{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-151188",
  "citation": "Res. 00407-2014 Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Intangibilidad de actos propios y deber de indemnización por cese unilateral de funcionario del AyA",
  "title_en": "Intangibility of administrative acts and duty to indemnify for unilateral dismissal of an AyA employee",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia analiza un recurso de casación interpuesto por el AyA contra una sentencia que anuló la destitución de un funcionario nombrado por plazo fijo. La Sala determina que tanto el Gerente General como el Presidente Ejecutivo son competentes para remover personal, pero esta cuestión no es suficiente para alterar el fallo. La razón central es que el AyA emitió un acto administrativo que declaró derechos subjetivos a favor del actor al nombrarlo hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2011, y posteriormente lo dejó sin efecto de manera intempestiva y sin seguir el procedimiento de lesividad correspondiente, violando el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios derivado del artículo 34 de la Constitución. La Sala subraya que, ante un acto declarativo de derechos, la Administración solo puede anularlo de oficio si la nulidad es absoluta, evidente y manifiesta; en los demás casos, debe acudir al proceso de lesividad ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. Al no haberse observado este procedimiento ni garantizado el debido proceso, la destitución fue ilegítima. Además, la Sala confirma la indemnización por daño material (salarios caídos) y daño moral subjetivo, sustentándose en la responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración y en el artículo 31 del Código de Trabajo, interpretado armónicamente con la obligación de reparación integral del artículo 41 constitucional.",
  "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice reviews a cassation appeal filed by the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (AyA) against a judgment that annulled the dismissal of an employee hired for a fixed term. The Chamber finds that both the General Manager and the Executive President are competent to remove personnel, but this issue does not alter the ruling. The core reason is that AyA issued an administrative act granting subjective rights to the plaintiff by appointing him until December 31, 2011, and later revoked it abruptly without following the required lesividad procedure, thereby violating the principle of intangibility of administrative acts derived from Article 34 of the Constitution. The Chamber stresses that, with respect to an act that confers rights, the Administration may only annul it ex officio if the nullity is absolute, evident, and manifest; otherwise, it must resort to the lesividad process before the administrative contentious jurisdiction. Since this procedure was not observed, nor was due process guaranteed, the dismissal was illegitimate. The Chamber also upholds the award of material damages (back pay) and subjective moral damages, based on the objective liability of the Administration and Article 31 of the Labor Code, harmoniously interpreted with the duty of full reparation under Article 41 of the Constitution.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "date": "2014",
  "year": "2014",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "intangibilidad de los actos propios",
    "lesividad",
    "derechos subjetivos",
    "acto declarativo de derechos",
    "salarios caídos",
    "daño moral subjetivo",
    "reparación integral"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 12",
      "law": "Ley 2726"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 3",
      "law": "Ley 5507"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 6",
      "law": "Ley 5507"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 6",
      "law": "Decreto 11846"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 34",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 41",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 49",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 31",
      "law": "Código de Trabajo"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "intangibilidad de los actos propios",
    "lesividad",
    "derechos subjetivos",
    "destitución",
    "AyA",
    "indemnización",
    "salarios caídos",
    "daño moral",
    "responsabilidad objetiva",
    "Código de Trabajo"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "intangibility of administrative acts",
    "lesividad",
    "subjective rights",
    "dismissal",
    "AyA",
    "indemnification",
    "back pay",
    "moral damages",
    "objective liability",
    "Labor Code"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "En relación, estima esta Cámara, por el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios que emana del artículo 34 de la Carta Magna, la Administración tiene vedado anular o dirigirse por sí misma, contra los actos por ella emitidos, que declaren derechos subjetivos a favor del administrado. La salvedad la constituyen los supuestos de revocación y declaratoria oficiosa de nulidad absoluta, evidente y manifiesta, contempladas en la LGAP. (...) Con fundamento en lo anterior, al margen de la discusión en torno al funcionario competente para remover el personal en el Instituto demandado, llámese Presidente Ejecutivo, Gerente General o ambos de manera conjunta, no se puede obviar que en la especie el AyA emitió un acto administrativo declarativo de derechos a favor del señor Román Matamoros (oficio PRE-2009-0694), al nombrarlo en el cargo de Contralor de la Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2011. Acto que, al declarar el derecho del actor a desempeñar dicho puesto hasta la fecha indicada, no se podía dejar sin efecto de manera intempestiva. La Administración, tal y como dispuso el Tribunal, debía acudir a los mecanismos que prevé el ordenamiento jurídico para ese fin (anulación en sede administrativa cuando ésta sea evidente y manifiesta, artículo 173 de la LGAP o en sede jurisdiccional por un proceso de lesividad, canon 183 del cuerpo legal citado, en los presupuestos de nulidad absoluta no evidente y no manifiesta o nulidad relativa).",
  "excerpt_en": "In this regard, this Chamber considers, by virtue of the principle of intangibility of administrative acts that emanates from Article 34 of the Constitution, that the Administration is barred from annulling or acting unilaterally against its own acts that declare subjective rights in favor of the administered party. The only exceptions are cases of revocation and ex officio declaration of absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, as provided for in the LGAP. (...) Based on the foregoing, regardless of the discussion regarding which official is competent to remove personnel in the defendant Institute—whether the Executive President, the General Manager, or both jointly—it cannot be overlooked that in this case AyA issued an administrative act declaring rights in favor of Mr. Román Matamoros (official letter PRE-2009-0694), appointing him to the position of Comptroller of the AyA-JBIC Executing Unit until December 31, 2011. This act, having declared the plaintiff's right to hold that position until the stated date, could not be abruptly set aside. As the lower court properly held, the Administration was required to resort to the mechanisms provided by law for that purpose (annulment at the administrative level when nullity is evident and manifest, Article 173 of the LGAP, or before the courts through a lesividad proceeding, Article 183 of the same body of law, in cases of non-evident, non-manifest absolute nullity or relative nullity).",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The AyA's cassation appeal is denied, upholding the annulment of the plaintiff's dismissal and the award of material and moral damages.",
    "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación del AyA, confirmando la nulidad de la destitución del actor y la condena indemnizatoria por daños materiales y morales."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "the Administration is barred from annulling or acting unilaterally against its own acts that declare subjective rights in favor of the administered party.",
      "quote_es": "la Administración tiene vedado anular o dirigirse por sí misma, contra los actos por ella emitidos, que declaren derechos subjetivos a favor del administrado."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "If the defect does not have those characteristics, the Administration may not decree its nullity ex officio, and must, in order to annul the act on grounds of invalidity, resort to the lesividad process.",
      "quote_es": "Si el vicio no reviste tales características, la Administración no podrá de oficio decretar su nulidad, y deberá, para que se suprima el acto con motivo de su invalidez, acudir al proceso de lesividad."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-37097",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 2726  Art. 12"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-3463",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 5507  Art. 3"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-151188",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-3239",
      "norm_num": "4646",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Modificación de Integración de Juntas Directivas de Instituciones Autónomas",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "20/10/1970"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-3463",
      "norm_num": "5507",
      "norm_name": "Ley 5507 — Reforma Juntas Directivas Autónomas",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "19/04/1974"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-37097",
      "norm_num": "2726",
      "norm_name": "Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "14/04/1961"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“IV.- Analizados los\r\nargumentos del casacionista y de los jueces de la instancia precedente, cabe\r\nexaminar lo que el ordenamiento jurídico, en su redacción vigente cuando se\r\nformuló esta lite, establece en torno al funcionario competente para destituir personal\r\nen el AyA. En primer término, se tiene naturalmente, la Ley de Creación del\r\nInstituto, no. 2726 del 14 de abril de 1961 y sus reformas, la cual, en el\r\nartículo 12 inciso b) dispone en lo que interesa: “El Gerente será\r\nresponsable ante la\r\n Junta Directiva del eficiente y correcto funcionamiento\r\nadministrativo del Instituto y tendrá las siguientes atribuciones: (…) b)\r\nAcordar la creación de nuevas plazas y designar el personal y su remoción, el\r\ncual se regirá por un escalafón, que deberá ser aprobado por la Junta Directiva;\r\n(…)”. Tómese en consideración también que la Ley 4646 de 1970, varió la\r\nintegración de las juntas directivas en las instituciones autónomas al\r\nestablecer que, el Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillado (ahora AyA)\r\nestaría integrado, entre otros, por un Ministro de Gobierno designado por el\r\nConsejo de Gobierno (canon 4). Lo que a su vez fue reformado por la Ley 5507\r\ndel 19 de abril de 1974, denominada “Reforma Juntas Directivas de\r\nInstituciones Autónomas Creando Presidencias Ejecutivas”. Cuerpo normativo\r\nque modificó la materia relacionada con la designación y conformación de las\r\njerarquías superiores en las instituciones autónomas, al incorporar la figura\r\ndel Presidente Ejecutivo. Señalan los preceptos 3° y 6° lo siguiente: artículo\r\n3° “Refórmase el artículo 4º de la\r\n ley Nº 4646 de 20 de octubre de 1970, para que se lea así:\r\n\"Artículo 4º.- Las Juntas Directivas del (…) Servicio Nacional de\r\nAcueductos y Alcantarillados, (…) estarán integradas de la siguiente manera: 1)\r\nPresidente Ejecutivo de reconocida experiencia y conocimientos en el campo de\r\nlas actividades de la correspondiente institución, designado por el Consejo de\r\nGobierno cuya gestión se regirá por las siguientes normas: a) Será el\r\nfuncionario de mayor jerarquía para efectos de gobierno de la institución y le\r\ncorresponderá fundamentalmente velar porque las decisiones tomadas por la Junta\r\nse ejecuten, así como coordinar la acción de la entidad cuya Junta preside, con\r\nla de las demás instituciones del Estado. Asimismo, asumirá las demás funciones\r\nque por ley le están reservadas al Presidente de la Junta Directiva\r\nasí como las otras que le asigne la propia Junta;(…)”. Artículo 6° “Los\r\nGerentes de las instituciones continuarán siendo los principales funcionarios\r\nadministrativos. (…)\". Asimismo, hay que tomar en cuenta el Decreto\r\nEjecutivo no. 11846-p del 9 de setiembre de 1980, “Reglamento a la Ley de\r\nPresidentes Ejecutivos de las Juntas Directivas del Banco Central de Costa Rica\r\ny demás Instituciones Autónomas y Semiautónomas No Bancarias”, el que\r\nestablece en el mandato 6° lo siguiente: “Atribuciones y Cometidos: El\r\nPresidente Ejecutivo, para efectos de gobierno, es el funcionario de mayor\r\njerarquía, de la respectiva institución. Es el superior jerárquico del Gerente,\r\nen los términos en que la\r\n Ley General de la Administración Pública,\r\nlo establece en sus artículos 101 y 102, en nombre de la Junta Directiva. \r\nEl Presidente Ejecutivo tiene a su cargo los siguientes cometidos: a)\r\nInformar a la Junta\r\n Directiva sobre las actuaciones de la Gerencia en cuanto al\r\ncumplimiento de sus funciones (…); b) Presidir la Junta Directiva;\r\nconvocar sus sesiones ordinarias y extraordinarias (…); c) Programar las\r\nactividades generales que se requieran para realizar las políticas y alcanzar\r\nlos objetivos de la institución (…); d) Ordenar a la Gerencia una labor\r\nsistemática de modernización de la entidad y racionalización del uso de sus\r\nrecursos, en coordinación con la Oficina de Planificación Nacional y Política\r\nEconómica de la Presidencia de la República, al efecto dictará las directrices\r\npertinentes; e) Someter a la aprobación de la Junta Directiva,\r\ncualesquiera cambios integrales de organización y administración; f) Coordinar\r\n(…) las negociaciones tendientes a obtener asistencia técnica y financiamiento\r\n(...); g) Coordinar con las demás instituciones autónomas y semiautónomas y con\r\nel Gobierno Central las políticas, objetivos, planes y programas de la entidad\r\nque preside; h) Dirigir y supervisar la unidad de planificación (…); i) Formar\r\nparte del Consejo de Coordinación Interinstitucional (…); j) Supervisar y\r\nevaluar periódicamente los programas de la entidad(…); k) Otorgar el visto\r\nbueno a los proyectos de presupuesto anual y extraordinarios que se eleven a la Junta Directiva\r\npara su aprobación, así como vigilar su correcta ejecución (…); l) Presentar\r\noportunamente a la Oficina de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica,\r\n(...), los proyectos de presupuesto y programas de inversión, así como las\r\nsolicitudes de financiamiento externo (…); ll) Proponer a la Junta directiva,\r\nen ejercicio de sus funciones superiores de gobierno, la organización técnica y\r\nadministrativa de la institución, (…); m) Reunirse las veces que sean\r\nnecesarias con el ministro del ramo o el Consejo de Gobierno (...); n) Las demás\r\nque le correspondan como funcionario de mayor jerarquía de la institución en\r\nmateria de gobierno, así como las que le encomiende la Junta Directiva\r\n(…) y las que le sean impuestas por mandato de las leyes y reglamentos\r\npertinentes\". De las disposiciones transcritas se pueden extraer\r\nvarias conclusiones. Primero, las atribuciones del Gerente General del AyA,\r\nestablecidas en el canon 12 de su Ley Constitutiva, no han sido derogadas por\r\nningún cuerpo normativo, por lo tanto, ese funcionario puede remover personal.\r\nSegundo, al Presidente Ejecutivo, como máximo jerarca de la Institución, se le\r\nhan otorgado amplias funciones de gobierno y administración, dentro de las\r\ncuales es dable inferir la competencia para destituir funcionarios. Así por\r\nejemplo, tal autoridad se encuentra incluida dentro de la potestad\r\ndisciplinaria que ostenta el superior jerárquico, pues, prácticamente\r\nconstituye la máxima sanción a que se puede hacer acreedor un funcionario.\r\nAdemás, se trata de una competencia ligada a la formulación presupuestaria,\r\ndirección y ordenación del ente. De manera que, se entiende contenida dentro de\r\nlas atribuciones dadas al Presidente Ejecutivo (dirección y supervisión de la\r\nunidad de planificación de la institución; dar el visto bueno a los proyectos\r\nde presupuesto anual y extraordinarios y vigilar su correcta ejecución, todo\r\ncon el fin de asegurar su congruencia con la política de la institución;\r\npresentar los proyectos de presupuesto y programas de inversión; proponer la\r\norganización técnica y administrativa de la Institución, etc.). Así las\r\ncosas, estima este Órgano Decisor que tanto el Presidente Ejecutivo como el\r\nGerente General o en su ausencia el Subgerente General (aspecto en el cual\r\nlleva razón el recurrente), son competentes para remover el personal en el AyA.\r\nPese a ello, este tema de la competencia, resulta inútil a efectos de variar el\r\ndispositivo de la sentencia impugnada, pues como se indicó en el considerando\r\nanterior, no constituye la única razón por la cual el Tribunal anuló los\r\noficios UE-JBIC-2010-851 y SGG-2010-02293. Para los juzgadores, la remoción del\r\nactor se adoptó sin que previamente se llevara a cabo un procedimiento\r\nadministrativo, mediante el cual se determinara la lesividad de ese acto\r\ndeclarativo de derechos. En relación, estima esta Cámara, por el principio de\r\nintangibilidad de los actos propios que emana del artículo 34 de la Carta Magna, la\r\nAdministración tiene vedado anular o dirigirse por sí misma, contra los actos\r\npor ella emitidos, que declaren derechos subjetivos a favor del administrado.\r\nLa salvedad la constituyen los supuestos de revocación y declaratoria oficiosa\r\nde nulidad absoluta, evidente y manifiesta, contempladas en la LGAP. En esta línea\r\npueden consultarse, entre otras, las sentencias de la Sala Constitucional\r\nde la Corte Suprema\r\nde Justicia números 2006-013447 de las 10 horas 6 minutos del 8 de setiembre de\r\n2006 y 2010-016314 de las 15 horas 16 minutos del 29 de setiembre de 2010. Este\r\nprincipio se erige entonces, como garante de los administrados frente a la Administración,\r\nquien no podrá desconocer mediante un acto posterior, los derechos subjetivos\r\nque les ha otorgado o reconocido. En virtud de lo anterior, la potestad de\r\naquélla para declarar por sí la nulidad, se ha configurado atendiendo a dos\r\nhipótesis distintas: el acto ablativo y el declarativo de derechos a\r\nfavor del administrado. En el primero, plenamente compatible con el principio\r\nmencionado, la Administración tiene la posibilidad de revisar de oficio y\r\ndeclarar la nulidad del acto que le causaba una situación de desventaja o\r\ngravamen, en razón de que el resultado será beneficioso para la esfera jurídica\r\ndel administrado. Desde otro ángulo, cuando de por medio existen derechos\r\nsubjetivos otorgados en el acto, para ser declarada su nulidad en la vía administrativa,\r\nésta ha de ser absoluta, evidente y manifiesta. Si el vicio no reviste tales\r\ncaracterísticas, la Administración no podrá de oficio decretar su nulidad, y\r\ndeberá, para que se suprima el acto con motivo de su invalidez, acudir al\r\nproceso de lesividad, establecido legalmente como concreción del artículo 49 de\r\nla Constitución\r\n Política, que a su vez, estatuye a la jurisdicción\r\ncontencioso administrativa, garante de los derechos subjetivos e intereses\r\nlegítimos de los administrados. Al respecto puede consultarse la resolución de\r\nesta Sala no. 000094-F-S-2011 de las 9 horas 10 minutos del 3 de febrero de\r\n2011. Con fundamento en lo anterior, al margen de la discusión en torno al\r\nfuncionario competente para remover el personal en el Instituto demandado, llámese\r\nPresidente Ejecutivo, Gerente General o ambos de manera conjunta, no se puede\r\nobviar que en la especie el AyA emitió un acto administrativo declarativo de\r\nderechos a favor del señor Román Matamoros (oficio PRE-2009-0694), al nombrarlo\r\nen el cargo de Contralor de la Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC\r\nhasta el 31 de diciembre de 2011. Acto que, al declarar el derecho del actor a\r\ndesempeñar dicho puesto hasta la fecha indicada, no se podía dejar sin efecto\r\nde manera intempestiva. La Administración, tal y como dispuso el Tribunal,\r\ndebía acudir a los mecanismos que prevé el ordenamiento jurídico para ese fin\r\n(anulación en sede administrativa cuando ésta sea evidente y manifiesta,\r\nartículo 173 de la LGAP o en sede jurisdiccional por un proceso de lesividad,\r\ncanon 183 del cuerpo legal citado, en los presupuestos de nulidad absoluta no\r\nevidente y no manifiesta o nulidad relativa). Supuesto no acreditado en la especie. En todo\r\ncaso, a mayor abundamiento de razones, considérese que en el caso en\r\nestudio no se llevó a cabo ningún procedimiento administrativo que permitiera\r\nal actor ejercer el derecho de defensa y conocer las razones por las\r\ncuales se tomó la decisión de ser removido de su cargo. Únicamente en el oficio\r\nUE-JBIC-2010-851 el Gerente de la Unidad en la cual laboraba le comunicó: “Me\r\npermito indicarle que su contrato laboral finaliza el próximo 31 de diciembre\r\ndel año en curso. Los extremos laborales correspondientes, de acuerdo a la\r\nlegislación laboral, se tramitarán en la Dirección de Recursos Humanos. Quiero\r\nagradecerle las gracias por la colaboración brindada durante el tiempo que\r\nlaboró con la\r\n Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC”. Determinación avalada en\r\niguales términos por el Subgerente General del Instituto (oficio\r\nSGG-2010-0229). Dentro de un marco de razonabilidad y lógica, el AyA al emitir\r\nel acto contenido en el oficio PRE-2009-0694 del 10 de agosto de 2009\r\n(nombramiento hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2011) y con posterioridad emanar los\r\noficios UE-JBIC-2010-851 y SGG-2010-02293, ambos del 22 de diciembre de 2010\r\n(terminación del contrato y dejar sin efecto el referido PRE-2009-0694),\r\ndesconoció los derechos subjetivos concedidos al señor Román Matamoros en el\r\nprimer acto, lo que sin duda alguna resulta contrario a derecho. Por lo\r\nmotivos expuestos, el agravio deberá ser rechazado.\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- Como segunda censura,\r\nesgrime que los juzgadores reconocieron una indemnización que no cuenta con\r\nsustento jurídico. De considerarse que el contrato laboral con el actor cesó de\r\nmanera anticipada e injustificada, al ser un convenio por tiempo definido según\r\nel canon 26 del CT, expresa, lo que en derecho corresponde es un resarcimiento\r\nconforme lo establece el precepto 31 de ese cuerpo normativo, es decir, un día\r\nde salario por cada siete laborados.\n\r\n\r\n\nVI- Esta Cámara ha\r\nexpresado: “De conformidad con la norma 190 de la LGAP … la Administración\r\nes responsable cuando su funcionamiento normal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo,\r\ncause un daño, el cual la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar, sea este\r\npatrimonial o extrapatrimonial, y siempre que entre el funcionamiento y el daño\r\nexista un nexo causal. La responsabilidad dicha, se enmarca, dentro de un\r\nrégimen objetivo, que procura la reparación indemnizatoria a quien ha\r\nexperimentado una lesión atribuible a la Administración Pública”.\r\n(Sentencia no. 1151 de las 9 horas 20 minutos del 13 de setiembre de 2011). En\r\ntesis de principio, cuando se haya sufrido una lesión originada en una conducta\r\npública, sea esta activa u omisiva, que la víctima no tenga la obligación de\r\nsoportar, se impone el deber de resarcir el menoscabo, en virtud del postulado\r\nde reparación integral que establece el precepto 41 de la Constitución Política.\r\n Por su parte, en lo de interés, la norma cuya falta de\r\naplicación se cuestiona establece que: “En los contratos a tiempo fijo y\r\npara obra determinada, cada una de las partes puede ponerles término, sin justa\r\ncausa, antes del advenimiento del plazo o de la conclusión de la obra, pagando\r\na la otra los daños y perjuicios concretos que demuestre (…),además deberá\r\npagar al trabajador, en el mismo momento de dar por concluido el contrato, el\r\nimporte correspondiente a un día de salario por cada siete días de trabajo\r\ncontinuo ejecutado (…)”. Según se aprecia, tal disposición regula la\r\nhipótesis de un cese anticipado de la relación laboral. En el caso de estudio,\r\nacreditada la nulidad de los actos administrativos por medio de los cuales se\r\ndejó sin efecto el nombramiento del actor, en el cargo de Contralor de la Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC\r\nhasta el 31 de diciembre de 2011, el Tribunal estimó procedente indemnizar (a\r\ntenor de lo reclamado en la demanda, por resguardo al principio dispositivo):\r\nel daño material ocasionado, consistente en los salarios caídos del 1° de enero\r\nal 31 de diciembre de 2011, salario escolar, aguinaldo y vacaciones correspondientes\r\nal monto que se fije por los 12 salarios reconocidos, a liquidar en ejecución\r\nde sentencia. Así como, el daño moral subjetivo (¢3.000.000,00), a raíz de la\r\nafectación anímica que sufrió el señor Román Matamoros al verse sin trabajo de\r\nun día para otro, debiendo afrontar obligaciones familiares y personales. Cabe\r\nresaltar, los extremos otorgados lo fueron a título de indemnización por los\r\ndaños y perjuicios soportados en razón del despido, lo que en criterio de este\r\nÓrgano Decisor debe verse como un mecanismo mediante el cual se busca\r\nequiparar los montos dejados de percibir como contraprestación de los servicios\r\nque, de haberse mantenido la relación laboral, se hubieran tenido que cancelar.\r\nSe trata del reconocimiento de daños y perjuicios que opera como un parámetro a\r\nmodo de equivalencia de los salarios caídos (dado que no hubo prestación\r\nefectiva del trabajo). Si bien es cierto, los jueces de la instancia precedente\r\nno fundamentaron jurídicamente la indemnización concedida al actor, lo cierto\r\nes que el canon 31 del CT, al que alude el casacionista, dispone el deber de\r\npagar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados al trabajador, cuando es removido\r\nantes del vencimiento del plazo. Así las cosas, la indemnización dispuesta por\r\nel Tribunal resulta conforme a derecho, pues es indudable que el período\r\ndurante el cual el señor Román Matamoros no laboró (del 1° de enero al 31\r\nde diciembre de 2011), lo fue en razón de que la Administración dio por\r\nfinalizado el contrato ilegítimamente. En dicho presupuesto, como se indicó, se\r\nreconocen los salarios caídos a título de daños y perjuicios (como parámetro de\r\nequivalencia), los que resultan atinentes al detrimento material. Esto último,\r\npese a que la regulación no lo diga de modo expreso, y en la inteligencia de\r\nque los salarios dejados de percibir por su propia naturaleza (retributiva),\r\nrefieren a un extremo netamente material, muy distinto al detrimento que el\r\nservidor despedido injustamente pudo experimentar en su esfera íntima. Ha de\r\nrecordarse, el daño material por su parte y el menoscabo moral por la otra\r\npropenden a indemnizaciones de muy diversa índole, donde lo concedido por una\r\nno cubre de modo alguno la otra, de manera que nada obsta, para que los\r\njuzgadores concedieran ambos extremos, como ocurrió en la especie. Al respecto\r\npuede consultarse la sentencia de esta Sala no. 000002-F-S1-2013 de las 9 horas\r\ndel 17 de enero de 2013. Por los motivos expuestos, no lleva razón el\r\ncasacionista en las violaciones que acusa, de manera que, la censura deberá ser\r\ndesestimada. \n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- En mérito de lo\r\nexpuesto, procede declarar sin lugar el recurso, con sus costas a cargo de la\r\npromovente, conforme al precepto 150 inciso 3) del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo.”",
  "body_en_text": "**IV.**— Having analyzed the arguments of the appellant and the judges of the prior instance, it is appropriate to examine what the legal system, in its wording in force when this litigation was filed, establishes regarding the official competent to dismiss personnel at AyA. First, we naturally have the Institute's Creation Law, No. 2726 of April 14, 1961, and its amendments, which, in Article 12, subsection b), provides, where relevant: *\"The General Manager shall be responsible before the Board of Directors for the efficient and correct administrative functioning of the Institute and shall have the following powers: (…) b) Agree to the creation of new positions and designate personnel and their removal, which shall be governed by a career ladder (escalafón), to be approved by the Board of Directors; (…)\".* It should also be taken into consideration that Law 4646 of 1970 altered the composition of the boards of directors in autonomous institutions by establishing that the Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillado (now AyA) would be composed, among others, by a Minister of Government designated by the Governing Council (canon 4). Which in turn was amended by Law 5507 of April 19, 1974, called *\"Reforma Juntas Directivas de Instituciones Autónomas Creando Presidencias Ejecutivas\"* [Reform of Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions Creating Executive Presidencies]. This body of law modified the matter related to the designation and formation of senior hierarchies in autonomous institutions, by incorporating the figure of the Executive President. Articles 3 and 6 state the following: Article 3 *\"Reform Article 4 of Law No. 4646 of October 20, 1970, so that it reads as follows: 'Article 4.– The Boards of Directors of (…) the Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, (…) shall be composed in the following manner: 1) An Executive President of recognized experience and knowledge in the field of activities of the corresponding institution, designated by the Governing Council, whose management shall be governed by the following rules: a) They shall be the highest-ranking official for the purposes of governance of the institution and shall be fundamentally responsible for ensuring that the decisions taken by the Board are executed, as well as coordinating the action of the entity whose Board they preside over with that of other State institutions. Likewise, they shall assume the other functions that by law are reserved to the President of the Board of Directors, as well as the others assigned by the Board itself; (…)'.\"* Article 6 *\"The Managers of the institutions shall continue being the principal administrative officials. (…)\"*. Likewise, one must take into account Executive Decree No. 11846-p of September 9, 1980, *\"Reglamento a la Ley de Presidentes Ejecutivos de las Juntas Directivas del Banco Central de Costa Rica y demás Instituciones Autónomas y Semiautónomas No Bancarias\"* [Regulation to the Law of Executive Presidents of the Boards of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica and other Non-Banking Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Institutions], which establishes in mandate 6 the following: *\"Powers and Duties: The Executive President, for purposes of governance, is the highest-ranking official of the respective institution. They are the hierarchical superior of the General Manager, in the terms established by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) in its Articles 101 and 102, on behalf of the Board of Directors. The Executive President has the following duties: a) Inform the Board of Directors about the actions of the Management regarding the fulfillment of its functions (…); b) Preside over the Board of Directors; call its ordinary and extraordinary sessions (…); c) Program the general activities required to carry out the policies and achieve the objectives of the institution (…); d) Order the Management to undertake a systematic task of modernizing the entity and rationalizing the use of its resources, in coordination with the Office of National Planning and Economic Policy of the Presidency of the Republic; for this purpose, they shall issue the pertinent directives; e) Submit for approval of the Board of Directors any comprehensive changes in organization and administration; f) Coordinate (…) negotiations aimed at obtaining technical assistance and financing (...); g) Coordinate with other autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions and with the Central Government the policies, objectives, plans, and programs of the entity they preside over; h) Direct and supervise the planning unit (…); i) Be part of the Interinstitutional Coordination Council (…); j) Periodically supervise and evaluate the entity's programs (…); k) Provide a favorable opinion (visto bueno) on the annual and extraordinary budget projects submitted to the Board of Directors for approval, as well as monitor their correct execution (…); l) Timely present to the Office of National Planning and Economic Policy, (...), the budget projects and investment programs, as well as requests for external financing (…); ll) Propose to the Board of Directors, in exercise of their superior governance functions, the technical and administrative organization of the institution, (…); m) Meet as many times as necessary with the relevant minister or the Governing Council (...); n) Others that correspond to them as the highest-ranking official of the institution in matters of governance, as well as those entrusted by the Board of Directors (…) and those imposed by mandate of the pertinent laws and regulations'.\"* From the transcribed provisions, several conclusions can be drawn. First, the powers of the General Manager of AyA, established in canon 12 of its Constitutive Law, have not been repealed by any normative body; therefore, that official can remove personnel. Second, the Executive President, as the highest authority of the Institution, has been granted broad powers of governance and administration, within which it is possible to infer the competence to dismiss officials.\n\n**IV.-** Having analyzed the arguments of the appellant in cassation (casacionista) and of the judges of the preceding instance, it is necessary to examine what the legal system, in its wording in force when this litigation (lite) was filed, establishes regarding the competent official to dismiss personnel in AyA. In the first place, there is naturally the Institute's Creation Law, No. 2726 of April 14, 1961 and its amendments, which, in Article 12, subsection b) provides in relevant part: <i>\"The Manager shall be responsible to the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) for the efficient and correct administrative functioning of the Institute and shall have the following powers: (…) b) To agree to the creation of new positions and to appoint personnel and their removal, which shall be governed by a career ladder system (escalafón), which must be approved by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva); (…)\".</i> Consider also that Law 4646 of 1970, changed the composition of the boards of directors (juntas directivas) in autonomous institutions (instituciones autónomas) by establishing that the National Water and Sewer Service (now AyA) would be comprised, among others, of a Government Minister designated by the Government Council (canon 4). Which in turn was amended by Law 5507 of April 19, 1974, called <i>\"Reform of Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions Creating Executive Presidencies.\"</i> A normative body that modified the subject matter related to the designation and conformation of the superior hierarchies in autonomous institutions (instituciones autónomas), by incorporating the figure of the Executive President.\n\nThus, for example, such authority is included within the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) held by the hierarchical superior, as it practically constitutes the maximum sanction to which an official can be subject. Furthermore, it is a competence linked to budget formulation, direction, and ordering of the entity. So, it is understood to be contained within the powers given to the Executive President (direction and supervision of the institution's planning unit; endorsing the annual and extraordinary budget projects and supervising their correct execution, all to ensure their congruence with the institution's policy; presenting the budget projects and investment programs; proposing the technical and administrative organization of the Institution, etc.). This being the case, this Deciding Body (Órgano Decisor) considers that both the Executive President and the General Manager or in his absence the Deputy General Manager (an aspect in which the appellant is correct), are competent to remove personnel in AyA. Despite this, this issue of competence is useless for the purpose of varying the operative part (dispositivo) of the challenged judgment, since as indicated in the preceding recital (considerando), it is not the only reason for which the Court annulled official letters UE-JBIC-2010-851 and SGG-2010-02293. For the judges, the removal of the plaintiff (actor) was adopted without a prior administrative proceeding (procedimiento administrativo) having been carried out, through which the harmfulness (lesividad) of that act declaring rights (acto declarativo de derechos) was determined. In relation to this, this Chamber considers, by the principle of the intangibility of one's own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios) that emanates from Article 34 of the Magna Carta (la Carta Magna), the Administration is prohibited from annulling or directing itself against the acts issued by it, which declare subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) in favor of the administered individual (administrado). The exception is constituted by the cases of revocation (revocación) and ex officio declaration of absolute, evident, and manifest nullity (declaratoria oficiosa de nulidad absoluta, evidente y manifiesta), contemplated in the LGAP. In this line, one can consult, among others, the judgments of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) numbers 2006-013447 of 10 hours 6 minutes on September 8, 2006 and 2010-016314 of 15 hours 16 minutes on September 29, 2010. This principle therefore stands as a guarantor for administered individuals (administrados) against the Administration, which cannot disregard through a later act the subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) it has granted or recognized to them. By virtue of the foregoing, the power of the former to declare nullity by itself has been configured based on two distinct hypotheses: the ablative act (acto ablativo) and the act declaring rights in favor of the administered individual (acto declarativo de derechos a favor del administrado). In the first, fully compatible with the mentioned principle, the Administration has the possibility to review ex officio and declare the nullity of the act that caused it a situation of disadvantage or burden, because the result will be beneficial for the legal sphere of the administered individual (administrado). From another angle, when subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) granted in the act are at stake, for its nullity to be declared in the administrative venue, it must be absolute, evident, and manifest. If the defect does not possess such characteristics, the Administration cannot ex officio decree its nullity, and must, for the act to be annulled due to its invalidity, resort to the harmfulness process (proceso de lesividad), legally established as a realization of Article 49 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), which in turn, establishes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso administrativa) as guarantor of the subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) and legitimate interests of administered individuals (administrados). In this respect, one can consult resolution of this Chamber no. 000094-F-S-2011 of 9 hours 10 minutes on February 3, 2011. Based on the foregoing, aside from the discussion regarding the competent official to remove personnel in the defendant Institute, whether called Executive President, General Manager, or both jointly, it cannot be overlooked that in the case at hand AyA issued an administrative act declaring rights (acto administrativo declarativo de derechos) in favor of Mr. Román Matamoros (official letter PRE-2009-0694), by appointing him to the position of Comptroller (Contralor) of the AyA-JBIC Executing Unit (Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC) until December 31, 2011. An act that, by declaring the plaintiff's right to hold said position until the indicated date, could not be left without effect untimely. The Administration, as the Court ordered, had to resort to the mechanisms provided by the legal system for that purpose (annulment in administrative venue when it is evident and manifest, Article 173 of the LGAP or in jurisdictional venue through a harmfulness process (proceso de lesividad), canon 183 of the cited legal body, in the cases of absolute non-evident and non-manifest nullity or relative nullity). A scenario not proven in the case at hand. In any case, to further elaborate on the reasons, consider that in the case under study no administrative proceeding (procedimiento administrativo) was carried out that would allow the plaintiff (actor) to exercise the right of defense and know the reasons for which the decision was made to remove him from his position. Only in official letter UE-JBIC-2010-851 did the Manager of the Unit in which he worked inform him: <i>\"I would like to indicate that your employment contract ends on December 31 of this year. The corresponding labor settlement amounts, in accordance with labor legislation, will be processed in the Human Resources Department. I want to thank you for the collaboration provided during the time you worked with the AyA-JBIC Executing Unit (Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC)\".</i> A determination endorsed in equal terms by the Deputy General Manager of the Institute (official letter SGG-2010-0229). Within a framework of reasonableness and logic, AyA, by issuing the act contained in official letter PRE-2009-0694 of August 10, 2009 (appointment until December 31, 2011) and subsequently issuing official letters UE-JBIC-2010-851 and SGG-2010-02293, both of December 22, 2010 (termination of the contract and leaving without effect the referred PRE-2009-0694), disregarded the subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) granted to Mr. Román Matamoros in the first act, which without any doubt is contrary to law. For the reasons stated, the grievance must be rejected.\n\n**V.-** As a **second** challenge, it argues that the judges recognized an indemnity (indemnización) that lacks legal support. Considering that the employment contract with the plaintiff (actor) ceased in an anticipated and unjustified manner, being a fixed-term agreement according to canon 26 of the CT, it states that what corresponds in law is compensation as established by precept 31 of that normative body, that is, one day's salary for each seven days worked.\n\n**VI-** This Chamber has expressed: <i>\"In accordance with norm 190 of the LGAP … the Administration is responsible when its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning, causes a damage, which the victim does not have the duty to bear, be it patrimonial or extra-patrimonial, and provided that a causal nexus exists between the functioning and the damage. Said responsibility is framed within an objective regime (régimen objetivo), which seeks reparation by means of indemnity (indemnización) for whoever has experienced an injury attributable to the Public Administration (Administración Pública)\"</i>. (Judgment no. 1151 of 9 hours 20 minutes on September 13, 2011). In principle, when an injury has been suffered originating from public conduct, be it active or omissive, which the victim has no obligation to bear, the duty to compensate for the detriment is imposed, by virtue of the postulate of integral reparation established by precept 41 of the Political Constitution. For its part, in the matter of interest, the norm whose lack of application is questioned establishes that: <i>\"In fixed-term contracts and for specific work, each of the parties may terminate them, without just cause, before the arrival of the term or the conclusion of the work, paying to the other the concrete damages and prejudices (daños y perjuicios) that they demonstrate (…), in addition, they must pay the worker, at the same moment of terminating the contract, the amount corresponding to one day of salary for every seven days of continuous work executed (…)\".</i> As can be seen, such provision regulates the hypothesis of an anticipated cessation of the employment relationship. In the case under study, once the nullity of the administrative acts (actos administrativos) was proven, through which the appointment of the plaintiff (actor) was left without effect in the position of Comptroller (Contralor) of the AyA-JBIC Executing Unit (Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC) until December 31, 2011, the Court deemed it appropriate to grant as indemnity (indemnización) (according to what was claimed in the lawsuit, in protection of the principle of party disposition): the material damage (daño material) caused, consisting of lost wages (salarios caídos) from January 1 to December 31, 2011, school bonus (salario escolar), Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) and vacations corresponding to the amount fixed for the 12 recognized salaries, to be liquidated in execution of the judgment. As well as, subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) (¢3,000,000.00), due to the emotional distress suffered by Mr. Román Matamoros upon finding himself without work from one day to the next, having to face family and personal obligations. It should be highlighted that the awarded amounts were granted as indemnity (indemnización) for the damages and prejudices (daños y perjuicios) suffered due to the dismissal, which in the opinion of this Deciding Body (Órgano Decisor) must be seen as a mechanism through which it seeks to equalize the amounts left unperceived as compensation for the services that, had the employment relationship been maintained, would have had to be paid. It is the recognition of damages and prejudices (daños y perjuicios) that operates as a parameter by way of equivalence of lost wages (salarios caídos) (given that there was no effective rendering of work). While it is true that the judges of the preceding instance did not legally justify the indemnity (indemnización) granted to the plaintiff (actor), what is certain is that canon 31 of the CT, to which the appellant in cassation alludes, provides the duty to pay the damages and prejudices (daños y perjuicios) caused to the worker, when he is removed before the expiration of the term. This being the case, the indemnity (indemnización) ordered by the Court is in accordance with the law, as it is indubitable that the period during which Mr. Román Matamoros did not work (from January 1 to December 31, 2011), was due to the illegitimately terminated contract by the Administration. In such scenario, as indicated, lost wages (salarios caídos) are recognized as damages and prejudices (daños y perjuicios) (as a parameter of equivalence), which are pertinent to the material detriment (detrimento material). This latter point, even though the regulation does not say so expressly, and with the understanding that salaries left unperceived by their very nature (remunerative) refer to a purely material aspect, very different from the detriment that the unjustly dismissed servant could have experienced in his intimate sphere. It must be remembered that material damage (daño material) on one hand and moral detriment (menoscabo moral) on the other tend towards indemnities (indemnizaciones) of very diverse kinds, where what is granted for one in no way covers the other, so nothing hinders the judges from granting both aspects, as occurred in the case at hand. In this respect, one can consult the judgment of this Chamber no. 000002-F-S1-2013 of 9 hours on January 17, 2013. For the stated reasons, the appellant in cassation is not correct in the violations it alleges, and therefore the challenge must be dismissed.\n\n**VII.-** Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the appeal without merit, with its costs charged to the appellant (promovente), in accordance with precept 150, subsection 3) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code.\n\nProvisions 3 and 6 state the following: article\n3° <i>“Article 4 of Law No. 4646 of October 20, 1970, is amended to read as follows:\n\"Article 4.- The Boards of Directors of the (…) Servicio Nacional de\nAcueductos y Alcantarillados, (…) shall be composed as follows: 1)\nExecutive President with recognized experience and knowledge in the field\nof the activities of the corresponding institution, appointed by the Government\nCouncil, whose management shall be governed by the following rules: a) They shall be the\nhighest-ranking official for purposes of governance of the institution and it shall\nfundamentally be their responsibility to ensure that the decisions taken by the Board\nare executed, as well as to coordinate the action of the entity whose Board they preside over, with\nthat of the other State institutions. Likewise, they shall assume the other functions\nthat by law are reserved to the President of the Board of Directors\nas well as the others assigned to them by the Board itself; (…)”.</i> Article 6°<i> “The\nManagers of the institutions shall continue to be the principal administrative\nofficials. (…)”. </i>Likewise, Executive Decree\nno. 11846-p of September 9, 1980, “<i>Reglamento a la Ley de\nPresidentes Ejecutivos de las Juntas Directivas del Banco Central de Costa Rica\ny demás Instituciones Autónomas y Semiautónomas No Bancarias”,</i> must be taken into account, which\nestablishes in mandate 6 the following: “<i>Powers and Duties: The\nExecutive President, for purposes of governance, is the highest-ranking official,\nof the respective institution. They are the hierarchical superior of the Manager,\nin the terms in which the General Law of Public Administration\nestablishes it in its articles 101 and 102, on behalf of the Board of Directors.\nThe Executive President is in charge of the following duties: a)\nInform the Board of Directors about the actions of the Management regarding the\nfulfillment of its functions (…); b) Preside over the Board of Directors;\nconvene its ordinary and extraordinary sessions (…); c) Program the\ngeneral activities required to carry out the policies and achieve\nthe objectives of the institution (…); d) Order the Management to carry out a systematic\nwork of modernizing the entity and rationalizing the use of its\nresources, in coordination with the Oficina de Planificación Nacional y Política\nEconómica de la Presidencia de la República, and for this purpose shall issue the pertinent\ndirectives; e) Submit for the approval of the Board of Directors,\nany integral organizational and administrative changes; f) Coordinate\n(…) the negotiations aimed at obtaining technical assistance and financing\n(...); g) Coordinate with the other autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions and with\nthe Central Government the policies, objectives, plans, and programs of the entity\nthey preside over; h) Direct and supervise the planning unit (…); i) Form\npart of the Interinstitutional Coordination Council (…); j) Periodically supervise and\nevaluate the entity's programs (…); k) Grant\napproval to the annual and extraordinary budget projects that are submitted to the Board of Directors\nfor their approval, as well as monitor their correct execution (…); l) Present\nin a timely manner to the Oficina de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica,\n(...) the budget projects and investment programs, as well as the\nrequests for external financing (…); ll) Propose to the Board of Directors,\nin the exercise of their superior governance functions, the technical and\nadministrative organization of the institution, (…); m) Meet as many times as\nnecessary with the relevant minister or the Government Council (...); n) The other\nfunctions that correspond to them as the highest-ranking official of the institution in\ngovernance matters, as well as those entrusted to them by the Board of Directors\n(…) and those imposed on them by mandate of the pertinent laws and\nregulations”. </i>From the transcribed provisions, several\nconclusions can be drawn. First, the powers of the General Manager of AyA,\nestablished in canon 12 of its Constitutive Law, have not been repealed by\nany regulatory body, therefore, that official can remove personnel.\nSecond, the Executive President, as the highest authority of the Institution, has\nbeen granted broad governance and administration functions, within\nwhich the competence to dismiss officials can be inferred. For\nexample, such authority is found within the disciplinary\npower held by the hierarchical superior, since it practically\nconstitutes the maximum sanction that an official can incur.\nFurthermore, it is a competence linked to budget formulation,\ndirection, and organization of the entity. Thus, it is understood as contained within\nthe powers given to the Executive President (direction and supervision of the\ninstitution's planning unit; granting approval to the\nannual and extraordinary budget projects and monitoring their correct execution, all\nwith the purpose of ensuring their congruence with the institution's policy;\npresenting the budget projects and investment programs; proposing the\ntechnical and administrative organization of the Institution, etc.).<i> </i>Thus\nthe case stands, this Deciding Body considers that both the Executive President and the\nGeneral Manager, or in their absence the Deputy General Manager (a point on which\nthe appellant is correct), are competent to remove personnel at AyA.\nDespite this, this issue of competence is useless for the purpose of varying the\nruling of the appealed judgment, since as indicated in the preceding recital,\nit does not constitute the only reason for which the Court annulled the\nofficial letters UE-JBIC-2010-851 and SGG-2010-02293. For the judges, the removal of the\nplaintiff was adopted without previously carrying out an administrative\nprocedure, through which the harmful nature of that\ndeclaratory act of rights could be determined. In relation to this, this Chamber considers, based on the principle of\nintangibility of one's own acts that emanates from article 34 of the Magna Carta,\nthat the Administration is prohibited from annulling or acting against, by itself,\nacts issued by it that declare individual rights in favor of the administered party.\nThe exceptions are the cases of revocation and ex officio declaration\nof absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, contemplated in the LGAP. Along these\nlines, one can consult, among others, the judgments of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court\nof Justice numbers 2006-013447 of 10 hours 6 minutes on September 8,\n2006, and 2010-016314 of 15 hours 16 minutes on September 29, 2010. This\nprinciple stands, then, as a guarantor of the administered parties before the Administration,\nwhich cannot disregard through a subsequent act the individual rights\nthat it has granted or recognized. By virtue of the foregoing, the power of\nthe former to declare nullity on its own has been configured taking into account two\ndifferent hypotheses: the ablative act and the declaratory act of rights\nin favor of the administered party. In the first, fully compatible with the principle\nmentioned, the Administration has the possibility of reviewing ex officio and\ndeclaring the nullity of the act that caused it a disadvantage or\nburden, because the result will be beneficial for the legal sphere\nof the administered party. From another angle, when individual\nrights granted in the act are involved, for its nullity to be declared in the administrative process,\nit must be absolute, evident, and manifest. If the defect does not meet such\ncharacteristics, the Administration cannot decree its nullity ex officio,\nand must, for the act to be suppressed due to its invalidity, resort to the\nlesivity proceeding, legally established as a concretion of article 49 of\nthe Political Constitution, which, in turn, establishes the\ncontentious-administrative jurisdiction as guarantor of the individual rights and legitimate\ninterests of the administered parties. In this regard, one can consult the resolution of\nthis Chamber no. 000094-F-S-2011 of 9 hours 10 minutes on February 3,\n2011. Based on the foregoing, aside from the discussion regarding the\ncompetent official to remove personnel in the defendant Institute, be it the\nExecutive President, the General Manager, or both jointly, it is not possible\nto ignore that in the specific case AyA issued a declaratory administrative act of\nrights in favor of Mr. Román Matamoros (official letter PRE-2009-0694), by appointing him\nto the position of Comptroller of the Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC\nuntil December 31, 2011. An act that, by declaring the plaintiff's right to\nhold said position until the indicated date, could not be rendered without effect\nabruptly. The Administration, as the Court ordered,\nhad to resort to the mechanisms provided by the legal system for that purpose\n(annulment in administrative proceedings when it is evident and manifest,\narticle 173 of the LGAP, or in jurisdictional proceedings through a lesivity proceeding,\ncanon 183 of the cited legal body, in cases of absolute nullity that is not\nevident and not manifest, or relative nullity). An assumption not demonstrated in\nthe specific case. In any\ncase, for the sake of further reasoning, consider that in the case under\nstudy, no administrative procedure was carried out that allowed\nthe plaintiff to exercise the right of defense and know the reasons for\nwhich the decision to remove him from his position was made. Only in the official letter\nUE-JBIC-2010-851 did the Manager of the Unit in which he worked inform him: <i>“I\nhereby inform you that your employment contract ends on December 31\nof the current year. The corresponding labor amounts, in accordance with\nlabor legislation, will be processed in the Human Resources Department. I want\nto thank you for the collaboration provided during the time you\nworked with the Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC”. </i>A determination endorsed in\nequal terms by the Deputy General Manager of the Institute (official letter\nSGG-2010-0229). Within a framework of reasonableness and logic, AyA, by issuing\nthe act contained in official letter PRE-2009-0694 of August 10, 2009\n(appointment until December 31, 2011) and subsequently issuing\nofficial letters UE-JBIC-2010-851 and SGG-2010-02293, both of December 22, 2010\n(termination of the contract and rendering without effect the referred PRE-2009-0694),\ndisregarded the individual rights granted to Mr. Román Matamoros in the\nfirst act, which without a doubt is contrary to law. For the\nreasons stated, the grievance must be rejected.\n\n**V.-** As a **second** censure,\nit argues that the judges recognized an indemnity that lacks\nlegal basis. If it is considered that the employment contract with the plaintiff ceased\nin an early and unjustified manner, being an agreement for a defined term according\nto canon 26 of the CT, it states, what legally corresponds is a compensation\nas established by precept 31 of that regulatory body, that is, one day\nof salary for each seven worked.\n\n**VI.-** This Chamber has\nstated: <i>“In accordance with rule 190 of the LGAP … the Administration\nis liable when its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate\noperation causes damage, which the victim has no duty to bear, whether\nmaterial or non-material, and provided that between the operation and the damage\nthere is a causal link. Such liability is framed within an\nobjective regime, which seeks compensatory reparation for the person who has\nexperienced an injury attributable to the Public Administration”</i>.\n(Judgment no. 1151 of 9 hours 20 minutes on September 13, 2011). In\nprinciple, when an injury has been suffered originating from public\nconduct, whether active or omissive, that the victim has no obligation to\nbear, the duty to compensate for the harm is imposed, by virtue of the postulate\nof integral reparation that establishes precept 41 of the Political Constitution.\nFor its part, regarding the matter of interest, the rule whose lack of\napplication is questioned establishes that: <i>“In fixed-term contracts and\ncontracts for specific work, each of the parties may terminate them, without just\ncause, before the arrival of the term or the conclusion of the work, paying\nto the other the specific damages and losses that they prove (…); in addition, they must\npay the worker, at the same moment of terminating the contract, the\namount corresponding to one day of salary for each seven days of continuous\nwork performed (…)”. </i>As can be seen, such provision regulates the\nhypothesis of an early cessation of the employment relationship. In the case under study,\nthe nullity of the administrative acts through which\nthe plaintiff's appointment, in the position of Comptroller of the Unidad Ejecutora AyA-JBIC\nuntil December 31, 2011, was rendered without effect being proven, the Court deemed it appropriate to indemnify (in\naccordance with what was claimed in the lawsuit, to safeguard the party-presentation principle):\nthe material damage caused, consisting of lost wages from January 1\nto December 31, 2011, school bonus, Christmas bonus, and vacations corresponding\nto the amount established for the 12 recognized salaries, to be liquidated in execution\nof judgment. As well as, the subjective moral damage (¢3,000,000.00), as a result of the\nemotional affectation that Mr. Román Matamoros suffered when finding himself out of work from\none day to the next, having to face family and personal obligations. It should\nbe highlighted that the granted amounts were by way of indemnity for the\ndamages and losses endured due to the dismissal, which in the opinion of this\nDeciding Body should be seen as a mechanism through which one seeks to\nequate the amounts not received as consideration for the services\nthat, had the employment relationship been maintained, would have had to be paid.\nIt is about the recognition of damages and losses that operates as a parameter by\nway of equivalence of the lost wages (given that there was no effective\nprovision of work). Although it is true that the judges of the preceding instance\ndid not legally base the indemnity granted to the plaintiff, what is true\nis that canon 31 of the CT, to which the appellant for cassation alludes, provides the duty to\npay the damages and losses caused to the worker, when they are removed\nbefore the expiration of the term. Thus, the case stands, the indemnity ordered by\nthe Court is in accordance with law, since it is undoubtable that the period\nduring which Mr. Román Matamoros did not work (from January 1 to December\n31, 2011), was due to the fact that the Administration illegitimately terminated\nthe contract. Under that premise, as indicated, lost\nwages are recognized by way of damages and losses (as a parameter of\nequivalence), which are pertinent to material detriment. This last point,\ndespite the regulation not saying so expressly, and with the understanding\nthat the wages not received by their very nature (retributive),\nrefer to a purely material aspect, very different from the detriment that the\nunjustly dismissed servant could have experienced in their intimate sphere. It\nmust be remembered that material damage on the one hand and moral impairment on the\nother lead to indemnities of a very diverse nature, where what is granted for one\nin no way covers the other, such that nothing prevents\nthe judges from granting both aspects, as occurred in the specific case. In this\nregard, one can consult the judgment of this Chamber no. 000002-F-S1-2013 of 9 hours\non January 17, 2013. For the reasons stated, the appellant for cassation is not correct\nin the violations they accuse; consequently, the censure must be\ndismissed.\n\n**VII.-** By virtue of the\nforegoing, it is proper to declare the appeal without merit, with its costs borne by the\npromoter, in accordance with precept 150 subsection 3) of the Código Procesal Contencioso\nAdministrativo.”"
}