{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-150845", "citation": "Res. 00029-2014 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Servicios publicitarios en prensa digital gravados con IGSV", "title_en": "Digital press advertising services subject to IGSV", "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI analiza la legalidad del criterio institucional DGT-CI-008-2012, que interpreta el inciso l) del artículo 1 de la Ley de Impuesto General sobre las Ventas (LIGSV) y grava con el IGSV los servicios publicitarios prestados a través de la prensa en formato digital. La demandante, La Nación Digital, impugna este criterio y los actos de aplicación derivados, alegando violación a los principios de legalidad, reserva de ley e irretroactividad, así como interpretación extensiva de una lista taxativa. El Tribunal rechaza todos los argumentos: sostiene que el legislador gravó los servicios publicitarios prestados por radio, prensa y televisión sin limitarlos a un formato específico; que la plataforma digital es solo un medio del mismo servicio; y que el criterio institucional no crea tributos sino que interpreta legítimamente la norma a la luz de una interpretación evolutiva y finalista. Confirma la validez del ajuste fiscal y de la sanción impuesta por periodos de 2008-2009, desestimando la alegación de irretroactividad porque la obligación existía desde las reformas de 1987-1988 y no había prescrito. También rechaza la supuesta desproporción con la capacidad contributiva, recordando que el IGSV grava indirectamente al consumidor final y el contribuyente actúa como mero recaudador.", "summary_en": "The Administrative Contentious Court, Section VI, reviewed the legality of institutional criterion DGT-CI-008-2012, which interpreted Article 1(l) of the General Sales Tax Law (LIGSV) as taxing advertising services provided through digital press media. The plaintiff, La Nación Digital, challenged the criterion and its application, arguing violations of legality, legislative reserve, non-retroactivity, and an extensive interpretation of an exhaustive list. The Court rejected all arguments, holding that the legislature taxed advertising services through radio, press, and television without limiting them to a specific format, and that digital platforms are just a different means of delivering the same service. The institutional criterion was found to be a legitimate, evolutionary, and purposive interpretation that does not create new taxes. The tax adjustment and penalty for the 2008-2009 periods were upheld, as the obligation existed since 1987-1988 and had not prescribed. The Court also dismissed the claim of disproportionate impact on the taxpayer's ability to pay, noting that IGSV is ultimately borne by the final consumer.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "date": "2014", "year": "2014", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "LIGSV", "hecho generador", "reserva de ley", "criterio institucional", "irretroactividad", "no sujeción", "interpretación evolutiva" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 1", "law": "Ley 6826" }, { "article": "Art. 5", "law": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios" } ], "keywords_es": [ "IGSV", "servicios publicitarios", "prensa digital", "interpretación evolutiva", "reserva de ley", "hecho generador", "criterio institucional", "irretroactividad", "capacidad contributiva", "no sujeción" ], "keywords_en": [ "IGSV", "advertising services", "digital press", "evolutionary interpretation", "legislative reserve", "taxable event", "institutional criterion", "non-retroactivity", "ability to pay", "non-subjection" ], "excerpt_es": "…luego de un mesurado análisis, el Tribunal llega a la conclusión de que la referida norma (artículo 1 inciso l) de la LIGSV) sí grava con ese tributo el servicio de publicidad prestado a través de la prensa desde una plataforma digital o web. Lo anterior ya que cuando la norma en cuestión grava con el IGSV los servicios publicitarios prestados a través de la radio, la prensa y la televisión, la referencia del legislador lo es a los servicios publicitarios prestados a través de los medios de comunicación que ahí se indican, independientemente de que ello lo sea en una plataforma física, virtual o digital. Es decir, lo que se grava es el servicio de publicidad prestado por la prensa, por lo que el medio o plataforma en que la prensa exponga la publicidad no elimina el acaecimiento del hecho generador.", "excerpt_en": "…after a measured analysis, the Court concludes that the rule in question (Article 1(l) of the LIGSV) does tax the advertising service provided through the press from a digital or web platform. The foregoing because when the rule taxes with IGSV the advertising services provided through radio, press, and television, the legislature's reference is to advertising services provided through the communication media indicated therein, regardless of whether this occurs on a physical, virtual, or digital platform. That is, what is taxed is the advertising service provided by the press, so the medium or platform on which the press displays the advertising does not eliminate the occurrence of the taxable event.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The Court denied the claim, confirming the legality of institutional criterion DGT-CI-008-2012 and the tax adjustments and penalties applied for web-based advertising services.", "summary_es": "El Tribunal declaró sin lugar la demanda, confirmando la legalidad del criterio institucional DGT-CI-008-2012 y de los ajustes y sanciones aplicados por servicios publicitarios prestados en la web." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando VIII", "quote_en": "The validity of any eventual interpretations of a given tax is conditioned on the possibility of sustaining that meaning or comprehensive orientation within the scope of grammatical permissibility of the rule.", "quote_es": "La validez de las eventuales interpretaciones respecto de determinado tributo se encuentra condicionada a la posibilidad de sustentar ese sentido u orientación comprensiva en el ámbito de permisibilidad gramatical de la norma." }, { "context": "Considerando VIII", "quote_en": "…what is taxed is the advertising service provided by the press, so the medium or platform on which the press displays the advertising does not eliminate the occurrence of the taxable event.", "quote_es": "…lo que se grava es el servicio de publicidad prestado por la prensa, por lo que el medio o plataforma en que la prensa exponga la publicidad no elimina el acaecimiento del hecho generador." }, { "context": "Considerando VIII", "quote_en": "…this Court considers that, under Articles 10 of the Civil Code and 10 of the LGAP, a purposive and hermeneutic interpretation of the legal system is perfectly possible, allowing consideration not only of the literal text of the rule but also its context and the factual and legal reality in force at the time of its application…", "quote_es": "…este Tribunal estima que, al amparo de los artículos 10 del Código Civil y 10 de la LGAP, es perfectamente posible una interpretación finalista y hermeneútica del ordenamiento jurídico que permita ponderar no solo la literalidad de la norma, sino además su contexto y la realidad (fáctica y jurídica) vigente al momento de aplicarla…" } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-32526", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 6826 Art. 1" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-150845", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-32526", "norm_num": "6826", "norm_name": "Ley del Impuesto al Valor Agregado", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "08/11/1982" }, { "doc_id": "norm-55666", "norm_num": "8454", "norm_name": "Ley de Certificados, Firmas Digitales y Documentos Electrónicos", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/08/2005" }, { "doc_id": "norm-6530", "norm_num": "4755", "norm_name": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "03/05/1971" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“VI.- Sobre la interpretación de las normas tributarias. Estima\r\nel Tribunal que, dado el objeto de lo debatido, resulta oportuno referirse a\r\nlos mecanismos interpretativos que han de ser aplicados en materia tributaria,\r\na fin de esclarecer si las normas que regulan este tipo de relaciones fiscales\r\nincorporan postulados especiales que ameriten soluciones particulares, o si\r\nbien, deben ser entendidas esas normas acorde a los mecanismos usuales de\r\ncomprensión de los preceptos normativos. Se trata de un tema ya abordado por\r\neste Tribunal, entre otras, en la sentencia No. 128-2012-VI, \r\ndictada a las 7 horas 30 minutos del 27 de junio del 2012, que, en lo que\r\ninteresa, indicó: \"(...) En materia tributaria, el\r\nnumeral 6 del citado Código establece las formas en que debe interpretarse la\r\nnormativa regulatoria. Tal mandato establece: \"Las normas tributarias se\r\ndeben interpretar con arreglo a todos los métodos admitidos por el Derecho\r\nComún. La analogía es procedimiento admisible para llenar los vacíos legales\r\npero en virtud de ella no pueden crearse tributos ni\r\nexenciones.\" Por ende, la normativa tributaria debe aplicarse conforme a\r\nlos mecanismos de interpretación normal. No existe criterio alguno que permita\r\nsostener seudo-máximas de interpretación tales como in dubio pro fisco, pro contribuyente, y otras por el\r\nestilo, que sean de aplicación genérica y total a una diversidad indeterminada\r\nde hipótesis, de modo que sean principios que deban imponerse en este ejercicio\r\nintelectivo del\r\noperador jurídico. Desde ese plano, las normas deberán\r\nser interpretadas acorde a las formas de comprensión usuales, lo que depende de\r\ncada caso concreto. En efecto, la determinación del mecanismo\r\ninterpretativo aplicable frente a una determinada situación jurídica, es un\r\ntema que ha de valorarse en cada caso concreto. Para ello, debe atenderse a la\r\nfinalidad misma de la norma, conforme a los parámetros que otorga el canon 10\r\nde la Ley General\r\nde la\r\n Administración Pública y canon 10 del Código Civil. En esa línea,\r\nmerece traer a colación lo dicho por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia en el fallo 145 de las 10 horas 15 minutos del 22 de febrero del 2008,\r\nen la cual, sobre el tema de la interpretación de las normas tributarias\r\nindicó: \"(...) De allí que la labor hermenéutica de las normas que regulan\r\nlas relaciones tributarias, debe realizarse dentro de los cauces de las reglas\r\nde la interpretación jurídica, comunes a todas las ramas del derecho acudiendo\r\na sus diversos métodos, a fin de precisar los alcances y particularidades de un\r\ndeterminado mandato, de modo que la formulación hipotética, aplicada a la\r\npraxis diaria, cumpla su cometido intrínseco y el fin que ha dispuesto el\r\nlegislador para su emisión. (...) En esta labor, de acuerdo al principio de\r\nigualdad constitucional, es claro que el intérprete debe ponderar las diversas\r\nvariables que convergen en cada situación, dentro de ellas, la naturaleza de la\r\ndisposición, procurando que su uso, en la forma y alcances que establezca, sea\r\nigual para todos los casos similares y evitar una aplicación material que burle\r\nla finalidad misma de su contenido. Los medios de que el operador jurídico se\r\nsirve para llevar a cabo este proceso, son\r\nsubstancialmente: filológico o gramatical, lógico, histórico, sociológico y\r\nfinalista. El artículo 10 del Código Civil, al cual remite el canon 6 del\r\nCódigo de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, en relación a la interpretación\r\nde las reglas tributarias, contempla estos elementos ... La exégesis de las\r\nnormas tributarias, debe analizar en cada caso, el contenido de la norma, para\r\nestablecer los cauces debidos de su aplicación, a tono con los parámetros ya\r\nseñalados, a fin de que el mandato cumpla su cometido, se satisfaga la\r\nfinalidad inmersa en la manifestación legislativa, sea imponer cargas\r\ntributarias, establecer marcos de beneficios y demás asuntos inherentes a la\r\nrelación jurídico tributaria que de aquella se desprenda.\" Por ende, el\r\noperador jurídico ha de acudir a los mecanismos de interpretación que sean pertinentes en cada caso concreto, sin que pueda partirse,\r\ncomo criterio genérico de base, que la interpretación debe atender a una\r\nforma específica. (...)\". (En\r\nsimilar sentido, puede consultarse la sentencia de este\r\nTribunal No. 089-2013-VI, dictada a las 15 \r\nhoras 55 minutos del\r\n25 de junio de 2013). Este órgano\r\ncolegiado comparte a cabalidad el anterior criterio, que servirá de punto de\r\npartida para resolver la divergencia interpretativa que se plantea en el caso\r\nconcreto. \n\r\n\r\n\n VII.- Algunas generalidades del Impuesto General Sobre las Ventas. Cabe recordar, también, que el IGSV es un\r\ntributo que grava el valor agregado en la venta de las mercancías y en la\r\nprestación de determinados servicios. Se caracteriza por gravar las distintas\r\nfases del ciclo económico (fabricación, comercialización, en fases de mayorista\r\ny detalle), por lo que su estructura parte de la existencia de cadenas\r\nproductivas, en donde quien produce un bien o presta un servicio, tiene uno o\r\nvarios proveedores de los cuales adquiere los insumos necesarios para su\r\nactividad, que son, a su vez, productos finales respecto de quien los\r\nmanufactura. Como\r\nconsecuencia de lo anterior, lo que se grava es el valor incorporado o agregado\r\nen cada etapa, que a su vez determina la principal ventaja económica de este tributo, a saber, la neutralidad. El hecho generador\r\ndel tributo surge en los siguientes supuestos: a) en la venta de mercancías,\r\ncon la facturación o entrega de ellas, en el acto que se realice primero; b) en\r\nlas importaciones o internaciones de mercancías en el momento de la aceptación\r\nde la póliza o del formulario aduanero, según corresponda; c) en la prestación\r\nde servicios, con la facturación o de la prestación del servicio, en el acto\r\nque se realice primero; ch) en el uso o consumo de mercancías por parte de los\r\ncontribuyentes, en la fecha en que aquellas se retiren de la empresa y d) en\r\nlas ventas en consignación y los apartados de mercaderías, en el momento en que\r\nla mercadería queda apartada, según sea el caso (artículos 2 y 3 de la LIGSV). Desde este plano, el\r\nsujeto pasivo será toda aquella persona física o jurídica, de derecho o de\r\nhecho, pública o privada, que realice ventas o preste determinados servicios en\r\nforma habitual, así como quienes realicen importaciones o internaciones de\r\nbienes. La tarifa del\r\ngravamen es de un 13%. Interesa resaltar que este tributo se \r\ncaracteriza por aplicar un sistema mixto de identificación de su objeto, el\r\ncual difiere, por ejemplo, del Impuesto sobre el Valor Agregado o Añadido,\r\nadoptado por otros países, entre ellos los de la Unión Europea. Así,\r\nnuestro legislador optó por gravar, de manera general y como categoría\r\nconceptual, la venta de cualquier bien o mercancía. Mientras\r\nque, en relación con la prestación de servicios acudió a una fórmula taxativa y\r\nexcepcional, esto es, únicamente se gravan aquellos que expresamente hayan sido\r\ndispuestos por el legislador. Así se refleja en el\r\nartículo 1 de la LIGSV,\r\nconforme al cual \"(...) Se establece un impuesto sobre el valor\r\nagregado en la venta de mercancías y en la prestación de los\r\nservicios siguientes: a) Restaurantes. b)\r\nCantinas. c) Centros nocturnos, sociales, de recreo y similares. ch) Hoteles, moteles, pensiones y casas de estancia\r\ntransitoria o no. d) Talleres de reparación y pintura de toda clase de\r\nvehículos. e) Talleres de reparación y de refacción de toda clase de\r\nmercancías. f) Aparcamientos de vehículos. g) Servicios telefónicos, de cable,\r\nde télex, radiolocalizadores, radiomensajes y similares. (Así\r\nreformado el inciso g), por el artículo 15 de la Ley N° 8114, Ley de\r\nSimplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria, de 4 de julio del 2001) h) Servicios de revelado y copias fotográficas, incluso fotocopias. i)\r\nServicios de bodegaje y otros servicios no financieros, brindados por almacenes\r\ngenerales de depósito, almacenes de depósito fiscal y estacionamientos\r\ntransitorios de mercancías, estos últimos bajo las condiciones previstas en el\r\nartículo 145 de la Ley\r\n General de Aduanas, Nº 7557, de 20 de octubre de 1995. (Así\r\nreformado el inciso i), por el artículo 15 de la Ley N° 8114, Ley de\r\nSimplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria, de 4 de julio del 2001). j) Servicios de lavandería y aplanchado de ropa de clase. k) Espectáculos\r\npúblicos en general, excepto los deportivos, teatros y cines, estos últimos\r\ncuando exhiban películas para niños. ( Así reformado por el artículo 19.21 de\r\nla ley N° 7097 de 1º de setiembre de 1988). l) Servicios publicitarios\r\nprestados a través de la radio, la prensa y la televisión. Estarán\r\nexentos de esta disposición las emisoras de radio y los periódicos rurales.\r\n( Así adicionado por el artículo 3º de la Ley Nº 7088 de 30 de noviembre de 1987 y ampliado\r\npor el inciso 39 del artículo 19 de la Ley No. 7097 de 18 de agosto de 1988). ll)\r\nTransmisión de programas de televisión por cable, satélite u otros sistemas\r\nsimilares, así como la grabación de \"videos\" y \"pistas\", y\r\nsu arrendamiento. ( Así adicionado por el artículo 3º de la Ley Nº 7088 de 30 de\r\nnoviembre de 1987). m) Servicios de las agencias aduanales. ( Así adicionado\r\npor el artículo 3º de la Ley Nº\r\n7088 de 30 de noviembre de 1987). n) Servicios de correduría de bienes raíces.\r\n( Así adicionado por el artículo 3º de la Ley Nº 7088 de 30 de noviembre de 1987). ñ)\r\nServicios de mudanzas internacionales. ( Así adicionado por el artículo 3º de la Ley Nº 7088 de 30 de\r\nnoviembre de 1987). o) Primas de seguro, excepto las referidas a los seguros\r\npersonales, los riesgos de trabajo, las cosechas y las viviendas de interés\r\nsocial. p) Servicios prestados por imprentas y litografías. Se exceptúan la Imprenta Nacional,\r\nlas imprentas y litografías de las universidades públicas, la del Ministerio de\r\nEducación Pública, así como las imprentas y litografías del Instituto\r\nTecnológico de Costa Rica y de la Editorial Costa Rica, respectivamente. Lo\r\nanterior, sin perjuicio de las excepciones contenidas en el artículo 9 de la Ley de impuesto general sobre\r\nventas, Nº 6826, de 10 de noviembre de 1982, y las establecidas en la Ley Nº 7874, de 23 de abril\r\nde 1999. q) Lavado, encerado y demás servicios de limpieza y mantenimiento de\r\nvehículos. (Así adicionados los incisos o), p), q), por el artículo\r\n16 de la Ley N°\r\n8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria, de 4 de julio del 2001) (NOTA: de acuerdo con el párrafo tercero del artículo 42 de la Ley Forestal Nº 7575\r\ndel 13 de febrero de 1996, la\r\n MADERA pagará un impuesto de ventas igual al impuesto general\r\nde ventas menos tres puntos porcentuales). (...)\". \n\r\n\r\n\n VIII.- Sobre el examen de legalidad del criterio institucional\r\nNo. DGT-CI-008-2012. La demandante impugna un criterio institucional y dos actos administrativos\r\nconcretos mediante los cuales se le aplicó lo dispuesto en aquel. En ese sentido, primero se analizará la legalidad del criterio institucional y luego la de los actos de\r\naplicación individual dictados tanto en el procedimiento determinativo como en el sancionatorio.\r\nLo anterior toda vez que, en caso de que existan vicios en el primero,\r\nnecesariamente se extenderán a los segundos. Para\r\nuna mejor comprensión, el Tribunal ha agrupado, según su contenido, los\r\ndiferentes vicios que se reclaman a efectos de evitar\r\nrepeticiones innecesarias. Como punto de\r\npartida, debemos señalar que, de conformidad con el artículo 99 del CNPT, los criterios institucionales constituyen\r\nnormas o disposiciones de carácter general que dicta la AT para la correcta aplicación\r\nde las leyes tributarias, claro está, dentro de los límites fijados por las\r\ndisposiciones legales y reglamentarias pertinentes. Se infiere, entonces, que\r\nse trata de un poder normativo que se otorga con una\r\nfinalidad específica y que se encuentra limitado por normas de rango superior como lo son las leyes y\r\nlos reglamentos. Constituyen fuente de derecho, según se desprende de los\r\nnumerales 2 y 168 del CNPT, así como el canon 2 del Reglamento General de\r\nGestión, Fiscalización y Recaudación Tributaria (en adelante RGGFRT) y tienen\r\ncarácter interpretativo de las leyes y reglamentos, sin que puedan innovar\r\nsituaciones jurídicas objetivas o suplir la insuficiencia de fuentes de rango\r\nsuperior. Estamos, entonces, frente a actos externos y generales a través de\r\nlos cuales la AT\r\nbusca delimitar, dar mayor claridad o precisión a los alcances; así como\r\nproyección al contenido, de los distintos deberes\r\nformales y materiales que las normas que regulan las relaciones jurídico\r\ntributarias imponen a los diferentes sujetos pasivos. Lo anterior a efectos de dotar esas relaciones de la certeza y seguridad\r\njurídica necesarias. Por ello, estimamos, resultan de vital importancia en un\r\nsistema tributario como\r\nel nuestro, que se fundamenta en un esquema de auto-determinación,\r\nauto-declaración y auto-liquidación sustentado, además, \r\nen el cumplimiento voluntario de esas obligaciones. Ello supone que es\r\nel sujeto pasivo quien, en primera\r\ninstancia, delimita el contenido y cuantía de sus obligaciones fiscales,\r\nlas declara y las cancela. Posteriormente, emergen las\r\npotestades de fiscalización de la\r\n AT. Pues bien, en este tipo de sistemas, frente al derecho\r\nque tiene el contribuyente a ser informado por la AT en relación con el\r\ncumplimiento de sus obligaciones y deberes tributarios, así como respecto del\r\ncontenido y alcance de éstos (artículo 171 inciso 2) del CNPT), los criterios\r\ninstitucionales, como actos de alcance general, resultan de gran relevancia\r\nporque permiten a los contribuyentes contar con un pronunciamiento de la AT respecto de cómo proceder en\r\nel cumplimiento de los deberes tributarios, en cada caso específico, máxime\r\ncuando el numeral 99 citado establece, también, que estos criterios serán de\r\nacatamiento obligatorio en la emisión de todos los actos administrativos,\r\ncalificando de nulos aquellos que se dicten en contra de tales normas, lo que\r\ndice de su incidencia en la esfera jurídica subjetiva de los sujetos pasivos.\r\nDada su relevancia e implicaciones, los artículos 101, 173 y 174 del mismo\r\nCNPT, imponen a la AT\r\nel deber de publicitarlos y divulgarlos por los diversos medios que ahí se\r\nestablecen, a efectos de garantizar el derecho de información de los sujetos\r\nobligados. Pues bien, en este proceso se impugna\r\nel c riterio institucional No.\r\nDGT-CI-008-2012, referido a \"Servicios publicitarios\r\nprestados a través de la prensa en formato escrito y digital\", en el cual\r\ndispuso, en lo medular, que los servicios publicitarios prestados a través de\r\nla prensa, entendida ésta tanto en formato \"escrito como digital\"\r\n(entiéndase tanto en formato físico o en digital), se encuentran gravados con\r\nel IGSV, de conformidad con una interpretación evolutiva de lo que \r\ndispone el inciso l) del artículo 1 de la LIGSV, mediante el cual se gravan los servicios\r\npublicitarios prestados a través de la radio, prensa y televisión. Para\r\nexaminar los reclamos que plantea la demandante, el primer aspecto que ha de\r\ndefinirse es si el artículo 1 inciso l) de la LIGSV grava con ese tributo los servicios\r\npublicitarios prestados a través de las páginas web de los medios de\r\nprensa. Ello por cuanto la parte actora consideran que los artículo 1 de la LIGSV y de su Reglamento, no\r\ncontemplan expresamente dentro de los servicios gravados, los de publicidad prestados\r\na través de la web; y considerando que se trata de una lista taxativa de\r\nservicios gravados, afirma, el criterio institucional realiza una\r\ninterpretación extensiva que se aparta de las normas citadas. Por su\r\nparte, el Estado sostiene que lo que se gravó fue el servicio de publicidad\r\nprestados en la presa (entre otros) y que el hecho de que se preste a través de\r\nla web no le quita esa condición sino que estaríamos frente a servicios\r\npublicitarios prestados a través de la prensa digital. Como explicamos supra, la norma\r\ntributaria debe interpretarse con arreglo a los mecanismos normales, según\r\ncorresponda en cada caso concreto. Para ello, estimamos que cualquier práctica\r\ninterpretativa que se intente ha de partir del contexto\r\ngramatical de las normas. Esto no implica que la comprensión de la norma sea, en todos los casos, dentro de una interpretación\r\nliteral. Por el contrario, la norma como expresión de lenguaje constituye a su\r\nvez el punto a partir del cual el operador jurídico inicia su ejercicio analítico\r\nfrente a casos reales en los que ha de ser aplicada, pero a su vez, consiste en\r\nel límite de la decisión de ese intérprete autorizado (en razón de que su\r\ndecisión busca la solución de un caso concreto mediante la aplicación de la\r\nnorma analizada). La validez de las eventuales interpretaciones respecto de\r\ndeterminado tributo se encuentra condicionada a la posibilidad de sustentar ese sentido u orientación comprensiva en el ámbito de\r\npermisibilidad gramatical de la norma. Pues bien, luego de un\r\nmesurado análisis, el Tribunal llega a la conclusión de que la referida norma\r\n(artículo 1 inciso l) de la\r\n LIGSV) sí grava con ese tributo el servicio de publicidad\r\nprestado a través de la prensa desde una plataforma digital o web. Lo anterior\r\nya que cuando la norma en cuestión grava con el IGSV\r\nlos servicios publicitarios prestados a través de la radio, la prensa y la\r\ntelevisión, la referencia del legislador lo es a los servicios\r\npublicitarios prestados a través de los medios de comunicación que ahí se\r\nindican, independientemente de que ello lo sea\r\nen una plataforma física, virtual o digital. Es decir, lo que se grava es el\r\nservicio de publicidad prestado por la prensa, por lo que el medio o plataforma\r\nen que la prensa exponga la publicidad no elimina el acaecimiento del\r\nhecho generador. No está demás recordar, en todo caso, que conforme al artículo\r\n3 de la Ley No.\r\n8454, del 30 de agosto de 2005, existe una equivalencia funcional entre\r\nlos documentos electrónicos y físicos, a los cuales debe brindarse idéntico tratamiento\r\njurídico. Desde esta perspectiva, estima el Tribunal que si la actividad sobre\r\nla cual recae el tributo son los diferentes servicios publicitarios que presta,\r\nen este caso, la prensa incluye, sin lugar a dudas, los que presten por la\r\nprensa en formato escrito o impreso, virtual o digital; lo que incluye,\r\nobviamente, los servicios publicitarios que venda la actora para ser expuestos\r\nen su página web, es decir, La Nación Digital. Al fin de cuentas, insistimos, se\r\nincurre en el hecho generador, sea, la prestación de servicios publicitarios en\r\nprensa, solo que a través de una plataforma o formato digital, lo que en nada\r\nmodifica el hecho imponible. Así, como primer punto, estimamos que la intención\r\ndel legislador fue gravar, de manera general, los servicios publicitarios que\r\nprestados a través de la radio, la prensa y\r\nla televisión, independientemente de la plataforma o formato que utilicen\r\nlos medios de comunicación para comercializarlos. En consecuencia, una simple\r\ninterpretación literal y finalista de la norma permite\r\nconcluir que sí se gravan los servicios de publicidad prestados a través de\r\nprensa en sus páginas web o formatos digitales. Conforme a lo\r\nexpuesto, no se observa que el criterio institucional que se impugna interprete\r\nen forma extensiva el artículo 1 inciso l) de la LIGSV. En rigor, esa\r\nnorma de alcance general lo que viene es a interpretar que cuando el legislador\r\nse refiere y grava los servicios publicitarios prestados por prensa, incluye a\r\nlos distintos formatos en que se presta, esto es tanto impreso como digital;\r\ninterpretación que el Tribunal comparte por las razones ya expuestas. Dada la\r\nredacción general de la norma, no podría el Tribunal avalar una interpretación\r\nque propugne gravar con el IGSV únicamente los servicios publicitarios\r\nprestados por la prensa en formato impreso, como pretende la accionante; y no\r\nesos mismos servicios, prestados también por la prensa, solo que a través de\r\nuna plataforma diferente a la física e impresa, como es en este caso, la\r\ndigital. Ello más bien crearía una distorsión tecnológica y económica (que se\r\ngrave con IGSV los servicios publicitarios que se presten en la prensa impresa\r\ny no los que, esa misma prensa, ofrece por tecnologías más novedosas, como lo\r\nes la prensa digital), que el Tribunal no podría cohonestar y que además\r\nresultaría violatoria del propio ordenamiento jurídico, particularmente de los\r\nprincipios de igualdad y generalidad. En ese punto, no debe llamar a confusión\r\nlo que indica el artículo 1 inciso 21) del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto General sobre\r\nlas Ventas, cuando define lo que ha de entenderse por servicios publicitarios, e indica que es la venta de espacio o de\r\ntiempo en estaciones de televisión y publicaciones periódicas, como diarios,\r\nrevistas, suplementos y otros impresos, efectuada por personas físicas o\r\njurídicas propietarios o no, intermediarios o agentes de publicidad. \r\nEn rigor, en estricto apego al contenido de la potestad reglamentaria y el\r\nPrincipio de Interdicción a la Arbitrariedad\r\n Administrativa, solo podría interpretarse que, en ese\r\nsupuesto, las referencias a material impresos no son excluyentes de la\r\nposibilidad de que otros servicios publicitarios que preste, por ejemplo, la\r\nradio o la prensa, puedan serlo a través de otras plataformas. No podríamos avalar\r\nla interpretación a la que llega la accionante (que la definición de servicios\r\npublicitarios únicamente comprende el material impreso físicamente, condición\r\nque no se cumple en los casos en que el servicio se preste a través de la web),\r\nporque no debe dejarse de lado que el reglamento es una norma subordinada a la\r\nley, que lo pretende es desarrollar sus alcances, más nunca contradecirla o\r\ndejar sin efecto sus disposiciones. En este caso, es\r\nclaro que el legislador nunca introdujo la referida limitación. Insistimos que\r\nlo que gravó fueron los servicios publicitarios prestados a través de la radio,\r\nprensa y televisión; sin que se observe limitación o exclusión alguna en cuanto\r\na la plataforma que utilice cualquiera de esos medios para prestar\r\nefectivamente el servicio. Pero además, una interpretación como la que pretende\r\nla accionante sería incompatible, por ejemplo, con el tributo impuesto a los\r\nservicios publicitarios que preste la radio, porque estos no podrían serlo en\r\nmaterial impreso. Así, interpretar que la norma reglamentaria define que los\r\nservicios publicitarios que se gravan son únicamente los que se prestan en\r\nmaterial impreso físicamente, llevaría a incurrir en un ejercicio abusivo de la\r\npotestad reglamentaria y supondría restringir los alcances del concepto\r\nempleado por el legislador quien, como se explicó, optó por utilizar un\r\npresupuesto de hecho general (los servicios publicitarios prestados a través de\r\nla radio, prensa y televisión) y sin limitación, a efectos de incluir las\r\ndistintas plataformas o formatos que utilicen esos medios de comunicación para\r\nvender o exponer los servicios publicitarios y que podrían ir apareciendo con\r\nel pasar de los años. Teniendo claro lo anterior, este Tribunal estima que, al\r\namparo de los artículos 10 del Código Civil y 10 de la LGAP, es perfectamente\r\nposible una interpretación finalista y hermeneútica del ordenamiento jurídico\r\nque permita ponderar no solo la literalidad de la norma, sino además su\r\ncontexto y la realidad (fáctica y jurídica) vigente al momento de aplicarla;\r\npara llegar a concluir que el artículo 1 inciso l) de la LIGSV grava con ese tributo\r\nlos servicios publicitarios que se prestan por la prensa, al margen de la\r\nplataforma o formato que se utilice para vender, prestar o exponer la\r\npublicidad. Por lo expuesto, estimamos que el criterio institucional no es\r\nextensivo en su interpretación, sino que más bien se orienta a la correcta\r\naplicación y comprensión de los alcances del artículo 1 inciso l)\r\ncitado. En ese tanto, no innova situaciones\r\njurídicas objetivas, solo desarrolla la interpretación que debe darse a una\r\nnorma preexistente, lo que este Tribunal avala.\n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nIX.- Tampoco se observa que el criterio\r\ninstitucional impugnado lesione el Principio de Legalidad o el de Reserva de\r\nLey, que encuentran fundamento en los artículos 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política\r\ny 5 del CNPT.\r\nEsta última norma establece con claridad que “(...) En cuestiones\r\ntributarias solo la ley puede: a) Crear, modificar o suprimir tributos; definir\r\nel hecho generador de la relación tributaria; establecer las tarifas de los\r\ntributos y sus bases de cálculo; e indicar el sujeto pasivo; b) Otorgar\r\nexenciones, reducciones o beneficios; c) Tipificar las infracciones y\r\nestablecer las respectivas sanciones; d) Establecer privilegios, preferencias y\r\ngarantías para los créditos tributarios; y e) Regular los modos de extinción de\r\nlos créditos tributarios por medios distintos del pago. (..)\". Lleva\r\nrazón la actora cuando señala que conforme a esta\r\ndisposición y al principio de reserva de ley, los componentes esenciales y\r\ndeterminantes del\r\ntributo deben, forzosamente, ser establecidos por el legislador. Nos referimos al hecho generador, el sujeto pasivo, la base\r\nimponible, la tarifa del tributo, así como período de cobro,\r\nsegún sea progresivo o instantáneo. No obstante, en cuanto a la tarifa, la Sala Constitucional\r\nha establecido la posibilidad de una delegación legislativa, claro está,\r\nmediante una ley que establezca de antemano los límites en que este ejercicio puede realizarse. De allí que la reserva de\r\nley referida pueda calificarse como “relativa”, según lo ha\r\nratificado en varios de sus pronunciamientos dicha Sala, entre otros en las\r\nsentencias No. 8271-2001, 8580-2001 y 5504-2002.\r\nEn el caso que nos ocupa, estimamos que el criterio institucional interpreta el\r\nnumeral 1 inciso l) de la LIGSV\r\nsin afectar los elementos sometidos al referido principio de reserva de ley. Es\r\ndecir, no se innova respecto del hecho generador, el sujeto pasivo, la base\r\nimponible, la tarifa del tributo o el período de cobro, ni impone una\r\nobligación ex novo, esto es, no prevista por el legislador. Insistimos en que\r\nel hecho generador que contempla la norma legal es la prestación de servicios\r\npublicitarios a través de la prensa, sin que el legislador limite ese hecho\r\nimponible únicamente a los que se vendan por medio de la prensa escrita impresa\r\nfísicamente, como parece interpretarlo la accionante. A diferencia de su tesis,\r\nestimamos que la ley no grava ni describe los medios a\r\ntravés de los cuáles se presten o vendan los servicios publicitarios. Es más, ni siquiera los califica. Lo que se grava es la prestación\r\nde tales servicios en la prensa, radio y televisión (que son todos medios de\r\ncomunicación); independientemente de la plataforma que se utilice para\r\nprestarlos. La página web es una plataforma que puede utilizar el medio de\r\ncomunicación (prensa, en este caso) para vender o\r\nprestar servicios publicitarios. De modo que, si éstos prestan a través de la\r\nprensa (física o digital) estarán gravados con el IGSV porque forman parte del\r\nsupuesto de hecho previsto por el legislador. El criterio institucional no\r\nintroduce un nuevo hecho generador, como\r\nse reclama; solo establece la correcta interpretación de la norma, a efectos de\r\nque no quede duda al contribuyente de los alcances del hecho generador que se describe en la\r\nreferida norma legal. En relación con el principio de legalidad, se acusa su\r\nviolación porque, en criterio de la demandante, la AT sin contar con una norma\r\nlegal que la habilitara procede a gravar los servicios publicitarios que ella\r\nprestara a través de la web. No obstante, reiteramos que esos servicios fueron\r\ngravados por el legislador, desde el momento en que impuso el pago del tributo\r\na los servicios publicitarios prestados a través de la prensa, y la actora\r\nincurrió en ese hecho generador cuando vendió servicios para ser expuestos en\r\nsu plataforma digital. Por ende, la actuación administrativa sí encuentra\r\nfundamento tanto en el citado artículo 1 de la LIGSV como en el propio criterio\r\ninstitucional. Si hemos señalado que el legislador gravó los servicios\r\npublicitarios prestados por la prensa, radio y televisión, con independencia de\r\nla plataforma en que se presten; más bien, se violentaría el bloque de\r\nlegalidad si la DGT\r\ndesconociera los alcances de la norma legal y no gravara los supuestos que aquí\r\nestán en discusión. Precisamente en sujeción al Principio de Legalidad (en su\r\nvertiente positiva) y para orientar el correcto cumplimiento de las\r\nobligaciones, dicta el criterio institucional en cuestión, el cual forma parte\r\nde las fuentes normativas, según se desprende del artículo 2 tanto del\r\nCNPT como del\r\nRGGRFT. Si integran el bloque de legalidad, no cabe duda de\r\nque la AT se\r\nencuentra sujeta a su observancia. Por lo expuesto, estimamos que el\r\ncriterio impugnado no violenta el principio de reserva de ley porque no está\r\ncreando o modificando tributos, ni se están\r\ndefiniendo, vía interpretación, los elementos esenciales de la obligación\r\ntributaria; menos aún, creándolos analógicamente. Nótese que no se están\r\nampliando los efectos de la norma (pues los servicios\r\npublicitarios que se presten por la prensa fueron expresamente contemplados por\r\nel legislador) a extremos que ella no contempla, o que no deriven de su\r\ncontenido. Reiteramos que, tratándose de los servicios publicitarios, esos\r\naspectos ya fueron definidos por el legislador cuando estableció que estaban\r\ngravados los que se presten por radio, prensa y televisión; razón por la cual\r\nla fórmula utilizada no violenta los artículos 5 y 6 del CNPT. Por\r\nlas mismas razones, tampoco es cierto que se esté gravando, por la vía de\r\nexcepción, un nuevo servicio. No se incorpora allí\r\nsupuestos no previstos por el legislador. Por el contrario, la norma establece\r\nsupuestos de hecho (servicios publicitarios prestados por radio, prensa y\r\ntelevisión) y los vincula con un elemento común, a saber, que se trate de\r\nservicios prestados por medios de comunicación, como se ha señalado. Lo\r\nanterior con independencia de la plataforma que utilice el medio de comunicación\r\npara vender, prestar o exponer la publicidad. Tampoco resulta de recibo el\r\nargumento de la accionante conforme al cual, para la fecha en que se creó la LIGSV, el formato digital ni siquiera existía. Insistimos que, al tratarse de\r\nservicios altamente influenciados por las innovaciones tecnológicas, el\r\nlegislador optó válidamente por utilizar un concepto genérico (servicios\r\npublicitarios prestados por radio, prensa y televisión), sin ninguna limitación\r\ny que pudiese adaptarse a la realidad vigente al momento de aplicar la norma, a\r\ntravés de una interpretación literal, hermenéutica y evolutiva, como la que\r\naplica el criterio impugnado otorgando certeza jurídica respecto de los\r\nalcances de las normas legales y reglamentarias atinentes al caso.\n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nX.- Sobre el examen de legalidad\r\nde las conductas formales administrativas de la AT que se impugnan. Como explicamos, la parte actora cuestiona, también, dos actos\r\nconcretos mediante los cuales la AT\r\naplicó el criterio institucional ya analizado. Nos referimos a la\r\nresolución determinativa No. DT-10V-081-12, mediante la cual se confirma el\r\najuste pretendido en el traslado de cargos No. 2752000031891, en relación a la\r\naplicación del IGSV a los servicios publicitarios\r\nprestados a través de la página web; así como\r\nde la resolución determinativa sancionatoria Infrac. DT-10V-082-12, \r\nmediante la cual se impone una multa equivalente al 25% por la suma de la\r\ndeterminación oficiosa de las declaraciones de IGSV de los períodos de octubre\r\nde 2008 a\r\nsetiembre de 2009. Por las mismas razones dadas para sostener que el criterio\r\ninstitucional cuestionado no es violatorio del principio de reserva de ley ni del de legalidad, somos del criterio que estas conductas formales\r\nconcretas tampoco los lesionan. Ambas se limitaron a\r\naplicar a la accionante en el procedimiento determinativo, en forma legítima,\r\nlo dispuesto en el artículo 1 inciso l) de la LIGSV y el referido criterio institucional;\r\nconcluyendo en el ajuste en cuestión. Luego, la resolución dictada en el\r\nprocedimiento sancionador aplica la infracción del artículo 81 del CNPT porque se presentan los\r\npresupuestos de hecho requeridos. Se acusa, también, que ambas conductas\r\nviolentan el principio de irretroactividad, fundamentalmente, porque\r\npretenden aplicar un criterio interpretativo del 2012 a situaciones jurídicas\r\nconsolidadas en el 2009. Luego del análisis correspondiente,\r\nel Tribunal no observa que exista efecto retroactivo en perjuicio de derechos\r\nadquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas de la actora. Primero, \r\nporque se aplicó un ajuste sobre un servicio que sí estaba expresamente gravado\r\npor el legislador, previsión que data desde la reforma introducida a la LGISV en los años 1987 y\r\n1988, según se ha explicado. Es decir, la obligación de pagar el IGSV tratándose\r\nde servicios publicitarios prestados por la prensa (en cualquiera de sus\r\nplataformas) no nace con el criterio interpretativo sino que se encontraba\r\ndispuesta desde mucho antes del ajuste efectuado o la sanción\r\ndispuesta. Segundo, porque el ajuste y la sanción se imponen en relación con\r\nperíodos fiscales sobre los cuáles la\r\n AT aún podía ejercer fiscalización, en tanto no había\r\nacaecido el plazo de prescripción que establece el artículo 51 del CNPT. \r\nSuponer que se violenta esa garantía únicamente porque se ejerce control\r\ntributario sobre períodos fiscales concluidos supondría una grave violación a\r\nla norma que impone el tributo en cuestión y a las potestades de fiscalización\r\nque el legislador ha encomendado a la\r\n AT, aspecto que este Tribunal no podría avalar. Por lo\r\nexpuesto, los reclamos en ese sentido son\r\nimprocedentes y se rechazan. Luego, se acusa que el\r\ncontenido de los actos impugnados tratan, de manera inadecuada, los conceptos y\r\nalcances de la exención y la no sujeción. La parte actora explica que\r\ncomo el artículo 1 de la LIGSV\r\nrestringe el objeto del impuesto solo a los servicios indicados taxativamente\r\nen la norma, todos los que el legislador no incluyó tienen el carácter de no\r\ngravados por no sujeción. Critica que la resolución determinativa le acusa de\r\nhaber aplicado una exoneración de impuestos que no existe en la LIGSV, cuando tal conclusión\r\nes incorrecta ya que el impuesto no se ha cobrado porque no existe un hecho\r\ngenerador establecido en la ley, razón por la cual no puede cobrar un impuesto\r\nsobre una situación de hecho que se encuentra no sujeta en la ley. Estimamos\r\nque este reclamo es, también, improcedente en tanto\r\nparte de una premisa errónea. Según hemos explicado con amplitud, los servicios\r\npublicitarios prestados en radio, prensa y televisión, independientemente de la\r\nplataforma en la que se presten (sea física o digital) sí están gravados con el\r\nIGSV, porque están contemplados en la lista taxativa que dispone el artículo 1\r\ninciso l) de la LIGSV. Por\r\nende, no es cierto que se trata de un servicio no\r\nsujeto al tributo, como\r\nafirma la accionante. Luego, las exenciones al tributo las contempla el propio\r\ninciso l) para las emisoras de radio y los\r\nperiódicos rurales; así como el numeral 9 de la referida Ley, en los\r\nsupuestos que ahí se señalan, sin que la actora se encuentre en ninguno de los\r\npresupuestos de hecho ahí establecidos. Así las cosas, los servicios\r\npublicitarios prestados en radio, prensa y televisión, con independencia de la\r\nplataforma que, para tales efectos, utilice el medio, están sujetos al IGSV y\r\nel legislador no estableció ninguna exención que beneficie, en el caso\r\nconcreto, a la accionante. Así, al margen de la imprecisión técnica en la que\r\npudo haber incurrido la AT\r\nen las conductas impugnadas, lo cierto es que la conclusión a la que se arriba respecto de ese punto, resulta sustancialmente\r\nconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico y así debe declararse. Otro\r\nreclamo que se plantea, tiene que con ver con la supuesta desproporción de la\r\ndeterminación y sanción aplicadas las que, en criterio de la actora, no se\r\ncorresponden con su capacidad contributiva. Al respecto, debemos señalar\r\nque la parte no explica, con la contundencia requerida, los alcances del\r\nvicio que se reclama; no obstante un análisis del Tribunal permite concluir que\r\nla lesión acusada no se presenta por las siguientes razones. No nos cabe duda\r\nrespecto de que el derecho a contribuir según la capacidad económica constituye\r\nun principio de justicia tributaria material que se\r\nerige, además, como\r\nun límite sustancial en el ejercicio de la potestad tributaria. Ahora, si bien\r\nlos tributos gravan diferentes manifestaciones de riqueza, debe tenerse\r\npresente que aunque por regla general coinciden la riqueza que el legislador\r\nquiere gravar (objeto fin) con la que, en definitiva, se grava (objeto\r\nmaterial); existen supuestos en los que una y otra difieren. Ejemplo de éstos\r\nse presentan en algunos de los tributos los que gravan el consumo como\r\níndice de capacidad económica y, dentro de éstos, el IGSV. Este tributo grava\r\nformalmente los ingresos que provienen de actividades empresariales y\r\nprofesionales (venta de mercancías y prestación de servicios), constituyendo\r\néste el objeto material o riqueza gravada. Sin\r\nembargo, el verdadero objeto, entendido como\r\nriqueza que el legislador ha querido gravar, es\r\nla riqueza gastada por el consumidor de las mercancías o servicios, en tanto\r\nmanifestación indirecta de la capacidad económica. Así, para facilitar la\r\nrecaudación del\r\ntributo, el legislador incluyó como elemento\r\nsubjetivo del hecho generador un sujeto cuya\r\ncapacidad económica no es la que se quiere gravar, pero es al que se le\r\nconsidera como contribuyente, obligado al pago del tributo y demás\r\ndeberes materiales y formales. A ese contribuyente se\r\nle atribuye un deber jurídico de trasladar el impuesto al sujeto cuya capacidad\r\neconómica es la que, en realidad, se quiere gravar, en este caso, los\r\nconsumidores finales. Desde esta perspectiva, en el caso concreto la actora no\r\nes la titular de la riqueza que se quiere gravar ni\r\nquien, en definitiva, lo soporta efectivamente. En rigor, el IGSV lo soportan\r\nlos consumidores del\r\nservicio, esto es quienes compren los servicios publicitarios que la\r\naccionante, como\r\nmedio de prensa, preste ya sea en forma impresa o digital. La actora, es\r\núnicamente el contribuyente con un poder deber de\r\ntrasladar al fisco el tributo que cobra a aquellos. En consecuencia, ni se\r\ngrava directamente la capacidad económica de la actora (sino la del consumidor) ni es ella quien soporta personalmente (y\r\nen su patrimonio) el tributo; solo debe cobrarlo\r\nal consumidor y trasladarlo al fisco cuando venda los referidos servicios\r\npublicitarios. En ese tanto, solo tiene el deber de\r\ntrasladar el tributo que cobre a los consumidores por servicios publicitarios\r\nefectivamente prestados. En esa inteligencia, no se observa\r\nninguna afectación directa o desproporcionada a su capacidad económica. Por las razones expuestas, estimamos que el ajuste efectuado en la\r\nresolución determinativa No. DT-10V-081-12, se conforma sustancialmente\r\ncon el ordenamiento jurídico ya que, con base en el numeral 1 inciso l) de la LIGSV y el criterio\r\ninterpretativo ya analizado, ajustaron la carga impositiva del IGSV en los\r\nperíodos que van de octubre de 2008\r\n a setiembre de 2009, para gravar los servicios publicitarios\r\nque ella prestó a través de su página web La Nación Digital y\r\nque no fueron declarados ni trasladados en el momento oportuno. Ante la\r\ndeclaración inexacta y la omisión de trasladar al fisco oportunamente ingresos\r\ngenerados por operaciones gravadas, se incurre\r\nen la infracción que contempla el numeral 81 del CNPT, debiendo la actora soportar las\r\nconsecuencias jurídicas sancionatorias de su conducta irregular. Por ende, tampoco se observa vicio alguno en la resolución\r\ndeterminativa sancionatoria Infrac. DT-10V-082-12.\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n \r\nXI.- En definitiva, estimamos que el Criterio Institucional No.\r\nDGT-CI-008-12, se conforma sustancialmente con\r\nel ordenamiento jurídico en tanto no está creando o modificando tributos\r\no elementos de la obligación tributaria. En rigor, esa conducta formal\r\ninterpreta legítimamente que \r\nlos servicios publicitarios prestados a través de la\r\nprensa, entendida ésta tanto en formato \"escrito como digital\", se\r\nencuentran gravados con el IGSV, de conformidad con una interpretación\r\nevolutiva de lo que dispone el inciso l) del artículo 1 de la LIGSV, mediante el cual se\r\ngravan los servicios publicitarios prestados a través de la radio, prensa y\r\ntelevisión. Lo anterior por cuanto,\r\nestimamos, la intención del legislador fue\r\ngravar con el tributo en comentario los servicios publicitarios que se presten\r\nen medios de comunicación como la radio, prensa y televisión; razón por la\r\ncual, con independencia de la plataforma o formato que se utilice para vender o\r\nexponer la publicidad, siempre estaremos frente a un servicio publicitario\r\nprestado por alguno de esos medios de comunicación. En ese tanto, no se\r\nobserva que la interpretación vertida en el criterio impugnado violente los\r\nPrincipios de Legalidad, Reserva de Ley o Seguridad Jurídica sino que más bien,\r\ninsistimos, responde a una interpretación literal y finalista de la norma que\r\nresulta coherente y armónica con el bloque de legalidad vigente. El criterio lo\r\nemite el sujeto competente y cuenta con un motivo\r\nlegítimo (en tanto se ampara en una interpretación viable del\r\nartículo 1 inciso l) en cuestión) y que existía tal y como fue tomado en cuenta al momento de\r\ndictar el acto. Su contenido es lícito, posible, claro y preciso, ya que\r\ndispone, en lo medular, que los servicios publicitarios prestados a\r\ntravés de la prensa, entendida ésta tanto en formato \"escrito como\r\ndigital\", se encuentran gravados con el IGSV, de conformidad con una\r\ninterpretación evolutiva de lo que dispone el inciso l) del artículo 1 de la LIGSV, mediante el cual se\r\ngravan los servicios publicitarios prestados a través de la radio, prensa y\r\ntelevisión. Esa decisión se conforma\r\nsustancialmente con el ordenamiento jurídico y resulta correspondiente al\r\nmotivo del acto y proporcionada al fin legal que se traduce en el interés\r\npúblico que subsiste detrás que cada uno de los habitantes contribuya a las\r\ncargas públicas, en tanto realicen el hecho generador y conforme a su capacidad\r\ncontributiva, y el que subsiste detrás de una eficiente fiscalización y\r\nrecaudación de los tributos. Se trata, además, de una\r\ndecisión debidamente motivada, en los términos que lo exige el numeral 136 de la LGAP. \r\nPor lo expuesto, el Tribunal avala la interpretación efectuada por la DGT ya que estimamos que\r\nresponde no solo a la literalidad de la norma sino además a la finalidad del\r\nlegislador y al contexto vigente al momento de aplicarla, sin que se denote que\r\naquella invada aspectos reservados a la ley como la creación o modificación de\r\ntributos o de elementos de la obligación tributaria, los que insistimos fueron\r\nestablecido por el legislador en el numeral 1 inciso l) de la LIGSV. A una conclusión\r\nsimilar se llega en relación con la legalidad de las resoluciones DT-10V-081-12\r\ny Infrac. DT-10V-082-12, emitidas por la AT. Se trata, de actos\r\ndictados por el órgano competente, con motivo cierto y legítimo. Lo que se\r\ndispuso es lícito, correspondiente al motivo y proporcionado al fin, según se\r\nexpuso. Se encuentra, también, motivado tanto directamente como en forma\r\nindirecta cuando remite al criterio institucional que ya ha sido validado. Por\r\ntodo lo expuesto, estimamos de conformidad con el artículo 10 del Código Civil,\r\nnumerales 10, 11, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133 y 136 de la LGAP, los ordinales 5, \r\n6, 11, 31, del CNPT y el canon 1 de la LGISV, las conductas administrativas sometidas a\r\nexamen resultan sustancialmente conformes con el ordenamiento jurídico, razón\r\npor la cual es improcedente, también, la pretensión dirigida a que se ordene al\r\nEstado devolver las sumas canceladas, bajo protesta, por IGSV, así como los\r\nintereses devengados desde la fecha de su pago hasta su efectiva devolución o\r\ndepósito. Si se ha declarado que las conductas impugnadas y el cobro del tributo son válidos, no hay\r\ncausa que legitime la devolución solicitada, debiendo rechazarse como en efecto se hace.”", "body_en_text": "**VI.- On the interpretation of tax rules.** The Tribunal considers that, given the subject matter under debate, it is appropriate to refer to the interpretive mechanisms that must be applied in tax matters, in order to clarify whether the rules governing this type of fiscal relationships incorporate special postulates that warrant particular solutions, or whether these rules should be understood according to the usual mechanisms for understanding normative precepts. This is an issue already addressed by this Tribunal, among others, in judgment No. 128-2012-VI, issued at 7:30 a.m. on June 27, 2012, which, in pertinent part, stated: \"(...) In tax matters, section 6 of the cited Code establishes the ways in which regulatory rules must be interpreted. That mandate establishes: 'Tax rules must be interpreted in accordance with all methods admitted by Common Law. Analogy is an admissible procedure to fill legal gaps, but by virtue thereof, neither taxes nor exemptions may be created.' Therefore, tax rules must be applied in accordance with normal interpretive mechanisms. There is no criterion whatsoever that allows for sustaining pseudo-maxims of interpretation such as *in dubio pro fisco*, *pro contribuyente*, and others of that kind, that are of generic and total application to an undetermined diversity of hypotheses, so that they are principles that must be imposed in this intellectual exercise of the legal operator. From that standpoint, the rules must be interpreted according to the usual forms of understanding, which depends on each specific case. Indeed, the determination of the applicable interpretive mechanism in a specific legal situation is an issue that must be assessed in each specific case. To do so, attention must be paid to the very purpose of the rule, in accordance with the parameters provided by canon 10 of the General Law of Public Administration and canon 10 of the Civil Code. In that regard, it is worth bringing up what was stated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling 145 at 10:15 a.m. on February 22, 2008, in which, on the subject of the interpretation of tax rules, it indicated: '(...) Hence, the hermeneutic task regarding the rules that regulate tax relationships must be carried out within the channels of the rules of legal interpretation, common to all branches of law, resorting to its various methods, in order to specify the scope and particularities of a given mandate, so that the hypothetical formulation, applied to daily praxis, fulfills its intrinsic purpose and the end that the legislator has provided for its issuance. (...) In this task, according to the principle of constitutional equality, it is clear that the interpreter must weigh the various variables that converge in each situation, including the nature of the provision, ensuring that its use, in the form and scope established, is equal for all similar cases and avoiding a material application that evades the very purpose of its content. The means that the legal operator uses to carry out this process are substantially: philological or grammatical, logical, historical, sociological, and teleological. Article 10 of the Civil Code, to which canon 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures refers, regarding the interpretation of tax rules, contemplates these elements... The exegesis of tax rules must analyze, in each case, the content of the rule, to establish the proper channels for its application, in tune with the parameters already indicated, so that the mandate fulfills its purpose, satisfies the purpose immersed in the legislative manifestation, which is to impose tax burdens, establish frameworks of benefits, and other matters inherent to the tax legal relationship arising therefrom.' Therefore, the legal operator must resort to the interpretive mechanisms that are pertinent in each specific case, without it being possible to assume, as a generic base criterion, that the interpretation must adhere to a specific form. (...)\". (In a similar vein, one may consult judgment No. 089-2013-VI of this Tribunal, issued at 3:55 p.m. on June 25, 2013). This collegiate body fully shares the foregoing criterion, which will serve as a starting point for resolving the interpretive divergence raised in the specific case.\n\n**VII.- Some general aspects of the General Sales Tax.** It should also be recalled that the IGSV is a tax that levies the value added on the sale of goods and the provision of certain services. It is characterized by levying the different phases of the economic cycle (manufacturing, commercialization, in wholesale and retail phases), so its structure is based on the existence of production chains, where whoever produces a good or provides a service has one or several suppliers from whom they acquire the necessary inputs for their activity, which are, in turn, final products with respect to whoever manufactures them. As a consequence of the foregoing, what is levied is the value incorporated or added at each stage, which in turn determines the main economic advantage of this tax, namely, neutrality. The taxable event of the tax arises in the following scenarios: a) in the sale of goods, upon the invoicing or delivery thereof, whichever occurs first; b) in imports or internations of goods, at the moment of acceptance of the customs policy or form, as applicable; c) in the provision of services, upon the invoicing or the provision of the service, whichever occurs first; d) in the use or consumption of goods by taxpayers, on the date on which they are withdrawn from the company; and e) in consignment sales and layaways of goods, at the moment in which the goods are set aside, as applicable (articles 2 and 3 of the LIGSV). From this standpoint, the taxable person will be any natural or legal person, de jure or de facto, public or private, that habitually makes sales or provides certain services, as well as those who carry out imports or internations of goods. The tax rate is 13%. It is important to highlight that this tax is characterized by applying a mixed system for identifying its object, which differs, for example, from the Value Added or Added Tax adopted by other countries, including those of the European Union. Thus, our legislator chose to levy, in a general manner and as a conceptual category, the sale of any good or merchandise. While, in relation to the provision of services, it resorted to an exhaustive and exceptional formula, that is, only those that have been expressly provided for by the legislator are levied. This is reflected in article 1 of the LIGSV, according to which \"(...) A tax on the value added on the sale of goods and on the provision of the following services is established: a) Restaurants. b) Bars. c) Nightclubs, social clubs, recreational clubs, and similar. d) Hotels, motels, boarding houses, and transient or non-transient lodging houses. e) Repair and painting shops for all kinds of vehicles. f) Repair and refurbishment shops for all kinds of goods. g) Parking lots for vehicles. h) Telephone, cable, telex, radiolocators, radio messaging, and similar services. (Thus amended subsection g) by article 15 of Law No. 8114, Tax Simplification and Efficiency Law, of July 4, 2001) i) Photographic developing and copying services, including photocopies. j) Warehousing services and other non-financial services provided by general deposit warehouses, fiscal deposit warehouses, and temporary storage of goods, the latter under the conditions provided in article 145 of the General Customs Law, No. 7557, of October 20, 1995. (Thus amended subsection i) by article 15 of Law No. 8114, Tax Simplification and Efficiency Law, of July 4, 2001). k) Laundry and ironing services for class clothing. l) Public shows in general, except sports, theater, and cinema, the latter when showing children's films. (Thus amended by article 19.21 of Law No. 7097 of September 1, 1988). m) Advertising services provided through radio, press, and television. Radio stations and rural newspapers shall be exempt from this provision. (Thus added by article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987, and expanded by subsection 39 of article 19 of Law No. 7097 of August 18, 1988). n) Transmission of television programs by cable, satellite, or other similar systems, as well as the recording of 'videos' and 'tracks,' and their rental. (Thus added by article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). ñ) Customs agency services. (Thus added by article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). o) Real estate brokerage services. (Thus added by article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). p) International moving services. (Thus added by article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). q) Insurance premiums, except those referring to personal insurance, workplace risks, crops, and social interest housing. r) Services provided by printing presses and lithographs. Excepted are the National Printing Office, the printing presses and lithographs of public universities, that of the Ministry of Public Education, as well as the printing presses and lithographs of the Costa Rican Institute of Technology and the Editorial Costa Rica, respectively. The foregoing, without prejudice to the exceptions contained in article 9 of the General Sales Tax Law, No. 6826, of November 10, 1982, and those established in Law No. 7874, of April 23, 1999. s) Washing, waxing, and other vehicle cleaning and maintenance services. (Thus added subsections q), r), s), by article 16 of Law No. 8114, Tax Simplification and Efficiency Law, of July 4, 2001) (NOTE: in accordance with the third paragraph of article 42 of the Forestry Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, WOOD shall pay a sales tax equal to the general sales tax minus three percentage points). (...)\".\n\n**VIII.- On the legality review of institutional criterion No. DGT-CI-008-2012.** The plaintiff challenges an institutional criterion and two specific administrative acts through which the provisions of the former were applied to her. In that sense, the legality of the institutional criterion will be analyzed first, and then that of the individual application acts issued both in the determinative procedure and in the sanctioning procedure. This is because, in the event that there are defects in the former, they will necessarily extend to the latter. For a better understanding, the Tribunal has grouped, according to their content, the different defects being claimed in order to avoid unnecessary repetition. As a starting point, we must point out that, in accordance with article 99 of the CNPT, institutional criteria constitute rules or provisions of a general nature issued by the AT for the correct application of tax laws, clearly, within the limits set by the pertinent legal and regulatory provisions. It is inferred, then, that this is a rule-making power granted for a specific purpose and that is limited by higher-ranking rules such as laws and regulations. They constitute a source of law, as derived from sections 2 and 168 of the CNPT, as well as canon 2 of the General Regulation for Tax Management, Oversight, and Collection (hereinafter RGGFRT), and they have an interpretive character regarding laws and regulations, without being able to innovate objective legal situations or supplement the insufficiency of higher-ranking sources. We are, then, facing external and general acts through which the AT seeks to define, give greater clarity or precision to the scope; as well as projection to the content, of the different formal and material duties that the rules governing tax legal relationships impose on the different taxable persons. This is for the purpose of endowing those relationships with the necessary certainty and legal security. For this reason, we consider, they are of vital importance in a tax system such as ours, which is based on a scheme of self-determination, self-declaration, and self-assessment, sustained, moreover, on the voluntary fulfillment of those obligations. This implies that it is the taxable person who, in the first instance, defines the content and amount of their fiscal obligations, declares them, and pays them. Subsequently, the oversight powers of the AT emerge. Well then, in this type of system, in light of the right that the taxpayer has to be informed by the AT regarding the fulfillment of their obligations and tax duties, as well as regarding the content and scope thereof (article 171, subsection 2) of the CNPT), institutional criteria, as acts of general scope, are of great relevance because they allow taxpayers to have a pronouncement from the AT regarding how to proceed in the fulfillment of tax duties, in each specific case, especially when the cited section 99 also establishes that these criteria will be of mandatory compliance in the issuance of all administrative acts, classifying as null those issued contrary to such rules, which speaks to their incidence in the subjective legal sphere of taxable persons. Given their relevance and implications, articles 101, 173, and 174 of the same CNPT impose on the AT the duty to publicize and disseminate them through the various means established therein, in order to guarantee the right to information of the obligated parties. Well then, in this proceeding, institutional criterion No. DGT-CI-008-2012 is challenged, which refers to \"Advertising services provided through the press in written and digital format\", in which it provided, in its core, that advertising services provided through the press, understood as both in \"written and digital\" format (understood both in physical or digital format), are levied with the IGSV, in accordance with an evolutionary interpretation of what subsection l) of article 1 of the LIGSV provides, by means of which advertising services provided through radio, press, and television are levied. To examine the claims raised by the plaintiff, the first aspect that must be defined is whether article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV levies that tax on advertising services provided through the web pages of press media. This is because the plaintiff party considers that article 1 of the LIGSV and its Regulation do not expressly contemplate, within the taxed services, those for advertising provided through the web; and considering that it is an exhaustive list of taxed services, she claims, the institutional criterion makes an extensive interpretation that departs from the cited rules. For its part, the State maintains that what was taxed was the advertising service provided in the press (among others) and that the fact that it is provided through the web does not remove that condition, but rather we would be facing advertising services provided through the digital press. As we explained *supra*, the tax rule must be interpreted in accordance with the normal mechanisms, as appropriate in each specific case. To do so, we consider that any interpretive practice attempted must start from the grammatical context of the rules. This does not imply that the understanding of the rule is, in all cases, within a literal interpretation. On the contrary, the rule as an expression of language constitutes, in turn, the point from which the legal operator begins their analytical exercise facing real cases in which it must be applied, but in turn, it constitutes the limit of the decision of that authorized interpreter (because their decision seeks the solution of a specific case through the application of the analyzed rule). The validity of the eventual interpretations regarding a determined tax is conditioned on the possibility of sustaining that meaning or comprehensive orientation within the scope of the grammatical permissibility of the rule. Well then, after a measured analysis, the Tribunal reaches the conclusion that the referred rule (article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV) does levy that tax on the advertising service provided through the press from a digital or web platform. This is because when the rule in question levies with the IGSV the advertising services provided through radio, press, and television, the legislator's reference is to the advertising services provided through the communication media indicated therein, regardless of whether this is on a physical, virtual, or digital platform. That is, what is taxed is the advertising service provided by the press, so the medium or platform on which the press displays the advertising does not eliminate the occurrence of the taxable event. It is not superfluous to recall, in any case, that in accordance with article 3 of Law No. 8454, of August 30, 2005, there is a functional equivalence between electronic and physical documents, which must be given identical legal treatment. From this perspective, the Tribunal considers that if the activity on which the tax falls is the different advertising services provided, in this case, by the press, it undoubtedly includes those provided by the press in written or printed, virtual, or digital format; which obviously includes the advertising services that the plaintiff sells to be displayed on its website, that is, La Nación Digital. In the end, we insist, the taxable event is incurred, that is, the provision of advertising services in the press, only through a digital platform or format, which in no way modifies the taxable event. Thus, as a first point, we consider that the legislator's intention was to generally levy the advertising services provided through radio, press, and television, regardless of the platform or format that the communication media use to commercialize them. Consequently, a simple literal and teleological interpretation of the rule allows concluding that advertising services provided through the press on its web pages or digital formats are indeed taxed. According to the foregoing, it is not observed that the institutional criterion being challenged extensively interprets article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV. Strictly speaking, that rule of general scope comes to interpret that when the legislator refers to and taxes the advertising services provided by the press, it includes the different formats in which they are provided, that is, both printed and digital; an interpretation that the Tribunal shares for the reasons already stated. Given the general wording of the rule, the Tribunal could not endorse an interpretation that advocates levying the IGSV only on advertising services provided by the press in printed format, as the plaintiff intends; and not those same services, also provided by the press, only through a platform different from the physical and printed one, as is the digital one in this case. This would rather create a technological and economic distortion (that advertising services provided in the printed press are levied with IGSV and not those that, the same press, offers through newer technologies, such as digital press), which the Tribunal could not countenance and which would also be violative of the legal system itself, particularly of the principles of equality and generality. On this point, what article 1, subsection 21) of the Regulation to the General Sales Tax Law indicates should not lead to confusion when it defines what should be understood by advertising services, and indicates that it is the sale of space or time on television stations and periodical publications, such as newspapers, magazines, supplements, and other printed materials, carried out by natural or legal persons, whether owners or not, intermediaries, or advertising agents. Strictly speaking, in strict adherence to the content of the regulatory power and the Principle of Prohibition of Administrative Arbitrariness, one could only interpret that, in that scenario, the references to printed materials are not exclusive of the possibility that other advertising services provided, for example, by radio or the press, may be provided through other platforms. We could not endorse the interpretation reached by the plaintiff (that the definition of advertising services only includes physically printed material, a condition not met in cases where the service is provided through the web), because it should not be overlooked that the regulation is a norm subordinate to the law, which intends to develop its scope, but never contradict it or render its provisions ineffective. In this case, it is clear that the legislator never introduced the referred limitation. We insist that what was taxed were the advertising services provided through radio, press, and television; without observing any limitation or exclusion whatsoever regarding the platform that any of those media uses to effectively provide the service. But moreover, an interpretation like the one the plaintiff seeks would be incompatible, for example, with the tax imposed on advertising services provided by radio, because these could not be provided in printed material. Thus, interpreting that the regulatory rule defines that the advertising services that are taxed are only those provided in physically printed material would lead to incurring an abusive exercise of the regulatory power and would imply restricting the scope of the concept used by the legislator who, as explained, chose to use a general factual presupposition (advertising services provided through radio, press, and television) and without limitation, in order to include the different platforms or formats that those communication media use to sell or display advertising services and that could appear over the years. Having the foregoing clear, this Tribunal considers that, under the protection of articles 10 of the Civil Code and 10 of the LGAP, a teleological and hermeneutic interpretation of the legal system is perfectly possible, which allows weighing not only the literal meaning of the rule, but also its context and the reality (factual and legal) in force at the time of applying it; in order to conclude that article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV levies that tax on advertising services provided by the press, regardless of the platform or format used to sell, provide, or display the advertising. For the reasons stated, we consider that the institutional criterion is not extensive in its interpretation, but rather is oriented towards the correct application and understanding of the scope of the cited article 1, subsection l). In that regard, it does not innovate objective legal situations, it only develops the interpretation that must be given to a pre-existing rule, which this Tribunal endorses.\n\n**IX.-** Nor is it observed that the challenged institutional criterion harms the Principle of Legality or the Principle of Legal Reserve, which find their basis in articles 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution and 5 of the CNPT. This latter rule clearly establishes that \"(...) In tax matters, only the law may: a) Create, modify, or suppress taxes; define the taxable event of the tax relationship; establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and indicate the taxable person; b) Grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits; c) Classify infractions and establish the respective sanctions; d) Establish privileges, preferences, and guarantees for tax credits; and e) Regulate the means of extinguishing tax credits other than payment. (...)\". The plaintiff is correct when she points out that, in accordance with this provision and the principle of legal reserve, the essential and determining components of the tax must necessarily be established by the legislator. We refer to the taxable event, the taxable person, the tax base, the tax rate, as well as the collection period, depending on whether it is progressive or instantaneous. However, regarding the rate, the Constitutional Chamber has established the possibility of a legislative delegation, clearly, through a law that establishes beforehand the limits within which this exercise may be carried out. Hence, the referred legal reserve can be qualified as \"relative\", as ratified by that Chamber in several of its pronouncements, among others, in judgments No. 8271-2001, 8580-2001, and 5504-2002. In the case at hand, we consider that the institutional criterion interprets section 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV without affecting the elements subject to the referred principle of legal reserve. That is, it does not innovate regarding the taxable event, the taxable person, the tax base, the tax rate, or the collection period, nor does it impose an obligation *ex novo*, that is, not provided for by the legislator. We insist that the taxable event contemplated by the legal rule is the provision of advertising services through the press, without the legislator limiting that taxable event only to those sold through the physically printed written press, as the plaintiff seems to interpret it. Unlike her thesis, we consider that the law neither taxes nor describes the means through which advertising services are provided or sold. What is more, it does not even qualify them. What is taxed is the provision of such services in the press, radio, and television (which are all communication media); regardless of the platform used to provide them. The website is a platform that the communication medium (press, in this case) can use to sell or provide advertising services. So, if these are provided through the press (physical or digital), they will be levied with the IGSV because they form part of the factual scenario provided for by the legislator. The institutional criterion does not introduce a new taxable event, as claimed; it only establishes the correct interpretation of the rule, so that the taxpayer is left in no doubt about the scope of the taxable event described in the referred legal rule. In relation to the principle of legality, its violation is alleged because, in the plaintiff's view, the AT, without having a legal rule enabling it, proceeds to tax the advertising services she provided through the web. However, we reiterate that those services were taxed by the legislator, from the moment it imposed the payment of the tax on advertising services provided through the press, and the plaintiff incurred that taxable event when she sold services to be displayed on her digital platform. Therefore, the administrative action does find its basis both in the cited article 1 of the LIGSV and in the institutional criterion itself.\n\nIf we have indicated that the legislator subjected to tax the advertising services provided by the press, radio, and television, regardless of the platform on which they are provided; rather, the legality framework would be violated if the DGT disregarded the scope of the legal rule and did not subject to tax the scenarios that are under discussion here. Precisely in subjection to the Principle of Legality (in its positive aspect) and to guide the correct fulfillment of obligations, it issues the institutional criterion in question, which forms part of the normative sources, as can be deduced from article 2 of both the CNPT and the RGGRFT. If they are part of the legality framework, there is no doubt that the AT is subject to its observance. For the foregoing reasons, we consider that the challenged criterion does not violate the principle of legal reservation (principio de reserva de ley) because it is not creating or modifying taxes, nor are the essential elements of the tax obligation being defined, via interpretation; much less, creating them analogically. Note that the effects of the rule are not being expanded (since the advertising services provided by the press were expressly contemplated by the legislator) to extremes not contemplated by it, or that do not derive from its content. We reiterate that, in the case of advertising services, those aspects were already defined by the legislator when it established that those provided by radio, press, and television were subject to tax; which is why the formula used does not violate articles 5 and 6 of the CNPT. For the same reasons, it is also not true that a new service is being subjected to tax by way of exception. Scenarios not foreseen by the legislator are not incorporated there. On the contrary, the rule establishes factual scenarios (advertising services provided by radio, press, and television) and links them to a common element, namely, that they are services provided by communication media, as has been indicated. The foregoing is regardless of the platform that the communication medium uses to sell, provide, or display the advertising. The claimant's argument that, as of the date the LIGSV was created, the digital format did not even exist, is also not admissible. We insist that, as these are services highly influenced by technological innovations, the legislator validly opted to use a generic concept (advertising services provided by radio, press, and television), without any limitation and that could adapt to the reality in force at the time of applying the rule, through a literal, hermeneutical, and evolutionary interpretation, such as the one applied by the challenged criterion, providing legal certainty regarding the scope of the legal and regulatory rules relevant to the case.\n\nX.- On the legality review of the formal administrative conducts of the AT that are challenged. As we explained, the claimant also questions two specific acts through which the AT applied the institutional criterion already analyzed. We refer to the determinative resolution No. DT-10V-081-12, which confirms the adjustment sought in the statement of charges No. 2752000031891, in relation to the application of the IGSV to advertising services provided through the website; as well as the sanctioning determinative resolution Infrac. DT-10V-082-12, which imposes a fine equivalent to 25% of the sum of the ex officio determination of the IGSV declarations for the periods from October 2008 to September 2009. For the same reasons given to sustain that the questioned institutional criterion is not a violation of the principle of legal reservation (principio de reserva de ley) or the principle of legality, we are of the opinion that these specific formal conducts do not harm them either. Both were limited to legitimately applying to the claimant in the determinative procedure what is provided in article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV and the referred institutional criterion; concluding in the adjustment in question. Subsequently, the resolution issued in the sanctioning procedure applies the infraction of article 81 of the CNPT because the required factual elements are present. It is also claimed that both conducts violate the principle of non-retroactivity, fundamentally because they seek to apply an interpretive criterion from 2012 to legal situations consolidated in 2009. After the corresponding analysis, the Tribunal does not observe that there is a retroactive effect to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations of the claimant. First, because an adjustment was applied to a service that was indeed expressly subjected to tax by the legislator, a provision that dates back to the reform introduced to the LGISV in the years 1987 and 1988, as has been explained. That is, the obligation to pay the IGSV in the case of advertising services provided by the press (on any of its platforms) does not arise with the interpretive criterion but was already in place long before the adjustment made or the sanction imposed. Second, because the adjustment and the sanction are imposed in relation to fiscal periods over which the AT could still exercise oversight, as the prescription period established by article 51 of the CNPT had not yet elapsed. Assuming that this guarantee is violated solely because tax control is exercised over concluded fiscal periods would imply a serious violation of the rule imposing the tax in question and the oversight powers that the legislator has entrusted to the AT, an aspect that this Tribunal could not endorse. For the foregoing, the claims in that sense are unfounded and are rejected. Subsequently, it is claimed that the content of the challenged acts treats, inadequately, the concepts and scope of exemption and non-subjection. The claimant explains that, as article 1 of the LIGSV restricts the object of the tax only to the services exhaustively indicated in the rule, all those that the legislator did not include have the character of not subject to tax due to non-subjection. It criticizes that the determinative resolution accuses it of having applied a tax exoneration that does not exist in the LIGSV, when such a conclusion is incorrect since the tax has not been charged because there is no generating event (hecho generador) established in the law, which is why it cannot charge a tax on a factual situation that is not subject to tax in the law. We consider that this claim is also unfounded insofar as it is based on an erroneous premise. As we have extensively explained, advertising services provided on radio, press, and television, regardless of the platform on which they are provided (whether physical or digital), are indeed subject to tax with the IGSV, because they are contemplated in the exhaustive list provided by article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV. Therefore, it is not true that it is a service not subject to the tax, as the claimant asserts. Subsequently, the exemptions to the tax are contemplated by subsection l) itself for radio stations and rural newspapers; as well as numeral 9 of the referred Law, in the scenarios indicated therein, without the claimant being in any of the factual elements established there. Thus, advertising services provided on radio, press, and television, regardless of the platform that the medium uses for such purposes, are subject to the IGSV, and the legislator did not establish any exemption that benefits, in the specific case, the claimant. Thus, aside from the technical imprecision that the AT may have incurred in the challenged conducts, the truth is that the conclusion reached regarding this point is substantially in accordance with the legal system and must be so declared. Another claim raised relates to the supposed disproportion of the determination and sanction applied, which, in the claimant's opinion, do not correspond to its ability to pay. In this regard, we must point out that the party does not explain, with the required forcefulness, the scope of the defect being claimed; however, an analysis by the Tribunal allows us to conclude that the harm claimed is not present for the following reasons. We have no doubt that the right to contribute according to economic capacity constitutes a principle of substantive tax justice that also stands as a substantial limit on the exercise of the taxing power. Now, while taxes are levied on different manifestations of wealth, it must be borne in mind that although, as a general rule, the wealth that the legislator wants to tax (object end) coincides with that which is ultimately taxed (material object); there are scenarios in which one and the other differ. Examples of these occur in some of the taxes that tax consumption as an index of economic capacity and, within these, the IGSV. This tax formally taxes the income that comes from business and professional activities (sale of goods and provision of services), this constituting the material object or taxed wealth. However, the true object, understood as the wealth that the legislator has wanted to tax, is the wealth spent by the consumer of the goods or services, as an indirect manifestation of economic capacity. Thus, to facilitate the collection of the tax, the legislator included as a subjective element of the generating event (hecho generador) a subject whose economic capacity is not the one intended to be taxed, but who is considered the taxpayer, obligated to pay the tax and other material and formal duties. This taxpayer is attributed a legal duty to pass on the tax to the subject whose economic capacity is the one that, in reality, is intended to be taxed, in this case, the final consumers. From this perspective, in the specific case, the claimant is not the owner of the wealth that is intended to be taxed nor the one who, ultimately, effectively bears it. Strictly speaking, the IGSV is borne by the consumers of the service, that is, those who purchase the advertising services that the claimant, as a press medium, provides either in print or digital form. The claimant is only the taxpayer with a power-duty to transfer to the treasury the tax it charges to them. Consequently, neither is the economic capacity of the claimant directly taxed (but rather that of the consumer), nor is it the claimant who personally bears (and on its assets) the tax; it only has to charge it to the consumer and transfer it to the treasury when it sells the referred advertising services. To that extent, it only has the duty to transfer the tax it charges to consumers for advertising services actually provided. In that understanding, no direct or disproportionate effect on its economic capacity is observed. For the reasons stated, we consider that the adjustment made in the determinative resolution No. DT-10V-081-12 is substantially in accordance with the legal system since, based on numeral 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV and the interpretive criterion already analyzed, they adjusted the tax burden of the IGSV in the periods from October 2008 to September 2009, to tax the advertising services that it provided through its website La Nación Digital and that were not declared nor transferred at the opportune time. Given the inaccurate declaration and the omission to timely transfer to the treasury income generated by taxed operations, the infraction contemplated in numeral 81 of the CNPT is incurred, and the claimant must bear the sanctioning legal consequences of its irregular conduct. Therefore, no defect is observed in the sanctioning determinative resolution Infrac. DT-10V-082-12.\n\nXI.- In conclusion, we consider that Institutional Criterion No. DGT-CI-008-12 is substantially in accordance with the legal system insofar as it is not creating or modifying taxes or elements of the tax obligation. Strictly speaking, this formal conduct legitimately interprets that advertising services provided through the press, understood as both \"written and digital\" format, are subject to tax with the IGSV, in accordance with an evolutionary interpretation of what is provided by subsection l) of article 1 of the LIGSV, by which advertising services provided through radio, press, and television are subject to tax. The foregoing because, we consider, the legislator's intention was to subject to the tax in question the advertising services provided in communication media such as radio, press, and television; which is why, regardless of the platform or format used to sell or display the advertising, we will always be facing an advertising service provided by one of those communication media. To that extent, it is not observed that the interpretation set forth in the challenged criterion violates the Principles of Legality, Legal Reservation (Reserva de Ley), or Legal Certainty but rather, we insist, responds to a literal and purposive interpretation of the rule that is coherent and harmonious with the legality framework in force. The criterion is issued by the competent subject and has a legitimate reason (insofar as it is based on a viable interpretation of article 1, subsection l) in question) and that existed as it was taken into account at the time of issuing the act. Its content is lawful, possible, clear, and precise, since it provides, in essence, that advertising services provided through the press, understood as both \"written and digital\" format, are subject to tax with the IGSV, in accordance with an evolutionary interpretation of what is provided by subsection l) of article 1 of the LIGSV, by which advertising services provided through radio, press, and television are subject to tax. This decision is substantially in accordance with the legal system and is corresponding to the reason for the act and proportionate to the legal purpose, which translates into the public interest that underlies that each inhabitant contributes to public burdens, insofar as they perform the generating event (hecho generador) and according to their ability to pay, and the one that underlies an efficient oversight and collection of taxes. It is, moreover, a duly reasoned decision, in the terms required by numeral 136 of the LGAP. For the foregoing, the Tribunal endorses the interpretation made by the DGT since we consider that it responds not only to the literal meaning of the rule but also to the purpose of the legislator and the context in force at the time of applying it, without it being evident that it invades aspects reserved to the law such as the creation or modification of taxes or elements of the tax obligation, which we insist were established by the legislator in numeral 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV. A similar conclusion is reached regarding the legality of resolutions DT-10V-081-12 and Infrac. DT-10V-082-12, issued by the AT. These are acts issued by the competent body, with a certain and legitimate reason. What was ordered is lawful, corresponding to the reason, and proportionate to the purpose, as set forth. It is also reasoned both directly and indirectly when it refers to the institutional criterion that has already been validated. For all the foregoing, we consider in accordance with article 10 of the Civil Code, numerals 10, 11, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, and 136 of the LGAP, ordinals 5, 6, 11, 31 of the CNPT, and canon 1 of the LGISV, the administrative conducts submitted for review are substantially in accordance with the legal system, which is why the claim aimed at ordering the State to return the sums paid, under protest, for IGSV, as well as the interest accrued from the date of their payment until their effective return or deposit, is also unfounded. If it has been declared that the challenged conducts and the collection of the tax are valid, there is no cause that legitimizes the requested return, and it must be rejected, as is hereby done.\"\n\nFrom this perspective, the taxpayer will be any natural or legal person, of public or private law, who habitually makes sales or provides certain services, as well as those who carry out imports or internments of goods. The tax rate is 13%. It is important to highlight that this tax is characterized by applying a mixed system for identifying its object, which differs, for example, from the Value Added Tax adopted by other countries, including those of the European Union. Thus, our legislator chose to tax, generally and as a conceptual category, the sale of any good or merchandise. Whereas, regarding the provision of services, it resorted to a taxative and exceptional formula, that is, only those services expressly stipulated by the legislator are taxed. This is reflected in Article 1 of the LIGSV, according to which \"(...) A tax on the added value is established **on the sale of merchandise** **and on the provision of the following services:** a) Restaurants. b) Bars (Cantinas). c) Nightclubs, social clubs, recreational centers, and similar establishments. ch) Hotels, motels, boarding houses, and transient or non-transient lodging houses. d) Repair and painting shops for all types of vehicles. e) Repair and refurbishment shops for all types of merchandise. f) Vehicle parking lots. g) Telephone, cable, telex, radio-paging, radio-messaging, and similar services. (Subparagraph g) thus amended by Article 15 of Law No. 8114, Law on Tax Simplification and Efficiency, of July 4, 2001) h) Photographic developing and copying services, including photocopies. i) Warehousing services and other non-financial services, provided by general deposit warehouses, fiscal deposit warehouses, and temporary storage facilities for merchandise, the latter under the conditions set forth in Article 145 of the General Customs Law, No. 7557, of October 20, 1995. (Subparagraph i) thus amended by Article 15 of Law No. 8114, Law on Tax Simplification and Efficiency, of July 4, 2001). j) High-class laundry and ironing services. k) Public shows in general, except sporting events, theater, and cinema, the latter when exhibiting films for children. (Thus amended by Article 19.21 of Law No. 7097 of September 1, 1988). l) Advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television. Radio stations and rural newspapers shall be exempt from this provision. (Thus added by Article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987 and expanded by subparagraph 39 of Article 19 of Law No. 7097 of August 18, 1988). ll) Transmission of television programs by cable, satellite, or other similar systems, as well as the recording of \"videos\" and \"tracks\", and their rental. (Thus added by Article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). m) Services of customs agencies. (Thus added by Article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). n) Real estate brokerage services. (Thus added by Article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). ñ) International moving services. (Thus added by Article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). o) Insurance premiums, except those referring to personal insurance, workplace risks, crops, and social-interest housing. p) Services provided by printing presses and lithographs. The National Press (Imprenta Nacional), the printing presses and lithographs of public universities, that of the Ministry of Public Education, as well as the printing presses and lithographs of the Costa Rica Institute of Technology and the Editorial Costa Rica, respectively, are excepted. The foregoing, without prejudice to the exceptions contained in Article 9 of the General Sales Tax Law, No. 6826, of November 10, 1982, and those established in Law No. 7874, of April 23, 1999. q) Washing, waxing, and other cleaning and maintenance services for vehicles. (Subparagraphs o), p), q) thus added by Article 16 of Law No. 8114, Law on Tax Simplification and Efficiency, of July 4, 2001) (NOTE: according to the third paragraph of Article 42 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, WOOD (MADERA) shall pay a sales tax equal to the general sales tax minus three percentage points). (...)\".\n\nVIII.- On the legality review of institutional criterion No. DGT-CI-008-2012. The plaintiff challenges an institutional criterion and two specific administrative acts through which the provisions therein were applied to her. In this sense, the legality of the institutional criterion will be analyzed first, and then the legality of the individual application acts issued both in the determination procedure and in the sanctioning procedure. The foregoing, since if there are defects in the former, they will necessarily extend to the latter. For a better understanding, the Court has grouped, according to their content, the different defects claimed in order to avoid unnecessary repetitions. As a starting point, we must point out that, in accordance with Article 99 of the CNPT, **institutional criteria** constitute norms or provisions of a general nature issued by the Tax Administration (AT) for the correct application of tax laws, clearly, within the limits set by the relevant legal and regulatory provisions. It is inferred, then, that this is a regulatory power granted for a specific purpose and limited by higher-ranking norms such as laws and regulations. They constitute a source of law, as derived from numerals 2 and 168 of the CNPT, as well as canon 2 of the General Regulations for Tax Management, Supervision, and Collection (Reglamento General de Gestión, Fiscalización y Recaudación Tributaria, RGGFRT) and are interpretive of laws and regulations, without being able to innovate objective legal situations or supplement the insufficiency of higher-ranking sources. We are, then, facing external and general acts through which the AT seeks to delimit, give greater clarity or precision to the scope; as well as projection to the content, of the various formal and material duties that the norms regulating legal-tax relations impose on different taxpayers. The foregoing, in order to provide these relations with the necessary certainty and legal security. For this reason, we believe they are vitally important in a tax system like ours, which is based on a scheme of self-determination, self-declaration, and self-assessment, supported, moreover, by the voluntary compliance with these obligations. This assumes that it is the taxpayer who, in the first instance, delimits the content and amount of their tax obligations, declares them, and pays them. Subsequently, the supervisory powers of the AT emerge. Well then, in this type of system, given the taxpayer's right to be informed by the AT regarding the fulfillment of their tax obligations and duties, as well as the content and scope thereof (Article 171 subsection 2) of the CNPT), institutional criteria, as acts of general scope, are highly relevant because they allow taxpayers to have a pronouncement from the AT on how to proceed in fulfilling tax duties, in each specific case, especially when the cited numeral 99 also establishes that these criteria shall be of mandatory compliance in the issuance of all administrative acts, declaring null those issued against such norms, which speaks of their incidence on the subjective legal sphere of taxpayers. Given their relevance and implications, Articles 101, 173, and 174 of the same CNPT impose on the AT the duty to publicize and disseminate them through the various means established therein, in order to guarantee the right to information of obligated subjects. Well then, in this proceeding, **institutional criterion No. DGT-CI-008-2012** is challenged, referring to \"Advertising services provided through the press in written and digital format,\" in which it established, at its core, that advertising services provided through the press, understood both in \"written and digital\" format (understood both in physical or digital format), are taxed with the IGSV, in accordance with an evolutionary interpretation of what subparagraph l) of Article 1 of the LIGSV provides, by which advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television are taxed. To examine the claims raised by the plaintiff, the first aspect to be defined is whether Article 1 subparagraph l) of the LIGSV taxes those services provided through the web pages of press media with this tax. This is because the plaintiff considers that Article 1 of the LIGSV and its Regulations do not expressly include, within the taxed services, advertising services provided through the web; and considering that it is an exhaustive list of taxed services, she affirms, the institutional criterion makes an extensive interpretation that departs from the cited norms. For its part, the State argues that what was taxed was the advertising service provided in the press (among others) and that the fact that it is provided through the web does not remove that condition, but rather we would be facing advertising services provided through digital press. As we explained supra, the tax norm must be interpreted according to normal mechanisms, as appropriate in each specific case. For this, we believe that any interpretive attempt must start from the grammatical context of the norms. This does not imply that the understanding of the norm is, in all cases, within a literal interpretation. On the contrary, the norm as an expression of language constitutes, in turn, the point from which the legal operator begins their analytical exercise against real cases in which it must be applied, but at the same time, it consists of the limit of that authorized interpreter's decision (because their decision seeks the solution of a specific case through the application of the norm analyzed). The validity of eventual interpretations regarding a specific tax is conditioned on the possibility of supporting that sense or comprehensive orientation within the scope of grammatical permissibility of the norm. Well then, after a measured analysis, the Court reaches the conclusion that the referred norm (Article 1 subparagraph l) of the LIGSV) does tax the advertising service provided through the press from a digital platform or web with this tax. The foregoing because when the norm in question taxes with the IGSV the advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television, the legislator's reference is to advertising services provided through the communication media indicated therein, regardless of whether this is on a physical, virtual, or digital platform. That is, what is taxed is the advertising service provided by the press, so the medium or platform on which the press displays the advertising does not eliminate the occurrence of the taxable event. It is worth remembering, in any case, that according to Article 3 of Law No. 8454, of August 30, 2005, there is a functional equivalence between electronic and physical documents, which must be given identical legal treatment. From this perspective, the Court considers that if the activity on which the tax falls is the different advertising services provided, in this case, by the press, it includes, without a doubt, those provided by the press in written or printed, virtual or digital format; which includes, obviously, the advertising services sold by the plaintiff to be displayed on its web page, that is, La Nación Digital. Ultimately, we insist, the taxable event is incurred, i.e., the provision of advertising services in the press, only through a digital platform or format, which in no way modifies the taxable event. Thus, as a first point, we consider that the legislator's intention was to tax, generally, the advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television, regardless of the platform or format that the communication media use to commercialize them. Consequently, a simple literal and purposive interpretation of the norm allows concluding that advertising services provided through the press on its web pages or digital formats are indeed taxed. As stated, it is not observed that the challenged institutional criterion interprets Article 1 subparagraph l) of the LIGSV extensively. Strictly speaking, this rule of general scope comes to interpret that when the legislator refers to and taxes the advertising services provided by the press, it includes the different formats in which they are provided, that is, both printed and digital; an interpretation that the Court shares for the reasons already stated. Given the general wording of the norm, the Court could not endorse an interpretation that advocates taxing with IGSV only the advertising services provided by the press in printed format, as the plaintiff intends; and not those same services, also provided by the press, only through a platform different from the physical and printed one, as is the case here, the digital one. This would rather create a technological and economic distortion (that advertising services provided in the printed press are taxed with IGSV, and those offered by the same press through newer technologies, such as digital press, are not), which the Court could not condone and which would also be violative of the legal system itself, particularly the principles of equality and generality. On this point, what Article 1 subparagraph 21) of the Regulations to the General Sales Tax Law indicates should not be confusing when it defines what is to be understood by advertising services, and indicates that it is the sale of space or time on television stations and periodical publications, such as newspapers, magazines, supplements, and other printed materials, carried out by natural or legal persons who are owners or not, intermediaries, or advertising agents. Strictly, in strict adherence to the content of regulatory power and the Principle of Prohibition of Administrative Arbitrariness (Principio de Interdicción a la Arbitrariedad Administrativa), it could only be interpreted that, in this case, the references to printed material are not exclusive of the possibility that other advertising services provided, for example, by radio or the press, could be through other platforms. We could not endorse the interpretation reached by the plaintiff (that the definition of advertising services only comprises physically printed material, a condition not met in cases where the service is provided through the web), because it should not be overlooked that the regulation is a norm subordinate to the law, which aims to develop its scope, never to contradict it or render its provisions ineffective. In this case, it is clear that the legislator never introduced the referred limitation. We insist that what was taxed were advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television; without observing any limitation or exclusion regarding the platform that any of these media use to effectively provide the service. But furthermore, an interpretation like the one the plaintiff intends would be incompatible, for example, with the tax imposed on advertising services provided by radio, because these could not be on printed material. Thus, interpreting that the regulatory norm defines that the taxed advertising services are only those provided on physically printed material would lead to an abusive exercise of regulatory power and would imply restricting the scope of the concept used by the legislator who, as explained, chose to use a general factual presupposition (advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television) and without limitation, in order to include the different platforms or formats that these communication media use to sell or display advertising services and that could appear over the years. Having clarified the foregoing, this Court considers that, under the protection of Articles 10 of the Civil Code and 10 of the LGAP, a purposive and hermeneutical interpretation of the legal system is perfectly possible to weigh not only the literal wording of the norm, but also its context and the reality (factual and legal) in force at the time of applying it; to conclude that Article 1 subparagraph l) of the LIGSV taxes with that levy the advertising services provided by the press, regardless of the platform or format used to sell, provide, or display the advertising. Based on the foregoing, we consider that the institutional criterion is not extensive in its interpretation, but rather is oriented towards the correct application and understanding of the scope of the cited Article 1 subparagraph l). To that extent, it does not innovate objective legal situations, it only develops the interpretation that must be given to a pre-existing norm, which this Court endorses.\n\nIX.- Nor is it observed that the challenged institutional criterion violates the Principle of Legality or the Principle of Legal Reserve (Principio de Reserva de Ley), which find their basis in Articles 121 subparagraph 13) of the Political Constitution and 5 of the CNPT. This last norm clearly establishes that \"(...) In tax matters, only the law may: a) Create, modify, or eliminate taxes; define the taxable event of the tax relationship; establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and indicate the taxpayer; b) Grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits; c) Typify infractions and establish the respective sanctions; d) Establish privileges, preferences, and guarantees for tax credits; and e) Regulate the modes of extinguishing tax credits by means other than payment. (...)\". The plaintiff is right when she points out that according to this provision and the principle of legal reserve, the essential and determining components of the tax must necessarily be established by the legislator. We refer to the taxable event, the taxpayer, the taxable base, the tax rate, as well as the collection period, depending on whether it is progressive or instantaneous. However, regarding the tariff, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has established the possibility of legislative delegation, clearly, through a law that establishes in advance the limits within which this exercise can be carried out. Hence, the referred legal reserve can be qualified as \"relative,\" as said Chamber has ratified in several of its pronouncements, among others in rulings No. 8271-2001, 8580-2001, and 5504-2002. In the case at hand, we consider that the institutional criterion interprets numeral 1 subparagraph l) of the LIGSV without affecting the elements subject to the referred principle of legal reserve. That is, it does not innovate regarding the taxable event, the taxpayer, the taxable base, the tax rate, or the collection period, nor imposes an obligation ex novo, i.e., not foreseen by the legislator. We insist that the taxable event contemplated by the legal norm is the provision of advertising services through the press, without the legislator limiting that taxable event only to those sold through the physically printed written press, as the plaintiff seems to interpret it. Unlike her thesis, we consider that the law neither taxes nor describes the means through which advertising services are provided or sold. Furthermore, it doesn’t even qualify them. What is taxed is the provision of such services in the press, radio, and television (which are all communication media); regardless of the platform used to provide them. The web page is a platform that the communication medium (press, in this case) can use to sell or provide advertising services. So, if these are provided through the press (physical or digital), they will be taxed with IGSV because they form part of the factual scenario foreseen by the legislator. The institutional criterion does not introduce a new taxable event, as claimed; it only establishes the correct interpretation of the norm, so that there is no doubt for the taxpayer about the scope of the taxable event described in the referred legal norm. In relation to the principle of legality, its violation is alleged because, in the plaintiff's opinion, the AT, without having a legal norm enabling it, proceeds to tax the advertising services she provided through the web.\n\nNevertheless, we reiterate that those services were taxed by the legislator, from the moment it imposed the payment of the tax on advertising services provided through the press, and the plaintiff incurred in that taxable event (hecho generador) when it sold services to be displayed on its digital platform. Therefore, the administrative action does find a basis both in the cited Article 1 of the LIGSV and in the institutional criterion itself. If we have indicated that the legislator taxed advertising services provided by the press, radio, and television, regardless of the platform on which they are provided; rather, the principle of legality would be violated if the DGT disregarded the scope of the legal rule and did not tax the situations under discussion here. Precisely in subjection to the Principle of Legality (in its positive aspect) and to guide the correct fulfillment of obligations, it issued the institutional criterion in question, which forms part of the normative sources, as derived from Article 2 of both the CNPT and the RGGRFT. If they form part of the principle of legality, there is no doubt that the AT is subject to its observance. For the foregoing reasons, we consider that the challenged criterion does not violate the principle of legal reservation because it is not creating or modifying taxes, nor are the essential elements of the tax obligation being defined through interpretation; much less, creating them analogically. Note that the effects of the rule are not being extended (since advertising services provided by the press were expressly contemplated by the legislator) to extremes that it does not contemplate, or that do not derive from its content. We reiterate that, in the case of advertising services, those aspects were already defined by the legislator when it established that those provided by radio, press, and television were taxed; for which reason the formula used does not violate Articles 5 and 6 of the CNPT. For the same reasons, it is also not true that a new service is being taxed by way of exception. Situations not foreseen by the legislator are not incorporated there. On the contrary, the rule establishes factual situations (advertising services provided by radio, press, and television) and links them with a common element, namely, that they are services provided by media outlets, as has been indicated. The foregoing, regardless of the platform that the media outlet uses to sell, provide, or display advertising. Nor is the plaintiff's argument admissible, according to which, at the date the LIGSV was created, the digital format did not even exist. We insist that, as these are services highly influenced by technological innovations, the legislator validly chose to use a generic concept (advertising services provided by radio, press, and television), without any limitation and that could adapt to the reality in force at the time of applying the rule, through a literal, hermeneutical, and evolutionary interpretation, like the one applied by the challenged criterion, granting legal certainty regarding the scope of the legal and regulatory rules pertinent to the case.\n\nX.- Regarding the legality review of the formal administrative actions of the AT that are challenged. As we explained, the plaintiff also questions two specific acts through which the AT applied the institutional criterion already analyzed. We refer to the determinative resolution No. DT-10V-081-12, which confirms the adjustment sought in the transfer of charges No. 2752000031891, in relation to the application of the IGSV to advertising services provided through the website; as well as the sanctioning determinative resolution Infraction DT-10V-082-12, which imposes a fine equivalent to 25% for the sum of the ex officio determination of the IGSV declarations for the periods from October 2008 to September 2009. For the same reasons given to sustain that the questioned institutional criterion is not violative of the principle of legal reservation nor of legality, we are of the opinion that these specific formal actions do not injure them either. Both limited themselves to legitimately applying to the plaintiff in the determinative procedure, what is provided in Article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV and the referred institutional criterion; concluding in the adjustment in question. Subsequently, the resolution issued in the sanctioning procedure applies the infraction of Article 81 of the CNPT because the required factual assumptions are present. It is also alleged that both actions violate the principle of non-retroactivity, fundamentally, because they seek to apply an interpretative criterion from 2012 to consolidated legal situations from 2009. After the corresponding analysis, the Tribunal does not observe that there is a retroactive effect to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations of the plaintiff. First, because an adjustment was applied to a service that was expressly taxed by the legislator, a provision dating from the reform introduced to the LGISV in the years 1987 and 1988, as has been explained. That is, the obligation to pay the IGSV in the case of advertising services provided by the press (on any of its platforms) does not originate with the interpretative criterion but was established long before the adjustment made or the sanction imposed. Second, because the adjustment and the sanction are imposed in relation to fiscal periods over which the AT could still exercise oversight powers, as the prescription period established by Article 51 of the CNPT had not yet occurred. To assume that this guarantee is violated solely because tax control is exercised over concluded fiscal periods would imply a grave violation of the rule that imposes the tax in question and of the oversight powers that the legislator has entrusted to the AT, an aspect this Tribunal could not endorse. For the foregoing, the claims in that sense are inadmissible and are rejected. Subsequently, it is alleged that the content of the challenged acts inadequately treats the concepts and scopes of exemption and non-subjection. The plaintiff explains that since Article 1 of the LIGSV restricts the object of the tax only to the services exhaustively indicated in the rule, all those that the legislator did not include have the character of non-taxed due to non-subjection. It criticizes that the determinative resolution accuses it of having applied a tax exemption that does not exist in the LIGSV, when such a conclusion is incorrect since the tax has not been charged because there is no taxable event (hecho generador) established in the law, for which reason it cannot charge a tax on a factual situation that is non-subject under the law. We consider that this claim is also inadmissible as it stems from an erroneous premise. As we have extensively explained, advertising services provided in radio, press, and television, regardless of the platform on which they are provided (whether physical or digital), are indeed taxed with the IGSV, because they are contemplated in the exhaustive list provided in Article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV. Therefore, it is not true that it is a service non-subject to the tax, as the plaintiff affirms. Subsequently, the exemptions to the tax are contemplated in subsection l) itself for radio stations and rural newspapers; as well as in numeral 9 of the referred Law, in the situations indicated therein, without the plaintiff being in any of the factual assumptions established there. Thus, advertising services provided in radio, press, and television, regardless of the platform that the medium uses for such purposes, are subject to the IGSV and the legislator did not establish any exemption that benefits, in the specific case, the plaintiff. So, aside from the technical imprecision that the AT may have incurred in the challenged actions, the truth is that the conclusion reached regarding that point results substantially in accordance with the legal system and must be so declared. Another claim that is raised has to do with the supposed disproportion of the determination and sanction applied, which, in the plaintiff's opinion, do not correspond to its ability to pay (capacidad contributiva). In this respect, we must point out that the party does not explain, with the required forcefulness, the scope of the defect being claimed; however, an analysis by the Tribunal allows us to conclude that the alleged injury is not present for the following reasons. We have no doubt that the right to contribute according to economic capacity constitutes a principle of material tax justice that also stands as a substantial limit on the exercise of the tax authority. Now, although taxes levy different manifestations of wealth, it must be kept in mind that although as a general rule the wealth that the legislator wishes to tax (final object) coincides with that which, ultimately, is taxed (material object); there are situations in which the two differ. An example of these occurs in some of the taxes that levy consumption as an index of economic capacity and, within these, the IGSV. This tax formally levies the income coming from business and professional activities (sale of goods and provision of services), this being the material object or taxed wealth. However, the true object, understood as the wealth that the legislator has wished to tax, is the wealth spent by the consumer of the goods or services, as an indirect manifestation of economic capacity. Thus, to facilitate the collection of the tax, the legislator included as a subjective element of the taxable event a subject whose economic capacity is not the one sought to be taxed, but who is considered the taxpayer (contribuyente), obligated to pay the tax and other material and formal duties. That taxpayer is attributed a legal duty to shift (trasladar) the tax to the subject whose economic capacity is the one that is actually sought to be taxed, in this case, the final consumers. From this perspective, in the specific case the plaintiff is not the holder of the wealth sought to be taxed nor who, ultimately, effectively bears it. Strictly speaking, the IGSV is borne by the consumers of the service, that is, those who purchase the advertising services that the plaintiff, as a media outlet, provides whether in print or digital format. The plaintiff is solely the taxpayer with a power-duty to shift to the treasury the tax it charges to those consumers. Consequently, neither is the economic capacity of the plaintiff directly taxed (but rather that of the consumer) nor is it she who personally bears the tax (in her assets); she only must charge it to the consumer and shift it to the treasury when selling the referred advertising services. To that extent, she only has the duty to shift the tax she charges to consumers for advertising services actually provided. In this understanding, no direct or disproportionate affectation to its economic capacity is observed. For the reasons stated, we consider that the adjustment made in the determinative resolution No. DT-10V-081-12 is substantially in accordance with the legal system since, based on numeral 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV and the interpretative criterion already analyzed, they adjusted the tax burden of the IGSV in the periods from October 2008 to September 2009, to tax the advertising services that it provided through its website La Nación Digital and that were neither declared nor shifted at the opportune moment. Given the inaccurate declaration and the omission to shift to the treasury, in a timely manner, income generated by taxed operations, the infraction contemplated in numeral 81 of the CNPT is incurred, the plaintiff having to bear the sanctioning legal consequences of its irregular conduct. Therefore, no defect is observed in the sanctioning determinative resolution Infraction. DT-10V-082-12.\n\nXI.- In definitive, we consider that the Institutional Criterion No. DGT-CI-008-12 is substantially in accordance with the legal system in that it is not creating or modifying taxes or elements of the tax obligation. Strictly speaking, this formal action legitimately interprets that advertising services provided through the press, understood as both in \"written and digital\" format, are taxed with the IGSV, in accordance with an evolutionary interpretation of what subsection l) of Article 1 of the LIGSV provides, through which advertising services provided via radio, press, and television are taxed. The foregoing because, we consider, the legislator's intention was to tax with the tax under discussion the advertising services provided in media outlets such as radio, press, and television; for which reason, regardless of the platform or format used to sell or display advertising, we will always be facing an advertising service provided by one of those media outlets. To that extent, it is not observed that the interpretation contained in the challenged criterion violates the Principles of Legality, Legal Reservation, or Legal Certainty but rather, we insist, responds to a literal and purposive interpretation of the rule that is coherent and harmonious with the principle of legality in force. The criterion is issued by the competent subject and has a legitimate reason (insofar as it is based on a viable interpretation of the Article 1, subsection l) in question) and that existed as it was taken into account at the time of issuing the act. Its content is lawful, possible, clear, and precise, since it provides, in its core, that advertising services provided through the press, understood as both in \"written and digital\" format, are taxed with the IGSV, in accordance with an evolutionary interpretation of what subsection l) of Article 1 of the LIGSV provides, through which advertising services provided via radio, press, and television are taxed. That decision is substantially in accordance with the legal system and is corresponding to the motive of the act and proportionate to the legal purpose translated into the public interest that subsists behind each inhabitant contributing to the public burdens, as long as they carry out the taxable event and according to their ability to pay, and that which subsists behind efficient oversight and collection of taxes. It is, moreover, a duly reasoned decision, in the terms required by numeral 136 of the LGAP. For the foregoing, the Tribunal endorses the interpretation made by the DGT since we consider that it responds not only to the literal meaning of the rule but also to the legislator's purpose and to the context in force at the time of applying it, without it being noted that it invades aspects reserved to the law such as the creation or modification of taxes or elements of the tax obligation, which we insist were established by the legislator in numeral 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV. A similar conclusion is reached regarding the legality of resolutions DT-10V-081-12 and Infraction. DT-10V-082-12, issued by the AT. They are acts issued by the competent body, with a certain and legitimate motive. What was ordered is lawful, corresponding to the motive and proportionate to the end, as stated. They are also reasoned both directly and indirectly when they refer to the institutional criterion that has already been validated.\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, we find, in accordance with article 10 of the Civil Code, articles 10, 11, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133 and 136 of the LGAP, articles 5, 6, 11, 31, of the CNPT and article 1 of the LGISV, the administrative conducts under examination are substantially in conformity with the legal system, for which reason the claim seeking to order the State to return the sums paid, under protest, for IGSV, as well as the interest accrued from the date of their payment until their effective return or deposit, is also inadmissible. If it has been declared that the challenged conducts and the collection of the tax are valid, there is no cause that legitimizes the requested refund, and it must be rejected, as is indeed done.”\n\nj) Laundry and pressing services for class clothing. k) Public shows in general, except sports, theaters, and cinemas, the latter when they exhibit films for children. (As amended by Article 19.21 of Law No. 7097 of September 1, 1988). l) Advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television. Radio stations and rural newspapers shall be exempt from this provision. (As added by Article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987, and expanded by subsection 39 of Article 19 of Law No. 7097 of August 18, 1988). ll) Transmission of television programs by cable, satellite, or other similar systems, as well as the recording of \"videos\" and \"tracks,\" and their rental. (As added by Article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). m) Services of customs agencies. (As added by Article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). n) Real estate brokerage services. (As added by Article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). ñ) International moving services. (As added by Article 3 of Law No. 7088 of November 30, 1987). o) Insurance premiums, except those referring to personal insurance, occupational hazards, crops, and low-income housing. p) Services provided by printing presses and lithographs. This excludes the Imprenta Nacional, the printing presses and lithographs of public universities, that of the Ministerio de Educación Pública, as well as the printing presses and lithographs of the Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica and the Editorial Costa Rica, respectively. The foregoing, without prejudice to the exceptions contained in Article 9 of the General Sales Tax Law, No. 6826, of November 10, 1982, and those established in Law No. 7874, of April 23, 1999. q) Washing, waxing, and other vehicle cleaning and maintenance services. (Subsections o), p), q) as added by Article 16 of Law No. 8114, Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria, of July 4, 2001) (NOTE: according to the third paragraph of Article 42 of the Ley Forestal No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, WOOD shall pay a sales tax equal to the general sales tax minus three percentage points). (...)\".\n\nVIII.- Regarding the examination of the legality of institutional criterion No. DGT-CI-008-2012. The plaintiff challenges an institutional criterion and two specific administrative acts through which the provisions of the former were applied to it. In that sense, the legality of the institutional criterion will be analyzed first, and then that of the individual application acts issued both in the determination procedure and in the sanctioning procedure. The foregoing, given that, should defects exist in the former, they will necessarily extend to the latter. For a better understanding, the Tribunal has grouped, according to their content, the different defects claimed to avoid unnecessary repetitions. As a starting point, we must point out that, in accordance with Article 99 of the CNPT, institutional criteria constitute general rules or provisions issued by the Tax Administration (AT) for the correct application of tax laws, clearly, within the limits set by the pertinent legal and regulatory provisions. It is inferred, then, that this is a regulatory power granted for a specific purpose and that it is limited by higher-ranking norms such as laws and regulations. They constitute a source of law, as can be inferred from numerals 2 and 168 of the CNPT, as well as canon 2 of the Reglamento General de Gestión, Fiscalización y Recaudación Tributaria (hereinafter RGGFRT), and have an interpretive character of the laws and regulations, without being able to innovate objective legal situations or supplement the insufficiency of higher-ranking sources. We are, then, faced with external and general acts through which the AT seeks to delimit, give greater clarity or precision to the scope; as well as projection to the content, of the different formal and material duties that the norms regulating legal-tax relations impose on the different subjects liable for the tax. The foregoing, for the purpose of providing these relations with the necessary certainty and legal security. For this reason, we believe, they are of vital importance in a tax system like ours, which is based on a scheme of self-determination, self-declaration, and self-assessment, supported, moreover, by the voluntary fulfillment of those obligations. This supposes that it is the subject liable for the tax who, in the first instance, delimits the content and amount of their tax obligations, declares them, and pays them. Subsequently, the supervisory powers of the AT emerge. Well, in this type of system, given the right of the taxpayer to be informed by the AT regarding the fulfillment of their tax obligations and duties, as well as regarding their content and scope (Article 171, subsection 2) of the CNPT), institutional criteria, as acts of general scope, are of great relevance because they allow taxpayers to have a pronouncement from the AT regarding how to proceed in the fulfillment of tax duties, in each specific case, especially when the cited numeral 99 also establishes that these criteria shall be of mandatory observance in the issuance of all administrative acts, classifying as null those that are issued contrary to such norms, which speaks to their incidence in the subjective legal sphere of the subjects liable for the tax. Given their relevance and implications, Articles 101, 173, and 174 of the same CNPT impose on the AT the duty to publicize and disseminate them through the various means established therein, to guarantee the right to information of the obligated subjects. Well, in this proceeding, institutional criterion No. DGT-CI-008-2012 is challenged, referring to \"Advertising services provided through the press in written and digital format,\" in which it established, at its core, that advertising services provided through the press, understood in both \"written and digital\" format (understood both in physical and digital format), are taxed under the IGSV (General Sales Tax), in accordance with an evolutionary interpretation of what subsection l) of Article 1 of the LIGSV (General Sales Tax Law) provides, through which advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television are taxed. To examine the claims raised by the plaintiff, the first aspect to be defined is whether Article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV taxes with that levy advertising services provided through the web pages of press media. This is because the plaintiff considers that Article 1 of the LIGSV and its Regulations do not expressly contemplate, within the taxed services, those for advertising provided through the web; and considering that it is an exhaustive list of taxed services, it affirms, the institutional criterion makes an extensive interpretation that departs from the cited norms. For its part, the State maintains that what was taxed was the advertising service provided in the press (among others) and that the fact that it is provided through the web does not remove that condition, but rather we would be facing advertising services provided through the digital press. As we explained supra, the tax norm must be interpreted in accordance with normal mechanisms, as appropriate in each specific case. To do this, we believe that any interpretative practice that is attempted must start from the grammatical context of the norms. This does not imply that the understanding of the norm is, in all cases, within a literal interpretation. On the contrary, the norm as an expression of language constitutes, in turn, the point from which the legal operator begins their analytical exercise against real cases in which it must be applied, but at the same time, it constitutes the limit of the decision of that authorized interpreter (because their decision seeks the solution of a specific case through the application of the analyzed norm). The validity of eventual interpretations regarding a specific tax is conditioned on the possibility of sustaining that meaning or comprehensive orientation within the scope of grammatical permissibility of the norm. Well, after a measured analysis, the Tribunal reaches the conclusion that the referred norm (Article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV) does tax with that levy the advertising service provided through the press via a digital or web platform. The foregoing, given that when the norm in question taxes with the IGSV the advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television, the legislator's reference is to advertising services provided through the communication media indicated therein, regardless of whether this is on a physical, virtual, or digital platform. That is, what is taxed is the advertising service provided by the press, such that the medium or platform on which the press displays the advertising does not eliminate the occurrence of the taxable event (hecho generador). It is worth remembering, in any case, that according to Article 3 of Law No. 8454, of August 30, 2005, there is a functional equivalence between electronic and physical documents, which must be given identical legal treatment. From this perspective, the Tribunal considers that if the activity upon which the levy falls is the different advertising services provided, in this case, by the press, it includes, without a doubt, those provided by the press in written or printed, virtual or digital format; which includes, obviously, the advertising services that the plaintiff sells to be displayed on its web page, that is, La Nación Digital. After all, we insist, the taxable event is incurred, namely, the provision of advertising services in the press, only through a digital platform or format, which in no way modifies the tax basis (hecho imponible). Thus, as a first point, we consider that the legislator's intention was to tax, in a general manner, advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television, regardless of the platform or format that the communication media use to commercialize them. Consequently, a simple literal and purposive interpretation of the norm allows concluding that advertising services provided through the press on its web pages or digital formats are indeed taxed. In accordance with the foregoing, it is not observed that the institutional criterion being challenged extensively interprets Article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV. Strictly speaking, that generally applicable norm comes to interpret that when the legislator refers to and taxes advertising services provided by the press, it includes the different formats in which it is provided, that is, both printed and digital; an interpretation that the Tribunal shares for the reasons already stated. Given the general wording of the norm, the Tribunal could not endorse an interpretation that advocates taxing with the IGSV only advertising services provided by the press in printed format, as the plaintiff intends; and not those same services, also provided by the press, only through a platform different from the physical and printed one, as is the case here, the digital one. This would, rather, create a technological and economic distortion (that advertising services provided in the printed press are taxed with IGSV and not those that the same press offers through newer technologies, such as the digital press), which the Tribunal could not condone and which would also be a violation of the legal system itself, particularly the principles of equality and generality. On this point, no confusion should arise from what Article 1, subsection 21) of the Regulation to the General Sales Tax Law indicates, when it defines what should be understood as advertising services, and indicates that it is the sale of space or time on television stations and periodic publications, such as newspapers, magazines, supplements, and other printed materials, carried out by natural or legal persons, whether owners or not, intermediaries, or advertising agents. Strictly speaking, in strict adherence to the content of regulatory power and the Principle of Prohibition of Administrative Arbitrariness, it could only be interpreted that, in that case, the references to printed materials are not exclusive of the possibility that other advertising services provided, for example, by radio or the press, may be provided through other platforms. We could not endorse the interpretation reached by the plaintiff (that the definition of advertising services only includes physically printed material, a condition not met in cases where the service is provided through the web), because one must not ignore that the regulation is a norm subordinate to the law, which aims to develop its scope, but never to contradict it or render its provisions ineffective. In this case, it is clear that the legislator never introduced the referred limitation. We insist that what it taxed was advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television; without observing any limitation or exclusion regarding the platform that any of those media use to effectively provide the service. But furthermore, an interpretation like the one the plaintiff intends would be incompatible, for example, with the levy imposed on advertising services provided by radio, because these could not be provided in printed material. Thus, interpreting that the regulatory norm defines that the advertising services taxed are only those provided on physically printed material would lead to an abusive exercise of regulatory power and would mean restricting the scope of the concept used by the legislator who, as explained, chose to use a general factual basis (advertising services provided through radio, the press, and television) and without limitation, in order to include the different platforms or formats that these communication media use to sell or display advertising services and that could appear over the years. Having clarified the above, this Tribunal considers that, under the auspices of Articles 10 of the Civil Code and 10 of the LGAP, a purposive and hermeneutic interpretation of the legal system is perfectly possible, which allows weighing not only the literalness of the norm, but also its context and the reality (factual and legal) in force at the time of applying it; to reach the conclusion that Article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV taxes with that levy the advertising services provided by the press, regardless of the platform or format used to sell, provide, or display the advertising. Based on the foregoing, we consider that the institutional criterion is not extensive in its interpretation, but rather is oriented toward the correct application and understanding of the scope of the cited Article 1, subsection l). In that sense, it does not innovate objective legal situations; it only develops the interpretation that must be given to a pre-existing norm, which this Tribunal endorses.\n\nIX.- Nor is it observed that the challenged institutional criterion harms the Principle of Legality or that of Legal Reserve, which find their basis in Articles 121, subsection 13) of the Constitución Política and 5 of the CNPT. This latter norm clearly establishes that \"(...) In tax matters only the law may: a) Create, modify, or suppress taxes; define the taxable event of the tax relationship; establish the rates of taxes and their bases for calculation; and indicate the subject liable for the tax; b) Grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits; c) Define infringements and establish the respective sanctions; d) Establish privileges, preferences, and guarantees for tax credits; and e) Regulate the modes of extinction of tax credits by means other than payment. (...)\". The plaintiff is correct when she points out that, according to this provision and the principle of legal reserve, the essential and determining components of the tax must necessarily be established by the legislator. We refer to the taxable event, the subject liable for the tax, the taxable base, the tax rate, as well as the collection period, depending on whether it is progressive or instantaneous. However, regarding the rate, the Sala Constitucional has established the possibility of a legislative delegation, clearly, through a law that establishes in advance the limits within which this exercise may be carried out. Hence, the referred legal reserve can be qualified as \"relative,\" according to what said Chamber has ratified in several of its pronouncements, among others in Judgments No. 8271-2001, 8580-2001, and 5504-2002. In the case at hand, we consider that the institutional criterion interprets numeral 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV without affecting the elements subject to the referred principle of legal reserve. That is, it does not innovate regarding the taxable event, the subject liable for the tax, the taxable base, the tax rate, or the collection period, nor does it impose an ex novo obligation, that is, one not provided for by the legislator. We insist that the taxable event contemplated in the legal norm is the provision of advertising services through the press, without the legislator limiting that tax basis solely to those sold through physically printed written press, as the plaintiff seems to interpret it. Contrary to her thesis, we consider that the law does not tax nor describe the means through which the advertising services are provided or sold. In fact, it does not even qualify them. What is taxed is the provision of such services in the press, radio, and television (which are all communication media); regardless of the platform used to provide them. The web page is a platform that the communication medium (press, in this case) can use to sell or provide advertising services. So that, if these are provided through the press (physical or digital), they will be taxed with the IGSV because they form part of the factual assumption provided for by the legislator. The institutional criterion does not introduce a new taxable event, as is claimed; it only establishes the correct interpretation of the norm, so that there is no doubt in the taxpayer's mind about the scope of the taxable event described in the referred legal norm. In relation to the principle of legality, its violation is alleged because, in the plaintiff's opinion, the AT, without having a legal norm that enabled it, proceeded to tax the advertising services she provided through the web. However, we reiterate that those services were taxed by the legislator, from the moment it imposed the payment of the levy on advertising services provided through the press, and the plaintiff incurred in that taxable event when she sold services to be displayed on her digital platform. Therefore, the administrative action does find basis in both the cited Article 1 of the LIGSV and in the institutional criterion itself. If we have pointed out that the legislator taxed the advertising services provided by the press, radio, and television, regardless of the platform on which they are provided; rather, the legality framework would be violated if the Tax Directorate (DGT) ignored the scope of the legal norm and did not tax the assumptions that are under discussion here. Precisely in subjection to the Principle of Legality (in its positive aspect) and to guide the correct fulfillment of obligations, it issues the institutional criterion in question, which forms part of the normative sources, as can be inferred from Article 2 of both the CNPT and the RGGRFT. If they integrate the legality framework, there is no doubt that the AT is subject to their observance. Based on the foregoing, we consider that the challenged criterion does not violate the principle of legal reserve because it is not creating or modifying taxes, nor are the essential elements of the tax obligation being defined, via interpretation; still less, creating them analogously. Note that the effects of the norm are not being extended (since advertising services provided by the press were expressly contemplated by the legislator) to extremes that it does not contemplate, or that do not derive from its content. We reiterate that, in terms of advertising services, those aspects were already defined by the legislator when it established that those provided by radio, the press, and television were taxed; reason why the formula used does not violate Articles 5 and 6 of the CNPT. For the same reasons, it is also not true that a new service is being taxed by way of exception. Assumptions not provided for by the legislator are not incorporated there. On the contrary, the norm establishes factual assumptions (advertising services provided by radio, the press, and television) and links them with a common element, namely, that they are services provided by communication media, as has been pointed out. The foregoing, regardless of the platform that the communication medium uses to sell, provide, or display the advertising.\n\nNor is the plaintiff's argument that, at the time the LIGSV was created, the digital format did not even exist, acceptable. We reiterate that, as these are services highly influenced by technological innovations, the legislator validly chose to use a generic concept (advertising services (servicios publicitarios) provided by radio, press, and television), without any limitation and capable of adapting to the current reality at the time of applying the norm, through a literal, hermeneutic, and evolutionary interpretation, like the one applied by the challenged criterion, granting legal certainty regarding the scope of the legal and regulatory norms related to the case.\n\n**X.- On the legality review of the formal administrative conducts of the AT that are challenged.** As we explained, the plaintiff also questions two specific acts through which the AT applied the institutional criterion already analyzed. We refer to the determination resolution No. DT-10V-081-12, which confirms the adjustment sought in the transfer of charges No. 2752000031891, regarding the application of the IGSV to advertising services (servicios publicitarios) provided through the website; as well as the sanctioning determination resolution Infrac. DT-10V-082-12, which imposes a fine equivalent to 25% for the sum of the ex officio determination of the IGSV declarations for the periods from October 2008 to September 2009. For the same reasons given to sustain that the questioned institutional criterion does not violate the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley) or the principle of legality, we are of the opinion that these specific formal conducts do not violate them either. Both were limited to legitimately applying to the plaintiff in the determination procedure the provisions of Article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV and the aforementioned institutional criterion, concluding in the adjustment in question. Subsequently, the resolution issued in the sanctioning procedure applies the infraction of Article 81 of the CNPT because the required factual circumstances are present. It is also alleged that both conducts violate the **principle of non-retroactivity**, fundamentally because they attempt to apply an interpretive criterion from 2012 to consolidated legal situations from 2009. After the corresponding analysis, the Tribunal does not observe a retroactive effect to the detriment of the plaintiff's acquired rights or consolidated legal situations. First, because an adjustment was applied to a service that was indeed expressly taxed by the legislator, a provision dating back to the reform introduced to the LGISV in the years 1987 and 1988, as has been explained. That is, the obligation to pay the IGSV for advertising services (servicios publicitarios) provided by the press (in any of its platforms) does not arise from the interpretive criterion but was established long before the adjustment made or the sanction imposed. Second, because the adjustment and the sanction are imposed in relation to fiscal periods over which the AT could still exercise oversight, as the statute of limitations period established by Article 51 of the CNPT had not yet elapsed. To assume that this guarantee is violated simply because tax control is exercised over concluded fiscal periods would represent a serious violation of the norm that imposes the tax in question and of the oversight powers the legislator has entrusted to the AT, an aspect this Tribunal could not endorse. For the foregoing reasons, the claims in that regard are unfounded and are rejected. Subsequently, it is alleged that the content of the challenged acts improperly address the concepts and scope of exemption (exención) and non-subjection (no sujeción). The plaintiff explains that because Article 1 of the LIGSV restricts the object of the tax only to the services exhaustively indicated in the norm, all those the legislator did not include have the character of untaxed due to non-subjection (no sujeción). She criticizes that the determination resolution accuses her of having applied a tax exemption (exención) that does not exist in the LIGSV, when such a conclusion is incorrect because the tax has not been charged since there is no taxable event (hecho generador) established in the law, for which reason a tax cannot be charged on a factual situation that is non-subject (no sujeta) in the law. We consider this claim to also be unfounded because it starts from an erroneous premise. As we have extensively explained, advertising services (servicios publicitarios) provided on radio, press, and television, regardless of the platform on which they are provided (whether physical or digital), are indeed taxed with the IGSV, because they are covered within the exhaustive list established by Article 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV. Therefore, it is not true that this is a service not subject (no sujeta) to the tax, as the plaintiff asserts. Furthermore, the exemptions (exenciones) to the tax are contemplated by subsection l) itself for radio stations and rural newspapers; as well as numeral 9 of the aforementioned Law, in the scenarios indicated therein, without the plaintiff falling into any of the factual circumstances established there. Thus, advertising services (servicios publicitarios) provided on radio, press, and television, regardless of the platform the medium uses for such purposes, are subject to the IGSV, and the legislator did not establish any exemption (exención) that benefits the plaintiff in this specific case. Therefore, regardless of any technical imprecision the AT may have incurred in the challenged conducts, the truth is that the conclusion reached on that point is substantially in conformity with the legal system and must be so declared. Another claim raised has to do with the alleged disproportion of the determination and sanction applied, which, in the plaintiff's opinion, do not correspond to her ability to pay (capacidad contributiva). In this regard, we must point out that the party does not explain, with the required forcefulness, the scope of the defect being alleged; however, an analysis by the Tribunal allows us to conclude that the alleged injury is not present for the following reasons. We have no doubt that the right to contribute according to economic capacity constitutes a principle of material tax justice that also stands as a substantial limit on the exercise of tax authority. Now, although taxes levy different manifestations of wealth, it must be kept in mind that although, as a general rule, the wealth the legislator wants to tax (final object) coincides with the wealth that is ultimately taxed (material object), there are scenarios where they differ. Examples of this arise in some of the taxes that levy consumption as an index of economic capacity, and among these, the IGSV. This tax formally levies income derived from business and professional activities (sales of goods and provision of services), this being the material object or taxed wealth. However, the true object, understood as the wealth the legislator intended to tax, is the wealth spent by the consumer of the goods or services, as an indirect manifestation of economic capacity. Thus, to facilitate tax collection, the legislator included as a subjective element of the taxable event (hecho generador) a subject whose economic capacity is not the one intended to be taxed, but who is considered the taxpayer, obligated to pay the tax and fulfill other material and formal duties. This taxpayer is attributed a legal duty to pass on (trasladar) the tax to the subject whose economic capacity is actually intended to be taxed, in this case, the final consumers. From this perspective, in this specific case, the plaintiff is not the holder of the wealth intended to be taxed, nor is she the one who ultimately and effectively bears it. Strictly speaking, the IGSV is borne by the consumers of the service, that is, those who purchase the advertising services (servicios publicitarios) that the plaintiff, as a press medium, provides whether in printed or digital form. The plaintiff is solely the taxpayer with a power-duty to pass on to the treasury the tax she collects from them. Consequently, the plaintiff's economic capacity is neither directly taxed (but rather that of the consumer), nor is she the one who personally bears (in her patrimony) the tax; she only must collect it from the consumer and pass it on to the treasury when she sells the aforementioned advertising services (servicios publicitarios). To that extent, she only has the duty to pass on the tax she collects from consumers for advertising services (servicios publicitarios) effectively provided. In this reasoning, no direct or disproportionate impact on her economic capacity is observed. For the stated reasons, we consider that the adjustment made in determination resolution No. DT-10V-081-12 is substantially in conformity with the legal system because, based on numeral 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV and the interpretive criterion already analyzed, they adjusted the tax burden of the IGSV in the periods from October 2008 to September 2009, to tax the advertising services (servicios publicitarios) she provided through her website La Nación Digital and that were neither declared nor passed on at the opportune time. Given the inaccurate declaration and the failure to timely pass on to the treasury income generated by taxed operations, the infraction contemplated in numeral 81 of the CNPT is incurred, and the plaintiff must bear the sanctioning legal consequences of her irregular conduct. Therefore, no defect is observed either in the sanctioning determination resolution Infrac. DT-10V-082-12.\n\n**XI.-** In conclusion, we consider that Institutional Criterion No. DGT-CI-008-12 is substantially in conformity with the legal system, as it is not creating or modifying taxes or elements of the tax obligation. Strictly speaking, this formal conduct legitimately interprets that advertising services (servicios publicitarios) provided through the press, understood in both \"written and digital\" format, are taxed with the IGSV, in accordance with an evolutionary interpretation of what subsection l) of Article 1 of the LIGSV stipulates, through which advertising services (servicios publicitarios) provided through radio, press, and television are taxed. The foregoing because, we consider, the legislator's intent was to tax with the tax in question the advertising services (servicios publicitarios) provided in communication media such as radio, press, and television; for which reason, regardless of the platform or format used to sell or display the advertising, we will always be facing an advertising service (servicio publicitario) provided by one of those communication media. To that extent, it is not observed that the interpretation set forth in the challenged criterion violates the Principles of Legality, Legal Reserve (Reserva de Ley), or Legal Certainty, but rather, we insist, it responds to a literal and purposive interpretation of the norm that is coherent and harmonious with the current legality block. The criterion is issued by the competent subject and has a legitimate reason (as it is supported by a viable interpretation of Article 1, subsection l) in question) and that existed just as it was taken into account at the moment of issuing the act. Its content is lawful, possible, clear, and precise, since it fundamentally stipulates that advertising services (servicios publicitarios) provided through the press, understood in both \"written and digital\" format, are taxed with the IGSV, in accordance with an evolutionary interpretation of what subsection l) of Article 1 of the LIGSV stipulates, through which advertising services (servicios publicitarios) provided through radio, press, and television are taxed. This decision is substantially in conformity with the legal system and corresponds to the reason for the act and is proportionate to the legal purpose, which translates into the public interest underlying that each inhabitant contributes to public burdens, as long as they realize the taxable event (hecho generador) and according to their ability to pay (capacidad contributiva), and the interest underlying an efficient oversight and collection of taxes. It is also a duly reasoned decision, in the terms required by numeral 136 of the LGAP. For the foregoing, the Tribunal endorses the interpretation made by the DGT because we consider it responds not only to the literal text of the norm but also to the legislator's purpose and the context in effect at the time of applying it, without it being evident that it invades aspects reserved to the law, such as the creation or modification of taxes or elements of the tax obligation, which, we insist, were established by the legislator in numeral 1, subsection l) of the LIGSV. A similar conclusion is reached in relation to the legality of resolutions DT-10V-081-12 and Infrac. DT-10V-082-12, issued by the AT. These are acts issued by the competent body, with a certain and legitimate reason. What was ordered is lawful, corresponds to the reason, and is proportionate to the purpose, as was explained. It is also reasoned both directly and indirectly by referring to the institutional criterion that has already been validated. For all the foregoing reasons, we consider, in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code, numerals 10, 11, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, and 136 of the LGAP, ordinals 5, 6, 11, 31 of the CNPT, and canon 1 of the LGISV, the administrative conducts submitted for examination are substantially in conformity with the legal system, for which reason the claim aimed at ordering the State to return the sums paid, under protest, for IGSV, along with the interest accrued from the date of their payment until their effective return or deposit, is also unfounded. If it has been declared that the challenged conducts and the tax collection are valid, there is no cause legitimizing the requested return, and it must be rejected, as is indeed done.”" }