{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-147023", "citation": "Res. 00012-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VII", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria disciplinaria en procesos de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública", "title_en": "Prescription of Disciplinary Sanctioning Power in Public Finance Control and Oversight Proceedings", "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VII, analiza la alegación de prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria formulada por un funcionario público del ICE que fue suspendido disciplinariamente por hechos ocurridos entre septiembre de 2008 y enero de 2009, cuyo procedimiento disciplinario se le notificó hasta julio de 2010. El demandante invocaba la prescripción según el plazo de un mes del artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo. Sin embargo, el Tribunal determina que, al tratarse de materia de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública, el régimen de prescripción aplicable es el especial contenido en el artículo 71 inciso b) de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (Ley 7428), que establece un plazo de cinco años contados desde la fecha en que el informe de auditoría o indagación se pone en conocimiento del jerarca competente. El Tribunal también desarrolla extensamente la doctrina sobre la prescripción como institución rogatoria, sus elementos constitutivos —inercia, transcurso del tiempo y alegación— y las reglas sobre interrupción del plazo, precisando que la interrupción no opera con la mera apertura del procedimiento, sino con la debida notificación del auto que tiene por instruida la causa conforme a la LGAP. En el caso concreto, el informe de investigación se entregó en setiembre de 2009 y la notificación ocurrió en julio de 2010, por lo que el plazo de cinco años no había expirado. En consecuencia, la sentencia declara sin lugar la excepción de prescripción, reconociendo la vigencia de la potestad sancionatoria ejercida por la administración.", "summary_en": "The Administrative Litigation Court, Section VII, examines a public employee's challenge to a 30-day unpaid disciplinary suspension on grounds that the administration's sanctioning power had prescribed. The underlying facts occurred between September 2008 and January 2009; the employee was notified of the disciplinary proceeding in July 2010 and argued that the one-month deadline under Article 603 of the Labor Code had expired. The Court holds that, because this case falls under the public-finance control and oversight regime —governed by Article 71(b) of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General (Law 7428)— a five-year prescription period applies, running from the date the investigation or audit report was brought to the attention of the competent authority. The decision develops the doctrinal framework of prescription as a rogatory institution, its three constitutive elements (inaction, lapse of time, and allegation), and the rules on interruption, clarifying that interruption requires proper notification of the procedural-resolution ordering the investigation, not mere initiation of the proceeding. Since the investigation results were delivered in September 2009 and the notification occurred in July 2010, the five-year period had not elapsed. The claim of prescription is denied, upholding the administration's sanctioning authority.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VII", "date": "2013", "year": "2013", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria", "hacienda pública", "principio rogatorio", "interrupción de la prescripción", "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República", "auto que tiene por instruida la causa" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 601", "law": "Código de Trabajo" }, { "article": "Art. 603", "law": "Código de Trabajo" }, { "article": "Art. 876", "law": "Código Civil" }, { "article": "Art. 140", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 239", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 240", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 243", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 71", "law": "Ley 7428" } ], "keywords_es": [ "prescripción", "potestad sancionatoria", "hacienda pública", "procedimiento disciplinario", "Ley 7428", "Contraloría General de la República", "interrupción de la prescripción", "Código de Trabajo", "LGAP", "Derecho Administrativo", "sanción administrativa", "funcionario público", "ICE", "seguridad jurídica", "principio rogatorio" ], "keywords_en": [ "prescription", "sanctioning power", "public finance", "disciplinary proceeding", "Law 7428", "Comptroller General", "interruption of prescription", "Labor Code", "LGAP", "Administrative Law", "administrative sanction", "public official", "ICE", "legal certainty", "rogatory principle" ], "excerpt_es": "“Por tratarse de materia de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública, conforme se explicó supra, lleva razón la parte demandada al sostener que el plazo de prescripción aplicable es el del artículo 71, inciso b), de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, que está fijado en cinco años, 'contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo'. Evidentemente, dicho plazo preclusivo no llegó a expirar en este caso, de manera que el alegato de prescripción debe ser denegado.”\n\n“...es claro que el fenecimiento del plazo conferido para ejercer la potestad correctiva se encuentra sujeto a las causales de interrupción que fija el ordinal 876 del Código Civil, por remisión que hace el ordinal 601, párrafo primero, del Código de Trabajo. Cabe precisar, las causales de interrupción –que hacen que el plazo prescriptivo inicie de nuevo– solo pueden producir ese efecto en la medida en que ocurran antes del vencimiento del plazo a interrumpir, pues aún ocurridas, si lo es vencido el plazo, la simple alegación de prescripción negativa lleva a la pérdida del ejercicio del derecho precluído por inercia en su ejercicio.”\n\n“...debe entenderse que la interrupción no se produce con la simple apertura del procedimiento, sino con la debida comunicación del auto que tiene por instruida la causa, de conformidad con los ordinales 140, 239, 240, 243 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (en adelante LGAP).”", "excerpt_en": "“Since this is a matter of control and oversight of public finances, as explained above, the respondent is correct in arguing that the applicable prescription period is that of Article 71, subsection b), of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, which is set at five years, 'counted from the date on which the report on the investigation or the respective audit is brought to the attention of the head or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding.' Evidently, this preclusive period did not expire in this case, so the claim of prescription must be denied.”\n\n“...it is clear that the expiration of the period granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the grounds for interruption established by Article 876 of the Civil Code, by remission of Article 601, first paragraph, of the Labor Code. It should be noted that grounds for interruption —which cause the prescriptive period to begin anew— can only produce this effect insofar as they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, for even if they occur, if the period has expired, the mere assertion of negative prescription leads to the loss of the right precluded by inaction in its exercise.”\n\n“...it must be understood that interruption is not produced by the mere opening of the proceeding, but by the proper communication of the order that deems the cause as having been instructed, in accordance with Articles 140, 239, 240, 243 of the General Law of Public Administration (hereinafter LGAP).”", "outcome": { "label_en": "Prescription denied", "label_es": "Denegada la prescripción", "summary_en": "The Court dismisses the exception of prescription of the sanctioning power, holding that the applicable five-year period under Article 71 of Law 7428 had not expired.", "summary_es": "El Tribunal declara sin lugar la excepción de prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria, determinando que el plazo aplicable es de cinco años según el artículo 71 de la Ley 7428, el cual no había vencido." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "prescription operates under a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio.", "quote_es": "la prescripción atiende a un principio rogatorio y a diferencia de la caducidad (en términos procesales), no puede ser considerada de oficio." }, { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "grounds for interruption —which cause the prescriptive period to start anew— can only produce this effect insofar as they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, for even if they occur, if the period has expired, the mere assertion of negative prescription leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inaction in its exercise.", "quote_es": "las causales de interrupción –que hacen que el plazo prescriptivo inicie de nuevo– solo pueden producir ese efecto en la medida en que ocurran antes del vencimiento del plazo a interrumpir, pues aún ocurridas, si lo es vencido el plazo, la simple alegación de prescripción negativa lleva a la pérdida del ejercicio del derecho precluído por inercia en su ejercicio." }, { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "interruption is not produced by the mere opening of the proceeding, but by the proper communication of the order that deems the cause as having been instructed, in accordance with Articles 140, 239, 240, 243 of the General Law of Public Administration.", "quote_es": "la interrupción no se produce con la simple apertura del procedimiento, sino con la debida comunicación del auto que tiene por instruida la causa, de conformidad con los ordinales 140, 239, 240, 243 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-21629", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7428 Art. 71" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-147023", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-21629", "norm_num": "7428", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "07/09/1994" }, { "doc_id": "norm-47258", "norm_num": "8131", "norm_name": "Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "18/09/2001" }, { "doc_id": "norm-49185", "norm_num": "8292", "norm_name": "Ley General de Control Interno", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "31/07/2002" }, { "doc_id": "norm-53738", "norm_num": "8422", "norm_name": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "06/10/2004" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“VI.- SOBRE LA IMPROCEDENCIA DEL ARGUMENTO DE PRESCRIPCIÓN\r\nDE LA POTESTAD SANCIONATORIA. Por razones de orden, estima el Tribunal\r\nnecesario examinar primero el reclamo que plantea el demandante, en el sentido\r\nde que los actos que le impusieron una suspensión disciplinaria de treinta días\r\nsin goce de salario son ilegales, por cuanto el ejercicio de la potestad\r\nsancionatoria en su caso había prescrito. Este orden de análisis se impone no\r\nsolo porque, en caso de que se acogiese el alegato, se tornaría innecesario\r\nexaminar las restantes alegaciones tocantes a la validez de las conductas\r\nadministrativas cuestionadas, sino, además, porque partiendo de lo que el\r\npropio actor plantea en la petitoria de la demanda –y lo reiteró así su\r\napoderado al momento de rendir las conclusiones en la audiencia preliminar– en\r\nel sentido de que “En caso de no considerar procedente la prescripción\r\nsolicito que se declare la nulidad de los actos administrativos indicados por\r\ninfringir el principio non bis in ídem ”, se sigue, justamente, que\r\nla pretensión anulatoria es, en realidad, subsidiaria a la declarativa. Pues\r\nbien, en cuanto al primer eje temático planteado, desarrolla el accionante su\r\nalegato de prescripción en el sentido de que los hechos que dieron lugar a la\r\nsanción que se le impuso ocurrieron en el último trimestre del año 2008 y\r\nllegaron a conocimiento de su jefe superior en abril del 2009, mientras que la\r\nresolución inicial del procedimiento disciplinario le fue notificada hasta el 5\r\nde julio de 2010. Para entonces, considera sobradamente vencido el plazo que\r\nestablece el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo. En relación con la\r\nprescripción, debe indicarse que esta supone la concurrencia de tres elementos\r\nfundamentales: a) inercia del titular de un derecho en su ejercicio; b)\r\ntranscurso del tiempo fijado por el ordenamiento jurídico al efecto; y, c)\r\nalegación o excepción del sujeto pasivo de la relación jurídica, haciendo valer\r\nla prescripción. Ello supone que no existe efecto liberatorio si, pese a\r\nconcurrir los dos primeros presupuestos, la articulación no se formula. Ello\r\nporque la prescripción atiende a un principio rogatorio y a diferencia de la\r\ncaducidad (en términos procesales), no puede ser considerada de oficio. En\r\ncuanto al ejercicio de la potestad sancionatoria, lo expuesto implica que el\r\ntitular del derecho es el jerarca administrativo o quien tenga la competencia\r\npara ejercer el referido poder–deber, mientras que el sujeto pasivo es el\r\nfuncionario público, quien en esa medida se encuentra sujeto a la potestad correctiva\r\nsolo por el plazo que expresamente fije la normativa aplicable; vencido el\r\ncual, emerge su facultad de requerir el reconocimiento de la pérdida del\r\nejercicio de la potestad jerárquica. Desde este plano, no hay duda que se trata\r\nde una potestad correctiva que, por criterio de seguridad jurídica, se\r\nencuentra sujeta a plazo prescriptivo. De manera genérica, ese plazo se regula\r\npor el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo, que fija un plazo de un mes para el\r\nejercicio de esa potestad represiva. Sin embargo, ha de advertirse que se trata\r\nde una norma que cede frente a regulaciones particulares y especiales, que\r\nincorporan reglas diversas en cuanto a ese extremo. Es el caso, por ejemplo, de\r\nla Ley General de Policía, N° 7410 del 26 de mayo de 1994, cuyo numeral 83 fija\r\nun régimen de prescripción particular, a saber: “Las faltas leves\r\nprescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La prescripción se\r\ninterrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario”. Lo mismo se\r\npresenta en materia de fiscalización de la hacienda pública, que es\r\nprecisamente la que concurre en el sub examine. Para este tipo de\r\nprocedimientos, el plazo aplicable es el regulado por las leyes N° 8292 (en su\r\nartículo 43), 8422 (artículo 44) y 8131 (artículo 112). Se trata de un sistema\r\nnormativo que se constituye como un ordenamiento sectorial que contiene reglas\r\nconcretas, que en tanto especiales, prevalecen sobre la normativa general. En\r\nlo medular, estas normas remiten al régimen previsto en el ordinal 71 de la Ley\r\nOrgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, N° 7428, que señala en lo\r\nmedular:\n\r\n\r\n\n“La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario\r\npúblico por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de\r\ncontrol y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes\r\nreglas:\n\r\n\r\n\na) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la\r\nresponsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento\r\ndel hecho.\n\r\n\r\n\nb) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea\r\nnotorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un\r\nestudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad– la\r\nresponsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que\r\nel informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento\r\ndel jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento\r\nrespectivo.” (El subrayado es\r\nnuestro.)\n\r\n\r\n\nAhora bien, es claro que el fenecimiento del plazo\r\nconferido para ejercer la potestad correctiva se encuentra sujeto a las causales\r\nde interrupción que fija el ordinal 876 del Código Civil, por remisión que hace\r\nel ordinal 601, párrafo primero, del Código de Trabajo. Cabe precisar, las\r\ncausales de interrupción –que hacen que el plazo prescriptivo inicie de nuevo–\r\nsolo pueden producir ese efecto en la medida en que ocurran antes del\r\nvencimiento del plazo a interrumpir, pues aún ocurridas, si lo es vencido el\r\nplazo, la simple alegación de prescripción negativa lleva a la pérdida del\r\nejercicio del derecho precluído por inercia en su ejercicio. Con todo, debe\r\nentenderse que la interrupción no se produce con la simple apertura del\r\nprocedimiento, sino con la debida comunicación del auto que tiene por instruida\r\nla causa, de conformidad con los ordinales 140, 239, 240, 243 de la Ley General\r\nde la Administración Pública (en adelante LGAP). Cabe agregar, además, que\r\nmientras el procedimiento administrativo se tramita, los diversos actos\r\ninternos que se emiten en su curso, producen un efecto igualmente interruptor\r\nen el plazo aludido, siempre que busquen la efectiva prosecución de la causa y\r\nno constituyan meras estratagemas formales para burlar los plazos que deben ser\r\naplicables al procedimiento.-\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- En el\r\ncaso concreto, se ha tenido por acreditado que los hechos que motivaron la\r\nsanción impuesta al actor ocurrieron dentro de un lapso que comprende los meses\r\nde setiembre del 2008 a enero del 2009, así como que dichos hechos llegaron\r\nprimero a conocimiento de la jefatura correspondiente en setiembre de ese\r\núltimo año, cuando fueron entregados los resultados de la investigación\r\nadministrativa efectuada por la Dirección de Protección y Seguridad\r\nInstitucional del ICE (hecho probado 3). Por otro lado, la notificación al\r\ndemandante del acto de apertura del procedimiento disciplinario establecido en\r\nsu contra se realizó el 5 de julio del 2010 (hecho probado 5). Por tratarse de\r\nmateria de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública, conforme se explicó supra,\r\nlleva razón la parte demandada al sostener que el plazo de prescripción\r\naplicable es el del artículo 71, inciso b), de la Ley Orgánica de la\r\nContraloría General de la República, que está fijado en cinco años, “contados\r\na partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría\r\nrespectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente\r\npara dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo”. Evidentemente, dicho plazo\r\npreclusivo no llegó a expirar en este caso, de manera que el alegato de\r\nprescripción debe ser denegado.”", "body_en_text": "“VI.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ARGUMENT OF EXPIRATION\nOF THE SANCTIONING POWER. For reasons of order, the Tribunal deems it necessary to first examine the claim raised by the plaintiff, to the effect that the acts that imposed a thirty-day disciplinary suspension without pay are illegal, because the exercise of the sanctioning power in his case had expired. This order of analysis is imposed not only because, if the allegation were to be accepted, it would become unnecessary to examine the remaining allegations concerning the validity of the challenged administrative conducts, but also because, based on what the plaintiff himself raises in the petition of the complaint – and his legal representative reiterated this when presenting conclusions at the preliminary hearing – stating that “Should the expiration not be considered applicable, I request that the indicated administrative acts be declared null and void for infringing the principle non bis in ídem,” it follows, precisely, that the annulment claim is, in reality, subsidiary to the declaratory one. Well, regarding the first thematic axis raised, the plaintiff develops his expiration allegation by arguing that the facts that gave rise to the sanction imposed on him occurred in the last quarter of 2008 and came to the attention of his direct superior in April 2009, whereas the initial resolution of the disciplinary proceeding was not notified to him until July 5, 2010. By then, he considers the period established by Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) to have amply expired. In relation to expiration, it must be noted that it requires the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia on the part of the holder of a right in its exercise; b) lapse of the time period established by the legal system for this purpose; and, c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, asserting the expiration. This means that there is no liberatory effect if, despite the concurrence of the first two presuppositions, the articulation is not formulated. This is because expiration responds to a rogatory principle and, unlike forfeiture (caducidad, in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. Regarding the exercise of the sanctioning power, the foregoing implies that the holder of the right is the administrative superior or whoever has the competence to exercise the aforementioned power–duty, while the passive subject is the public officer, who to that extent is subject to the corrective power only for the period expressly established by the applicable regulations; once that period has expired, their power to demand recognition of the loss of the exercise of the hierarchical authority emerges. From this perspective, there is no doubt that it is a corrective power that, for reasons of legal certainty, is subject to a prescriptive period. Generically, that period is regulated by numeral 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which sets a one-month period for the exercise of that repressive power. However, it must be noted that this is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate different rules regarding this point. This is the case, for example, of the Ley General de Policía, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, whose numeral 83 establishes a particular expiration regime, namely: “Minor infractions shall expire in one month and serious ones, in two years. The expiration shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated.” The same occurs in matters of control and oversight of the public treasury, which is precisely the subject matter applicable in the sub examine. For this type of proceeding, the applicable period is that regulated by laws No. 8292 (in its Article 43), 8422 (Article 44), and 8131 (Article 112). This is a regulatory system that constitutes a sectorial legal order containing specific rules, which, being special, prevail over the general regulation. At its core, these rules refer to the regime provided for in ordinal 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, which essentially states:\n\n“The administrative responsibility of the public officer for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher-ranking control and oversight legal framework shall expire in accordance with the following rules:”\n\na) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, the responsibility shall expire in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act.\n\nb) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious – understood as an act that requires an inquiry (indagación) or an audit study to inform of its possible irregularity – the responsibility shall expire in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry (indagación) or audit is brought to the attention of the superior (jerarca) or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding.” (The underlining is ours.)\n\nNow, it is clear that the expiry of the period granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the grounds for interruption established in ordinal 876 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), by remission made by ordinal 601, first paragraph, of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). It should be clarified that the grounds for interruption – which cause the prescriptive period to start anew – can only produce that effect to the extent that they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occur, if it is after the period has expired, the simple allegation of negative expiration leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded due to inertia in its exercise. Nevertheless, it must be understood that the interruption does not occur with the simple opening of the proceeding, but with the proper communication of the order that deems the cause as formally established (auto que tiene por instruida la causa), in accordance with ordinals 140, 239, 240, 243 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (hereinafter LGAP). It should also be added that while the administrative proceeding is being processed, the various internal acts issued in its course produce an equally interrupting effect on the aforementioned period, provided they seek the effective prosecution of the cause and do not constitute mere formal stratagems to circumvent the periods that must be applicable to the proceeding.-\n\nVII.- In the specific case, it has been proven that the facts that motivated the sanction imposed on the plaintiff occurred within a period spanning the months of September 2008 to January 2009, and that these facts first came to the attention of the corresponding head in September of the latter year, when the results of the administrative investigation carried out by the Dirección de Protección y Seguridad Institucional del ICE were delivered (proven fact 3). On the other hand, the notification to the plaintiff of the act initiating the disciplinary proceeding established against him was made on July 5, 2010 (proven fact 5). As this pertains to a matter of control and oversight of the public treasury, as explained supra, the defendant is correct in arguing that the applicable expiration period is that of Article 71, subsection b), of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, which is set at five years, “counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry (indagación) or audit is brought to the attention of the superior (jerarca) or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding.”\n\n**VI.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE SANCTIONING POWER.** For reasons of order, the Court deems it necessary to first examine the claim raised by the plaintiff, to the effect that the acts which imposed a thirty-day disciplinary suspension without pay are illegal, because the exercise of the sanctioning power in his case had prescribed. This order of analysis is necessary not only because, if the argument were upheld, it would be unnecessary to examine the remaining allegations concerning the validity of the challenged administrative conduct, but also because, based on what the plaintiff himself proposes in the petition of the complaint—and his legal representative reiterated this when presenting conclusions at the preliminary hearing—that *“If the statute of limitations (prescripción) is not deemed applicable, I request that the nullity of the indicated administrative acts be declared for violating the principle* non bis in idem *”*, it follows, precisely, that the annulment claim is, in reality, subsidiary to the declaratory one. Well then, regarding the first thematic axis raised, the plaintiff develops his statute of limitations argument to the effect that the events giving rise to the sanction imposed on him occurred in the last quarter of 2008 and came to the knowledge of his superior in April 2009, while the initial resolution of the disciplinary proceeding was not notified to him until July 5, 2010. By then, he considers the time limit established by Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) to be amply exceeded. Regarding the statute of limitations, it must be noted that this requires the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise; b) lapse of the time fixed by the legal system for that purpose; and, c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, asserting the statute of limitations. This means that there is no liberatory effect if, despite the concurrence of the first two requirements, the pleading is not formulated. This is because the statute of limitations follows a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. Regarding the exercise of the sanctioning power, the foregoing implies that the holder of the right is the administrative superior or whoever has the competence to exercise the aforementioned power-duty, while the passive subject is the public official, who to that extent is subject to the corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations; upon the expiration of which, his power to demand recognition of the loss of the exercise of the hierarchical power arises. From this perspective, there is no doubt that it is a corrective power which, for reasons of legal certainty, is subject to a prescriptive period. Generically, this period is regulated by numeral 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which establishes a one-month period for the exercise of this repressive power. However, it must be warned that this is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate different rules regarding this aspect. This is the case, for example, of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía), No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, whose numeral 83 establishes a particular statute of limitations regime, namely: *“Minor offenses shall prescribe in one month and serious ones in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated”*. The same occurs in matters of supervision of the public treasury, which is precisely the one occurring in the *sub examine* case. For this type of proceeding, the applicable period is that regulated by Laws No. 8292 (in its Article 43), 8422 (Article 44), and 8131 (Article 112). It is a regulatory system constituted as a sectoral framework containing specific rules, which, being special, prevail over general regulations. In essence, these rules refer to the regime provided in ordinal 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, which states in essence:\n\n“The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided in this Law and in the higher control and supervision framework shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules:\n\na) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act.\n\nb) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as that act which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the superior or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding.” (The underlining is ours.)\n\nNow then, it is clear that the expiration of the time limit granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the grounds for interruption established by ordinal 876 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), by reference made by ordinal 601, first paragraph, of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). It should be specified that the grounds for interruption—which cause the prescriptive period to start anew—can only produce this effect insofar as they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they have occurred, if the period has expired, the mere negative allegation of the statute of limitations leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inertia in its exercise. However, it must be understood that the interruption does not occur with the simple opening of the proceeding, but with the proper notification of the order that finds the cause to be instructed, in accordance with ordinals 140, 239, 240, 243 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, hereinafter LGAP). It should be added, furthermore, that while the administrative proceeding is being processed, the various internal acts issued in its course produce an equally interrupting effect on the aforementioned period, provided that they seek the effective continuation of the cause and do not constitute mere formal stratagems to circumvent the time limits that should be applicable to the proceeding.-\n\n**VII.-** In the specific case, it has been held as proven that the events motivating the sanction imposed on the plaintiff occurred within a period spanning the months of September 2008 to January 2009, as well as that said events first came to the attention of the corresponding superior in September of that last year, when the results of the administrative investigation conducted by the Directorate of Institutional Protection and Security of the ICE were delivered (proven fact 3). On the other hand, the notification to the plaintiff of the act opening the disciplinary proceeding established against him took place on July 5, 2010 (proven fact 5). Because this is a matter of control and supervision of the public treasury, as explained *supra*, the respondent party is correct in maintaining that the applicable prescriptive period is that of Article 71, subsection b), of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), which is set at five years, *“counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the superior or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding”*. Evidently, said peremptory time limit did not expire in this case, so the statute of limitations argument must be denied.”" }