{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-147996",
  "citation": "Res. 00114-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Reconstrucción crediticia y responsabilidad del acreedor en el sistema de cuota real",
  "title_en": "Credit Reconstruction and Lender's Responsibility in the Real Payment System",
  "summary_es": "Esta sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI, resuelve un proceso de conocimiento sobre un crédito para vivienda bajo el sistema de 'cuota real' regulado por el artículo 167 de la Ley 7052. La demandante alegó nulidad de la cláusula contractual y falta de información como consumidora, ya que tras once años de pagos su capital adeudado se había multiplicado al no efectuar los acreedores los ajustes semestrales de cuota pactados. El Tribunal declara la validez sustancial de la cláusula por ajustarse a la ley, pero condena a los demandados por incumplimiento del deber de ajuste y por emitir recibos sin información sobre saldos y amortización. Ordena la nulidad de las propuestas de 'soluciones' que pretendían trasladar las consecuencias del error al deudor, y ordena la reconstrucción legítima del crédito respetando el plan de pagos y plazo originales. La cuota deberá ajustarse conforme al salario mínimo, pero no podrá superar el 30% del ingreso familiar, y al cumplirse las 240 cuotas pactadas la obligación se extinguirá y se levantará el gravamen hipotecario.",
  "summary_en": "This ruling by the Administrative Litigation Tribunal, Section VI, decides a claim regarding a housing loan under the 'real payment' system regulated by Article 167 of Law 7052. The plaintiff alleged nullity of the contractual clause and lack of consumer information, since after eleven years of payments her outstanding capital had multiplied because the lenders failed to make the agreed semi-annual payment adjustments. The Court declares the clause substantially valid under the law, but finds the defendants in breach of their duty to adjust and for issuing receipts lacking balance and amortization information. It annuls the 'solution' proposals that aimed to shift the consequences of the error onto the debtor, and orders a legitimate reconstruction of the credit, respecting the original payment plan and term. The payment must be adjusted according to the minimum wage but cannot exceed 30% of family income, and upon completion of the 240 agreed payments, the debt shall be extinguished and the mortgage released.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI",
  "date": "2013",
  "year": "2013",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "cuota real",
    "anatocismo",
    "cuota refinanciada",
    "Ley 7052",
    "BANHVI",
    "LPCDEC",
    "dación en pago"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 167",
      "law": "Ley 7052"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 505",
      "law": "Código de Comercio"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 46",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 28",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 764",
      "law": "Código Civil"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 1022",
      "law": "Código Civil"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 1023",
      "law": "Código Civil"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "cuota real",
    "anatocismo",
    "crédito de vivienda",
    "BANHVI",
    "Ley 7052",
    "derechos del consumidor",
    "responsabilidad del acreedor",
    "nulidad contractual",
    "reconstrucción crediticia",
    "buena fe",
    "ajuste semestral",
    "salario mínimo"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "real payment system",
    "anatocism",
    "housing loan",
    "BANHVI",
    "Law 7052",
    "consumer rights",
    "creditor liability",
    "contractual nullity",
    "credit reconstruction",
    "good faith",
    "semi-annual adjustment",
    "minimum wage"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "“el ordenamiento jurídico nacional veda la figura de la capitalización de intereses, sea, el denominado anatocismo, que supone, en términos simples, la aplicación de intereses sobre intereses. En este sentido, el canon 505 del Código de Comercio indica de manera diáfana: 'Es prohibido capitalizar intereses. Sin embargo, si hecha la liquidación de una deuda se estuvieran debiendo intereses, se podrán sumar éstos al capital para formar un solo total. Al otorgar nuevo documento o prorrogar el anterior, pueden estipularse intereses sobre la totalidad de la obligación.' ... la Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda y Creación del BANHVI, No. 7052 del 27 de noviembre de 1986, establece en su artículo 167: 'Las entidades autorizadas podrán otorgar sus créditos mediante sistemas de pago, en los cuales la cuota se ajuste con base en la variación de los salarios mínimos. Esas cuotas pueden ser menores al mínimo necesario para cubrir intereses y amortización -cuota refinanciada- y las diferencias en descubierto se acumularán en el saldo del crédito en forma de capitalización, sin que por ello se pueda aplicar el artículo 505 del Código de Comercio.'\n\n... la omisión de no haber ajustado la cuota mensual semestralmente y bajo los parámetros que establecía el contrato de préstamo es atribuible, exclusivamente, a quienes fungían como acreedores de la obligación, siendo éstos quienes deben asumir las consecuencias económicas que se deriven de esa desatención; sin que resulte procedente trasladar esa omisión a la deudora, como se ha pretendido.\n\n... la obligación de la actora deberá extinguirse en el plazo que establece el contrato y con las 240 cuotas originalmente pactadas. ... si por errores de los acreedores el plazo no es suficiente para saldar la deuda, será éste quien deba asumir las consecuencias patrimoniales de sus desatenciones y no trasladarlos a una deudora que, por más de quince años, ha cumplido sus obligaciones. Ello no significa, bajo ninguna circunstancia, que se impida a los demandados cobrar sus acreencias o un enriquecimiento sin causa en favor de la deudora. Se reitera que quien no ejerció el derecho de crédito en las condiciones pactadas fueron los distintos acreedores y que la cuota que se va fijar para el resto del plazo contractual es consecuencia de su inercia y para garantizar el derecho de la actora como consumidora, a que se respeten los términos pactados y por ella cumplidos.”",
  "excerpt_en": "\"the national legal system prohibits the capitalization of interest, that is, the so-called anatocism, which simply means the application of interest on interest. In this regard, canon 505 of the Commercial Code clearly states: 'It is forbidden to capitalize interest. However, if upon settlement of a debt interest is owed, it may be added to the principal to form a single total. When granting a new document or extending the previous one, interest may be stipulated on the total obligation.' ... Law of the National Financial System for Housing and Creation of BANHVI, No. 7052 of November 27, 1986, establishes in its article 167: 'Authorized entities may grant their loans through payment systems in which the installment is adjusted based on variations in minimum wages. Such installments may be lower than the minimum necessary to cover interest and amortization —refinanced installment— and the uncovered differences will accumulate in the loan balance as capitalization, without this implying the application of Article 505 of the Commercial Code.'\n\n... the omission of not having adjusted the monthly installment semi-annually and under the parameters established by the loan contract is attributable exclusively to those who acted as creditors of the obligation, who must bear the economic consequences derived from that neglect; it is not appropriate to transfer that omission to the debtor, as has been sought.\n\n... the plaintiff's obligation shall be extinguished within the term established by the contract and with the 240 originally agreed installments. ... if due to the creditors' errors the term is not sufficient to settle the debt, the creditor shall bear the property consequences of its neglect and shall not transfer them to a debtor who, for more than fifteen years, has fulfilled her obligations. This does not mean, under any circumstances, that the defendants are prevented from collecting their claims or an unjust enrichment in favor of the debtor. It is reiterated that those who did not exercise the credit right under the agreed conditions were the various creditors and that the installment to be set for the remainder of the contractual term is a consequence of their inertia and to guarantee the plaintiff's right as a consumer to have the terms agreed and complied with by her respected.\"",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Partially granted",
    "label_es": "Parcialmente con lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Court partially grants the claim: it upholds the real payment clause but annuls the defendants' solution proposals as illegitimate and orders the reconstruction of the credit, respecting the original term and installments, attributing to the creditor the economic consequences of not adjusting the installments.",
    "summary_es": "El Tribunal declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda: valida la cláusula contractual de cuota real pero anula las propuestas de solución de los demandados por ilegítimas y ordena la reconstrucción del crédito respetando plazo y cuotas originales, atribuyendo al acreedor las consecuencias económicas de no haber ajustado las cuotas."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV, ref. Código de Comercio Art. 505",
      "quote_en": "It is forbidden to capitalize interest. However, if upon settlement of a debt interest is owed, it may be added to the principal to form a single total.",
      "quote_es": "Es prohibido capitalizar intereses. Sin embargo, si hecha la liquidación de una deuda se estuvieran debiendo intereses, se podrán sumar éstos al capital para formar un solo total."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "the omission of not having adjusted the monthly installment semi-annually and under the parameters established by the loan contract is attributable exclusively to those who acted as creditors of the obligation, who must bear the economic consequences derived from that neglect",
      "quote_es": "la omisión de no haber ajustado la cuota mensual semestralmente y bajo los parámetros que establecía el contrato de préstamo es atribuible, exclusivamente, a quienes fungían como acreedores de la obligación, siendo éstos quienes deben asumir las consecuencias económicas que se deriven de esa desatención"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IX",
      "quote_en": "if due to the creditors' errors the term is not sufficient to settle the debt, the creditor shall bear the property consequences of its neglect and shall not transfer them to a debtor who, for more than fifteen years, has fulfilled her obligations",
      "quote_es": "si por errores de los acreedores el plazo no es suficiente para saldar la deuda, será éste quien deba asumir las consecuencias patrimoniales de sus desatenciones y no trasladarlos a una deudora que, por más de quince años, ha cumplido sus obligaciones"
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-12391",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7052  Art. 167"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-147996",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-12391",
      "norm_num": "7052",
      "norm_name": "Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "13/11/1986"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-26481",
      "norm_num": "7472",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "20/12/1994"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-75696",
      "norm_num": "37899",
      "norm_name": "Reglamento a la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor",
      "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo",
      "norm_fecha": "08/07/2013"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“IV.-Sobre la prohibición de anatocismo y el\r\nsistema de cuota real en créditos de vivienda. Se\r\ntrata de un tema que ya ha sido tratado por este Tribunal, entre otras, en la\r\nsentencia No. 926-2010, dictada a las 7 horas 49 minutos del 11 de marzo de\r\n2010. En lo que interesa, se indicó que \"(...) el ordenamiento\r\njurídico nacional veda la figura de la capitalización de intereses, sea, el\r\ndenominado anatocismo, que supone, en términos simples, la aplicación de\r\nintereses sobre intereses. En este sentido, el canon 505 del Código de Comercio\r\nindica de manera diáfana: \"Es prohibido capitalizar intereses. Sin\r\nembargo, si hecha la liquidación de una deuda se estuvieran debiendo intereses,\r\nse podrán sumar éstos al capital para formar un solo total. Al otorgar nuevo documento\r\no prorrogar el anterior, pueden estipularse intereses sobre la totalidad de la\r\nobligación.\" Desde ese plano, es evidente que salvo regla en contrario,\r\ntoda obligación de préstamo mercantil es onerosa por tanto, retribuido con\r\nintereses legales (artículo 496 Código de Comercio). Tal dimensión supone que\r\nen el pago de las cuotas del crédito, primero se amortizan los réditos\r\ncorrientes y el remanente se aplica al capital de la obligación. Ahora bien, la\r\nLey del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda y Creación del BANHVI ,\r\nNo. 7052 del 27 de noviembre de 1986, establece en su artículo 167: \" Las\r\nentidades autorizadas podrán otorgar sus créditos mediante sistemas de pago, en\r\nlos cuales la cuota se ajuste con base en la variación de los salarios mínimos.\r\nEsas cuotas pueden ser menores al mínimo necesario para cubrir intereses y\r\namortización -cuota refinanciada- y las diferencias en descubierto se\r\nacumularán en el saldo del crédito en forma de capitalización, sin que por ello\r\nse pueda aplicar el artículo 505 del Código de Comercio. En todo caso, el monto\r\nde la cuota así fijada será aplicable primero a cubrir intereses, y si queda\r\nalgo será aplicado a amortizar la deuda. Similar tratamiento podrá aplicarse a\r\ncréditos ya establecidos. / Los entes autorizados podrán utilizar sistemas\r\nmediante otros parámetros fijados por la Junta Directiva del Banco. (Así\r\nreformado por el artículo 165 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa\r\nRica No.7558 del 3 de noviembre de 1995) \" Se trata de un sistema que busca\r\nestablecer un mecanismo de financiamiento para vivienda con cuotas más\r\naccesibles a los postulantes a créditos de esta naturaleza. La norma prevé la\r\ndenominada cuota escalonada, que supone el incremento porcentual de la cuota,\r\npreviamente pactado por las partes, usualmente cada año, a efectos de poder\r\ncompensar en las cuotas de los años sucesivos, el déficit en el pago del\r\nprincipal que pueda tenerse con la cuota inicial, de manera que conforme avanza\r\nel crédito, la cuota se incrementa. Cabe en este punto indicar, que en tesis de\r\nprincipio, la cuota pactada debe permitir el pago de intereses y amortización a\r\ncapital. Sin embargo, dentro esta modalidad, el citado ordinal 167 permite, a\r\nmodo de excepción, que la cuota inicial no abarque el mínimo necesario para\r\ncubrir los intereses y la amortización al capital. En ese caso, pueden surgir\r\nvariaciones; por un lado, cuando la cuota solo permita la cobertura del interés\r\ncorriente, el capital se mantendrá invariable hasta que el incremento\r\nescalonado de la cuota permita cubrir esos réditos y aplicar aporte al saldo\r\nprincipal. Por otra parte, cuando la cuota no permita cubrir los intereses a\r\nplenitud, de manera excepcional y dada la permisibilidad legal, las diferencias\r\nal descubierto de los intereses se acumulan al saldo del crédito en forma de\r\ncapitalización, sin que ello suponga, señala la ley aludida, aplicar el\r\nartículo 505 del Código de Comercio. De lo anterior se desprende que en este\r\nescenario, se está frente a una cuota refinanciada en lo que a intereses se refiere,\r\nes decir, esa fracción de réditos no cancelada por la insuficiencia de la\r\ncuota, pasan a engrosar el capital primario. En su contexto, esos intereses\r\nluego podrán ser cancelados con el escalonamiento del pago. En suma, se inicia\r\ncon una cuota baja que va subiendo con el curso del tiempo, incremento que\r\npermite cubrir no solo los intereses y saldo actuales, sino los réditos no\r\ncubiertos con antelación. Cabe reiterar que se trata de una excepcional en el\r\nrégimen crediticio que se sustenta en la ratio del sistema de vivienda.\r\n(...)\". Este Tribunal reafirma el anterior criterio e ingresa al\r\nexamen de las pretensiones deducidas. \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nV.- Sobre la validez de la cláusula impugnada. Como primer\r\naspecto, ha de analizarse la pretensión dirigida a que se anule la cláusula de\r\nescritura suscrita por la accionante con el Consorcio Cooperativo de Vivienda\r\nFedecrédito R.L., mediante la cual recibió del segundo la suma de seis millones\r\ncincuenta y ocho mil colones exactos (¢6.058.000,00). Particularmente se impugnan\r\nlas líneas del instrumento público que van de la 7 a la 23 y que indican\r\n\"(...) Las cuotas se fijarán de acuerdo a lo dispuesto por\r\nel artículo 167 de la Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda y el\r\nBANHVI el que se establece bajo los siguientes parámetros: la cuota se\r\ncalculará como un porcentaje del ingreso familiar del deudor, no superior al\r\ntreinta por ciento de su salario a esta fecha. Cada vez que se produzca un\r\naumento en los salarios mínimos en igual porcentaje se incrementará la cuota\r\nmensual a partir del mes siguiente en que rige el incremento en dicho salario\r\nmínimo, decretado por las autoridades correspondientes. Para ello se utilizará\r\ncomo referencia la variación porcentual correspondiente al salario mínimo de un\r\nobrero no especializado de la industria de la construcción. En caso de que el\r\nsalario mínimo desaparezca o bien que no se aplicare, se utilizará como\r\nreferencia para fijar e incremento del porcentaje de las cuotas, la variación\r\nporcentual del salario promedio calculado por la CCSS, y en caso de que este\r\notro mecanismo tampoco pueda ser aplicado, se utilizará como referencia la\r\nvariación porcentual del índice de precios al consumidor, emanado de las\r\nautoridades gubernamentales correspondientes. Los pagos que haga el deudor se\r\naplicarán para cubrir hasta donde alcance el pago de los seguros, de los\r\nintereses de cada mes, y una vez que el pago exceda dicho monto se aplicará la\r\ndiferencia como abono al principal. En caso de que la cuota fijada a la parte\r\ndeudora no sea suficiente para cubrir el monto de los intereses, este saldo se\r\ncapitalizará con el principal aumentando consiguientemente el saldo de la\r\noperación. Por ahora cada cuota inicial será de setenta y dos mil quinientos\r\nnoventa y seis colones con seis céntimos, suma que comprende los seguros\r\nobligatorios previstos por la legislación para este tipo de operaciones, los\r\nintereses del préstamo y la amortización al capital.(...)\". En lo\r\nmedular, la parte actora estima que dicha cláusula es absolutamente nula por\r\ninexistencia de la voluntad de uno de los sujetos ya que se faltó al deber de\r\ninformación al consumidor. También, por inexistencia de objeto y causa ya que\r\nsu motivo aparente para contratar era tener una casa con una cuota que pudiera\r\npagar, no mayor al treinta por ciento de su salario base. Sin embargo, no se\r\nanalizó su capacidad de pago a futuro ni otras alternativas de crédito que\r\npudieron aplicarle. Por su parte, los demandados estiman que, en general, no se\r\nenlistan, con la claridad debida, los vicios que aquejan a la cláusula.\r\nConsideran que ésta es válida porque reproduce normas legales y reglamentarias\r\nque no han sido impugnadas. Agrega, además, que sí se le suministró la\r\ninformación requerida para la toma de la decisión de consumo y que ello se\r\nconstata en que ella firmó la escritura y manifestó que entendía sus alcances.\r\nUna vez examinada la cláusula impugnada, el Tribunal estima que ésta se\r\nconforma sustancialmente con el ordenamiento jurídico por las siguientes\r\nrazones. Como indicamos supra y apunta el apoderado de las demandadas, el\r\nsistema de pago denominado cuota real está permitido por nuestra legislación,\r\ntal y como lo señala la propia cláusula que remite al numeral 167 de la LSFV.\r\nLuego, como principal mecanismo de ajuste, se establece la variación de los\r\nsalarios mínimos de un obrero no calificado de la industria de la construcción,\r\ntal y como lo establece tanto la norma citada como los artículos 117 y 119 del\r\nReglamento de Operaciones del Sistema Financiero Nacional para la Vivienda. La\r\nreferencia a otros mecanismos de ajuste es supletoria, esto es, solo en caso de\r\nque el salario mínimo desaparezca o bien que no se aplicare. Además, se\r\ntrata de una posibilidad (fijar mecanismos alternativos de ajuste) que\r\ncontempla el propio numeral 167 y los artículos 117 inciso a) y 122 del\r\nreferido reglamento y que, en todo caso, estimamos razonable en tanto acuden a\r\nparámetros objetivos como lo son la variación porcentual del salario promedio\r\ncalculado por la CCSS, y en caso de que este otro mecanismo tampoco pueda ser\r\naplicado, la variación porcentual del índice de precios al consumidor, emanado\r\nde las autoridades gubernamentales correspondientes. Posteriormente, la\r\ncláusula refiere a la forma en que se va imputar el pago y la forma de proceder\r\nen caso de que la cuota fijada a la parte deudora no sea suficiente para cubrir\r\nel monto de los intereses; regulaciones que se ajustan a lo que establecen las\r\nnormas legales y reglamentarias citadas. Finalmente, se establece el monto de\r\nla cuota inicial o de partida, en los términos que exige los numerales 117 y\r\n119 del Reglamento ya citado. Desde este plano, no encuentra el Tribunal vicio\r\nalguno ni en la causa ni en el objeto, en tanto el motivo para contratar existe\r\ndesde el momento en que se acude a un mecanismo crediticio para obtener\r\nsolución habitacional que es válido y regulado por el ordenamiento jurídico, en\r\nlos términos que fue pactado el objeto contractual. Luego, si lo que la\r\naccionante cuestiona es la constitucionalidad del sistema de crédito de\r\ncuota real, lo cierto es que debió haber ejercido la correspondiente acción de\r\ninconstitucionalidad o si reclamaba la ilegalidad de las regulaciones\r\nreglamentarias pudo haberlas impugnado directamente en esta jurisdicción. Como\r\nno se hizo, el Tribunal se limita a un cotejo de lo pactado en relación con las\r\ndisposiciones normativas que regulan la modalidad de crédito específica, siendo\r\nque las condiciones estipuladas en la escritura resultan sustancialmente\r\nconformes con el ordenamiento jurídico y así debe declararse. \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nVI.- En cuanto a los vicios de la voluntad que se acusan cabe\r\nseñalar lo siguiente. El artículo 46 de la Constitución Política establece como\r\nderechos fundamentales la protección de la salud,\r\nseguridad e intereses económicos del consumidor; la libertad de elección –de la\r\ncual, se deriva el principio de libre contratación que se extrae del artículo\r\n28 del mismo texto constitucional y a un trato equitativo –que desarrollan los\r\nartículos 31 y siguientes de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa\r\nEfectiva del Consumidor (en adelante LPCDEC), así como el 40 y siguientes del\r\nReglamento a esa Ley. Esto supone un deber de brindar información adecuada,\r\noportuna, clara, veraz y suficiente acerca de todos los elementos que incidan\r\nde forma directa en su decisión de consumo. En el tema que nos ocupa, la\r\ncorrecta comprensión de esta garantía supone que la persona que pretende\r\nsuscribir un contrato de crédito, conozca suficiente y oportunamente las\r\ncondiciones en que se adopta la negociación. Específicamente, \r\nquienes busquen opciones de vivienda y pretendan suscribir un crédito bajo el\r\nsistema de cuota real deben ser informados de las implicaciones de ese\r\nmecanismo en su caso particular y con mayor énfasis, si su situación va a\r\nencuadrar dentro de un módulo de capitalización de intereses. Lo anterior\r\nporque, la aplicación de una fórmula crediticia en la que se capitalizan\r\nintereses solo es posible, en el caso específico que regula el numeral 167 de\r\nla Ley No. 7052 y solo es válida cuando el consumidor del servicio financiero,\r\nesto es, quien accede a entidades financieras a buscar opciones de crédito para\r\ndiversas necesidades (en este caso vivienda), es informado de manera diáfana\r\nsobre los alcances de esa modalidad, sea, el incremento escalonado de la cuota,\r\npero además, que su cuota no cubre intereses corrientes en una porción que\r\npasará a formar parte del capital adeudado en el siguiente pago y por ende, el\r\ncálculo de los réditos de la siguiente cuota, se realizará sobre la base del\r\nsaldo original más la fracción de intereses no cubiertos y no sobre el capital\r\noriginal. Las implicaciones de esta modalidad exigen, además, y como aspecto\r\ndeterminante, la anuencia expresa y voluntaria del deudor, sea, su\r\nconsentimiento a este efecto en su crédito. Tal aspecto no puede colegirse por\r\nmedios interpretativos o deductivos, sino que debe estar claramente\r\nestablecido, se insiste, por sus repercusiones. Debe tomarse en cuenta que,\r\ncomo bien admiten ambas partes, estamos frente a contratos bilaterales,\r\nonerosos y adhesivos o predispuestos. Ello supone un necesario resguardo del\r\nequilibrio y equidad en las cargas de las partes involucradas en la relación de\r\nconsumo, tutelando los derechos y garantías del consumidor (potencial deudor),\r\nya que la dimensión misma de este tipo de negocios jurídicos supone una\r\nposición de ventaja por parte del agente económico, a efectos de mantener o al\r\nmenos potenciar una equidad en la distribución de las cargas contractuales en\r\ndicho régimen bilateral. Expuesto lo anterior debe señalarse que de los\r\nelementos que constan en autos, no se observa que haya existido una violación\r\npor parte de la entidad financiera acreedora al deber de información de la\r\naccionante al momento de suscribir el crédito que aquí nos ocupa. Tenemos que\r\nla escritura especificaba claramente el tipo de mecanismo de crédito que se\r\ncontrataba, sea, de cuota real; explicaba que la cuota se fijaba con base en un\r\nporcentaje del salario mínimo no superior al treinta por ciento, que se iría\r\nincrementando semestralmente y los parámetros que se utilizarían para tales\r\nefectos; una clara referencia al mecanismo de imputación de pagos explicando\r\nque los pagos que se efectúen se aplicarán para cubrir hasta donde\r\nalcance el pago de los seguros, de los intereses de cada mes, y una vez que el\r\npago exceda dicho monto se aplicará la diferencia como abono al principal así\r\ncomo la posibilidad de que se capitalizaran intereses si la cuota fijada a la\r\nparte deudora no era suficiente para cubrir el monto de los intereses, con el\r\nconsecuente aumento del principal. Luego, la escritura señala que la\r\nactora entendió y aceptó expresamente las referidas condiciones y una vez leída\r\nla aprobó y firmó. Pese a que la accionante adujo que no se le leyó la\r\nescritura y aportó el testimonio de su madre en ese sentido, es criterio del\r\nTribunal ello no desvirtúa la presunción probatorio de ese instrumento público.\r\nDesde esta perspectiva y tomando en cuenta el nivel de escolaridad de\r\naccionante entiende el Tribunal que su voluntad al momento de contratar fue\r\nlibre y conciente, sin que se observen vicios imputables a una falta de\r\ninformación por parte del ente acreedor. En conclusión, no observamos que la\r\ncláusula impugnada adolezca de vicios que conlleven su nulidad, más bien, se\r\nestima que es válida y obligaba a las partes a su cumplimiento, siendo\r\nprecisamente este último aspecto el que reviste relevancia para el objeto del\r\nproceso, según se expondrá de seguido. \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nVII.- Sobre el cumplimiento de las obligaciones surgidas a la luz del\r\ncontrato de préstamo. En este punto, la parte demandante explica que\r\nella siempre cumplió con el pago de las cuotas que su acreedor le cobraba y que\r\nlos recibos fueron omisos porque nunca señalaron cuál era el saldo de la deuda.\r\nLuego, relata que se enteró de que durante 11 años no había amortizado nada a\r\nla deuda y que más bien se habían capitalizado intereses al saldo principal\r\nacrecentándolo en forma desmedida. Cuando acude al BANHVI, le explican\r\nque ello se debe a que, por error, el acreedor no efectuó oportunamente los ajustes\r\nsemestrales a los que se obligó. Reclama que ella no tiene porque asumir el\r\nerror del banco y que ahora pretenden desconocer los pagos que desde 1997 ha\r\nefectuado. Luego de un análisis de las distintas probanzas traídas al proceso,\r\nel Tribunal concluye que durante la relación contractual, la accionante ha\r\ncumplido, en general, con las obligaciones a su cargo referidas\r\nfundamentalmente al pago de las cuotas del\r\npréstamo, inicialmente ante el acreedor primigeneo y luego ante dos diferentes\r\nfiduciarios que lo han sucedido. No obstante, al examinar las actuaciones de\r\nlos demandados respecto del cumplimiento de las condiciones pactadas, las\r\nmismas pruebas permiten acreditar que han existido desatenciones atribuibles a\r\nlos titulares del derecho de crédito y que han incidido en la esfera subjetiva\r\nde la demandante. La primera de ellas, se observa en el hecho que durante\r\n11 años, ninguno de los entes acreedores efectuó los ajustes semestrales de la\r\ncuota mensual del préstamo, tal y como se establecía en el contrato pactado. Se\r\ntrata de una omisión o error que reconoce expresamente la Auditoría Interna del\r\nBANHVI en el Informe preliminar sobre la atención de requerimiento de\r\nvaloración relacionada con el otorgamiento de financiamiento bajo el sistema\r\ncuota real a la señora Medrano Valverde y la testigo Ana Julia Fernández en su\r\ndeclaración. Pero además, el informe concluye que la carencia de modificaciones\r\no ajustes en la cuota hipotecaria en forma oportuna desde la fecha de\r\nformalización de la operación hipotecaria hasta febrero de 2003, son\r\nresponsabilidad de Coovivienda R.L. en primera instancia y de La Vivienda\r\nMutual de Ahorro y Préstamo, en calidad de fiduciario, luego del traslado de la\r\noperación, ya que aunque la actora conocía los términos contractuales, ella no\r\npodía calcular y disponer de la nueva cuota a pagar por su operación (folios\r\n253 a 255 del expediente judicial). El Tribunal comparte esa\r\nconclusión, toda vez que se trata (el ajuste semestral) de una obligación a\r\ncargo del acreedor y que además constituye un pilar dentro de esta modalidad o\r\nsistema de crédito. Ello toda vez que la cuota real supone un sistema de\r\nreajuste periódico de las cuotas nominales de las operaciones de crédito (en\r\neste caso habitacional) conforme al cual la fijación de las cuotas no va a\r\ndepender ni se va efectuar tomando como parámetro las tasas de interés, sino\r\nque lo será en forma proporcional a la variación, en lo medular, del salario\r\nmínimo de un obrero no calificado de la industria de la construcción. Si\r\nesos reajustes no se efectúan, la obligación no se va actualizando y trae como\r\nconsecuencia que el valor de la cuota disminuya de modo tal que lo pagado en\r\nese rubro no alcance, siquiera para intereses, capitalizándolos al principal\r\ncomo aquí aconteció. Pero, insistimos, que reajustar la cuota incumbía al\r\nacreedor. Así lo reconocen el informe de auditoría y la testigo Ana Julia\r\nFernández. Por ello no se comparte, bajo ninguna perspectiva lo señalado en\r\ndiciembre de 2004, por la Dirección FONAVI del BANHVI cuando indica que \"(...)\r\nlas variaciones en el monto de la cuota se encontraban claramente establecidos\r\nal momento de la formalización y fueron aceptados de conformidad...durante\r\nalgún período el seguimiento a la cartera de créditos se vio afectado,\r\ngenerando un atraso en la ejecución de los ajustes correspondientes a la cuota.\r\nEsta situación se presentó a pesar de que la deudora contaba con conocimiento\r\nexpreso de la política de ajustes y, por tanto, estaba en posibilidad de\r\nrealizar el ajuste respectivo, evitando de esta forma la desactualización del\r\nmonto de la cuota. En este sentido, no se considera razonable argumentar que la\r\ndeudora no es responsable de que los aumentos del monto de la cuota no fueran\r\nejecutados en el momento oportuno, porque las condiciones del crédito se\r\nencontraban claramente establecidas y es responsabilidad tanto de los\r\nadministradores de la cartera como del deudor velar por su\r\ncumplimiento.(...)\". Nótese que estamos frente a un derecho de crédito\r\nque, incluso, puede o no ser ejercido por el acreedor. Así, es criterio del\r\nTribunal que la omisión de no haber ajustado la cuota mensual semestralmente y\r\nbajo los parámetros que establecía el contrato de préstamo es atribuible,\r\nexclusivamente, a quienes fungían como acreedores de la obligación, siendo\r\néstos quienes deben asumir las consecuencias económicas que se deriven de esa\r\ndesatención; sin que resulte procedente trasladar esa omisión a la deudora,\r\ncomo se ha pretendido. Un segundo aspecto determinante que debe ser\r\nvalorado es que aunque la accionante pagó sus cuotas conforme lo establecido en\r\nel contrato, los recibos que se entregaron como comprobante del pago no\r\nconsignaron cuál era el saldo de la deuda ni la amortización al capital (folios\r\n20 al 99 y 253 a 255 del expediente judicial). Estimamos que al omitir esta\r\ninformación se lesionaron los derechos de la accionante toda vez que le impidió\r\nconocer el estado y comportamiento de su deuda en el tiempo. Pero además, le\r\nimpedía conocer si se estaban o no efectuando los referidos ajustes semestrales.\r\nEsa situación se presentó hasta febrero de 2003, fecha a partir de la cual los\r\nrecibos incluyen el saldo de la deuda y la amortización al capital (folios\r\n75 al 88 y 253 a 255 del expediente judicial). Precisamente, el\r\nrecibo emitido el 2 de febrero de 2003 indica que, a esa fecha, el saldo de la\r\ndeuda era de Ë 10.639.890.35 (diez millones seiscientos\r\ntreinta y nueve mil ochocientos noventa colones con treinta cinco céntimos) (folios\r\n75 del expediente judicial). Así, luego de casi seis años de pago de la\r\ncuota mensual cobrada por el acreedor (lo que bien hacía presumir a la deudora\r\nque lo cobrado era lo que correspondía) el recibo refleja que no había\r\namortizado ninguna suma al capital y que más bien aquel se había acrecentado.\r\nAnte ese estado de cosas, la demandante acude al BANHVI para exponer su caso y\r\nsolicitar una revisión y ajuste de su operación hipotecaria, debido al\r\nincremento en el saldo de la deuda, a pesar de que ella ha venido pagando las\r\ncuotas mensualmente. Sin embargo, lejos de encontrar una solución ajustada a\r\nderecho, le proponen una serie de alternativas que, al fin de cuentas,\r\npretenden trasladarle las desatenciones y omisiones de los entes acreedores, lo\r\nque, según se explicará infra, las vuelve ilegítimas. Se estima igualmente\r\ngrave que a pesar de que el BANVHI conocía de la falta de ajuste semestral de\r\nlas cuotas desde el 2003, como lo admite la testigo Ana Julia Fernández, no\r\nhaya tomado ninguna acción proactiva tendente a regularizar tal omisión y que\r\nimpidiera que el capital se acrecentará de la forma en que lo hizo. Es\r\ndecir, esas conductas pretenden no solo desconocer los efectos de la inercia\r\ndel ente acreedor respecto del ajuste de las cuotas, sino también trasladar las\r\nimplicaciones de tal indolencia a a deudora, agravando su situación financiera\r\ny pretendiendo desvincularse de su deber de ajuste. En suma, sacar provecho\r\neconómico de sus propias desantenciones e inadvertencias, lo que el Tribunal no\r\nconsidera apegado a la buena fe que debe privar en la ejecución del contrato de\r\ncrédito. No resultan atendibles las justificaciones otorgadas según las cuales\r\nlos ajustes no se hicieron debido al impase que hubo con el traslado de la\r\noperación de Coovivienda a Grupo Mutual (porque tuvieron cerca de cinco años\r\npara ajustar la cuota, sin que se hubiera hecho) o que ello lo fue para no\r\nperjudicar a la demandante por el cambio del monto de la cuota. No haber\r\nefectuado los ajustes semestrales a partir del 2003 (conociendo de la omisión)\r\nsolo permitió que se capitalizaran más intereses al capital endeudado en\r\nevidente perjuicio de la accionante. Prueba de ello es que para julio del 2009,\r\nlos recibos mostraban un saldo de la deuda por Ë 34.162.599.63 (treinta y cuatro millones ciento sesenta y dos mil\r\nquinientos noventa y nueve colones con sesenta y tres céntimos), pese a que la\r\naccionante continuó cancelando mensualmente la cuota que la entidad acredora\r\ncobraba. Por las razones expuestas, si de conformidad con los ordinales 1022 y\r\n1023 del Código Civil los contratos obligan tanto a lo que se expresa en\r\nellos, como a las consecuencias que la equidad, el uso o la ley hacen nacer de\r\nla obligación, según la naturaleza de ésta; lo cierto es que sí existía\r\nconvenio expreso sobre la forma en que se efectuarían los ajustes a las\r\ncuotas, los errores y omisiones en el ajuste y cálculo de éstas, cometido\r\ndesde el momento mismo en que se le otorgó el préstamo, son imputables\r\nexclusivamente a los diferentes acreedores, quienes incluso conociendo de tal\r\nomisión no ajustaron su actuación a lo pactado. Por ello, estimamos que resulta\r\nnotoriamente injusto que, tras muchos años de cumplir con su obligación de\r\npago, los demandados trasladen a la actora las consecuencias económicas de\r\ntales desatenciones, como han pretendido. \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nVIII.- Y es que, tal y como lo han reconocido ambos testigos en\r\neste proceso, a partir de que los demandados se dan cuenta del error cometido,\r\nen lugar de enmendar y regularizar la situación, plantean a la accionante una\r\nserie de propuestas que el Tribunal estima ilegítimas. Veamos. En\r\ndiciembre de 2004, el BANHVI rechazó la propuesta de cancelación que\r\nrealizara la accionante proponiendo, en su lugar, alternativas como readecuar\r\nla deuda por el plazo restante de la operación, pasando de cuota real a cuota\r\nnivelada o cancelar la diferencia que se ha generado por los ajuste no\r\nrealizados a las cuotas según lo establecía la escritura (suma que en ese\r\nmomento superaba los dos millones de colones) y autorizar que semestralmente se\r\nsiguieran efectuando los ajustes a las cuotas (así se desprende del informe\r\nde auditoría No. AI-X-045-2010, visible de folios 141 al 156 del expediente\r\njudicial, particularmente en los folios 147 a 153, así como de la declaración\r\nde Ana Julia Fernández). Luego, en febrero de 2010, el\r\nBANHVI comunicó a la demandante que existía posibilidad de entregar la\r\npropiedad en dación de pago y adquirirla nuevamente por el valor del avalúo\r\nadministrativo, más gastos, montos que según el fiduciario asciende\r\naproximadamente a los doce millones de colones, pago que debía realizar de\r\ncontado (así se desprende del informe de auditoría No. AI-X-045-2010,\r\nvisible de folios 141 al 156 del expediente judicial, particularmente en los\r\nfolios 147 a 153, así como de la declaración de Ana Julia Fernández). Finalmente,\r\nmediante oficio DFNV-DF-0317-2011, de 28 de marzo de 2011, el BANHVI reiteró a\r\nla actora las propuestas para llegar a una solución definitiva de la\r\nproblemática de su crédito, que se reducían a entregar la propiedad en dación\r\nen pago y adquirirla nuevamente por el valor del avalúo actualizado más gastos,\r\no cancelar los montos no aplicados a las cuotas por las variaciones estipuladas\r\nen la escritura y que a partir de ese momento se cancele la cuota que\r\ncorresponda y se apliquen las variaciones periódicas (folios 134 a 137 del\r\nexpediente judicial) . Estimamos que tales propuestas son ilegítimas porque\r\nsugieren alternativas no pactadas y que no se aviene a la modalidad crediticia\r\npactada por las partes inicialmente (y más bien pretenden cambiar el sistema de\r\ncrédito de cuota real a uno lineal) ni reconoce que el error de no\r\najustar la cuota era responsabilidad del acreedor. Más bien constituyen\r\ninterpretaciones ilegitimas mediante las cuales se pretende sacar provecho de\r\nsu propio incumplimiento y trasladar las consecuencias económicas que de\r\nahí se derivan (el pago del capital que aumentó al haberse capitalizado los\r\nintereses al principal por no ajustar la cuota en el momento oportuno pactado)\r\na la actora. Pero además, no es posible concluir que esas alternativas hayan\r\nponderado las condiciones crediticias y la capacidad de pago actuales de la\r\nactora. Ana Julia Fernández manifestó que las propuestas de readecuación las\r\nhicieron con base en las condiciones que se establecían la escritura y\r\nMauricio González Zumbado señaló que él no participó en las propuestas, que\r\ndesconocía los parámetros que se utilizaron para llegar a ellas y que acudió a\r\nlos datos que constaban en el expediente. Hasta aquí tenemos que durante la\r\nejecución del contrato de préstamo han habido desatenciones y errores que\r\ntrajeron como consecuencia que el acreedor incumpliera con su deber de ajustar\r\nla cuota mensual conforme lo pactado, e interpretaciones abusivas e ilegítimas\r\nen tanto se apartan de lo convenido y trasladan las repercusiones económicas de\r\nesas omisiones a la accionante, quien hasta esa fecha venía cancelando sus\r\ncuotas. Ahora bien, a partir del testimonio de Ana Julia Fernández, el Tribunal\r\nacredita que en una fecha no precisada pero entre marzo y noviembre de 2011, el\r\nBANHVI efectúa una reconstrucción de la operación crediticia de la accionante\r\nen la que consideraron las cuotas que debieron cancelarse por los ajustes\r\nestipulados en la escritura (y no efectuados por los acreedores), \r\ncomparándolos con las cuotas pagadas, a efectos de determinar como se vio\r\nafectado el principal de la obligación por esos montos. Así, obtuvieron un\r\nsaldo corregido y ajustaron la deuda a Ë\r\n19.400.000.00 (diecinueve millones cuatrocientos mil colones exactos), lo que\r\ncomunicaron al Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda para que efectúe las\r\nvariaciones correspondientes (se infiere, también, de los folios 132 a 137\r\ndel expediente judicial). Este acto constituye, a juicio del Tribunal, la\r\nactuación legítima a partir de la cual los demandados asumen las consecuencias\r\nde no haber ajustado la cuota durante aproximadamente once años y disminuyen el\r\ncapital adeudado. Se recalca, eso sí, que no se trata de una condonación de\r\ndeuda, como indicó el apoderado de las demandadas en sus conclusiones. Más\r\nbien, supone asumir las consecuencias económicas de sus propias desatenciones\r\npor casi once años, en el mecanismo de ajuste de la cuota mensual que\r\ndebía pagar la actora. Si el error es atribuible al acreedor, es éste quien\r\ndebe asumir las consecuencias económicas derivadas. Lo anterior salvo aquellas\r\nsituaciones en que se observe un evidente abuso de derecho de parte del\r\ndeudor, lo que estima esta Cámara, no se observa en el presente caso. No\r\nobstante, pese a que se regulariza lo relativo al capital adeudado, lo\r\ncierto es que cuando se comunicó a la demandante y al Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La\r\nVivienda esa decisión, se incurre nuevamente en el error de plantear\r\nalternativas que no se avienen a las condiciones y al plan de pago que había\r\npactado la actora desde 1997. En ese sentido, se observa que mediante oficios DFNV-DF-1119-2011\r\ny DFNV-DF-1120-2011, del 25 de noviembre del 2011 se informó no\r\nsolo la reconstrucción y disminución del capital adeudado (decisión que resulta\r\nconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico) sino que, nuevamente, se plantean a la\r\nactora alternativas que no se avienen a las condiciones y plan de pago pactado\r\ndesde 1997. Es por ello que estimamos que esas conductas formales son\r\nabsolutamente nulas únicamente en cuanto plantearon alternativas que distan de\r\nlo convenido y sin considerar la capacidad de pago que, en ese momento, tenía\r\nla actora. Esto es, parten de un motivo inexistente y su contenido es\r\nilegítimo. La nulidad no se extiende a la reconstrucción y ajuste de la deuda\r\npor dos razones. Primero, porque se trata de una decisión que fue adoptada con\r\nanterioridad y los actos impugnados solo la comunican. Segundo, porque con el\r\najuste al capital adeudado los demandados asumen sus errores y omisiones\r\nrespecto de las obligaciones pactadas. Así, el saldo de la deuda lo será a\r\npartir de ese reajuste y tomando en cuenta las consideraciones que se expondrán\r\ninfra. En conclusión, deberá declararse la nulidad absoluta de los oficios\r\nDFNV-DF-317-2011, DFNV-DF-1119-2011 y DFNV-DF-1120-2011 ya citados, en\r\nlos términos expuestos\n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nIX.- En rigor, estimamos que la reconstrucción de la operación\r\ncrediticia de la accionante en la que consideraron las cuotas que debieron\r\ncancelarse por los ajustes estipulados en la escritura y compararlos con las\r\ncuotas pagadas, a efectos de determinar como se vio afectado el principal de la\r\nobligación por esos montos, era la actuación a la que estaban obligadas los\r\nacreedores a partir de que conocieron del error cometido. Si esa actuación\r\nhubiese sido oportuna, el contrato hubiese sido posible de cumplir conforme a\r\nlo pactado. Así, es claro que desde noviembre del 2011 se ajustó el capital\r\nadeudado y las cuotas se han venido ajustando conforme a lo pactado. No\r\nobstante, lo cierto es que existen otras condiciones dentro del contrato que\r\ntambién debe ser consideradas porque a ellas se obligaron ambas partes.\r\nEspecíficamente nos referimos al plazo de la obligación. Conforme al contrato,\r\nel plazo del préstamo lo fue por veinte años y se pagaría por medio de\r\ndoscientos cuarenta cuotas mensuales, sucesivas y vencidas a partir del\r\nveintiocho junio de mil novecientos noventa y siete. Conforme\r\na lo estipulado en el numeral 764 del Código Civil, el pago –para que tenga\r\nefecto extintivo o liberatorio– debe hacerse “bajo todos respectos conforme\r\nal tenor de la obligación” ; es decir, tal cual quedó plasmado en el\r\nconvenio. Desde es perspectiva, corresponde al acreedor verificar que las\r\ncondiciones pactadas en el plan de pago sean las necesarias y suficientes para\r\ncancelar la deuda. Así, estima el Tribunal que dadas las circunstancias\r\nacaecidas en el caso concreto, los demandados deben respetar plazo y cuotas\r\npactadas originalmente. Insistimos que la actora ha venido, de buena fe,\r\ncumpliendo con las obligaciones pactadas y cancelando durante aproximadamente\r\nquince años, la cuota que los entes acreedores han establecido. No a otra\r\nconclusión puede llegarse si se observa el historial de pagos y el interés que\r\nla accionante ha mantenido desde el momento en que supo del aumento del capital\r\nadeudado. Fue ella quien acudió al BANHVI y quien solicitó la Auditoría\r\nque concluye haciendo ver los errores tanto en el ajuste semestral de la cuota\r\ncomo en la no actualización de las tasas de interés, incumplimiento que también\r\nhizo ver el testigo González Zumbado. Se descarta, también, que ella hubiera\r\ncontratado con la intención de no cumplir con sus obligaciones. En su\r\nmomento, ella contrató bajo condiciones que le eran asequibles y que, en todo\r\ncaso correspondía al ente acreedor verificar; sin que se observe intención\r\nalguna de no cumplir con lo pactado. Para ello basta remitirse, insistimos, a\r\nque durante más de quince años ha venido cumpliendo con el pago de las cuotas.\r\nNo se comparten las conclusiones de la Auditoría referidas a que ella sacó\r\nprovecho de los beneficios de contratar bajo el mecanismo de cuota real porque\r\nle permitió adquirir una vivienda con un valor superior a su capacidad\r\ncrediticia. En rigor, la capacidad de pago de la actora en relaciones con sus\r\nopciones crediticias era un aspecto que el acreedor debió valorar y analizar\r\nprevio al contrato. Si en aquel se estimó que podía contratar bajo modalidades\r\nque no fueron las pactadas. Tampoco en que se pretenda achacar a la\r\naccionante responsabilidad por no haber actualizado el monto de la cuota a cancelar.\r\nReiteramos que se trata de una obligación inherente al acreedor. Si no lo hizo\r\no lo hizo de modo que, actualmente, le resulta inviable, debe asumir él las\r\nrepercusiones económicas de esa omisión. Es por ello que estimamos que la\r\nobligación de la actora deberá extinguirse en el plazo que establece el\r\ncontrato y con las 240 cuotas originalmente pactadas. Nótese que el contrato no\r\nestablece la posibilidad de que el plazo aumente. Más bien indica que dicho\r\nplazo podría verse reducido en aplicación del sistema de pago convenido y que\r\nla parte deudora acepta expresamente. Así, somos del criterio que debe\r\nrespetarse el plan de pagos y condiciones de extinción de la deuda pactadas. Si\r\npor errores de los acreedores el plazo no es suficiente para saldar la deuda,\r\nserá éste quien deba asumir las consecuencias patrimoniales de sus\r\ndesatenciones y no trasladarlos a una deudora que, por más de quince\r\naños, ha cumplido sus obligaciones. Ello no significa, bajo ninguna\r\ncircunstancia, que se impida a los demandados cobrar sus acreencias o un\r\nenriquecimiento sin causa en favor de la deudora. Se reitera que quien no\r\nejerció el derecho de crédito en las condiciones pactadas fueron los distintos\r\nacreedores y que la cuota que se va fijar para el resto del plazo contractual\r\nes consecuencia de su inercia y para garantizar\r\nel derecho de la actora como consumidora, a que se respeten los términos\r\npactados y por ella cumplidos. Así, se declara que la accionante deberá\r\ncancelar, por el resto del plazo y hasta que se cumplan las doscientos cuarenta\r\ncuotas pactadas, una cuota mensual que deberá ser ajustada a conforme a los\r\nparámetros establecidos en el contrato. Específicamente, la cuota que\r\nactualmente paga, deberá ajustarse en igual porcentaje al aumento del\r\nsalario mínimo decretado por la autoridades correspondientes para el segundo\r\nsemestre de este año. Posteriormente, y hasta que concluya el plazo\r\ncontractual, cada vez que se produzca un aumento en los salarios mínimos en\r\nigual porcentaje a éste. Se utilizará como referencia la variación porcentual\r\ncorrespondiente al salario mínimo de un obrero no especializado de la industria\r\nde la construcción. En caso de que el salario mínimo desaparezca o bien que no\r\nse aplicare, se utilizará como referencia para fijar e incremento del porcentaje\r\nde las cuotas, la variación porcentual del salario promedio calculado por la\r\nCCSS, y en caso de que este otro mecanismo tampoco pueda ser aplicado, se\r\nutilizará como referencia la variación porcentual del índice de precios al\r\nconsumidor, emanado de las autoridades gubernamentales correspondientes. En\r\ntodo caso, la cuota no podrá superar el treinta por ciento del del\r\ningreso familiar de la accionante a esa fecha. Tampoco deberá considerar los\r\nincrementos no aplicados a lo largo de la vigencia de la operación crediticia.\r\nVencido el plazo de veinte años o canceladas las doscientos cuarenta cuotas\r\npactadas, la obligación deberá darse por extinguida y levantarse el gravamen\r\nhipotecario que le afecte.”",
  "body_en_text": "**IV.—On the prohibition of compounding interest and the**\n**real installment system in housing loans**. This\nis an issue that has already been addressed by this Tribunal, among others, in\nruling No. 926-2010, issued at 7:49 a.m. on March 11,\n2010. In relevant part, it stated that \"(…) the national\nlegal system prohibits the practice of interest capitalization, that is, the\nso-called compounding interest (anatocismo), which entails, in simple terms, the application of\ninterest upon interest. In this regard, canon 505 of the Commercial Code\nclearly states: 'It is prohibited to capitalize interest. However,\nif upon the settlement of a debt interest is owed,\nit may be added to the principal to form a single total. When granting a new instrument\nor extending the previous one, interest may be stipulated on the totality of the\nobligation.' From that standpoint, it is evident that unless a rule provides otherwise,\nevery commercial loan obligation is onerous and therefore, compensated with\nlegal interest (article 496 of the Commercial Code). This dimension implies that\nin the payment of the loan installments, the current\ninterest is amortized first and the remainder is applied to the principal of the obligation. Now then, the\nLaw of the National Financial System for Housing and Creation of the BANHVI,\nNo. 7052 of November 27, 1986, establishes in its article 167: ' The\nauthorized entities may grant their loans through payment systems in\nwhich the installment is adjusted based on the variation of minimum wages.\nThese installments may be less than the minimum necessary to cover interest and\namortization—refinanced installment—and the uncovered differences shall\naccumulate in the loan balance as a form of capitalization, without\narticle 505 of the Commercial Code therefore being applicable. In any case, the amount\nof the installment thus established shall be applied first to cover interest, and if anything\nremains it shall be applied to amortize the debt. Similar treatment may be applied to\nloans already established. / The authorized entities may use systems\nbased on other parameters established by the Bank's Board of Directors. (Thus\nreformed by article 165 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa\nRica No.7558 of November 3, 1995)' This is a system that seeks\nto establish a financing mechanism for housing with installments more\naccessible to applicants for loans of this nature. The provision contemplates the\nso-called graduated installment, which entails the percentage increase of the installment,\npreviously agreed upon by the parties, usually each year, in order to be able\nto compensate in the installments of the successive years the deficit in the payment of the\nprincipal that may arise with the initial installment, so that as the loan\nprogresses, the installment increases. It is worth noting at this point that, in principle,\nthe agreed-upon installment must allow for the payment of interest and amortization to\nprincipal. However, within this modality, the cited article 167 permits, as\nan exception, that the initial installment not cover the minimum necessary to\ncover the interest and the amortization to the principal. In that case, variations may\narise; on the one hand, when the installment only allows for coverage of the current\ninterest, the principal will remain unchanged until the graduated\nincrease of the installment allows for covering that interest and applying a contribution to the principal\nbalance. On the other hand, when the installment does not allow for covering the interest\nin full, exceptionally and given the legal permissibility, the uncovered\ndifferences of the interest accumulate to the loan balance as a form of\ncapitalization, without this entailing, the aforementioned law states, applying\narticle 505 of the Commercial Code. From the foregoing, it follows that in this\nscenario, one is faced with a refinanced installment with respect to the interest,\nthat is, that fraction of interest not paid due to the insufficiency of the\ninstallment, becomes part of the primary capital. In this context, that interest\nmay later be paid off with the graduated increase in payment. In short, it begins\nwith a low installment that increases over the course of time, an increase that\nallows for covering not only the current interest and balance, but also the interest\nnot previously covered. It bears reiterating that this is an exception in the\ncredit regime based on the ratio of the housing system.\n(…)”. This Tribunal reaffirms the above criterion and proceeds to the\nexamination of the claims brought.\n\n**V.- On the validity of the contested clause.** As a first\nmatter, the claim seeking to annul the clause of the\ndeed signed by the plaintiff with the Consorcio Cooperativo de Vivienda\nFedecrédito R.L., through which she received from the latter the sum of six million\nfifty-eight thousand exact colones (¢6,058,000.00), must be analyzed. Specifically contested\nare the lines of the public instrument from 7 to 23 which state\n\"(…) The installments shall be set in accordance with the provisions of\narticle 167 of the Law of the National Financial System for Housing and the\nBANHVI, which is established under the following parameters: the installment shall be\ncalculated as a percentage of the debtor's family income, not exceeding\nthirty percent of her salary at this date. Each time there is an\nincrease in the minimum wages, the\nmonthly installment shall be increased by the same percentage starting the month after that increase in said minimum\nwage, decreed by the corresponding authorities, takes effect. For this purpose,\nthe percentage variation corresponding to the minimum wage of a\nnon-specialized laborer in the construction industry shall be used as a reference. In the event that the\nminimum wage disappears or is not applied, the\npercentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS shall be used as a\nreference to set the increase in the percentage of the installments, and in the event that this\nother mechanism cannot be applied either, the\npercentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the\ncorresponding governmental authorities, shall be used as a reference. The payments made by the debtor shall be\napplied to cover, to the extent possible, the payment of insurance, the\ninterest for each month, and once the payment exceeds said amount the\ndifference shall be applied as a credit to the principal. In the event that the installment set for the\ndebtor party is not sufficient to cover the amount of the interest, this balance shall be\ncapitalized with the principal, consequently increasing the balance of the\ntransaction. For now, each initial installment shall be seventy-two thousand five hundred\nninety-six colones and six céntimos, a sum that includes the mandatory\ninsurance policies provided by legislation for this type of transaction, the\nloan interest, and the amortization to the principal. (…)”. At its\ncore, the plaintiff considers that said clause is absolutely null due to\nthe non-existence of the will of one of the parties, since the duty of\nconsumer information was breached. Also, due to non-existence of object and cause since\nher apparent motive for contracting was to have a house with an installment she could\npay, not exceeding thirty percent of her base salary. However, her\nfuture payment capacity or other credit alternatives that\ncould have been applied to her were not analyzed. For their part, the defendants consider that, in general, the\ndefects afflicting the clause are not\nlisted with due clarity.\nThey consider it to be valid because it reproduces legal and regulatory provisions\nthat have not been challenged. They add, furthermore, that the\nrequired information for making the consumer decision was indeed provided to her and that this is\nverified in that she signed the deed and stated that she understood its implications.\nHaving examined the contested clause, the Tribunal finds that it\nsubstantially conforms to the legal system for the following\nreasons. As we indicated supra and as the attorney for the defendants points out, the\npayment system called the real installment is permitted by our legislation,\nas indicated by the clause itself, which refers to article 167 of the LSFV.\nThen, as the main adjustment mechanism, the variation of\nminimum wages of an unskilled laborer in the construction industry is established,\nas provided both by the cited provision and by articles 117 and 119 of the\nRegulations for Operations of the National Financial System for Housing. The\nreference to other adjustment mechanisms is supplementary, that is, only in case\nthe minimum wage disappears or is not applied. Moreover, it is\na possibility (to establish alternative adjustment mechanisms) that is\ncontemplated by article 167 itself and articles 117 subsection a) and 122 of the\naforementioned Regulations and which, in any case, we consider reasonable insofar as they resort to\nobjective parameters such as the percentage variation of the average salary\ncalculated by the CCSS, and in the event that this other mechanism cannot be\napplied either, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued\nby the corresponding governmental authorities. Subsequently, the\nclause refers to the manner in which the payment shall be allocated and the manner of proceeding\nin the event that the installment set for the debtor party is not sufficient to cover\nthe amount of the interest; regulations that conform to what is established by the\ncited legal and regulatory provisions. Finally, the amount of\nthe initial or starting installment is established, in the terms required by articles 117 and\n119 of the aforementioned Regulations. From this standpoint, the Tribunal finds no\ndefect whatsoever in either the cause or the object, insofar as the motive for contracting exists\nfrom the moment one resorts to a credit mechanism to obtain a\nhousing solution that is valid and regulated by the legal system, under\nthe terms in which the contractual object was agreed upon. Then, if what the\nplaintiff questions is the constitutionality of the\nreal installment credit system, the truth is that she should have filed the corresponding\nconstitutional challenge action (acción de inconstitucionalidad), or if she claimed the illegality of the\nregulatory provisions, she could have challenged them directly in this jurisdiction. Since\nthis was not done, the Tribunal limits itself to a comparison of what was agreed upon in relation to the\nnormative provisions that govern the specific credit modality, with\nthe conditions stipulated in the deed being substantially\nconsistent with the legal system, and it must be so declared.\n\n**VI.—Regarding the alleged defects of consent**, the following must be\nnoted. Article 46 of the Political Constitution establishes as\nfundamental rights the protection of the consumer's health,\nsafety, and economic interests; freedom of choice—from\nwhich the principle of free contracting, derived from article\n28 of the same constitutional text, arises—and equitable treatment—which is developed in\narticles 31 and following of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective\nConsumer Protection (hereinafter LPCDEC), as well as articles 40 and following of the\nRegulations to that Law. This entails a duty to provide adequate,\ntimely, clear, truthful, and sufficient information about all the elements that directly\naffect the consumer's consumption decision. In the matter before us, the\ncorrect understanding of this guarantee implies that the person intending\nto sign a credit contract is sufficiently and timely aware of the\nconditions under which the transaction is being adopted. Specifically,\nthose seeking housing options and intending to sign a loan under the\nreal installment system must be informed of the implications of that\nmechanism in their particular case, and with greater emphasis, if their situation will\nfall within a module of interest capitalization. The foregoing\nbecause the application of a credit formula in which interest is\ncapitalized is only possible, in the specific case regulated by article 167 of\nLaw No. 7052, and is only valid when the financial service consumer,\nthat is, the person who goes to financial institutions to seek credit options for\nvarious needs (in this case housing), is informed in a clear manner\nabout the implications of that modality, i.e., the graduated increase of the installment,\nbut also, that their installment does not cover current interest in a portion that\nwill become part of the principal owed in the next payment and therefore, the\ncalculation of the interest for the following installment will be made based on the\noriginal balance plus the fraction of interest not covered, and not on the original\nprincipal. The implications of this modality further require, as a\ndetermining aspect, the express and voluntary consent of the debtor, i.e., their\nagreement to this effect in their loan. Such an aspect cannot be inferred by\ninterpretive or deductive means, but must be clearly\nestablished, we insist, due to its repercussions. It must be taken into account that,\nas both parties rightly admit, we are faced with bilateral,\nonerous, and adhesion or pre-drafted contracts. This implies a necessary safeguard of the\nbalance and equity in the obligations of the parties involved in the consumer\nrelationship, protecting the rights and guarantees of the consumer (potential debtor),\nsince the very nature of this type of legal transaction implies a\nposition of advantage on the part of the economic agent, for the purpose of maintaining or at\nleast promoting equity in the distribution of contractual obligations in\nsaid bilateral regime. Having stated the above, it must be noted that from the\nelements contained in the case file, it is not observed that there was a violation\nby the creditor financial institution of the duty to inform the\nplaintiff at the time of signing the loan at issue here. We have that\nthe deed clearly specified the type of credit mechanism being\ncontracted, that is, the real installment; it explained that the installment was set based on a\npercentage of the minimum wage not exceeding thirty percent, that it would be\nincreased semi-annually, and the parameters to be used for such\npurposes; a clear reference to the payment allocation mechanism, explaining\nthat the payments made shall be applied to cover, to the extent\npossible, the payment of insurance, the interest for each month, and once the\npayment exceeds said amount, the difference shall be applied as a credit to the principal, as well\nas the possibility that interest would be capitalized if the installment set for the\ndebtor party was not sufficient to cover the amount of interest, with the\nconsequent increase of the principal. Then, the deed states that the\nplaintiff understood and expressly accepted the referenced conditions and, once read,\napproved and signed it. Although the plaintiff alleged that the\ndeed was not read to her and provided her mother's testimony in that regard, it is the Tribunal's\ncriterion that this does not rebut the evidentiary presumption of that public instrument.\nFrom this perspective, and taking into account the plaintiff's level of education,\nthe Tribunal understands that her will at the time of contracting was\nfree and conscious, without observing defects attributable to a lack of\ninformation on the part of the creditor entity. In conclusion, we do not observe that the\ncontested clause suffers from defects that would lead to its nullity; rather, it is\nfound to be valid and bound the parties to its fulfillment, with\nprecisely this last aspect being relevant to the object of the\nproceedings, as will be discussed below.\n\n**VII.—On the fulfillment of the obligations arising from the**\n**loan contract**. On this point, the plaintiff explains that\nshe always complied with the payment of the installments that her creditor charged her and that\nthe receipts were deficient because they never indicated the outstanding\nbalance of the debt.\nShe then relays that she found out that for 11 years she had not amortized anything toward\nthe debt and that, rather, interest had been capitalized to the principal balance,\nincreasing it in an excessive manner. When she goes to the BANHVI, they explain\nthat this was because, due to an error, the creditor did not timely make the semi-annual\nadjustments to which it was obligated. She claims that she does not have to assume the\nbank's error and that they now seek to disregard the payments she has\nmade since 1997. After an analysis of the various evidentiary items presented in the proceedings,\nthe Tribunal concludes that during the contractual relationship, the plaintiff has\ngenerally complied with the obligations incumbent upon her, referring\nfundamentally to the payment of the\nloan installments, initially to the original creditor and later to two different\ntrustees that succeeded it. However, upon examining the actions of\nthe defendants regarding compliance with the agreed-upon conditions, the\nsame evidence demonstrates that there have been instances of neglect attributable to\nthe holders of the credit right that have affected the plaintiff's\nsubjective sphere. The first of these is observed in the fact that for\n11 years, none of the creditor entities made the semi-annual adjustments to the\nmonthly loan installment, as was established in the agreed-upon contract. This is\nan omission or error that is expressly acknowledged by the Internal Audit of\nBANHVI in the preliminary report on the attention to a request for\nassessment related to the granting of financing under the\nreal installment system to Mrs. Medrano Valverde and by the witness Ana Julia Fernández in her\nstatement. Moreover, the report concludes that the lack of modifications\nor adjustments to the mortgage installment in a timely manner from the date of\nformalization of the mortgage transaction until February 2003, is the\nresponsibility of Coovivienda R.L. in the first instance, and of La Vivienda\nMutual de Ahorro y Préstamo, in its capacity as trustee, after the transfer of the\ntransaction, since although the plaintiff knew the contractual terms, she\ncould not calculate and determine the new installment to pay for her transaction (pages\n253 to 255 of the judicial file). The Tribunal shares that\nconclusion, given that it (the semi-annual adjustment) is an obligation\nincumbent upon the creditor and also constitutes a pillar within this modality or\ncredit system. This is because the real installment entails a system of\nperiodic readjustment of the nominal installments of credit transactions (in\nthis case, housing) according to which the setting of the installments will not\ndepend on nor be made taking interest rates as a parameter, but\nrather will be made proportionally to the variation, principally, of the minimum\nwage of an unskilled laborer in the construction industry. If\nthese readjustments are not made, the obligation is not updated and brings as a\nconsequence that the value of the installment diminishes in such a way that what is paid under\nthat item is not even enough for interest, capitalizing them to the principal\nas happened here. But, we insist, adjusting the installment was the responsibility of the\ncreditor. The audit report and the witness Ana Julia\nFernández acknowledge this. Therefore, what was stated in\nDecember 2004 by the FONAVI Directorate of the BANHVI, indicating that \"(…)\nthe variations in the installment amount were clearly established\nat the time of formalization and were accepted accordingly… during\nsome period the monitoring of the loan portfolio was affected,\ngenerating a delay in the execution of the corresponding adjustments to the installment.\nThis situation occurred despite the fact that the debtor had express\nknowledge of the adjustment policy and, therefore, was in a position to\nmake the respective adjustment, thereby avoiding the lack of updating of the\ninstallment amount. In this sense, it is not considered reasonable to argue that the\ndebtor is not responsible for the fact that the increases in the installment amount were not\nexecuted in a timely manner, because the loan conditions were\nclearly established and it is the responsibility of both the\nportfolio administrators and the debtor to ensure\ncompliance. (…)”, is not shared under any perspective. Note that we are faced with a credit right\nthat may even be exercised or not by the creditor. Thus, it is the Tribunal's\ncriterion that the omission of not having adjusted the monthly installment semi-annually and\nunder the parameters established by the loan contract is attributable\nexclusively to those who acted as creditors of the obligation, and it is\nthey who must assume the economic consequences derived from that\nneglect; without it being appropriate to transfer that omission to the debtor,\nas has been attempted. A second determining aspect that must be\nevaluated is that although the plaintiff paid her installments as established in\nthe contract, the receipts delivered as proof of payment did\nnot record the outstanding balance of the debt or the amortization to the principal (pages\n20 to 99 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file). We find that by omitting this\ninformation, the plaintiff's rights were harmed since it prevented her\nfrom knowing the status and behavior of her debt over time. But furthermore, it\nprevented her from knowing whether the referenced semi-annual adjustments were being made or not.\nThat situation continued until February 2003, a date after which the\nreceipts include the outstanding debt balance and the amortization to the principal (pages\n75 to 88 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file). Precisely, the\nreceipt issued on February 2, 2003, indicates that, as of that date, the outstanding\ndebt balance was ₡10,639,890.35 (ten million six hundred\nthirty-nine thousand eight hundred ninety colones and thirty-five céntimos) (pages\n75 of the judicial file). Thus, after almost six years of paying the\nmonthly installment charged by the creditor (which rightly led the debtor to presume\nthat what was charged was what was owed), the receipt reflects that she had\namortized no sum toward the capital and that, rather, it had grown.\nFaced with this state of affairs, the plaintiff went to the BANHVI to present her case and\nrequest a review and adjustment of her mortgage transaction, due to the\nincrease in the debt balance, despite the fact that she has been paying the\ninstallments monthly. However, far from finding a solution in accordance with\nthe law, they propose a series of alternatives that, in the end,\nseek to transfer to her the neglect and omissions of the creditor entities, which,\nas will be explained infra, renders them illegitimate. It is equally\nserious that despite BANHVI having known about the failure to make semi-annual adjustments to\nthe installments since 2003, as the witness Ana Julia Fernández admits, they\ntook no proactive action aimed at regularizing such omission and\npreventing the capital from increasing in the manner it did. That is\nto say, these conducts seek not only to disregard the effects of the inertia\nof the creditor entity regarding the adjustment of the installments, but also to transfer the\nimplications of such indolence to the debtor, aggravating her financial situation\nand attempting to evade their duty to adjust. In short, to obtain economic advantage\nfrom their own neglectfulness and inadvertence, which the Tribunal does\nnot consider consistent with the good faith that must prevail in the execution of the loan\ncontract. The justifications provided, according to which\nthe adjustments were not made due to the impasse that occurred with the transfer of the\ntransaction from Coovivienda to Grupo Mutual (because they had approximately five years\nto adjust the installment, without it having been done), or that this was done so as not to\nharm the plaintiff due to the change in the installment amount, are not acceptable. Not\nhaving made the semi-annual adjustments from 2003 onwards (knowing of the omission)\nonly allowed more interest to be capitalized to the principal owed, to the\nevident detriment of the plaintiff. Proof of this is that by July 2009,\nthe receipts showed an outstanding debt balance of ₡34,162,599.63 (thirty-four million one hundred sixty-two thousand\nfive hundred ninety-nine colones and sixty-three céntimos), despite the fact that the\nplaintiff continued to pay the installment charged by the creditor entity monthly. For the\nreasons stated, if in accordance with articles 1022 and\n1023 of the Civil Code, contracts obligate not only what is expressed in\nthem but also the consequences that equity, custom, or the law give rise to from\nthe obligation, according to its nature; the truth is that there did exist\nan express agreement on the manner in which the adjustments to the\ninstallments would be made, and the errors and omissions in the adjustment and calculation thereof, committed\nfrom the very moment the loan was granted to her, are exclusively\nattributable to the different creditors, who even knowing of such\nomission did not adjust their conduct to what was agreed upon. Therefore, we find that it is\nnotoriously unjust that, after many years of complying with her payment\nobligation, the defendants transfer to the plaintiff the economic consequences of\nsuch neglectfulness, as they have attempted to do.\n\n**VIII.—Indeed**, as both witnesses in\nthis proceeding have acknowledged, from the moment the defendants realized the error committed,\ninstead of correcting and regularizing the situation, they proposed to the plaintiff a\nseries of proposals that the Tribunal deems illegitimate. Let us examine. In\nDecember 2004, the BANHVI rejected the cancellation proposal\nmade by the plaintiff, proposing, instead, alternatives such as restructuring\nthe debt for the remaining term of the transaction, changing from a real installment to a fixed\ninstallment, or paying the difference generated due to the adjustments\nnot made to the installments as established in the deed (a sum that at that\ntime exceeded two million colones) and authorizing that the\nadjustments to the installments continue to be made semi-annually (thus it follows from audit\nreport No. AI-X-045-2010, visible from pages 141 to 156 of the judicial\nfile, particularly on pages 147 to 153, as well as from the testimony\nof Ana Julia Fernández). Then, in February 2010, the\nBANHVI informed the plaintiff that there was a possibility of surrendering the\nproperty in dation in payment and reacquiring it for the value of the administrative\nappraisal, plus costs, amounts that according to the fiduciary approximate\ntwelve million colones, a payment she had to make in\ncash (thus it follows from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010,\nvisible from pages 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly on\npages 147 to 153, as well as from the testimony of Ana Julia Fernández). Finally,\nthrough official letter DFNV-DF-0317-2011, dated March 28, 2011, the BANHVI reiterated to\nthe plaintiff the proposals to reach a definitive solution to the\nproblems of her loan, which were reduced to surrendering the property in dation\nin payment and reacquiring it for the value of the updated appraisal plus costs,\nor paying the amounts not applied to the installments due to the variations stipulated\nin the deed and that from that moment on she pay the corresponding\ninstallment and the periodic variations be applied (pages 134 to 137 of the\njudicial file). We find that such proposals are illegitimate because\nthey suggest alternatives not agreed upon and that are not consistent with the credit modality\ninitially agreed upon by the parties (and, rather, seek to change the credit\nsystem from a real installment to a linear one), nor do they acknowledge that the error of not\nadjusting the installment was the responsibility of the creditor. Rather, they constitute\nillegitimate interpretations by which they seek to take advantage of\ntheir own non-compliance and transfer the economic consequences derived\ntherefrom (the payment of the principal that increased because interest had been capitalized\nto the principal for not adjusting the installment at the timely moment agreed upon)\nto the plaintiff. Moreover, it is not possible to conclude that these alternatives\nweighed the plaintiff's current credit conditions and payment capacity.\n\nAna Julia Fernández stated that the readjustment proposals were made based on the conditions set forth in the public deed and Mauricio González Zumbado indicated that he did not participate in the proposals, that he was unaware of the parameters used to arrive at them, and that he relied on the data contained in the case file. Up to this point, we have that during the execution of the loan contract, there have been instances of neglect and errors that resulted in the creditor breaching its duty to adjust the monthly installment as agreed, and abusive and illegitimate interpretations insofar as they depart from what was agreed and shift the economic repercussions of those omissions to the plaintiff, who up to that date had been paying her installments. Now, based on the testimony of Ana Julia Fernández, the Court certifies that on an unspecified date but between March and November 2011, BANHVI carried out a reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation in which they considered the installments that should have been paid according to the adjustments stipulated in the public deed (and not made by the creditors), comparing them with the installments paid, in order to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts. Thus, they obtained a corrected balance and adjusted the debt to ₡19,400,000.00 (nineteen million four hundred thousand colones exactly), which they communicated to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda so that it would make the corresponding variations (this is also inferred from folios 132 to 137 of the judicial file). This act constitutes, in the Court's opinion, the legitimate action whereby the defendants assume the consequences of not having adjusted the installment for approximately eleven years and reduce the principal owed. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not a debt forgiveness (condonación de deuda), as indicated by the defendants' legal representative in his conclusions. Rather, it implies assuming the economic consequences of their own neglect for almost eleven years, in the mechanism for adjusting the monthly installment that the plaintiff was required to pay. If the error is attributable to the creditor, it is the latter who must assume the resulting economic consequences. The foregoing is excepted in those situations where an evident abuse of right (abuso de derecho) on the part of the debtor is observed, which this Chamber considers is not observed in the present case. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the matter related to the principal owed was regularized, the fact is that when that decision was communicated to the plaintiff and to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda, the error was again made of proposing alternatives that do not conform to the conditions and the payment plan that the plaintiff had agreed to since 1997. In this regard, it is observed that through official letters DFNV-DF-1119-2011 and DFNV-DF-1120-2011, dated November 25, 2011, they informed not only of the reconstruction and reduction of the principal owed (a decision that is compliant with the legal system) but also, once again, proposed to the plaintiff alternatives that do not conform to the conditions and payment plan agreed to since 1997. It is for this reason that we deem those formal actions to be absolutely null and void only insofar as they proposed alternatives that deviate from what was agreed and without considering the payment capacity that the plaintiff had at that time. That is, they are based on a nonexistent reason and their content is illegitimate. The nullity does not extend to the reconstruction and adjustment of the debt for two reasons. First, because it is a decision that was adopted previously and the challenged acts merely communicate it. Second, because with the adjustment to the principal owed, the defendants assume their errors and omissions regarding the agreed obligations. Thus, the debt balance shall be as of that readjustment and taking into account the considerations that will be set forth below. In conclusion, the absolute nullity of official letters DFNV-DF-317-2011, DFNV-DF-1119-2011, and DFNV-DF-1120-2011, already cited, must be declared, in the terms set forth.\n\n\nIX.- Strictly speaking, we consider that the reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation, in which they considered the installments that should have been paid according to the adjustments stipulated in the public deed and compared them with the installments paid, in order to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts, was the action that the creditors were obligated to take from the moment they learned of the error committed. If that action had been timely, the contract would have been possible to fulfill as agreed. Thus, it is clear that since November 2011, the principal owed was adjusted and the installments have been adjusted as agreed. However, the fact is that there are other conditions within the contract that must also be considered because both parties obligated themselves to them. Specifically, we refer to the term of the obligation. According to the contract, the loan term was for twenty years and was to be paid through two hundred forty successive, due monthly installments starting June twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-seven. According to the provisions of numeral 764 of the Civil Code, payment—for it to have an extinctive or liberating effect—must be made “in all respects in accordance with the terms of the obligation”; that is, exactly as set forth in the agreement. From that perspective, it is the creditor's responsibility to verify that the conditions agreed upon in the payment plan are those necessary and sufficient to pay off the debt. Thus, the Court considers that, given the circumstances that have occurred in the specific case, the defendants must respect the term and installments originally agreed upon. We insist that the plaintiff has, in good faith, been complying with the agreed obligations and paying, for approximately fifteen years, the installment that the creditor entities have established. No other conclusion can be reached if one observes the payment history and the interest that the plaintiff has maintained from the moment she learned of the increase in the principal owed. She was the one who went to BANHVI and who requested the Audit that concludes by revealing the errors both in the semiannual adjustment of the installment and in the failure to update the interest rates, a breach that the witness González Zumbado also pointed out. It is also ruled out that she contracted with the intention of not complying with her obligations. At the time, she contracted under conditions that were accessible to her and that, in any event, it was the creditor entity's responsibility to verify; without any intention of failing to comply with what was agreed being observed. To that end, it suffices to refer, we insist, to the fact that for more than fifteen years she has been complying with the payment of the installments. The Audit's conclusions regarding the fact that she took advantage of the benefits of contracting under the real installment mechanism because it allowed her to acquire a dwelling with a value exceeding her credit capacity are not shared. Strictly speaking, the plaintiff's payment capacity in relation to her credit options was an aspect that the creditor should have assessed and analyzed prior to the contract. If at that time it was deemed that she could contract under modalities other than those agreed upon. Nor is it intended that responsibility be attributed to the plaintiff for not having updated the amount of the installment to be paid. We reiterate that this is an obligation inherent to the creditor. If it did not do so, or did so in a way that is currently unviable, it must assume the economic repercussions of that omission. It is for this reason that we consider that the plaintiff's obligation must be extinguished within the term established by the contract and with the 240 installments originally agreed upon. Note that the contract does not establish the possibility of the term increasing. Rather, it indicates that said term could be reduced by application of the agreed payment system and which the debtor expressly accepts. Thus, we are of the opinion that the payment plan and conditions for extinguishing the debt as agreed must be respected. If, due to the creditors' errors, the term is not sufficient to pay off the debt, they must be the ones to assume the financial consequences of their neglect and not transfer them to a debtor who, for more than fifteen years, has complied with her obligations. This does not mean, under any circumstances, that the defendants are prevented from collecting their receivables or that there is unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) in favor of the debtor. It is reiterated that it was the various creditors who failed to exercise the credit right under the agreed conditions and that the installment that will be set for the remainder of the contractual term is a consequence of their inertia and to guarantee the plaintiff's right as a consumer, that the terms agreed upon and complied with by her be respected. Thus, it is declared that the plaintiff must pay, for the remainder of the term and until the two hundred forty agreed installments are completed, a monthly installment that must be adjusted according to the parameters established in the contract. Specifically, the installment she currently pays must be adjusted in the same percentage as the increase in the minimum wage decreed by the corresponding authorities for the second half of this year. Subsequently, and until the contractual term concludes, each time an increase in minimum wages occurs, by the same percentage thereof. The reference used shall be the percentage variation corresponding to the minimum wage of an unskilled laborer in the construction industry. In the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied, the percentage variation of the average wage calculated by the CCSS shall be used as a reference to set the percentage increase of the installments, and in the event that this other mechanism also cannot be applied, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities, shall be used as a reference. In any case, the installment may not exceed thirty percent of the plaintiff's family income at that date. Nor shall it consider the increases not applied throughout the duration of the credit operation. Once the twenty-year term has expired or the two hundred forty agreed installments have been paid, the obligation must be considered extinguished and the mortgage lien affecting it must be lifted.\"\n\nWe have that the deed clearly specified the type of credit mechanism being contracted, that is, real quota; it explained that the quota was set based on a percentage of the minimum wage not exceeding thirty percent, which would increase semiannually, and the parameters that would be used for such purposes; a clear reference to the payment imputation mechanism explaining that the payments made will be applied to cover, to the extent the payment reaches, the insurance, the interest for each month, and once the payment exceeds that amount, the difference will be applied as a credit to the principal, as well as the possibility that interest would be capitalized if the quota set for the debtor was not sufficient to cover the amount of interest, with the consequent increase in the principal. Then, the deed indicates that the plaintiff expressly understood and accepted the referenced conditions and, having read it, approved and signed it. Despite the fact that the plaintiff alleged that the deed was not read to her and offered her mother's testimony to that effect, it is the Tribunal's criterion that this does not undermine the evidentiary presumption of that public instrument. From this perspective and considering the plaintiff's level of education, the Tribunal understands that her will at the time of contracting was free and conscious, without observing defects attributable to a lack of information on the part of the creditor entity. In conclusion, we do not observe that the challenged clause suffers from defects that lead to its nullity; rather, it is considered valid and obligated the parties to its fulfillment, this last aspect being precisely what is relevant to the object of the proceeding, as will be explained below.\n\n**VII.- On the fulfillment of obligations arising under the loan contract.** On this point, the plaintiff explains that she always fulfilled the payment of the quotas that her creditor charged her and that the receipts were deficient because they never indicated the outstanding balance of the debt. Then, she relates that she found out that for 11 years she had not amortized anything toward the debt and that, rather, interest had been capitalized to the principal balance, increasing it disproportionately. When she goes to BANHVI, they explain to her that this is because, by error, the creditor did not timely make the semiannual adjustments to which it was obligated. She claims that she does not have to assume the bank's error and that they now seek to disregard the payments she has made since 1997. After an analysis of the various pieces of evidence brought to the proceeding, the Tribunal concludes that during the contractual relationship, the plaintiff has, in general, fulfilled the obligations under her responsibility, referring fundamentally to the payment of the loan quotas, initially before the original creditor and later before two different trustees that succeeded it. However, upon examining the actions of the defendants regarding the fulfillment of the agreed conditions, the same evidence allows it to be established that there have been acts of neglect attributable to the holders of the credit right, which have impacted the subjective sphere of the plaintiff. The first of these is observed in the fact that for 11 years, none of the creditor entities made the semiannual adjustments to the monthly loan quota, as was established in the agreed contract. This is an omission or error expressly recognized by the Internal Audit Office of BANHVI in the preliminary report on the attention to a request for appraisal related to the granting of financing under the real quota system to Mrs. Medrano Valverde and the witness Ana Julia Fernández in her statement. But additionally, the report concludes that the lack of modifications or adjustments to the mortgage quota in a timely manner from the date of formalization of the mortgage operation until February 2003 are the responsibility of Coovivienda R.L. in the first instance and of La Vivienda Mutual de Ahorro y Préstamo, as trustee, after the transfer of the operation, since although the plaintiff knew the contractual terms, she could not calculate and provide the new quota to pay for her operation *(folios 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* The Tribunal shares this conclusion, since it involves (the semiannual adjustment) an obligation under the responsibility of the creditor and that also constitutes a pillar within this credit modality or system. This is because the real quota presupposes a system of periodic readjustment of the nominal quotas of credit operations (in this case, housing) according to which the setting of the quotas will not depend on nor be carried out using interest rates as a parameter, but rather will be done in proportion to the variation, essentially, of the minimum wage of an unskilled construction worker. If these readjustments are not made, the obligation does not update and brings as a consequence that the value of the quota decreases in such a way that what is paid under that heading does not even cover interest, capitalizing it to the principal, as happened here. But, we insist, readjusting the quota was incumbent upon the creditor. The audit report and the witness Ana Julia Fernández recognize this. For this reason, what was indicated in December 2004 by the FONAVI Directorate of BANHVI is not shared under any perspective, when it indicates that *\"(...) the variations in the amount of the quota were clearly established at the time of formalization and were accepted in conformity... for a certain period, the monitoring of the loan portfolio was affected, generating a delay in the execution of the adjustments corresponding to the quota. This situation arose despite the fact that the debtor had express knowledge of the adjustment policy and, therefore, was in a position to make the respective adjustment, thereby avoiding the outdated amount of the quota. In this sense, it is not considered reasonable to argue that the debtor is not responsible for the increases in the quota amount not being executed at the opportune moment, because the credit conditions were clearly established and it is the responsibility of both the portfolio administrators and the debtor to ensure their fulfillment.(...)\"*. Note that we are facing a credit right that, even, may or may not be exercised by the creditor. Thus, it is the Tribunal's criterion that the omission of having failed to adjust the monthly quota semiannually and under the parameters established by the loan contract is attributable, exclusively, to those who served as creditors of the obligation, it being these who must assume the economic consequences derived from that neglect; it is not appropriate to transfer that omission to the debtor, as has been attempted. A second determining aspect that must be assessed is that although the plaintiff paid her quotas according to what was established in the contract, the receipts delivered as proof of payment did not record the outstanding balance of the debt or the amortization to capital *(folios 20 to 99 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* We consider that omitting this information harmed the plaintiff's rights since it prevented her from knowing the status and behavior of her debt over time. Furthermore, it prevented her from knowing whether the referenced semiannual adjustments were being made or not. That situation existed until February 2003, a date from which the receipts include the outstanding balance of the debt and the amortization to capital *(folios 75 to 88 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* Precisely, the receipt issued on February 2, 2003, indicates that, as of that date, the outstanding balance of the debt was Ë 10,639,890.35 (ten million six hundred thirty-nine thousand eight hundred ninety colones with thirty-five céntimos) *(folio 75 of the judicial file).* Thus, after almost six years of paying the monthly quota charged by the creditor (which led the debtor to reasonably presume that what was charged was what corresponded), the receipt reflects that she had not amortized any sum toward the capital and that, rather, it had increased. Faced with this state of affairs, the plaintiff goes to BANHVI to present her case and request a review and adjustment of her mortgage operation, due to the increase in the outstanding balance of the debt, despite the fact that she has been paying the quotas monthly. However, far from finding a solution in accordance with the law, they propose a series of alternatives that, ultimately, seek to transfer the neglect and omissions of the creditor entities to her, which, as will be explained below, makes them illegitimate. It is considered equally serious that despite BANHVI knowing about the lack of semiannual adjustment of the quotas since 2003, as admitted by the witness Ana Julia Fernández, it took no proactive action tending to regularize such omission and prevent the capital from increasing in the way it did. That is to say, these conducts seek not only to disregard the effects of the creditor entity's inaction regarding the adjustment of the quotas, but also to transfer the implications of such negligence to the debtor, worsening her financial situation and seeking to disassociate itself from its duty to adjust. In sum, to obtain economic advantage from its own failures and inadvertences, which the Tribunal does not consider in keeping with the good faith that must prevail in the execution of the credit contract. The justifications provided, according to which the adjustments were not made due to the impasse that occurred with the transfer of the operation from Coovivienda to Grupo Mutual (because they had nearly five years to adjust the quota, without it having been done) or that this was done so as not to harm the plaintiff due to the change in the quota amount, are not acceptable. Not having made the semiannual adjustments starting in 2003 (knowing of the omission) only allowed more interest to be capitalized to the indebted capital, to the evident detriment of the plaintiff. Proof of this is that by July 2009, the receipts showed an outstanding balance of the debt of Ë 34,162,599.63 (thirty-four million one hundred sixty-two thousand five hundred ninety-nine colones with sixty-three céntimos), despite the fact that the plaintiff continued paying monthly the quota that the creditor entity was charging. For the reasons set forth, if, in accordance with articles 1022 and 1023 of the Civil Code, contracts obligate both what is expressed in them and the consequences that equity, usage, or the law create from the obligation, according to its nature; the truth is that there was an express agreement on the way in which the adjustments to the quotas would be made, the errors and omissions in the adjustment and calculation thereof, committed from the very moment the loan was granted, are attributable exclusively to the different creditors, who, even knowing of such omission, did not adjust their conduct to what was agreed. Therefore, we consider that it is manifestly unjust that, after many years of fulfilling her payment obligation, the defendants transfer the economic consequences of such failures to the plaintiff, as they have attempted.\n\n**VIII.-** And indeed, as both witnesses in this proceeding have recognized, from the moment the defendants realized the committed error, instead of rectifying and regularizing the situation, they proposed to the plaintiff a series of proposals that the Tribunal considers illegitimate. Let us examine them. In December 2004, BANHVI rejected the cancellation proposal made by the plaintiff, proposing, instead, alternatives such as restructuring the debt for the remaining term of the operation, switching from real quota to leveled quota, or paying the difference generated by the adjustments not made to the quotas as established in the deed (a sum that at that time exceeded two million colones) and authorizing that semiannual adjustments to the quotas continue to be made *(this is evident from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010, visible at folios 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly at folios 147 to 153, as well as from the statement of Ana Julia Fernández).* Then, in February 2010, BANHVI communicated to the plaintiff that there was a possibility of delivering the property in dation in payment and acquiring it again for the value of the administrative appraisal, plus expenses, amounts that according to the trustee total approximately twelve million colones, a payment that had to be made in cash *(this is evident from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010, visible at folios 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly at folios 147 to 153, as well as from the statement of Ana Julia Fernández).* Finally, through official letter DFNV-DF-0317-2011, dated March 28, 2011, BANHVI reiterated to the plaintiff the proposals to reach a definitive solution to her credit problem, which essentially involved delivering the property in dation in payment and acquiring it again for the value of the updated appraisal plus expenses, or paying the amounts not applied to the quotas due to the variations stipulated in the deed and that from that moment on, the corresponding quota be paid and the periodic variations applied *(folios 134 to 137 of the judicial file).* We consider that such proposals are illegitimate because they suggest alternatives not agreed upon and that do not conform to the credit modality initially agreed upon by the parties (and rather seek to change the credit system from real quota to a linear one), nor acknowledge that the error of not adjusting the quota was the creditor's responsibility. Rather, they constitute illegitimate interpretations through which one seeks to take advantage of its own breach and transfer the economic consequences derived therefrom (the payment of the capital that increased as interest was capitalized to the principal because the quota was not adjusted at the opportune time agreed upon) to the plaintiff. But additionally, it is not possible to conclude that these alternatives weighed the plaintiff's current credit conditions and payment capacity. Ana Julia Fernández stated that the restructuring proposals were made based on the conditions established in the deed, and Mauricio González Zumbado indicated that he did not participate in the proposals, that he was unaware of the parameters used to arrive at them, and that he relied on the data contained in the file. Thus far, we have that during the execution of the loan contract, there have been failures and errors that resulted in the creditor breaching its duty to adjust the monthly quota as agreed, and abusive and illegitimate interpretations insofar as they deviate from what was agreed and transfer the economic repercussions of those omissions to the plaintiff, who up to that date was paying her quotas. Now, based on the testimony of Ana Julia Fernández, the Tribunal finds it proven that on an unspecified date between March and November 2011, BANHVI carried out a reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation in which they considered the quotas that should have been paid due to the adjustments stipulated in the deed (and not made by the creditors), comparing them with the quotas paid, to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts. Thus, they obtained a corrected balance and adjusted the debt to Ë 19,400,000.00 (nineteen million four hundred thousand colones exactly), which they communicated to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda for it to make the corresponding variations *(this is also inferred from folios 132 to 137 of the judicial file).* This act constitutes, in the Tribunal's judgment, the legitimate action through which the defendants assume the consequences of not having adjusted the quota for approximately eleven years and reduce the outstanding capital. It is emphasized, however, that this does not constitute a debt forgiveness, as the defendants' legal representative indicated in his conclusions. Rather, it represents assuming the economic consequences of their own failures for almost eleven years in the adjustment mechanism for the monthly quota the plaintiff had to pay. If the error is attributable to the creditor, it is the latter who must assume the derived economic consequences. The foregoing except in those situations where an evident abuse of right on the part of the debtor is observed, which this Chamber considers is not observed in the present case. However, despite regularizing the matter regarding the outstanding capital, the truth is that when this decision was communicated to the plaintiff and to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda, the error was again made of proposing alternatives that do not conform to the conditions and the payment plan that the plaintiff had agreed upon since 1997. In this sense, it is observed that through official letters DFNV-DF-1119-2011 and DFNV-DF-1120-2011, dated November 25, 2011, not only was the reconstruction and reduction of the outstanding capital communicated (a decision that conforms to the legal order), but also, alternatives were again proposed to the plaintiff that do not conform to the conditions and payment plan agreed upon since 1997. It is for this reason that we consider these formal conducts to be absolutely null only insofar as they proposed alternatives that depart from what was agreed and without considering the payment capacity that the plaintiff had at that time. That is, they stem from a nonexistent motive and their content is illegitimate. The nullity does not extend to the reconstruction and adjustment of the debt for two reasons. First, because it involves a decision that was adopted previously and the challenged acts only communicate it. Second, because with the adjustment to the outstanding capital, the defendants assume their errors and omissions regarding the agreed obligations. Thus, the outstanding balance of the debt shall be as of that readjustment and taking into account the considerations that will be set forth below. In conclusion, the absolute nullity of official letters DFNV-DF-317-2011, DFNV-DF-1119-2011, and DFNV-DF-1120-2011 already cited must be declared, in the terms expressed.\n\n**IX.-** Strictly speaking, we consider that the reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation in which they considered the quotas that should have been paid due to the adjustments stipulated in the deed and compared them with the quotas paid, in order to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts, was the action to which the creditors were obligated from the moment they learned of the committed error. If this action had been timely, the contract would have been capable of being fulfilled according to what was agreed. Thus, it is clear that as of November 2011, the outstanding capital was adjusted and the quotas have been adjusted according to what was agreed. However, the truth is that there are other conditions within the contract that must also be considered because both parties obligated themselves to them. Specifically, we refer to the term of the obligation. According to the contract, the term of the loan was for twenty years and would be paid through two hundred forty successive, overdue monthly quotas starting from June twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-seven. According to what is stipulated in article 764 of the Civil Code, payment—for it to have an extinctive or liberating effect—must be made *\"in all respects according to the tenor of the obligation\"*; that is, exactly as set forth in the agreement. From this perspective, it is the creditor's responsibility to verify that the conditions agreed upon in the payment plan are necessary and sufficient to cancel the debt. Thus, the Tribunal considers that given the circumstances that have occurred in the specific case, the defendants must respect the originally agreed term and quotas. We insist that the plaintiff has been, in good faith, fulfilling the agreed obligations and paying, for approximately fifteen years, the quota that the creditor entities have established. No other conclusion can be reached if one observes the payment history and the interest that the plaintiff has maintained from the moment she learned of the increase in the outstanding capital. It was she who went to BANHVI and she who requested the Audit that concludes by revealing the errors both in the semiannual adjustment of the quota and in the non-updating of the interest rates, a breach that the witness González Zumbado also noted. It is also ruled out that she contracted with the intention of not fulfilling her obligations. At the time, she contracted under conditions that were affordable to her and that, in any case, it was the creditor entity's duty to verify; without any intention to not comply with what was agreed being observed. For this, it suffices to refer, we insist, to the fact that for more than fifteen years she has been fulfilling the payment of the quotas. The conclusions of the Audit stating that she took advantage of the benefits of contracting under the real quota mechanism because it allowed her to acquire a home with a value greater than her credit capacity are not shared. Strictly speaking, the plaintiff's payment capacity in relation to her credit options was an aspect that the creditor should have assessed and analyzed prior to the contract. If at that time it was considered that she could contract under modalities that were not the ones agreed upon. Nor with the attempt to blame the plaintiff for not having updated the amount of the quota to be paid. We reiterate that this is an obligation inherent to the creditor. If it did not do so, or did so in a way that currently proves unfeasible, it must assume the economic repercussions of that omission. It is for this reason that we consider that the plaintiff's obligation must be extinguished within the term established by the contract and with the originally agreed 240 quotas. Note that the contract does not establish the possibility of the term increasing. Rather, it indicates that said term could be reduced in application of the agreed payment system and which the debtor expressly accepts. Thus, we are of the criterion that the payment plan and conditions for extinguishing the debt agreed upon must be respected. If, due to errors by the creditors, the term is not sufficient to settle the debt, it will be the latter who must assume the financial consequences of their failures and not transfer them to a debtor who, for more than fifteen years, has fulfilled her obligations. This does not mean, under any circumstance, that the defendants are prevented from collecting their credits or that there is unjust enrichment in favor of the debtor. It is reiterated that it was the different creditors who did not exercise the credit right under the agreed conditions, and that the quota to be set for the remainder of the contractual term is a consequence of their inaction and to guarantee the plaintiff's right as a consumer, that the terms agreed upon and fulfilled by her be respected. Thus, it is declared that the plaintiff must pay, for the remainder of the term and until the two hundred forty agreed quotas are completed, a monthly quota that must be adjusted according to the parameters established in the contract. Specifically, the quota she currently pays must be adjusted by the same percentage as the increase in the minimum wage decreed by the corresponding authorities for the second half of this year. Subsequently, and until the contractual term concludes, each time an increase in the minimum wages occurs, by the same percentage. The percentage variation corresponding to the minimum wage of an unskilled construction worker will be used as a reference. In the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied, the percentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS will be used as a reference to set the percentage increase of the quotas, and in the event that this other mechanism also cannot be applied, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities, will be used as a reference. In any case, the quota may not exceed thirty percent of the plaintiff's family income at that date.\n\nNor shall it consider increases not applied throughout the life of the credit transaction. Once the twenty-year term has expired or the two hundred forty agreed-upon installments have been paid, the obligation must be deemed extinguished and the mortgage lien (gravamen hipotecario) affecting it lifted.\"\n\n**IV.- On the prohibition of compounding interest (anatocismo) and the real installment system in housing loans**. This is an issue that has already been addressed by this Court, among others, in judgment No. 926-2010, issued at 7:49 a.m. on March 11, 2010. In what is relevant, it was stated that *\"(...) the national legal system prohibits the figure of interest capitalization, that is, the so-called compounding interest (anatocismo), which entails, in simple terms, the application of interest on interest. In this regard, canon 505 of the Commercial Code clearly states: 'It is prohibited to capitalize interest. However, if upon settling a debt, interest is owed, such interest may be added to the principal to form a single total. When issuing a new document or extending the previous one, interest may be stipulated on the total amount of the obligation.' From that standpoint, it is evident that unless there is a rule to the contrary, every commercial loan obligation is onerous and therefore compensated with legal interest (Article 496 of the Commercial Code). Such a dimension implies that in the payment of credit installments, the current interest is amortized first, and the remainder is applied to the principal of the obligation. Now then, the Law of the National Financial System for Housing and the Creation of BANHVI, No. 7052 of November 27, 1986, establishes in its Article 167: 'Authorized entities may grant their loans through payment systems in which the installment is adjusted based on the variation of minimum wages. Those installments may be less than the minimum necessary to cover interest and amortization—refinanced installment—and the outstanding differences shall accumulate to the loan balance in the form of capitalization, without this allowing the application of Article 505 of the Commercial Code. In any case, the amount of the installment thus set shall first be applied to cover interest, and if any remains, it shall be applied to amortize the debt. Similar treatment may be applied to already established loans. / Authorized entities may use systems based on other parameters set by the Bank's Board of Directors. (Thus amended by Article 165 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica No. 7558 of November 3, 1995)' This is a system that seeks to establish a financing mechanism for housing with more accessible installments for applicants for loans of this nature. The rule provides for the so-called stepped installment, which entails the percentage increase of the installment, previously agreed upon by the parties, usually each year, in order to compensate, in the installments of subsequent years, for the deficit in the payment of the principal that may exist with the initial installment, so that as the loan progresses, the installment increases. It is worth pointing out here that, as a matter of principle, the agreed-upon installment must allow for the payment of interest and amortization toward principal. However, within this modality, the aforementioned Article 167 allows, as an exception, for the initial installment not to cover the minimum necessary to pay the interest and the amortization toward principal. In that case, variations may arise; on the one hand, when the installment only allows coverage of current interest, the principal will remain unchanged until the stepped increase of the installment allows for covering that interest and applying a contribution to the principal balance. On the other hand, when the installment does not fully cover the interest, exceptionally and given the legal permissibility, the uncovered differences in interest are accumulated to the loan balance in the form of capitalization, without this entailing, as the cited law states, the application of Article 505 of the Commercial Code. From the foregoing, it follows that in this scenario, we are facing a refinanced installment as far as interest is concerned, that is, that fraction of interest not paid due to the insufficiency of the installment becomes part of the primary capital. In this context, that interest may later be paid off with the stepping up of the payment. In sum, it begins with a low installment that increases over time, an increase that allows covering not only current interest and balance, but also the interest not previously covered. It bears reiterating that this is an exception in the credit regime based on the rationale of the housing system. (...)\"*. This Court reaffirms the foregoing criterion and proceeds to examine the claims asserted.\n\n**V.- On the validity of the challenged clause.** As a first point, the claim seeking to annul the clause of the deed signed by the plaintiff with the Housing Cooperative Consortium Fedecrédito R.L., through which she received from the latter the sum of exactly six million fifty-eight thousand colones (¢6,058,000.00), must be analyzed. Particularly challenged are the lines of the public instrument from line 7 to line 23, which state *\"(...) The installments shall be set according to the provisions of Article 167 of the Law of the National Financial System for Housing and BANHVI, which is established under the following parameters: the installment shall be calculated as a percentage of the debtor's family income, not exceeding thirty percent of their salary at this date. Every time an increase in minimum wages occurs, the monthly installment shall be increased by the same percentage starting the month after the increase in said minimum wage comes into effect, as decreed by the corresponding authorities. For this purpose, the percentage variation corresponding to the minimum wage of an unskilled construction industry worker shall be used as a reference. In the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied, the percentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS shall be used as a reference to set and increase the percentage of the installments, and in the event that this other mechanism also cannot be applied, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities, shall be used as a reference. Payments made by the debtor shall be applied to cover, to the extent possible, the payment of insurance, the interest for each month, and once the payment exceeds said amount, the difference shall be applied as a payment toward principal. In the event that the installment set for the debtor is not sufficient to cover the interest amount, this balance shall be capitalized with the principal, consequently increasing the balance of the transaction. For now, each initial installment shall be seventy-two thousand five hundred ninety-six colones and six céntimos, a sum that includes the mandatory insurance premiums provided by legislation for this type of transaction, the loan interest, and the amortization toward principal.(...)\"*. In essence, the plaintiff considers that said clause is absolutely null due to the non-existence of the will of one of the parties, as the duty to inform the consumer was breached. Also, due to the non-existence of object and cause, since her apparent motive for contracting was to have a house with an installment she could pay, not exceeding thirty percent of her base salary. However, her future payment capacity was not analyzed, nor were other credit alternatives that could have been applied to her. For their part, the defendants consider that, in general, the defects afflicting the clause are not listed with due clarity. They consider that it is valid because it reproduces legal and regulatory provisions that have not been challenged. They further add that she was indeed provided with the information required to make the consumer decision, and that this is evidenced by the fact that she signed the deed and stated that she understood its scope. Having examined the challenged clause, the Court considers that it substantially conforms to the legal system for the following reasons. As we indicated above and as the attorney for the defendants points out, the payment system called real installment is permitted by our legislation, as indicated by the clause itself, which refers to numeral 167 of the LSFV. Then, as the main adjustment mechanism, the variation of the minimum wages of an unskilled construction industry worker is established, as set forth by both the cited norm and Articles 117 and 119 of the Regulations for Operations of the National Financial System for Housing. The reference to other adjustment mechanisms is supplementary, that is, only in the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied. Moreover, it is a possibility (to set alternative adjustment mechanisms) contemplated by said numeral 167 and Articles 117, subsection a), and 122 of the aforementioned regulations, and which, in any case, we consider reasonable insofar as they rely on objective parameters such as the percentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS, and in the event that this other mechanism also cannot be applied, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities. Subsequently, the clause refers to the manner in which payment is to be allocated and the manner of proceeding in the event that the installment set for the debtor is not sufficient to cover the interest amount; regulations that conform to what the cited legal and regulatory norms establish. Finally, the amount of the initial or starting installment is established, under the terms required by numerals 117 and 119 of the already cited Regulations. From this standpoint, the Court finds no defect in either the cause or the object, insofar as the motive for contracting exists from the moment a credit mechanism is used to obtain a housing solution that is valid and regulated by the legal system, under the terms in which the contractual object was agreed upon. Then, if what the plaintiff questions is the constitutionality of the real installment credit system, the truth is that she should have filed the corresponding action of unconstitutionality, or if she claimed the illegality of the regulatory provisions, she could have challenged them directly in this jurisdiction. As this was not done, the Court limits itself to a comparison of what was agreed upon in relation to the normative provisions that regulate the specific credit modality, finding that the conditions stipulated in the deed are substantially in conformity with the legal system, and it must be so declared.\n\n**VI.-** Regarding the defects of will alleged, the following must be noted. Article 46 of the Political Constitution establishes as fundamental rights the protection of the consumer's health, safety, and economic interests; the freedom of choice—from which the principle of free contracting derived from Article 28 of the same constitutional text is inferred—and equitable treatment—developed by Articles 31 and following of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (hereinafter LPCDEC), as well as Article 40 and following of the Regulations to that Law. This entails a duty to provide adequate, timely, clear, truthful, and sufficient information about all elements that directly affect their consumer decision. In the matter before us, the correct understanding of this guarantee implies that the person intending to enter into a credit contract knows sufficiently and in a timely manner the conditions under which the negotiation is undertaken. Specifically, those seeking housing options and intending to enter into a credit under the real installment system must be informed of the implications of that mechanism in their particular case, and with greater emphasis, if their situation is to fall within a module of interest capitalization. The foregoing because the application of a credit formula in which interest is capitalized is only possible in the specific case regulated by numeral 167 of Law No. 7052, and is only valid when the consumer of the financial service, that is, the person turning to financial entities to seek credit options for different needs (in this case, housing), is clearly informed about the scope of that modality, that is, the stepped increase of the installment, and furthermore, that their installment does not cover current interest in a portion that will become part of the principal owed in the next payment, and therefore, the calculation of the interest for the next installment will be made on the basis of the original balance plus the fraction of uncovered interest, and not on the original principal. The implications of this modality also require, and as a determining aspect, the express and voluntary consent of the debtor, that is, their consent to this effect in their loan. Such an aspect cannot be inferred through interpretive or deductive means but must be clearly established, it is insisted, due to its repercussions. It must be taken into account that, as both parties correctly admit, we are dealing with bilateral, onerous, and adhesion or pre-formulated contracts. This entails a necessary safeguarding of balance and equity in the burdens of the parties involved in the consumer relationship, protecting the rights and guarantees of the consumer (potential debtor), since the very dimension of this type of legal business implies a position of advantage on the part of the economic agent, for the purpose of maintaining or at least enhancing equity in the distribution of contractual burdens in said bilateral regime. Having set forth the foregoing, it must be indicated that from the elements contained in the case file, it is not observed that there was a violation by the creditor financial entity of the duty to inform the plaintiff at the time of signing the loan that concerns us here. We have that the deed clearly specified the type of credit mechanism being contracted, that is, real installment; it explained that the installment was set based on a percentage of the minimum wage not exceeding thirty percent, that it would be increased semiannually, and the parameters that would be used for such purposes; a clear reference to the payment allocation mechanism explaining that payments made shall be applied to cover, to the extent possible, the payment of insurance, the interest for each month, and once the payment exceeds said amount, the difference shall be applied as a payment toward principal, as well as the possibility that interest would be capitalized if the installment set for the debtor was not sufficient to cover the interest amount, with the consequent increase of the principal. Then, the deed indicates that the plaintiff understood and expressly accepted the referred-to conditions, and once read, she approved and signed it. Although the plaintiff alleged that the deed was not read to her and provided her mother's testimony in that regard, it is the Court's criterion that this does not undermine the evidentiary presumption of that public instrument. From this perspective, and considering the plaintiff's level of education, the Court understands that her will at the time of contracting was free and conscious, without observing defects attributable to a lack of information on the part of the creditor entity. In conclusion, we do not observe that the challenged clause suffers from defects that would entail its nullity; rather, it is considered valid and bound the parties to its fulfillment, it being precisely this latter aspect that is relevant for the purpose of the proceeding, as will be set forth below.\n\n**VII.- On the fulfillment of the obligations arising in light of the loan contract.**\n\nAt this point, the plaintiff explains that she always complied with the payment of the installments that her creditor charged her and that the receipts were deficient because they never indicated the outstanding balance of the debt. She then relates that she learned that for 11 years she had not amortized any amount toward the debt and that, rather, interest had been capitalized to the principal balance, enlarging it disproportionately. When she goes to BANHVI, they explain that this is because, by error, the creditor did not timely make the semiannual adjustments to which it was obligated. She claims that she should not have to assume the bank's error and that they now attempt to disregard the payments she has made since 1997. After an analysis of the various items of evidence brought to the process, the Court concludes that during the contractual relationship, the plaintiff has, in general, complied with the obligations under her charge, referring fundamentally to the payment of the loan installments, initially before the original creditor and then before two different fiduciaries that have succeeded it. However, upon examining the actions of the defendants regarding compliance with the agreed conditions, the same evidence permits crediting that there have been instances of neglect attributable to the holders of the credit right, which have affected the subjective sphere of the plaintiff. The first of these is observed in the fact that for 11 years, none of the creditor entities made the semiannual adjustments to the monthly loan installment, as established in the agreed contract. This is an omission or error expressly recognized by the Internal Audit of BANHVI in the Preliminary report on the attention to the valuation requirement related to the granting of financing under the real installment system to Mrs. Medrano Valverde and the witness Ana Julia Fernández in her statement. Furthermore, the report concludes that the lack of modifications or adjustments to the mortgage installment in a timely manner from the date of formalization of the mortgage operation until February 2003 are the responsibility of Coovivienda R.L. in the first instance and of La Vivienda Mutual de Ahorro y Préstamo, in its capacity as fiduciary, after the transfer of the operation, since although the plaintiff knew the contractual terms, she could not calculate and arrange for the new installment to pay for her operation *(folios 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* The Court shares that conclusion, given that it concerns (the semiannual adjustment) an obligation under the charge of the creditor and that it also constitutes a pillar within this modality or credit system. This is because the real installment assumes a system of periodic readjustment of the nominal installments of credit operations (in this case, housing) according to which the setting of the installments will not depend on nor be carried out taking interest rates as a parameter, but rather will be done proportionally to the variation, fundamentally, of the minimum wage of an unskilled construction industry worker. If those readjustments are not made, the obligation is not updated and results in the value of the installment decreasing in such a way that the amount paid under that heading is not sufficient even for interest, capitalizing them to the principal as happened here. But, we insist, readjusting the installment was incumbent upon the creditor. The audit report and the witness Ana Julia Fernández so recognize. Therefore, what was indicated in December 2004 by the FONAVI Directorate of BANHVI is not shared under any perspective when it indicates that *\"(...) the variations in the amount of the installment were clearly established at the time of formalization and were accepted in conformity... during a certain period the monitoring of the credit portfolio was affected, generating a delay in the execution of the adjustments corresponding to the installment. This situation occurred despite the fact that the debtor had express knowledge of the adjustment policy and, therefore, was in a position to make the respective adjustment, thus avoiding the deactualization of the amount of the installment. In this sense, it is not considered reasonable to argue that the debtor is not responsible for the increases in the amount of the installment not being executed at the opportune moment, because the conditions of the credit were clearly established and it is the responsibility of both the portfolio administrators and the debtor to ensure their compliance.(...)\".* Note that we are faced with a credit right that, even, may or may not be exercised by the creditor. Thus, it is the Court's criterion that the omission of not having adjusted the monthly installment semiannually and under the parameters established by the loan contract is attributable exclusively to those who acted as creditors of the obligation, and it is they who must assume the economic consequences derived from that neglect; without it being appropriate to transfer that omission to the debtor, as has been attempted. A second determining aspect that must be assessed is that although the plaintiff paid her installments as established in the contract, the receipts delivered as proof of payment did not state the outstanding balance of the debt nor the amortization to capital *(folios 20 to 99 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* We consider that by omitting this information, the plaintiff's rights were injured, given that it prevented her from knowing the state and behavior of her debt over time. Furthermore, it prevented her from knowing whether or not the referred semiannual adjustments were being made. That situation existed until February 2003, a date from which the receipts include the outstanding balance of the debt and the amortization to capital *(folios 75 to 88 and 253 to 255 of the judicial file).* Precisely, the receipt issued on February 2, 2003, indicates that, on that date, the outstanding balance of the debt was ₡ 10,639,890.35 (ten million six hundred thirty-nine thousand eight hundred ninety colones with thirty-five céntimos) *(folio 75 of the judicial file).* Thus, after almost six years of paying the monthly installment charged by the creditor (which rightly led the debtor to presume that what was charged was what corresponded), the receipt reflects that she had not amortized any sum to capital and that, rather, it had increased. Faced with this state of affairs, the plaintiff goes to BANHVI to present her case and request a review and adjustment of her mortgage operation, due to the increase in the outstanding balance, despite the fact that she has been paying the installments monthly. However, far from finding a legal solution, they propose a series of alternatives that, ultimately, attempt to transfer to her the neglect and omissions of the creditor entities, which, as will be explained infra, renders them illegitimate. It is considered equally serious that despite BANHVI knowing of the lack of semiannual adjustment of the installments since 2003, as admitted by the witness Ana Julia Fernández, it took no proactive action aimed at regularizing such omission and preventing the capital from increasing in the way it did. That is, those conducts attempt not only to disregard the effects of the creditor entity's inertia regarding the adjustment of the installments but also to transfer the implications of such indolence to the debtor, worsening her financial situation and attempting to disassociate itself from its duty to adjust. In sum, to derive economic advantage from its own neglect and inadvertence, which the Court does not consider compliant with the good faith that must prevail in the execution of the credit contract. The justifications given are not admissible, according to which the adjustments were not made due to the impasse that occurred with the transfer of the operation from Coovivienda to Grupo Mutual (because they had nearly five years to adjust the installment, without it having been done) or that this was to avoid harming the plaintiff by changing the amount of the installment. Not having made the semiannual adjustments as of 2003 (knowing of the omission) only allowed more interest to be capitalized to the indebted capital to the evident detriment of the plaintiff. Proof of this is that by July 2009, the receipts showed an outstanding balance of ₡ 34,162,599.63 (thirty-four million one hundred sixty-two thousand five hundred ninety-nine colones with sixty-three céntimos), despite the fact that the plaintiff continued to pay monthly the installment that the creditor entity charged. For the reasons stated, if in accordance with articles 1022 and 1023 of the Civil Code the contracts bind both as to what is expressed in them and as to the consequences that equity, usage, or the law give rise to from the obligation, according to its nature; the truth is that there was an express agreement on the manner in which adjustments to the installments would be made; the errors and omissions in the adjustment and calculation of these, committed from the very moment the loan was granted, are attributable exclusively to the different creditors, who even knowing of such omission did not adjust their actions to what was agreed. Therefore, we consider that it is notoriously unjust that, after many years of complying with her payment obligation, the defendants transfer to the plaintiff the economic consequences of such instances of neglect, as they have attempted.\n\n             **VIII.-** And it is that, as both witnesses in this process have recognized, from the moment the defendants become aware of the error committed, instead of correcting and regularizing the situation, they propose to the plaintiff a series of proposals that the Court deems illegitimate. Let us see. In December 2004, BANHVI rejected the cancellation proposal made by the plaintiff, proposing, instead, alternatives such as restructuring the debt for the remaining term of the operation, changing from real installment to leveled installment, or paying the difference generated by the adjustments not made to the installments as established in the deed (a sum that at that time exceeded two million colones) and authorizing that the adjustments to the installments continue to be made semiannually *(as follows from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010, visible on folios 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly on folios 147 to 153, as well as from the statement of Ana Julia Fernández).* Then, in February 2010, BANHVI informed the plaintiff that there was a possibility of handing over the property in dation in payment (dación de pago) and acquiring it again for the value of the administrative appraisal, plus expenses, amounts that according to the fiduciary total approximately twelve million colones, payment that she had to make in cash *(as follows from audit report No. AI-X-045-2010, visible on folios 141 to 156 of the judicial file, particularly on folios 147 to 153, as well as from the statement of Ana Julia Fernández).* Finally, by means of official communication DFNV-DF-0317-2011, dated March 28, 2011, BANHVI reiterated to the plaintiff the proposals to reach a definitive solution to the problem of her credit, which were reduced to handing over the property in dation in payment and acquiring it again for the value of the updated appraisal plus expenses, or paying the amounts not applied to the installments for the variations stipulated in the deed and that from that moment on she pay the corresponding installment and the periodic variations be applied *(folios 134 to 137 of the judicial file).* We consider that such proposals are illegitimate because they suggest alternatives not agreed upon and that do not conform to the credit modality initially agreed upon by the parties (and rather attempt to change the credit system from real installment to a linear one) nor do they recognize that the error of not adjusting the installment was the creditor's responsibility. Rather, they constitute illegitimate interpretations through which there is an attempt to take advantage of its own non-compliance and transfer the economic consequences derived therefrom (the payment of the capital that increased due to interest having been capitalized to the principal for not adjusting the installment at the opportune agreed time) to the plaintiff. Furthermore, it is not possible to conclude that these alternatives have weighed the plaintiff's current credit conditions and payment capacity. Ana Julia Fernández stated that the restructuring proposals were made based on the conditions established in the deed, and Mauricio González Zumbado indicated that he did not participate in the proposals, that he did not know the parameters used to arrive at them, and that he referred to the data contained in the file. So far, we have that during the execution of the loan contract, there have been instances of neglect and errors that resulted in the creditor failing to comply with its duty to adjust the monthly installment as agreed, and abusive and illegitimate interpretations insofar as they depart from what was agreed and transfer the economic repercussions of those omissions to the plaintiff, who up to that date had been paying her installments. Now, based on the testimony of Ana Julia Fernández, the Court credits that on an unspecified date but between March and November 2011, BANHVI performed a reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation in which they considered the installments that should have been paid for the adjustments stipulated in the deed (and not made by the creditors), comparing them with the installments paid, in order to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts. Thus, they obtained a corrected balance and adjusted the debt to ₡ 19,400,000.00 (nineteen million four hundred thousand exact colones), which they communicated to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda so that it could make the corresponding variations *(it is also inferred from folios 132 to 137 of the judicial file).* This act constitutes, in the Court's opinion, the legitimate action from which the defendants assume the consequences of not having adjusted the installment for approximately eleven years and reduce the capital owed. It is emphasized, however, that this is not a condonation of debt, as indicated by the legal representative of the defendants in his conclusions. Rather, it entails assuming the economic consequences of their own neglect for almost eleven years, in the mechanism for adjusting the monthly installment that the plaintiff had to pay. If the error is attributable to the creditor, it is the latter who must assume the derived economic consequences. The foregoing, except in those situations where evident abuse of right on the part of the debtor is observed, which this Chamber considers is not observed in the present case. However, despite the regularization of the capital owed, when that decision was communicated to the plaintiff and to Grupo Mutual Alajuela-La Vivienda, the error is incurred once again of proposing alternatives that do not conform to the conditions and the payment plan that the plaintiff had agreed upon since 1997. In that sense, it is observed that through official communications DFNV-DF-1119-2011 and DFNV-DF-1120-2011, of November 25, 2011, it was reported not only the reconstruction and reduction of the capital owed (a decision that is in accordance with the legal system) but, once again, alternatives are proposed to the plaintiff that do not conform to the conditions and payment plan agreed upon since 1997. It is for this reason that we consider those formal acts to be absolutely null only insofar as they proposed alternatives that depart from what was agreed and without considering the payment capacity that the plaintiff had at that time. That is, they are based on a non-existent motive and their content is illegitimate. The nullity does not extend to the reconstruction and adjustment of the debt for two reasons. First, because it is a decision that was adopted previously and the contested acts only communicate it. Second, because with the adjustment to the capital owed, the defendants assume their errors and omissions regarding the agreed obligations. Thus, the outstanding balance of the debt will be as of that readjustment and taking into account the considerations that will be set forth infra. In conclusion, the absolute nullity of the cited official communications DFNV-DF-317-2011, DFNV-DF-1119-2011, and DFNV-DF-1120-2011 must be declared, in the terms stated.\n\n             **IX.-** Strictly speaking, we consider that the reconstruction of the plaintiff's credit operation, in which they considered the installments that should have been paid per the adjustments stipulated in the deed and compared them with the installments paid, in order to determine how the principal of the obligation was affected by those amounts, was the action to which the creditors were obligated from the moment they learned of the error committed. If that action had been timely, the contract would have been capable of being fulfilled as agreed. Thus, it is clear that since November 2011, the capital owed was adjusted and the installments have been adjusted as agreed. However, the truth is that there are other conditions within the contract that must also be considered because both parties obligated themselves to them. Specifically, we refer to the term of the obligation. According to the contract, the term of the loan was for twenty years and would be paid by means of two hundred forty successive monthly installments, due and payable starting from June twenty-eighth, nineteen hundred and ninety-seven. In accordance with the provisions of article 764 of the Civil Code, the payment – in order to have extinctive or liberating effect – must be made *\"in all respects according to the tenor of the obligation\"**; that is, exactly as it was set forth in the agreement. From this perspective, it is up to the creditor to verify that the conditions agreed in the payment plan are those necessary and sufficient to cancel the debt. Thus, the Court considers that given the circumstances that occurred in the specific case, the defendants must respect the originally agreed term and installments. We insist that the plaintiff has been, in good faith, complying with the agreed obligations and paying, for approximately fifteen years, the installment that the creditor entities have established. No other conclusion can be reached if one observes the payment history and the interest that the plaintiff has maintained from the moment she learned of the increase in the capital owed. It was she who went to BANHVI and who requested the Audit that concludes by noting the errors both in the semiannual adjustment of the installment and in the non-updating of interest rates, non-compliance that was also noted by the witness González Zumbado. It is also ruled out that she contracted with the intention of not fulfilling her obligations. At the time, she contracted under conditions that were affordable to her and that, in any case, it was up to the creditor entity to verify; without any intention of not complying with what was agreed being observed. For that, it is sufficient to refer, we insist, to the fact that for more than fifteen years she has been complying with the payment of the installments. The Audit's conclusions are not shared, referring to the fact that she took advantage of the benefits of contracting under the real installment mechanism because it allowed her to acquire a home with a value superior to her credit capacity. Strictly speaking, the plaintiff's payment capacity in relation to her credit options was an aspect that the creditor should have assessed and analyzed prior to the contract. If at that time it was deemed that she could contract under modalities that were not those agreed upon. Nor is it acceptable to attempt to blame the plaintiff for not having updated the amount of the installment to be paid. We reiterate that it is an obligation inherent to the creditor. If it did not do so, or did so in a way that is currently unfeasible for it, it must itself assume the economic repercussions of that omission. It is for this reason that we consider that the plaintiff's obligation must be extinguished within the term established by the contract and with the 240 originally agreed installments. Note that the contract does not establish the possibility of the term increasing. Rather, it indicates that said term could be reduced by application of the agreed payment system and which the debtor expressly accepts. Thus, we are of the criterion that the payment plan and conditions for the extinction of the debt agreed must be respected. If due to errors by the creditors the term is not sufficient to settle the debt, it will be the latter who must assume the patrimonial consequences of its neglect and not transfer them to a debtor who, for more than fifteen years, has fulfilled her obligations. That does not mean, under any circumstance, that the defendants are prevented from collecting their debts or that there is unjust enrichment in favor of the debtor. It is reiterated that it was the various creditors who did not exercise the credit right under the agreed conditions and that the installment to be set for the remainder of the contractual term is a consequence of their inertia and to guarantee the plaintiff's right as a consumer, that the terms agreed and fulfilled by her be respected. Thus, it is declared that the plaintiff must pay, for the remainder of the term and until the two hundred forty agreed installments are completed, a monthly installment that must be adjusted according to the parameters established in the contract. Specifically, the installment she currently pays must be adjusted by the same percentage as the increase in the minimum wage decreed by the corresponding authorities for the second semester of this year. Subsequently, and until the contractual term concludes, each time an increase in minimum wages occurs, by the same percentage thereof. The percentage variation corresponding to the minimum wage of an unskilled construction industry worker shall be used as a reference. In the event that the minimum wage disappears or is not applied, the percentage variation of the average salary calculated by the CCSS will be used as a reference to set the percentage increase of the installments, and in the event that this other mechanism also cannot be applied, the percentage variation of the consumer price index, issued by the corresponding governmental authorities, will be used as a reference. In any case, the installment may not exceed thirty percent of the plaintiff's family income on that date. Nor shall it consider the increases not applied throughout the validity of the credit operation. Once the twenty-year term has expired or the two hundred forty agreed installments have been paid, the obligation must be deemed extinguished and the mortgage lien affecting it must be lifted.\""
}