{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-151082", "citation": "Res. 00401-2014 Sala Primera de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Instituto Nacional de Seguros puede actuar como fiduciario en fideicomisos de obra pública", "title_en": "National Insurance Institute May Act as Trustee in Public Works Trusts", "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia declaró con lugar la demanda del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) y anuló el inciso b) del artículo 76 del Reglamento sobre Oferta Pública de Valores, que limitaba la función de fiduciario en fideicomisos de desarrollo de obra pública únicamente a bancos supervisados por la SUGEF y organismos financieros internacionales. La Sala determinó que esta restricción reglamentaria ignoraba las facultades del INS previstas en el artículo 9, inciso c), de la Ley 12, que le permite celebrar contratos de fideicomiso de cualquier índole. El Tribunal consideró que el INS no solo está habilitado para el negocio de seguros, sino que también tiene la obligación de diversificar sus inversiones, incluyendo la participación en el mercado de valores y fideicomisos de obra pública, y que la prohibición reglamentaria carecía de sustento técnico y vulneraba la libertad de competencia reconocida en el artículo 46 de la Constitución.", "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the National Insurance Institute (INS) and annulled subparagraph b) of Article 76 of the Regulation on Public Offering of Securities, which restricted the role of trustee in public works development trusts exclusively to banks supervised by SUGEF and international financial organizations. The Chamber determined that this regulatory restriction ignored the powers of the INS under Article 9(c) of Law 12, which allows it to enter into trust contracts of any kind. The Court considered that the INS is not only authorized for the insurance business but also has the obligation to diversify its investments, including participation in the securities market and public works trusts, and that the regulatory ban lacked technical basis and violated the freedom of competition recognized in Article 46 of the Constitution.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte", "date": "2014", "year": "2014", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "fideicomiso", "fiduciario", "obra pública", "mercado de valores", "casación", "nulidad", "interpretación finalista" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 9", "law": "Ley 12" }, { "article": "Art. 3", "law": "Ley 7732" }, { "article": "Art. 116", "law": "Ley 1644" }, { "article": "Art. 13", "law": "Ley 8653" }, { "article": "Art. 14", "law": "Ley 8653" } ], "keywords_es": [ "INS", "fideicomiso", "obra pública", "fiduciario", "mercado de valores", "Conassif", "Reforma reglamento", "casación", "nulidad reglamento", "ley 12", "Sugeval", "competencia" ], "keywords_en": [ "INS", "trust", "public works", "trustee", "securities market", "Conassif", "regulation reform", "cassation", "nullity of regulation", "law 12", "Sugeval", "competition" ], "excerpt_es": "V.- Del análisis del canon 9 de la Ley no. 12, se desprende con claridad que existen una serie de contratos, exceptuados de los procedimientos ordinarios de contratación, entre los cuales se encuentran los de fideicomiso de cualquier índole cuando el INS y sus sociedades anónimas funjan tanto como fideicomitente, fiduciario o fideicomisario. En criterio de esta Sala, la norma aludida pretende facilitarle al Instituto, la realización de negocios jurídicos indispensables para la eficiente gestión de sus tareas y dotarlo de mecanismos ágiles de contratación, que le permita competir en un mercado abierto y moderno. El precepto incorpora una serie de supuestos, cuya observancia requiere una interpretación finalista, que busque principalmente la proporcionalidad entre los actos y sus consecuencias. El Tribunal excluye al Instituto de poder participar en el mercado de fideicomisos de obra pública, cuando establece que esta norma no es posible interpretarla aisladamente, sino en el contexto en el que se encuentra. Concluye que solo es posible esa participación, si se encuentra relacionada con la actividad aseguradora y reaseguradora. No es cuestionable que la actividad principal del INS es el del mercado de los seguros; sin embargo, su participación no se limita exclusivamente a ese tipo de negocios.\n\nVII.- Por lo expuesto, lo pertinente será declarar con lugar el recurso del apoderado general judicial del INS, en consecuencia, se anulará la sentencia del Tribunal. Resolviendo por el fondo, se rechaza la defensa de falta de derecho interpuesta por la parte demandada y se declarará con lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. De este modo, lo procedente es decretar la nulidad del artículo 76 inciso b) del Reglamento mencionado, por resultar disconforme al ordenamiento jurídico, al suprimir la posibilidad de que el INS participe en los contratos de fideicomiso de obra pública en la posición de fiduciario.", "excerpt_en": "V.- From the analysis of Article 9 of Law No. 12, it is clear that there are a series of contracts exempted from ordinary procurement procedures, including trust contracts of any kind when the INS and its corporations act as settlor, trustee, or beneficiary. In the opinion of this Chamber, the provision seeks to facilitate the Institute in carrying out legal transactions essential for the efficient management of its tasks and to provide it with agile contracting mechanisms that allow it to compete in an open and modern market. The provision incorporates a series of assumptions, the observance of which requires a purposive interpretation, seeking mainly proportionality between acts and their consequences. The lower court excluded the Institute from participating in the public works trust market, holding that this provision cannot be interpreted in isolation but rather in its context. It concluded that such participation is only possible if it is related to insurance and reinsurance activity. It is not disputed that the main activity of the INS is the insurance market; however, its participation is not limited exclusively to that type of business.\n\nVII.- For the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the appeal of the INS's general legal representative, consequently annulling the lower court's judgment. Deciding on the merits, the defense of lack of standing raised by the defendant is rejected, and the claim is upheld in its entirety. Thus, it is proper to decree the nullity of subparagraph b) of Article 76 of the aforementioned Regulation, as it is contrary to the legal system by eliminating the possibility of the INS participating in public works trust contracts as trustee.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Granted", "label_es": "Declarado con lugar", "summary_en": "Subparagraph b) of Article 76 of the Regulation on Public Offering of Securities was annulled, allowing the INS to participate as trustee in public works trusts.", "summary_es": "Se anuló el inciso b) del artículo 76 del Reglamento sobre Oferta Pública de Valores, permitiendo al INS participar como fiduciario en fideicomisos de obra pública." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "In the opinion of this Chamber, the provision seeks to facilitate the Institute in carrying out legal transactions essential for the efficient management of its tasks and to provide it with agile contracting mechanisms that allow it to compete in an open and modern market.", "quote_es": "En criterio de esta Sala, la norma aludida pretende facilitarle al Instituto, la realización de negocios jurídicos indispensables para la eficiente gestión de sus tareas y dotarlo de mecanismos ágiles de contratación, que le permita competir en un mercado abierto y moderno." }, { "context": "Considerando V", "quote_en": "A literal interpretation of the provisions of the National Insurance Institute Law, which defines its competence only to carry out insurance and reinsurance activities as the judges state, would harm the economic interests of the INS and those of the Administration itself.", "quote_es": "Una interpretación literal de las normas de la Ley del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, que definan su competencia solamente para desarrollar la actividad aseguradora y reaseguradora como lo exponen los jueces, atentaría contra los intereses económicos del INS y los de la propia Administración." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-33488", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 12 Art. 9" }, { "target_id": "norm-29302", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7732 Art. 3" }, { "target_id": "norm-9925", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 1644 Art. 116" }, { "target_id": "norm-63749", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 8653 Art. 13" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-151082", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-29302", "norm_num": "7732", "norm_name": "Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "17/12/1997" }, { "doc_id": "norm-63749", "norm_num": "8653", "norm_name": "Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "22/07/2008" }, { "doc_id": "norm-9925", "norm_num": "1644", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "26/09/1953" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“IV.- En resumen, el INS aduce la\r\nnulidad del canon 76 inciso b) del Reglamento sobre Oferta Pública de Valores\r\nvigente, el cual fue introducido por Conassif, en la\r\nsesión número 881-2010, celebrada el 17 de setiembre\r\nde 2010 (reforma publicada en La Gaceta no. 198 del 12 de octubre de 2010).\r\nCuestiona, se le haya excluido como posible fiduciario en los contratos de obra\r\npública, sin analizar que su Ley de Creación (Ley no. 12) y la Ley Reguladora del\r\nMercado de Seguros, le permiten participar en el mercado financiero mediante la\r\ninserción en otras actividades económicas y no solamente en el campo de los\r\nseguros. Específicamente, deja ver que a los bancos se les atribuya conocimiento,\r\ncapacidad, experiencia y el respaldo económico para llevar a cabo esos \r\nnegocios, cuando en realidad, arguye, el Instituto posee las mismas\r\ncaracterísticas y condiciones. En este entendido, refiere, fueron preteridas\r\npor el Tribunal, las conversaciones que se dieron en el seno del Consejo, a\r\nraíz de la reforma del Reglamento. Al realizar esa modificación, dice, el BCCR a través de sus órganos desconcentrados, los excluyó\r\ndel mercado ilegalmente, en quebranto del principio de interdicción de la\r\narbitrariedad y de razonabilidad. Esta Sala advierte,\r\nen el proceso, en ningún momento se han cuestionado las facultades\r\nreglamentarias que dispone el Banco Central a través de sus órganos, en este\r\ncaso Conassif, por lo que cualquier análisis al\r\nrespecto resulta innecesario. Ahora bien, independientemente del orden como se\r\nhayan presentado los reparos, resulta de capital importancia para el análisis\r\ndel recurso y de lo que más adelante se dirá, la transcripción\r\nparcial del numeral 9 inciso c) de la Ley no. 12, puesto que es el precepto\r\nsobre el cual fundamenta sus reparos el casacionista.\r\nEse artículo en lo que interesa establece: “Contrataciones exceptuadas de\r\nlos procedimientos ordinarios de contratación/ Por tratarse de\r\nactividades indispensables para la eficiente realización de su actividad\r\nordinaria y para permitir la efectiva competencia del INS\r\nen el mercado abierto y sin perjuicio de lo establecido en los artículos 2 y 2\r\nbis de la Ley N.º\r\n7494, Contratación administrativa, de 2 de mayo de 1995, y sus reformas, quedan\r\nexcluidos de los procedimientos ordinarios de concurso establecidos en dicha\r\nLey, los siguientes tipos de contrataciones que realice tanto el INS como sus sociedades anónimas sujetas al régimen de\r\ncontratación de dicha Ley: … c) Contratos de fideicomiso de cualquier índole\r\ncuando funja tanto como fideicomitente, fiduciario o fideicomisario…”. En\r\ntérminos generales, este es el artículo que el recurrente aduce para justificar\r\nsu competencia en el mercado financiero, especialmente para incursionar en el\r\nmercado de construcción de obra pública y otros, mediante la figura jurídica y\r\neconómica del fideicomiso. Para el Tribunal “Esta norma constituye una\r\ndispensa del trámite de procedimientos de concurso que establece la Ley de\r\nContratación Administrativa, excepción que se permite tanto al INS como a sus sociedades anónimas, en lo que efectivamente\r\nse incluye la posibilidad de que el INS realice\r\ncontratos de fideicomiso de cualquier índole cuando funja como fideicomitente,\r\nfiduciario o fideicomisario. Sin embargo, hay que rescatar que las excepciones\r\nque se plantean en este artículo lo son para que el INS\r\nrealice \"actividades indispensables para la eficiente realización de su\r\nactividad ordinaria y permitir la efectiva competencia del INS\r\nen el mercado abierto\" según dice el encabezado de la misma norma... En\r\nesa línea, a la entidad actora se le ha encomendado una función singular, la\r\ncual se limita al campo del aseguramiento, dentro del que… se incluye la\r\nadministración de los seguros comerciales, del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo y\r\ndel Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores, todo con plena garantía del\r\nEstado… Es decir, existe una habilitación expresa hecha al INS para firmar fideicomisos, lo que no puede ser\r\ndesvirtuado, pero esta herramienta para firmar contratos (sea el fideicomiso)\r\núnicamente puede ser utilizada en el tanto el INS lo\r\nrequiera para su actividad ordinaria, -la que ya se definió supra-,\r\ny además de ello, como una forma de generarle un abanico más amplio de formas\r\nde hacer negocios y de competir como entidad aseguradora, dado el rompimiento\r\ndel monopolio en dicha materia… el INS no\r\npuede realizar actividades distintas a las que le han sido encomendadas por vía\r\nlegal y que, tratándose de contratos de fideicomiso de cualquier índole (inciso\r\nc del artículo 9º de la Ley número 12), éstos no pueden ser para otro fin que\r\nno sea para la eficiente realización de la actividad ordinaria, situación que\r\nno podría variarse -ni para permitir o restringir- por medio de un reglamento,\r\npuesto que es la ley la que le fija de previo esta limitante. Ello sin\r\nperjuicio de que por ley eventualmente se le encomienden competencias\r\nadicionales, que amplíen su ámbito de acción…” (lo\r\nresaltado es del original a folios 77 y 78).\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- Del análisis del\r\ncanon 9 de la Ley no. 12, se desprende con claridad que existen una serie de\r\ncontratos, exceptuados de los procedimientos ordinarios de contratación, entre\r\nlos cuales se encuentran los de fideicomiso de cualquier índole cuando el INS y sus sociedades anónimas funjan tanto como\r\nfideicomitente, fiduciario o fideicomisario. En criterio de esta Sala, la norma\r\naludida pretende facilitarle al Instituto, la realización de negocios jurídicos\r\nindispensables para la eficiente gestión de sus tareas y dotarlo de mecanismos\r\nágiles de contratación, que le permita competir en un mercado abierto y\r\nmoderno. El precepto incorpora una serie de supuestos, cuya observancia\r\nrequiere una interpretación finalista, que busque principalmente la\r\nproporcionalidad entre los actos y sus consecuencias. El Tribunal excluye al\r\nInstituto de poder participar en el mercado de fideicomisos de obra pública,\r\ncuando establece que esta norma no es posible interpretarla aisladamente, sino\r\nen el contexto en el que se encuentra. Concluye que solo es posible esa\r\nparticipación, si se encuentra relacionada con la actividad aseguradora y reaseguradora. No es cuestionable que la actividad\r\nprincipal del INS es el del mercado de los seguros;\r\nsin embargo, su participación no se limita exclusivamente a ese tipo de\r\nnegocios. Una interpretación literal de las normas de la Ley del Instituto\r\nNacional de Seguros, que definan su competencia solamente para desarrollar la\r\nactividad aseguradora y reaseguradora como lo exponen\r\nlos jueces, atentaría contra los intereses económicos del INS\r\ny los de la\r\n propia Administración, pues no se les permitiría utilizar\r\nesquemas alternativos de financiamiento y ejecución para el desarrollo de obra\r\npública. En el precepto 9 de la Ley 12, se infiere que los contratos de\r\nfideicomiso de cualquier índole cuando el INS funja\r\ntanto como fideicomitente, fiduciario o fideicomisario, debían quedar excluidos\r\nde los procedimientos ordinarios de concurso establecidos en la Ley, porque\r\nello le iba a permitir la efectiva participación en un mercado abierto, empero,\r\nno se puede caer en la tesis que esa participación se limita solo a la\r\nactividad de seguros. Se insiste, el objetivo principal de la norma, es que el INS y sus empresas no tuvieran inconvenientes u obstáculos\r\nen su labor dentro del terreno de los seguros, pero para ello, resulta\r\nfundamental que también puedan acudir a otros mercados de inversión de su\r\ncapital, pues ello depararía en la generación de mayor rentabilidad para la\r\ninstitución y por ende, para el desarrollo de sus negocios. En el sub exámine, el problema surge\r\nporque el artículo 76 inciso b) del Reglamento sobre Oferta Pública de Valores,\r\nen criterio del INS, no le permite participar como\r\nfiduciario en fideicomisos de desarrollo de obra pública. La norma cuestionada\r\ndispone lo siguiente: “Partes del fideicomiso de desarrollo de obra\r\npública. / Las partes del fideicomiso de desarrollo de obra pública\r\nse deben ajustar a los siguientes lineamientos:… b. El fiduciario: Pueden\r\nconstituirse como fiduciarios los bancos sujetos a la supervisión de la SUGEF, y los organismos financieros internacionales con\r\nparticipación del Estado costarricense…”. Para el recurrente, en la\r\ndiscusión de la adición del artículo cuestionado, el Consejo no solo debía\r\nanalizar la estructura y solidez de los Bancos para participar en este mercado\r\nparticular, sino también la de otras instituciones del Estado que bien podrían\r\nintervenir como fiduciarios. Para esta Sala, lleva razón el apoderado del\r\nInstituto, por las razones que de seguido se exponen. En primer lugar,\r\nel análisis debe realizarse siempre ajustado a lo establecido en el cardinal 9\r\nde la Ley 12. Es esa norma legal, como se ha indicado, la que en principio\r\nposibilita al Instituto, suscribir “Contratos de fideicomiso de\r\ncualquier índole cuando funja tanto como fideicomitente, fiduciario o\r\nfideicomisario…”. En segundo lugar, no existen fundamentos técnicos\r\nni legales que impidan a una entidad como el INS, su\r\nparticipación en estos negocios. En este sentido, recuérdese, el primer\r\nescollo que se mencionó por parte de la autoridades del Consejo, fue la falta\r\nde regulación y de valoración de riesgos respecto este tipo de instituciones,\r\nen claro perjuicio del inversionista. No obstante, en juicio de este órgano decisor, esa no era una razón de peso para prohibirle la\r\nparticipación al INS. Al tenor del ordinal 3 de la Ley Reguladora del\r\nMercado de Valores, Ley 7732, la Sugeval es la\r\nencargada de velar por la transparencia de los mercados de valores, la\r\nformación correcta de los precios en ellos, la protección de los inversionistas\r\ny la difusión de la información necesaria para asegurar la consecución de estos\r\nfines. Por ello, se le dotó de potestades de regulación, supervisión y\r\nfiscalización de los mercados de valores, la actividad de las personas físicas\r\no jurídicas que intervengan directa o indirectamente en ellos y los actos o\r\ncontratos relacionados con ellos, según lo dispuesto en el mencionado texto\r\nlegislativo. Ello dice, que ante la falta de regulación sobre la gestión del\r\nriesgo de titularización y de fideicomisos respecto de la actividad fiduciaria\r\nde instituciones del Estado, la Superintendencia debía implementar la normativa\r\nprudencial al efecto, tal y como lo dispone la Ley 7732. El otro factor\r\nmencionado en su momento por el Consejo para limitar el acceso en condición de\r\nfiduciarios a otras entidades públicas, fue que los Bancos disponen de solidez\r\ny experiencia en este tipo de convenios. Esto no es cuestionable, incluso así\r\nse desprende de la disposición 116 de la Ley Orgánica del\r\nSistema Bancario Nacional, Ley 1644, al establecer que entre las comisiones de\r\nconfianza que pueden efectuar los bancos, se encuentra la de fideicomiso,\r\nconforme a lo dispuesto en el Código de Comercio y las demás normas legales y\r\nreglamentarias aplicables (inciso 7). Pero como bien lo establece el casacionista, tanto el Instituto como otras entidades se\r\nencuentran en iguales facultades para participar en este tipo de negocios, no\r\nsolo porque en teoría, disponen de capital suficiente para ello, sino también,\r\nporque no existe sustento técnico que indique lo contrario (cardinales 15 y 16 LGAP). En tercer lugar, es conveniente indicar, que en un\r\nmarco de libre competencia, no encuentra asidero el hecho de que solo las\r\nentidades bancarias se les permita ser fiduciarias en fideicomisos de\r\ndesarrollo de obra pública, puesto que ello puede influir negativamente en el\r\navance de la infraestructura nacional, ya que se dejaría de lado entidades con\r\ngrandes posibilidades de inversión, que al final de cuentas con las condiciones\r\nque ofrezcan, no solo beneficiarían a la propia Administración\r\ncontratante sino también al inversionista. En suma, la Superintendencia debe\r\nverificar los requerimientos mínimos de gestión de riesgos que deben observar\r\nentidades distintas a las Bancarias y según participen en contratos de fideicomisos\r\no en procesos de titularización, de conformidad con el papel que desempeñen\r\nesas organizaciones en el mercado. Asimismo, no existe fundamento técnico que\r\nimpida al INS participar en este tipo de convenios.\r\nTodo lo cual iría en contra de la libertad de la competencia que se desprende\r\ndel canon 46 de la\r\n Carta Magna. Así las cosas, la decisión que se adoptara en el\r\nConsejo, debió ser respaldada: 1. En que el negocio de fideicomiso en\r\ntérminos generales es parte de la actividad ordinaria de los bancos comerciales,\r\npero también pueden participar otras entidades que manejen liquidez suficiente\r\npara ello; 2. En el análisis de la normativa legal y reglamentaria que\r\nles brinde la posibilidad de realizar esos convenios; 3. La\r\nimplementación de las directrices o reglamentaciones que supervisen los riesgos\r\nasociados a la actividad; y, 4. La experiencia y solidez de dichas\r\nentidades en el mercado. Aspectos, que se insiste, involucran tanto a los\r\nBancos Comerciales como a las instituciones del Estado costarricense como es el\r\ncaso del INS.\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- De igual modo,\r\nel recurrente aduce lesionadas por el Tribunal, varias normas sustantivas que\r\nse orientan a permitir que el Instituto invierta en otros mercados como el de\r\nvalores, a través del fideicomiso de obras públicas o de otro tipo de negocios.\r\nEsta Sala debe señalar, que efectivamente, entre la normativa señalada por el casacionista y otros preceptos, se deduce que la actividad\r\ndel INS no debe ser limitada al mercado de seguros,\r\nal punto de impedirle participar como fiduciario en fideicomisos de obra\r\npública. En este análisis legal, el artículo 1 de la Ley 12 del INS, dice: “….estará facultado para que realice todas\r\nlas acciones técnicas, comerciales y financieras requeridas, de conformidad con\r\nlas mejores prácticas del negocio… El INS queda\r\nfacultado para constituir o adquirir participaciones de capital en sociedades\r\nanónimas, sociedades comerciales, sucursales, agencias o cualquier otro ente\r\ncomercial de naturaleza similar, ninguno de los cuales contará con la garantía\r\nindicada en el párrafo anterior para los siguientes propósitos: a)\r\nEjercer las actividades que le han sido encomendadas por ley dentro del\r\npaís. Dichas actividades comprenden las de carácter financiero,\r\notorgamiento de créditos, las de prestación de servicios de salud y las propias\r\ndel Cuerpo de Bomberos, el suministro de prestaciones médicas y la venta de\r\nbienes adquiridos por el INS en razón de sus\r\nactividades…”. En este predicado, corresponderá a la Junta Directiva\r\nvelar por que las finanzas de la Institución y las de sus empresas sean sanas,\r\nasí como aprobar los planes de desarrollo, la política general de inversiones\r\nde corto, mediano y largo plazo, así como los planes de endeudamiento (ordinal\r\n5 Inciso a) puntos 2 y 4 de la Ley 12). Por su lado, el ordinal 55 de la Ley Reguladora del\r\nMercado de Valores, establece que el INS así como los\r\nbancos estatales pueden formar sociedades para participar en las actividades de\r\nlos puestos de bolsa, por lo que a través de esta figura, también podría el\r\nInstituto participar indirectamente en fideicomisos de obra pública en general\r\ny no solo relacionados con la actividad de seguros, sobre todo si esos\r\nconvenios son autorizadas por la Superintendencia como lo dispone el numeral 56\r\ninciso f) ibídem. Aunado a lo anterior, también hay\r\nque tener presente que la\r\n Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, exige a las entidades\r\naseguradoras y reaseguradoras que constituyan y\r\nmantengan, en todo momento, provisiones técnicas suficientes para garantizar el\r\ncumplimiento de sus obligaciones asociadas a sus contratos y los demás riesgos\r\nque puedan afectar el desarrollo del negocio (artículo 13). La mejor forma de\r\nlograrlo, en consideración de esta Sala, es manteniendo inversiones en activos\r\nelegibles, que respalden las provisiones técnicas, las reservas y el\r\nrequerimiento de capital, las cuales no podrán ser inferiores al capital mínimo\r\n(doctrina del precepto 14 ibídem). En virtud de lo\r\nanterior, lleva razón el apoderado general judicial del INS,\r\nal estimar que del análisis normativo indicado, se desprende que el Instituto\r\nno solo se encuentra facultado para ejercer la actividad aseguradora, sino que\r\ntiene la obligación de invertir sus provisiones técnicas, capital y utilidades\r\nasí como realizar actividad financiera y otorgar créditos, como una forma de\r\ndiversificar los riesgos y sus portafolios de negocios, sea otorgándole mayor\r\nrentabilidad de sus actividades. Por todas las razones expuestas, es que el\r\nartículo 76 inciso b) del Reglamento Sobre Oferta Pública de Valores, lesiona\r\nel canon 9 inciso c) de la Ley del INS, pues de forma\r\ntácita, suprime la posibilidad de participar como fiduciario en fideicomisos de\r\ndesarrollo de obra pública, razón por la cual, el agravio achacado al Tribunal\r\npor violación directa de la ley debe ser acogido.\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- Por lo expuesto, lo pertinente será declarar con\r\nlugar el recurso del apoderado general judicial del INS,\r\nen consecuencia, se anulará la sentencia del Tribunal. Resolviendo por el\r\nfondo, se rechaza la defensa de falta de derecho interpuesta por la parte demandada\r\ny se declarará con lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. De este modo, lo\r\nprocedente es decretar la nulidad del artículo 76 inciso b) del Reglamento\r\nmencionado, por resultar disconforme al ordenamiento jurídico, al suprimir la\r\nposibilidad de que el INS participe en los contratos\r\nde fideicomiso de obra pública en la posición de fiduciario. Esta declaratoria\r\ntendrá efectos retroactivos al momento de su promulgación. En aplicación del\r\ncanon 193 del CPCA, se impondrá a la demandada, el\r\npago de las costas procesales y personales de este proceso, así como sus\r\nrespectivos intereses.”", "body_en_text": "“IV.- In summary, the INS alleges the nullity of canon 76, subsection b) of the current Reglamento sobre Oferta Pública de Valores, which was introduced by Conassif, in session number 881-2010, held on September 17, 2010 (reform published in La Gaceta no. 198 of October 12, 2010). It challenges that it has been excluded as a possible trustee (fiduciario) in public works contracts, without analyzing that its Creation Law (Ley no. 12) and the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros allow it to participate in the financial market through insertion in other economic activities and not only in the field of insurance. Specifically, it implies that banks are attributed knowledge, capacity, experience, and the economic backing to carry out those businesses, when in reality, it argues, the Institute possesses the same characteristics and conditions. In this understanding, it refers, the conversations that took place within the Council, as a result of the reform of the Reglamento, were disregarded by the Tribunal. By making that modification, it says, the BCCR through its deconcentrated organs excluded them from the market illegally, in violation of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness and reasonableness. This Chamber warns, in the process, at no time have the regulatory powers available to the Central Bank through its organs, in this case Conassif, been questioned, so any analysis in that regard is unnecessary. Now, regardless of the order in which the objections were presented, the partial transcription of numeral 9, subsection c) of Ley no. 12 is of capital importance for the analysis of the appeal and of what will be said later, since it is the precept on which the cassation appellant (casacionista) bases its objections. That article, as relevant, establishes: “Contracts exempted from ordinary contracting procedures/ Because they involve activities indispensable for the efficient realization of its ordinary activity and to allow the effective competition of the INS in the open market and without prejudice to the provisions of articles 2 and 2 bis of Ley N.º 7494, Contratación administrativa, of May 2, 1995, and its reforms, the following types of contracts executed by both the INS and its corporations (sociedades anónimas) subject to the contracting regime of said Law are excluded from the ordinary bidding procedures established in said Law: … c) Trust (fideicomiso) contracts of any kind when it acts as settlor (fideicomitente), trustee (fiduciario), or beneficiary (fideicomisario)…”. In general terms, this is the article that the appellant cites to justify its competence in the financial market, especially to venture into the public works construction market and others, through the legal and economic figure of the trust. For the Tribunal “This norm constitutes a waiver of the bidding procedure process established by the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, an exception that is permitted to both the INS and its corporations, in which the possibility for the INS to execute trust contracts of any kind when it acts as settlor, trustee, or beneficiary is effectively included. However, it must be noted that the exceptions set forth in this article are for the INS to carry out \"activities indispensable for the efficient realization of its ordinary activity and to allow the effective competition of the INS in the open market\" as stated in the heading of the same norm... Along that line, the plaintiff entity has been entrusted with a singular function, which is limited to the field of insurance, within which… is included the administration of commercial insurance, the Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo, and the Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores, all with the full guarantee of the State… That is, there is an express authorization given to the INS to sign trusts, which cannot be distorted, but this tool for signing contracts (i.e., the trust) can only be used insofar as the INS requires it for its ordinary activity, -which was already defined supra-, and in addition to that, as a way to generate a broader range of ways to do business and to compete as an insurance entity, given the breaking of the monopoly in that matter… the INS cannot carry out activities different from those that have been entrusted to it by law and that, in the case of trust contracts of any kind (subsection c of Article 9 of Ley número 12), these cannot be for any purpose other than the efficient realization of the ordinary activity, a situation that could not be varied -neither to permit nor restrict- by means of a regulation, since it is the law that sets this limitation beforehand. This is without prejudice to the fact that by law it may eventually be entrusted with additional competencies, which expand its scope of action…” (the highlights are from the original at folios 77 and 78).\n\nV.- From the analysis of canon 9 of Ley no. 12, it is clearly evident that there are a series of contracts, exempted from ordinary contracting procedures, among which are those of trust of any kind when the INS and its corporations act as settlor, trustee, or beneficiary.\n\nIn the opinion of this Chamber, the cited rule aims to facilitate the Institute's execution of legal transactions (negocios jurídicos) essential for the efficient management of its tasks and to provide it with agile contracting mechanisms, allowing it to compete in an open and modern market. The provision incorporates a series of scenarios, the observance of which requires a purposive interpretation (interpretación finalista) that primarily seeks proportionality between the acts and their consequences. The lower court (Tribunal) excludes the Institute from participating in the public works trust (fideicomisos de obra pública) market, when it establishes that this rule cannot be interpreted in isolation, but rather in the context in which it is found. It concludes that such participation is only possible if it is related to insurance and reinsurance activity. It is not questionable that the main activity of the INS is the insurance market; however, its participation is not limited exclusively to that type of business. A literal interpretation of the rules of the Law of the National Insurance Institute (Ley del Instituto Nacional de Seguros), which define its competence solely for developing insurance and reinsurance activity as argued by the judges, would undermine the economic interests of the INS and those of the Administration itself, as they would not be allowed to use alternative financing and execution schemes for the development of public works. From provision 9 of Law 12, it is inferred that trust agreements of any kind when the INS acts as trustor (fideicomitente), trustee (fiduciario), or beneficiary (fideicomisario), should be excluded from the ordinary competitive bidding procedures established in the Law, because this would allow it effective participation in an open market; however, one cannot fall into the thesis that this participation is limited only to the insurance activity. It is reiterated that the main objective of the rule is that the INS and its companies not have any inconveniences or obstacles in their work within the field of insurance, but for this, it is fundamental that they can also access other markets for investing their capital, as this would result in generating greater profitability for the institution and, therefore, for the development of its businesses. In the case under review (sub exámine), the problem arises because article 76, subsection b) of the Regulation on Public Securities Offering (Reglamento sobre Oferta Pública de Valores), in the opinion of the INS, does not allow it to participate as a trustee in public works development trusts. The challenged rule provides the following: “Parties to the public works development trust. / The parties to the public works development trust must adhere to the following guidelines:… b. The trustee: Banks subject to the supervision of SUGEF, and international financial organizations with participation of the Costa Rican State may be constituted as trustees…”. For the appellant, in the discussion of the addition of the challenged article, the Council (Consejo) had to analyze not only the structure and solidity of the Banks to participate in this particular market, but also that of other State institutions that could well intervene as trustees. For this Chamber, the Institute's legal representative is correct, for the reasons set forth below. First, the analysis must always be conducted in accordance with the provisions of cardinal 9 of Law 12. It is that legal norm, as has been indicated, that in principle enables the Institute to enter into “Trust agreements of any kind when it acts as trustor, trustee, or beneficiary…”. Second, there are no technical or legal grounds that prevent an entity such as the INS from participating in these businesses. In this regard, it should be remembered that the first obstacle mentioned by the Council authorities was the lack of regulation and risk assessment regarding this type of institution, in clear detriment to the investor. However, in the judgment of this deciding body (órgano decisor), that was not a compelling reason to prohibit the INS's participation. Under the terms of ordinal 3 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores), Law 7732, Sugeval is responsible for ensuring the transparency of the securities markets, the correct formation of prices therein, the protection of investors, and the dissemination of information necessary to ensure the achievement of these ends. Therefore, it was endowed with powers of regulation, supervision, and oversight of the securities markets, the activity of individuals or legal entities that intervene directly or indirectly in them, and the acts or contracts related to them, as provided in the aforementioned legislative text. This means that in the absence of regulation on the risk management of securitization (titularización) and trusts regarding the fiduciary activity of State institutions, the Superintendency (Superintendencia) had to implement the corresponding prudential regulations, as provided by Law 7732. The other factor mentioned at the time by the Council to limit access as trustees to other public entities was that the Banks have solidity and experience in this type of agreement. This is not questionable, and it is even evident from provision 116 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional), Law 1644, which establishes that among the trust commissions that banks can carry out is that of trust (fideicomiso), according to the provisions of the Commercial Code and other applicable legal and regulatory rules (subsection 7). But as the appellant (casacionista) correctly states, both the Institute and other entities are equally empowered to participate in this type of business, not only because, in theory, they have sufficient capital for it, but also because there is no technical support indicating otherwise (cardinals 15 and 16 LGAP). Third, it is appropriate to indicate that in a framework of free competition, the fact that only banking entities are allowed to be trustees in public works development trusts finds no basis, as this could negatively influence the advancement of national infrastructure, since entities with great investment possibilities would be sidelined, which in the end, with the conditions they offer, would benefit not only the contracting Administration itself but also the investor. In summary, the Superintendency must verify the minimum risk management requirements that entities other than Banks must observe depending on their participation in trust agreements or securitization processes, in accordance with the role those organizations play in the market. Likewise, there is no technical basis that prevents the INS from participating in this type of agreement. All of which would go against the freedom of competition derived from canon 46 of the Magna Carta. Thus, the decision adopted by the Council should have been supported by: 1. That the trust business in general terms is part of the ordinary activity of commercial banks, but other entities that manage sufficient liquidity can also participate; 2. The analysis of the legal and regulatory framework that provides them the possibility of executing these agreements; 3. The implementation of guidelines or regulations that supervise the risks associated with the activity; and, 4. The experience and solidity of said entities in the market. Aspects which, it is reiterated, involve both Commercial Banks and Costa Rican State institutions, as is the case of the INS.\n\nVI.- Similarly, the appellant alleges that the lower court violated several substantive rules aimed at allowing the Institute to invest in other markets, such as the securities market, through public works trusts or other types of businesses. This Chamber must point out that, indeed, from the regulations cited by the appellant (casacionista) and other provisions, it is deduced that the activity of the INS should not be limited to the insurance market, to the point of preventing it from participating as a trustee in public works trusts. In this legal analysis, article 1 of Law 12 of the INS states: “…it shall be empowered to carry out all technical, commercial, and financial actions required, in accordance with the best business practices… The INS is empowered to constitute or acquire equity participations in corporations (sociedades anónimas), commercial companies, branches, agencies, or any other commercial entity of a similar nature, none of which shall have the guarantee indicated in the previous paragraph, for the following purposes: a) To exercise the activities entrusted to it by law within the country. Such activities include those of a financial nature, granting of credits, the provision of health services and those specific to the Fire Department (Cuerpo de Bomberos), the supply of medical benefits, and the sale of goods acquired by the INS by reason of its activities…”. In this regard, it will be the responsibility of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) to ensure that the finances of the Institution and those of its companies are sound, as well as to approve development plans, the general short, medium, and long-term investment policy, as well as indebtedness plans (ordinal 5, Subsection a), points 2 and 4 of Law 12). For its part, ordinal 55 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law establishes that the INS, as well as state banks, may form companies to participate in the activities of brokerage houses (puestos de bolsa), so through this figure, the Institute could also indirectly participate in general public works trusts and not only those related to the insurance activity, especially if those agreements are authorized by the Superintendency as provided by numeral 56, subsection f) ibidem. In addition to the foregoing, it must also be borne in mind that the Insurance Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros) requires insurance and reinsurance entities to constitute and maintain, at all times, sufficient technical provisions to guarantee the fulfillment of their obligations associated with their contracts and other risks that may affect business development (article 13). The best way to achieve this, in the consideration of this Chamber, is by maintaining investments in eligible assets that back the technical provisions, reserves, and the capital requirement, which may not be less than the minimum capital (doctrine of provision 14 ibidem). By virtue of the foregoing, the judicial general representative (apoderado general judicial) of the INS is correct in considering that from the indicated normative analysis, it is clear that the Institute is not only empowered to carry out insurance activity, but also has the obligation to invest its technical provisions, capital, and profits, as well as to carry out financial activity and grant credits, as a way of diversifying risks and its business portfolios, that is, granting greater profitability to its activities. For all the reasons stated, article 76, subsection b) of the Regulation on Public Securities Offering violates canon 9, subsection c) of the Law of the INS, since it tacitly eliminates the possibility of participating as a trustee in public works development trusts, which is why the grievance attributed to the lower court for direct violation of the law must be upheld.\n\nVII.- Based on the foregoing, the pertinent course is to grant the appeal (recurso) of the judicial general representative of the INS; consequently, the judgment of the lower court will be annulled. Deciding on the merits, the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by the defendant is rejected, and the lawsuit will be granted in all its aspects. Thus, the appropriate action is to decree the nullity of article 76, subsection b) of the mentioned Regulation, as it is contrary to the legal system by eliminating the possibility of the INS participating in public works trust agreements in the position of trustee. This declaration will have retroactive effects to the moment of its promulgation. In application of canon 193 of the CPCA, the defendant shall be ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) of this process, as well as their respective interest.\n\nNow, regardless of the order in which the objections were presented, a partial transcription of subsection 9(c) of Law No. 12 is of paramount importance for the analysis of the appeal and for what will be said later, since it is the precept upon which the appellant (casacionista) bases its objections.\nThat article, in the relevant part, establishes: “***Contracts exempted from ordinary procurement procedures*** */ As they involve activities indispensable for the efficient performance of its ordinary activity and to allow the effective competition of the INS in the open market, and without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 2 and 2 bis of Law No. 7494, Administrative Procurement (Contratación administrativa), of May 2, 1995, and its amendments, the following types of contracts carried out by the INS as well as its corporations (sociedades anónimas) subject to the procurement regime of said Law are excluded from the ordinary competitive bidding procedures established in said Law: … c) Trust contracts of any kind when acting as trustor (fideicomitente), trustee (fiduciario), or beneficiary (fideicomisario)…*”. In general terms, this is the article that the appellant invokes to justify its competence in the financial market, especially to enter the public works construction market and others, through the legal and economic figure of the trust. For the Tribunal, “*This norm constitutes a waiver from the competitive bidding procedure established by the Law of Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), an exception that is allowed to both the INS and its corporations, which effectively includes the possibility for the INS to enter into trust contracts of any kind when acting as trustor, trustee, or beneficiary. However, it must be noted that the exceptions set forth in this article are for the INS to carry out ‘activities indispensable for the efficient performance of its ordinary activity and to allow the effective competition of the INS in the open market’ as stated in the heading of the same norm... In this line, the plaintiff entity has been entrusted with a singular function, which is limited to the insurance field, within which… the administration of commercial insurance, Workers’ Compensation Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo), and Mandatory Automobile Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores) is included, all with the full guarantee of the State… That is, there is an express authorization given to the INS to sign trusts, which cannot be distorted, but this tool for signing contracts (i.e., the trust) can only be used insofar as the INS requires it for its ordinary activity—which has already been defined supra—and, in addition, as a way to generate a broader range of ways to do business and compete as an insurance entity, given the break-up of the monopoly in this matter… the INS cannot carry out activities different from those that have been entrusted to it by law and, in the case of trust contracts of any kind (subsection c of Article 9 of Law Number 12), these cannot be for any purpose other than for the efficient performance of the ordinary activity, a situation that could not be varied—neither to permit nor to restrict—by means of a regulation, since it is the law that previously sets this limitation for it. This without prejudice to additional powers that may eventually be entrusted to it by law, which would broaden its scope of action…*” (emphasis is from the original on folios 77 and 78).\n\n**V.-** From the analysis of article 9 of Law No. 12, it clearly emerges that there is a series of contracts exempted from ordinary procurement procedures, among which are trust contracts of any kind when the INS and its corporations act as trustor, trustee, or beneficiary. In the opinion of this Chamber, the aforementioned norm seeks to facilitate for the Institute the execution of legal transactions indispensable for the efficient management of its tasks and to provide it with agile procurement mechanisms that allow it to compete in an open and modern market. The precept incorporates a series of assumptions, the observance of which requires a teleological interpretation, primarily seeking proportionality between the acts and their consequences. The Tribunal excludes the Institute from being able to participate in the public works trust market, when it establishes that this norm cannot be interpreted in isolation, but rather in the context in which it is found. It concludes that such participation is only possible if it is related to the insurance and reinsurance activity. It is not questionable that the main activity of the INS is the insurance market; however, its participation is not limited exclusively to that type of business. A literal interpretation of the norms of the Law of the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), which define its competence only to develop the insurance and reinsurance activity as the judges state, would undermine the economic interests of the INS and those of the Administration itself, because they would not be allowed to use alternative financing and execution schemes for public works development. In precept 9 of Law 12, it is inferred that trust contracts of any kind when the INS acts as trustor, trustee, or beneficiary should be excluded from the ordinary competitive bidding procedures established in the Law, because this would allow it effective participation in an open market; however, one cannot fall into the thesis that this participation is limited only to the insurance activity. It is insisted, the main objective of the norm is that the INS and its companies would not have inconveniences or obstacles in their work within the insurance field, but for this, it is essential that they can also resort to other capital investment markets, because this would lead to the generation of greater profitability for the institution and, therefore, for the development of its business. In the sub examine, the problem arises because Article 76(b) of the Regulation on the Public Offering of Securities (Reglamento sobre Oferta Pública de Valores), in the opinion of the INS, does not allow it to participate as a trustee in public works development trusts. The questioned norm provides the following: “***Parties of the public works development trust. / *** *The parties of the public works development trust must conform to the following guidelines:… b. The trustee: Banks subject to the supervision of the SUGEF, and international financial organizations with participation of the Costa Rican State may be constituted as trustees*…”. For the appellant, in the discussion of the addition of the questioned article, the Council should not only analyze the structure and solidity of the Banks to participate in this particular market, but also that of other State institutions that could well intervene as trustees. For this Chamber, the legal representative of the Institute is correct, for the reasons set forth below. *First*, the analysis must always be carried out in accordance with the provisions of article 9 of Law 12. It is that legal norm, as has been indicated, that in principle enables the Institute to sign “*Trust contracts **of any kind*** * when acting as trustor, trustee, or beneficiary…*”. *Second*, there are no technical or legal grounds that prevent an entity such as the INS from participating in these businesses. In this sense, it should be remembered, the first obstacle mentioned by the Council authorities was the lack of regulation and risk assessment regarding this type of institution, to the clear detriment of the investor. However, in the judgment of this decision-making body, that was not a compelling reason to prohibit the INS from participating. Pursuant to article 3 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores), Law 7732, the Sugeval is responsible for ensuring the transparency of the securities markets, the correct formation of prices therein, the protection of investors, and the dissemination of the information necessary to ensure the achievement of these purposes. For this reason, it was endowed with powers of regulation, supervision, and oversight of the securities markets, the activity of individuals or legal entities that intervene directly or indirectly in them, and the acts or contracts related to them, according to the provisions of the aforementioned legislative text. This implies that, in the absence of regulation on the risk management of securitization and trusts regarding the fiduciary activity of State institutions, the Superintendency should implement the prudential regulations to that effect, as provided by Law 7732. The other factor mentioned at the time by the Council to limit access as trustees to other public entities was that Banks have solidity and experience in this type of agreement. This is not questionable; it even derives from provision 116 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional), Law 1644, by establishing that among the trust commissions that banks may execute is that of a trust, in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) and other applicable legal and regulatory norms (subsection 7). But as the appellant (casacionista) well establishes, both the Institute and other entities have equal powers to participate in this type of business, not only because in theory they have sufficient capital to do so, but also because there is no technical support indicating otherwise (articles 15 and 16 of the LGAP). *Third*, it is appropriate to indicate that, in a framework of free competition, there is no basis for the fact that only banking entities are allowed to be trustees in public works development trusts, since this can negatively influence the progress of national infrastructure, as it would leave aside entities with large investment possibilities, which in the end, with the conditions they offer, would benefit not only the contracting Administration but also the investor. In short, the Superintendency must verify the minimum risk management requirements that entities other than Banks must observe, depending on their participation in trust contracts or in securitization processes, in accordance with the role those organizations play in the market. Likewise, there is no technical basis that prevents the INS from participating in this type of agreement. All of which would go against the freedom of competition derived from article 46 of the Constitution (Carta Magna). Thus, the decision adopted by the Council should have been supported by: **1.** The fact that the trust business in general terms is part of the ordinary activity of commercial banks, but other entities that manage sufficient liquidity for this purpose can also participate; **2.** The analysis of the legal and regulatory regulations that provide them with the possibility of executing these agreements; **3.** The implementation of directives or regulations that supervise the risks associated with the activity; and, **4.** The experience and solidity of said entities in the market. Aspects which, it is insisted, involve both Commercial Banks and Costa Rican State institutions, as is the case of the INS.\n\n**VI.-** Similarly, the appellant claims that several substantive norms oriented towards allowing the Institute to invest in other markets, such as the securities market, through public works trusts or other types of business, were harmed by the Tribunal. This Chamber must point out that, indeed, from the regulations cited by the appellant (casacionista) and other precepts, it is deduced that the activity of the INS should not be limited to the insurance market, to the point of preventing it from participating as a trustee in public works trusts. In this legal analysis, Article 1 of Law 12 of the INS states: “…*it shall be empowered to carry out all the technical, commercial, and financial actions required, in accordance with the best practices of the business… The INS is empowered to constitute or acquire capital participations in corporations (sociedades anónimas), commercial companies, branches, agencies, or any other commercial entity of a similar nature, none of which will have the guarantee indicated in the preceding paragraph for the following purposes: **a)** Exercise the activities that have been entrusted to it by law within the country. Said activities include those of a financial nature, granting of loans, those of providing health services and those of the Fire Department (Cuerpo de Bomberos), the supply of medical benefits, and the sale of goods acquired by the INS by reason of its activities*…”. In this predicate, it will be up to the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) to ensure that the finances of the Institution and those of its companies are sound, as well as to approve the development plans, the general policy of short, medium, and long-term investments, as well as the indebtedness plans (article 5, Subsection a) points 2 and 4 of Law 12). For its part, article 55 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores) establishes that the INS as well as state banks can form companies to participate in the activities of stock exchange positions (puestos de bolsa), so through this figure, the Institute could also indirectly participate in public works trusts in general and not only those related to the insurance activity, especially if these agreements are authorized by the Superintendency as provided by numeral 56 subsection f) ibidem. In addition to the foregoing, it must also be kept in mind that the Insurance Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros) requires insurance and reinsurance entities to constitute and maintain, at all times, sufficient technical provisions to guarantee the fulfillment of their obligations associated with their contracts and other risks that may affect the development of the business (Article 13). The best way to achieve this, in the consideration of this Chamber, is by maintaining investments in eligible assets that support the technical provisions, reserves, and capital requirement, which cannot be less than the minimum capital (doctrine of precept 14 ibidem). By virtue of the foregoing, the general judicial representative of the INS is correct in considering that from the indicated normative analysis, it emerges that the Institute is not only empowered to exercise the insurance activity, but also has the obligation to invest its technical provisions, capital, and profits, as well as to carry out financial activity and grant loans, as a way to diversify risks and its business portfolios, that is, granting greater profitability to its activities. For all the reasons set forth, it is that Article 76(b) of the Regulation on the Public Offering of Securities (Reglamento Sobre Oferta Pública de Valores) harms article 9(c) of the INS Law, because it tacitly suppresses the possibility of participating as a trustee in public works development trusts, for which reason the grievance attributed to the Tribunal for direct violation of the law must be upheld.\n\n**VII.-** In view of the foregoing, the appropriate course will be to uphold the appeal of the general judicial representative of the INS; consequently, the judgment of the Tribunal shall be annulled. Ruling on the merits, the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) interposed by the defendant is rejected, and the lawsuit shall be upheld in all its aspects. Thus, the proper course is to decree the nullity of Article 76(b) of the aforementioned Regulation, for being inconsistent with the legal system, by suppressing the possibility for the INS to participate in public works trust contracts in the position of trustee. This declaration shall have retroactive effects to the moment of its enactment. In application of article 193 of the CPCA, the defendant shall be ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this process, as well as their respective interest.”" }