{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-149162", "citation": "Res. 01321-2013 Sala Primera de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Legitimación de asociación de consumidores para defender intereses difusos y colectivos", "title_en": "Consumer association standing to defend diffuse and collective interests", "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte anula la sentencia que negó legitimación activa a la Asociación Nacional de Consumidores Libres (ANCL) en un proceso contencioso administrativo contra dos bancos estatales. La ANCL reclamaba daños materiales y morales para sus asociados por cláusulas abusivas en créditos referenciados a la Tasa Básica Pasiva (TBP), así como la protección de intereses difusos y colectivos de los consumidores exigiendo información clara sobre los riesgos de esos créditos. La Sala define los conceptos de intereses difusos, colectivos y corporativos, traza la evolución constitucional y legal de la protección al consumidor en Costa Rica, y concluye que las asociaciones de consumidores están legitimadas por la Constitución Política (artículo 46) y la Ley 7472 (artículos 32, 33, 46, 54 y 56) para accionar judicialmente en defensa de intereses difusos y colectivos, sin necesidad de individualizar el daño. El fallo ordena reenviar el expediente al tribunal de origen para que dicte nueva sentencia conforme a derecho.", "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court annuls the lower court's ruling that denied standing to the National Association of Free Consumers (ANCL) in an administrative lawsuit against two state banks. The ANCL sought material and moral damages for its members due to allegedly abusive clauses in loans tied to the Basic Passive Rate (TBP), as well as protection of diffuse and collective consumer interests by demanding clear information on the risks of such loans. The Chamber defines diffuse, collective, and corporate interests, traces the constitutional and legal evolution of consumer protection in Costa Rica, and concludes that consumer associations have standing under Article 46 of the Constitution and Law 7472 (Articles 32, 33, 46, 54, and 56) to bring judicial actions in defense of diffuse and collective interests without needing to individualize the harm. The case is remanded to the trial court for a new ruling in accordance with the law.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte", "date": "2013", "year": "2013", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "intereses difusos", "intereses colectivos", "legitimación activa", "acción popular", "Ley 7472", "Tasa Básica Pasiva", "CNC (Comisión Nacional del Consumidor)", "CPCA (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 46", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 32", "law": "Ley 7472" }, { "article": "Art. 33", "law": "Ley 7472" }, { "article": "Art. 46", "law": "Ley 7472" }, { "article": "Art. 54", "law": "Ley 7472" }, { "article": "Art. 56", "law": "Ley 7472" }, { "article": "Art. 196", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 10", "law": "Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo" } ], "keywords_es": [ "legitimación activa", "intereses difusos", "intereses colectivos", "consumidor", "asociación de consumidores", "ANCL", "Ley 7472", "artículo 46 Constitución Política", "cláusulas abusivas", "tasa básica pasiva", "TBP", "individualización del daño", "acción popular", "Sala Primera", "proceso contencioso administrativo" ], "keywords_en": [ "standing", "diffuse interests", "collective interests", "consumer", "consumer association", "ANCL", "Law 7472", "Article 46 of the Constitution", "abusive clauses", "basic passive rate", "TBP", "individualization of harm", "class action", "First Chamber", "administrative lawsuit" ], "excerpt_es": "De ahí que, este Órgano Decisor no concuerda con el criterio del Tribunal, en cuanto estima que \"persiste la necesidad de la individualización del daño, como requisito necesario para el ejercicio de la acción\". Por el contrario, los preceptos constitucionales y legales señalados, y su desarrollo jurisprudencial, permiten concluir que la ANCL se encuentra legitimada para interponer el presente proceso en sede judicial, ante la lesión que, arguye, se ha causado a los intereses difusos y colectivos de los consumidores de productos y servicios financieros, por causa de: la supuesta falta de información acerca de los eventuales riesgos que implican los créditos bancarios vinculados a la TBP y la alegada naturaleza abusiva de las cláusulas contractuales que estipulen esa modalidad de cálculo. Más aún, no sería posible determinar si se han ocasionado daños individualizables a las personas particulares, hasta tanto no se evidencie, en primer lugar, si existe la vulneración a esos intereses difusos y colectivos que la ANCL ha reclamado.\n\n[...] El canon 46 de la Carta Magna, en consuno con el análisis armónico de la Ley no. 7472, impone tal conclusión, garantizando el acceso a la vía administrativa o judicial, con el fin de lograr la tutela efectiva de estos derechos e intereses (disposiciones 1, 32, incisos b), e), y f), 33, inciso d), 46, 54 y 56 de la citada Ley).", "excerpt_en": "Hence, this decision-making body does not agree with the trial court's view that \"the need to individualize the harm persists as a requirement for bringing the action.\" On the contrary, the constitutional and legal provisions cited, along with their jurisprudential development, lead to the conclusion that ANCL has standing to bring this judicial process, given the harm it argues has been caused to the diffuse and collective interests of consumers of financial products and services, due to: the alleged lack of information about the potential risks of bank loans tied to the TBP and the allegedly abusive nature of contractual clauses stipulating that calculation method. Moreover, it would not be possible to determine whether individualizable harm has been caused to specific persons until it is first established whether there has been a violation of those diffuse and collective interests that ANCL has claimed.\n\n[...] Article 46 of the Constitution, in harmony with Law 7472, mandates this conclusion, guaranteeing access to administrative or judicial remedies to achieve effective protection of these rights and interests (Articles 1, 32(b), (e), (f), 33(d), 46, 54, and 56 of said Law).", "outcome": { "label_en": "Annulment", "label_es": "Anulatoria", "summary_en": "The First Chamber annuls the appealed ruling, recognizes ANCL's standing to defend diffuse and collective consumer interests, and remands the case to the trial court for a new ruling.", "summary_es": "La Sala Primera anula la sentencia impugnada, reconoce la legitimación activa de la ANCL para defender intereses difusos y colectivos de consumidores, y ordena reenviar el expediente al tribunal de origen para una nueva sentencia." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "In the broad spectrum of interests, with general interests at one end and individual interests at the other, diffuse interests lie at an intermediate point, and as they become more specific, collective interests appear, followed by corporate interests.", "quote_es": "En el amplio espectro de los intereses, donde en un extremo se tienen los generales y en el otro los individuales, los difusos se colocan en un punto intermedio y, en la medida en que se especifican, se ubican los colectivos y, luego, los corporativos." }, { "context": "Considerando IX", "quote_en": "This Chamber does not share the trial court's view. It is worth recalling that, in previous rulings, this decision-making body has accepted the existence of non-individualizable harm that can be caused to collectivities: 'this is not a harm caused directly to the plaintiff, but to the community at large; because it harms a diffuse interest, it has autonomy.'", "quote_es": "Esta Sala no comparte el criterio de los juzgadores. Conviene recordar que, en anteriores oportunidades, este órgano decisor ha aceptado la existencia de daños no individualizables, que pueden ser causados a colectividades: \"no se trata de un daño generado directamente en la persona de la actora, sino a la globalidad; que por lesionar un interés difuso, posee autonomía\"." }, { "context": "Considerando X", "quote_en": "The mere absence of a direct relationship or injury, as a matter of principle, cannot lead to a loss of standing for someone who holds a constitutionally recognized right.", "quote_es": "La simple falta de relación directa o de perjuicio, en tesis de principio, no puede conducir a una pérdida de la legitimación para quien posee un derecho reconocido a nivel constitucional." }, { "context": "Considerando X", "quote_en": "Consumer associations, such as ANCL, also have standing to defend diffuse and collective interests. Article 46 of the Constitution, in harmony with Law 7472, mandates this conclusion.", "quote_es": "Las agrupaciones de consumidores, como la ANCL, se encuentran también legitimadas para la defensa de sus intereses difusos y colectivos. El canon 46 de la Carta Magna, en consuno con el análisis armónico de la Ley no. 7472, impone tal conclusión." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-26481", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7472 Art. 32" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-149162", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-11296", "norm_num": "7319", "norm_name": "Ley de la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "17/11/1992" }, { "doc_id": "norm-26481", "norm_num": "7472", "norm_name": "Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "20/12/1994" }, { "doc_id": "norm-38915", "norm_num": "6815", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "27/09/1982" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“IV. Para el resolver el cargo en contra de la falta de\r\nlegitimación activa de la ANCL –alegada por los\r\nbancos demandados y acogida en la sentencia que se impugna–\r\nimporta hacer referencia a los razonamientos utilizados por los juzgadores para\r\nsustentar su decisión, quienes señalaron lo siguiente: “En cuanto al fondo\r\ndel asunto, para efectos del análisis de la demanda, este Tribunal luego de\r\nescuchar en juicio las intervenciones de las partes y la prueba testimonial,\r\nobserva que la cuestión a resolver es la eventual responsabilidad objetiva,\r\nrecayendo esta condición en los bancos demandados, atribuyéndole una conducta\r\nque está vinculada a los vaivenes de la tasa básica pasiva, la cual reflejó una\r\ntendencia hacia el alza en el período que le interesa a la Asociación actora;\r\nes decir, a partir del segundo semestre del año 2007 y a la fecha de\r\npresentación de la demanda. Pero en la forma en que la parte actora definió la\r\npretensión, desde la audiencia preliminar, observa el Tribunal que la petitoria\r\nde la demanda refiere a un contenido abstracto e indeterminado, dejando\r\nexpuesto el dilema de que nos encontramos ante la inexistencia de un caso en\r\nconcreto que permita al Tribunal dar fiel cumplimiento al artículo 196 de la\r\nLey General de la Administración Pública, de manera que sea posible analizar la\r\nexistencia del daño, para comprobar que sea efectivo, evaluable e individualizable con relación a una persona o grupo. El\r\nTribunal de Juicio tiene plena conciencia de que el artículo 122, inciso m),\r\ndel Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo admite la condenatoria en\r\nabstracto de los daños y perjuicios, pero ni aún en ese supuesto resulta\r\nadmisible pensar que esa condición –etérea– se\r\nrefiere no sólo a la condenatoria sino también a sujetos en abstracto, es\r\ndecir, no identificados, puesto que la norma exige siempre, al menos, la\r\nacreditación de una conducta administrativa o relación jurídica administrativa,\r\nque debe entenderse necesariamente como aquella que nace de la interrelación\r\nentre la Administración y el administrado, de manera que resulte oponible por\r\nquien resultó afectado. De antemano no se niega la posibilidad de admitir la\r\nlegitimación por interés colectivo pero aún en esa hipótesis persiste la\r\nnecesidad de la individualización del daño, como requisito necesario para el\r\nejercicio de la acción, ya que admitir lo contrario implicaría dar cabida a\r\ndemandas con pretensiones abstractas, siendo impensable el dictado de una\r\neventual sentencia abstracta, que evade de esa forma la referencia de una\r\nrelación jurídico administrativa, concreta y específica, como generadora del\r\ndaño, conducta frente a la cual bien pudo reclamar el consumidor planteando una\r\npretensión en forma individual o en forma colectiva, pero en ambos casos\r\nacreditado, al menos, la existencia de esa relación y el interés del afectado\r\npara hacer valer sus derechos. En el presente caso no ha sido posible ubicar\r\nuna manifestación expresa, que dé a entender que la Asociación actora cumplió el\r\nmandato citado en las normas mencionadas, pues hemos revisado las hipótesis y\r\nla demanda no cumple alguna o cualesquiera de ellas, es decir, uno, que cada\r\nasociado afectado por las condiciones del crédito que reclama la citada\r\ndemanda, haya delegado la representación de su caso individual en la Asociación\r\ndicha, por medio de poder conforme a derecho; o bien, dos, que\r\nindependientemente de la existencia de un poder para ejercer la representación\r\ny tratándose de un interés colectivo la Asociación actora haya demandado en\r\nrepresentación efectiva de sus miembros, habiendo acreditado de manera\r\nanticipada la identificación de cada uno de ellos y el contexto de sus casos en\r\nparticular, individualizando cuáles son los asociados que fueron sujetos del\r\ncrédito en las condiciones que precisamente se reclama en la demanda. Para\r\ncorroborar lo dicho basta observar, precisamente, la demanda en su elenco\r\nfáctico, probatorio y petitorio, donde nos queda la impresión de que la\r\nAsociación actora más bien está intentando una especie de acción popular, la\r\nque no es admitida, al menos, en los términos del artículo 10, inciso 1), subinciso d) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo”. (Registro audiovisual de la lectura de sentencia oral, de\r\nlas 10:18:57 a las 10:23:39 horas). Adicional a lo transcrito,\r\nel Tribunal realizó la lectura –prácticamente en su totalidad–\r\ndel considerando V de la sentencia de esa misma Sección, no. 175-2011 de las 14\r\nhoras del 31 de agosto de 2011, referido a la falta de legitimación de la ANCL en una demanda contra el Banco Crédito Agrícola de\r\nCartago, incorporando dichos argumentos a la resolución oral de este proceso.\r\nAllí refieren a la diferencia entre legitimación “ad procesum”\r\ny “ad causam”, entendida la primera como\r\ncapacidad procesal (presupuesto del proceso) y la segunda como legitimación\r\npropiamente dicha, sea tanto activa o pasiva (presupuesto material o de la\r\npretensión), respecto de lo cual adiciona extensas citas de jurisprudencia y\r\ndoctrina. Agregan, en el precepto 54 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y\r\nDefensa Efectiva del Consumidor, Ley no. 7472 del 20 de diciembre de 1994, el\r\nlegislador previó una legitimación directa y una indirecta. En el primer caso,\r\nincluye a los consumidores que se asocian para litigar en la vía administrativa\r\no judicial, no de manera individual, sino por intermedio de la corporación; o\r\nbien, cuando algunas personas integrantes de una agrupación son afectadas por\r\nla práctica de un comerciante, por lo que ésta los defendería. De ahí que, si\r\nlos miembros no cuentan con legitimación para instaurar un proceso, la\r\nasociación tampoco la tendría. La indirecta sería, según los juzgadores,\r\nequivalente a la figura de la coadyuvancia, mediante\r\nla cual la entidad grupal concurre a estrados cuando alguno de sus integrantes\r\npodría verse beneficiado de las resultas del proceso, en tanto los efectos del\r\nfallo se podrían extender a algún otro o nuevo proceso. No logran deducir,\r\nseñalan, una especie de legitimación ampliada, abierta o semejante, a favor de\r\nlas asociaciones de consumidores por su mera condición, aún cuando sus\r\nintegrantes o la razón social no evidencien ninguna relación directa con el\r\nobjeto procesal. La parte actora, indican, pretende extraer una especie de\r\nacción popular, lo que no es compartido por el Tribunal; pues, en su criterio,\r\nel fin de la norma es permitir que los grupos de consumidores, especialmente\r\ncon afectaciones pequeñas o de poco valor económico, pudieran presentar una\r\npretensión conjunta para tomar fuerza de grupo, lo que no se configura en el presente\r\ncaso. Mencionan los supuestos contemplados en el canon 10 del CPCA y las diferencias entre intereses colectivos y\r\ndifusos. Los primeros, manifiestan, hacen referencia a grupos limitados, a\r\nveces unidos por un vínculo jurídico, para la persecución de fines propios; lo\r\nque permite que personas con pequeñas pretensiones puedan litigar como grupo,\r\nrepartiéndose todos los costos del proceso y otorgándole más fuerza a sus\r\npretensiones personales, pero consideradas en forma colectiva. Por su parte, en\r\nlos difusos, explican, afectan al individuo como miembro de la sociedad, en\r\ndonde no hay un particular vínculo jurídico y, por ello, se permite que\r\ncualquiera gestione para hacer valer la tutela general y preventiva. El\r\nprecepto 54 de la Ley no. 7472, continúan, regula dos supuestos, la\r\nlegitimación directa de la persona que efectivamente integra la relación\r\nprocesal y la Asociación de Consumidores que defiende los intereses legítimos\r\nde sus asociados. Sin embargo, la Asociación demandante parece extraer que su\r\ncondición le faculta plantear cualquier tipo de proceso en beneficio de los\r\nconsumidores, al margen de si se trata de afiliados o no, quienes pudieran\r\nverse afectados por una práctica de comercio concreta. Tal mecanismo, aseguran,\r\npermitiría una burla procesal, pues cualquier persona que se encuentre en unas\r\nsituación semejante, en caso de obtener una resolución favorable, podría\r\nrecurrir a unirse a la agrupación, con el único fin de economizarse el proceso,\r\ncuando ya el ordenamiento jurídico prevé un mecanismo para tal circunstancia\r\n(numerales 185 a\r\n188 del CPCA), de ahí que se debe declarar la falta\r\nde legitimación de la ANCL (todo lo anterior se\r\nextrae del registro audiovisual de la sentencia oral, de las 10:24:52 a las\r\n10:49:28 horas). Por último, en cuanto la prueba testimonial recibida en el\r\njuicio oral, el Tribunal consideró: “Sus testimonios resultan inertes, a los\r\nefectos del dictado de la presente sentencia, ya que no permiten acreditar\r\naspectos procesales, como el relacionado con la legitimación; quedando en\r\nevidencia que los relatos de los testigos de la Asociación actora hacían\r\nreferencia a casos que no estaban sometidos a valoración, en el contexto de la\r\ndemanda, según el planteamiento de los hechos, de las pruebas y de las\r\npretensiones que fueron trabados en la litis. No desconocemos el valor y la\r\nimportancia de las situaciones materiales o emocionales de cada una de las\r\npersonas ofrecidas por dicha Asociación, tal y como fueron escuchadas por el\r\nTribunal, pues entendemos con claridad que cada circunstancia es el resultado\r\nde una apreciación subjetiva que merece el respeto de todos los que\r\ninteractuamos en juicio oral; pero tampoco podemos desconocer lo que ya\r\ndijimos, en el entendido que estas declaraciones reflejan cuatro situaciones\r\nespecíficas, que no conforman parte del elenco de hechos que presentó la\r\nAsociación actora, dado que en la demanda no existe referencia alguna a casos\r\nen particular, según hemos referido anteriormente”. (Registro audiovisual\r\nde la sentencia oral, de las 10:50:15 a las 10:51:48 horas).\n\r\n\r\n\nV. Tal y como se explicó, el casacionista\r\ncombate la sentencia por cuanto, alega, su representada ha invocado la defensa\r\nde intereses difusos, colectivos y los que denomina individuales homogéneos,\r\npor el desequilibrio generado en la relación de consumo entre las entidades\r\nbancarias y los usuarios, al referenciar los intereses corrientes a la TBP. De tal forma que, estima, sin mediar información\r\npertinente y advertencias sobre los riesgos, se incorporaron cláusulas abusivas\r\nen los contratos de crédito, las cuales se materializaron en un aumento\r\ndesproporcionado de las cuotas que debían cancelar los deudores. Su\r\nlegitimación para la defensa de estos intereses, alega, la encuentra en los\r\npreceptos 27 y 46 de la Constitución Política, 1023 del Código Civil, 54 de la\r\nLey no. 7472, así como los cardinales 9,10, 48 y 130, inciso 2), del CPCA, los cuales considera infringidos por la sentencia\r\nimpugnada. En virtud de lo anterior, conviene realizar –de previo–\r\nuna breve referencia a los conceptos de intereses difusos y colectivos; a\r\npartir de ahí, determinar su aplicación en materia del consumidor y, con ello,\r\ndilucidar el punto que aquí se discute.\n\r\n\r\n\nVI. En el amplio espectro de los intereses, donde en un\r\nextremo se tienen los generales y en el otro los individuales, los difusos se\r\ncolocan en un punto intermedio y, en la medida en que se especifican, se ubican\r\nlos colectivos y, luego, los corporativos. De esta forma, los intereses\r\ndifusos, aún pudiendo ser relevantes para un sujeto, trascienden hacia una\r\ndimensión supra-individual, extendiéndose a un\r\nconjunto más o menos extenso y amorfo de personas, no organizadas formalmente,\r\nque pueden ser vinculadas a un bien jurídico tutelado, como punto de referencia\r\nobjetivo (ambiente natural, salud, patrimonio cultural, Hacienda Pública, etc.)\r\no unidas a partir de una determinada condición subjetiva (por ejemplo una\r\ncaracterística física, origen étnico o una necesidad social). Al respecto, esta\r\nSala lo ha entendido como un interés “extendido, difundido, dilatado; se\r\npropaga o diluye entre los miembros del conjunto sea que este se encuentre o no\r\norganizado y compacto” (sentencia no. 675-F-2007 de las 10 horas del 21 de setiembre de 2007). Estos intereses –por ser tales– pertenecen a una colectividad; sin embargo, cuando\r\nse pueden concretizar en un grupo identificable, se les denomina colectivos en\r\nsentido estricto o de categoría; así, este órgano decisor\r\nlos ha distinguido de la siguiente manera: “La distinción que debe\r\nrealizarse sobre este aspecto es que, a diferencia de lo que ocurre en el\r\ninterés difuso, en el colectivo este grupo es determinable” (sentencia no.\r\n896-F-S1-2012 de las 15 horas del 26 de julio de 2012). Valga acotar que,\r\ncuando el ligamen se da por una relación previa derivada de la pertenencia a un\r\ngrupo jurídicamente organizado, se trataría entonces de un interés corporativo\r\n(tal es el caso, por ejemplo, de los colegios profesionales). Por otra parte,\r\nesta Sala ha destacado la arista procesal de los intereses difusos, como\r\nparámetro vinculado al derecho de acción en determinadas circunstancias: “se\r\ntrata por ello, en tesis de esta Cámara, de un interés de titularidad\r\nindefinida que legitima al sujeto para accionar, el cual se transforma, en\r\nvirtud de su incorporación al elenco de los derechos de la persona humana, en\r\nuna especie de ‘derecho reaccional’, dispuesto a fin\r\nde que su titular se oponga a la violación originada en actos u omisiones\r\nilegítimas, causados a una globalidad” (resolución no. 805-F-S1-2010 de las\r\n13 horas 55 minutos del 5 de julio de 2010). Asimismo, es necesario tomar en\r\ncuenta que estos intereses “por ser difusos o colectivos, no dejan de\r\nintegrar la categoría más amplia de los legítimos” (sentencia no.\r\n896-F-S1-2012 de las 15 horas del 26 de julio de 2012).\n\r\n\r\n\nVII. Ahora\r\nbien, en cuanto al tema que aquí interesa, importa advertir que la protección\r\nde los derechos e intereses de los consumidores obtuvo reconocimiento expreso\r\nen la más alta jerarquía normativa, mediante reforma operada por Ley no. 7606\r\ndel 29 de mayo de 1996 al precepto 46 de la Constitución Política, en virtud de\r\nla cual se dispuso: “Los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la\r\nprotección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos; a recibir\r\ninformación adecuada y veraz; a la libertad de elección, y a un trato\r\nequitativo. El Estado apoyará los organismos que ellos constituyan para la\r\ndefensa de sus derechos. La ley regulará esas materias”. Dicho canon\r\nconstitucional es producto de un desarrollo normativo que, en este país,\r\nencuentra antecedentes en normas que datan desde el Código General del Estado\r\nde Costa Rica (Código de Carrillo) del 30 de julio de 1841, el cual obligaba al\r\nvendedor: “á [sic] explicar claramente aquello á [sic] que se\r\nobliga: todo pacto oscuro ó [sic] ambiguo, se interpreta contra el\r\nvendedor” (artículo 1020 de la Parte Primera); además, sancionaba los\r\nfraudes en el comercio que se hubieran cometido mediante mercadería\r\nfalsificada, engaño o alteración de pesas y medidas (numerales 309, 310 y 644\r\nde la Parte Segunda). En el siglo XX, ante la\r\ndepresión de los años 30 y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, se promulgaron las leyes\r\nde Abastos, no. 51 del 16 de julio de 1932; de Subsistencias e Inquilinato, no.\r\n6 del 21 de setiembre de 1939; de Creación de la\r\nOficina de Defensa Económica, no. 206 del 20 de agosto de 1944 y de Defensa\r\nEconómica, no. 57 del 26 de marzo de 1945, tendentes a regular prácticas\r\nmonopolísticas, acaparamiento, fijación de precios, calidad, inspecciones y se\r\nadmitía que “cualquiera puede denunciar las infracciones punibles de esta\r\nley” (precepto 37 de la Ley no. 57 de 1945). En el Código Penal de 1941,\r\nLey no. 368 del 21 de agosto de 1941, se sancionaba “depreciar la calidad de\r\nlos servicios, productos o mercancías de un competidor” y la “propaganda\r\ndesleal” (canon 259), así como defraudar a otro “en la sustancia,\r\ncalidad o cantidad las cosas que le entregue en virtud de contrato”\r\n(artículo 282, inciso 1). La Ley General de Salud, no. 5395 del 30 de octubre\r\nde 1973 y la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, no. 5412 del 8 de noviembre\r\nde ese mismo año, establecieron derechos y deberes para prevenir riesgos a la\r\nsalud de quienes consumen medicinas, alimentos, productos envasados o son\r\nusuarios de centros de salud o educativos, entre otros. Poco después, se emitió\r\nla Ley de Protección al Consumidor, no. 5665 del 28 de febrero de 1975, si bien\r\nse centraba en fijación de precios y abastecimiento, también establecía “obligaciones\r\nde quienes ejercen el comercio” , lo cual contemplaba exponer en lugar\r\nvisible el precio de los productos y los planes de venta a plazos, donde se\r\ndebía indicar la tasa de interés, base y plazo; extender factura; mantener en\r\nperfectas condiciones la pesas y medidas y prohibía las “prácticas engañosas\r\nen la oferta de bienes y servicios” (artículo 17). En esa Ley, el enfoque sancionatorio seguía siendo mayoritariamente de carácter\r\npenal, mediante acción pública que posibilitaba a cualquiera interponer la\r\nrespectiva denuncia (precepto 25). Al promulgarse la Ley Orgánica de la\r\nProcuraduría General de la República, Ley no. 6815 del 27 de setiembre de 1982, se le encomendó la atribución de: “Tomar\r\nlas acciones legales en resguardo de los intereses de los consumidores”\r\nmediante una “Procuraduría de Defensa del Consumidor” (numerales 3,\r\ninciso i) y 7, inciso f). Dicha función pasó luego a formar parte de la “Defensoría\r\nGeneral de los Derechos Humanos”, según los artículos 21 y 22 de la Ley no.\r\n7142 del 8 de marzo de 1990, los cuales fueron derogados tácitamente por el\r\ncanon 32 de la Ley de la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República, Ley no.\r\n7319 del 17 de noviembre de 1992, que asumió tales competencias, hasta la\r\npromulgación de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del\r\nConsumidor, Ley no. 7472 del 20 de diciembre de 1994, que derogó la Ley no. 5665\r\nde 1975 y actualmente rige la materia. En la normativa vigente, se prohibieron\r\nprácticas monopolísticas y, entre otras cosas, se reconoció un elenco de\r\nderechos del consumidor (precepto 32), además de correlativas obligaciones de\r\nlos comerciantes y proveedores (canon 34).\n\r\n\r\n\nVIII. Es\r\nnecesario destacar que ese desarrollo jurídico no se limita a reconocer\r\nderechos subjetivos a favor del consumidor, entendidos como aquellos poderes de\r\nun individuo particular para obrar válidamente (posición de libertad) o de exigir\r\na otro(s) –inclusive coactivamente– una conducta\r\nconcreta y específica, para la satisfacción de fines e intereses propios y\r\nactuales, jurídicamente tutelables (tal como lo\r\nsería, por ejemplo, hacer valer la garantía de un producto dentro de los 30 días\r\nsiguientes a su compra, conforme el artículo 43 de la Ley no. 7472). Sea,\r\naunado a los derechos subjetivos que se le atribuyen a las partes de una\r\ndeterminada relación de consumo, ese ordenamiento ha reconocido intereses\r\ndifusos y colectivos, como derechos fundamentales e irrenunciables para la\r\ngeneralidad de los consumidores. Así, el precepto 32, incisos b), d) y e) ibídem, contempla: “la protección de sus legítimos\r\nintereses económicos y sociales”\r\n; “la educación y la divulgación sobre el consumo adecuado\r\nde bienes o servicios, que aseguren la libertad de escogencia y la igualdad en\r\nla contratación” y “la protección administrativa y judicial contra la\r\npublicidad engañosa, las prácticas y las cláusulas abusivas, así como los\r\nmétodos comerciales desleales o que restrinjan la libre elección”. En ese\r\norden de ideas, la Sala Constitucional ha resaltado la necesidad de comprender\r\nal consumidor no sólo como uno de los sujetos de una relación comercial\r\nparticular, toda vez que también es necesario abarcar su protección desde una\r\nperspectiva más general: “la Ley de Protección al Consumidor no impone\r\nlimitaciones o afectaciones al patrimonio de los comerciantes en los términos\r\ndel artículo 45 constitucional. Lo que ese cuerpo normativo hace, no es afectar\r\nel patrimonio privado de cada comerciante, sino regular una actividad\r\nespecífica que es la comercial, que tiene la característica de trascender el\r\námbito concreto del particular e involucrar al gran público consumidor. Sin\r\nduda, el hecho de que los terceros puedan resultar afectados por la actividad\r\ncomercial (acaparamiento, porcentajes de utilidad irrazonables, existencia de\r\nmonopolios de carácter privado, etc.) hace factible que el legislador ordinario\r\ndisponga, con fundamento en el artículo 28 de la Carta Política obligaciones\r\nespeciales a los comerciantes, en relación con los bienes que ofrecen al\r\npúblico y ello no resulta inconstitucional en tanto es consecuencia de los\r\ndeberes y relaciones jurídicas que el ordenamiento jurídico puede y debe\r\nregular. […] Los principios de orden público social justifican el amplio\r\ndesarrollo que se promueve en torno a la protección de los derechos de los\r\nconsumidores” (sentencia no. 4286-95 de las 15 horas 12 minutos del 3 de\r\nagosto de 1995). Por ello, no es de extrañar que ese órgano decisor\r\nincluya esta materia como uno de los ejemplos donde se evidencia este tipo de\r\nintereses: “En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad\r\npertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir\r\nde una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen\r\nétnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un\r\ncierto producto, etc. […]” (resolución no. 2002-00481 de las 14 horas 42\r\nminutos del 23 de enero de 2002). Bajo esa misma óptica, esta Sala Primera ha\r\nconsiderado que el concepto de “consumidor” no se limita a una parte\r\ncontractual, sino que comprende a todo un colectivo indeterminado, conformado\r\npor los potenciales adquirentes de un producto: “En concordancia con el parámetro\r\nconstitucional, consumidor, debe entenderse en un planteamiento expansivo\r\nrespecto al ámbito de aplicación de las personas que requieran de una especial\r\nprotección en esta materia. No se supedita a un “contrato de consumo”, porque\r\nsignificaría aplicarla de forma restringida y limitada a aquella persona que\r\ncompra, o que contrata. La posición del derecho moderno, según este Órgano\r\ndecidor, es que se le conciba como cliente, entendido a quien participa en las\r\nactividades comerciales en la posición de potencial adquiriente -y no comprador\r\nefectivo-, de bienes y servicios con el titular de la oferta. Dependiendo de la\r\netapa del proceso, se puede distinguir entre contratante y cliente. El primero,\r\nse denomina consumidor jurídico. Adquiere un bien o servicio mediante una\r\nrelación jurídica típica, como por ejemplo, la compra. El segundo es el\r\nconsumidor material, quien no contrata el bien o servicio, puede potencialmente\r\nadquirirlo o utilizarlo. Este último es el centro de protección jurídica en el\r\námbito de la seguridad de los consumidores” (sentencia no. 295-F-2007 de\r\nlas 10 horas 45 minutos del 26 de abril de 2007).\n\r\n\r\n\nIX. En la\r\nsentencia impugnada, el Tribunal estima que la ACNL\r\ncarece de legitimación por cuanto considera que “nos encontramos ante la\r\ninexistencia de un caso en concreto que permita al Tribunal dar fiel\r\ncumplimiento al artículo 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, de\r\nmanera que sea posible analizar la existencia del daño, para comprobar que sea\r\nefectivo, evaluable e individualizable con relación a\r\nuna persona o grupo. […]. De antemano no se niega la posibilidad de\r\nadmitir la legitimación por interés colectivo pero aún en esa hipótesis\r\npersiste la necesidad de la individualización del daño, como requisito\r\nnecesario para el ejercicio de la acción” (ver transcripción\r\nsupra). En virtud de lo anterior, concluye:\r\n“[…] si los asociados no presentan legitimación para instaurar algún\r\nproceso, la asociación, en cuanto representante de los derechos o intereses\r\nlegítimos de estos, tampoco lo tendría” (registro audiovisual de la\r\nsentencia oral, de las 10:39:51 a las 10:40:06 horas). Esta Sala no comparte el\r\ncriterio de los juzgadores. Conviene recordar que, en anteriores oportunidades,\r\neste órgano decisor ha aceptado la existencia de\r\ndaños no individualizables, que pueden ser causados a\r\ncolectividades: “no se trata de un daño generado directamente en la persona\r\nde la actora, sino a la globalidad; que por lesionar un interés difuso, posee\r\nautonomía, por lo que puede o no concurrir con daños causados individualmente”\r\n(resolución no. 805-F-S1-2010 de las 13 horas 55 minutos del 5 de julio de\r\n2010; en similar sentido véase la no. 547-F-S1-2012 de las 8 horas 55 minutos\r\ndel 10 de mayo de 2012). Es decir, contrario a lo indicado por el Tribunal, el hecho\r\nde que no se llegue a demostrar una lesión a un derecho subjetivo de un\r\nparticular, no descarta –necesariamente– una\r\nafectación a intereses difusos o colectivos. En ese sentido, refiriéndose a los\r\ndaños ambientales, esta Cámara ha indicado que: “el primer y principal\r\ndamnificado es la sociedad en su conjunto, o bien una generalidad indeterminada\r\nde sujetos; sin perjuicio de que simultáneamente también puedan resultar\r\nafectados en forma particular, algunos de los individuos del grupo. […]. […] Se\r\ndefine un nuevo y particular modo de daño, el cual goza de algunas\r\nespecificaciones, y conforme a ello, las reglas para su reparación no podrán\r\nequipararse a las que otorgan protección a los derechos subjetivos, simplemente\r\nporque este tipo de daño puede conculcar además otro tipo de prerrogativas,\r\ncomo los derechos de incidencia colectiva o general” (sentencia no.\r\n675-F-2007 de las 10 horas del 21 de setiembre de\r\n2007). En el presente caso, se está ante una acción correlativa, es decir, una\r\ndoble acción procesal, dirigida –por un lado– a favor\r\nde los intereses y derechos subjetivos de los asociados a la ANCL; pero que –desde otro ángulo–\r\ntambién se encuentra encaminada hacia la defensa de intereses difusos y\r\ncolectivos. Cada una de estas acciones tiene causas e implicaciones diferentes,\r\nsin que sean necesariamente contrapuestas o excluyentes. Así, la demandante\r\npretende se condene al BPDC y al BNCR\r\nal pago del daño material y moral y los perjuicios causados a cada uno de sus\r\nasociados, que suscribieron con esas entidades contratos crediticios bajo la\r\nmodalidad de intereses referenciados a la TBP. Sin\r\nembargo –he aquí lo relevante– su demanda no se\r\nlimita a ello, la Asociación también exige se ordene a esos bancos informar de\r\nmanera clara y veraz sobre los riesgos económicos que, en su criterio, entrañan\r\nlos créditos en esas condiciones. Para esta Sala, tomándose en cuenta lo\r\nexpuesto en los considerandos precedentes, se trata\r\nde un reclamo sustentado en un interés difuso, a favor de todos aquellos\r\ninteresados –actuales o potenciales– en adquirir un\r\ncrédito bancario (artículo 32, incisos c) y d), de la Ley no. 7472). Aunado a\r\nlo anterior, esa pretensión se encuentra íntimamente ligada con la tesis que la\r\nANCL ha esgrimido en este proceso, en cuanto que tal\r\nmodalidad de cálculo de intereses constituye una cláusula abusiva, incorporada\r\nen contratos de adhesión que impacta, al menos, unas 270.017 operaciones de\r\ncrédito, las cuales representaban un 55% del total, en los bancos objeto de ese\r\nestudio (folio 296 del expediente judicial). Se tiene así, en criterio de esta\r\nCámara, una acción que aboga –además– por un interés\r\ncolectivo, de todo el grupo de deudores –indeterminado pero determinable–\r\nque suscribieron contratos de créditos vinculados a la TBP\r\n(numeral 32, incisos b) y e), ibídem). Teniéndose\r\nclaro lo anterior, resulta ahora necesario analizar si una asociación de\r\nconsumidores se encuentra legitimada para accionar en favor de tales intereses\r\ndifusos y colectivos.\n\r\n\r\n\nX. Según\r\nlo que se ha expuesto, el país ha presenciado una evolución hacia el\r\nreconocimiento y protección de los derechos e intereses legítimos del\r\nconsumidor, que culmina con la reforma del precepto 46 constitucional y\r\nencuentra desarrollo en la Ley no. 7472. Conviene destacar el canon primero de\r\ndicho cuerpo legal, cuyo concepto “efectivamente” le brinda al\r\nintérprete jurídico una pauta para la exégesis de la norma, con el fin de que\r\nestos derechos e intereses encuentren verdadero resguardo, tanto en sede\r\nadministrativa como judicial. En esa línea, la Sala Constitucional, desde la\r\nresolución no. 4286-95 de las 15 horas 12 minutos del 3 de agosto de 1995,\r\nestimó: “El Estado debe contar con normas que permitan el cumplimiento de la\r\nlabo r de protección al consumidor, ya que, de\r\npoco o nada sirve establecer un principio del Estado Social de derecho, sino se\r\nestablecen, además, los mecanismos adecuados para su desarrollo y aplicación.\r\n[…]”. Aunado a lo anterior, ese órgano decisor\r\nagregó: “[…] El rol estatal en esta materia debe partir de la consagración\r\nde un sistema legal efectivo de protección del consumidor, que reconozca\r\nexpresamente sus derechos fundamentales, establezca las soluciones sustanciales\r\npara las cuestiones básicas emergentes de las relaciones de consumo, y\r\nfinalmente consagre los mecanismos concretos de implementación que permitan\r\nhacer valer efectivamente aquellos derechos” (sentencia no. 2001-01391 de\r\nlas 14 horas 52 minutos del 14 de febrero de 2001). En el mismo sentido, la\r\nSala Primera ha indicado: “En vista del surgimiento de una situación desequilibrada\r\nen las relaciones de consumo entre empresarios y consumidores o usuarios, los\r\ninstrumentos jurídicos tradicionales no resultaban suficientes para tutelarlos.\r\nCon el fin de evitar, o al menos atenuar esas diferencias, el legislador ha\r\ncreado diversos sistemas jurídicos de defensa, en aras de encontrar un justo\r\nequilibrio entre los intereses recíprocos de consumidores y productores”\r\n(resolución no. 655-F-2007 de las 15 horas 5 minutos del 19 de septiembre de\r\n2007). Tal enfoque debe guiar el análisis de la Ley no. 7472 y, en lo que aquí\r\ninteresa, la legitimación para la tutela de los intereses difusos y colectivos\r\nde los consumidores, en tanto estos integran la amplia categoría de los\r\nlegítimos. Ese es el sentido en que debe ser entendido el numeral 32, inciso\r\nf), del referido cuerpo normativo, en cuanto impone, como uno de sus derechos\r\nfundamentales e irrenunciables, los “mecanismos efectivos de acceso para la\r\ntutela administrativa y judicial de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, que\r\nconduzcan a prevenir adecuadamente, sancionar y reparar con prontitud la lesión\r\nde estos, según corresponda”. Lo anterior debe ser garantizado por el\r\nEstado, como parte de sus funciones esenciales, según lo ordena el precepto 33,\r\ninciso d), ibídem: “En los términos establecidos\r\nen la presente Ley, son funciones esenciales del Estado las siguientes: // d)\r\nGarantizar el acceso a mecanismos efectivos y ágiles de tutela administrativa y\r\njudicial, para defender los derechos y los intereses legítimos de los\r\nconsumidores”. De igual forma, la regla 46 de ese mismo cuerpo regulatorio, consagra: “Para hacer valer sus derechos,\r\nel consumidor puede acudir a la vía administrativa o a la judicial, […]”;\r\nde donde interesa destacar que la norma utiliza el concepto de “derechos”,\r\nen términos generales y en sentido amplio, sin restringirlo únicamente a los\r\nsubjetivos. Al tenor de las disposiciones transcritas, se tiene que el deber de\r\nprevenir y, eventualmente, reparar, no se limita a los daños individualizables que un comerciante o proveedor pudo haber\r\ncausado a un sujeto (o sujetos) determinado(s); sino que incluye toda lesión a\r\nlos intereses legítimos de los consumidores, lo cuales podrían ser difusos o\r\ncolectivos. Es decir, según se ha visto, el ordenamiento jurídico patrio\r\nreconoce, respecto de los consumidores, no sólo los derechos subjetivos que\r\npuedan surgir de una relación particular de consumo, sino –también–\r\nsus intereses difusos y colectivos; motivo por el cual se garantiza el acceso a\r\nlos mecanismos para su efectiva tutela, ya sea en el ámbito administrativo o\r\njudicial. Sobre el particular, obsérvese el numeral 56 de esa Ley, en cuanto\r\nestipula: “La acción ante la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor sólo puede\r\niniciarse en virtud de una denuncia de cualquier consumidor o persona, sin que\r\nsea necesariamente el agraviado por el hecho que denuncia. […]”. Esa\r\nComisión es un órgano del Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, con la\r\ntarea de “conocer y sancionar las infracciones administrativas, los\r\nincumplimientos de las obligaciones establecidas en el Capítulo V y, en\r\nparticular, tutelar los derechos de los consumidores, […]” (artículo 53,\r\ninciso a), de la Ley en comentario). Así, el precepto 56 ibídem,\r\notorga una amplia facultad para que cualquiera ponga en operación ese órgano\r\nadministrativo, en procura de la defensa efectiva de los consumidores, que si\r\nbien se encuentra referida a procedimientos administrativos, evidencia “una\r\napertura en cuanto a la legitimación –cualquier consumidor–\r\ny predominantemente objetiva, ya que lo importante son los hechos denunciados,\r\ny no quién ha sufrido la lesión” (según lo reconoció esta Cámara en la\r\nsentencia no. 870-F-2007 de las 10 horas 50 minutos del 4 de diciembre de\r\n2007). Mas aún, sería contradictorio que –en virtud de dicha norma– una organización de consumidores pudiera interponer\r\nuna denuncia en sede administrativa, pero se le negara la legitimación para\r\nimpugnar en sede judicial lo que allí se resuelva, cuando lo acordado por la\r\nComisión fuera contrario a sus intereses. Por otra parte, la disposición 54 del\r\ncuerpo normativo en comentario dispone: “Las organizaciones de consumidores\r\nestán legitimadas para iniciar como parte o intervenir, en calidad de\r\ncoadyuvantes, en los procedimientos ante la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor y\r\nante los tribunales de justicia, en defensa de los derechos y los intereses\r\nlegítimos de sus asociados. […]”. Este canon confiere legitimación a tal\r\ntipo de agrupaciones para intervenir en calidad de parte, tanto en sede\r\nadministrativa como judicial, no sólo en defensa de los derechos subjetivos de\r\nsus asociados, sino también de sus intereses legítimos, lo cual incluye –según\r\nse explicó– los difusos y colectivos, siendo –como tales– supraindividuales y sin\r\nsujeción de unos a otros. Dicho precepto no podría ser interpretado de forma\r\nque restrinja ese reconocimiento, en tanto se trata de derechos que el\r\nordenamiento jurídico concibe como fundamentales e irrenunciables; según se\r\nderiva del numeral 46 de la Constitución Política en relación con el artículo\r\n32 de la Ley no. 7472, a\r\nlos que ya se hizo referencia. De tal suerte que aplicaría aquí lo que ya se ha\r\nindicado para casos en materia de ambiente, sea: “la simple falta de\r\nrelación directa o de perjuicio, en tesis de principio, no puede conducir a una\r\npérdida de la legitimación para quien posee un derecho reconocido a nivel\r\nconstitucional” (sentencia no. 675-F-2007 de las 10 horas del 21 de setiembre de 2007, de esta Sala). Así las cosas, aunado a\r\nla legitimación que pueda ostentar una organización para abogar por los derechos\r\nsubjetivos o los intereses de sus asociados (interés corporativo); las\r\nagrupaciones de consumidores, como la ANCL, se\r\nencuentran también legitimadas para la defensa de sus intereses difusos y\r\ncolectivos. El canon 46 de la Carta Magna, en consuno con el análisis armónico\r\nde la Ley no. 7472, impone tal conclusión, garantizando el acceso a la vía\r\nadministrativa o judicial, con el fin de lograr la tutela efectiva de estos\r\nderechos e intereses (disposiciones 1, 32, incisos b), e), y f), 33, inciso d),\r\n46, 54 y 56 de la citada Ley).\n\r\n\r\n\nXI. De ahí\r\nque, este Órgano Decisor no concuerda con el criterio\r\ndel Tribunal, en cuanto estima que “persiste la necesidad de la\r\nindividualización del daño, como requisito necesario para el ejercicio de la\r\nacción”. Por el contrario, los preceptos constitucionales y legales\r\nseñalados, y su desarrollo jurisprudencial, permiten concluir que la ANCL se encuentra legitimada para para\r\ninterponer el presente proceso en sede judicial, ante la lesión que, arguye, se\r\nha causado a los intereses difusos y colectivos de los consumidores de\r\nproductos y servicios financieros, por causa de: la supuesta falta de\r\ninformación acerca de los eventuales riesgos que implican los créditos\r\nbancarios vinculados a la TBP y la alegada naturaleza\r\nabusiva de las cláusulas contractuales que estipulen esa modalidad de cálculo.\r\nMás aún, no sería posible determinar si se han ocasionado daños individualizables a las personas particulares, hasta tanto\r\nno se evidencie, en primer lugar, si existe la vulneración a esos intereses\r\ndifusos y colectivos que la ANCL ha reclamado; en\r\ntanto es preciso –primeramente– demostrar si\r\nreferenciar los intereses de los créditos a la TBP\r\nconstituye realmente un riesgo que, como tal, debe ser informado y, además, si\r\nla incorporación de esas metodologías de cálculo de intereses en los créditos\r\nbancarios podrían ser calificadas como cláusulas abusivas en contratos de\r\nadhesión.\n\r\n\r\n\nXII. En\r\nvirtud de lo anteriormente analizado, se impone acoger el agravio procesal\r\ninvocado. En atención a lo dispuesto en el numeral 105.1 del CPCA, procede anular la sentencia impugnada y reenviar el\r\nexpediente al despacho de origen, para que se dicte la que en derecho\r\ncorresponda.”", "body_en_text": "“IV. To resolve the challenge against ANCL’s lack of\nactive standing (legitimación activa) —alleged by the\ndefendant banks and upheld in the judgment under appeal—\nit is important to refer to the reasoning used by the judges to\nsupport their decision, who stated the following: ‘Regarding the merits\nof the matter, for the purposes of analyzing the claim, this Court, after\nhearing the parties’ arguments and the testimonial evidence at trial,\nobserves that the issue to be resolved is the potential strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva),\nthis condition falling upon the defendant banks, attributing to them conduct\nthat is linked to the fluctuations of the basic passive rate (tasa básica pasiva), which reflected an\nupward trend in the period of interest to the plaintiff Association;\nthat is, from the second half of 2007 to the date of\nfiling of the claim. But in the manner in which the plaintiff defined the\nclaim, from the preliminary hearing, the Court observes that the petition\nof the claim refers to an abstract and indeterminate content, exposing\nthe dilemma that we are faced with the non-existence of a specific\ncase that allows the Court to faithfully comply with Article 196 of the\nLey General de la Administración Pública, so that it is possible to analyze the\nexistence of the damage, to verify that it is effective, assessable, and individualizable (efectivo, evaluable e individualizable) in relation to a person or group. The\nTrial Court is fully aware that Article 122, subsection m),\nof the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo allows for a condemnation in\nthe abstract (condenatoria en\nabstracto) of damages (daños y perjuicios), but not even in that scenario is it\nadmissible to think that this —ethereal— condition\nrefers not only to the condemnation but also to subjects in the abstract, that\nis, unidentified subjects, since the rule always requires, at least, the\nproof of administrative conduct or an administrative legal relationship,\nwhich must necessarily be understood as that which arises from the interrelation\nbetween the Administration and the administered party, so that it is enforceable by\nthe person affected. The possibility of admitting\nstanding by collective interest (legitimación por interés colectivo) is not rejected a priori, but even in that hypothesis, the\nneed for individualization of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for\nfiling the action, since admitting the contrary would mean allowing\nclaims with abstract pretensions, the issuance of an\neventual abstract judgment being unthinkable, which thus evades the reference to a\nconcrete and specific administrative legal relationship, as the generator of the\ndamage, conduct against which the consumer could well have claimed by raising a\nclaim individually or collectively, but in both cases\nproving, at least, the existence of that relationship and the affected party’s interest\nin asserting their rights. In the present case, it has not been possible to locate\nan express manifestation that suggests the plaintiff Association fulfilled\nthe mandate cited in the mentioned rules, since we have reviewed the hypotheses and\nthe claim does not meet any one or any of them, that is, one, that each\nmember (asociado) affected by the credit conditions claimed in the said\nclaim, has delegated the representation of their individual case to the said\nAssociation, by means of a power of attorney in accordance with the law; or, two, that\nregardless of the existence of a power of attorney to exercise representation\nand in the case of a collective interest, the plaintiff Association has sued in\neffective representation of its members, having proven in\nadvance the identification of each of them and the context of their\nparticular cases, individualizing which members were the subjects of\ncredit under the conditions precisely claimed in the claim. To\ncorroborate what has been said, it is enough to observe, precisely, the claim in its factual,\nevidentiary, and petitionary elements, where we are left with the impression that the\nplaintiff Association is rather attempting a kind of popular action (acción popular), which\nis not admitted, at least not under the terms of Article 10, subsection 1), sub-subsection d) of the Código Procesal Contencioso\nAdministrativo.’ (Audiovisual record of the reading of the oral judgment, from\n10:18:57 a.m. to 10:23:39 a.m.). In addition to what was transcribed,\nthe Court read —practically in its entirety—\nconsiderando V of the judgment of that same Section, no. 175-2011 of 2:00\np.m. on August 31, 2011, referring to the lack of standing of the ANCL in a lawsuit against Banco Crédito Agrícola de\nCartago, incorporating those arguments into the oral resolution of this proceeding.\nThere they refer to the difference between standing “ad procesum” (legitimación “ad procesum”)\nand “ad causam” (legitimación “ad causam”), the first being understood as\nprocedural capacity (procedural prerequisite) and the second as standing\nproperly speaking, whether active or passive (material prerequisite or prerequisite of\nthe claim), regarding which they add extensive citations of jurisprudence and\ndoctrine. They add, in precept 54 of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y\nDefensa Efectiva del Consumidor, Ley no. 7472 of December 20, 1994, the\nlegislator provided for direct standing (legitimación directa) and indirect standing (legitimación indirecta). In the first case,\nit includes consumers who associate to litigate in the administrative\nor judicial venue, not individually, but through the corporation; or\nelse, when some persons who are members of a group are affected by\nthe practice of a merchant, for which the latter would defend them. Hence, if\nthe members lack standing to institute a proceeding, the\nassociation would also lack it. The indirect one would be, according to the judges,\nequivalent to the figure of intervention (coadyuvancia), through\nwhich the group entity appears in court when one of its members\ncould benefit from the outcome of the proceeding, insofar as the effects of\nthe judgment could extend to some other or new proceeding. They fail to deduce,\nthey note, a kind of expanded standing (legitimación ampliada), open or similar, in favor\nof consumer associations by their mere condition, even when their\nmembers or the corporate name do not evidence any direct relationship with the\nprocedural object. The plaintiff, they indicate, seeks to extract a kind of\npopular action, which is not shared by the Court; since, in their opinion,\nthe purpose of the rule is to allow groups of consumers, especially\nwith small impacts or little economic value, to present a\njoint claim to gain group strength, a situation that does not arise in the present\ncase. They mention the scenarios contemplated in canon 10 of the CPCA and the differences between collective interests (intereses colectivos) and\ndiffuse interests (difusos). The former, they state, refer to limited groups, at\ntimes united by a legal bond, for the pursuit of their own purposes; which\nallows persons with small claims to litigate as a group,\nsharing all the costs of the proceeding and giving more strength to their\npersonal claims, but considered collectively. As for\ndiffuse interests, they explain, they affect the individual as a member of society,\nwhere there is no particular legal bond and, therefore, it is permitted that\nanyone manages to assert general and preventive protection. The\nprecept 54 of Ley no. 7472, they continue, regulates two scenarios: the\ndirect standing of the person who effectively forms part of the procedural\nrelationship and the Consumer Association that defends the legitimate interests\nof its members. However, the plaintiff Association seems to extract that its\ncondition empowers it to bring any type of proceeding for the benefit of\nconsumers, regardless of whether they are members or not, who could\nbe affected by a specific commercial practice. Such a mechanism, they assert,\nwould allow a procedural fraud (burla procesal), since any person who is in a\nsimilar situation, in the event of obtaining a favorable resolution, could\nresort to joining the group, for the sole purpose of saving themselves the proceeding,\nwhen the legal system already provides a mechanism for such a circumstance\n(articles 185 to\n188 of the CPCA), hence the lack\nof standing of the ANCL must be declared (all the foregoing is\nextracted from the audiovisual record of the oral judgment, from 10:24:52 a.m. to\n10:49:28 a.m.). Finally, regarding the testimonial evidence received at the\noral trial, the Court considered: ‘Their testimonies prove inert, for\nthe purposes of issuing this judgment, since they do not allow for proving\nprocedural aspects, such as that related to standing; it becoming\nevident that the accounts of the witnesses for the plaintiff Association made\nreference to cases that were not subject to assessment, in the context of the\nclaim, according to the presentation of the facts, the evidence, and the\nclaims (pretensiones) that were lodged in the litis. We do not ignore the value and\nimportance of the material or emotional situations of each of the\npersons offered by said Association, just as they were heard by the\nCourt, as we clearly understand that each circumstance is the result\nof a subjective appreciation that deserves the respect of all those who\ninteracted in the oral trial; but we also cannot ignore what we\nalready said, on the understanding that these statements reflect four specific\nsituations, which do not form part of the set of facts presented by the\nplaintiff Association, given that in the claim there is no reference whatsoever to\nparticular cases, as we have previously stated.’ (Audiovisual record\nof the oral judgment, from 10:50:15 a.m. to 10:51:48 a.m.).\n\nV. As was explained, the appellant\nchallenges the judgment inasmuch as, she alleges, her represented party has invoked the defense\nof diffuse interests, collective interests, and what she calls homogeneous individual interests (individuales homogéneos),\ndue to the imbalance generated in the consumer relationship between the banking\nentities and the users, by referencing the current interest rates to the TBP. In such a way that, she considers, without providing\npertinent information and warnings about the risks, abusive clauses (cláusulas abusivas)\nwere incorporated into the credit contracts, which materialized in a disproportionate\nincrease in the installments that the debtors had to pay. Her\nstanding for the defense of these interests, she alleges, is found in the\nprecepts 27 and 46 of the Constitución Política, 1023 of the Código Civil, 54 of\nLey no. 7472, as well as articles 9, 10, 48 and 130, subsection 2), of the CPCA, which she considers violated by the judgment\nunder appeal. In light of the foregoing, it is advisable to make —beforehand—\na brief reference to the concepts of diffuse and collective interests; from\nthere, to determine their application in consumer matters and, with that,\nelucidate the point under discussion here.\n\nVI. In the broad spectrum of interests, where at one\nextreme are general interests and at the other are individual interests, diffuse interests are\nplaced at an intermediate point and, to the extent that they are specified, are located\nthe collective interests and, later, the corporate interests. In this way, diffuse\ninterests, even though capable of being relevant to a subject, transcend towards a\nsupra-individual dimension, extending to a\nmore or less extensive and amorphous set of persons, not formally organized,\nwho can be linked to a protected legal right, as a point of objective\nreference (natural environment, health, cultural heritage, Public Treasury, etc.)\nor united based on a determined subjective condition (for example, a\nphysical characteristic, ethnic origin, or a social need). In this regard, this\nChamber has understood it as an interest “extended, disseminated, dilated; it\npropagates or dilutes among the members of the group whether it is or is not\norganized and compact” (judgment no. 675-F-2007 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2007). These interests —being such— belong to a community; however, when\nthey can be concretized in an identifiable group, they are called collective in the\nstrict sense or categorical; thus, this decision-making body\nhas distinguished them as follows: “The distinction that must\nbe made on this aspect is that, unlike what occurs with the\ndiffuse interest, in the collective interest this group is determinable” (judgment no.\n896-F-S1-2012 of 3:00 p.m. on July 26, 2012). It is worth noting that,\nwhen the link occurs through a prior relationship derived from belonging to a\nlegally organized group, it would then be a corporate interest\n(such is the case, for example, of professional colleges). On the other hand,\nthis Chamber has highlighted the procedural aspect of diffuse interests, as\na parameter linked to the right of action in certain circumstances: “it\nis therefore a matter, in the thesis of this Chamber, of an interest of undefined\nownership that legitimizes the subject to take action, which transforms, by\nvirtue of its incorporation into the catalog of rights of the human person, into\na kind of ‘reactional right’, designed so\nthat its holder opposes the violation originating from illegitimate acts or omissions,\ncaused to a whole” (resolution no. 805-F-S1-2010 of\n1:55 p.m. on July 5, 2010). Likewise, it is necessary to take into\naccount that these interests “since they are diffuse or collective, do not cease to\nbe part of the broader category of legitimate interests” (judgment no.\n896-F-S1-2012 of 3:00 p.m. on July 26, 2012).\n\nVII. Now\nthen, regarding the issue of interest here, it is important to note that the protection\nof the rights and interests of consumers obtained express recognition\nat the highest normative level, through the reform operated by Ley no. 7606\nof May 29, 1996, to precept 46 of the Constitución Política, by virtue of\nwhich it was provided: “Consumers and users have the right to the\nprotection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive\nadequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable\ntreatment. The State shall support the organizations they constitute for the\ndefense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters.” This constitutional\ncanon is the product of a normative development that, in this country,\nfinds antecedents in rules dating back to the Código General del Estado\nde Costa Rica (Código de Carrillo) of July 30, 1841, which obligated the\nseller: “to [sic] clearly explain that to which he\nobligates himself: every obscure or [sic] ambiguous covenant shall be interpreted against the\nseller” (Article 1020 of the First Part); in addition, it sanctioned\nfrauds in commerce that had been committed through falsified\nmerchandise, deceit, or alteration of weights and measures (articles 309, 310, and 644\nof the Second Part). In the 20th century, in the face of the\ndepression of the 1930s and the Second World War, the laws\nof Abastos, no. 51 of July 16, 1932; of Subsistencias e Inquilinato, no.\n6 of September 21, 1939; of Creación de la\nOficina de Defensa Económica, no. 206 of August 20, 1944; and of Defensa\nEconómica, no. 57 of March 26, 1945, were enacted, aimed at regulating monopolistic\npractices, hoarding, price fixing, quality, inspections, and it\nwas admitted that “anyone may report the punishable infractions of this\nlaw” (precept 37 of Ley no. 57 of 1945). In the Código Penal of 1941,\nLey no. 368 of August 21, 1941, it was sanctioned to “depreciate the quality of\nthe services, products or merchandise of a competitor” and “unfair\npropaganda” (canon 259), as well as to defraud another “in the substance,\nquality or quantity the things that are delivered by virtue of a contract”\n(Article 282, subsection 1). The Ley General de Salud, no. 5395 of October 30,\n1973, and the Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, no. 5412 of November 8\nof that same year, established rights and duties to prevent risks to the\nhealth of those who consume medicines, foods, packaged products or are\nusers of health or educational centers, among others. Shortly thereafter, was issued\nthe Ley de Protección al Consumidor, no. 5665 of February 28, 1975, although\nfocused on price setting and supply, it also established “obligations\nof those who engage in commerce,” which included displaying in a\nvisible place the price of products and installment sales plans, where it was\nnecessary to indicate the interest rate, basis, and term; to issue an invoice; to maintain\nweights and measures in perfect condition; and it prohibited “deceptive practices\nin the offer of goods and services” (Article 17). In that Law, the sanctioning approach continued to be mainly criminal\nin nature, through public action that enabled anyone to file the\nrespective complaint (precept 25). With the enactment of the Ley Orgánica de la\nProcuraduría General de la República, Ley no. 6815 of September 27, 1982, it was entrusted with the function of: “Taking\nlegal actions to safeguard the interests of consumers”\nthrough a “Procuraduría de Defensa del Consumidor” (articles 3,\nsubsection i) and 7, subsection f). Said function later became part of the “Defensoría\nGeneral de los Derechos Humanos,” according to Articles 21 and 22 of Ley no.\n7142 of March 8, 1990, which were tacitly repealed by\ncanon 32 of the Ley de la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República, Ley no.\n7319 of November 17, 1992, which assumed such powers, until the\nenactment of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del\nConsumidor, Ley no. 7472 of December 20, 1994, which repealed Ley no. 5665\nof 1975 and currently governs the matter. In the current regulations, monopolistic\npractices were prohibited and, among other things, a catalog of\nconsumer rights was recognized (precept 32), in addition to correlative obligations of\nmerchants and suppliers (canon 34).\n\nVIII. It is\nnecessary to highlight that this legal development is not limited to recognizing\nsubjective rights (derechos subjetivos) in favor of the consumer, understood as those powers of a\nparticular individual to act validly (position of freedom) or to demand\nfrom another or others —including coercively— a concrete\nand specific conduct, for the satisfaction of their own and current,\nlegally protectable ends and interests (as\nwould be, for example, enforcing the guarantee of a product within 30\ndays following its purchase, pursuant to Article 43 of Ley no. 7472). That is,\nin addition to the subjective rights attributed to the parties of a\nspecific consumer relationship, that legal system has recognized diffuse\nand collective interests, as fundamental and inalienable rights for the\ngenerality of consumers. Thus, precept 32, subsections b), d), and e) ibidem, contemplates: “the protection of their legitimate\neconomic and social interests”;\n“education and dissemination on the proper consumption\nof goods or services, that ensure freedom of choice and equality in\ncontracting,” and “administrative and judicial protection against\ndeceptive advertising, abusive practices and clauses, as well as\nunfair or freedom-restricting commercial methods.” In that\nvein, the Sala Constitucional has highlighted the need to understand\nthe consumer not only as one of the subjects of a particular commercial relationship,\nsince it is also necessary to encompass their protection from a\nmore general perspective: “the Ley de Protección al Consumidor does not impose\nlimitations or affectations on the assets of merchants in the terms\nof Article 45 of the Constitution. What that normative body does is not to affect\nthe private assets of each merchant, but to regulate a specific\nactivity, which is commercial, having the characteristic of transcending the\nspecific sphere of the individual and involving the general consuming public. Without\na doubt, the fact that third parties may be affected by commercial\nactivity (hoarding, unreasonable profit percentages, existence of\nprivate monopolies, etc.) makes it feasible for the ordinary legislator\nto provide, based on Article 28 of the Political Charter, special\nobligations for merchants, in relation to the goods they offer to the\npublic, and this is not unconstitutional as it is a consequence of the\nduties and legal relationships that the legal system can and must\nregulate. […] The principles of public social order justify the broad\ndevelopment promoted around the protection of consumer rights”\n(judgment no. 4286-95 of 3:12 p.m. on August 3,\n1995). Therefore, it is not surprising that this decision-making body\nincludes this matter as one of the examples where this type of\ninterest is evidenced: “In synthesis, diffuse interests are those whose ownership\nbelongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based\non a determined social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic\norigin, a determined personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a\ncertain product, etc. […]” (resolution no. 2002-00481 of 2:42\np.m. on January 23, 2002). Under that same perspective, this First Chamber has\nconsidered that the concept of “consumer” is not limited to a contractual\nparty, but rather encompasses an entire undetermined collective, made up\nof the potential purchasers of a product: “In accordance with the constitutional\nparameter, consumer must be understood in an expansive approach\nregarding the scope of application of those persons who require special\nprotection in this matter. It is not subordinated to a ‘consumer contract,’ because\nthat would mean applying it in a restricted and limited manner to the person who\nbuys, or who contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Decision-Making\nBody, is that it be conceived as a client, understood as one who participates in\ncommercial activities in the position of a potential acquirer —and not an effective\nbuyer— of goods and services from the owner of the offer. Depending on the\nstage of the process, one can distinguish between contracting party and client. The first,\nis called a legal consumer (consumidor jurídico). He acquires a good or service through a\ntypical legal relationship, such as, for example, a purchase. The second is the\nmaterial consumer (consumidor material), who does not contract for the good or service, but can potentially\nacquire or use it. The latter is the focus of legal protection in the\narea of consumer safety” (judgment no. 295-F-2007 of\n10:45 a.m. on April 26, 2007).\n\nIX. In the\njudgment under appeal, the Court considers that the ACNL\nlacks standing because it considers that “we are faced with the\nnon-existence of a specific case that allows the Court to faithfully\ncomply with Article 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, so\nthat it is possible to analyze the existence of the damage, to verify that it is\neffective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to\na person or group. […]. The possibility of\nadmitting standing by collective interest is not denied a priori, but even in that hypothesis,\nthe need for individualization of the damage persists, as a necessary\nrequirement for filing the action” (see transcription\nsupra). By virtue of the foregoing, it concludes:\n“[…] if the members do not present standing to institute any\nproceeding, the association, as representative of the legitimate rights or interests\nof these, would also lack it” (audiovisual record of the\noral judgment, from 10:39:51 a.m. to 10:40:06 a.m.). This Chamber does not share the\ncriterion of the judges. It is worth recalling that, on previous occasions,\nthis decision-making body has accepted the existence of\nnon-individualizable damages (daños no individualizables), which can be caused to\ncommunities: “it is not a matter of damage generated directly in the person\nof the plaintiff, but to the whole; which, by injuring a diffuse interest, possesses\nautonomy, and therefore may or may not concur with individually caused damages”\n(resolution no. 805-F-S1-2010 of 1:55 p.m. on July 5,\n2010; in a similar sense see no. 547-F-S1-2012 of 8:55 a.m.\non May 10, 2012). That is, contrary to what was indicated by the Court, the fact\nthat an injury to a subjective right of a\nprivate individual may not be proven does not —necessarily— rule out\nan affectation of diffuse or collective interests. In that sense, referring to\nenvironmental damages, this Chamber has indicated that: “the first and principal\nvictim is society as a whole, or else an undetermined generality\nof subjects; without prejudice to the fact that simultaneously, some of the individuals in the group may also be\naffected in a particular manner. […]. […] There is\ndefined a new and particular mode of damage, which enjoys certain\nspecifications, and accordingly, the rules for its reparation cannot\nbe equated with those that grant protection to subjective rights, simply\nbecause this type of damage may also violate other types of prerogatives,\nsuch as rights of collective or general incidence” (judgment no.\n675-F-2007 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21,\n2007). In the present case, we are faced with a correlative action, that is, a\ndouble procedural action, directed —on one hand— in favor\nof the subjective interests and rights of the members (asociados) of the ANCL; but which —from another angle—\nis also directed towards the defense of diffuse and\ncollective interests. Each one of these actions has different causes and implications,\nwithout them being necessarily opposing or mutually exclusive. Thus, the plaintiff\nseeks that the BPDC and the BNCR\nbe ordered to pay the material and moral damage and the losses (daño material y moral y los perjuicios) caused to each one of its\nmembers, who entered into credit contracts with those entities under the\nmodality of interest rates referenced to the TBP. However\n—and this is the relevant point— its claim does not\nlimit itself to that, the Association also demands that those banks be ordered to inform\nclearly and truthfully about the economic risks that, in its opinion,\ncredits under those conditions entail. For this Chamber, taking into account what was\nstated in the preceding considerandos, this is\na claim based on a diffuse interest, in favor of all those\ninterested —current or potential— in acquiring a\nbank loan (Article 32, subsections c) and d), of Ley no. 7472). In addition to\nthe foregoing, this claim is intimately linked to the thesis that the\nANCL has put forward in this proceeding, in that such\na method of calculating interest constitutes an abusive clause, incorporated\ninto adhesion contracts that impacts at least some 270,017\ncredit operations, which represented 55% of the total, in the banks that were the object of that\nstudy (folio 296 of the judicial expediente). Thus, in the opinion of this\nChamber, there is an action that advocates —in addition— for a collective\ninterest, of the entire group of debtors —undetermined but determinable—\nwho signed credit contracts linked to the TBP\n(article 32, subsections b) and e), ibidem). Having\nthe foregoing clear, it now becomes necessary to analyze whether a consumer\nassociation has standing to take action in favor of such diffuse\nand collective interests.\n\nX. According to\nwhat has been set forth, the country has witnessed an evolution towards the\nrecognition and protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the\nconsumer, which culminates with the reform of constitutional precept 46 and\nfinds development in Ley no. 7472. It is worth highlighting the first canon of\nsaid legal body, whose concept “effectively” provides the\nlegal interpreter with guidance for the exegesis of the norm, so that\nthese rights and interests find true protection, both in the administrative\nand judicial venue. Along these lines, the Sala Constitucional, since\nresolution no.\n\n4286-95 of 15 hours 12 minutes of August 3, 1995, held: “The State must have rules that allow the fulfillment of consumer protection work, since it is of little or no use to establish a principle of the Social State of law, if the adequate mechanisms for its development and application are not also established. […]”. In addition to the above, that decision-making body added: “[…] The state role in this matter must start from the enshrinement of an effective legal system of consumer protection, which expressly recognizes their fundamental rights, establishes substantial solutions for the basic questions emerging from consumer relations, and finally enshrines the concrete implementation mechanisms that allow those rights to be effectively enforced” (judgment no. 2001-01391 of 14 hours 52 minutes of February 14, 2001). In the same vein, the First Chamber has indicated: “In view of the emergence of an unbalanced situation in consumer relations between businesspersons and consumers or users, traditional legal instruments were not sufficient to protect them. In order to avoid, or at least mitigate these differences, the legislator has created various legal defense systems, in the interest of finding a fair balance between the reciprocal interests of consumers and producers” (resolution no. 655-F-2007 of 15 hours 5 minutes of September 19, 2007). Such an approach must guide the analysis of Law no. 7472 and, as relevant here, the standing for the protection of diffuse and collective interests of consumers, as these form part of the broad category of legitimate interests. That is the sense in which article 32, subsection f), of the referenced regulatory body must be understood, insofar as it imposes, as one of their fundamental and inalienable rights, the “effective access mechanisms for the administrative and judicial protection of their legitimate rights and interests, which lead to adequately preventing, sanctioning, and promptly repairing the injury to these, as appropriate.” The foregoing must be guaranteed by the State, as part of its essential functions, as ordered by precept 33, subsection d), ibid: “In the terms established in this Law, the essential functions of the State are the following: // d) Guarantee access to effective and agile administrative and judicial protection mechanisms, to defend the legitimate rights and interests of consumers.” Likewise, rule 46 of that same regulatory body enshrines: “To enforce their rights, the consumer may resort to the administrative or the judicial route, […]”; from which it is important to highlight that the rule uses the concept of “rights,” in general terms and in a broad sense, without restricting it solely to subjective ones. Pursuant to the transcribed provisions, it follows that the duty to prevent and, eventually, repair, is not limited to the individualizable damages that a merchant or supplier may have caused to a determined subject (or subjects); but rather includes any injury to the legitimate interests of consumers, which could be diffuse or collective. That is, as has been seen, the national legal system recognizes, regarding consumers, not only the subjective rights that may arise from a particular consumer relationship, but also their diffuse and collective interests; which is why access to the mechanisms for their effective protection is guaranteed, whether in the administrative or judicial sphere. On this point, note article 56 of that Law, insofar as it stipulates: “The action before the National Consumer Commission can only be initiated by virtue of a complaint from any consumer or person, without it necessarily being the party aggrieved by the fact being reported. […].” That Commission is a body of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, tasked with “hearing and sanctioning administrative infractions, breaches of the obligations established in Chapter V, and, in particular, protecting consumer rights, […]” (article 53, subsection a), of the Law under discussion). Thus, precept 56 ibidem grants broad authority for anyone to set that administrative body in motion, in pursuit of the effective defense of consumers, which, while referring to administrative procedures, demonstrates “an opening regarding standing—any consumer—and predominantly objective, since what matters are the reported facts, and not who has suffered the injury” (as this Chamber recognized in judgment no. 870-F-2007 of 10 hours 50 minutes of December 4, 2007). Even more, it would be contradictory if—by virtue of said norm—a consumer organization could file a complaint in the administrative venue, but be denied standing to challenge in the judicial venue what is resolved therein, when what was agreed by the Commission was contrary to its interests. On the other hand, provision 54 of the regulatory body under discussion states: “Consumer organizations have standing to initiate as a party or intervene, as coadjuvants, in proceedings before the National Consumer Commission and before courts of justice, in defense of the legitimate rights and interests of their members. […].” This canon confers standing on this type of group to intervene as a party, both in administrative and judicial venues, not only in defense of the subjective rights of their members, but also of their legitimate interests, which includes—as explained—diffuse and collective ones, being—as such—supraindividual and without subjection of one to another. Said precept could not be interpreted in a way that restricts that recognition, as these are rights that the legal system conceives as fundamental and inalienable, as derived from article 46 of the Political Constitution in relation to article 32 of Law no. 7472, to which reference has already been made. Thus, what has already been indicated for environmental cases would apply here, namely: “the simple lack of a direct relationship or of harm, in principle, cannot lead to a loss of standing for someone who possesses a right recognized at the constitutional level” (judgment no. 675-F-2007 of 10 hours of September 21, 2007, of this Chamber). Therefore, in addition to the standing a consumer organization may hold to advocate for the subjective rights or interests of its members (corporate interest), such groupings, like the ANCL, are also vested with standing for the defense of their diffuse and collective interests. Canon 46 of the Magna Carta, in conjunction with the harmonious analysis of Law no. 7472, imposes such a conclusion, guaranteeing access to the administrative or judicial route, with the aim of achieving effective protection of these rights and interests (provisions 1, 32, subsections b), e), and f), 33, subsection d), 46, 54 and 56 of the cited Law).\n\n\nXI. Hence, this Decision-Making Body does not agree with the criterion of the Court, insofar as it considers that “the need for individualization of damage persists, as a necessary requirement for exercising the action.” On the contrary, the constitutional and legal precepts indicated, and their jurisprudential development, allow concluding that the ANCL has standing to file the present process in the judicial venue, given the injury that, it argues, has been caused to the diffuse and collective interests of consumers of financial products and services, due to: the alleged lack of information about the possible risks implied by bank loans linked to the TBP and the alleged abusive nature of contractual clauses stipulating that calculation method. Even more, it would not be possible to determine if individualizable damages to particular persons have been caused, until it is first evidenced whether there is a violation of those diffuse and collective interests that the ANCL has claimed; as it is necessary—firstly—to demonstrate if referencing loan interest rates to the TBP really constitutes a risk that, as such, must be reported and, additionally, if the incorporation of these interest calculation methodologies in bank loans could be qualified as abusive clauses in adhesion contracts.\n\n\nXII. By virtue of the foregoing analysis, it is necessary to uphold the procedural grievance invoked. Pursuant to the provisions of article 105.1 of the CPCA, it is appropriate to annul the appealed judgment and remand the file to the office of origin, so that the judgment that is legally appropriate may be rendered.\n\n51 of July 16, 1932; on Subsistence and Tenancy, No. 6 of September 21, 1939; on the Creation of the Office of Economic Defense, No. 206 of August 20, 1944, and on Economic Defense, No. 57 of March 26, 1945, aimed at regulating monopolistic practices, hoarding, price fixing, quality, inspections, and it was admitted that *\"anyone may report the punishable infractions of this law\"* (precept 37 of Law No. 57 of 1945). In the Penal Code of 1941, Law No. 368 of August 21, 1941, *\"depreciating the quality of the services, products, or goods of a competitor\"* and *\"unfair advertising\"* were sanctioned (canon 259), as well as defrauding another *\"in the substance, quality, or quantity of the things delivered by virtue of a contract\"* (article 282, subsection 1). The General Health Law, No. 5395 of October 30, 1973, and the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health, No. 5412 of November 8 of that same year, established rights and duties to prevent health risks for those who consume medicines, food, packaged products, or are users of health or educational centers, among others. Shortly after, the Consumer Protection Law was issued, No. 5665 of February 28, 1975, and although it focused on price fixing and supply, it also established *\"obligations of those engaged in commerce\"*, which contemplated displaying the price of products and installment sales plans in a visible place, where the interest rate, basis, and term had to be indicated; issuing an invoice; maintaining weights and measures in perfect condition; and it prohibited *\"deceptive practices in the offering of goods and services\"* (article 17). In that Law, the sanctioning approach continued to be predominantly criminal in nature, through public action that enabled anyone to file the respective complaint (precept 25). Upon the enactment of the Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, Law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982, it was entrusted with the power to: *\"Take legal actions to protect the interests of consumers\"* through a *\"Consumer Defense Attorney's Office\"* (numerals 3, subsection i) and 7, subsection f). Said function later became part of the *\"General Ombudsman for Human Rights\"*, according to articles 21 and 22 of Law No. 7142 of March 8, 1990, which were tacitly repealed by canon 32 of the Law of the Ombudsman of the Inhabitants of the Republic, Law No. 7319 of November 17, 1992, which assumed such powers, until the enactment of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, Law No. 7472 of December 20, 1994, which repealed Law No. 5665 of 1975 and currently governs the matter. In the current regulations, monopolistic practices were prohibited and, among other things, a list of consumer rights was recognized (precept 32), in addition to correlative obligations of merchants and suppliers (canon 34).\n\n**VIII.** It is necessary to emphasize that this legal development is not limited to recognizing subjective rights in favor of the consumer, understood as those powers of a particular individual to act validly (position of freedom) or to demand from another or others –including coercively– a concrete and specific conduct, for the satisfaction of their own, current, and legally protectable ends and interests (as would be, for example, enforcing a product warranty within 30 days following its purchase, pursuant to article 43 of Law No. 7472). That is, in addition to the subjective rights attributed to the parties of a specific consumer relationship, that legal system has recognized diffuse and collective interests, as fundamental and inalienable rights for the generality of consumers. Thus, precept 32, subsections b), d), and e) ibidem, contemplates: *\"the protection of their legitimate economic and social interests\"*; *\"education and dissemination on the adequate consumption of goods or services, which ensure freedom of choice and equality in contracting\"*; and *\"administrative and judicial protection against misleading advertising, abusive practices and clauses, as well as unfair commercial methods or those that restrict free choice\"*. In that vein, the Constitutional Chamber has highlighted the necessity of understanding the consumer not only as one of the subjects of a particular commercial relationship, since it is also necessary to encompass their protection from a more general perspective: *\"the Consumer Protection Law does not impose limitations or affectations on the patrimony of merchants in the terms of constitutional article 45. What that regulatory body does is not affect the private patrimony of each merchant, but rather regulate a specific activity, which is commercial, having the characteristic of transcending the concrete sphere of the individual and involving the general consuming public. Undoubtedly, the fact that third parties may be affected by commercial activity (hoarding, unreasonable profit margins, existence of private monopolies, etc.) makes it feasible for the ordinary legislator to provide, based on article 28 of the Political Charter, special obligations for merchants, in relation to the goods they offer to the public, and this is not unconstitutional as it is a consequence of the duties and legal relationships that the legal system can and must regulate. [...] The principles of social public order justify the broad development that is promoted around the protection of consumer rights\"* (judgment No. 4286-95 of 15 hours 12 minutes of August 3, 1995). Therefore, it is not surprising that this deciding body includes this matter as one of the examples where this type of interests is evident: *\"In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. [...]\"* (resolution No. 2002-00481 of 14 hours 42 minutes of January 23, 2002). Under that same optic, this First Chamber has considered that the concept of \"consumer\" is not limited to a contractual party, but rather encompasses an entire indeterminate collective, made up of the potential purchasers of a product: *\"In accordance with the constitutional parameter, consumer must be understood in an expansive approach regarding the scope of application of persons who require special protection in this matter. It is not subordinated to a 'consumer contract,' because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited way to that person who buys, or who contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Deciding Body, is that it be conceived as a client, understood as one who participates in commercial activities in the position of a potential purchaser –and not an effective buyer– of goods and services with the holder of the offer. Depending on the stage of the process, a distinction can be made between contracting party and client. The former is called a legal consumer. They acquire a good or service through a typical legal relationship, such as a purchase. The latter is the material consumer, who does not contract for the good or service, but may potentially acquire or use it. The latter is the center of legal protection in the field of consumer safety\"* (judgment No. 295-F-2007 of 10 hours 45 minutes of April 26, 2007).\n\n**IX.** In the contested judgment, the Court considers that the ACNL lacks standing because it believes that *\"we find ourselves before the non-existence of a concrete case that allows the Court to faithfully comply with article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, so that it is possible to analyze the existence of the damage, to verify that it is effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group. [...] It is not denied in advance the possibility of admitting standing by collective interest, but even in that hypothesis, the necessity of the individualization of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for the exercise of the action\"* (see transcription supra). By virtue of the foregoing, it concludes: *\"[...] if the members do not have standing to institute any proceeding, the association, as the representative of their legitimate rights or interests, would not have it either\"* (audiovisual record of the oral judgment, from 10:39:51 to 10:40:06 hours). This Chamber does not share the criterion of the judges. It is worth recalling that, on previous occasions, this deciding body has accepted the existence of non-individualizable damages, which can be caused to collectivities: *\"it is not a matter of damage generated directly upon the person of the plaintiff, but to the whole; which, for harming a diffuse interest, possesses autonomy, so it may or may not concur with damages caused individually\"* (resolution No. 805-F-S1-2010 of 13 hours 55 minutes of July 5, 2010; in a similar sense, see No. 547-F-S1-2012 of 8 hours 55 minutes of May 10, 2012). That is, contrary to what the Court indicated, the fact that an injury to a subjective right of an individual is not proven, does not necessarily rule out an affectation to diffuse or collective interests. In that sense, referring to environmental damages, this Chamber has indicated that: *\"the first and principal injured party is society as a whole, or rather an indeterminate generality of subjects; without prejudice to the fact that some of the individuals within the group may also be simultaneously affected in a particular manner. [...] A new and particular mode of damage is defined, which enjoys some specifications, and accordingly, the rules for its reparation cannot be equated to those that grant protection to subjective rights, simply because this type of damage can also infringe upon another type of prerogatives, such as rights of collective or general incidence\"* (judgment No. 675-F-2007 of 10 hours of September 21, 2007). In the present case, we are faced with a correlative action, that is, a dual procedural action, directed –on one hand– in favor of the subjective interests and rights of the members of the ANCL; but which –from another angle– is also aimed toward the defense of diffuse and collective interests. Each of these actions has different causes and implications, without them being necessarily opposed or mutually exclusive. Thus, the plaintiff seeks that BPDC and BNCR be ordered to pay material and moral damage and the losses caused to each of their members, who signed credit contracts with those entities under the modality of interest rates referenced to the TBP. However –and this is the relevant point– its lawsuit is not limited to that; the Association also demands that those banks be ordered to inform clearly and truthfully about the economic risks that, in its view, credits under those conditions entail. For this Chamber, taking into account what was set forth in the preceding recitals (considerandos), this constitutes a claim based on a diffuse interest, in favor of all those interested –current or potential– in acquiring a bank loan (article 32, subsections c) and d), of Law No. 7472). Added to the foregoing, that claim is intimately linked to the thesis that the ANCL has advanced in this proceeding, in that such a method of calculating interest constitutes an abusive clause, incorporated into adhesion contracts that impacts, at least, some 270,017 credit operations, which represented 55% of the total, in the banks subject to that study (folio 296 of the judicial file). Thus, in the criterion of this Chamber, we have an action that advocates –in addition– for a collective interest, of the entire group of debtors –indeterminate but determinable– who signed credit contracts linked to the TBP (numeral 32, subsections b) and e), ibidem). Having clarified the foregoing, it is now necessary to analyze whether a consumer association has standing to bring an action in favor of such diffuse and collective interests.\n\n**X.** According to what has been set forth, the country has witnessed an evolution toward the recognition and protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the consumer, which culminates with the reform of constitutional precept 46 and finds development in Law No. 7472. It is worth highlighting the first canon of said legal body, whose concept *\"effectively\"* provides the legal interpreter with a guideline for the exegesis of the norm, so that these rights and interests find true protection, both in administrative and judicial venues. Along these lines, the Constitutional Chamber, since resolution No. 4286-95 of 15 hours 12 minutes of August 3, 1995, considered: *\"The State must have norms that allow the fulfillment of the work of consumer protection, since it is of little or no use to establish a principle of the Social State of law, if the adequate mechanisms for its development and application are not also established. [...]\"*. In addition to the foregoing, that deciding body added: *\"[...] The state role in this matter must stem from the consecration of an effective legal system for consumer protection, which expressly recognizes their fundamental rights, establishes the substantial solutions for the basic issues emerging from consumer relations, and finally consecrates the concrete mechanisms of implementation that allow those rights to be effectively enforced\"* (judgment No. 2001-01391 of 14 hours 52 minutes of February 14, 2001). In the same sense, the First Chamber has indicated: *\"In view of the emergence of an imbalanced situation in consumer relations between entrepreneurs and consumers or users, the traditional legal instruments were not sufficient to protect them. In order to avoid, or at least mitigate those differences, the legislator has created various systems of legal defense, in the interest of finding a fair equilibrium between the reciprocal interests of consumers and producers\"* (resolution No. 655-F-2007 of 15 hours 5 minutes of September 19, 2007). Such an approach must guide the analysis of Law No. 7472 and, in what is of interest here, the standing for the protection of the diffuse and collective interests of consumers, insofar as these form part of the broad category of legitimate interests. That is the sense in which numeral 32, subsection f), of the referenced regulatory body must be understood, as it imposes, as one of their fundamental and inalienable rights, *\"effective access mechanisms for the administrative and judicial protection of their legitimate rights and interests, that lead to the adequate prevention, sanctioning, and prompt reparation of the injury to these, as appropriate\"*. The foregoing must be guaranteed by the State, as part of its essential functions, as ordered by precept 33, subsection d), ibidem: *\"In the terms established in this Law, the following are essential functions of the State: // d) Guarantee access to effective and agile mechanisms of administrative and judicial protection, to defend the legitimate rights and interests of consumers\"*. Similarly, rule 46 of that same regulatory body consecrates: *\"To enforce their rights, the consumer may resort to the administrative or judicial route, [...]\"*; from which it is important to highlight that the norm uses the concept of *\"rights\"*, in general terms and in a broad sense, without restricting it solely to subjective ones. In light of the transcribed provisions, it follows that the duty to prevent and, eventually, repair, is not limited to the individualizable damages that a merchant or supplier may have caused to a specific subject (or subjects); but includes any injury to the legitimate interests of consumers, which could be diffuse or collective. That is, as has been seen, the national legal system recognizes, regarding consumers, not only the subjective rights that may arise from a particular consumer relationship, but also their diffuse and collective interests; which is why access to the mechanisms for their effective protection is guaranteed, whether in the administrative or judicial sphere. On this point, observe numeral 56 of that Law, as it stipulates: *\"The action before the National Consumer Commission can only be initiated by virtue of a complaint from any consumer or person, without it necessarily having to be the aggrieved party by the fact reported. [...]\"*. That Commission is an organ of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, with the task of *\"hearing and sanctioning administrative infractions, breaches of the obligations established in Chapter V, and, in particular, protecting the rights of consumers, [...]\"* (article 53, subsection a), of the Law under comment). Thus, precept 56 ibidem grants broad authority for anyone to set that administrative organ in operation, in pursuit of the effective defense of consumers, which, although it refers to administrative procedures, shows *\"an opening regarding standing –any consumer– and predominantly objective, since what is important are the facts reported, and not who has suffered the injury\"* (as recognized by this Chamber in judgment No. 870-F-2007 of 10 hours 50 minutes of December 4, 2007). Moreover, it would be contradictory if –by virtue of said norm– a consumer organization could file a complaint in an administrative venue, but was denied standing to challenge in a judicial venue what is resolved there, when what was agreed upon by the Commission was contrary to its interests. On the other hand, provision 54 of the regulatory body under comment provides: *\"Consumer organizations have standing to initiate as a party or intervene, in the capacity of coadjuvants, in proceedings before the National Consumer Commission and before the courts of justice, in defense of the legitimate rights and interests of their members. [...]\"*. This canon confers standing on such types of groups to intervene as a party, both in administrative and judicial venues, not only in defense of the subjective rights of their members, but also of their legitimate interests, which includes –as was explained– those that are diffuse and collective, being –as such– supraindividual and without subjection of some to others. Said precept could not be interpreted in a way that restricts that recognition, as they are rights that the legal system conceives as fundamental and inalienable; as derived from numeral 46 of the Political Constitution in relation to article 32 of Law No. 7472, to which reference has already been made. Such that what has already been indicated for environmental cases would apply here, namely: *\"the simple lack of a direct relationship or of prejudice, as a matter of principle, cannot lead to a loss of standing for one who possesses a right recognized at the constitutional level\"* (judgment No. 675-F-2007 of 10 hours of September 21, 2007, from this Chamber). Thus things, added to the standing that an organization may hold to advocate for the subjective rights or interests of its members (corporate interest); consumer groups, such as the ANCL, also have standing for the defense of their diffuse and collective interests. Canon 46 of the Magna Carta, in conjunction with the harmonious analysis of Law No. 7472, imposes such a conclusion, guaranteeing access to the administrative or judicial route, in order to achieve the effective protection of these rights and interests (provisions 1, 32, subsections b), e), and f), 33, subsection d), 46, 54, and 56 of the cited Law).\n\n**XI.** Hence, this Deciding Body does not concur with the criterion of the Court, which considered that *\"the necessity of the individualization of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for the exercise of the action\"*. On the contrary, the constitutional and legal precepts indicated, and their jurisprudential development, allow the conclusion that the ANCL has standing to file the present proceeding in a judicial venue, given the injury that, it argues, has been caused to the diffuse and collective interests of consumers of financial products and services, due to: the alleged lack of information about the potential risks entailed by bank loans linked to the TBP and the alleged abusive nature of the contractual clauses that stipulate that calculation method. Furthermore, it would not be possible to determine whether individualizable damages have been caused to particular persons, until it is evidenced, in the first place, whether the violation of those diffuse and collective interests that the ANCL has claimed exists; as it is necessary –first– to demonstrate whether referencing loan interest rates to the TBP truly constitutes a risk that, as such, must be disclosed, and also, whether the incorporation of those interest calculation methodologies into bank loans could be qualified as abusive clauses in adhesion contracts.\n\n**XII.** By virtue of what was previously analyzed, it is imperative to uphold the procedural grievance invoked.\n\nIn compliance with the provisions of numeral 105.1 of the CPCA, it is appropriate to annul the appealed judgment and remand the case file (expediente) to the court of origin, so that the legally appropriate judgment may be issued.”

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOn the other hand, this Chamber has highlighted the procedural aspect of diffuse interests, as a parameter linked to the right of action in certain circumstances: *“it is therefore, in the opinion of this Chamber, an interest of undefined ownership that legitimizes the subject to bring an action, which is transformed, by virtue of its incorporation into the catalog of the rights of the human person, into a kind of ‘reactional right’ (derecho reaccional), intended so that its holder may oppose the violation originating from illegitimate acts or omissions caused to a generality”* (Resolution No. 805-F-S1-2010 of 1:55 p.m. on July 5, 2010). Likewise, it is necessary to take into account that these interests *“because they are diffuse or collective, do not cease to be part of the broader category of legitimate interests”* (Judgment No. 896-F-S1-2012 of 3:00 p.m. on July 26, 2012).\n\n**VII.** Now, regarding the matter at hand here, it is important to note that the protection of consumer rights and interests obtained express recognition at the highest normative level, through a reform implemented by Ley 7606 of May 29, 1996, to Article 46 of the Constitución Política, by virtue of which it was provided: *“Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they form for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters.”* Said constitutional canon is the product of a normative development that, in this country, finds antecedents in regulations dating back to the Código General del Estado de Costa Rica (Código de Carrillo) of July 30, 1841, which obligated the seller: *“to clearly explain that to which he obligates himself: every obscure or ambiguous pact is interpreted against the seller”* (Article 1020 of the First Part); furthermore, it sanctioned fraud in commerce committed through falsified merchandise, deceit, or alteration of weights and measures (Articles 309, 310, and 644 of the Second Part). In the 20th century, in the face of the depression of the 1930s and the Second World War, the following laws were enacted: Ley de Abastos, No. 51 of July 16, 1932; Ley de Subsistencias e Inquilinato, No. 6 of September 21, 1939; Ley de Creación de la Oficina de Defensa Económica, No. 206 of August 20, 1944; and Ley de Defensa Económica, No. 57 of March 26, 1945, aimed at regulating monopolistic practices, hoarding, price fixing, quality, inspections, and it was admitted that *“anyone may report the punishable infractions of this law”* (Article 37 of Ley 57 of 1945). In the Código Penal of 1941, Ley No. 368 of August 21, 1941, it was sanctioned to *“depreciate the quality of the services, products, or merchandise of a competitor”* and *“unfair advertising”* (Article 259), as well as defrauding another *“in the substance, quality, or quantity of the things delivered to them by virtue of a contract”* (Article 282, subsection 1). The Ley General de Salud, No. 5395 of October 30, 1973, and the Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, No. 5412 of November 8 of that same year, established rights and duties to prevent risks to the health of those who consume medicines, food, packaged products, or are users of health or educational centers, among others. Shortly thereafter, the Ley de Protección al Consumidor, No. 5665 of February 28, 1975, was issued; although it focused on price fixing and supply, it also established *“obligations of those who engage in commerce,”* which included displaying the price of products and installment sales plans in a visible place, where the interest rate, basis, and term had to be indicated; issuing an invoice; maintaining weights and measures in perfect condition; and it prohibited *“deceptive practices in the offering of goods and services”* (Article 17). In that Law, the sanctioning approach remained mostly criminal in nature, through public action that enabled anyone to file the corresponding complaint (Article 25). Upon the enactment of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, Ley No. 6815 of September 27, 1982, it was entrusted with the attribution of: *“Taking legal actions to safeguard the interests of consumers”* through a *“Procuraduría de Defensa del Consumidor”* (Articles 3, subsection i) and 7, subsection f)). That function later became part of the *“Defensoría General de los Derechos Humanos,”* according to Articles 21 and 22 of Ley No. 7142 of March 8, 1990, which were tacitly repealed by Article 32 of the Ley de la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República, Ley No. 7319 of November 17, 1992, which assumed such competencies, until the enactment of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, Ley No. 7472 of December 20, 1994, which repealed Ley No. 5665 of 1975 and currently governs the matter. In the current legislation, monopolistic practices were prohibited and, among other things, a list of consumer rights was recognized (Article 32), in addition to correlative obligations of merchants and suppliers (Article 34).\n\n**VIII.** It is necessary to emphasize that this legal development is not limited to recognizing subjective rights in favor of the consumer, understood as those powers of a particular individual to act validly (a position of freedom) or to demand from another(s) –including coercively– a concrete and specific conduct, for the satisfaction of their own current, legally protectable ends and interests (as would be, for example, enforcing the warranty of a product within 30 days following its purchase, pursuant to Article 43 of Ley 7472). That is, in addition to the subjective rights attributed to the parties of a specific consumer relationship, that legal system has recognized diffuse and collective interests, as fundamental and inalienable rights for the generality of consumers. Thus, Article 32, subsections b), d), and e) ibidem, contemplates: *“the protection of their legitimate economic and social interests”;* *“education and dissemination about the adequate consumption of goods or services, which ensure freedom of choice and equality in contracting”;* and *“administrative and judicial protection against misleading advertising, abusive practices and clauses, as well as unfair commercial methods or those that restrict free choice.”* In that order of ideas, the Sala Constitucional has emphasized the need to understand the consumer not only as one of the subjects of a particular commercial relationship, since it is also necessary to encompass their protection from a more general perspective: *“the Consumer Protection Law does not impose limitations or affectations on the assets of merchants in the terms of Article 45 of the Constitution. What that normative body does is not affect the private assets of each merchant, but rather regulate a specific activity, which is commercial, which has the characteristic of transcending the concrete sphere of the individual and involving the consuming public at large. Undoubtedly, the fact that third parties may be affected by commercial activity (hoarding, unreasonable profit margins, existence of private monopolies, etc.) makes it feasible for the ordinary legislator, based on Article 28 of the Carta Política, to impose special obligations on merchants in relation to the goods they offer to the public, and this is not unconstitutional as it is a consequence of the duties and legal relationships that the legal order can and must regulate. [...] The principles of social public order justify the broad development promoted around the protection of consumer rights”* (Judgment No. 4286-95 of 3:12 p.m. on August 3, 1995). Therefore, it is not surprising that this deciding body includes this matter as one of the examples where this type of interest is evidenced: *“In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united based on a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. [...]”* (Resolution No. 2002-00481 of 2:42 p.m. on January 23, 2002). Under that same perspective, this Sala Primera has considered that the concept of “consumer” is not limited to a contractual party, but rather encompasses an entire indeterminate collective, made up of the potential purchasers of a product: *“In accordance with the constitutional parameter, consumer must be understood in an expansive approach regarding the scope of application of persons requiring special protection in this matter. It is not contingent upon a ‘consumer contract,’ because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited manner to that person who purchases or contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Deciding Body, is that they be conceived of as a client, understood as one who participates in commercial activities in the position of a potential acquirer –and not an effective purchaser– of goods and services with the offeror. Depending on the stage of the process, a distinction can be made between contracting party and client. The former is called a legal consumer. They acquire a good or service through a typical legal relationship, such as, for example, a purchase. The latter is the material consumer, who does not contract for the good or service, but may potentially acquire or use it. The latter is the center of legal protection in the field of consumer safety”* (Judgment No. 295-F-2007 of 10:45 a.m. on April 26, 2007).\n\n**IX.** In the appealed judgment, the Tribunal considers that the ACNL lacks standing because it considers that *“we are faced with the non-existence of a concrete case that allows the Tribunal to faithfully comply with Article 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, so that it is possible to analyze the existence of the damage, to verify that it is effective, assessable, and individualizable (individualizable) in relation to a person or group. [...] It is not denied in advance the possibility of admitting standing by collective interest, but even in that hypothesis the need for the individualization (individualización) of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for the exercise of the action”* (see transcription *supra*). By virtue of the foregoing, it concludes: *“[...] if the associates do not have standing to institute any proceeding, the association, as the representative of their rights or legitimate interests, would not have it either”* (audiovisual record of the oral judgment, from 10:39:51 a.m. to 10:40:06 a.m.). This Chamber does not share the criterion of the judges. It is worth remembering that, on previous occasions, this deciding body has accepted the existence of non-individualizable (individualizable) damages, which may be caused to collectivities: *“it is not a damage generated directly in the person of the plaintiff, but to the generality; which, because it injures a diffuse interest, possesses autonomy, so it may or may not concur with individually caused damages”* (Resolution No. 805-F-S1-2010 of 1:55 p.m. on July 5, 2010; in a similar sense, see No. 547-F-S1-2012 of 8:55 a.m. on May 10, 2012). That is, contrary to what was indicated by the Tribunal, the fact that an injury to a subjective right of an individual is not proven does not –necessarily– rule out an affectation to diffuse or collective interests. In that sense, referring to environmental damages, this Chamber has indicated that: *“the first and main injured party is society as a whole, or else an indeterminate generality of subjects; without prejudice to the fact that, simultaneously, some of the individuals in the group may also be affected in a particular manner. [...] A new and particular mode of damage is defined, which enjoys some specifications, and accordingly, the rules for its reparation cannot be equated to those that grant protection to subjective rights, simply because this type of damage may also violate other types of prerogatives, such as rights of collective or general incidence”* (Judgment No. 675-F-2007 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2007). In the present case, we are faced with a correlative action, that is, a double procedural action, directed –on one hand– in favor of the interests and subjective rights of the associates of the ANCL; but which –from another angle– is also directed towards the defense of diffuse and collective interests. Each of these actions has different causes and implications, without them being necessarily opposed or mutually exclusive. Thus, the plaintiff seeks to condemn the BPDC and the BNCR to pay for the material and moral damage and the losses caused to each of its associates, who entered into credit contracts with those entities under the modality of interests referenced to the TBP. However –and this is what is relevant– its claim is not limited to that; the Association also demands that those banks be ordered to inform clearly and truthfully about the economic risks that, in its view, credits under those conditions entail. For this Chamber, taking into account what has been set forth in the preceding considerandos, this is a claim sustained on a diffuse interest, in favor of all those interested –current or potential– in acquiring a bank loan (Article 32, subsections c) and d), of Ley 7472). In addition to the foregoing, that claim is intimately linked to the thesis that the ANCL has put forward in this process, namely that such a modality of interest calculation constitutes an abusive clause (cláusula abusiva), incorporated into adhesion contracts that impacts at least some 270,017 credit operations, which represented 55% of the total, in the banks subject to that study (folio 296 of the judicial file). This Chamber thus considers that there is an action that advocates –additionally– for a collective interest, of the entire group of debtors –indeterminate but determinable– who signed credit contracts linked to the TBP (Article 32, subsections b) and e), ibidem). With the foregoing clear, it now becomes necessary to analyze whether a consumer association has standing to bring an action on behalf of such diffuse and collective interests.\n\n**X.** According to what has been set forth, the country has witnessed an evolution towards the recognition and protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the consumer, which culminates with the reform of Article 46 of the Constitution and finds development in Ley 7472. It is worth highlighting the first canon of said legal body, whose concept *“effectively”* provides the legal interpreter with a guideline for the exegesis of the norm, so that these rights and interests find true protection, both in administrative and judicial venues. Along those lines, the Sala Constitucional, since Resolution No. 4286-95 of 3:12 p.m. on August 3, 1995, considered: *“The State must have norms that allow the fulfillment of the task of consumer protection, since it is of little or no use to establish a principle of the Social State of law if the adequate mechanisms for its development and application are not also established. [...]”*. In addition to the foregoing, that deciding body added: *“[...] The state role in this matter must start from the consecration of an effective legal system of consumer protection, which expressly recognizes their fundamental rights, establishes the substantial solutions for the basic questions emerging from consumer relations, and finally consecrates the concrete implementation mechanisms that allow those rights to be effectively enforced”* (Judgment No. 2001-01391 of 2:52 p.m. on February 14, 2001). In the same sense, the Sala Primera has indicated: *“In view of the emergence of an unbalanced situation in consumer relations between businesses and consumers or users, traditional legal instruments were not sufficient to protect them. In order to avoid, or at least attenuate those differences, the legislator has created diverse legal defense systems, in an effort to find a fair balance between the reciprocal interests of consumers and producers”* (Resolution No. 655-F-2007 of 3:05 p.m. on September 19, 2007). Such an approach must guide the analysis of Ley 7472 and, as relevant here, the standing for the protection of the diffuse and collective interests of consumers, as these form part of the broad category of legitimate interests. That is the sense in which Article 32, subsection f) of the referred normative body must be understood, in that it imposes, as one of their fundamental and inalienable rights, *“effective mechanisms of access for the administrative and judicial protection of their legitimate rights and interests, which lead to adequately preventing, sanctioning, and promptly repairing the injury to these, as appropriate.”* The foregoing must be guaranteed by the State, as part of its essential functions, as ordered by Article 33, subsection d), ibidem: *“In the terms established in this Law, the essential functions of the State are the following: // d) Guarantee access to effective and agile mechanisms of administrative and judicial protection, to defend the legitimate rights and interests of consumers.”* Similarly, Article 46 of that same regulatory body consecrates: *“To enforce their rights, the consumer may resort to the administrative or judicial route, [...]”*; from which it is important to highlight that the norm uses the concept of *“rights,”* in general terms and in a broad sense, without restricting it solely to subjective rights. In accordance with the transcribed provisions, it follows that the duty to prevent and, eventually, repair, is not limited to the individualizable (individualizable) damages that a merchant or supplier may have caused to a determined subject (or subjects); but rather includes any injury to the legitimate interests of consumers, which could be diffuse or collective. That is, as has been seen, the national legal system recognizes, regarding consumers, not only the subjective rights that may arise from a particular consumer relationship, but –also– their diffuse and collective interests; for which reason access to the mechanisms for their effective protection is guaranteed, whether in the administrative or judicial sphere. On this point, note Article 56 of that Law, in that it stipulates: *“The action before the Comisión Nacional del Consumidor may only be initiated by virtue of a complaint from any consumer or person, without it being necessary that they be the aggrieved party by the fact being reported. [...]”*. That Commission is a body of the Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, tasked with *“hearing and sanctioning administrative infractions, breaches of the obligations established in Chapter V, and, in particular, protecting the rights of consumers, [...]”* (Article 53, subsection a), of the Law under discussion). Thus, Article 56 ibidem grants a broad power for anyone to set that administrative body in motion, in pursuit of the effective defense of consumers, which, although it refers to administrative procedures, evidences *“an opening regarding standing –any consumer– and predominantly objective, since what is important are the reported facts, and not who has suffered the injury”* (as this Chamber recognized in Judgment No. 870-F-2007 of 10:50 a.m. on December 4, 2007). Furthermore, it would be contradictory if –by virtue of said norm– a consumer organization could file a complaint in the administrative venue, but were denied standing to challenge in the judicial venue what is resolved there, when what was agreed upon by the Commission was contrary to its interests. Moreover, Article 54 of the normative body under discussion provides: *“Consumer organizations have standing to initiate as a party or intervene, in the capacity of coadjuvants, in proceedings before the Comisión Nacional del Consumidor and before the courts of justice, in defense of the legitimate rights and interests of their associates. [...]”*. This canon confers standing on such types of groups to intervene as a party, in both the administrative and judicial venues, not only in defense of the subjective rights of their associates, but also their legitimate interests, which includes –as explained– the diffuse and collective ones, being –as such– supraindividual (supraindividuales) and without subjection of some to others. Said precept could not be interpreted in a way that restricts that recognition, as they are rights that the legal system conceives of as fundamental and inalienable; as derived from Article 46 of the Constitución Política in relation to Article 32 of Ley 7472, to which reference has already been made. Thus, what has already been indicated for cases in environmental matters would apply here, namely: *“the simple lack of a direct relationship or of harm, in principle, cannot lead to a loss of standing for one who possesses a right recognized at the constitutional level”* (Judgment No. 675-F-2007 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2007, of this Chamber). This being the case, in addition to the standing that an organization may hold to advocate for the subjective rights or interests of its associates (corporate interest); consumer groups, such as the ANCL, also have standing for the defense of their diffuse and collective interests. Article 46 of the Carta Magna, in conjunction with the harmonious analysis of Ley 7472, imposes such a conclusion, guaranteeing access to the administrative or judicial route, in order to achieve the effective protection of these rights and interests (Articles 1, 32, subsections b), e), and f), 33, subsection d), 46, 54, and 56 of the cited Law).\n\n**XI.** Hence, this Deciding Body does not agree with the Tribunal's criterion, in that it considers that *“the need for the individualization (individualización) of the damage persists, as a necessary requirement for the exercise of the action.”* On the contrary, the constitutional and legal precepts indicated, and their jurisprudential development, allow the conclusion that the ANCL has standing to file the present proceeding in the judicial venue, given the injury that, it argues, has been caused to the diffuse and collective interests of consumers of financial products and services, due to: the alleged lack of information about the eventual risks that bank credits linked to the TBP entail and the alleged abusive nature of the contractual clauses stipulating that calculation modality. Moreover, it would not be possible to determine whether individualizable (individualizable) damages have been caused to particular persons, until it is shown, first, whether there exists the violation of those diffuse and collective interests that the ANCL has claimed; in that it is necessary –firstly– to demonstrate whether referencing the interest on credits to the TBP truly constitutes a risk that, as such, must be informed and, additionally, whether the incorporation of those interest calculation methodologies in bank credits could be qualified as abusive clauses in adhesion contracts.\n\n**XII.** By virtue of the foregoing analysis, it is necessary to uphold the procedural grievance invoked. In accordance with the provisions of Article 105.1 of the CPCA, it is appropriate to annul the appealed judgment and remand the case file to the court of origin, so that the judgment that may be appropriate in law is issued." }