terrestre, dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional. El tribunal confirma que la restitución de bienes es procedente incluso en fallos absolutorios, conforme al artículo 366 del Código Procesal Penal, y que no constituye un vicio de ultrapetita. En cuanto al fondo, determina que la zona pública es inalienable por mandato expreso de las Leyes N° 4558, 5602 y 6043, por lo que cualquier negocio jurídico sobre ella es absolutamente nulo. La declaración del refugio de vida silvestre no desafecta el carácter demanial de la zona marítimo terrestre, ya que ambas figuras jurídicas coexisten sin conflicto; los refugios nacionales que incluyen áreas de dicha zona se rigen por la legislación de vida silvestre, pero mantienen su naturaleza pública. El tribunal concluye que los ocupantes carecen de derecho de propiedad y deben restituir el bien sin indemnización.", "summary_en": "The Criminal Appeals Tribunal of Guanacaste dismisses an appeal against a judgment that, despite acquitting the defendant of criminal charges, ordered the restitution to the State of land located in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone within the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge. The court confirms that restitution of property is permissible even in acquittals, under Article 366 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and does not constitute an ultra petita defect. On the merits, it finds that the public zone is inalienable by express mandate of Laws 4558, 5602, and 6043, rendering any transaction concerning it absolutely void. The designation of a wildlife refuge does not divest the maritime-terrestrial zone of its public-domain character, as both legal regimes coexist without conflict; national refuges encompassing areas of that zone are governed by wildlife legislation while retaining their public nature. The court holds that occupants lack any property right and must return the land without compensation.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Guanacaste", "date": "24/10/2012", "year": "2012", "topic_ids": [ "water-law" ], "primary_topic_id": "water-law", "es_concept_hints": [ "zona marítimo terrestre", "zona pública inalienable", "bien demanial", "Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional", "restitución en absolutoria", "ultrapetita", "usurpación de dominio público" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre", "article": "6", "doc_id": "norm-6549", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 4558", "article": "6", "doc_id": "norm-6549", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre", "article": "71", "doc_id": "norm-32006", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 6043", "article": "71", "doc_id": "norm-32006", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre", "article": "73", "doc_id": "norm-32006", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 6043", "article": "73", "doc_id": "norm-32006", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Código Civil", "article": "261", "doc_id": "norm-15437", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 63", "article": "261", "doc_id": "norm-15437", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre", "article": "17", "doc_id": "norm-12648", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7317", "article": "17", "doc_id": "norm-12648", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Código Procesal Penal", "article": "366", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7594", "article": "366", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Código Procesal Penal", "article": "489", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7594", "article": "489", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Código Procesal Penal", "article": "490", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7594", "article": "490", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Código Procesal Penal", "article": "491", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7594", "article": "491", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Código Procesal Penal", "article": "492", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7594", "article": "492", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "restitución de bien demanial", "sentencia absolutoria", "zona marítimo terrestre", "zona pública inalienable", "Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional", "usurpación de dominio público", "Código Procesal Penal artículo 366", "Ley 6043", "nulidad absoluta", "bien de dominio público", "indemnización improcedente", "Tribunal de Apelación Penal Guanacaste", "Res. 00380-2012", "expediente 110000040577PE" ], "keywords_en": [ "restitution of public property", "acquittal judgment", "maritime-terrestrial zone", "inalienable public zone", "Ostional National Wildlife Refuge", "usurpation of public domain", "Criminal Procedure Code Article 366", "Law 6043", "absolute nullity", "public domain property", "compensation not warranted", "Criminal Appeals Court Guanacaste", "Res. 00380-2012", "case 110000040577PE" ], "excerpt_es": "Con claridad dispone el artículo 366 del Código Procesal Penal: \"La sentencia absolutoria ordenará la libertad del imputado, la cesación de las medidas cautelares, la restitución de los objetos afectados al procedimiento que no sean sujetos a comiso, las inscripciones necesarias y fijará las costas...\". Lo anterior significa que tanto el comiso como la restitución de bienes o la reconstrucción, supresión o reforma de un acto jurídico relacionado con un documento falso, pueden ser ordenados en un pronunciamiento absolutorio y con prescindencia de que se hubiese formulado o no acción civil resarcitoria, la cual únicamente se requiere como presupuesto para imponer la reparación del daño. Así lo confirman los artículos 489, 490, 491 y 492 del Código de rito. Por otra parte, salta a la vista que el juez a quo incurrió en yerro al declarar sin lugar la acción civil entablada por la Procuraduría General de la República pues, como es sabido, aunque la demanda civil no sea necesaria para ordenar la restitución de un bien, no existe obstáculo alguno para que el actor pida -incluso como única pretensión de su demanda- que se restituya el objeto (en tal sentido, puede consultarse la sentencia No. 1462-04, de 22 de diciembre de 2004, de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). En este asunto, consta en el folio 1770 vuelto que, en el debate, el representante del Estado (actor civil), solicitó \"se ordene devolver las cosas al Estado, el desahucio y demoler\", y el juez, de forma incongruente, decreta esa restitución, pero declara sin lugar la acción civil, cuando lo lógico y apegado a derecho era acogerla e imponer el deber de restituir, aunque se rechazaran otras pretensiones adicionales, si fuere del caso. El yerro dicho solo causó agravio al actor civil, no puede ya enmendarse, a falta de recurso de su parte y solo interesa recalcar que la orden de restitución, en sí misma, es lícita y podía pronunciarse aun en el evento de que no hubiese mediado acción resarcitoria, sin que ello significara el vicio de \"ultra petita\" alegado por el recurrente. Procede, entonces, rechazar la protesta.", "excerpt_en": "Article 366 of the Criminal Procedure Code clearly provides: \"The acquittal judgment shall order the release of the accused, the cessation of precautionary measures, the restitution of objects seized in the proceedings that are not subject to confiscation, the necessary registrations, and shall set costs...\". This means that both confiscation and restitution of property, or the reconstruction, suppression or modification of a legal act related to a false document, may be ordered in an acquittal regardless of whether a civil action for damages has been filed, which is only required as a prerequisite for imposing compensation for harm. This is confirmed by Articles 489, 490, 491 and 492 of the Code. Moreover, it is evident that the trial judge erred in dismissing the civil action brought by the Attorney General's Office, for, as is well known, even though a civil claim is not necessary to order restitution of property, there is no obstacle for the plaintiff to request—even as the sole prayer of its claim—that the object be restored (in this regard, see judgment No. 1462-04 of 22 December 2004 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). In this case, it appears at folio 1770 verso that, at trial, the State’s representative (civil plaintiff) requested “that the property be returned to the State, eviction ordered and demolition carried out,” and the judge, inconsistently, ordered such restitution yet dismissed the civil action, when the logical and legally correct course was to grant it and impose the duty to restore, even if additional claims were rejected, if applicable. That error caused harm only to the civil plaintiff, cannot now be corrected absent an appeal on its part, and it is only relevant to emphasize that the restitution order, in itself, is lawful and could be issued even had no civil action for damages been brought, without thereby incurring the alleged \"ultra petita\" defect. The objection is therefore rejected.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The Appeals Court fully denies the appeal and upholds the restitution order to the State, affirming the criminal acquittal but finding the land occupies the inalienable public zone and must be returned without compensation.", "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Apelación rechaza íntegramente el recurso y confirma la orden de restitución del bien al Estado, manteniendo la absolutoria penal pero declarando que el terreno ocupa la zona pública inalienable y debe devolverse sin indemnización." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando I, citando Art. 366 CPP", "quote_en": "The acquittal judgment shall order the release of the accused, the cessation of precautionary measures, the restitution of objects seized in the proceedings that are not subject to confiscation, the necessary registrations, and shall set costs...", "quote_es": "La sentencia absolutoria ordenará la libertad del imputado, la cesación de las medidas cautelares, la restitución de los objetos afectados al procedimiento que no sean sujetos a comiso, las inscripciones necesarias y fijará las costas..." }, { "context": "Considerando II, citando Art. 6 Ley 4558", "quote_en": "The fifty meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone from the ordinary high-tide line shall be inalienable and may in no case be leased or sold. Therefore, no one may claim any right over that strip...", "quote_es": "Los cincuenta metros de la zona marítimo terrestre a partir de la pleamar ordinaria, serán inalienables y en ningún caso puede ser objeto de arrendamiento o venta. Por lo tanto, nadie puede alegar derecho alguno sobre dicha franja..." }, { "context": "Considerando II, citando Art. 71 Ley 6043", "quote_en": "All acts, contracts, agreements and provisions made or taken after the enactment of Law No. 5602 of 4 November 1974 that are contrary to its provisions are absolutely null and void.", "quote_es": "Son absolutamente nulos todos los actos, contratos, acuerdos y disposiciones, realizados o tomados, a partir de la promulgación de la ley Nº 5602 de 4 de noviembre de 1974 y que fueren contrarios a sus disposiciones." }, { "context": "Considerando II, citando Art. 73 Ley 6043", "quote_en": "This law does not apply to maritime-terrestrial zones included in national parks and equivalent reserves, which shall be governed by the relevant legislation.", "quote_es": "La presente ley no se aplica a las zonas marítimo terrestres, incluidas en los parques nacionales y reservas equivalentes, las cuales se regirán por la legislación respectiva." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-6549", "citation": "Ley 4558", "title_en": "Tourism Development Law for the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone", "title_es": "Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre", "doc_type": "law", "date": "22/04/1970", "year": "1970" }, { "id": "norm-32006", "citation": "Ley 6043", "title_en": "Maritime Terrestrial Zone Law", "title_es": "Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/03/1977", "year": "1977" }, { "id": "norm-12648", "citation": "Ley 7317", "title_en": "Wildlife Conservation Law", "title_es": "Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/10/1992", "year": "1992" }, { "id": "norm-41297", "citation": "Ley 7594", "title_en": "Criminal Procedure Code — Criminal Action in Environmental Crimes", "title_es": "Código Procesal Penal — Acción penal en delitos ambientales", "doc_type": "law", "date": "10/04/1996", "year": "1996" }, { "id": "norm-2467", "citation": "Ley 5602", "title_en": "Law Suspending the Maritime Zone Urbanization Law", "title_es": "Suspende Vigencia de Ley Urbanización Zona Marítimo Terrestre", "doc_type": "law", "date": "04/11/1974", "year": "1974" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-12648", "citation": "Ley 7317", "title_en": "Wildlife Conservation Law", "title_es": "Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre", "doc_type": "law", "date": "30/10/1992", "year": "1992" }, { "id": "norm-32006", "citation": "Ley 6043", "title_en": "Maritime Terrestrial Zone Law", "title_es": "Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre", "doc_type": "law", "date": "02/03/1977", "year": "1977" }, { "id": "norm-6549", "citation": "Ley 4558", "title_en": "Tourism Development Law for the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone", "title_es": "Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre", "doc_type": "law", "date": "22/04/1970", "year": "1970" } ], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-6549", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre" }, { "target_id": "norm-32006", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre" }, { "target_id": "norm-12648", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre" }, { "target_id": "norm-41297", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Código Procesal Penal" }, { "target_id": "norm-2467", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 5602" } ], "external": [ { "ref_id": "norm-15437", "url": "https://pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_norma.aspx?param1=NRM&nValor1=1&nValor2=15437&strTipM=FN", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Código Civil", "norm_id": "15437" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0007-445614", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0007-445614" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-294621", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-294621" } ] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-146750", "tier": 2, "is_environmental": true, "_editorial_citation_count": 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"0", "doc_id": "norm-15437", "norm_fecha": "28 Sep 1887", "norm_name": "Código Civil", "norm_num": "63", "norm_ver": "90115", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "17", "art_scij": "73890", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-12648", "norm_fecha": "30 Oct 1992", "norm_name": "Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre", "norm_num": "7317", "norm_ver": "91688", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "366", "art_scij": "180625", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "norm_fecha": "10 Abr 1996", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal", "norm_num": "7594", "norm_ver": "91900", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "489", "art_scij": "180724", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "norm_fecha": "10 Abr 1996", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal", "norm_num": "7594", "norm_ver": "91900", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "490", "art_scij": "180725", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "norm_fecha": "10 Abr 1996", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal", "norm_num": "7594", "norm_ver": "91900", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "491", "art_scij": "180726", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "norm_fecha": "10 Abr 1996", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal", "norm_num": "7594", "norm_ver": "91900", "tipo_norma": "Ley" }, { "art_num": "492", "art_scij": "180727", "art_subnum": "0", "doc_id": "norm-41297", "norm_fecha": "10 Abr 1996", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal", "norm_num": "7594", "norm_ver": "91900", "tipo_norma": "Ley" } ], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-12648", "norm_num": "7317", "norm_name": "Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/10/1992" }, { "doc_id": "norm-32006", "norm_num": "6043", "norm_name": "Ley sobre la Zona Marítimo Terrestre", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/03/1977" }, { "doc_id": "norm-6549", "norm_num": "4558", "norm_name": "Ley de Urbanización Turística de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "22/04/1970" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [ "sen-1-0007-445614", "sen-1-0034-294621" ], "temas_y_subtemas": [ { "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Posibilidad de ordenar restitución de bien demanial pese absolutoria" } ], "id": 2, "nombre": "Usurpación" }, { "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Posibilidad de ordenar restitución de bien demanial pese absolutoria" } ], "id": 1, "nombre": "Usurpación de dominio público" }, { "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Posibilidad de ordenar restitución de bien demanial pese absolutoria" } ], "id": 3, "nombre": "Zona marítimo terrestre" } ], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“I- […] El quejoso dirige sus reproches, de modo exclusivo, contra la restitución ordenada y pide se revoque ese extremo de la sentencia. A fin de asegurar el orden lógico de la exposición, ha de examinarse el último alegato planteado por el recurrente, según el cual la restitución es un derecho del propietario y no una facultad del juez, de suerte que este incurrió en el vicio de \"ultrapetita\" al absolver a la acusada y declarar sin lugar la acción resarcitoria entablada por el Estado, pero ordenando la referida restitución. Añade que hubo falta de competencia y \"de jurisdicción\", al tiempo que lo resuelto no posee motivaciones. La queja no es atendible. En primer término, el criterio del recurrente en el sentido de que en el fallo absolutorio no puede decretarse la restitución de bienes, es equivocado. Con claridad dispone el artículo 366 del Código Procesal Penal: \"La sentencia absolutoria ordenará la libertad del imputado, la cesación de las medidas cautelares, la restitución de los objetos afectados al procedimiento que no sean sujetos a comiso, las inscripciones necesarias y fijará las costas...\". Lo anterior significa que tanto el comiso como la restitución de bienes o la reconstrucción, supresión o reforma de un acto jurídico relacionado con un documento falso, pueden ser ordenados en un pronunciamiento absolutorio y con prescindencia de que se hubiese formulado o no acción civil resarcitoria, la cual únicamente se requiere como presupuesto para imponer la reparación del daño. Así lo confirman los artículos 489, 490, 491 y 492 del Código de rito. Por otra parte, salta a la vista que el juez a quo incurrió en yerro al declarar sin lugar la acción civil entablada por la Procuraduría General de la República pues, como es sabido, aunque la demanda civil no sea necesaria para ordenar la restitución de un bien, no existe obstáculo alguno para que el actor pida -incluso como única pretensión de su demanda- que se restituya el objeto (en tal sentido, puede consultarse la sentencia No. 1462-04, de 22 de diciembre de 2004, de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). En este asunto, consta en el folio 1770 vuelto que, en el debate, el representante del Estado (actor civil), solicitó \"se ordene devolver las cosas al Estado, el desahucio y demoler\", y el juez, de forma incongruente, decreta esa restitución, pero declara sin lugar la acción civil, cuando lo lógico y apegado a derecho era acogerla e imponer el deber de restituir, aunque se rechazaran otras pretensiones adicionales, si fuere del caso. El yerro dicho solo causó agravio al actor civil, no puede ya enmendarse, a falta de recurso de su parte y solo interesa recalcar que la orden de restitución, en sí misma, es lícita y podía pronunciarse aun en el evento de que no hubiese mediado acción resarcitoria, sin que ello significara el vicio de \"ultra petita\" alegado por el recurrente. Procede, entonces, rechazar la protesta.\n\n II- En el resto del recurso se dedica el impugnante a exponer su criterio de que el bien que en sentencia se ordena restituir al Estado no forma parte de la zona marítimo terrestre, pues fue desafectado por las leyes No. 6919 y 7313 que crearon el Refugio de Vida Silvestre de Ostional y luego lo ampliaron para incluir el territorio comprendido entre la desembocadura del [Dirección1] Nosara y Punta Guiones. Según el quejoso, dicho Refugio de Vida Silvestre no constituye un bien demanial, ya que la naturaleza pública solo puede ser adquirida en virtud de una ley formal y no de una disposición del Poder Ejecutivo, cual ocurre con las áreas silvestres protegidas. Tampoco tienen la finalidad de uso público, característica de los bienes demaniales, conforme las previsiones del artículo 261 del Código Civil, sino las de protección de los recursos, conservación del ambiente y promoción de la investigación científica, entre otras. Concluye el defensor que el Refugio de Ostional es de propiedad mixta; que las normas de la ley de la zona marítimo terrestre no le son aplicables y que en virtud de los vaivenes que el tema ha sufrido en el ámbito legislativo, así como los problemas en el amojonamiento y las interpretaciones que el propio recurrente hace de diversas normas, ha de sostenerse que la justiciable no puede ser despojada del bien que ocupa si no es previamente indemnizada. Los reparos son inatendibles. Parte el quejoso de suposiciones erróneas y de la lectura e interpretación incorrectas de las previsiones legales aplicables en este asunto. En primer término, sostiene que, con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el artículo 261 del Código Civil, la declaratoria de la naturaleza pública de un bien requiere de una ley formal y no una mera decisión del Poder Ejecutivo, pero luego, de modo incongruente, reconoce que el Refugio de Vida Silvestre Ostional fue creado, no por disposición ejecutiva, sino por ley emitida por la Asamblea Legislativa. En segundo lugar, afirma que el ya fallecido cónyuge de la justiciable compró el terreno situado en Playa Guiones en 1976, de manos de \"... un particular que había iniciado un denuncio ante la Municipalidad de Nicoya...\" y posteriormente \"construyó o mejoró su casita\", pues no fue sino en 1981 cuando el Instituto Geográfico Nacional amojonó la playa, señalando el límite de los cincuenta metros (obviamente, de la zona pública). Sin embargo, olvida el defensor que por Ley No. 5602, de 4 de noviembre de 1974 (vigente, entonces, dos años antes de la alegada compra del terreno), se suspendió la vigencia de la antigua \"Ley de Urbanización de la zona marítimo terrestre\" y se dispuso con claridad: \"Ninguna playa ni isla, marítima o fluvial, reguladas por la ley Nº 4558 de 22 de abril de 1970, podrá ser vendida, arrendada, ni subarrendada, durante el plazo de suspensión de la vigencia de dicha ley, sin perjuicio únicamente de las prórrogas de derechos de arrendamientos que sean procedentes de conformidad con la ley cuyos efectos se suspenden. Las respectivas municipalidades se abstendrán de conceder permisos de construcción si dichas edificaciones van a ser construidas en terrenos que se poseen como consecuencia de los derechos que otorga la citada ley Nº 4558\". Lo anterior significa que desde el año 1974 (aunque en realidad desde mucho antes, como se verá) se sabe, por así disponerlo de forma expresa la ley, que las playas o las islas de la República no pueden ser sometidas al dominio de los particulares y que ni siquiera las personas que hubiesen construido alguna edificación en esas áreas, al supuesto amparo de la ley de urbanización de la zona marítimo terrestre, podían transmitir derechos ni, mucho menos, vender terrenos. Por ende, la alegada compra que se supone hecha en el año 1976 constituiría un negocio absolutamente nulo que tuvo por objeto un bien público, en cuanto supusiese una invasión de la zona pública, lo cual basta para descartar la opinión del impugnante de que procede la expropiación o algún tipo de resarcimiento, pues debe tenerse presente que la legislación que se promulgó y puso fin a las normativas relacionadas con la urbanización de la zona marítimo terrestre, no fue otra que la ley de la zona marítimo terrestre ahora en vigor (No. 6043, de 2 de marzo de 1977) y en su artículo 71 se indicó con claridad: \"Son absolutamente nulos todos los actos, contratos, acuerdos y disposiciones, realizados o tomados, a partir de la promulgación de la ley Nº 5602 de 4 de noviembre de 1974 y que fueren contrarios a sus disposiciones\". Sin embargo, y como se adelantó, ha de añadirse que la propia Ley de urbanización turística de la zona marítimo terrestre, No. 4558 de 22 de abril de 1970, antes citada, dispuso en su artículo 6: \"Los cincuenta metros de la zona marítimo terrestre a partir de la pleamar ordinaria, serán inalienables y en ningún caso puede ser objeto de arrendamiento o venta. Por lo tanto, nadie puede alegar derecho alguno sobre dicha franja, que estará dedicada a uso público para fines de esparcimiento, recreo o libre circulación. Las construcciones o instalaciones actualmente ubicadas en esa zona, no podrán ser remodeladas y en caso de destrucción de las mismas, las nuevas construcciones deberán respetar esa zona inalienable\". De lo dicho se infiere, entonces, que ni aun con arreglo a las previsiones de la ley de urbanización de la zona marítimo terrestre podía existir dominio particular sobre la zona pública; sino que se concedía a los municipios el dominio de la zona marítimo terrestre con la posibilidad de arrendar terrenos situados dentro de los ciento cincuenta metros que ahora se conocen como \"zona restringida\" y venderlos a los arrendatarios transcurridos diez años desde la contratación; pero, se reitera, aquella ley preservó la inalienabilidad de los cincuenta metros que en la actualidad conforman la \"zona pública\". También se colige de lo expuesto que la tesis del defensor de que el terreno objeto de esta causa (la parte situada dentro de la zona pública), forma parte de un \"refugio de vida silvestre mixto\", carece de todo asidero lógico o jurídico pues, amén de que el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional fue creado por ley y no por coparticipación estatal y privada, su territorio formaba parte ya de la zona marítimo terrestre mucho tiempo antes de tal creación. Son asimismo erróneos e insostenibles los criterios del quejoso en cuanto al supuesto conflicto entre la ley de la zona marítimo terrestre y los refugios de vida silvestre. Con claridad dispone el artículo 73 de la Ley de la zona marítimo terrestre: \"La presente ley no se aplica a las zonas marítimo terrestres, incluidas en los parques nacionales y reservas equivalentes, las cuales se regirán por la legislación respectiva\" (la negrita es suplida). No hay, entonces, conflicto de leyes. Las áreas de parques nacionales, refugios y reservas pueden hallarse dentro de la zona marítimo terrestre, sin que por tal circunstancia esa zona pierda su nombre (de hecho, así lo expresa la propia norma recién transcrita). Continúan siendo parte de la zona, pero se les asigna un manejo o trato distinto del aplicable al resto de esa zona en el territorio nacional, no solo desde el punto de vista de su gestión administrativa (instituciones diversas a cargo de su administración), sino atendiendo al uso y las finalidades a los que deben responder, de modo que proyectos que podrían realizarse con arreglo a las disposiciones sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, no podrán ejecutarse de acuerdo con la ley de conservación de la vida silvestre u otras normativas especiales y, a la inversa, las finalidades propias de las reservas permitirían el diseño de proyectos ajenos a los propósitos de la ley de la zona marítimo terrestre y abren paso a la participación comunitaria, fomentada en el artículo 17 de la Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre; mientras que el artículo 83 de ese mismo texto dispone \"La Dirección General de Vida Silvestre tendrá las facultades y deberes que establece la Ley No. 6043, respecto de los Refugios Nacionales de Vida Silvestre que incluyen áreas de la zona marítimo terrestre\". La propia ley que creó el Refugio de Ostional (Ley de Conservación de la fauna silvestre, No. 6919 de 17 de noviembre de 1983) lo ubicó \"... en los doscientos metros de la zona marítimo-terrestre que se extiende desde la margen derecha de la desembocadura del Río Nosara hasta la Punta India...\" (el resaltado es suplido); en tanto que la Ley No. 7317, de 30 de octubre de 1992 (ley de conservación de la vida silvestre), lo amplió, situándolo \"... en los doscientos metros de la zona marítimo terrestre que se extiende desde Punta India hasta Punta Guiones, Cantón de Nicoya, Provincia de Guanacaste...\" (la negrita no aparece en el original). Por lo demás, el tema ha sido objeto de múltiples pronunciamientos de la Sala Constitucional, algunos citados por el propio impugnante y en el fallo No. [Telf1], de 8:30 horas de 13 de febrero de 2009, la referida Sala destacó de forma expresa que el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional es un \"bien de dominio público\" que se extiende sobre la zona marítimo terrestre, añadiendo que el Estado tiene el deber de protegerlo y que los particulares que ocupan de modo precario ese bien demanial carecen de derecho de propiedad. No sobra recalcar que la restitución ordenada en la sentencia de mérito se refiere a las áreas comprendidas en la zona pública de la zona marítimo terrestre, las cuales, por las razones aquí expuestas, nunca pudieron ser objeto de adquisición por los particulares. Así las cosas, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos el recurso de apelación planteado.”", "body_en_text": "**I- […]**\nThe complainant directs his criticisms, exclusively, against the ordered restitution and requests that this part of the judgment be revoked. In order to ensure the logical order of the presentation, the last argument raised by the appellant must be examined, according to which restitution is a right of the owner and not a power of the judge, such that the latter incurred the defect of \"ultra petita\" by acquitting the accused and dismissing the civil action for damages brought by the State, but ordering the aforementioned restitution. He adds that there was a lack of competence and \"jurisdiction,\" while the decision lacks reasoning. The complaint is not admissible. First, the appellant's criterion that restitution of property cannot be decreed in an acquittal judgment is mistaken. Article 366 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) clearly states: *\"The acquittal judgment shall order the release of the accused, the cessation of precautionary measures, the restitution of objects affected to the proceeding that are not subject to confiscation, the necessary registrations, and shall set costs...\"*. The foregoing means that both confiscation (comiso) and the restitution of property or the reconstruction, suppression, or reformation of a juridical act related to a false document can be ordered in an acquittal ruling and regardless of whether a civil action for damages had been filed or not, which is only required as a prerequisite for imposing the reparation of harm. This is confirmed by Articles 489, 490, 491, and 492 of the procedural code (Código de rito). On the other hand, it is evident that the a quo judge erred in dismissing the civil action brought by the Procuraduría General de la República because, as is known, although a civil claim is not necessary to order the restitution of property, there is no obstacle whatsoever for the plaintiff to request—even as the sole claim of their lawsuit—that the object be restored (in this regard, judgment No. 1462-04, of December 22, 2004, from the Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia can be consulted). In this matter, it appears on folio 1770 verso that, during the trial, the representative of the State (civil plaintiff) requested \"that the property be returned to the State, the eviction be ordered, and demolition carried out,\" and the judge, incongruously, decreed that restitution but dismissed the civil action, when the logical and legally correct course was to grant it and impose the duty to restore, even if other additional claims were rejected, as the case might be. The said error only caused grievance to the civil plaintiff, cannot be amended now for lack of an appeal on its part, and it is only important to emphasize that the restitution order, in itself, is lawful and could have been issued even if no civil action for damages had been filed, without this signifying the defect of \"ultra petita\" alleged by the appellant. Consequently, the protest must be rejected.\n\n**II-** In the rest of the appeal, the appellant dedicates himself to setting forth his criterion that the asset ordered to be restored to the State in the judgment does not form part of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), because it was disaffected by Laws No. 6919 and 7313, which created the Refugio de Vida Silvestre de Ostional and then expanded it to include the territory between the mouth of the Río [Dirección1] Nosara and Punta Guiones. According to the complainant, said Refugio de Vida Silvestre does not constitute a public domain asset (bien demanial), since public nature can only be acquired by virtue of a formal law and not by a disposition of the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), as occurs with protected wild areas. Nor do they have the public use purpose characteristic of public domain assets (bienes demaniales), according to the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), but rather those of resource protection, environmental conservation, and the promotion of scientific research, among others. The defender concludes that the Refugio de Ostional is of mixed ownership; that the rules of the law of the maritime-terrestrial zone are not applicable to it; and that, by virtue of the fluctuations the subject has suffered in the legislative sphere, as well as the problems in boundary demarcation (amojonamiento) and the interpretations that the appellant himself makes of various norms, it must be held that the accused cannot be dispossessed of the asset she occupies without prior compensation. The objections are inadmissible. The appellant starts from erroneous assumptions and from an incorrect reading and interpretation of the legal provisions applicable in this matter. First, he maintains that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the public nature of an asset requires a formal law and not a mere decision of the Executive Branch, but then, incongruously, he acknowledges that the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Ostional was created, not by executive disposition, but by law issued by the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa). Second, he affirms that the now-deceased spouse of the accused bought the land located in Playa Guiones in 1976, from *\"... a private individual who had initiated a claim (denuncio) before the Municipalidad de Nicoya...\"* and later \"built or improved his little house,\" since it was not until 1981 that the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN) demarcated the beach, marking the fifty-meter limit (obviously, of the public zone). However, the defender forgets that by Law No. 5602, of November 4, 1974 (in effect, therefore, two years before the alleged purchase of the land), the validity of the old \"Ley de Urbanización de la zona marítimo terrestre\" was suspended, and it was clearly established: *\"No beach or island, maritime or fluvial, regulated by Law No. 4558 of April 22, 1970, may be sold, leased, or subleased during the period of suspension of said law's validity, without prejudice only to the extensions of lease rights that are appropriate in accordance with the law whose effects are suspended. The respective municipalities shall refrain from granting construction permits if said buildings are to be constructed on lands possessed as a result of the rights granted by the cited Law No. 4558.\"* The foregoing means that since 1974 (although in reality since much earlier, as will be seen), it has been known, as expressly provided by law, that the Republic's beaches or islands cannot be subjected to private ownership and that not even persons who had built some construction in those areas, under the supposed protection of the urbanization law of the maritime-terrestrial zone, could transfer rights or, much less, sell lands. Therefore, the alleged purchase supposedly made in 1976 would constitute an absolutely null transaction that had a public asset as its object, insofar as it entailed an invasion of the public zone, which is sufficient to discard the appellant's opinion that expropriation or some type of compensation is appropriate, since it must be kept in mind that the legislation that was enacted and put an end to the regulations related to the urbanization of the maritime-terrestrial zone was none other than the law of the maritime-terrestrial zone now in force (No. 6043, of March 2, 1977), and its Article 71 clearly indicated: *\"All acts, contracts, agreements, and dispositions, performed or taken as of the enactment of Law No. 5602 of November 4, 1974, and that are contrary to its provisions, are absolutely null.\"* However, and as anticipated, it must be added that the \"Ley de urbanización turística de la zona marítimo terrestre\" itself, No. 4558 of April 22, 1970, cited above, provided in its Article 6: *\"The fifty meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone from the ordinary high tide shall be inalienable and in no case can be the object of lease or sale. Therefore, no one may assert any right over said strip, which shall be dedicated to public use for leisure, recreation, or free circulation purposes. Constructions or installations currently located in that zone may not be remodeled, and in case of their destruction, new constructions must respect that inalienable zone.\"* From the foregoing, it is inferred, then, that not even under the provisions of the urbanization law of the maritime-terrestrial zone could there be private ownership over the public zone; rather, the municipalities were granted ownership of the maritime-terrestrial zone with the possibility of leasing lands located within the one hundred and fifty meters now known as the \"restricted zone\" (zona restringida) and selling them to lessees after ten years from the contracting; but, it is reiterated, that law preserved the inalienability of the fifty meters that currently make up the \"public zone\" (zona pública). It also follows from the above that the defender's thesis that the land which is the object of this case (the part located within the public zone) forms part of a \"mixed wildlife refuge,\" lacks any logical or legal basis, because, besides the fact that the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional was created by law and not by state and private co-participation, its territory already formed part of the maritime-terrestrial zone long before such creation. The complainant's criteria regarding the alleged conflict between the law of the maritime-terrestrial zone and wildlife refuges are likewise erroneous and unsustainable. Article 73 of the Law of the maritime-terrestrial zone (Ley de la zona marítimo terrestre) clearly states: *\"This law does not apply to the maritime-terrestrial zones included in national parks and equivalent reserves, which shall be governed by their respective legislation\"* (boldface supplied). There is, then, no conflict of laws. The areas of national parks, refuges, and reserves can be found within the maritime-terrestrial zone, without such circumstance causing that zone to lose its name (indeed, the very rule just transcribed states so). They continue to be part of the zone, but they are assigned a different management or treatment from that applicable to the rest of that zone in the national territory, not only from the standpoint of their administrative management (different institutions in charge of their administration), but also attending to the use and purposes to which they must respond, such that projects that could be carried out in accordance with the provisions on the maritime-terrestrial zone cannot be executed under the wildlife conservation law (ley de conservación de la vida silvestre) or other special regulations, and conversely, the specific purposes of the reserves would allow the design of projects foreign to the purposes of the law of the maritime-terrestrial zone and pave the way for community participation, encouraged in Article 17 of the wildlife conservation law; while Article 83 of that same text provides: *\"The Dirección General de Vida Silvestre shall have the powers and duties established by Law No. 6043, regarding the Refugios Nacionales de Vida Silvestre that include areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone.\"* The very law that created the Refugio de Ostional (Ley de Conservación de la fauna silvestre, No. 6919 of November 17, 1983) located it *\"... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone that extends from the right bank of the mouth of the Río Nosara to Punta India...\"* (the highlighting is supplied); while Law No. 7317, of October 30, 1992 (wildlife conservation law), expanded it, situating it *\"... in the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Cantón de Nicoya, Provincia de Guanacaste...\"* (the boldface does not appear in the original). Moreover, the subject has been the object of multiple pronouncements from the Sala Constitucional, some cited by the appellant himself, and in ruling No. [Telf1], of 8:30 a.m. on February 13, 2009, the said Chamber expressly highlighted that the Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional is a \"bien de dominio público\" that extends over the maritime-terrestrial zone, adding that the State has the duty to protect it and that private individuals who precariously occupy that public domain asset (bien demanial) lack property rights. It is not unnecessary to emphasize that the restitution ordered in the judgment on the merits refers to the areas comprised in the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, which, for the reasons set forth here, could never be the object of acquisition by private individuals. In light of the foregoing, the appeal filed is dismissed in all its parts.\"\n\n “I- […] The complainant directs his objections exclusively against the ordered restitution and requests that this part of the judgment be revoked. To ensure the logical order of the presentation, the final argument raised by the appellant must be examined, according to which restitution is a right of the owner and not a power of the judge, such that the latter incurred the vice of ruling \"ultra petita\" by acquitting the accused and declaring the compensation action (acción resarcitoria) filed by the State without merit, yet ordering the aforementioned restitution. He adds that there was a lack of competence and \"of jurisdiction,\" while the decision lacks reasoning. The complaint is not admissible. First, the appellant's criterion that restitution of property cannot be decreed in an acquittal judgment is mistaken. Article 366 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) clearly provides: \"The acquittal judgment shall order the release of the accused, the cessation of precautionary measures, the restitution of objects seized in the proceeding that are not subject to confiscation, the necessary registrations, and shall fix costs...\" The foregoing means that both confiscation and the restitution of property or the reconstruction, suppression, or reformation of a legal act related to a false document can be ordered in an acquittal ruling and regardless of whether a civil compensation action had been filed, which is only required as a prerequisite to impose reparation for the damage. This is confirmed by Articles 489, 490, 491, and 492 of the Procedural Code. On the other hand, it is obvious that the trial judge (juez a quo) erred in declaring the civil action filed by the Office of the Attorney General without merit because, as is known, although a civil lawsuit is not necessary to order the restitution of a property, there is no obstacle whatsoever to the plaintiff requesting – even as the sole claim of their lawsuit – that the object be returned (in this sense, see judgment No. 1462-04, of December 22, 2004, of the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) of the Supreme Court (Corte Suprema de Justicia)). In this matter, it is recorded on the back of page 1770 that, during the trial, the representative of the State (civil plaintiff) requested \"that the property be returned to the State, eviction and demolition be ordered\", and the judge, inconsistently, decrees that restitution but declares the civil action without merit, when the logical and legally sound approach was to grant it and impose the duty to restitute, even if other additional claims were rejected, if applicable. The aforementioned error only caused harm to the civil plaintiff, it can no longer be rectified for lack of an appeal on its part, and it is only relevant to emphasize that the restitution order, in itself, is lawful and could be issued even in the event that no compensation action had been filed, without this implying the vice of \"ultra petita\" alleged by the appellant. It is therefore appropriate to reject the protest.

     II- In the remainder of the appeal, the challenger dedicates himself to presenting his criterion that the property ordered to be restituted to the State in the judgment is not part of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), as it was unencumbered (desafectado) by Laws No. 6919 and 7313, which created the Ostional Wildlife Refuge (Refugio de Vida Silvestre) and later expanded it to include the territory between the mouth of the Nosara River and Punta Guiones. According to the complainant, said Wildlife Refuge does not constitute public domain property (bien demanial), since public nature can only be acquired by virtue of a formal law and not by a provision of the Executive Branch, as occurs with protected wildlife areas. Nor do they have the purpose of public use, characteristic of public domain properties, according to the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), but rather those of resource protection, environmental conservation, and the promotion of scientific research, among others. The defense concludes that the Ostional Refuge is of mixed ownership; that the rules of the maritime-terrestrial zone law are not applicable to it; and that by virtue of the fluctuations the subject has suffered in the legislative sphere, as well as problems in boundary demarcation (amojonamiento) and the interpretations that the appellant himself makes of various regulations, it must be maintained that the defendant cannot be dispossessed of the property she occupies without prior compensation. The objections are inadmissible. The complainant starts from erroneous assumptions and the incorrect reading and interpretation of the applicable legal provisions in this matter. First, he maintains that, according to the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the public nature of a property requires a formal law and not a mere decision of the Executive Branch, but then, inconsistently, acknowledges that the Ostional Wildlife Refuge was created, not by an executive provision, but by a law issued by the Legislative Assembly. Second, he affirms that the defendant's now-deceased spouse bought the land located in Playa Guiones in 1976, from \"... an individual who had initiated a claim (denuncio) before the Municipality of Nicoya...\" and later \"built or improved his little house,\" since it was not until 1981 that the National Geographic Institute (IGN) demarcated the beach, indicating the limit of fifty meters (obviously, of the public zone). However, the defense forgets that by Law No. 5602, of November 4, 1974 (in force, therefore, two years before the alleged purchase of the land), the effectiveness of the old \"Law on Tourism Development of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone\" was suspended, and it was clearly stated: \"No beach or island, maritime or fluvial, regulated by Law No. 4558 of April 22, 1970, may be sold, leased, or subleased, during the period of suspension of the effectiveness of said law, without prejudice solely to the extensions of lease rights that are appropriate in accordance with the law whose effects are suspended. The respective municipalities shall refrain from granting construction permits if such buildings are to be constructed on land possessed as a consequence of the rights granted by the aforementioned Law No. 4558\". The foregoing means that since 1974 (although in reality much earlier, as will be seen) it is known, as expressly provided by the law, that the beaches or islands of the Republic cannot be subject to the domain of private individuals, and that not even individuals who had built some structure in those areas, supposedly under the protection of the law on tourism development of the maritime-terrestrial zone, could transfer rights, much less sell land. Consequently, the alleged purchase supposedly made in 1976 would constitute an absolutely null transaction whose object was public property, insofar as it presumed an invasion of the public zone, which is sufficient to dismiss the challenger's opinion that expropriation or some type of compensation is appropriate, since it must be borne in mind that the legislation that was enacted and put an end to the regulations related to the development of the maritime-terrestrial zone was none other than the law of the maritime-terrestrial zone now in force (No. 6043, of March 2, 1977), and its Article 71 clearly indicated: \"All acts, contracts, agreements, and provisions, executed or made, as of the enactment of Law No. 5602 of November 4, 1974, and that were contrary to its provisions, are absolutely null\". However, and as anticipated, it must be added that the Law on Tourism Development of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone itself, No. 4558 of April 22, 1970, cited above, provided in its Article 6: \"The fifty meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone from the ordinary high-water mark shall be inalienable and in no case may be the object of lease or sale. Therefore, no one may claim any right over said strip, which shall be dedicated to public use for purposes of recreation, leisure, or free movement. The constructions or installations currently located in that zone may not be remodeled, and in the event of their destruction, new constructions must respect that inalienable zone\". From the foregoing it is inferred, then, that not even under the provisions of the law on tourism development of the maritime-terrestrial zone could private ownership exist over the public zone; rather, the municipalities were granted ownership of the maritime-terrestrial zone with the possibility of leasing land located within the one hundred fifty meters now known as the \"restricted zone\" and selling it to the lessees after ten years from the contracting had elapsed; but, it is reiterated, that law preserved the inalienability of the fifty meters that currently comprise the \"public zone.\" It is also deduced from the foregoing that the defense's thesis that the land subject of this case (the part located within the public zone) forms part of a \"mixed wildlife refuge\" lacks any logical or legal basis because, besides the fact that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Ostional) was created by law and not by state and private co-participation, its territory had already formed part of the maritime-terrestrial zone long before such creation. The complainant's criteria regarding the alleged conflict between the law of the maritime-terrestrial zone and wildlife refuges are likewise erroneous and untenable. Article 73 of the Law of the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone clearly provides: \"This law does not apply to the maritime-terrestrial zones included within national parks and equivalent reserves, which shall be governed by the respective legislation\" (the boldface is supplied). There is, then, no conflict of laws. The areas of national parks, refuges, and reserves may be located within the maritime-terrestrial zone, without this circumstance causing that zone to lose its name (in fact, the recently transcribed rule itself so states). They continue to be part of the zone, but a different management or treatment is assigned to them from that applicable to the rest of that zone in the national territory, not only from the point of view of their administrative management (different institutions in charge of their administration) but also with regard to the use and purposes they must serve, so that projects that could be carried out under the provisions on the maritime-terrestrial zone may not be executed in accordance with the wildlife conservation law or other special regulations and, conversely, the specific purposes of the reserves would allow the design of projects unrelated to the purposes of the maritime-terrestrial zone law and open the way for community participation, encouraged in Article 17 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre); while Article 83 of that same text provides \"The General Directorate of Wildlife (Dirección General de Vida Silvestre) shall have the powers and duties established by Law No. 6043, with respect to the National Wildlife Refuges that include areas of the maritime-terrestrial zone\". The very law that created the Ostional Refuge (Wildlife Conservation Law, No. 6919 of November 17, 1983) located it \"... within the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo-terrestre) that extends from the right bank of the mouth of the Nosara River to Punta India...\" (the highlighting is supplied); while Law No. 7317, of October 30, 1992 (Wildlife Conservation Law), expanded it, locating it \"... within the two hundred meters of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre) that extends from Punta India to Punta Guiones, Canton of Nicoya, Province of Guanacaste...\" (the boldface does not appear in the original). Moreover, the issue has been the subject of multiple pronouncements by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), some cited by the challenger himself, and in ruling No. 2009-002547, at 8:30 a.m. on February 13, 2009, said Chamber expressly highlighted that the Ostional National Wildlife Refuge is a \"public domain asset (bien de dominio público)\" that extends over the maritime-terrestrial zone, adding that the State has the duty to protect it and that private individuals who precariously occupy that public domain property lack ownership rights. It is worth reiterating that the restitution ordered in the judgment on the merits refers to the areas comprised within the public zone of the maritime-terrestrial zone, which, for the reasons set forth herein, could never have been the object of acquisition by private individuals. Thus, the filed appeal is declared without merit in all its aspects.”

 

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