{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-148806",
  "citation": "Res. 00122-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Anulación de despido en la CCSS por vicios procedimentales y dilación injustificada",
  "title_en": "Annulment of CCSS dismissal for procedural defects and undue delay",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI, anuló el despido de un funcionario de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) en el expediente disciplinario 006-08. El tribunal encontró tres vicios insubsanables: (1) una dilación injustificada e irrazonable del procedimiento de casi 22 meses, que vulneró los principios de justicia pronta y cumplida, impulso procesal y debido proceso, a pesar de la complejidad aducida; (2) un traslado de cargos inicial que omitió advertir al investigado sobre las posibles sanciones o consecuencias jurídicas, lo que lesionó el derecho de defensa; y (3) un acto final carente de motivación suficiente, que no estableció el vínculo causal entre los hechos probados y las normas que justificaban la sanción máxima de despido, incumpliendo el principio de tipicidad. En consecuencia, se decretó la nulidad absoluta del procedimiento, del acto de traslado de cargos y del acto final de despido, por ser actos viciados de nulidad absoluta conforme a la Ley General de la Administración Pública.",
  "summary_en": "The Administrative Litigation Tribunal, Section VI, annulled the dismissal of a CCSS employee under disciplinary file 006-08. The court found three irremediable defects: (1) an unjustified and unreasonable delay of nearly 22 months, violating principles of prompt justice, procedural impulse, and due process despite alleged complexity; (2) an initial statement of charges that failed to warn the defendant of possible sanctions or legal consequences, breaching the right of defense; and (3) a final act lacking adequate reasoning, which did not establish a causal link between proven facts and the norms justifying the maximum penalty of dismissal, breaching the principle of legality. Consequently, the court declared absolute nullity of the procedure, the statement of charges, and the final dismissal act.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI",
  "date": "2013",
  "year": "2013",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
    "traslado de cargos",
    "órgano director",
    "debido proceso",
    "justicia pronta y cumplida",
    "nulidad absoluta",
    "tipicidad",
    "caducidad del procedimiento"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 223",
      "law": "Ley 6227"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 166",
      "law": "Ley 6227"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 261",
      "law": "Ley 6227"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 340",
      "law": "Ley 6227"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 603",
      "law": "Código de Trabajo"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 44",
      "law": "Ley 8422"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 43",
      "law": "Ley 8292"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 71",
      "law": "Ley 7428"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "procedimiento administrativo disciplinario",
    "prescripción potestad disciplinaria",
    "despido sin responsabilidad patronal",
    "nulidad absoluta",
    "debido proceso",
    "dilación injustificada",
    "justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida",
    "traslado de cargos",
    "motivación del acto administrativo",
    "principio de tipicidad",
    "CCSS",
    "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
    "caducidad del procedimiento",
    "órgano director",
    "órgano decisor",
    "vicio formal sustancial"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "disciplinary administrative procedure",
    "statute of limitations disciplinary authority",
    "dismissal without employer liability",
    "absolute nullity",
    "due process",
    "unjustified delay",
    "prompt administrative justice",
    "statement of charges",
    "administrative act motivation",
    "principle of legality",
    "CCSS",
    "General Law of Public Administration",
    "lapse of proceedings",
    "instructing body",
    "deciding body",
    "substantial formal defect"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "X.- Sinopsis de las nulidades decretadas. En suma, debe disponerse la nulidad del procedimiento disciplinario y las conductas que adelante se detallan, por evidenciarse diversas patologías que llevan a una invalidez insalvable, de grado absoluto que ha de ser declarada en esta sede, en concreto: a) Procedimiento administrativo 006-08 instaurado contra el señor Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara: por la dilación injustificada, irrazonable y desproporcionada del procedimiento administrativo en perjuicio del principio de concentración, inmediación, impulso procesal, debido proceso y justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida, b) Resolución DRSSCN-2994-2008 de las 07 horas del 21 de agosto del 2008, de la Dirección Regional de Servicios de Salud Central Norte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, que constituye el Traslado de cargos inicial del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario expediente 006-08, en lo que se refiere al accionante Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara; c) De conformidad con el numeral 164.2 y 163.2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, se dispone la nulidad de los demás actos del procedimiento administrativo expediente 006-08, que dependan o tengan como antecedente justificante el traslado inicial de cargos, en lo que se refiere al actor; d) Resolución No. DRSSCN-2350-2010 de las 07 horas del 21 de junio del 2010 de la Dirección Regional de Servicios de Salud Central Norte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en cuanto impone al señor Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara una sanción de despido sin responsabilidad patronal.",
  "excerpt_en": "X.- Synopsis of the nullities decreed. In sum, the nullity of the disciplinary procedure and the acts detailed below must be ordered, showing various pathologies that lead to an irremediable, absolute invalidity that must be declared in this venue, specifically: a) Administrative procedure 006-08 brought against Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara: due to the unjustified, unreasonable and disproportionate delay of the administrative procedure in detriment of the principles of concentration, immediacy, procedural impulse, due process and prompt and complete administrative justice, b) Resolution DRSSCN-2994-2008 of 07 hours on August 21, 2008, of the Regional Directorate of Health Services Central Norte of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, which constitutes the initial statement of charges of the disciplinary administrative procedure file 006-08, regarding the plaintiff Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara; c) In accordance with numeral 164.2 and 163.2 of the General Law of Public Administration, the nullity of the other acts of administrative procedure file 006-08, that depend on or have the initial statement of charges as justifying antecedent, regarding the plaintiff, is ordered; d) Resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010 of 07 hours on June 21, 2010 of the Regional Directorate of Health Services Central Norte of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, insofar as it imposes on Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara a penalty of dismissal without employer liability.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Upheld (nullity)",
    "label_es": "Con lugar (nulidad)",
    "summary_en": "The court declared the absolute nullity of the disciplinary procedure, the statement of charges, and the dismissal act due to substantial defects, including unjustified delay, failure to warn of the sanction, and lack of reasoning.",
    "summary_es": "El tribunal declaró la nulidad absoluta del procedimiento disciplinario, del traslado de cargos y del acto de despido por vicios sustanciales, incluyendo dilación injustificada, omisión de advertencia de sanción y falta de motivación."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "In this case, from the issuance of the initial statement of charges on August 21, 2008 to the issuance of the disciplinary sanction act on June 21, 2010, approximately one year and 10 months elapsed, a period that is considered, by far, completely arbitrary and unjustified.",
      "quote_es": "En la especie, desde la emisión del acto inicial de traslado de cargos en fecha 21 de agosto del 2008 a la fecha de emisión del acto de sanción disciplinaria el 21 de junio del 2010, transcurrió un aproximado de un año y 10 meses, plazo que se considera, por mucho, totalmente arbitrario e injustificado."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VIII",
      "quote_en": "Indeed, the initial statement of charges completely omits, regarding the plaintiff, to warn about the possible legal consequences of the proceedings, that is, it fails to indicate the possible sanctions or effects that this course may generate in the legal sphere of the official, as a result of the conduct and facts attributed to him. In the judgment of this collegiate body, such warning constitutes a fundamental right of the investigated party.",
      "quote_es": "En efecto, el acto inicial de traslado de cargos deja de lado por completo, en lo que respecta al accionante, advertir sobre las posibles consecuencias jurídicas del trámite, es decir, omite señalar las posibles sanciones o efectos que ese curso puede llegar a generar en la esfera jurídica del funcionarios, como consecuencia de las conductas y hechos que se le imputan. A juicio de este cuerpo colegiado, tal advertencia constituye un derecho fundamental del investigado."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IX",
      "quote_en": "The final act projects the deficiency detected in the statement of charges, since just as the latter omitted to refer to the legal classification of the imputed acts, in the former, no logical construction is made regarding the causal relational link, that allows establishing how those determined facts fit within the conditioning premise, so that the appropriateness or not of that conditioned consequence can be established.",
      "quote_es": "El acto final proyecta la falencia detectada en el traslado de cargos, pues así como este último omitió referirse a la calificación jurídica de los hechos imputados, en aquel, no se realiza una construcción lógica en cuanto al vínculo relacional causa-efecto, que permita establecer cómo esos hechos determinados, encajan dentro del presupuesto condicionante, de manera que pueda establecerse la procedencia o no de esa consecuencia condicionada."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "The complexity or otherwise of the procedure cannot justify arbitrarily long procedures, since this would imply condoning an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and at its own discretion, the power to resolve the conflict, in evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear violation of due process.",
      "quote_es": "La complejidad o no del procedimiento no puede justificar procedimientos arbitrariamente largos, pues ello supondría cohonestar una potestad incontrolable de la Administración para ejercitar, en cualquier tiempo y bajo su propio arbitrio, la potestad de resolver el conflicto, en mengua evidente de la aludida certeza y en clara lesión del debido proceso."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-13231",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 6227  Art. 223"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-53738",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 8422  Art. 44"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-49185",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 8292  Art. 43"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-21629",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7428  Art. 71"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-148806",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
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  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-21629",
      "norm_num": "7428",
      "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "07/09/1994"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-49185",
      "norm_num": "8292",
      "norm_name": "Ley General de Control Interno",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "31/07/2002"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-53738",
      "norm_num": "8422",
      "norm_name": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "06/10/2004"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“III.- Generalidades sobre el\r\nprocedimiento administrativo. En el presente proceso el accionante cuestiona la\r\nvalidez del acto que dispone su despido sin\r\nresponsabilidad patronal alegando una serie de vicios dentro del procedimiento administrativo (expediente\r\n006-08) instaurado en su contra. Tales alegaciones hace necesario exponer\r\nalgunas consideraciones, breves, en cuanto a la dinámica de este tipo de\r\ncursos. El procedimiento administrativo constituye\r\nun importante elemento formal de la conducta pública. Cumple una doble\r\nfinalidad. Por un lado, establece el camino que ha de seguir la Administración para\r\nadoptar una determinada decisión, orientando su proceder. Por otro, se impone como un marco de referencia que permite al administrado,\r\nestablecer un cotejo del\r\nproceder público, a fin de fijar un control de que sus actuaciones se hayan\r\nmanifestado acorde a las normas que orientan ese proceder. Busca por ende,\r\nconstituirse en un mecanismo de tutela de derechos subjetivos e intereses\r\nlegítimos frente a poder público, así como garantizar la legalidad, oportunidad\r\ny conveniencia de la decisión administrativa y correcto funcionamiento de la\r\nfunción pública. Conforme lo señala el canon 214 de la Ley No. 6227, su objeto es\r\nestablecer la verdad real de los hechos que sirven de motivo al caso final.\r\nEste elemento formal resulta imperativo para lograr un equilibrio entre el\r\nmejor cumplimiento de los fines de la Administración y la tutela de los derechos del\r\nparticular, tal y como se expresa en el artículo 225.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.\r\nDe ahí que el canon 216.1 ibidem, exija a la Administración\r\nadoptar sus decisiones dentro del\r\nprocedimiento con estricto apego al ordenamiento jurídico. En su curso, el\r\nprocedimiento pretende establecer las formalidades básicas que permitan al\r\nadministrado el ejercicio pleno del derecho de defensa y el contradictorio,\r\npara llegar a establecer la referida verdad real de los hechos (dentro de las\r\ncuales pueden verse las estatuidas en los cánones 217, 218, 219, 297, 317,\r\nentre otros, todos de la citada Ley General). Ello adquiere aún mayor\r\nrelevancia en los denominados procedimientos de control o sancionatorios,\r\nsiendo que en esos caso, la decisión final puede imponer un marco represivo en\r\nla esfera jurídica de una persona. El mismo plexo normativo dispone la\r\nsustancialidad de estas garantías mínimas, considerando inválido el\r\nprocedimiento que no satisfaga esas cuestiones mínimas. Así se desprende del\r\nmandato 223 de la Ley\r\nde referencia, en cuanto señala que la omisión de formalidades sustanciales\r\ncausará nulidad del procedimiento. Desde este plano, esta Tribunal ya ha\r\nseñalado que el control de la función administrativa que confiere a esta\r\njurisdicción el canon 49 de la\r\n Carta Magna, supone un cotejo de que la Administración en\r\nel curso de esos procedimientos (de corte sancionatorio para este caso),\r\nsatisfacen las garantías mínimas fijadas por la normativa aplicable, y que en\r\nlo medular, se ha tutelado el debido proceso que ha de ser infranqueable en ese\r\nproceder. Ahora bien, en virtud de lo alegado, es menester abordar el tema de\r\nlas funciones que le son propias al órgano director y al órgano decisor del procedimiento. La\r\ncompetencia para emitir el acto final dentro de un procedimiento corresponde al\r\nórgano decisor, sea, a quien se ha otorgado la competencia legal para emitir el\r\nacto que causa estado. Empero, en aras de la eficiencia administrativa, las\r\ncompetencias de instrucción son delegables en un órgano encargado de llevar a\r\ncabo la instrucción del\r\nprocedimiento, el que se ha tendido en denominar \"órgano director o\r\ninstructor\". Es evidente que la designación de este último corresponde al\r\nórgano decisor, para lo cual, su validez se encuentra sujeta a que recaiga en\r\nun funcionario adscrito, designado regularmente y en posesión del cargo. De manera excepcional, se ha\r\ntolerado que se constituya como órgano director del procedimiento a\r\npersonas que no son funcionarios regulares, sin embargo, en esa función\r\nespecífica, debe entenderse que cumplen una función pública, con las obligaciones\r\ninherentes. En cuanto a sus competencias, el órgano instructor representa a la Administración en\r\nel procedimiento y ostenta un rol de instrucción. Le corresponde emitir un\r\nanálisis fáctico. Si bien puede rendir recomendaciones, ciertamente no serían\r\nvinculantes, por lo que sus determinaciones de cara a la adopción de una\r\ndecisión final se consideran actos de trámite. Por ende, le corresponde \r\ndictar el acto de apertura, dar impulso procesal, toda la labor de instrucción\r\ndel procedimiento, dirigir la comparecencia, resolver cuestiones previas,\r\nresolver el recurso de revocatoria que se interponga contra los actos de\r\ntrámite, rendir un informe al órgano decisor al momento de remitir el\r\nexpediente para el dictado del acto final. Dentro de sus competencias pueden\r\nverse los artículos 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304,\r\n314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, todos de la Ley General de\r\nreferencia. Por su parte, el órgano decisor es el jerarca competente que reúne\r\nlas condiciones necesarias para dictar el acto final que resuelve el\r\nprocedimiento.\n\r\n\r\n\n IV.-\r\nSobre la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria. El primer alegato por cuestiones\r\nde orden que ha presentado el actor se refiere a la supuesta prescripción de la\r\npotestad correctiva jerárquica al haber transcurrido el plazo mensual que fija\r\nel canon 603 del\r\nCódigo de Trabajo, y la vulneración de los plazos que estatuye la LGAP. En este sentido\r\nexpresa que así lo declaró la Sala Constitucional en el voto 10-6364. Destaca,\r\nel caso ha sido elevado a conocimiento de la Junta Directiva\r\ndesde hace más de un año sin que exista pronunciamiento, por lo que la sanción\r\nse encuentra prescrita. Sobre el particular debe indicarse lo que de seguido se\r\nexpone. El análisis de validez de la resolución cuestionada tiene como punto fundamental\r\ndeterminar el régimen de prescripción aplicable al procedimiento administrativo\r\ndisciplinario instaurado contra el demandante. El trasfondo de los alegatos\r\nresumidos exige ingresar a analizar cuestiones varias del\r\nelemento temporal que incide en el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria, así como en el procedimiento\r\nadministrativo. Sobre el particular debe indicarse lo que de seguido se expone.\r\nEn las relaciones funcionariales, el ejercicio de la potestad correctiva del jerarca frente a los funcionarios que han cometido\r\nfaltas sancionables, se encuentra sujeto a un factor de temporalidad, luego del cual, tal ejercicio\r\nno podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal, según se verá, varía según se\r\ntrae de la materia regulada y de la existencia de un régimen jurídico especial\r\nque configure reglas particulares para tipos específicos de relaciones de\r\nempleo público. En consecuencia, esa potestad disciplinaria (que se basa en la\r\ndoctrina del ordinal 102 de la\r\n LGAP) no es irrestricta en el tiempo. A diferencia de otras\r\npotestades públicas que por aspectos finalistas se consideran imprescriptibles\r\n(art. 66 LGAP), las que se refieren al ejercicio sancionatorio interno -como el\r\nque se examina en este caso- están sujetas a reglas de temporalidad en virtud\r\nde lo cual, puede fenecer por el decurso del tiempo establecido por el\r\nordenamiento jurídico sin concretarlas. Por ende, en este tipo de relaciones,\r\nel titular del poder correctivo es el jerarca administrativo y el sujeto pasivo\r\nel funcionario público, quien en esa medida, se encuentra sujeto a la potestad\r\ncorrectiva interna solo por el plazo que expresamente fije la normativa\r\naplicable, vencido el cual, emerge su facultad de requerir el reconocimiento de\r\nla pérdida de la potestad jerárquica. Ahora bien, para los efectos del presente\r\ncaso es necesario discriminar entre diversos supuestos que se producen en este\r\ntipo de procedimientos disciplinarios, todos en los cuales, aplican reglas de\r\nejercicio temporal de facultades o potestades, pero con matices diversos. Se\r\ntrata del establecimiento necesario, para fines de claridad, de criterios de\r\ndemarcación que permitan el abordaje de los temas discutidos, según el supuesto\r\nde que se trate. En esta línea, ha de distinguirse el decurso temporal de\r\netapas diversas: 1) Prescripción del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria:\r\nse refiere al plazo que fija el ordenamiento jurídico para que el titular de la\r\npotestad correctiva interna adopte las medidas procedimentales del caso que le\r\npermitan emitir la decisión final. En este plano, se trata del plazo máximo\r\nimpuesto por el ordenamiento jurídico para que el jerarca administrativo\r\ndisponga la apertura del procedimiento correspondiente, direccionado a\r\nestablecer la pertinencia o no de la imposición de una sanción. En este caso,\r\nes claro que la notificación de la apertura del procedimiento que busca el\r\nestablecimiento de los hechos (verdad real) que sirven de base al motivo del\r\nacto, genera un efecto interruptor de ese margen de temporalidad, en la medida\r\nen que consiste un acto expreso y una medida que directamente propende al\r\nejercicio de esa potestad. No podría considerarse que el citado plazo del\r\nejercicio de la potestad se interrumpe con el dictado del acto final pues como\r\nderivación del principio del debido proceso, es menester que la Administración\r\ndisponga la apertura de una causa administrativa, se insiste, para establecer\r\nsi corresponde la sanción, como derivación de lo establecido en los ordinales\r\n214, 221, 297, 308 de la\r\n LGAP. En esta hipótesis analizada, la potestad disciplinaria\r\ndel jerarca administrativo se encuentra sujeta a plazo prescriptivo (cuyo\r\ntratamiento en la praxis es en realidad muy próximo a la figura de la\r\ncaducidad, en la medida en que en determinados supuestos se estila declarar ese\r\naspecto ex officio), genéricamente regulado por el mandato 603 del\r\nCódigo de Trabajo, norma que fija un plazo de un mes para el ejercicio de esa\r\npotestad represiva, el que se insiste, se interrumpe con la comunicación del\r\ntraslado de cargos. Lo anterior sin perjuicio de las faltas que se encuentren\r\nreguladas por el régimen especial precisado por el régimen de control interno,\r\nprobidad en la función pública y gestión de la hacienda pública, en los cuales,\r\nacorde a lo regulado por la\r\n Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292 (art. 43), Ley\r\ncontra la Corrupción\r\ny Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública, No. 8422 (art. 44) y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General\r\nde la República,\r\nNo. 7428, opera un plazo especial de cinco años (según los supuestos y\r\ndesde los momentos en que esas normas disponen), y no el plazo mensual\r\nestatuido por el Código de Trabajo, se insiste, al ser una normativa especial y\r\nposterior que prevalece sobre el régimen general de la función pública. Ahora bien,\r\nresulta determinante el punto de partida del cómputo de ese plazo prescriptivo.\r\nSobre el particular, el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo señala que el plazo\r\ncorre desde que se dio la causa para la separación o en su defecto, desde que\r\nfueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria. En\r\neste sentido, el plazo mensual se computa desde el momento en que el titular de\r\nla potestad correctiva se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta\r\ny por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad. Por ende, cuando las\r\nparticularidades del caso exija la realización de una etapa previa de\r\ninvestigación preliminar, el plazo mensual aludido corre desde el momento en\r\nque se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca los resultados de ese ejercicio. Con\r\ntodo, debe discriminarse en cada caso la necesidad o no de esa fase, pues de\r\notro modo, podría utilizarse como estrategia para evadir la prescripción,\r\nsiendo que no en todos los escenarios, esa investigación sería necesaria, sino\r\nsolo aquellos en que por las particularidades del caso, esa fase sea\r\nindispensable para determinar pertinencia o no de la apertura del procedimiento\r\nsancionatorio, o bien, para recabar indicios que propendan a clarificar su\r\nnecesidad o no. En el caso concreto de los procedimientos instaurados por la CCSS, la Normativa Interna\r\nde Relaciones Laborales, aprobada por la Junta Directiva de\r\nla CCSS, en\r\nsesión No. 8474, artículo 5 del 21 de octubre del 2010, establece en el ordinal\r\n146 las reglas de prescripción del ejercicio de la citada potestad, indicando\r\nque en cuestiones disciplinarias aplica el citado ordinal 603 del Código de\r\nTrabajo, computado desde que el órgano decisor cuente con elementos objetivos\r\nsuficientes para determinar si instaura o no el procedimiento administrativo,\r\nsalvo para los casos de responsabilidad por daño patrimonial, regulado por el\r\nmandato 198 de la Ley No.\r\n6227/78, así como el régimen tutelar de hacienda pública ya comentado. Debe\r\nverse en este sentido además el canon 116 de esa Normativa Interna. 2)\r\nPrescripción de la potestad de adoptar la sanción dentro del procedimiento:\r\nSe refiere al tiempo máximo que puede durar el procedimiento\r\nadministrativo instaurado para establecer los hechos que permitan adoptar la\r\ndecisión final del titular de la potestad represiva pública. Este tema, salvo\r\nnorma especial, se encuentra regulado por el ordinal 261, en relación con el\r\n319 y el 340, todos de la Ley\r\n No. 6227. Sin embargo, ese plazo bimensual que allí se\r\ndispone consiste en un plazo de naturaleza ordenatoria, no perentoria, lo que\r\ndesde luego no incluye ni permite procedimientos con dilaciones injustificadas,\r\narbitrarias y desproporcionadas, los que serían inválidos por lesión a la\r\nmáxima de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida. En este sentido, puede verse\r\nel fallo No. 199-2011-VI de esta Sección VI, de las las 16: 20 horas del 12 de\r\nseptiembre del 2011. En este punto ha de remitirse además a lo estatuido por el\r\nprecepto 340 de la LGAP\r\nque regula el instituto de la caducidad del procedimiento, en los casos en que la Administración\r\ninstructora que lo inició, lo someta a estado de abandono por un plazo igual o\r\nsuperior de seis meses por causas imputables a aquella. En este supuesto, la\r\ncaducidad aplica incluso en los casos en que el procedimiento se encuentra listo\r\npara el dictado del acto final, pues la restricción del inciso 2 del citado\r\ncanon 340, en cuanto a la imposibilidad de la caducidad cuando el asunto se\r\nencuentra listo para el dictado de ese acto final, solo aplica cuando el\r\nprocedimiento ha iniciado a instancia de parte, dado que la etapa siguiente\r\nsolo compete a la\r\n Administración, la que no podría escudarse en su inercia.\r\nEsto no ocurre cuando se ha instruido de oficio, pues en ese caso, la dilación\r\nsi beneficia al administrado, en la medida en que se trataría en ese caso, de\r\nun retraso solo imputable a la oficina pública. La aplicación de esta norma se\r\nencuentra prevista además en el precepto 147 de aquella Normativa de Relaciones\r\nLaborales. Cabe señalar, dentro del curso del procedimiento, una vez concluida\r\nla audiencia oral y privada, el numeral 319 de la LGAP establece un plazo de 15\r\ndías computados desde la fecha de la comparecencia para la emisión del acto\r\nfinal. Se trata de un plazo especial para la culminación del procedimiento. Sin\r\nembargo, de nuevo, se trata de un plazo ordenatorio, que pretende orientar la\r\neficiencia del procedimiento, pero cuya vulneración no supone, per se, en todos\r\nlos casos, la invalidez de lo actuado, salvo los casos en que esa dilación\r\nfuese arbitraria e injustificada, aspecto que adelante se tratará. Sin embargo,\r\ncabe indicar, una vez que el jerarca titular de la potestad disciplinaria\r\ncuente con la posibilidad objetiva de ejercitarla mediante la eventual adopción\r\ndel acto correctivo interno, opera la prescripción mensual del aludido numeral\r\n603 del Código de Trabajo. Esto supone, en la mayoría de los casos, recibido el\r\nexpediente por parte del Órgano Director del procedimiento, lo que incluye la\r\nremisión del informes de conclusiones y recomendaciones, el jerarca se encuentra\r\nhabilitado para decidir si impone la sanción que le ha sido recomendada por\r\naquella instancia instructora o bien opta por decisión distinta (ver art. 302\r\nLGAP), de suerte que tal potestad ha de emitirse dentro del plazo de un mes\r\nrecién señalado. Lo opuesto llevaría a desconocer las reglas de prescripción\r\nque esa norma (art. 603 del Código de Trabajo) establece, en mengua de los\r\nderechos del funcionario. 3) Prescripción de la potestad de ejecutar la\r\nsanción impuesta: Se refiere al plazo con que cuenta el jerarca\r\nadministrativo para disponer la aplicación de la sanción dictada. Consiste por\r\nende en la ejecución material del acto que dispone como contenido, una sanción\r\ndisciplinaria. En este caso, por integración analógica, el plazo aplicable,\r\nsalvo norma especial, sería el plazo mensual previsto en el numeral 603 del\r\nCódigo de Trabajo. La negación de semejante plazo supondría la posibilidad\r\nperenne del jerarca de aplicar la sanción dispuesta de antemano, bajo el\r\nalegato de una suerte de imprescriptibilidad de esa potestad. Así, una cosa es\r\nel plazo para disponer el acto final una vez emitido el informe final del\r\nórgano director, y otro el plazo para materializar la sanción firme dispuesta.\r\nEn este punto, el plazo ha de computarse desde la firmeza de ese acto, lo que\r\npuede originarse por la confirmación de la sanción luego del ejercicio y\r\nresolución de los recursos ordinarios que quepan contra el acto según\r\ncorresponda, o bien, si luego del plazo establecido por el ordenamiento\r\njurídico para formular esos recursos, no han sido planteados, en cuya\r\neventualidad, la firmeza administrativa se produce por la inercia del\r\ndestinatario de los efectos de la conducta. Cabe destacar que la comprensión de\r\nlas reglas de temporalidad del procedimiento ha de realizarse conforme a los\r\nprincipios generales que rigen el curso procedimental, como es el caso de la\r\neficiencia, eficacia y economía, impulso procesal, oficiosidad (arts. 222, 225\r\ny 227 LGAP), los que en el caso de la\r\n CCSS, pueden verse en los incisos 3, 4 y 21 del artículo 95\r\nde la Normativa\r\n Interna de Relaciones Laborales. \n\r\n\r\n\n V.-\r\nSobre la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria alegada. Como primer punto a\r\nanalizar ha de abordarse la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria que\r\nrefuta el actor. En cuanto a la primera fase de examen, sea, el plazo para\r\niniciar las acciones internas de disciplina, por un lado, la parte promovente\r\nno esgrime reproche alguno contra ese aspecto, limitándose a señalar que el\r\nfenecimiento del plazo mensual del artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo se\r\nprodujo en la fase de adopción final del acto. Con todo, la prescripción de la\r\npotestad para iniciar las acciones disciplinarias no ha sobrevenido en este\r\ncaso. En efecto, ciertamente los actos que dieron base al procedimiento administrativo\r\nhacen referencia a la vulneración de normas propias del régimen de control\r\ninterno, concretamente, en tópicos de compras públicas. Desde ese plano, la\r\nprescripción para disponer la apertura de la causa administrativa no se regula\r\npor el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo. En el traslado de cargos se anunció\r\nal destinatario de las normas jurídicas que se consideraban infraccionadas,\r\ndentro de las cuales se hace referencia a la supuesta contravención del\r\nprincipio de probidad en la función pública y en en el manejo adecuado y la\r\nsana administración de los recursos públicos. La definición del régimen legal\r\naplicable ha de considerar los hechos por los cuales se dio la apertura del\r\nprocedimiento administrativo, a fin de establecer si se trata de un cuadro fáctico\r\nque se relaciona con una relación funcionarial simple o bien, con conductas que\r\nse amparan al régimen de incompatibilidad. Acorde a lo expuesto en el traslado\r\nde cargos, los hechos imputados, se insiste, tienen relación con el deber de\r\nprobidad y el de administración de la hacienda pública. A la luz de esa\r\ncircunstancia, resulta notorio que las conductas reprochadas no se corresponden\r\na una responsabilidad disciplinaria simple, sino que la implicación y alcance\r\nde los comportamientos intimados se relacionan con presuntas infracciones al\r\ndeber de probidad y manejo de recursos públicos. Desde ese plano, ese tipo de\r\nfaltas presuntas se encuentran reguladas por la Ley No. 8422, tanto en lo\r\nque se refiere a causales y sanciones, pero además, en procedimientos,\r\nprincipios y prescripción. En efecto, si bien la potestad disciplinaria del\r\njerarca administrativo se encuentra sujeta a plazo prescriptivo, genéricamente\r\nregulado por el mandato 603 del Código de Trabajo, norma que fija un plazo de\r\nun mes para el ejercicio de esa potestad represiva, lo cierto del caso es que\r\ntratándose de conductas que se regulan y precisan por la Ley No. 8422, están\r\nafectas a éste régimen particular. Se trata de un sistema normativo que se\r\nconstituye como un ordenamiento sectorial que contiene reglas concretas, que en\r\ntanto especiales, prevalecen sobre la normativa general. Desde esa arista, el\r\nartículo 44 de la citada legislación, en cuanto al plazo de prescripción de la\r\nresponsabilidad administrativa del funcionario, se señala: \"La\r\nresponsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones\r\nprevistas en esta Ley, y en el ordenamiento relativo a la Hacienda Pública,\r\nprescribirá, según el artículo 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno y el artículo 71\r\nde la Ley Orgánica\r\nde la Contraloría\r\n General de la\r\n República, No. 7428, de 7 de setiembre de 1994.\" Por\r\nsu parte, el canon 43 de la\r\n Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292, remite al precepto\r\n71 de la Ley Orgánica\r\nde la Contraloría\r\n General de la\r\n República, No. 7428. Esta última norma señala en lo medular: \"La\r\nresponsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones\r\nprevistas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización\r\nsuperiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: a) En los casos\r\nen que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco\r\naños, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. b) En los casos en que el\r\nhecho irregular no sea notorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere\r\nuna indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible\r\nirregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir\r\nde la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se\r\nponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio\r\nal procedimiento respectivo. (...)\" En consecuencia, en conductas que\r\npuedan implicar infracción a las normas fijadas por la Ley No. 8422, en\r\nmenesteres de prescripción, la normativa aplicable es el ordinal 71 de la Ley No. 7428, por la\r\nremisión dispuesta por el mandato 44 de aquella fuente legal, ergo, un plazo de\r\ncinco años, y no el plazo mensual estatuido por el Código de Trabajo, se\r\ninsiste, al ser una normativa especial y posterior que prevalece sobre el\r\nrégimen general laboral. Ahora bien, dada esa dinámica, en la especie, ese\r\nplazo quinquenal no ha fenecido, por lo que en cuanto a ese aspecto, la\r\npotestad no se encuentra prescrita. \n\r\n\r\n\n VI.-\r\nSobre la prescripción del procedimiento. Por otra parte, se esgrime la\r\nprescripción del procedimiento por la dilación superior a un mes desde la\r\nculminación de la comparecencia oral y privada. El análisis de fondo de las\r\nargumentaciones del accionante, sobre este extremo, hacen entender que el\r\nalegato en cuestión parte de la tesis que la potestad correctiva del jerarca\r\nacorde al 603 del Código de Trabajo, aplica para los casos en que el órgano\r\ndirector ha concluido la audiencia oral y privada, o bien, ha rendido el\r\ninforme de conclusiones y eventuales recomendaciones. Tal tesis se respeta más\r\nen definitiva no se comparte por lo que de seguido se expresa. Como se ha\r\nseñalado, el plazo aludido opera para iniciar la causa disciplinaria (salvo los\r\ncasos de control interno o régimen contra la corrupción), para ejecutar la sanción\r\ndispuesta. Empero, en lo que atañe a la culminación del procedimiento, esa\r\nnorma no es aplicable, pues en esas fases opera la regla de temporalidad del\r\nnumeral 261 de la LGAP\r\ny lo señalado en el canon 319 ejusdem, ambos plazos, según se ha expuesto, de naturaleza\r\nordenatoria. Ello implica que un procedimiento que tarde más allá de dicho\r\nplazo, no lleva, en tesis de inicio a la nulidad del acto final dictado dentro\r\nde ese curso. Sin embargo, este Tribunal es del criterio que si bien el plazo\r\nde dos meses aludido es una orientación de eficiencia (deontológica), más no un\r\nreferente preclusivo de la competencia, es claro que ello no puede cohonestar\r\nprocedimientos excesiva e injustificadamente largos, con independencia de la\r\ncomplejidad o no que se invoque como pseudo justificante por parte de la Administración. Tal\r\ndinámica ha de abordarse en cada caso concreto, pues en determinados supuestos,\r\nla dilación de un procedimiento puede obedecer a la necesidad de incorporar\r\npruebas de compleja obtención, como sería el caso de pruebas que deban ser\r\ntraidas de registros ubicados en el extranjero y que por ende, se trate de\r\ndocumentos que deban ser nacionalizados mediante el trámite consular, entre\r\notros supuestos. O bien se da el caso de tácticas dilatorias del administrado\r\nmediante formulación de todo tipo de medidas recursivas o gestiones con fines\r\nde retraso del procedimiento, como sería la formulación de recursos de amparo,\r\nalegatos de incompetencia, gestiones de nulidad, reprogramaciones de\r\naudiencias, entre otras tácticas. Lo anterior sin perjuicio de la potestad de\r\nrechazo ad portas de esas gestiones abiertamente improcedentes o dilatorias que\r\nconsagra el canon 292.3 de la\r\n LGAP en relación al numeral 97.1 del Código Procesal Civil.\r\nEn tal supuesto, acceder a una supresión del acto final por el análisis de\r\ntemporalidad llevaría, a no dudarlo, a un abuso de derecho, pues en definitiva,\r\nse beneficiaría a quien ha pretendido dilatar intencionadamente la causa (arts.\r\n20-22 Código Civil). No sucede lo mismo con procedimientos en los cuales, pese\r\na que la misma Administración alegue extrema complejidad, su duración en\r\ntérminos integrales es desproporcionada y somete al administrado a una causa\r\ninterminable sin razón válida para ello. Sobre ese particular, este órgano colegiado\r\nes del criterio que el principio de justicia pronta y cumplida supone, para el\r\ncaso de los procedimientos administrativos, que deben ser resueltos, en tesis\r\nde principio, por acto final, dentro de plazos razonables y proporcionales,\r\nevitando someter al destinatario a procedimientos infundadamente largos y\r\ntediosos. Constituye por ende una expresión de la máxima de seguridad jurídica,\r\neficiencia administrativa e impulso procesal, en la medida en que exige la\r\ndefinición de la causa dentro del espacio temporal debido. A diferencia de lo\r\nque expone la CCSS,\r\nla complejidad o no del procedimiento no puede justificar procedimientos\r\narbitrariamente largos, pues ello supondría cohonestar una potestad\r\nincontrolable de la\r\n Administración para ejercitar, en cualquier tiempo y bajo su\r\npropio arbitrio, la potestad de resolver el conflicto, en mengua evidente de la\r\naludida certeza y en clara lesión del debido proceso. Se insiste, la\r\ncomplejidad es un elemento más a considerar en la variable objeto de\r\ncomentario, pero no es un aspecto que legitime, en cualquier hipótesis, plazos\r\nirrazonables. En esa línea, el numeral 261.1 de la Ley No. 6227 señala:\r\n\" El procedimiento administrativo deberá\r\nconcluirse, por acto final, dentro de los dos meses posteriores a su iniciación\r\no, en su caso, posteriores a la presentación de la demanda o petición del\r\nadministrado, salvo disposición en contrario de esta ley.\" Ese mismo\r\nplazo fija el canon 32 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Ambas\r\nnormas señalan, en lo medular, que vencidos los plazos señalados sin que la Administración\r\nemita acto final, el destinatario podrá tener por rechazada la petición,\r\nmediante silencio negativo, a fin de interponer los recursos administrativos o\r\nbien, acudir a la tutela jurisdiccional. Es claro que la figura del silencio\r\nnegativo en la actualidad ostenta una orientación garantista para el\r\ndestinatario y no un privilegio administrativo como anteriormente se manejaba.\r\nConstituye la posibilidad de entender por rechazado el reclamo para poder\r\nacudir a otras instancias y no encontrarse sujeto a que la Administración\r\nemita acto formal. Era precisamente la visión \"acto-céntrica\" de la\r\njusticia administrativa, evidenciada en el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía\r\nadministrativa que imperaba hasta la emisión del fallo 3669-2006 de la Sala Constitucional\r\ny el numeral 31.1 del CPCA, la que exigía la emisión de un acto formal para\r\nacceder a la tutela jurisdiccional, para lo cual, el rechazo tácito buscaba\r\nprecisamente acudir a escalas superiores para emitir esa conducta formal -debe\r\nrecordarse que el anterior modelo tenía una tendencia preeminentemente\r\nobjetiva-. Hoy en día, con la noción solo facultativa del agotamiento de la vía\r\nadministrativa, el silencio supone una garantía para el particular, que le\r\nposibilita acudir a otros medios jurídicos para buscar la tutela de su\r\nsituación jurídica, ya no como presupuesto para contar con un acto preleable,\r\nsino para suprimir la inercia administrativa en la definición de su relación\r\njurídica. No obstante, el análisis de esa figura supone que tal efecto\r\ndenegatorio solo es viable dentro de los procedimientos iniciados a gestión de\r\nparte, siendo que no se puede entender negado lo que no ha sido pedido, ergo,\r\nen las causas instauradas ex officio, no se encuentra presente el presupuesto\r\nde base, tal cual es la petición o reclamo. Así lo establece el inciso 3 del\r\ncitado precepto 261 en cuanto señala: \"...se entenderá rechazado\r\nel reclamo o petición del administrado en vista del silencio de la Administración...\"\r\nErgo, no es una figura que pueda tenerse por pragmática en procedimientos\r\nde oficio. Ahora, la lesión de los plazos fijados por el ordenamiento para el\r\nejercicio de una competencia, bien pueden llegar a incorporar una patología en\r\nel acto, por infracción al elemento subjetivo competencia. Debe recordarse que\r\na la luz del precepto 255 de la\r\n LGAP, los plazos legales vinculan tanto a la Administración como\r\nal \"particular\" (término este último que ha de entenderse como\r\n\"persona\" pues el destinatario de un procedimiento bien podría ser\r\nuna persona pública, privada, física o jurídica y no necesariamente un\r\nparticular, salvo que por tal se entienda el destinatario -sin que tal\r\naplicación pueda compartirse desde el plano conceptual, por considerarse\r\nlimitada-). De tal postulado se desprende entonces que las competencias sujetas\r\na plazo pueden desembocar en actos nulos (doctrina del numeral 60.1 LGAP). No\r\nobstante, la correcta comprensión de esa última afirmación debe llevar a lo\r\nsiguiente. Las potestades de imperio son imprescriptibles (art. 66.1 ibídem),\r\naspecto que justifica lo enunciado por el canon 329.3 de la citada Ley No. 6227\r\nen cuanto a que el acto dictado fuera de plazo será válido para todo efecto\r\nlegal, salvo mención expresa de ley. Constituye ejemplo claro de esas excepciones\r\nel silencio positivo (sea, acto presunto -art. 330 ejusdem en relación al\r\n139-), caso en el cual, correctamente declarado o acaecido, opera la máxima de\r\nintangibilidad de actos propios, lo que implica la imposibilidad de la Administración de\r\ndesconocer ese efecto, so pena de nulidad absoluta por infracción del precepto\r\n34 constitucional. En este ejemplo de silencio positivo, es precisamente por un\r\nfactor temporal que se pierde la competencia para emitir el acto, que no para\r\nbuscar las formas de supresión del acto presunto. Dicho esto vale aclarar, pese\r\na su redacción en lenguaje imperativo (propio de un método normativo\r\nprescriptivo), el plazo bimensual que fija el canon 261.2 de LGAP no es\r\nperentorio, sino solo ordenatorio, lo que se desprende de lo expuesto en cuanto\r\nal deber de la\r\n Administración de ejercitar sus competencias y la validez\r\ninicial de los actos \"extemporáneos\". Tal postura puede verse además\r\nen el fallo No. 34-F-S1-2011 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia. Esto aplica tanto para los procedimientos instaurados de oficio como\r\nlos de gestión de parte. En estos últimos, pese al ejercicio de la facultad de\r\nlos efectos del silencio negativo, bien puede la Administración\r\ndictar el acto, el cual, ampliaría el debate en sede recursiva, sea\r\nadministrativa o jurisdiccional. Desde este plano, la potestad instructora del\r\nprocedimiento ni el procedimiento en si, se encuentran fenecidos si el plazo en\r\ncuestión ha sido superado. Si bien la estructura del procedimiento ordinario\r\nharía presumir que el plazo de marras debe ser siempre respetado, es claro que\r\nla complejidad de un asunto y las vicisitudes propias del curso, lleven a\r\nplazos superiores. Lo determinante entonces estriba en que el procedimiento\r\nmuestre señales de actividad que sean necesarias y pertinentes y no dilaciones\r\ninjustificadas, acorde al principio de celeridad e impulso procesal -numerales\r\n222 y 225 LGAP-, de manera tal que su duración no sea producto de un proceder o\r\ninercia arbitraria. Tal inercia, según se verá luego, es sancionada con figuras\r\ncomo la caducidad -precepto 340 ibídem-, tema de seguido a analizar. \n\r\n\r\n\n VII.- Análisis concreto de los\r\naspectos temporales del procedimiento. No obstante lo expuesto, la\r\nnaturaleza ordenatoria del plazo aludido, no dice de la validez de actos\r\ndictados dentro de procedimientos cuya dilación superan el umbral normal de\r\nrazonabilidad. En efecto, una duración irrazonable del procedimiento puede\r\nllevar a la nulidad de lo actuado por la lesión al principio de justicia pronta\r\ny cumplida (que este Tribunal debe tutelar). En esta línea puede observarse lo\r\ndicho en los precedentes números 2007-3140 y 2007-6758, ambos del Tribunal\r\nConstitucional. En el primero, de manera contundente se señaló: \"Ahora\r\nbien, desde el momento en que inicia un procedimiento administrativo, hasta la\r\nemisión del acto final, debe mediar un plazo razonable y proporcionado, tomando\r\nen cuenta la actuación de las partes, la complejidad del asunto y los plazos\r\nlegales establecidos para cada caso, de tal forma, que la Administración\r\npueda contar con un plazo prudencial, pero sin incurrir en dilaciones indebidas\r\nque entraben el procedimiento… estima este Tribunal, que el tiempo utilizado\r\npor el recurrido desde el momento en que se inició el procedimiento, a la\r\nfecha, lejos de ser justificable resulta excesivo, irrazonable y en perjuicio\r\nde los derechos fundamentales del amparado, por el retardo injustificado en el\r\nque ha incurrido la administración recurrida.” Ese fallo es citado por la Sala Primera en la\r\nsentencia 34-2011 ya mencionada. En la especie, como se ha dicho, no todo procedimiento que\r\ntarde más de dos meses implica la nulidad de lo actuado, sino solo en la medida\r\nque el plazo sea irrazonable, lo que ha de ser ponderado en cada caso,\r\natendiendo a la tramitación y complejidad de lo actuado. En esta causa, del\r\nanálisis del cuadro fáctico expuesto en el elenco de hechos probados, se\r\nobserva que el procedimiento no ingresó en una fase de abandono siendo que se\r\nrealizaron múltiples citaciones para audiencias de evacuación de prueba\r\ntestimonial y cumplir con diversas fase de la audiencia oral y privada. No\r\nobstante, el análisis de lo acaecido lleva a este cuerpo colegiado a concluir\r\nsobre lo irrazonable e insostenible de los plazos en que ha incurrido la Administración en\r\neste caso, en claro y evidente detrimento del principio de eficiencia\r\nadministrativa y justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida. Del análisis de los\r\nautos se tiene que mediante resolución número DRSSCN-2994-2008\r\nde 21 de agosto de 2008, la\r\n Dirección de Gestión Regional y Red de Servicios de Salud\r\nCentral Norte de la\r\n Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, se dio inicio al\r\nprocedimiento administrativo expediente 006-08 mediante traslado de cargos, por\r\nla presunta infracción a las normas de control interno en el sistema de\r\ncontratación directa para la obtención de bienes y servicios en el Hospital San\r\nRafael de Alajuela. (Folios 2-99 del tomo I del legajo administrativo, folios\r\n240-336 del administrativo del procedimiento). Luego en oficio número\r\nHCLVV-AJ-405-2009, fechado 27 de julio de 2009, el Órgano Director del\r\nProcedimiento Administrativo resolvió la excepción de prescripción incoada por\r\nlos amparados, rechazando dicho pedimento. Como justificación de ese rechazo,\r\nla administración señaló que las actuaciones del Órgano Director siempre han\r\nestado ajustadas a Derecho. Señaló además, nunca ha estado el procedimiento sin\r\nla diligencia debida en plazos razonablemente lógicos. (Folio 2369 del\r\nadministrativo del procedimiento, folio 381 del tomo III según nueva foliatura\r\ndel expediente administrativo del procedimiento). Con posterioridad, mediante\r\noficio HCLVV-AGL-042-2010 de 28 de enero de 2010, el Director del Órgano\r\nDirector del Procedimiento remitió a la Directora Regional\r\nCentral Norte una aclaración con respecto a los errores materiales o\r\naritméticos de las certificaciones emitidas por el licenciado Pablo Andrés\r\nEsquivel Chaverri que los mismos consistían en que el documento de\r\ncertificación indicaba que certificaba una determinada cantidad de copias y del\r\nconteo de recibido del expediente se determinó que contenía cifras variables,\r\npor lo que esos expedientes no fueron recibidos del todo por parte del Órgano\r\nDirector, al considerar que contenían errores materiales y aritméticos; que se\r\nremitieron los expedientes administrativos a la Directora Regional\r\nCentral Norte para resolver recursos de apelación y nulidad absoluta planteada\r\npor los investigados (ver folios 3179 del administrativo del procedimiento). Con\r\nocasión de ese relato, el accionante, junto con otras personas, presentó un\r\nrecurso de amparo ante la Sala Constitucional, tramitado bajo el expediente\r\n10-001159-0007-CO, dentro del cual, mediante el fallo No. 2010-6364 de las 09\r\nhoras 36 minutos del 09 de abril del 2010, ese alto Tribunal refirió al rechazo\r\nde un recurso de amparo que los mismos amparados habían formulado con\r\nantelación contra ese mismo procedimiento 006-08, rechazo dictado mediante el\r\nvoto 2009-04298 del 17 de marzo del 2009. Sin embargo, precisó que las\r\ncondiciones ponderadas en aquel caso habían mutado sustancialmente\r\nrespecto de las consideradas en el nuevo recurso. En definitiva, en este último\r\ncaso, la Sala\r\n Constitucional señaló en lo relevante: \"... En este\r\ncaso, la Sala\r\nseñaló en el pronunciamiento del diecisiete de marzo de dos mil nueve que se\r\ntrataba de un procedimiento administrativo sumamente complejo, pues involucra\r\nvarios hechos y personas, razón por la cual descartó lesión al derecho de\r\njusticia pronta y cumplida. Pero ahora ha transcurrido más de un año de aquel\r\nfallo y el procedimiento sigue sin que se resuelva en forma definitiva, debido,\r\nsegún los recurridos a la complejidad del asunto. Esto justificaría un plazo de\r\naños para resolver definitivamente el procedimiento, en detrimento de los\r\nderechos de los involucrados, quienes estarían en una incertidumbre jurídica.\r\nSin más que, contabilizar el plazo desde el 21 de agosto de 2008, en que la Dirección de Gestión\r\nRegional y Red de Servicios de Salud Central Norte de la Caja Costarricense\r\nde Seguro Social inició traslado de cargos contra los amparados por haber\r\ninfringido normas de control interno en el sistema de contratación directa para\r\nla obtención de bienes y servicios en el Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, se\r\nacredita más de año en medio en un procedimiento administrativo, que si bien\r\ncomplejo, ha trasgredido todos los plazos de la Ley General de\r\nAdministración Pública, razón para estimar el recurso con las consecuencias de\r\nley.\" A partir de ello, la\r\n Sala concedió un plazo de quince días hábiles para\r\nculminar el procedimiento. Con todo, el acto que propone el despido del\r\nfuncionario accionante, sea, la resolución No. DRSSCN-2350-2010, fue emitido el\r\n21 de junio del 2010 (folios 1036-1144 del tomo II del expediente administrativo)\r\nLo expresado por el Tribunal Constitucional engarza con las consideraciones de\r\neste cuerpo colegiado en cuanto a la vulneración en este caso concreto de los\r\nplazos razonables que deben imperar en materia de procedimientos\r\nadministrativos disciplinarios. No se trata de la vulneración del plazo\r\nbimensual tantas veces mencionado (art. 261 LGAP), sino de la infracción a la\r\nmáxima de la justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida, que exige una duración\r\nrazonable y adecuada del procedimiento según su grado de complejidad. En la\r\nespecie, desde la emisión del acto inicial de traslado de cargos en fecha 21 de\r\nagosto del 2008 a\r\nla fecha de emisión del acto de sanción disciplinaria el 21 de junio del 2010,\r\ntranscurrió un aproximado de un año y 10 meses, plazo que se considera, por\r\nmucho, totalmente arbitrario e injustificado. Ciertamente el procedimiento en\r\ncuestión se direccionaba respecto de varios funcionarios; además, las probanzas\r\neran cuantiosas, por lo que en principio podría decirse que el procedimiento\r\nera complejo. Empero, debe indicarse que la apertura del procedimiento estaba\r\nantecedida de un informe de la Auditoria Interna de la CCSS, así como de una fase de\r\ninvestigación preliminar, por lo cual, el tema de recolección de la prueba era\r\nuna etapa ya adelantada. Sobre estas etapas puede verse la referencia que\r\nindica el informe final del órgano director que consta a folios 852 y\r\nsiguientes del tomo II del legajo administrativo. No obstante, no se observa,\r\npese a esos factores, como un plazo de 22 meses sea razonable para la\r\ntramitación de esa causa. Ese plazo es aun más amplio si se consideran las\r\nfases posteriores del procedimiento y que se establecen como garantía del\r\nfuncionario acorde a la\r\n Normativa Interna de la CCSS, en concreto, la remisión del asunto a la Comisión o Junta de\r\nRelaciones Laborales, según lo estatuye el ordinal 135 de esa normativa. \n\r\n\r\n\nEl análisis del expediente evidencia una compleja\r\nred de actuaciones, informes, ampliaciones de informes y solicitudes de\r\nampliación o corrección de documentos, aspecto que a modo de simple referencia,\r\npuede verse en el acto de sanción en su parte de resultandos (folios 1036-1047\r\ndel administrativo). Incluso, en ese acto se aborda el alegato de prescripción\r\nformulado por el demandante y se señala, en lo medular, que si bien la potestad\r\nde disciplinar las faltas de los funcionarios prescribe en un mes, ese plazo se\r\ncomputa desde el momento en que la instancia jerárquica pueda ejercer la\r\npotestad. Señala que en el caso concreto, el informe de conclusiones del órgano\r\ndirector se recibió en fecha 27 de abril del 2010, pero este informe carecía de\r\nelementos primordiales para que el órgano decisor pudiera resolver, por lo que\r\nse peticionó una ampliación, que en definitiva fue recibida el 25 de mayo del\r\n2010, por lo que no ocurrió la prescripción alegada. Ciertamente, ese plazo\r\nmensual aludido no feneció, sin embargo, lo que se analiza en este punto es la\r\ndilación exagerada del procedimiento. No comparte este Tribunal el alegato de\r\nque la complejidad del expediente justificó ese plazo. Véase que el grueso de\r\nla prueba estribaba en el informe de la inspección preliminar que dio base al\r\nprocedimiento. Las actas de las audiencias celebradas evidencian solo\r\nevacuaciones de deposiciones testimoniales o declaraciones de parte. Se\r\ninsiste, los 22 meses de tramitación de la causa disciplinaria (sin contar la\r\nremisión a la instancia de Relaciones Laborales), muestra un plazo irrazonable\r\nen la tramitación del procedimiento que la CCSS se limita a justificar por una extrema complejidad.\r\nNo obstante, ese solo decir no es suficiente y por el contrario, el análisis\r\ndel objeto del procedimiento, concretado a determinar si el funcionario\r\naccionante había incurrido en las acciones denunciadas por los informes\r\nAGL-216-R-2007 del 26 de abril del 2007 y AIN-322-R-2007 del 19 de septiembre\r\ndel 2007, ambos de la\r\n Auditoria Interna de la CCSS, así como la dinámica mostrada por el curso\r\nprocedimental, no justifican esa duración. En definitiva, tal aspecto vicia el\r\nprocedimiento por infracción a los principios de impulso procesal, celeridad,\r\nconcentración y justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida. Por ende, se\r\npresenta una deficiencia que da base a la invalidez de lo actuado. Lo contrario\r\nllevaría a cohonestar procedimientos con plazos irrazonables sin consecuencia\r\njurídica alguna, lo que desde luego, no tolera este Tribunal. Si bien el\r\nnumeral 329.3 de referencia previa, señala que el acto final recaído fuera de\r\nplazo, es válido, salvo excepciones de ley, es claro que ello no supone en modo\r\nalguno una suerte de carta abierta, permisiva incontrolable que justifique\r\nprocedimientos en extremo dilatados, con vulneración irrazonable de plazos en\r\nmengua del debido proceso, concentración, celeridad, unidad procedimental,\r\ncerteza jurídica, todos elementos constituyentes de la máxima de justicia\r\nadministrativa pronta y cumplida. Como se ha señalado, tal falencia muestra una\r\ndisconformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico (numerales 128, 158 y\r\n223, todos de LGAP) en cuanto al procedimiento llevado, desde el plano\r\nintegral. Tal aspecto exige, junto con equívocos que se presentan en la fase de\r\ntraslado de cargos y acto final, que adelante se tratan, la nulidad de lo\r\nactuado. En suma, por la dilación injustificada que se presenta en el\r\nprocedimiento bajo examen converge una causal de nulidad absoluta, insalvable\r\nque desemboca, sin más, en la supresión de ese procedimiento. Por demás, a la\r\nluz de lo dicho, carece de relevancia referirse al tema de la caducidad del\r\nprocedimiento. \n\r\n\r\n\n VIII.-\r\nSobre los defectos de motivación de la Resolución No.\r\nDRSSCN-2350-2010 de las 07 horas del 21 de junio del 2010. Sin perjuicio de lo\r\nseñalado arriba en cuanto a la vulneración de los elementos temporales del\r\nprocedimiento, de seguido se ingresa a ponderar la motivación tanto del acto de\r\ninicio como del acto final dictado de ese expediente 006-08. En el traslado de\r\ncargos, en lo que respecta al accionante Sánchez Lara, se le imputaron en lo\r\nfundamental deficiencias en los siguientes aspectos: a. Que durante los años\r\n2005 y 2006 en su condición de Jefe del Área de Recursos Materiales del\r\nHospital San Rafael de Alajuela, conoció, gestionó, aplicó y ejecutó la\r\nmodalidad de compra directa simplificada, sin cumplir con las etapas\r\nsustanciales y requerimientos de la\r\n Ley de Contratación Administrativa y su reglamento. En ese\r\nsentido se acompaña cuadro detalle de los expedientes de contratación, objeto\r\ncontractual y código, visibles de folio 49 al 52 del expediente administrativo\r\ny que resulta irrelevante consignar en este fallo; b. Que durante los\r\naños 2005 y 2006 en su condición de Jefe del Área de Recursos Materiales del\r\nHospital San Rafael de Alajuela, conoció, gestionó, aplicó y ejecutó la\r\nmodalidad de compra directa simplificada, que mostraron deficiencias en la actividad\r\ncontractual de compras directas, lo que provocó un ineficiente control interno\r\ny riesgo patrimonial para la\r\n Administración dado el incumplimiento técnico de sus\r\nfunciones; c. Que durante los años 2005 y 2006, no cumplió con los\r\nelementos básicos para la ejecución de la compra directa simplificada señalados\r\nen el oficio ARM-00700-2005 del 11 de octubre del 2005, en el que se detallaba\r\nlas acciones a seguir en los procedimientos de compras; ch. Que durante\r\nlos períodos 2005-2006 gestionó, aprobó y autorizó compras directas\r\nHRSA-CD-1782-2005, HSRA-CD-01-2006, HSRA-CD-84-2006, HSRA-CD-0420-2006 y\r\nHSRA-CD-0032-2006, en las que los solicitantes omitieron presentar la fórmula\r\ndenominada \"solicitud de adquisición directa a proveedores\r\nexclusivos\"; d. Que durante los períodos 2005-2006 gestionó, aprobó\r\ny autorizó las compras directas 1798-2005, 1743-2005, 0092-2006, 1748-2005,\r\n1701-2005, 170-2006 (todas HSRA-CD), en las que el oferente presentó junto con\r\nla cotización una carta de exclusividad, sin que se desprenda de ese documento\r\nla exclusividad; e. Que en la compra directa 2007CD-000366-2205 se\r\ninvita a 3 potenciales oferentes, pero dos de las empresas no ofrecen para la\r\nventa el bien requerido y la única empresa que ofrece el bien, según estudio de\r\nmercado, no es aceptable por sobre precio. Además se omite comunicar lo\r\nocurrido al Ministerio de Industria y Comercio. f. Que incumplió sus\r\nfunciones competentes a la gestión administrativa dentro del procedimiento de\r\ncompra directa 2007CD-00785-2205 por cuanto por el mismo objeto de la compra\r\n2007CD-366-2005 invita de nuevo a las 3 empresas indicadas; g. Que\r\ndurante los años 2005 y 2006 en su condición de Jefe del Área de Recursos\r\nMateriales del Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, gestionó, aprobó y autorizó\r\ncompras irregulares en la adquisición de productos alimenticios y otros, al\r\nmargen de la Ley\r\nde Contratación Administrativa. En ese sentido se acompaña cuadro detalle de\r\nlos expedientes de contratación, objeto contractual y código, visibles de folio\r\n54 al 57 del expediente administrativo y que resulta irrelevante consignar en\r\neste fallo; h. Que en el período 2005-2006 ejecutó la práctica de\r\nfraccionamiento o fragmentación ilícita en la promoción de compras aisladas; i.\r\nQue durante los años 2005 y 2006 en su condición de Jefe del Área de\r\nRecursos Materiales del Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, incumplió con sus\r\nfunciones de control, custodia y archivo de expedientes de contratación\r\nadministrativa en el caso concreto de las compras directas que en ese acto se\r\ncitan, y cuyo detalle va del folio 58 al 68 del expediente administrativo.\r\nLuego, ese traslado de cargos incorpora un aparte titulado \"III:\r\nFUNDAMENTO JURÍDICO\", en el que el órgano director se limita a citar un\r\nconjunto de normas jurídicas, en que según indica de manera expresa, encuentra\r\nfundamento el procedimiento, dentro de estas, artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General\r\nde la República,\r\nLGAP, Reglamento interior de Trabajo (arts. 46, 48, 50, 79), Código de Ética de\r\nlos Servidores de la CCSS\r\n(arts. 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16), Normativa de relaciones Laborales, Ley de\r\nContratación Administrativa y su reglamento, Ley General de Control Interno,\r\nReglamento de Normas y Procedimientos para la obtención de bienes y servicios\r\nen forma desconcentrada de la CCSS,\r\nModelo de Facultades y Niveles de Adjudicación por Instancia Administrativa de la CCSS, jurisprudencia de la Contraloría General\r\nde la República,\r\nLey de Archivos No. 7202, Código Procesal Civil. De seguido detalla la prueba\r\ndocumental que consta en el expediente, separa del cargo temporalmente a los\r\ninvestigados, y finalmente indica los derechos que considera pertinentes dentro\r\nde la causa. El análisis de ese traslado de cargos evidencia un patología\r\ninsalvable que es menester precisar. En efecto, el acto inicial de traslado de\r\ncargos deja de lado por completo, en lo que respecta al accionante, advertir\r\nsobre las posibles consecuencias jurídicas del trámite, es decir, omite señalar\r\nlas posibles sanciones o efectos que ese curso puede llegar a generar en la\r\nesfera jurídica del funcionarios, como consecuencia de las conductas y hechos\r\nque se le imputan. A juicio de este cuerpo colegiado, tal advertencia\r\nconstituye un derecho fundamental del investigado, pues de pleno inicio, la\r\ncalificación jurídica de esos hechos y sus consecuencias puede ser objeto de\r\ncuestionamiento, así como la impugnación de una eventual variación en la\r\ncalificación jurídica de las circunstancias objeto del procedimiento (por\r\nejemplo, que se advierta una suspensión sin goce de sueldo y luego se\r\nrecalifique y se despida). Se trata desde esta óptica, de un aspecto elemental\r\ndel traslado de cargos. A lo sumo, al inicio del acto se señala que el\r\nprocedimiento es para establecer la responsabilidad disciplinaria y\r\npatrimonial, pero no se explicita la posible sanción a aplicar. Esa forma de\r\nintimación no satisface los deberes ya apuntados y constituye por el contrario\r\nuna fórmula genérica, imprecisa, base fértil de confusiones e incertidumbre\r\nantagónicas con la seguridad que ha de imperar en estos casos. Si en el curso\r\ndel procedimiento se estima que la gravedad de los hechos puede motivar una\r\nsanción mas intensa, así debe advertirse al destinatario para que ejercite su\r\nderecho de contradictorio, mas resulta patológico simplemente advertir que se va\r\na sancionar, sin explicitar qué represión en particular es la posiblemente\r\naplicable. Tal exigencia no se satisface con la mención generalizada de normas\r\nsin referencia alguna a aspectos atinentes a como se han vulnerado en grado de\r\nprobabilidad y qué relación guardan con el objeto del procedimiento. No es un\r\naspecto que el investigado deba colegir o inferir, pues en estos casos se\r\nimpone la claridad de lo analizado, como derivación innegable del derecho de\r\ndefensa y contradictorio. En suma, consiste en una deficiencia sustancial \r\nque a la luz del ordinal 223 en relación al 166, ambos de la LGAP, supone la invalidez de\r\nese acto. \n\r\n\r\n\n IX.-\r\nSobre las deficiencias del\r\nacto final. Ahora bien, una vez sustanciado el procedimiento y realizadas las diversas\r\nfases de la audiencia oral y privada, según se ha indicado, mediante Resolución\r\nNo. DRSSCN-2350-2010 de las 07 horas del 21 de junio del 2010 de la Dirección Regional\r\nde Servicios de Salud Central Norte de la Caja Costarricense\r\nde Seguro Social, se impuso al señor Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara una sanción de\r\ndespido sin responsabilidad patronal. En esa particularidad, a partir del\r\nfolio 1071 del legajo administrativo (página 36 del citado acto), el Órgano\r\nDecisor reitera las conductas que en grado de probabilidad habían sido\r\nimputadas al accionante, en los mismos términos señalados en el aparte previo.\r\nDe seguido, se realiza una exposición de las circunstancia probadas y no\r\nprobadas de los diversos elementos analizados en lo que se refiere a las\r\nsituaciones investigadas en cuanto a las compras directas simplificadas (aparte\r\nA), compra directa 2007CD-366-2205 y 2007CD-785-2205 (aparte B), compras\r\nirregulares en productos alimenticios varios (aparte C), custodia, control y\r\narchivo de expedientes (aparte D) -ver folios 1075 al 1105 del legajo\r\nadministrativo-. Más adelante en el acto, se realiza una exposición de las\r\ncircunstancias que se tuvieron por acreditadas y las razones por las cuales la\r\ninstancia decisoria consideró que las actuaciones analizadas eran indebidas.\r\nSin embargo, como proyección de las deficiencias del traslado de cargos, el\r\nacto en cuestión, pasa de inmediato a considerar que la sanción aplicables es\r\nel despido sin responsabilidad patronal, sin establecer en ese caso concreto,\r\nel análisis relacional de las conductas ponderadas y las normas con fundamento\r\nen las cuales se sustentaría esa consecuencia jurídica. El acto se limita a\r\nseñalar que esas actuaciones detectadas son incumplimientos graves a las\r\nfunciones del actor y al régimen de la contratación administrativa y el control\r\ninterno, pero no precisa como es debido, las normas concretas infraccionadas,\r\nde suerte que se pueda realizar un análisis de relación motivo-contenido\r\ny de paso, de la motivación de esa decisión administrativa. Si bien en cuanto\r\nal establecimiento de los hechos probados se hace una relación concatenada de\r\nlos hallazgos relevantes en el procedimiento, de manera que se puedan entender\r\nmotivada esa parte del acto, aun cuando no se hace referencia explícita a las\r\npruebas concretas con fundamento en las cuales se llega a la conclusión fáctica\r\nen cada caso, no sucede lo mismo en cuanto a la motivación de las razones\r\njurídicas para imponer el despido como sanción máxima en menesteres de empleo\r\npúblico. El acto final proyecta la falencia detectada en el traslado de cargos,\r\npues así como este último omitió referirse a la calificación jurídica de los\r\nhechos imputados, en aquel, no se realiza una construcción lógica en cuanto al\r\nvínculo relacional causa-efecto, que permita establecer cómo esos hechos\r\ndeterminados, encajan dentro del presupuesto condicionante, de manera que pueda\r\nestablecerse la procedencia o no de esa consecuencia condicionada. El efecto\r\nque pretende imponer la conducta cuestionada, sea, el despido, que constituye\r\nla sanción máxima que puede imponerse en relaciones funcionariales, exige no\r\nsolo la exposición de hechos demostrados que darían base al elemento motivo de\r\nese acto, entendido como el presupuesto de hecho o derecho que exige o faculta\r\nla emisión de la voluntad pública (art. 133 LGAP), sino además, la indicación\r\ndiáfana de cómo esos hechos encajan dentro del presupuesto de hecho que fija\r\ndeterminada norma jurídica, de manera que pueda imponerse el resultado\r\nproyectado por esa disposición normativa. Desde ese plano,\r\nel elemento contenido del acto, considerado como el efecto\r\njurídico-material que el acto busca imponer (art. 132 LGAP), debe guardar una\r\nrelación de correspondencia y proporcionalidad con el elemento motivo (art.\r\n132.2 LGAP). Se trata de una simbiosis entre ambos elementos, que impregna de\r\nvalidez el acto, pues el contenido del acto se\r\nemite en función del motivo, y este a su vez\r\ncondiciona los alcances e implicaciones del\r\ncontenido. De ese modo, para el análisis de la legitimidad de ese binomio\r\nmaterial (motivo-contenido), es imperativo que el acto indique no solo el\r\npresupuesto fáctico detectado, sino además, la norma jurídica que ampara el\r\ncontenido adoptado. De no ser así, no será factible analizar si esas conductas\r\nmerecen el resultado aplicado. Ello es aun más determinante en el derecho\r\npunitivo administrativo sancionatorio, en el que, se impone una máxima de\r\ntaxatividad de las faltas y de las sanciones, conocida como principio de\r\ntipicidad, que encuentra base en los ordinales 39 y 41 de la Carta Magna, 11, 19 y\r\n124 de la LGAP. Solo\r\nante la formulación clara de tales exigencias, puede ponderarse si la sanción\r\naplicada es la de mérito en el caso concreto, o si bien, no resultaba atinente,\r\nsea por falta de tipicidad de la conducta reprochada, o por desproporción entre\r\nel motivo y el contenido. De nuevo, esa desatención se pone en entredicho desde\r\nel mismo acto inicial de traslado de cargos. Ahora, esto último constituye\r\npilar fundamental del elemento motivacional de la decisión pública (art. 136\r\nLGAP), que a la postre viene a constituirse en un eje fundamental del derecho\r\nde defensa, pues caso contrario, el destinatario del acto no podría cuestionar\r\nla aludida tipicidad o relación de correspondencia y/o proporción comentada. De\r\nesa manera, no se realiza un cotejo de los hechos versus el ordenamiento\r\njurídico que permita tener por debidamente motivado el citado acto. Si bien\r\nadelante se realiza una serie de citas de normas jurídicas, al igual que lo\r\nocurrido en el traslado de cargos, la Administración se limitó a citar de manera\r\nabstracta un conjunto de disposiciones legales y reglamentarias, en algunos\r\ncasos citando artículos concretos, y en otros (una cantidad considerable),\r\nsimplemente a citar el nombre de la fuente formal. Nótese que incluso se alude a\r\nla jurisprudencia de la\r\n Contraloría General de la República, sin referir a\r\nun solo precedente de esa instancia administrativa que se relacione con\r\nel objeto de la causa disciplinaria. Lo mismo ocurre con la Ley 7494, la Ley de Control Interno, y en\r\ngeneral, con las fuentes citadas en los apartes G al P del ítem de\r\nfundamento legal. De nuevo, ello introduce una incorrección seria en el acto,\r\npues no puede entenderse como debidamente motivado un acto que en cuanto a la\r\ncalificación jurídica de las conductas, como presupuesto de base de la sanción\r\nadoptada, se limita a señalar de manera genérica un conjunto de normas, sin\r\nprecisar en qué forma se han visto vulneradas y sin ingresar a ponderar que\r\nnormas concretas se han infraccionado y las razones por las cuales, aplica\r\ndeterminado precepto para justificar la sanción impuesta. Se insiste, no cabe\r\nen este punto proponer una suerte de deber del funcionario de inferir que esa\r\nsanción le resultaría aplicable, cuando desde el inicio del procedimiento, ese\r\nresultado no fue intimado (ni advertido), ni el acto justifica, con la\r\ncontundencia debida (y necesaria), las razones jurídicas específicas que\r\npermiten, desde el plano de razonabilidad de la conducta, en el caso concreto,\r\nsemejante consecuencia jurídica. De nuevo, se trata de una informalidad\r\nsustancial que se presenta en el curso del procedimiento administrativo y\r\nconcretamente, una ausencia sustancial de uno de los elementos del acto\r\nadministrativo, que al amparo del canon 166 de la citada Ley No. 6227/78, lleva,\r\nsin más remedio, a la nulidad de esas actuaciones. Lo anteriormente expuesto\r\nlleva a lo innecesario de abordar los demás agravios presentados por el\r\naccionante, pues al haberse determinado ya la nulidad de los actos cuestionados\r\npor las razones procesales y de fondo aludidas, a nada llevaría, por sobre\r\nabundante, ponderar los demás alegatos relacionados con supuestas deficiencias\r\nen las probanzas de la causa administrativa, composición del órgano director y\r\ndemás cuestiones presentadas en la demanda. Ante ello, en el aparte de hechos\r\nprobados no se han incorporado situaciones o antecedentes que si bien se\r\nrelacionan a los demás vicios alegados en la demanda, carecen de relevancia por\r\nser innecesario ingresar a ponderar su pertinencia en virtud de lo resuelto. \r\nEn suma, por las razones pre citadas, debe disponer la nulidad del acto inicial\r\nde traslado de cargos, resolución DRSSCN-2994-2008 de las 07 horas del 21 de\r\nagosto del 2008, así como del acto final, resolución DRSSCN-2350-2010 de las 07\r\nhoras del 21 de junio del 2010. De igual modo, para los efectos del ordinal\r\n164.2 de la LGAP,\r\nla nulidad del traslado de cargos supone la invalidez de las conductas\r\nposteriores del procedimiento que dependan de aquel. \n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nX.- Sinopsis de las nulidades decretadas. En suma, debe disponerse la\r\nnulidad del procedimiento disciplinario y las conductas que adelante se\r\ndetallan, por evidenciarse diversas patologías que llevan a una invalidez\r\ninsalvable, de grado absoluto que ha de ser declarada en esta sede, en concreto:\r\na) Procedimiento administrativo 006-08 instaurado contra el señor Juan\r\nCarlos Sánchez Lara: por la dilación injustificada, irrazonable y\r\ndesproporcionada del procedimiento administrativo en perjuicio del principio de\r\nconcentración, inmediación, impulso procesal, debido proceso y justicia\r\nadministrativa pronta y cumplida, b) Resolución DRSSCN-2994-2008 de las 07\r\nhoras del 21 de agosto del 2008, de la Dirección Regional\r\nde Servicios de Salud Central Norte de la Caja Costarricense\r\nde Seguro Social, que constituye el Traslado de cargos inicial del\r\nprocedimiento administrativo disciplinario expediente 006-08, en lo que se\r\nrefiere al accionante Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara; c) De conformidad con el\r\nnumeral 164.2 y 163.2 de la\r\n Ley General de la Administración Pública,\r\nse dispone la nulidad de los demás actos del procedimiento administrativo\r\nexpediente 006-08, que dependan o tengan como antecedente justificante el\r\ntraslado inicial de cargos, en lo que se refiere al actor; d) Resolución\r\nNo. DRSSCN-2350-2010 de las 07 horas del 21 de junio del 2010 de la Dirección Regional\r\nde Servicios de Salud Central Norte de la Caja Costarricense\r\nde Seguro Social, en cuanto impone al señor Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara una\r\nsanción de despido sin responsabilidad patronal.”",
  "body_en_text": "**III.- General information on the administrative procedure.** In the present proceeding, the plaintiff challenges the validity of the act ordering his dismissal without employer liability, alleging a series of defects within the administrative procedure (file 006-08) initiated against him. Such allegations make it necessary to set forth some brief considerations regarding the dynamics of this type of process. The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its conduct. On the other, it is imposed as a frame of reference that allows the administered party to establish a comparison of public conduct, in order to set a control to ensure that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the rules that guide that conduct. It therefore seeks to become a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the proper functioning of the public function. As indicated by canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its object is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as grounds for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Hence, canon 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure in strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure seeks to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial principle, in order to arrive at establishing the aforementioned real truth of the facts (among which can be seen those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law). This acquires even greater relevance in the so-called control or sanctioning procedures, given that in such cases, the final decision can impose a repressive framework on a person's legal sphere. The same normative plexus provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid the procedure that does not satisfy these minimum requirements. This emerges from mandate 223 of the reference Law, insofar as it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the procedure. From this standpoint, this Tribunal has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred upon this jurisdiction by canon 49 of the Magna Carta, involves a comparison to ensure that the Administration, in the course of those procedures (of a sanctioning nature for this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, at its core, the due process that must be insurmountable in that proceeding has been protected. Now, by virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions proper to the directing body (órgano director) and the deciding body (órgano decisor) of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the deciding body, that is, to whom the legal competence to issue the act that causes status has been granted. However, for the sake of administrative efficiency, the instructional competencies are delegable to a body charged with carrying out the instruction (instrucción) of the procedure, which has tended to be called the \"directing or instructing body\". It is evident that the designation of the latter corresponds to the deciding body, for which its validity is subject to being vested in an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated that persons who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure; however, in that specific function, it must be understood that they perform a public function, with the inherent obligations. As for its competencies, the instructing body represents the Administration in the procedure and holds an instructional role. It is responsible for issuing a factual analysis. While it can render recommendations, they certainly would not be binding, meaning its determinations regarding the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts. Therefore, it is responsible for issuing the opening act, giving procedural impetus, all the instructional work of the procedure, directing the hearing, resolving preliminary issues, resolving the appeal for reversal filed against procedural acts, rendering a report to the deciding body at the time of forwarding the file for the issuance of the final act. Among its competencies can be seen Articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the reference General Law. For its part, the deciding body is the competent hierarchical superior who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act that resolves the procedure.\n\n**IV.- On the statute of limitations for disciplinary power.** The first argument on grounds of order presented by the plaintiff refers to the alleged statute of limitations for the hierarchical corrective power due to the expiration of the monthly period established by canon 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and the violation of the periods established by the LGAP. In this sense, he states that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) so declared in ruling 10-6364. He notes that the case has been elevated to the knowledge of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) for more than a year without a pronouncement, and therefore the sanction is time-barred. Regarding this point, the following must be indicated. The validity analysis of the challenged resolution has as its fundamental point to determine the statute of limitations regime applicable to the disciplinary administrative procedure initiated against the plaintiff. The substance of the summarized arguments requires entering to analyze various questions of the temporal element that affects the exercise of the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria), as well as the administrative procedure. Regarding this point, the following must be indicated. In employment relationships, the exercise of the hierarchical superior's corrective power against officials who have committed sanctionable offenses is subject to a temporality factor, after which such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be seen, varies depending on the subject matter regulated and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, that disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of ordinal 102 of the LGAP) is not unrestricted over time. Unlike other public powers that for finalistic aspects are considered imprescriptible (art. 66 LGAP), those referring to internal sanctioning exercise—such as that examined in this case—are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which, it may expire due to the passage of time established by the legal system without being realized. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarchical superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly established by the applicable regulations, upon the expiration of which, his power to require recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. Now, for the purposes of the present case, it is necessary to discriminate among various scenarios that occur in this type of disciplinary procedure, in all of which rules of temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, but with diverse nuances. It involves the necessary establishment, for purposes of clarity, of demarcation criteria that allow the addressing of the discussed topics, according to the scenario in question. Along these lines, the temporal course of various stages must be distinguished: 1) Statute of limitations for the exercise of disciplinary power: refers to the period established by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures of the case that allow issuing the final decision. At this level, it concerns the maximum period imposed by the legal system for the administrative hierarchical superior to order the opening of the corresponding procedure, directed at establishing the pertinence or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure that seeks the establishment of the facts (real truth) that serve as the basis for the grounds of the act generates an interrupting effect on that temporal margin, to the extent that it consists of an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power. It could not be considered that the cited period for the exercise of the power is interrupted by the issuance of the final act because, as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative case, it is insisted, to establish whether the sanction corresponds, as a derivation of what is established in ordinals 214, 221, 297, 308 of the LGAP. In this analyzed hypothesis, the disciplinary power of the administrative hierarchical superior is subject to a prescriptive period (whose treatment in practice is actually very close to the figure of expiration (caducidad), to the extent that in certain scenarios it is customary to declare that aspect ex officio), generically regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code, a rule that establishes a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power, which, it is insisted, is interrupted by the communication of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos). The foregoing is without prejudice to offenses that are regulated by the special regime specified by the internal control, probity in public function, and public treasury management regime, in which, according to what is regulated by the General Law on Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), No. 8292 (art. 43), Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Function (Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública), No. 8422 (art. 44) and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, a special five-year period operates (according to the scenarios and from the moments those rules provide), and not the monthly period established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general regime of the public function. Now, the starting point for the computation of that prescriptive period is decisive. On this point, numeral 603 of the Labor Code indicates that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility of knowing the offense and therefore, undertaking the exercise of his power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require a prior stage of preliminary investigation, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are brought to the hierarchical superior's knowledge. Nonetheless, the necessity or not of that phase must be discriminated in each case, as otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or to gather evidence tending to clarify its necessity or not. In the specific case of procedures initiated by the CCSS, the Internal Labor Relations Regulations (Normativa Interna de Relaciones Laborales), approved by the Board of Directors of the CCSS, in session No. 8474, article 5 of October 21, 2010, establishes in ordinal 146 the rules for the statute of limitations for the exercise of the cited power, indicating that in disciplinary matters, the cited ordinal 603 of the Labor Code applies, computed from when the deciding body has sufficient objective elements to determine whether or not to initiate the administrative procedure, except for cases of liability for patrimonial damage, regulated by mandate 198 of Law No. 6227/78, as well as the protective regime of public treasury already commented on. Canon 116 of that Internal Regulations must also be seen in this regard. 2) Statute of limitations for the power to adopt the sanction within the procedure: Refers to the maximum time that the administrative procedure initiated to establish the facts allowing the adoption of the final decision by the holder of the public repressive power can last. This topic, except for a special rule, is regulated by ordinal 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of Law No. 6227. However, that bi-monthly period provided therein is a period of a regulatory nature, not peremptory, which of course does not include or permit procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to harm to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. In this sense, ruling No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, issued at 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011, may be seen. On this point, reference must also be made to what is established by precept 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the institute of expiration of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento), in cases where the instructing Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or exceeding six months for reasons attributable to it. In this scenario, expiration applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, because the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited canon 340, regarding the impossibility of expiration when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure was initiated at the request of a party, given that the next stage only pertains to the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inertia. This does not occur when it has been processed ex officio, because in that case, the delay does benefit the administered party, to the extent that it would be a delay solely attributable to the public office. The application of this rule is also foreseen in precept 147 of that Labor Relations Regulations. It should be noted, within the course of the procedure, once the oral and private hearing is concluded, numeral 319 of the LGAP establishes a period of 15 days computed from the date of the hearing for the issuance of the final act. This is a special period for the culmination of the procedure. However, again, this is a regulatory period, intended to guide the efficiency of the procedure, but whose violation does not entail, per se, in all cases, the invalidity of what has been acted upon, except in cases where that delay was arbitrary and unjustified, an aspect that will be addressed later. However, it should be noted that once the hierarchical superior holding the disciplinary power has the objective possibility of exercising it through the eventual adoption of the internal corrective act, the monthly statute of limitations of the aforementioned numeral 603 of the Labor Code operates. This means, in most cases, that once the file is received from the Directing Body of the procedure, which includes the submission of the conclusions and recommendations report, the hierarchical superior is enabled to decide whether to impose the sanction that has been recommended to him by that instructing instance or to opt for a different decision (see art. 302 LGAP), such that said power must be exercised within the one-month period just indicated. The opposite would lead to disregarding the prescription rules that that rule (art. 603 of the Labor Code) establishes, to the detriment of the official's rights. 3) Statute of limitations for the power to execute the imposed sanction: Refers to the period available to the administrative hierarchical superior to order the application of the dictated sanction. It therefore consists of the material execution of the act that provides as its content a disciplinary sanction. In this case, through analogical integration, the applicable period, except for a special rule, would be the one-month period foreseen in numeral 603 of the Labor Code. The denial of such a period would imply the perpetual possibility of the hierarchical superior to apply the sanction previously ordered, under the allegation of a sort of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, one thing is the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body has been issued, and another is the period to materialize the firm sanction ordered. On this point, the period must be computed from the finality of that act, which can originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary remedies available against the act as applicable, or, if after the period established by the legal system to file those remedies, they have not been raised, in which case, administrative finality occurs due to the inertia of the recipient of the effects of the conduct. It should be noted that the understanding of the temporality rules of the procedure must be carried out in accordance with the general principles governing the procedural course, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and economy, procedural impetus, ex officio action (arts. 222, 225 and 227 LGAP), which, in the case of the CCSS, can be seen in subsections 3, 4 and 21 of article 95 of the Internal Labor Relations Regulations.\n\n**V.- On the alleged statute of limitations for disciplinary power.** As the first point to analyze, the statute of limitations for the disciplinary power that the plaintiff refutes must be addressed. Regarding the first phase of examination, that is, the period to initiate internal disciplinary actions, on one hand, the promoting party does not raise any reproach against that aspect, limiting himself to pointing out that the expiration of the monthly period of Article 603 of the Labor Code occurred in the final adoption phase of the act. In any case, the statute of limitations for the power to initiate disciplinary actions has not supervened in this case. Indeed, the acts that gave basis to the administrative procedure refer to the violation of rules proper to the internal control regime, specifically, on topics of public procurement. From that standpoint, the statute of limitations to order the opening of the administrative case is not regulated by numeral 603 of the Labor Code. In the statement of charges, the recipient was informed of the legal rules that were considered violated, among which reference is made to the alleged contravention of the principle of probity in public function and in the proper management and sound administration of public resources. The definition of the applicable legal regime must consider the facts for which the opening of the administrative procedure occurred, in order to establish whether it is a factual situation related to a simple employment relationship or to conduct covered by the incompatibility regime. According to what was stated in the statement of charges, the facts attributed, it is insisted, are related to the duty of probity and the administration of public treasury. In light of that circumstance, it is notorious that the reproached conduct does not correspond to a simple disciplinary responsibility, but rather the implication and scope of the charged behaviors are related to alleged infractions of the duty of probity and handling of public resources. From that standpoint, that type of alleged offense is regulated by Law No. 8422, both in terms of grounds and sanctions, but also in procedures, principles, and statute of limitations. Indeed, while the disciplinary power of the administrative hierarchical superior is subject to a prescriptive period, generically regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code, a rule that establishes a one-month period for the exercise of that repressive power, the truth of the matter is that concerning conduct regulated and specified by Law No. 8422, it is subject to this particular regime. It is a normative system that constitutes a sectoral ordinance containing specific rules, which, as special rules, prevail over the general regulations. From that angle, Article 44 of the cited legislation, regarding the statute of limitations period for the administrative liability of the official, states: \"The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions foreseen in this Law, and in the ordinance relating to the Public Treasury, shall prescribe, according to Article 43 of the General Law on Internal Control and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994.\" For its part, canon 43 of the General Law on Internal Control, No. 8292, refers to precept 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428. This latter rule states at its core: \"The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions foreseen in this Law and in the superior control and oversight ordinance, shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious – understood as that fact which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity – the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the knowledge of the hierarchical superior or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. (...)\" Consequently, in conduct that may imply an infraction of the rules established by Law No. 8422, in matters of statute of limitations, the applicable regulation is ordinal 71 of Law No. 7428, by the remission ordered by mandate 44 of that legal source, ergo, a five-year period, and not the monthly period established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime. Now, given that dynamic, in the present case, that five-year period has not expired, so regarding that aspect, the power is not time-barred.\n\n**VI.- On the statute of limitations of the procedure.** On the other hand, the statute of limitations of the procedure is argued due to the delay exceeding one month from the culmination of the oral and private hearing. The substantive analysis of the plaintiff's arguments on this point leads to understanding that the allegation in question starts from the thesis that the corrective power of the hierarchical superior, according to 603 of the Labor Code, applies in cases where the directing body has concluded the oral and private hearing, or has rendered the conclusions and eventual recommendations report. Such a thesis is respected, but ultimately it is not shared, for what is stated below. As has been pointed out, the aforementioned period operates to initiate the disciplinary case (except for cases of internal control or anti-corruption regime), to execute the ordered sanction. However, regarding the culmination of the procedure, that rule is not applicable, because in those phases the temporality rule of numeral 261 of the LGAP and what is indicated in canon 319 ejusdem operate, both periods, as has been stated, of a regulatory nature. This implies that a procedure that takes longer than said period does not lead, as a starting thesis, to the nullity of the final act issued within that course. However, this Tribunal is of the opinion that while the aforementioned two-month period is an orientation of efficiency (deontological), and not a preclusive reference for competence, it is clear that this cannot condone excessively and unjustifiably long procedures, regardless of the complexity or not invoked as a pseudo justification by the Administration. Such a dynamic must be addressed in each specific case, because in certain scenarios, the delay of a procedure may be due to the need to incorporate evidence of complex obtention, as would be the case of evidence that must be brought from registries located abroad and therefore, involves documents that must be nationalized through consular proceedings, among other scenarios. Or the case of dilatory tactics by the administered party through the filing of all types of remedial measures or proceedings for the purpose of delaying the procedure, such as the filing of amparo remedies, allegations of incompetence, nullity proceedings, rescheduling of hearings, among other tactics. The foregoing is without prejudice to the power of rejection at the threshold of these clearly improper or dilatory proceedings, enshrined in canon 292.3 of the LGAP in relation to numeral 97.1 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). In such a scenario, acceding to a suppression of the final act based on a temporality analysis would undoubtedly lead to an abuse of right, because ultimately, it would benefit whoever has intended to intentionally delay the case (arts. 20-22 Civil Code (Código Civil)). The same does not happen with procedures in which, despite the Administration itself alleging extreme complexity, its duration in integral terms is disproportionate and subjects the administered party to an interminable cause without valid reason for it. On this point, this collegiate body is of the opinion that the principle of prompt and complete justice implies, in the case of administrative procedures, that they must be resolved, as a matter of principle, by a final act, within reasonable and proportional periods, avoiding subjecting the recipient to unjustifiably long and tedious procedures. It therefore constitutes an expression of the maxim of legal certainty, administrative efficiency, and procedural impetus, to the extent that it requires the definition of the case within the proper temporal space. Unlike what the CCSS states, the complexity or not of the procedure cannot justify arbitrarily long procedures, as that would imply condoning an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and at its own discretion, the power to resolve the conflict, to the evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear harm to due process. It is insisted, complexity is one more element to consider in the variable under comment, but it is not an aspect that legitimizes, in any hypothesis, unreasonable periods. Along these lines, numeral 261.1 of Law No. 6227 states: \"The administrative procedure must be concluded, by final act, within the two months following its initiation or, as the case may be, following the presentation of the demand or petition of the administered party, unless otherwise provided in this law.\" That same period is established by canon 32 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Both rules indicate, at their core, that once the indicated periods have elapsed without the Administration issuing a final act, the recipient may consider the petition rejected by negative silence, in order to file the administrative remedies or to resort to judicial protection.\n\nIt is clear that the figure of negative silence (silencio negativo) currently holds a guarantee-oriented approach for the recipient and not an administrative privilege as was previously handled. It constitutes the possibility of deeming the claim rejected in order to be able to resort to other instances and not be subject to the Administration issuing a formal act. It was precisely the \"act-centric\" vision of administrative justice, evidenced in the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies that prevailed until the issuance of ruling 3669-2006 of the Sala Constitucional and numeral 31.1 of the CPCA, that required the issuance of a formal act to access jurisdictional protection, for which purpose the tacit rejection sought precisely to go to higher levels to issue that formal conduct—it must be remembered that the previous model had a preeminently objective tendency. Nowadays, with the merely optional notion of exhausting administrative remedies, silence constitutes a guarantee for the individual, which enables them to resort to other legal means to seek protection of their legal situation, no longer as a prerequisite to have a preexisting act, but to suppress administrative inertia in the definition of their legal relationship. However, the analysis of that figure assumes that such denial effect is only viable within proceedings initiated at the request of a party, given that what has not been requested cannot be deemed denied, ergo, in causes initiated ex officio, the basic prerequisite is not present, which is the petition or claim. This is established by subsection 3 of the cited precept 261 as it states: \"...the claim or petition of the administered party shall be deemed rejected in view of the Administration's silence...\" Ergo, it is not a figure that can be considered pragmatic in ex officio proceedings. Now, the violation of the deadlines set by the legal system for the exercise of a competence may well incorporate a pathology in the act, due to infringement of the subjective element of competence. It must be remembered that in light of precept 255 of the LGAP, legal deadlines bind both the Administration and the \"private individual\" (this last term must be understood as \"person\" since the recipient of a proceeding could well be a public person, a private person, an individual or a legal entity and not necessarily a private individual, unless the recipient is understood as such—without such application being shared from a conceptual standpoint, as it is considered limited). From that postulate, it follows then that time-limited competences can result in null acts (doctrine of numeral 60.1 LGAP). However, the correct understanding of that last assertion must lead to the following. Imperium powers are imprescriptible (art. 66.1 ibidem), an aspect that justifies what is stated by canon 329.3 of the cited Law No. 6227 in that the act issued outside the deadline shall be valid for all legal effects, unless expressly stated otherwise by law. A clear example of those exceptions is positive silence (that is, a presumed act—art. 330 ejusdem in relation to 139-), in which case, correctly declared or occurred, the maxim of intangibility of one's own acts operates, which implies the impossibility of the Administration to disregard that effect, under penalty of absolute nullity for infringement of constitutional precept 34. In this example of positive silence, it is precisely due to a time factor that the competence to issue the act is lost, not the competence to seek forms of suppression of the presumed act. This being said, it is worth clarifying, despite its drafting in imperative language (proper to a prescriptive normative method), the two-month deadline set by canon 261.2 of the LGAP is not peremptory, but merely directory, which follows from the foregoing regarding the duty of the Administration to exercise its competences and the initial validity of \"extemporaneous\" acts. Such position can also be seen in ruling No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. This applies both to proceedings initiated ex officio and those at the request of a party. In the latter, despite the exercise of the power of the effects of negative silence, the Administration may well issue the act, which would broaden the debate in the appeal venue, whether administrative or jurisdictional. From this standpoint, the investigative power of the proceeding nor the proceeding itself are expired if the deadline in question has been exceeded. Although the structure of the ordinary proceeding would lead one to presume that said deadline must always be respected, it is clear that the complexity of a matter and the vicissitudes inherent in the course lead to longer deadlines. The determining factor then lies in the proceeding showing signs of activity that are necessary and pertinent and not unjustified delays, according to the principle of celerity and procedural impetus—numerals 222 and 225 LGAP—such that its duration is not the product of arbitrary conduct or inertia. Such inertia, as will be seen later, is sanctioned with figures such as lapsing (caducidad)—precept 340 ibidem—a topic to be analyzed next.\n\nVII.- Specific analysis of the temporal aspects of the proceeding. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the directory nature of the aforementioned deadline does not speak to the validity of acts issued within proceedings whose delay exceeds the normal threshold of reasonableness. Indeed, an unreasonable duration of the proceeding can lead to the nullity of what has been done due to the harm to the principle of prompt and complete justice (which this Court must protect). In this vein, one can observe what was stated in precedents numbers 2007-3140 and 2007-6758, both from the Tribunal Constitucional. In the first, it was forcefully stated: \"That being said, from the moment an administrative proceeding begins until the issuance of the final act, a reasonable and proportionate period must elapse, taking into account the actions of the parties, the complexity of the matter, and the legal deadlines established for each case, in such a way that the Administration may have a prudential period, but without incurring undue delays that hinder the proceeding… this Court deems that the time used by the respondent from the moment the proceeding began to date, far from being justifiable, is excessive, unreasonable, and to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the protected party, due to the unjustified delay incurred by the respondent administration.\" That ruling is cited by the Sala Primera in judgment 34-2011 already mentioned. In the present case, as has been stated, not every proceeding that takes more than two months implies the nullity of what has been done, but only to the extent that the deadline is unreasonable, which must be weighed in each case, considering the processing and complexity of what has been done. In this cause, from the analysis of the factual framework set forth in the list of proven facts, it is observed that the proceeding did not enter a phase of abandonment given that multiple summonses were made for hearings for the taking of testimonial evidence and to comply with various phases of the oral and private hearing. However, the analysis of what occurred leads this collegiate body to conclude on the unreasonableness and unsustainability of the deadlines incurred by the Administration in this case, in clear and evident detriment to the principle of administrative efficiency and prompt and complete administrative justice. From the analysis of the orders (autos), it is observed that through resolution number DRSSCN-2994-2008 of August 21, 2008, the Dirección de Gestión Regional y Red de Servicios de Salud Central Norte of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, initiated administrative proceeding file 006-08 through a statement of charges (traslado de cargos), for the alleged infringement of internal control regulations in the direct contracting system for the procurement of goods and services at the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela. (Folios 2-99 of volume I of the administrative file, folios 240-336 of the administrative file of the proceeding). Then, in official letter number HCLVV-AJ-405-2009, dated July 27, 2009, the Directing Body of the Administrative Proceeding resolved the statute of limitations exception raised by the protected parties, rejecting said petition. As justification for that rejection, the administration stated that the actions of the Directing Body have always been in accordance with the law. It also stated that the proceeding has never lacked due diligence within reasonably logical periods. (Folio 2369 of the administrative file of the proceeding, folio 381 of volume III according to new foliation of the administrative file of the proceeding). Subsequently, through official letter HCLVV-AGL-042-2010 of January 28, 2010, the Director of the Directing Body of the Proceeding sent to the Directora Regional Central Norte a clarification regarding material or arithmetic errors in the certifications issued by licenciado Pablo Andrés Esquivel Chaverri, which consisted in the fact that the certification document indicated that it certified a certain number of copies and from the count of the file's receipt it was determined that it contained variable figures, for which reason those files were not entirely received by the Directing Body, considering that they contained material and arithmetic errors; that the administrative files were sent to the Directora Regional Central Norte to resolve appeals and absolute nullity raised by the investigated parties (see folios 3179 of the administrative file of the proceeding). On the occasion of that account, the claimant, along with other persons, filed an amparo appeal before the Sala Constitucional, processed under file 10-001159-0007-CO, within which, through ruling No. 2010-6364 of 09 hours 36 minutes of April 9, 2010, that high Court referred to the rejection of an amparo appeal that the same protected parties had previously filed against that same proceeding 006-08, rejection issued through vote 2009-04298 of March 17, 2009. However, it specified that the conditions weighed in that case had substantially changed with respect to those considered in the new appeal. Ultimately, in this last case, the Sala Constitucional stated in the relevant part: \"... In this case, the Sala stated in the pronouncement of March 17, 2009, that it was an extremely complex administrative proceeding, as it involves several facts and persons, which is why it dismissed harm to the right to prompt and complete justice. But now more than a year has elapsed since that ruling and the proceeding continues without being definitively resolved, due, according to the respondents, to the complexity of the matter. This would justify a period of years to definitively resolve the proceeding, to the detriment of the rights of those involved, who would be in a state of legal uncertainty. Without further ado, counting the period from August 21, 2008, when the Dirección de Gestión Regional y Red de Servicios de Salud Central Norte of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social initiated a statement of charges against the protected parties for having infringed internal control regulations in the direct contracting system for the procurement of goods and services at the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, more than a year and a half is credited in an administrative proceeding that, although complex, has transgressed all the deadlines of the Ley General de Administración Pública, reason to grant the appeal with the legal consequences.\" Based on that, the Sala granted a period of fifteen business days to conclude the proceeding. With all this, the act proposing the dismissal of the claimant official, that is, resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010, was issued on June 21, 2010 (folios 1036-1144 of volume II of the administrative file). What was expressed by the Tribunal Constitucional aligns with the considerations of this collegiate body regarding the violation in this specific case of the reasonable deadlines that must prevail in matters of disciplinary administrative proceedings. It is not about the violation of the two-month deadline repeatedly mentioned (art. 261 LGAP), but rather the infringement of the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice, which requires a reasonable and adequate duration of the proceeding according to its degree of complexity. In this case, from the issuance of the initial statement of charges on August 21, 2008, to the date of issuance of the disciplinary sanction act on June 21, 2010, approximately one year and 10 months elapsed, a period that is considered, by far, completely arbitrary and unjustified. Certainly, the proceeding in question was directed at several officials; furthermore, the evidence was voluminous, so in principle one could say the proceeding was complex. However, it must be noted that the opening of the proceeding was preceded by a report from the Auditoria Interna of the CCSS, as well as a preliminary investigation phase, therefore, the issue of evidence collection was an already advanced stage. Regarding these stages, one can see the reference indicated in the final report of the directing body that appears at folio 852 and following of volume II of the administrative file. Nevertheless, it is not observed, despite those factors, how a period of 22 months is reasonable for the processing of that cause. That period is even longer if the later phases of the proceeding are considered, which are established as a guarantee for the official according to the Internal Regulations of the CCSS, specifically, the referral of the matter to the Comisión or Junta de Relaciones Laborales, as stipulated by ordinal 135 of that regulation.\n\nThe analysis of the file reveals a complex network of actions, reports, report expansions, and requests for expansion or correction of documents, an aspect that, as a simple reference, can be seen in the sanction act in its resultandos section (folios 1036-1047 of the administrative file). Even in that act, the statute of limitations plea raised by the plaintiff is addressed, and it is stated, in essence, that although the power to discipline official misconduct prescribes in one month, that period is computed from the moment the hierarchical instance can exercise the power. It notes that in this specific case, the conclusions report of the directing body was received on April 27, 2010, but this report lacked essential elements for the deciding body to rule, so an expansion was requested, which was ultimately received on May 25, 2010, so the alleged statute of limitations did not occur. Certainly, that alluded monthly period did not expire; however, what is analyzed at this point is the exaggerated delay of the proceeding. This Court does not share the argument that the complexity of the file justified that period. Note that the bulk of the evidence consisted of the preliminary inspection report that formed the basis of the proceeding. The minutes of the hearings held evidence only the taking of testimonial depositions or party statements. It is reiterated, the 22 months of processing the disciplinary cause (without counting the referral to the Labor Relations instance) shows an unreasonable period in the processing of the proceeding that the CCSS limits itself to justifying by extreme complexity. However, that mere statement is not sufficient and, on the contrary, the analysis of the object of the proceeding, concretized to determine if the claimant official had incurred in the actions denounced by reports AGL-216-R-2007 of April 26, 2007, and AIN-322-R-2007 of September 19, 2007, both from the Auditoria Interna of the CCSS, as well as the dynamic shown by the procedural course, do not justify that duration. In short, such aspect vitiates the proceeding for infringement of the principles of procedural impetus, celerity, concentration, and prompt and complete administrative justice. Therefore, a deficiency arises that provides a basis for the invalidity of what has been done. The contrary would lead to condoning proceedings with unreasonable deadlines without any legal consequence, which, of course, this Court does not tolerate. Although numeral 329.3 previously referenced states that the final act issued outside the deadline is valid, except for exceptions established by law, it is clear that this in no way constitutes a sort of open, uncontrollably permissive letter that justifies extremely prolonged proceedings, with unreasonable violation of deadlines to the detriment of due process, concentration, celerity, procedural unity, and legal certainty, all constituent elements of the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. As has been noted, such flaw demonstrates a substantial non-conformity with the legal system (numerals 128, 158, and 223, all of LGAP) regarding the proceeding conducted, from an integral standpoint. This aspect requires, along with errors that appear in the statement of charges phase and the final act, which are discussed further below, the nullity of what has been done. In summary, due to the unjustified delay present in the proceeding under review, a cause for absolute, insurmountable nullity converges, which leads, without further ado, to the suppression of that proceeding. Moreover, in light of the foregoing, it is irrelevant to refer to the issue of lapsing (caducidad) of the proceeding.\n\nVIII.- On the defects of reasoning of Resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010 of 07 hours on June 21, 2010. Without prejudice to what was stated above regarding the violation of the temporal elements of the proceeding, the reasoning of both the initiating act and the final act issued in that file 006-08 is now weighed. In the statement of charges, regarding the claimant Sánchez Lara, deficiencies were imputed to him fundamentally in the following aspects: a. That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his position as Chief of the Material Resources Area of the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, he knew of, managed, applied, and executed the simplified direct purchase modality, without complying with the substantial stages and requirements of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its regulations. In that sense, a detail table is attached of the contracting files, contractual object, and code, visible from folio 49 to 52 of the administrative file and which is irrelevant to record in this ruling; b. That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his position as Chief of the Material Resources Area of the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, he knew of, managed, applied, and executed the simplified direct purchase modality, which showed deficiencies in the contractual activity of direct purchases, causing inefficient internal control and patrimonial risk for the Administration given the technical breach of his duties; c. That during the years 2005 and 2006, he did not comply with the basic elements for the execution of the simplified direct purchase indicated in official letter ARM-00700-2005 of October 11, 2005, which detailed the actions to follow in the purchase procedures; ch. That during the periods 2005-2006, he managed, approved, and authorized direct purchases HRSA-CD-1782-2005, HSRA-CD-01-2006, HSRA-CD-84-2006, HSRA-CD-0420-2006, and HSRA-CD-0032-2006, in which the requesters omitted to submit the form called \"solicitud de adquisición directa a proveedores exclusivos\"; d. That during the periods 2005-2006, he managed, approved, and authorized direct purchases 1798-2005, 1743-2005, 0092-2006, 1748-2005, 1701-2005, 170-2006 (all HSRA-CD), in which the offeror submitted, along with the quotation, a letter of exclusivity, without exclusivity being evident from that document; e. That in direct purchase 2007CD-000366-2205, 3 potential offerors are invited, but two of the companies do not offer the required good for sale, and the only company that offers the good, according to a market study, is not acceptable due to overpricing. Furthermore, it is omitted to communicate what occurred to the Ministerio de Industria y Comercio. f. That he breached his duties pertaining to administrative management within the direct purchase procedure 2007CD-00785-2205, since for the same object as purchase 2007CD-366-2005, he again invites the 3 indicated companies; g. That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his position as Chief of the Material Resources Area of the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, he managed, approved, and authorized irregular purchases in the acquisition of food products and others, outside the margin of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. In that sense, a detail table is attached of the contracting files, contractual object, and code, visible from folio 54 to 57 of the administrative file and which is irrelevant to record in this ruling; h. That in the period 2005-2006, he executed the practice of illicit subdivision or fragmentation (fraccionamiento) in the promotion of isolated purchases; i. That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his position as Chief of the Material Resources Area of the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, he breached his duties of control, custody, and archiving of administrative contracting files in the specific case of the direct purchases cited in that act, the detail of which runs from folio 58 to 68 of the administrative file. Then, that statement of charges incorporates a section titled \"III: LEGAL BASIS,\" in which the directing body limits itself to citing a set of legal norms on which, as it expressly indicates, the proceeding finds its basis, among these, article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, LGAP, Reglamento Interior de Trabajo (arts. 46, 48, 50, 79), Código de Ética de los Servidores de la CCSS (arts. 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16), Normativa de Relaciones Laborales, Ley de Contratación Administrativa and its regulations, Ley General de Control Interno, Reglamento de Normas y Procedimientos para la obtención de bienes y servicios en forma desconcentrada de la CCSS, Modelo de Facultades y Niveles de Adjudicación por Instancia Administrativa de la CCSS, jurisprudence of the Contraloría General de la República, Ley de Archivos No. 7202, Código Procesal Civil. It then details the documentary evidence in the file, temporarily separates the investigated parties from their positions, and finally indicates the rights it considers pertinent within the cause. The analysis of that statement of charges reveals an insurmountable pathology that must be specified. In effect, the initial statement of charges completely disregards, with respect to the claimant, warning about the possible legal consequences of the proceeding, that is, it omits to indicate the possible sanctions or effects that this course may generate in the legal sphere of the officials, as a consequence of the conducts and facts imputed to them. In the judgment of this collegiate body, such warning constitutes a fundamental right of the investigated party, since from the very beginning, the legal qualification of those facts and their consequences can be subject to challenge, as well as the challenge of a potential variation in the legal qualification of the circumstances that are the object of the proceeding (for example, that a suspension without pay is warned and then reclassified and dismissed). It is, from this perspective, a basic element of the statement of charges. At most, at the beginning of the act, it is stated that the proceeding is to establish disciplinary and patrimonial responsibility, but the possible sanction to be applied is not specified. That form of notification (intimación) does not satisfy the duties already noted and constitutes, on the contrary, a generic, imprecise formula, a fertile ground for confusion and uncertainty antagonistic to the certainty that must prevail in these cases. If during the course of the proceeding it is considered that the seriousness of the facts may warrant a more intense sanction, the recipient must be so warned so that they may exercise their right to adversarial proceedings, but it is pathological to simply warn that a sanction will be imposed, without specifying what particular repression is possibly applicable. Such requirement is not satisfied by the generalized mention of norms without any reference to aspects regarding how they have probably been violated and what relationship they have with the object of the proceeding. It is not an aspect that the investigated party must deduce or infer, since in these cases, clarity of what is analyzed is required, as an undeniable derivation of the right to defense and adversarial proceedings. In summary, it consists of a substantial deficiency which, in light of ordinal 223 in relation to 166, both of the LGAP, entails the invalidity of that act.\n\nIX.- On the deficiencies of the final act. Now then, once the proceeding was substantiated and the various phases of the oral and private hearing were carried out, as has been indicated, through Resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010 of 07 hours on June 21, 2010, of the Dirección Regional de Servicios de Salud Central Norte of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, a sanction of dismissal without employer liability was imposed on Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara. In that particular, starting from folio 1071 of the administrative file (page 36 of the cited act), the Deciding Body reiterates the conducts that, in probability, had been imputed to the claimant, in the same terms indicated in the previous section. Then, a presentation is made of the circumstances proven and not proven regarding the various elements analyzed in reference to the investigated situations concerning the simplified direct purchases (section A), direct purchase 2007CD-366-2205 and 2007CD-785-2205 (section B), irregular purchases in various food products (section C), custody, control, and archiving of files (section D)—see folios 1075 to 1105 of the administrative file—. Later in the act, a presentation is made of the circumstances that were considered accredited and the reasons for which the deciding instance considered that the analyzed actions were improper. However, as a projection of the deficiencies of the statement of charges, the act in question immediately proceeds to consider that the applicable sanction is dismissal without employer liability, without establishing in that specific case the relational analysis of the weighed conducts and the norms on the basis of which that legal consequence would be sustained. The act merely points out that those detected actions are serious breaches of the plaintiff's duties and the administrative contracting and internal control regime, but it does not specify, as required, the specific norms violated, in such a way that an analysis of the reason-content relationship and, incidentally, of the reasoning of that administrative decision can be carried out. Although regarding the establishment of the proven facts, a concatenated account is made of the relevant findings in the proceeding, in such a way that this part of the act can be understood as reasoned, even when no explicit reference is made to the specific evidence on the basis of which the factual conclusion is reached in each case, the same does not happen with regard to the reasoning of the legal grounds to impose dismissal as the maximum sanction in public employment needs. The final act projects the flaw detected in the statement of charges, since just as the latter omitted to refer to the legal qualification of the imputed facts, in the former, no logical construction is made regarding the relational cause-effect link, which would allow establishing how those determined facts fit within the conditioning prerequisite, in such a way that the appropriateness or not of that conditioned consequence can be established. The effect that the questioned conduct seeks to impose, that is, dismissal, which constitutes the maximum sanction that can be imposed in employment relationships, requires not only the presentation of proven facts that would give basis to the reason element of that act, understood as the factual or legal prerequisite that requires or empowers the issuance of the public will (art. 133 LGAP), but also the clear indication of how those facts fit within the factual prerequisite established by a specific legal norm, in such a way that the result projected by that normative provision can be imposed. From that standpoint, the content element of the act, considered as the legal-material effect that the act seeks to impose (art.\n\n132 LGAP), must maintain a relationship of correspondence and proportionality with the grounds (reason) element (art. 132.2 LGAP). This is a symbiosis between both elements, which imbues the act with validity, since the content of the act is issued based on the grounds, and these in turn condition the scope and implications of the content. Thus, for the analysis of the legitimacy of this material binomial (grounds-content), it is imperative that the act indicate not only the factual premise detected, but also the legal norm that supports the adopted content. If this is not the case, it will not be feasible to analyze whether those conducts merit the applied result. This is even more decisive in administrative sanctioning punitive law, in which a maxim of strict definition of offenses and sanctions is imposed, known as the principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad), which is founded on articles 39 and 41 of the Carta Magna, and 11, 19, and 124 of the LGAP. Only with a clear formulation of such requirements can it be weighed whether the applied sanction is the merited one in the specific case, or whether it was not pertinent, either due to lack of specificity of the reproached conduct, or due to disproportion between the grounds and the content. Again, this lack of attention is called into question from the very initial act of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos). Now, this last point constitutes a fundamental pillar of the motivational element of the public decision (art. 136 LGAP), which ultimately becomes a fundamental axis of the right of defense, since otherwise, the recipient of the act could not question the aforementioned specificity or the commented relationship of correspondence and/or proportion. In this manner, a comparison of the facts versus the legal system that would allow the cited act to be considered duly reasoned is not carried out. Although a series of citations of legal norms is made later on, as happened in the statement of charges, the Administration limited itself to citing in an abstract manner a set of legal and regulatory provisions, in some cases citing specific articles, and in others (a considerable number), simply citing the name of the formal source. Note that even the jurisprudence of the Contraloría General de la República is alluded to, without referring to a single precedent from that administrative body related to the object of the disciplinary case. The same occurs with Law 7494, the Law on Internal Control (Ley de Control Interno), and in general, with the sources cited in sections G through P of the item on legal grounds. Again, this introduces a serious incorrectness into the act, since an act cannot be understood as duly reasoned when, regarding the legal qualification of the conduct as the basic premise of the adopted sanction, it limits itself to generically pointing out a set of norms, without specifying in what way they have been violated and without entering into weighing which specific norms have been infringed and the reasons why a particular precept applies to justify the imposed sanction. It must be insisted that at this point it is not possible to propose a sort of duty of the official to infer that this sanction would be applicable to him, when from the beginning of the procedure, that result was not formally notified (nor warned of), nor does the act justify, with the due (and necessary) forcefulness, the specific legal reasons that allow, from the plane of reasonableness of the conduct in the specific case, such a legal consequence. Again, this is a substantial informality that occurs in the course of the administrative procedure and specifically, a substantial absence of one of the elements of the administrative act, which, under the protection of canon 166 of the cited Law No. 6227/78, leads, without further remedy, to the nullity of those actions. The foregoing makes it unnecessary to address the other grievances presented by the plaintiff, since having already determined the nullity of the questioned acts for the procedural and substantive reasons alluded to, it would be futile, as it would be redundant, to weigh the other allegations related to supposed deficiencies in the evidence of the administrative case, the composition of the directing body (órgano director), and other issues presented in the claim. Given this, in the section of proven facts, situations or background information have not been incorporated which, although related to the other defects alleged in the claim, lack relevance because it is unnecessary to enter into weighing their pertinence by virtue of what has been resolved.\n\nX.- Summary of the decreed nullities. In sum, the nullity of the disciplinary procedure and the subsequent detailed actions must be ordered, as various pathologies are evidenced that lead to an insurmountable invalidity, of an absolute degree that must be declared in this venue, specifically: a) Administrative procedure 006-08 brought against Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara: due to the unjustified, unreasonable, and disproportionate delay of the administrative procedure to the detriment of the principle of concentration (concentración), immediacy (inmediación), procedural impulse (impulso procesal), due process (debido proceso), and prompt and complete administrative justice (justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida), b) Resolution DRSSCN-2994-2008 of 07:00 hours on August 21, 2008, from the Directorate Regional of Central North Health Services of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which constitutes the initial statement of charges (traslado de cargos) of the disciplinary administrative procedure file 006-08, regarding the plaintiff Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara; c) In accordance with numerals 164.2 and 163.2 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the nullity of the other acts of administrative procedure file 006-08 is ordered, which depend upon or have as a justifying antecedent the initial statement of charges, regarding the plaintiff; d) Resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010 of 07:00 hours on June 21, 2010, of the Directorate Regional of Central North Health Services of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, insofar as it imposes on Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara a sanction of dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal).”\n\nIn this scenario, the expiration (caducidad) applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, because the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited canon 340, regarding the impossibility of expiration when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure has been initiated at the request of a party, given that the next stage is solely the responsibility of the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inertia. This does not occur when it has been initiated ex officio, since in that case, the delay does benefit the individual, to the extent that it would involve, in that case, a delay only attributable to the public office. The application of this rule is also provided for in precept 147 of that Labor Relations Regulations. It should be noted, within the course of the procedure, once the oral and private hearing has concluded, numeral 319 of the LGAP establishes a period of 15 days calculated from the date of the appearance for the issuance of the final act. This is a special period for the completion of the procedure. However, again, it is an ordering period, intended to guide the efficiency of the procedure, but whose violation does not, per se, in all cases, imply the invalidity of the actions taken, except in cases where that delay was arbitrary and unjustified, an aspect that will be discussed later. However, it should be indicated that once the hierarchical superior holding disciplinary authority has the objective possibility of exercising it through the eventual adoption of the internal corrective act, the monthly prescription (prescripción) of the aforementioned numeral 603 of the Labor Code takes effect. This means, in most cases, that once the file is received by the Directing Body of the procedure, which includes the referral of the conclusions and recommendations report, the hierarchical superior is enabled to decide whether to impose the sanction that has been recommended by that investigating instance or to opt for a different decision (see art. 302 LGAP), such that said authority must be issued within the one-month period just indicated. The opposite would lead to disregarding the rules of prescription established by that norm (art. 603 of the Labor Code), to the detriment of the official's rights. 3) <u>Prescription of the authority to execute the imposed sanction</u>: This refers to the period available to the administrative hierarchical superior to order the application of the dictated sanction. It therefore consists of the material execution of the act that orders, as its content, a disciplinary sanction. In this case, through analogical integration, the applicable period, unless a special norm provides otherwise, would be the monthly period provided for in numeral 603 of the Labor Code. The denial of such a period would imply the perpetual possibility for the hierarchical superior to apply the previously ordered sanction, under the allegation of a sort of imprescriptibility of that authority. Thus, one thing is the period to order the final act once the final report of the directing body is issued, and another is the period to materialize the firm sanction ordered. On this point, the period must be calculated from the moment that act becomes firm, which may originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary remedies that may be applicable against the act as appropriate, or, if after the period established by the legal system to file those remedies, they have not been filed, in which case, administrative finality occurs due to the inertia of the recipient of the conduct's effects. It should be highlighted that the understanding of the temporality rules of the procedure must be carried out in accordance with the general principles governing the procedural course, such as efficiency, effectiveness and economy, procedural impetus, ex officio duty (arts. 222, 225 and 227 LGAP), which, in the case of the CCSS, can be seen in subsections 3, 4 and 21 of article 95 of the Internal Labor Relations Regulations.\n\n&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;V.- Regarding the alleged prescription of the disciplinary authority. The first point to analyze must address the prescription of the disciplinary authority that the claimant contests. Regarding the first phase of examination, that is, the period to initiate internal disciplinary actions, on one hand, the claimant raises no objection against that aspect, merely indicating that the expiration of the monthly period of article 603 of the Labor Code occurred in the phase of final adoption of the act. Nevertheless, the prescription of the authority to initiate disciplinary actions has not occurred in this case. Indeed, the acts that served as the basis for the administrative procedure certainly refer to the violation of norms specific to the internal control regime, specifically, on topics of public procurement. From that standpoint, the prescription for ordering the opening of the administrative case is not governed by numeral 603 of the Labor Code. In the statement of charges, the recipient was informed of the legal norms considered infringed, among which reference is made to the alleged contravention of the principle of probity in public service and in the proper management and sound administration of public resources. The definition of the applicable legal regime must consider the facts that led to the opening of the administrative procedure, in order to establish whether it involves a factual framework relating to a simple employment relationship or, rather, to conducts covered by the incompatibility regime. According to what is stated in the statement of charges, the attributed facts, it is insisted, are related to the duty of probity and the management of the public treasury. In light of that circumstance, it is notorious that the reproached conducts do not correspond to simple disciplinary liability, but rather that the implication and scope of the imputed behaviors are related to alleged infractions of the duty of probity and management of public resources. From that standpoint, these types of alleged faults are regulated by Law No. 8422, both in terms of grounds and sanctions, but also in procedures, principles, and prescription. Indeed, while the disciplinary authority of the administrative hierarchical superior is subject to a prescriptive period, generically regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code, a norm that sets a one-month period for the exercise of that repressive authority, the truth is that, in the case of conducts regulated and specified by Law No. 8422, they are subject to this particular regime. This is a normative system constituted as a sectoral ordinance containing specific rules, which, being special, prevail over general regulations. From that perspective, article 44 of the cited legislation, regarding the prescriptive period for the administrative liability of the official, states: <i>\"The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the regulations relating to the Public Treasury, shall prescribe, according to article 43 of the General Law on Internal Control and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994.\" </i>In turn, canon 43 of the General Law on Internal Control, No. 8292, refers to precept 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428. This last norm essentially indicates: <i>\"The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight regulations shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious – understood as that fact which requires an investigation or an audit study to inform of its possible irregularity – liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is brought to the attention of the hierarchical superior or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. (...)\"</i> Consequently, for conducts that may imply an infraction of the norms established by Law No. 8422, regarding matters of prescription, the applicable regulation is ordinal 71 of Law No. 7428, by the referral provided by mandate 44 of that legal source, ergo, a five-year period, and not the monthly period stipulated by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime. Now, given this dynamic, in the specific case, that five-year period has not expired, and therefore, regarding that aspect, the authority has not prescribed.\n\n&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;VI.- Regarding the prescription of the procedure. On the other hand, the prescription of the procedure is alleged due to the delay exceeding one month from the completion of the oral and private hearing. The substantive analysis of the claimant's arguments on this point suggests that the argument in question is based on the thesis that the corrective authority of the hierarchical superior according to 603 of the Labor Code applies to cases where the directing body has concluded the oral and private hearing, or has rendered the report of conclusions and eventual recommendations. This thesis is respected, but ultimately not shared, for the reasons set forth below. As has been indicated, the aforementioned period operates to initiate the disciplinary case (except for cases of internal control or anti-corruption regimes) and to execute the ordered sanction. However, regarding the completion of the procedure, that norm is not applicable, because in those phases, the temporality rule of numeral 261 of the LGAP and what is indicated in canon 319 ejusdem operate, both periods, as has been stated, being of an ordering nature. This implies that a procedure lasting beyond said period does not, as an initial thesis, lead to the nullity of the final act issued within that course. However, this Court (Tribunal) is of the opinion that although the aforementioned two-month period is a guideline of efficiency (deontological), but not a preclusive reference for the competence, it is clear that this cannot condone excessively and unjustifiably long procedures, regardless of the complexity invoked or not by the Administration as a pseudo-justification. Such a dynamic must be addressed in each specific case, because in certain scenarios, the delay of a procedure may be due to the need to incorporate evidence of complex procurement, as would be the case of evidence that must be brought from records located abroad and which, therefore, involves documents that must be legalized through consular proceedings, among other scenarios. Or there is the case of dilatory tactics by the individual through the filing of all kinds of recourses or motions for the purpose of delaying the procedure, such as the filing of amparo recourses, allegations of lack of competence, nullity motions, rescheduling of hearings, among other tactics. The foregoing is without prejudice to the authority to reject ad portas those clearly inadmissible or dilatory motions enshrined in canon 292.3 of the LGAP in relation to numeral 97.1 of the Civil Procedure Code. In such a scenario, agreeing to the suppression of the final act based on a temporality analysis would undoubtedly lead to an abuse of right, since ultimately, it would benefit the person who has intended to intentionally delay the case (arts. 20-22 Civil Code). The same does not apply to procedures in which, even if the Administration itself alleges extreme complexity, their duration in comprehensive terms is disproportionate and subjects the individual to an interminable case without valid reason for it. On this particular matter, this collegiate body is of the opinion that the principle of prompt and complete justice implies, in the case of administrative procedures, that they must be resolved, as a matter of principle, by a final act, within reasonable and proportional periods, avoiding subjecting the recipient to unfoundedly long and tedious procedures. It therefore constitutes an expression of the maxims of legal certainty, administrative efficiency, and procedural impetus, to the extent that it demands the definition of the case within the due temporal space. Contrary to what the CCSS argues, the complexity or lack thereof of the procedure cannot justify arbitrarily long procedures, as this would imply condoning an uncontrollable authority of the Administration to exercise, at any time and at its own discretion, the authority to resolve the conflict, to the evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear injury to due process. It is insisted, complexity is one more element to consider in the variable under discussion, but it is not an aspect that legitimizes, under any hypothesis, unreasonable periods. Along these lines, numeral 261.1 of Law No. 6227 indicates: \"<span style='color:#010101'> <i>The administrative procedure must be concluded, by a final act, within the two months following its initiation or, as applicable, following the presentation of the demand or petition of the administered party, unless otherwise provided by this law.</i>\" The same period is set by canon 32 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code. Both norms essentially state that once the indicated periods have expired without the Administration issuing a final act, the recipient may consider the petition rejected, through negative silence (silencio negativo), in order to file administrative recourses or else resort to jurisdictional protection. It is clear that the figure of negative silence currently holds a guarantee-oriented purpose for the recipient and not an administrative privilege as was previously handled. It constitutes the possibility of considering the claim rejected in order to be able to resort to other instances and not find oneself subject to the Administration issuing a formal act. It was precisely the \"act-centric\" vision of administrative justice, evidenced in the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies that prevailed until the issuance of ruling 3669-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and numeral 31.1 of the CPCA, which required the issuance of a formal act to access jurisdictional protection, for which purpose, the tacit rejection precisely sought to resort to higher levels to issue that formal conduct – it must be remembered that the previous model had a preeminently objective tendency. Nowadays, with the merely optional nature of exhausting administrative remedies, silence implies a guarantee for the individual, enabling them to resort to other legal means to seek protection of their legal situation, no longer as a prerequisite to have an appealable act, but to eliminate the administrative inertia in defining their legal relationship. However, the analysis of that figure implies that such a denial effect is only viable within procedures initiated at the request of a party, given that what has not been requested cannot be understood as denied, ergo, in cases initiated ex officio, the basic prerequisite, which is the petition or claim, is not present. This is established by subsection 3 of the cited precept 261 when it indicates: \"...<i>the claim or petition of the administered party shall be deemed rejected in view of the silence of the Administration....\" </i>Ergo, it is not a figure that can be considered pragmatic in ex officio procedures. Now, the breach of the periods set by the legal system for the exercise of a competence can certainly lead to a pathology in the act, due to an infraction of the subjective element of competence. It must be remembered that in light of precept 255 of the LGAP, legal periods bind both the Administration and the \"particular\" (this latter term must be understood as \"person\" since the recipient of a procedure could well be a public, private, natural, or legal person and not necessarily a private individual, unless by that term one understands the recipient – although such an application cannot be shared from a conceptual standpoint, being considered limited). From this postulate, it follows then that competences subject to a period can result in null acts (doctrine of numeral 60.1 LGAP). However, the correct understanding of that last statement must lead to the following. The authorities of imperium are imprescriptible (art. 66.1 ibidem), an aspect that justifies what is stated by canon 329.3 of the cited Law No. 6227 in that the act issued outside the established period shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly mentioned by law. A clear example of those exceptions is positive silence (that is, presumed act – art. 330 ejusdem in relation to 139–), in which case, correctly declared or having occurred, the maxim of intangibility of one's own acts operates, which implies the impossibility for the Administration to disregard that effect, under penalty of absolute nullity for infringement of constitutional precept 34. In this example of positive silence, it is precisely due to a temporal factor that the competence to issue the act is lost, but not the competence to seek ways to suppress the presumed act. That said, it is worth clarifying that, despite its wording in imperative language (typical of a prescriptive normative method), the two-month period set by canon 261.2 of the LGAP is not peremptory, but only ordering, which follows from what has been stated regarding the Administration's duty to exercise its competences and the initial validity of \"extemporaneous\" acts. This stance can also be seen in ruling No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice. This applies to both procedures initiated ex officio and those at the request of a party. In the latter, despite the exercise of the power to invoke the effects of negative silence, the Administration may well issue the act, which would broaden the debate in the recourses phase, whether administrative or jurisdictional. From this standpoint, neither the investigating authority of the procedure nor the procedure itself is deemed expired if the period in question has been exceeded. Although the structure of the ordinary procedure would suggest that the mentioned period must always be respected, it is clear that the complexity of a matter and the very vicissitudes of the course can lead to longer periods. The determining factor thus lies in the procedure showing signs of activity that are necessary and pertinent, and not unjustified delays, in accordance with the principle of celerity and procedural impetus – numerals 222 and 225 LGAP – such that its duration is not the product of arbitrary conduct or inertia. Such inertia, as will be seen later, is sanctioned with figures like expiration – precept 340 ibidem – a topic to be analyzed next.\n\n&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\nVII.- Specific analysis of the temporal aspects of the procedure. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the ordering nature of the aforementioned period does not speak to the validity of acts issued within procedures whose delay exceeds the normal threshold of reasonableness. Indeed, an unreasonable duration of the procedure can lead to the nullity of the actions taken due to injury to the principle of prompt and complete justice (which this Court must protect). In this line, what was stated in precedents numbers 2007-3140 and 2007-6758, both of the Constitutional Court, can be observed. In the first, it was forcefully stated: \"<i>Now, from the moment an administrative procedure begins until the issuance of the final act, a reasonable and proportional period must elapse, taking into account the actions of the parties, the complexity of the matter, and the legal periods established for each case, so that the Administration may have a prudent period, but without incurring undue delays that obstruct the procedure… this Court considers that the time used by the respondent from the moment the procedure began, to date, far from being justifiable, is excessive, unreasonable, and to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the protected party, due to the unjustified delay incurred by the respondent administration.</i>” That ruling is cited by the First Chamber in the aforementioned judgment 34-2011. In the specific case, as has been said, not every procedure that lasts more than two months implies the nullity of the actions taken, but only to the extent that the period is unreasonable, which must be weighed in each case, taking into account the processing and complexity of the actions. In this case, from the analysis of the factual framework set forth in the list of proven facts, it is observed that the procedure did not enter a phase of abandonment, given that multiple citations were issued for hearings for the taking of testimonial evidence and to complete various phases of the oral and private hearing. However, the analysis of what occurred leads this collegiate body to conclude that the periods incurred by the Administration in this case are unreasonable and unsustainable, in clear and evident detriment to the principle of administrative efficiency and prompt and complete administrative justice. From the analysis of the court records, it is seen that through resolution number DRSSCN-2994-2008 of August 21, 2008, the Directorate of Regional Management and Central North Health Services Network of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, initiated administrative procedure file 006-08 via a statement of charges, for the alleged infraction of internal control norms in the direct contracting system for the procurement of goods and services at the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela. (Folios 2-99 of volume I of the administrative case file, folios 240-336 of the administrative file of the procedure). Then, in official communication HCLVV-AJ-405-2009, dated July 27, 2009, the Directing Body of the Administrative Procedure resolved the exception of prescription raised by the protected parties, rejecting that petition. As justification for that rejection, the administration indicated that the actions of the Directing Body have always been adjusted to law. It also indicated that the procedure has never been without due diligence within reasonably logical periods. (Folio 2369 of the administrative file of the procedure, folio 381 of volume III according to new foliation of the administrative file of the procedure). Subsequently, through official communication HCLVV-AGL-042-2010 of January 28, 2010, the Director of the Directing Body of the Procedure sent to the North Central Regional Director a clarification regarding the material or arithmetic errors in the certifications issued by the licensed official Pablo Andrés Esquivel Chaverri, which consisted of the fact that the certification document indicated that it certified a certain number of copies, and from the count of what was received in the file, it was determined that it contained variable figures, for which reason those files were not received entirely by the Directing Body, considering they contained material and arithmetic errors; that the administrative files were sent to the North Central Regional Director to resolve recourses of appeal and absolute nullity filed by those investigated (see folio 3179 of the administrative file of the procedure). On the occasion of that account, the claimant, along with other persons, filed a recurso de amparo before the Constitutional Chamber, processed under file 10-001159-0007-CO, within which, through ruling No. 2010-6364 of 09:36 hours on April 9, 2010, that high Court referred to the rejection of a recurso de amparo that the same protected parties had previously filed against that same procedure 006-08, rejection issued through vote 2009-04298 of March 17, 2009. However, it specified that the conditions weighed in that case had substantially changed compared to those considered in the new recurso.\n\nUltimately, in this last case, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) stated the following relevant point: \"... *In this case, the Chamber (Sala) stated in its ruling of March seventeenth, two thousand nine, that it was an extremely complex administrative procedure, as it involves several facts and persons, which is why it dismissed any violation of the right to swift and complete justice. But now, more than a year has passed since that ruling, and the procedure remains unresolved definitively, due, according to the respondents, to the complexity of the matter. This would justify a period of years to definitively resolve the procedure, to the detriment of the rights of those involved, who would be in a state of legal uncertainty. Without further consideration, counting the period from August 21, 2008, when the Directorate (Dirección) of Regional Management and Network of Health Services Central Norte of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) initiated a statement of charges against the amparo petitioners for having violated internal control rules in the direct contracting system for obtaining goods and services at the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital, it is confirmed that more than a year and a half has elapsed in an administrative procedure that, although complex, has transgressed all the deadlines of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), a reason to grant the appeal with the legal consequences.*\" Based on this, the Chamber (Sala) granted a period of fifteen business days to conclude the procedure. Nevertheless, the act proposing the dismissal of the plaintiff official, namely, resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010, was issued on June 21, 2010 (pages 1036-1144 of volume II of the administrative file). The statements made by the Constitutional Court align with the considerations of this collegiate body regarding the violation, in this specific case, of the reasonable deadlines that must prevail in disciplinary administrative procedure matters. It does not concern the violation of the bi-monthly period so often mentioned (Art. 261 LGAP), but rather the infringement of the maxim of swift and complete administrative justice, which demands a reasonable and adequate duration of the procedure according to its degree of complexity. In the specific case, from the issuance of the initial statement of charges on August 21, 2008, to the date of issuance of the disciplinary sanction act on June 21, 2010, approximately one year and 10 months elapsed, a period considered, by far, totally arbitrary and unjustified. Certainly, the procedure in question was directed at several officials; moreover, the evidence was substantial, so it could initially be said that the procedure was complex. However, it must be noted that the opening of the procedure was preceded by a report from the Internal Audit Office (Auditoria Interna) of the CCSS, as well as a preliminary investigation phase, meaning the evidence-gathering stage was already well advanced. Regarding these stages, reference can be made to the final report of the directing body found on page 852 and following of volume II of the administrative file. Nonetheless, despite these factors, it is not apparent how a 22-month period can be considered reasonable for processing this case. This period is even longer if the subsequent phases of the procedure are considered, phases established as a guarantee for the official in accordance with the Internal Regulations (Normativa Interna) of the CCSS, specifically, the referral of the matter to the Commission (Comisión) or Labor Relations Board, as stipulated in Article 135 of those regulations.\n\nThe analysis of the file reveals a complex network of actions, reports, report expansions, and requests for expansion or correction of documents, an aspect that, as a simple reference, can be seen in the sanction act in its operative part (pages 1036-1047 of the administrative file). Even in this act, the plea of prescription made by the plaintiff is addressed, and it is noted, in essence, that while the power to discipline officials' faults expires in one month, this period is calculated from the moment the hierarchical instance can exercise that power. It notes that in this specific case, the conclusions report from the directing body was received on April 27, 2010, but this report lacked essential elements for the decision-making body to resolve, so an expansion was requested, which was ultimately received on May 25, 2010, therefore the alleged prescription did not occur. Certainly, the referenced one-month period did not expire; however, what is being analyzed at this point is the exaggerated delay of the procedure. This Court does not agree with the claim that the file's complexity justified this period. It is evident that the bulk of the evidence rested on the preliminary inspection report that formed the basis of the procedure. The records of the hearings held show only evacuations of testimonial depositions or party statements. It is reiterated that the 22 months of processing the disciplinary case (not counting the referral to the Labor Relations instance) demonstrate an unreasonable period in the processing of the procedure, which the CCSS merely attempts to justify by claiming extreme complexity. However, this mere statement is insufficient, and on the contrary, the analysis of the procedure's object—focused on determining whether the plaintiff official had incurred in the actions reported in reports AGL-216-R-2007 of April 26, 2007, and AIN-322-R-2007 of September 19, 2007, both from the Internal Audit Office (Auditoria Interna) of the CCSS—as well as the dynamics shown by the procedural course, do not justify that duration. In short, this aspect vitiates the procedure due to the violation of the principles of procedural momentum, celerity, concentration, and swift and complete administrative justice. Therefore, a deficiency exists that provides a basis for the invalidity of the proceedings. To rule otherwise would lead to condoning procedures with unreasonable times without any legal consequence, which, of course, this Court does not tolerate. Although the previously referenced article 329.3 states that a final act rendered outside the deadline is valid, except for legal exceptions, it is clear that this in no way constitutes a sort of open letter, an uncontrollable permissiveness that justifies extremely drawn-out procedures, with an unreasonable violation of deadlines to the detriment of due process, concentration, celerity, procedural unity, legal certainty—all constituent elements of the maxim of swift and complete administrative justice. As stated, such a flaw demonstrates a substantial nonconformity with the legal system (articles 128, 158, and 223, all of the LGAP) regarding the procedure carried out, from an integral standpoint. This aspect, together with errors occurring in the statement of charges phase and final act discussed below, demands the nullity of the proceedings. In summary, the unwarranted delay in the procedure under review brings about a cause for absolute, insurmountable nullity that leads, without further ado, to the annulment of this procedure. Moreover, in light of what has been said, it is irrelevant to refer to the issue of the procedure's expiration.\n\nVIII.- On the deficiencies in the reasoning of Resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010 issued at 07:00 hours on June 21, 2010. Notwithstanding what was noted above regarding the violation of the temporal elements of the procedure, the following analysis weighs the reasoning of both the initial act and the final act issued in this file 006-08. In the statement of charges, with respect to the plaintiff Sánchez Lara, he was fundamentally charged with deficiencies in the following aspects: a. That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his capacity as Head of the Material Resources Area of the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital, he knew of, managed, applied, and executed the simplified direct purchase modality, without complying with the substantial stages and requirements of the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) and its regulations. In this regard, a detailed table of the procurement files, contractual object, and code is attached, visible from page 49 to 52 of the administrative file, and which is irrelevant to include in this judgment; b. That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his capacity as Head of the Material Resources Area of the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital, he knew of, managed, applied, and executed the simplified direct purchase modality, which showed deficiencies in the contractual activity of direct purchases, causing inefficient internal control and patrimonial risk for the Administration (Administración) given the technical breach of his duties; c. That during the years 2005 and 2006, he failed to comply with the basic elements for the execution of the simplified direct purchase outlined in official communication ARM-00700-2005 of October 11, 2005, which detailed the actions to follow in procurement procedures; ch. That during the 2005-2006 periods, he managed, approved, and authorized direct purchases HRSA-CD-1782-2005, HSRA-CD-01-2006, HSRA-CD-84-2006, HSRA-CD-0420-2006, and HSRA-CD-0032-2006, in which the requestors omitted to present the form called \"direct acquisition request to exclusive suppliers\"; d. That during the 2005-2006 periods, he managed, approved, and authorized direct purchases 1798-2005, 1743-2005, 0092-2006, 1748-2005, 1701-2005, 170-2006 (all HSRA-CD), in which the offeror submitted, along with the quotation, a letter of exclusivity, without it being evident from that document that exclusivity existed; e. That in direct purchase 2007CD-000366-2205, 3 potential offerors are invited, but two of the companies do not offer the required good for sale, and the only company that offers the good, according to a market study, is not acceptable due to overpricing. Furthermore, it omits to communicate what occurred to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. f. That he breached his duties related to administrative management within the direct purchase procedure 2007CD-00785-2205 because, for the same object as purchase 2007CD-366-2005, he again invites the 3 indicated companies; g. That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his capacity as Head of the Material Resources Area of the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital, he managed, approved, and authorized irregular purchases in the acquisition of food products and others, outside the margins of the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa). In that regard, a detailed table of the procurement files, contractual object, and code is attached, visible from page 54 to 57 of the administrative file, and which is irrelevant to include in this judgment; h. That in the 2005-2006 period, he executed the practice of unlawful subdivision (fraccionamiento) or fragmentation in promoting isolated purchases; i. That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his capacity as Head of the Material Resources Area of the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital, he breached his duties of control, custody, and archiving of administrative procurement files in the specific case of the direct purchases cited in that act, the details of which run from page 58 to 68 of the administrative file. Subsequently, this statement of charges incorporates a section titled \"III: LEGAL BASIS,\" wherein the directing body merely cites a set of legal norms on which, as it expressly states, the procedure is based, including Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), LGAP, Internal Labor Regulations (Arts. 46, 48, 50, 79), Code of Ethics for Servants of the CCSS (Arts. 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16), Labor Relations Regulations, Public Procurement Law and its regulation, General Law on Internal Control, Regulations on Norms and Procedures for the Obtaining of Goods and Services in a Deconcentrated Manner of the CCSS, Model of Powers and Award Levels by Administrative Instance of the CCSS, jurisprudence of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), Archives Law No. 7202, Civil Procedure Code. It then details the documentary evidence included in the file, temporarily separates the investigated parties from their positions, and finally indicates the rights it considers pertinent within the case. The analysis of this statement of charges reveals an insurmountable pathology that must be specified. Indeed, the initial statement of charges entirely neglects, regarding the plaintiff, to warn of the possible legal consequences of the process, that is, it omits to indicate the possible sanctions or effects that this course of action could generate in the legal sphere of the officials as a consequence of the conduct and facts charged. In the judgment of this collegiate body, such a warning constitutes a fundamental right of the investigated party, because from the very beginning, the legal classification of those facts and their consequences can be subject to challenge, as well as the challenge of a possible variation in the legal classification of the circumstances subject to the procedure (for example, a suspension without pay is warned, and later it is reclassified and results in dismissal). From this perspective, it is an elementary aspect of the statement of charges. At most, at the beginning of the act, it is stated that the procedure is to establish disciplinary and patrimonial liability, but the possible sanction to be applied is not specified. That form of notification does not satisfy the aforementioned duties and constitutes, on the contrary, a generic, imprecise formula, fertile ground for confusion and uncertainty, antagonistic to the security that must prevail in these cases. If during the course of the procedure it is considered that the seriousness of the facts may warrant a more intense sanction, the recipient must be so warned so they can exercise their right to challenge; but it is patently deficient simply to warn that a sanction will be imposed, without specifying what particular penalty is possibly applicable. Such a requirement is not satisfied by the generalized mention of norms without any reference to aspects concerning how they have been violated in terms of probability and what relationship they bear to the object of the procedure. It is not an aspect that the investigated party must deduce or infer, because in these cases, clarity regarding what is analyzed is imperative, as an undeniable derivation of the right of defense and contradiction. In summary, this constitutes a substantial deficiency that, in light of Article 223 in relation to Article 166, both of the LGAP, renders that act invalid.\n\nIX.- On the deficiencies of the final act. However, once the procedure was substantiated and the various phases of the oral and private hearing were conducted, as previously indicated, by Resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010 issued at 07:00 hours on June 21, 2010, by the Regional Directorate of Central Norte Health Services (Dirección Regional de Servicios de Salud Central Norte) of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), a sanction of dismissal without employer liability was imposed on Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara. In this particular, starting from page 1071 of the administrative file (page 36 of the cited act), the Decision-Making Body reiterates the conduct that, in terms of probability, had been attributed to the plaintiff, in the same terms indicated in the previous section. Subsequently, an exposition is made of the proven and unproven circumstances of the various elements analyzed, concerning the situations investigated regarding simplified direct purchases (section A), direct purchase 2007CD-366-2205 and 2007CD-785-2205 (section B), irregular purchases of various food products (section C), custody, control, and archiving of files (section D) - see pages 1075 to 1105 of the administrative file. Later in the act, an exposition is made of the circumstances that were considered accredited and the reasons why the decision-making instance considered the analyzed actions to be improper. However, as a consequence of the deficiencies in the statement of charges, the act in question immediately proceeds to consider that the applicable sanction is dismissal without employer liability, without establishing, in that specific case, the relational analysis of the weighed conduct and the norms on which that legal consequence would be based. The act merely indicates that these detected actions are serious breaches of the plaintiff's duties and the regime of public procurement and internal control, but it does not specify, as required, the specific norms violated, such that an analysis of the motive-content relationship and, consequently, the reasoning of that administrative decision can be carried out. While regarding the establishment of the proven facts, a concatenated list of relevant findings from the procedure is presented, such that this part of the act may be considered reasoned, even though no explicit reference is made to the specific evidence on the basis of which the factual conclusion is reached in each case, the same does not occur regarding the reasoning of the legal grounds for imposing dismissal as the maximum sanction in public employment matters. The final act projects the flaw detected in the statement of charges, because just as the latter omitted referring to the legal classification of the charged facts, the former does not contain a logical construction regarding the relational cause-effect link, which would allow establishing how those determined facts fit within the conditioning premise, so that the appropriateness or otherwise of that conditioned consequence can be established. The effect that the questioned conduct intends to impose, namely, dismissal, which constitutes the maximum sanction that can be imposed in employment relationships, requires not only the exposition of proven facts that would provide a basis for the motive element of that act, understood as the factual or legal premise that requires or empowers the issuance of the public will (Art. 133 LGAP), but also a clear indication of how those facts fit within the factual premise established by a specific legal norm, so that the result projected by that normative provision can be imposed. From this standpoint, the content element of the act, considered as the legal-material effect the act seeks to impose (Art. 132 LGAP), must maintain a relationship of correspondence and proportionality with the motive element (Art. 132.2 LGAP). It is a symbiosis between both elements, which imbues the act with validity, because the content of the act is issued based on the motive, and this, in turn, conditions the scope and implications of the content. Thus, for the analysis of the legitimacy of this material binomial (motive-content), it is imperative that the act indicates not only the detected factual premise, but also the legal norm that supports the adopted content. Otherwise, it will not be feasible to analyze whether that conduct merits the applied result. This is even more critical in punitive administrative sanctioning law, in which a maxim of specificity of faults and sanctions is imposed, known as the principle of typicality, which finds its basis in Articles 39 and 41 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna), and 11, 19, and 124 of the LGAP. Only upon a clear formulation of such requirements can it be weighed whether the applied sanction is the appropriate one in the specific case, or whether it was not pertinent, either due to lack of typicality of the reproached conduct or disproportion between the motive and the content. Again, this disregard is called into question from the very initial act of the statement of charges. Now, this latter point constitutes a fundamental pillar of the motivational element of the public decision (Art. 136 LGAP), which ultimately becomes a fundamental axis of the right of defense, because otherwise, the recipient of the act could not challenge the aforementioned typicality or the commented relationship of correspondence and/or proportion. In this way, no comparison of the facts versus the legal system is made that would allow the cited act to be considered duly reasoned. Although a series of citations of legal norms follows, similar to what occurred in the statement of charges, the Administration (Administración) merely cited, in an abstract manner, a set of legal and regulatory provisions, in some cases citing specific articles, and in others (a considerable number), simply citing the name of the formal source. It is noted that it even alludes to the jurisprudence of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), without referring to a single precedent from that administrative instance that relates to the object of the disciplinary case. The same occurs with Law 7494, the Law on Internal Control, and, in general, with the sources cited in sections G to P of the legal basis item. Again, this introduces a serious inaccuracy in the act, since an act cannot be understood as duly reasoned when, regarding the legal classification of the conduct as the basic premise for the adopted sanction, it merely points out a set of norms generically, without specifying in what way they have been violated and without engaging in weighing which specific norms have been infringed and the reasons why a specific precept applies to justify the imposed sanction. It is reiterated that it is not appropriate, at this point, to propose a sort of duty for the official to infer that this sanction would be applicable to him, when from the beginning of the procedure, that result was not communicated (nor warned of), nor does the act justify, with the due (and necessary) forcefulness, the specific legal reasons that allow, from the standpoint of the reasonableness of the conduct and in the specific case, such a legal consequence. Once again, this is a substantial informality occurring in the course of the administrative procedure and, specifically, a substantial absence of one of the elements of the administrative act, which, under the protection of Article 166 of the cited Law No. 6227/78, leads, without further remedy, to the nullity of these actions. The foregoing makes it unnecessary to address the other grievances presented by the plaintiff, because having already determined the nullity of the questioned acts for the procedural and substantive reasons mentioned, it would be pointless, and overly abundant, to weigh the other allegations related to alleged deficiencies in the evidence of the administrative case, the composition of the directing body, and other issues presented in the claim. Given this, the proven facts section does not incorporate situations or background that, while related to the other vices alleged in the claim, lack relevance as it is unnecessary to undertake weighing their pertinence by virtue of what has been resolved. In summary, for the reasons cited above, the nullity must be ordered of the initial statement of charges, resolution DRSSCN-2994-2008 issued at 07:00 hours on August 21, 2008, as well as the final act, resolution DRSSCN-2350-2010 issued at 07:00 hours on June 21, 2010. Likewise, for the purposes of Article 164.2 of the LGAP, the nullity of the statement of charges results in the invalidity of the subsequent procedural actions that depend on it.\n\nX.- Synopsis of the annulments decreed. In summary, the annulment of the disciplinary procedure and the actions detailed below must be ordered, given that various irregularities are evident, leading to an insurmountable invalidity, of an absolute degree that must be declared in this venue, specifically: a) Administrative procedure 006-08 brought against Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara: due to the unjustified, unreasonable, and disproportionate delay of the administrative procedure to the detriment of the principle of concentration, immediacy, procedural impulse, due process, and prompt and complete administrative justice, b) Resolution DRSSCN-2994-2008 of 07:00 hours on August 21, 2008, of the Dirección Regional de Servicios de Salud Central Norte of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which constitutes the initial statement of charges (Traslado de cargos) of the administrative disciplinary procedure file 006-08, with respect to the claimant Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara; c) In accordance with numerals 164.2 and 163.2 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the annulment is ordered of the other acts of the administrative procedure file 006-08 that depend upon or have the initial statement of charges as their justifying antecedent, with respect to the claimant; d) Resolution No.\n\nDRSSCN-2350-2010 of 07:00 hours on June 21, 2010, of the Central North Regional Directorate of Health Services of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, insofar as it imposes on Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara a sanction of dismissal without employer liability.”\n\n**III.- General aspects of the administrative procedure.** In the present proceeding, the plaintiff challenges the validity of the act ordering his dismissal without employer liability, alleging a series of defects within the administrative procedure (expediente 006-08) initiated against him.\n\nSuch allegations make it necessary to set forth some brief considerations regarding the dynamics of this type of proceeding. The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its actions. On the other, it is imposed as a frame of reference that allows the individual to establish a comparison of public conduct, in order to set a control ensuring that its actions have been carried out in accordance with the rules that guide that conduct. It therefore seeks to become a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated by canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its purpose is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's objectives and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in article 225.1 of the General Law of Public Administration. Hence, canon 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure in strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure seeks to establish the basic formalities that allow the individual the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial principle, in order to arrive at establishing the aforementioned real truth of the facts (within which can be seen those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the aforementioned General Law). This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning procedures, given that in those cases, the final decision can impose a repressive framework on a person's legal sphere. The same regulatory framework provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid any procedure that does not satisfy these minimum requirements. This is derived from mandate 223 of the referenced Law, insofar as it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the procedure. From this perspective, this Court has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred upon this jurisdiction by canon 49 of the Magna Carta implies a comparison to ensure that the Administration, in the course of these procedures (of a sanctioning nature in this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, in essence, the due process that must be inviolable in that conduct has been protected. That said, by virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions proper to the directing body (órgano director) and the decision-making body (órgano decisor) of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the decision-making body, that is, the one that has been granted the legal competence to issue the act that exhausts the administrative channel. However, for the sake of administrative efficiency, the instructional competencies are delegable to a body tasked with carrying out the instruction of the procedure, which has come to be called the \"directing or investigating body.\" It is evident that the designation of the latter corresponds to the decision-making body, for which its validity is subject to it falling upon an assigned official, regularly appointed, and in possession of the position. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated that persons who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure; however, in that specific function, it must be understood that they perform a public function, with the inherent obligations. Regarding its competencies, the investigating body represents the Administration in the procedure and holds an instructional role. It is responsible for issuing a factual analysis. Although it can render recommendations, they are certainly not binding, meaning its determinations regarding the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts. Therefore, it is responsible for issuing the opening act, providing procedural impulse, all the investigation work of the procedure, directing the appearance (comparecencia), resolving preliminary issues, resolving the appeal for reversal filed against procedural acts, and rendering a report to the decision-making body at the time of remitting the case file for the issuance of the final act. Among its competencies can be seen articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the referenced General Law. For its part, the decision-making body is the competent hierarchical head who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act resolving the procedure.\n\nIV.- Regarding the statute of limitations applicable to the disciplinary power. The first allegation on procedural grounds presented by the plaintiff refers to the alleged statute of limitations applicable to the hierarchical corrective power due to the expiration of the monthly period established by canon 603 of the Labor Code, and the violation of the time limits established by the LGAP. In this sense, he states that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) so declared in vote 10-6364. He emphasizes that the case was brought to the knowledge of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) more than a year ago without any ruling, meaning the sanction is time-barred. On this matter, the following must be indicated. The analysis of the validity of the challenged resolution has as a fundamental point to determine the statute of limitations regime applicable to the administrative disciplinary procedure initiated against the plaintiff. The background of the summarized allegations requires entering to analyze various issues of the temporal element that affects the exercise of the disciplinary power, as well as in the administrative procedure. On this matter, the following must be indicated. In employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the hierarchical head against officials who have committed sanctionable offenses is subject to a temporality factor, after which such exercise cannot be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be seen, varies depending on the regulated matter and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, that disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of ordinal 102 of the LGAP) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that, for finalistic aspects, are considered imprescriptible (art. 66 LGAP), those referring to internal sanctioning exercise—like the one examined in this case—are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which it may lapse due to the passage of time established by the legal system without executing them. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarchical head and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly established by the applicable regulations, after which his or her faculty to request recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. That said, for the purposes of the present case, it is necessary to discriminate between various scenarios that arise in this type of disciplinary proceedings, in all of which rules of temporal exercise of faculties or powers apply, but with diverse nuances. This involves the necessary establishment, for clarity's sake, of demarcation criteria that allow the discussed topics to be addressed, according to the scenario in question. Along these lines, the temporal passage of various stages must be distinguished: 1) Statute of limitations for the exercise of the disciplinary power: This refers to the period established by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the relevant procedural measures that allow issuing the final decision. At this level, it concerns the maximum period imposed by the legal system for the administrative hierarchical head to order the opening of the corresponding procedure, aimed at establishing the pertinence or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure seeking to establish the facts (real truth) that serve as the basis for the motive of the act generates an interrupting effect on that temporal margin, to the extent that it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power. One could not consider that the cited period for the exercise of the power is interrupted by the issuance of the final act, because as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative case—it is insisted—to establish if the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of what is established in ordinals 214, 221, 297, 308 of the LGAP. In this analyzed hypothesis, the disciplinary power of the administrative hierarchical head is subject to a statute of limitations period (whose treatment in practice is actually very close to the concept of expiration (caducidad), to the extent that in certain scenarios it is customary to declare that aspect ex officio), generically regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code, a rule that sets a one-month period for the exercise of that repressive power, which, it is insisted, is interrupted by the communication of the statement of charges. The foregoing without prejudice to offenses regulated by the special regime specified by the internal control, probity in public service, and public finance management regime, in which, according to what is regulated by the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 (art. 43), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422 (art. 44), and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, a special five-year period operates (according to the scenarios and from the moments those rules provide), and not the monthly period established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and later rule that prevails over the general regime of the public service. That said, the starting point for calculating that statute of limitations period is decisive. On this matter, numeral 603 of the Labor Code indicates that the period runs from when the cause for separation arose or, failing that, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known. In this sense, the monthly period is computed from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility to know the offense and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of his or her power. Consequently, when the particularities of the case require a prior stage of preliminary investigation, the aforementioned monthly period runs from the moment the results of that exercise are brought to the knowledge of the hierarchical head. Nevertheless, the need or not for that phase must be discriminated in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that this investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or else, to gather indications that tend to clarify its necessity or not. In the specific case of procedures initiated by the CCSS, the Normativa Interna de Relaciones Laborales, approved by the Board of Directors of the CCSS, in session No. 8474, article 5 of October 21, 2010, establishes in ordinal 146 the statute of limitations rules for the exercise of the cited power, indicating that in disciplinary matters, the cited ordinal 603 of the Labor Code applies, computed from when the decision-making body has sufficient objective elements to determine whether or not to initiate the administrative procedure, except for cases of liability for pecuniary damage, regulated by mandate 198 of Law No. 6227/78, as well as the protective regime for public finances already discussed. In this regard, canon 116 of that Normativa Interna should also be seen. 2) Statute of limitations of the power to adopt the sanction within the procedure: This refers to the maximum time the administrative procedure initiated to establish the facts that allow the holder of the repressive public power to adopt the final decision can last. This matter, save for special rule, is regulated by ordinal 261, in relation to 319 and 340, all of Law No. 6227. However, that two-month period provided therein is a period of an ordering, non-peremptory nature, which of course does not include or allow procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays, which would be invalid due to harm to the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. In this sense, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, issued at 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011. On this point, reference must also be made to what is established by precept 340 of the LGAP, which regulates the concept of expiration (caducidad) of the procedure, in cases where the investigating Administration that initiated it subjects it to a state of abandonment for a period equal to or greater than six months for causes attributable to it. In this scenario, expiration applies even in cases where the procedure is ready for the issuance of the final act, as the restriction of subsection 2 of the cited canon 340, regarding the impossibility of expiration when the matter is ready for the issuance of that final act, only applies when the procedure was initiated at the request of a party, given that the next stage only corresponds to the Administration, which could not shield itself in its inertia. This does not occur when it has been initiated ex officio, as in that case, the delay does benefit the individual, to the extent that it would be a delay solely attributable to the public office. The application of this rule is also provided for in precept 147 of that Normativa de Relaciones Laborales. It should be noted that within the course of the procedure, once the oral and private hearing is concluded, numeral 319 of the LGAP establishes a period of 15 days computed from the date of the appearance for the issuance of the final act. This is a special period for the completion of the procedure. However, again, it is an ordering period, intended to guide the efficiency of the procedure, but whose violation does not necessarily imply, per se, in all cases, the invalidity of the proceedings, except in cases where that delay was arbitrary and unjustified, an aspect that will be discussed later. However, it should be noted that once the hierarchical head holding the disciplinary power has the objective possibility to exercise it through the eventual adoption of the internal corrective act, the monthly statute of limitations of the aforementioned numeral 603 of the Labor Code applies. This means, in most cases, that once the case file is received from the Directing Body of the procedure, which includes the referral of the final report and recommendations, the hierarchical head is enabled to decide whether to impose the sanction that was recommended by that investigating instance or opts for a different decision (see art. 302 LGAP), such that this power must be executed within the one-month period just indicated. The opposite would lead to disregarding the statute of limitations rules that that rule (art. 603 of the Labor Code) establishes, to the detriment of the official's rights. 3) Statute of limitations of the power to execute the imposed sanction: This refers to the period available to the administrative hierarchical head to order the application of the issued sanction. It therefore consists of the material execution of the act whose content provides a disciplinary sanction. In this case, by analogical integration, the applicable period, unless there is a special rule, would be the monthly period provided in numeral 603 of the Labor Code. The denial of such a period would imply the perpetual possibility of the hierarchical head to apply the sanction previously ordered, under the allegation of a sort of imprescriptibility of that power. Thus, one thing is the period for ordering the final act once the final report of the directing body is issued, and another is the period for materializing the firm sanction ordered. On this point, the period must be computed from the firmness of that act, which may originate from the confirmation of the sanction after the exercise and resolution of the ordinary appeals available against the act as appropriate, or, if after the period established by the legal system to file those appeals, they have not been filed, in which event, administrative firmness occurs due to the inertia of the recipient of the effects of the conduct. It should be highlighted that the understanding of the temporality rules of the procedure must be carried out in accordance with the general principles governing the procedural course, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and economy, procedural impulse, ex officio action (arts. 222, 225, and 227 LGAP), which, in the case of the CCSS, can be seen in subsections 3, 4, and 21 of article 95 of the Normativa Interna de Relaciones Laborales.\n\nV.- Regarding the alleged statute of limitations applicable to the disciplinary power. As the first point to analyze, the statute of limitations applicable to the disciplinary power challenged by the plaintiff must be addressed. Regarding the first phase of examination, that is, the period for initiating internal disciplinary actions, on the one hand, the moving party does not make any reproach against that aspect, merely indicating that the expiration of the monthly period of article 603 of the Labor Code occurred in the final adoption phase of the act. Nevertheless, the statute of limitations for initiating disciplinary actions has not supervened in this case. Indeed, the acts that formed the basis of the administrative procedure certainly refer to the violation of rules specific to the internal control regime, specifically, in topics of public procurement. From that perspective, the statute of limitations for ordering the opening of the administrative case is not regulated by numeral 603 of the Labor Code. In the statement of charges, the recipient was notified of the legal rules considered to have been infringed, within which reference is made to the alleged contravention of the principle of probity in public service and in the proper management and sound administration of public resources. The definition of the applicable legal regime must consider the facts for which the opening of the administrative procedure was ordered, in order to establish whether it concerns a factual framework related to a simple employment relationship or, rather, to conduct protected under the incompatibility regime. According to what was stated in the statement of charges, the imputed facts, it is insisted, are related to the duty of probity and the administration of public finances. In light of that circumstance, it is notorious that the reproached conduct does not correspond to a simple disciplinary liability, but rather that the implication and scope of the notified behaviors relate to alleged infractions of the duty of probity and management of public resources. From that perspective, that type of alleged offenses are regulated by Law No. 8422, both in terms of causes and sanctions, but also, in procedures, principles, and statute of limitations. Indeed, although the disciplinary power of the administrative hierarchical head is subject to a statute of limitations period, generically regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code, a rule that sets a one-month period for the exercise of that repressive power, the truth of the matter is that, in the case of conduct regulated and specified by Law No. 8422, it is subject to this particular regime. This is a regulatory system constituted as a sectoral framework containing specific rules, which, as special rules, prevail over general regulations. From this standpoint, article 44 of the cited legislation, regarding the statute of limitations period for the administrative liability of the official, states: \"The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the framework relating to the Public Finance (Hacienda Pública), shall be subject to the statute of limitations, according to article 43 of the General Law of Internal Control and article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994.\" For its part, canon 43 of the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292, refers to precept 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428. This last rule states in essence: \"The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight framework shall be subject to the statute of limitations according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall be subject to a five-year statute of limitations, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious – understood as that act requiring an inquiry or audit study to report its possible irregularity – liability shall be subject to a five-year statute of limitations, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the knowledge of the hierarchical head or competent official to initiate the respective procedure. (...)\" Consequently, in conduct that may involve an infraction of the rules established by Law No. 8422, in matters of statute of limitations, the applicable regulation is ordinal 71 of Law No. 7428, by the referral ordered by mandate 44 of that legal source, ergo, a five-year period, and not the monthly period established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and later rule that prevails over the general labor regime. That said, given that dynamic, in the present case, that five-year period has not expired, so regarding that aspect, the power is not time-barred.\n\nVI.- Regarding the statute of limitations of the procedure. Moreover, the statute of limitations of the procedure is argued due to the delay of more than one month since the completion of the oral and private hearing (comparecencia oral y privada). The substantive analysis of the plaintiff's arguments on this point makes it understood that the allegation in question starts from the thesis that the corrective power of the hierarchical head, according to 603 of the Labor Code, applies to cases where the directing body has concluded the oral and private hearing, or else, has rendered the final report and any recommendations. Such thesis is respected, but definitively is not shared for the following reasons.\n\nAs has been noted, the aforementioned time limit operates to initiate the disciplinary proceeding (except in cases of internal control or anti-corruption regimes), and to execute the ordered sanction. However, regarding the conclusion of the procedure, that rule is not applicable, since in those phases the rule of temporality of numeral 261 of the LGAP and the provisions of canon 319 ejusdem apply, both time limits, as has been explained, being of an ordinating nature. This implies that a procedure that takes longer than said time limit does not, as a starting premise, lead to the nullity of the final act issued within that course. However, this Tribunal is of the opinion that although the aforementioned two-month time limit is an orientation of efficiency (deontological), and not a preclusive referent of competence, it is clear that this cannot condone excessively and unjustifiably long procedures, regardless of the complexity or lack thereof invoked as a pseudo-justification by the Administration. Such dynamics must be addressed on a case-by-case basis, since in certain situations, the delay in a procedure may be due to the need to incorporate evidence that is complex to obtain, such as evidence that must be brought from registries located abroad and which, therefore, involves documents that must be authenticated through consular proceedings, among other situations. Or there may be cases of dilatory tactics by the administered party through the filing of all types of appeals or motions aimed at delaying the procedure, such as the filing of amparo actions, allegations of lack of jurisdiction, motions for nullity, rescheduling of hearings, among other tactics. This is without prejudice to the power to summarily reject such manifestly improper or dilatory motions, as established by canon 292.3 of the LGAP, in relation to numeral 97.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a scenario, agreeing to the suppression of the final act based on the analysis of temporality would, without a doubt, lead to an abuse of right, since ultimately, it would benefit the party who has intentionally sought to delay the proceeding (arts. 20-22 Civil Code). The same does not hold true for proceedings in which, despite the Administration itself alleging extreme complexity, the overall duration is disproportionate and subjects the administered party to an interminable proceeding without a valid reason for it. On this particular point, this collegiate body is of the opinion that the principle of prompt and complete justice implies, in the case of administrative proceedings, that they must be resolved, as a general rule, by a final act, within reasonable and proportional time limits, avoiding subjecting the addressee to unduly long and tedious procedures. It therefore constitutes an expression of the maxim of legal certainty, administrative efficiency, and procedural momentum, insofar as it requires the definition of the case within the proper span of time. Unlike what the CCSS argues, the complexity or lack thereof of the procedure cannot justify arbitrarily long proceedings, since this would imply condoning an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and at its own discretion, the power to resolve the conflict, to the evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear violation of due process. It is reiterated that complexity is one more element to consider in the variable under discussion, but it is not an aspect that legitimizes, in any hypothesis, unreasonable time periods. In this line, numeral 261.1 of Law No. 6227 states: \"<span style='color:#010101'> <i>The administrative procedure must be concluded, by a final act, within two months following its initiation or, as the case may be, following the filing of the complaint or petition of the administered party, unless otherwise provided in this law.</i>\" The same time limit is set by canon 32 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code. Both rules establish, in essence, that once the indicated time limits have expired without the Administration issuing a final act, the addressee may consider the petition rejected by means of negative silence, in order to file administrative appeals or seek judicial protection. It is clear that the figure of negative silence currently serves a protective orientation for the addressee and is not an administrative privilege as was previously understood. It constitutes the possibility of understanding the claim as rejected in order to be able to appeal to other instances and not be subject to the Administration issuing a formal act. It was precisely the \"act-centric\" vision of administrative justice, evidenced by the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies that prevailed until the issuance of ruling 3669-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber and numeral 31.1 of the CPCA, that required the issuance of a formal act to access judicial protection, for which purpose tacit rejection precisely sought to go to higher levels to issue that formal conduct—it should be recalled that the previous model had a predominantly objective tendency. Nowadays, with the merely optional notion of exhausting administrative remedies, silence constitutes a guarantee for the individual, enabling them to resort to other legal means to seek the protection of their legal situation, no longer as a prerequisite to have a challengeable act, but rather to suppress administrative inertia in the definition of their legal relationship. However, the analysis of that figure presupposes that such a negative effect is only viable within proceedings initiated at the request of a party, given that what has not been requested cannot be deemed denied; ergo, in proceedings initiated ex officio, the basic premise, which is the petition or claim, is not present. This is established by subsection 3 of the aforementioned precept 261, which states: \"...</span><i>the claim or petition of the administered party shall be considered rejected in view of the silence of the Administration...</i>\" Ergo, it is not a figure that can be considered applicable in ex officio procedures. Now, the breach of the time limits set by the legal system for the exercise of a competence may indeed incorporate a pathology in the act, due to the infringement of the subjective element of competence. It must be recalled that in light of precept 255 of the LGAP, the legal time limits bind both the Administration and the \"particular\" (a term that must be understood as \"person\" since the addressee of a procedure could well be a public, private, natural, or legal person and not necessarily a particular individual, unless this is understood to mean the addressee—although such an interpretation cannot be shared from a conceptual standpoint, being considered limited). From this postulate, it follows then that time-limited competences can lead to null acts (doctrine of numeral 60.1 LGAP). However, the correct understanding of that last statement must lead to the following. Sovereign powers are imprescriptible (art. 66.1 ibidem), an aspect that justifies what is stated in canon 329.3 of the cited Law No. 6227, insofar as an act issued outside the time limit shall be valid for all legal purposes, except where expressly provided by law. A clear example of these exceptions is positive silence (i.e., a presumed act—art. 330 ejusdem in relation to 139-), a case in which, once correctly declared or having occurred, the maxim of the intangibility of one's own acts operates, which implies the impossibility for the Administration to disregard that effect, under penalty of absolute nullity for violation of constitutional precept 34. In this example of positive silence, it is precisely due to a temporal factor that the competence to issue the act is lost, though not the ability to seek ways to suppress the presumed act. That said, it is worth clarifying that, despite its wording in imperative language (typical of a prescriptive normative method), the two-month time limit set by canon 261.2 of the LGAP is not peremptory but merely ordinating, a fact that can be gleaned from what has been stated regarding the duty of the Administration to exercise its competences and the initial validity of \"extemporaneous\" acts. This position can also be seen in decision No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. This applies both to proceedings initiated ex officio and those initiated at the request of a party. In the latter, despite the exercise of the faculty of the effects of negative silence, the Administration may well issue the act, which would broaden the debate in appellate proceedings, whether administrative or judicial. From this perspective, the investigative power of the procedure, nor the procedure itself, is extinguished if the time limit in question has been exceeded. Although the structure of the ordinary procedure would lead one to presume that the time limit in question must always be respected, it is clear that the complexity of a matter and the vicissitudes inherent to the process can lead to longer durations. The determining factor, then, lies in whether the procedure shows signs of activity that are necessary and pertinent, and not unjustified delays, in accordance with the principle of speed and procedural momentum—numerals 222 and 225 LGAP—such that its duration is not the product of arbitrary conduct or inertia. Such inertia, as will be seen later, is sanctioned by figures such as expiration—precept 340 ibidem—a topic to be analyzed next.\n\n**VII.- Concrete analysis of the temporal aspects of the procedure.** Notwithstanding the foregoing, the ordinating nature of the aforementioned time limit does not speak to the validity of acts issued within proceedings whose delay exceeds the normal threshold of reasonableness. Indeed, an unreasonable duration of the procedure can lead to the nullity of the proceedings due to a violation of the principle of prompt and complete justice (which this Tribunal must protect). In this regard, reference can be made to the precedents numbered 2007-3140 and 2007-6758, both from the Constitutional Tribunal. In the first, it was emphatically stated: \"<i>Now then, from the moment an administrative procedure begins until the issuance of the final act, a reasonable and proportional period must elapse, taking into account the conduct of the parties, the complexity of the matter, and the legal time limits established for each case, such that the Administration may have a prudential period, but without incurring undue delays that hinder the procedure... this Tribunal considers that the time used by the respondent from the moment the procedure was initiated, to date, far from being justifiable, is excessive, unreasonable, and to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the amparo petitioner, due to the unjustified delay incurred by the respondent administration.</i>” This decision is cited by the First Chamber in the aforementioned judgment 34-2011. In the present case, as has been stated, not every procedure that takes more than two months implies the nullity of the proceedings, but only insofar as the delay is unreasonable, which must be weighed in each case, considering the processing and complexity of the proceedings. In this matter, from the analysis of the factual framework set forth in the list of proven facts, it is observed that the procedure did not enter a phase of abandonment, given that multiple summons were issued for hearings to evaluate testimonial evidence and to comply with various phases of the oral and private hearing. However, the analysis of what occurred leads this collegiate body to conclude the unreasonableness and untenability of the time limits incurred by the Administration in this case, to the clear and evident detriment of the principle of administrative efficiency and prompt and complete administrative justice. From the analysis of the case file, it is observed that by <span style='color:#010101'>resolution number DRSSCN-2994-2008 of August 21, 2008, the Regional Management and Central North Health Services Network Directorate of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund initiated administrative procedure file 006-08 by means of a statement of charges, for the alleged violation of internal control rules in the direct contracting system for obtaining goods and services at the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital. (Folios 2-99 of tome I of the administrative file, folios 240-336 of the administrative file of the procedure). Subsequently, in official communication number HCLVV-AJ-405-2009, dated July 27, 2009, the Directing Body of the Administrative Procedure resolved the statute of limitations exception raised by the amparo petitioners, rejecting said request. As justification for this rejection, the administration stated that the actions of the Directing Body have always been in accordance with the Law. It further noted that the procedure has never lacked due diligence within reasonably logical time limits. (Folio 2369 of the administrative file of the procedure, folio 381 of tome III according to the new foliation of the administrative file of the procedure). Subsequently, through official communication HCLVV-AGL-042-2010 of January 28, 2010, the Director of the Directing Body of the Procedure sent the Central North Regional Director a clarification regarding the material or arithmetic errors in the certifications issued by Licentiate Pablo Andrés Esquivel Chaverri, which consisted of the certification document indicating it certified a certain number of copies and, from the receipt count of the file, it was determined that it contained variable figures; therefore, those files were not entirely received by the Directing Body, considering they contained material and arithmetic errors; that the administrative files were sent to the Central North Regional Director to resolve the appeals of appeal and absolute nullity filed by the investigated parties (see folios 3179 of the administrative file of the procedure). On the occasion of this account, the plaintiff, together with other persons, filed an amparo action before the Constitutional Chamber, processed under file number 10-001159-0007-CO, within which, through ruling No. 2010-6364 of 09 hours 36 minutes on April 9, 2010, that high Tribunal referred to the rejection of an amparo action that the same amparo petitioners had previously filed against this same procedure 006-08, a rejection issued through vote 2009-04298 of March 17, 2009. However, it specified that the conditions weighed in that prior case had substantially changed compared to those considered in the new appeal. Ultimately, in this last case, the Constitutional Chamber stated in the relevant part: \"... <i>In this case, the Chamber stated in the pronouncement of March seventeenth, two thousand nine, that it was an extremely complex administrative procedure, as it involved several facts and persons, a reason for which it dismissed a violation of the right to prompt and complete justice. But now, more than a year has passed since that ruling, and the procedure continues without being definitively resolved, due, according to the respondents, to the complexity of the matter. This would justify a period of years to definitively resolve the procedure, to the detriment of the rights of those involved, who would be in a state of legal uncertainty. Simply by counting the time from August 21, 2008, when the Regional Management and Central North Health Services Network Directorate of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund initiated the statement of charges against the amparo petitioners for having violated internal control rules in the direct contracting system for obtaining goods and services at the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital, over a year and a half is credited in an administrative procedure, which, although complex, has exceeded all the time limits of the General Law of Public Administration, a reason to grant the appeal with the consequences provided by law.</i>\" Based on this, the Chamber granted a period of fifteen business days to conclude the procedure. Even so, the act proposing the dismissal of the plaintiff employee, i.e., resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010, was issued on June 21, 2010 (folios 1036-1144 of tome II of the administrative file). What was expressed by the Constitutional Tribunal connects with the considerations of this collegiate body regarding the violation in this specific case of the reasonable time limits that must prevail in matters of administrative disciplinary proceedings. It is not a matter of the violation of the two-month time limit so many times mentioned (art. 261 LGAP), but rather the infringement of the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice, which requires a reasonable and adequate duration of the procedure according to its degree of complexity. In this case, from the issuance of the initial act of the statement of charges on August 21, 2008, to the date of issuance of the act of disciplinary sanction on June 21, 2010, approximately one year and 10 months elapsed, a period that is considered, by far, completely arbitrary and unjustified. Certainly, the procedure in question was directed against several officials; moreover, the evidence was voluminous, so in principle it could be said that the procedure was complex. However, it must be pointed out that the opening of the procedure was preceded by a report from the Internal Audit of the CCSS, as well as a preliminary investigation phase, meaning that the stage of gathering evidence was already advanced. Regarding these stages, reference can be seen in the final report of the directing body, which is recorded at folios 852 and following of tome II of the administrative file. Nonetheless, it is not apparent, despite these factors, how a period of 22 months is reasonable for processing this case. That period is even longer if the later phases of the procedure, established as a guarantee for the employee in accordance with the Internal Regulations of the CCSS, are considered—specifically, the referral of the matter to the Labor Relations Committee or Board, as stipulated by numeral 135 of those regulations. The analysis of the file reveals a complex network of actions, reports, extensions of reports, and requests for extension or correction of documents, an aspect which, by way of simple reference, can be seen in the section of recitals (resultandos) of the sanctioning act (folios 1036-1047 of the administrative file). Even in that act, the argument of the statute of limitations raised by the plaintiff is addressed, and it is noted, in essence, that although the power to discipline the faults of officials expires in one month, this period is computed from the moment the hierarchical instance can exercise that power. It indicates that in the specific case, the report of conclusions from the directing body was received on April 27, 2010, but this report lacked essential elements for the deciding body to be able to resolve, so an extension was requested, which was ultimately received on May 25, 2010, and therefore the alleged statute of limitations did not occur. Certainly, that aforementioned one-month period did not expire; however, what is being analyzed at this point is the exaggerated delay of the procedure. This Tribunal does not share the argument that the complexity of the file justified that time period. Observe that the bulk of the evidence consisted of the preliminary inspection report that formed the basis for the procedure. The minutes of the hearings held show only the evaluation of witness testimonies or party statements. It is reiterated, the 22 months of processing the disciplinary case (without counting the referral to the Labor Relations instance) shows an unreasonable time limit in the processing of the procedure, which the CCSS limits itself to justifying by extreme complexity. However, that mere statement is not sufficient, and on the contrary, the analysis of the purpose of the procedure, concretized to determine whether the plaintiff employee had incurred in the actions denounced in reports AGL-216-R-2007 of April 26, 2007, and AIN-322-R-2007 of September 19, 2007, both from the Internal Audit of the CCSS, as well as the dynamics shown by the procedural course, do not justify that duration. In short, this aspect vitiates the procedure for violation of the principles of procedural momentum, speed, concentration, and prompt and complete administrative justice. Therefore, a deficiency is present that provides the basis for the invalidity of the proceedings. The opposite would lead to condoning procedures with unreasonable time limits without any legal consequence, which, of course, this Tribunal does not tolerate. Although numeral 329.3, referenced previously, states that the final act rendered outside of the time limit is valid, except for legal exceptions, it is clear that this in no way constitutes a sort of open letter, an uncontrollable permit justifying extremely lengthy procedures, with an unreasonable violation of time limits to the detriment of due process, concentration, speed, procedural unity, legal certainty—all constituent elements of the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. As has been pointed out, this flaw shows a substantial nonconformity with the legal system (numerals 128, 158 and 223, all of the LGAP) regarding the procedure carried out, from an integral standpoint. This aspect demands, together with errors appearing in the phase of the statement of charges and the final act, which will be dealt with later, the nullity of the proceedings. In sum, the unjustified delay occurring in the procedure under examination gives rise to a ground for absolute, insurmountable nullity, which inevitably leads to the suppression of that procedure. Moreover, in light of what has been said, it is irrelevant to refer to the issue of the expiration of the procedure.\n\n**VIII.- On the defects in the statement of reasons of Resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010 of 07 hours on June 21, 2010.** Without prejudice to what was stated above regarding the violation of the temporal elements of the procedure, the analysis now proceeds to weigh the statement of reasons both for the initiating act and for the final act issued in that file 006-08. In the statement of charges, as regards the plaintiff Sánchez Lara, he was primarily charged with deficiencies in the following aspects: **a.** That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his capacity as Head of the Material Resources Area of the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital, he knew of, managed, applied, and executed the simplified direct purchase modality, without complying with the substantial stages and requirements of the Administrative Contracting Law and its regulations. In this regard, a detailed table is attached showing the contracting files, contractual object, and code, visible from folio 49 to 52 of the administrative file, which it is irrelevant to record in this judgment; **b.** That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his capacity as Head of the Material Resources Area of the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital, he knew of, managed, applied, and executed the simplified direct purchase modality, which showed deficiencies in the contractual activity of direct purchases, causing inefficient internal control and financial risk for the Administration due to the technical non-compliance with his duties; **c.**\n\nb. That during the years 2005 and 2006, he failed to comply with the basic elements for executing simplified direct purchases (compra directa simplificada) set forth in official communication ARM-00700-2005 of October 11, 2005, which detailed the actions to follow in purchase procedures; c. That during the 2005-2006 periods, he managed, approved, and authorized direct purchases (compras directas) HRSA-CD-1782-2005, HSRA-CD-01-2006, HSRA-CD-84-2006, HSRA-CD-0420-2006, and HSRA-CD-0032-2006, in which the requestors omitted to present the form called \"request for direct acquisition from exclusive suppliers\"; d. That during the 2005-2006 periods, he managed, approved, and authorized direct purchases (compras directas) 1798-2005, 1743-2005, 0092-2006, 1748-2005, 1701-2005, 170-2006 (all HSRA-CD), in which the offeror presented, together with the quote, a letter of exclusivity, without it being evident from that document that exclusivity exists; e. That in direct purchase (compra directa) 2007CD-000366-2205, 3 potential offerors are invited, but two of the companies do not offer the required good for sale, and the only company that offers the good, according to market research, is not acceptable due to price gouging. Furthermore, he omitted to communicate what occurred to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. f. That he breached his duties pertaining to administrative management within the procedure of direct purchase (compra directa) 2007CD-00785-2205, because for the same object of purchase 2007CD-366-2005, he again invites the 3 indicated companies; g. That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his capacity as Head of the Material Resources Area of the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital, he managed, approved, and authorized irregular purchases in the acquisition of food products and others, outside the bounds of the Administrative Procurement Law. In that sense, a detail table is attached of the procurement files, contractual object, and code, visible from folios 54 to 57 of the administrative file and which is irrelevant to record in this judgment; h. That in the 2005-2006 period, he executed the practice of unlawful subdivision (fraccionamiento) or fragmentation in the promotion of isolated purchases; i. That during the years 2005 and 2006, in his capacity as Head of the Material Resources Area of the San Rafael de Alajuela Hospital, he breached his duties of control, custody, and filing of administrative procurement files in the specific case of the direct purchases (compras directas) cited in that act, and whose detail runs from folio 58 to 68 of the administrative file.\n\nThen, that statement of charges incorporates a section titled \"III: LEGAL BASIS\", in which the directing body limits itself to citing a set of legal norms, in which, as it expressly indicates, the procedure finds its basis, among these, article 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptrollership of the Republic, LGAP, Internal Labor Regulations (arts. 46, 48, 50, 79), Code of Ethics for Servants of the CCSS (arts. 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16), Labor Relations Regulations, Administrative Procurement Law and its regulations, General Law of Internal Control, Regulation of Norms and Procedures for obtaining goods and services in a decentralized manner of the CCSS, Faculties Model and Levels of Adjudication by Administrative Instance of the CCSS, jurisprudence of the General Comptrollership of the Republic, Law of Archives No. 7202, Civil Procedure Code. Next, it details the documentary evidence contained in the file, temporarily separates the investigated parties from their positions, and finally indicates the rights it deems pertinent within the cause.\n\nThe analysis of that statement of charges evidences an insurmountable pathology that must be specified. Indeed, the initial act of the statement of charges completely disregards, with respect to the plaintiff, warning about the possible legal consequences of the proceeding, that is, it omits to indicate the possible sanctions or effects that this course may generate in the legal sphere of the official, as a consequence of the conducts and facts imputed to them. In the judgment of this collegiate body, such a warning constitutes a fundamental right of the investigated party, since from the very beginning, the legal qualification of those facts and their consequences can be subject to questioning, as well as the challenge of an eventual variation in the legal qualification of the circumstances subject to the procedure (for example, that a suspension without pay is noticed and then it is reclassified and leads to dismissal). From this perspective, it is an elementary aspect of the statement of charges. At most, at the beginning of the act, it is indicated that the procedure is to establish disciplinary and patrimonial liability, but the possible sanction to be applied is not specified. That form of notification does not satisfy the duties already noted and constitutes, on the contrary, a generic, imprecise formula, a fertile basis for confusion and uncertainty, antagonistic to the certainty that must prevail in these cases. If during the course of the procedure it is estimated that the severity of the facts may motivate a more intense sanction, the recipient must be advised of this so that they may exercise their right to adversarial proceedings, but it is pathological simply to advise that punishment will be imposed, without specifying what particular reprimand is possibly applicable. Such a requirement is not satisfied by the generalized mention of norms without any reference to aspects pertaining to how they have probably been violated and what relationship they have with the object of the procedure. It is not an aspect that the investigated party should deduce or infer, since in these cases clarity of what has been analyzed is required, as an undeniable derivation of the right of defense and adversarial proceedings. In short, it consists of a substantial deficiency that, in light of ordinance 223 in relation to 166, both of the LGAP, implies the invalidity of that act.\n\nIX.- On the deficiencies of the final act. Now then, once the procedure was substantiated and the various phases of the oral and private hearing were conducted, as has been indicated, through Resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010 of 07:00 hours on June 21, 2010, of the Central North Health Services Regional Directorate of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, a sanction of dismissal without employer liability was imposed on Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara. In that particularity, starting from folio 1071 of the administrative dossier (page 36 of the cited act), the Deciding Body reiterates the conducts that, with a degree of probability, had been imputed to the plaintiff, in the same terms indicated in the previous section. Next, an exposition is made of the proven and unproven circumstances of the various elements analyzed regarding the situations investigated concerning the simplified direct purchases (compras directas simplificadas) (section A), direct purchase (compra directa) 2007CD-366-2205 and 2007CD-785-2205 (section B), irregular purchases in various food products (section C), custody, control, and filing of files (section D) - see folios 1075 to 1105 of the administrative dossier -. Further on in the act, an exposition is made of the circumstances that were deemed accredited and the reasons why the deciding body considered that the analyzed actions were improper. However, as a projection of the deficiencies of the statement of charges, the act in question immediately proceeds to consider that the applicable sanction is dismissal without employer liability, without establishing, in that specific case, the relational analysis of the weighted conducts and the norms on the basis of which that legal consequence would be sustained. The act limits itself to pointing out that those detected actions are serious breaches of the plaintiff's duties and the regime of administrative procurement and internal control, but it does not specify, as is due, the specific norms violated, such that an analysis of the motive-content relationship, and incidentally, of the reasoning for that administrative decision, can be carried out. Although regarding the establishment of the proven facts, a concatenated account of the relevant findings in the procedure is given, such that that part of the act can be understood as reasoned, even though no explicit reference is made to the specific evidence on the basis of which the factual conclusion is reached in each case, the same does not occur regarding the reasoning for the legal grounds to impose dismissal as the maximum sanction in public employment matters. The final act projects the flaw detected in the statement of charges, because just as the latter omitted referring to the legal qualification of the imputed facts, in the former, no logical construction is made regarding the relational cause-effect link, which allows establishing how those determined facts fit within the conditioning premise, so that the appropriateness or not of that conditioned consequence can be established. The effect that the questioned conduct intends to impose, that is, dismissal, which constitutes the maximum sanction that can be imposed in employment relationships, demands not only the exposition of proven facts that would provide the basis for the motive element of that act, understood as the factual or legal premise that demands or empowers the issuance of public will (art. 133 LGAP), but also the clear indication of how those facts fit within the factual premise set by a specific legal norm, so that the result projected by that normative provision can be imposed. From that standpoint, the content element of the act, considered as the material-legal effect that the act seeks to impose (art. 132 LGAP), must maintain a relationship of correspondence and proportionality with the motive element (art. 132.2 LGAP). It is a symbiosis between both elements, which imbues the act with validity, because the content of the act is issued as a function of the motive, and this in turn conditions the scope and implications of the content. Thus, for the analysis of the legitimacy of this material binomial (motive-content), it is imperative that the act indicate not only the detected factual premise, but also the legal norm that supports the adopted content. If this is not the case, it will not be feasible to analyze whether those conducts merit the applied result. This is even more decisive in sanctioning administrative punitive law, in which a maxim of strict legality of offenses and sanctions is required, known as the principle of typicality (principio de tipicidad), which finds its basis in ordinances 39 and 41 of the Magna Carta, 11, 19, and 124 of the LGAP. Only in the face of a clear formulation of such requirements can it be weighed whether the applied sanction is the one of merit in the specific case, or whether it was not pertinent, be it due to a lack of typicality (tipicidad) of the reproached conduct, or due to disproportion between the motive and the content. Again, this omission is called into question from the very initial act of the statement of charges. Now, this last point constitutes a fundamental pillar of the motivational element of the public decision (art. 136 LGAP), which ultimately becomes a fundamental axis of the right of defense, because otherwise, the recipient of the act could not question the aforementioned typicality (tipicidad) or the commented relationship of correspondence and/or proportionality. In this way, a comparison of the facts versus the legal system that would allow the cited act to be considered duly reasoned is not carried out. Although a series of citations of legal norms is made later on, just as occurred in the statement of charges, the Administration limited itself to abstractly citing a set of legal and regulatory provisions, in some cases citing specific articles, and in others (a considerable amount), simply citing the name of the formal source. Note that it even alludes to the jurisprudence of the General Comptrollership of the Republic, without referring to a single precedent of that administrative body that is related to the object of the disciplinary cause. The same occurs with Law 7494, the Internal Control Law, and in general, with the sources cited in sections G to P of the legal basis item. Again, this introduces a serious inaccuracy in the act, because an act cannot be understood as duly reasoned when, regarding the legal qualification of the conducts, as the basic premise for the adopted sanction, it limits itself to generically pointing out a set of norms, without specifying in what manner they have been violated and without entering into pondering which specific norms have been breached and the reasons why a certain precept applies to justify the imposed sanction. It is insisted that at this point it is not possible to propose a kind of duty for the official to infer that this sanction would be applicable to them, when from the start of the procedure, that result was neither notified (nor warned of), nor does the act justify, with the due (and necessary) forcefulness, the specific legal reasons that allow, from the standpoint of the reasonableness of the conduct, in the specific case, such a legal consequence. Again, it is a substantial informality that occurs in the course of the administrative procedure and, specifically, a substantial absence of one of the elements of the administrative act, which, under the protection of canon 166 of the cited Law No. 6227/78, leads, without any other remedy, to the nullity of those proceedings.\n\nThe foregoing exposition makes it unnecessary to address the other grievances presented by the plaintiff, because having already determined the nullity of the questioned acts for the procedural and substantive reasons mentioned, it would be of no use, being excessive, to weigh the other allegations related to supposed deficiencies in the evidence of the administrative cause, composition of the directing body, and other issues presented in the lawsuit. In view of this, in the proven facts section, situations or antecedents have not been incorporated that, although related to the other defects alleged in the lawsuit, lack relevance because it is unnecessary to enter into pondering their pertinence by virtue of what has been resolved. In sum, for the aforementioned reasons, the nullity of the initial act of statement of charges, resolution DRSSCN-2994-2008 of 07:00 hours on August 21, 2008, must be ordered, as well as the final act, resolution DRSSCN-2350-2010 of 07:00 hours on June 21, 2010. Likewise, for the effects of ordinance 164.2 of the LGAP, the nullity of the statement of charges implies the invalidity of the subsequent acts of the procedure that depend upon it.\n\nX.- Synopsis of the decreed nullities. In sum, the nullity of the disciplinary procedure and the conducts that are detailed below must be ordered, because various pathologies are evident that lead to an insurmountable invalidity, of an absolute degree that must be declared in this venue, specifically: a) Administrative procedure 006-08 brought against Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara: due to the unjustified, unreasonable, and disproportionate delay of the administrative procedure to the detriment of the principle of concentration, immediacy, procedural impulse, due process, and prompt and complete administrative justice, b) Resolution DRSSCN-2994-2008 of 07:00 hours on August 21, 2008, of the Central North Health Services Regional Directorate of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, which constitutes the initial Statement of Charges for disciplinary administrative procedure dossier 006-08, with respect to the plaintiff Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara; c) In accordance with numerals 164.2 and 163.2 of the General Law of Public Administration, the nullity of the other acts of administrative procedure dossier 006-08, which depend on or have as their justifying antecedent the initial statement of charges, with respect to the plaintiff, is ordered; d) Resolution No. DRSSCN-2350-2010 of 07:00 hours on June 21, 2010, of the Central North Health Services Regional Directorate of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, insofar as it imposes on Mr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Lara a sanction of dismissal without employer liability.\""
}