{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-152158",
  "citation": "Res. 00100-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Efectos del síndrome de dependencia del alcohol como causal de terminación del empleo público",
  "title_en": "Effects of alcohol dependence syndrome as grounds for termination in public employment",
  "summary_es": "Esta sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo resuelve la demanda de un médico interino de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social contra un procedimiento administrativo y su posterior renuncia. El actor alegó persecución laboral, nulidad del procedimiento por vicios de forma y en la voluntad de su renuncia, y solicitó reinstalación y daños. El Tribunal analiza extensamente el régimen de empleo público y, en particular, los efectos del síndrome de dependencia del alcohol como causal objetiva de terminación de la relación laboral. Concluye que el alcoholismo es una enfermedad y, como tal, el empleador debe brindar al trabajador una oportunidad de rehabilitación antes de aplicar sanciones disciplinarias o el despido. Sin embargo, determina que en el caso concreto el procedimiento administrativo fue archivado sin producir efectos jurídicos adversos, no se demostró persecución ni vicios en la renuncia, y la reinstalación era improcedente al tratarse de un cargo de confianza de libre remoción. Se rechazaron todas las pretensiones del actor.",
  "summary_en": "This ruling by the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal resolves the claim of an interim physician of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund against an administrative procedure and his subsequent resignation. The plaintiff alleged workplace harassment, nullity of the procedure for formal defects and defects in the will of his resignation, and sought reinstatement and damages. The Tribunal extensively analyzes the regime of public employment and, in particular, the effects of alcohol dependence syndrome as objective grounds for termination of employment. It concludes that alcoholism is a disease and, as such, the employer must offer the worker an opportunity for rehabilitation before applying disciplinary sanctions or dismissal. However, it finds that in the specific case, the administrative procedure was archived without producing adverse legal effects, no harassment or defects in the resignation were proven, and reinstatement was improper because the position was a freely removable trust appointment. All the plaintiff's claims were dismissed.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV",
  "date": "2013",
  "year": "2013",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "empleo público",
    "síndrome de dependencia del alcohol",
    "régimen disciplinario",
    "oportunidad de rehabilitación",
    "funcionario interino",
    "libre remoción",
    "interés público",
    "vicio en la voluntad"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 191",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 192",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 72",
      "law": "Código de Trabajo"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 81",
      "law": "Código de Trabajo"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 111",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 113",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 29",
      "law": "Ley General de Salud"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 35",
      "law": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "empleo público",
    "alcoholismo como enfermedad",
    "régimen disciplinario",
    "oportunidad de rehabilitación",
    "síndrome de dependencia del alcohol",
    "causal de terminación",
    "funcionario interino",
    "libre remoción",
    "interés público",
    "debida fundamentación"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "public employment",
    "alcoholism as a disease",
    "disciplinary regime",
    "rehabilitation opportunity",
    "alcohol dependence syndrome",
    "grounds for termination",
    "interim official",
    "freely removable",
    "public interest",
    "due reasoning"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "\" ... la potestad sancionatoria del empleador para despedir al trabajador alcohólico (enfermo-dependiente) procede cuando no hay una respuesta positiva de su parte, una vez que se le ha dado la opción de asesorarse, tratarse y rehabilitarse... \" \n\nDe conformidad con lo anterior, se evidencia que para que las ausencias con motivo del alcoholismo-enfermedad puedan ser sancionadas, se requiere que el trabajador haya desaprovechado oportunidades las brindadas previamente para su debida rehabilitación. No es posible entonces, la sanción al que padece la enfermedad de análisis, en tales supuestos, dada la naturaleza de afectación crónica a la salud que ella significa, si antes no se le ha brindado al enfermo la opción de que acuda a tratamiento.",
  "excerpt_en": "\" ... the employer's sanctioning power to dismiss the alcoholic worker (dependent-sick person) proceeds when there is no positive response from the worker, once they have been given the option to seek counseling, treatment and rehabilitation... \" \n\nAccordingly, it is evident that for absences due to alcoholism-illness to be sanctioned, the worker must have previously wasted the opportunities offered for their proper rehabilitation. It is not possible, then, to sanction the individual suffering from the disease under analysis in such cases, given the nature of the chronic health impact it entails, if the ill person has not previously been offered the option of undergoing treatment.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "All of the plaintiff's claims were rejected, including the nullity of the administrative procedure, annulment of the resignation, reinstatement, and payment of damages.",
    "summary_es": "Se rechazaron todas las pretensiones del actor, incluyendo la nulidad del procedimiento administrativo, la anulación de la renuncia, la reinstalación y el pago de daños y perjuicios."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "\" ... the employer's sanctioning power to dismiss the alcoholic worker (dependent-sick person) proceeds when there is no positive response from the worker, once they have been given the option to seek counseling, treatment and rehabilitation... \"",
      "quote_es": "\" ... la potestad sancionatoria del empleador para despedir al trabajador alcohólico (enfermo-dependiente) procede cuando no hay una respuesta positiva de su parte, una vez que se le ha dado la opción de asesorarse, tratarse y rehabilitarse... \""
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "\" From this it follows that, in our country, the employer cannot force the worker to undergo any treatment, but can inform, advise or refer them to receive it. If the employee refuses to cooperate, their dismissal proceeds without further consideration.\"",
      "quote_es": "\" De ello se desprende que, en nuestro país, el empleador no puede obligar al trabajador a someterse a tratamiento alguno, pero sí puede informarlo, asesorarlo o remitirlo para que lo reciba. Si el empleado se niega a colaborar, procede su despido sin mayores miramientos.\""
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "\" ... the condition cannot be considered as something that must be tolerated forever by the employer - it is not a privilege that grants the worker covert stability - since once the possibility of rehabilitation and overcoming the disease has been fulfilled, if it was not successful, the possibility of dismissal on those grounds does open up.\"",
      "quote_es": "\" ... tampoco puede ser considerado el padecimiento como algo que debe ser tolerado por siempre por el empleador, - no es un fuero que otorgue una estabilidad encubierta al trabajador- en tanto que una vez cumplida la posibilidad de rehabilitación y superación de la enfermedad, si ésta no fue exitosa, sí se abre la posibilidad de despido por tal motivo.\""
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-152158",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-32708",
      "norm_num": "1581",
      "norm_name": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "30/05/1953"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-48116",
      "norm_num": "8220",
      "norm_name": "Protección al ciudadano del exceso de requisitos y trámites administrativos",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "04/03/2002"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-49185",
      "norm_num": "8292",
      "norm_name": "Ley General de Control Interno",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "31/07/2002"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-53738",
      "norm_num": "8422",
      "norm_name": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "06/10/2004"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“IV.- Sobre el régimen de empleo público: Doctrinariamente se ha establecido\r\nque \" el Estado posee una personalidad única. Se trata de una sola\r\npersona jurídica, que puede desarrollar actividades regidas por el derecho público;\r\no por el derecho privado (...) Se sabe que el Estado tiene dos modalidades de\r\nactuación: una bajo el régimen jurídico del derecho público; y otra bajo el régimen\r\ndel derecho privado\". (González Ballar Rafael. Límites del derecho\r\nadministrativo. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, página 95, 97; en el\r\nmismo sentido Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, Tesis de derecho\r\nadministrativo. Editorial Stradtmann, S.A, tomo I, San José, 1998, página 85). De modo que,\r\n\"toda persona pública por el sólo hecho de serlo, tiene capacidad para\r\nrealizar los actos y negocios al alcance de los particulares, con las\r\nlimitaciones y prohibiciones que establece la ley y los principios generales\r\ndel derecho.\" \n\r\n\r\n\n. (Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz,\r\nIBID, página 85). Posición que ha sido avalada por los Tribunales de Justicia\r\nen diferentes ocasiones (a manera de ejemplo es posible ver de la Sala Constitucional\r\nde la Corte Suprema\r\nde Justicia el Voto número 2006-03002, de las diez horas con cuarenta minutos\r\ndel nueve de marzo de dos mil seis, así como la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia, en el voto número 10 de las 15:45 horas del 06 de febrero de 1998).\r\nDe este modo, según sea que la Administración Pública\r\nse desempeñe dentro del ámbito del derecho público o del derecho privado, su régimen\r\nlaboral será de empleo público o de empleo privado. El régimen de empleo público\r\ncorresponde a un sistema de contratación de personal que difiere\r\nsustancialmente del que presenta el sector privado, el cual tiene sustento en\r\nel numeral ciento noventa y dos de la Constitución Política;\r\nse trata en esencia de un solo régimen regulado en diversos estatutos los que\r\nen esencia están sometidos a parámetros de constitucionalidad y legalidad, en\r\nespecial sobre los temas de proporcionalidad e igualdad. En ese marco, existen\r\nuna serie de derechos y obligaciones (ver votos de la Sala Constitucional\r\n2883-96, 1420-91 y 1918-00) de muy diversa índole que define la relación como\r\ndiametralmente diferente (ver voto de Sala Constitucional 492317-03), bajo una\r\nserie de principios como legalidad, idoneidad comprobada, ausencia de libre\r\ndisposición de la relación, sometimiento a los esquemas del derecho público,\r\ninamovilidad relativa, derecho de reinstalación (al respecto ver los votos\r\n2012-6225 y 2000-04951 de la Sala Constitucional), entre otros. Los artículos\r\nciento noventa y uno y ciento noventa y dos de la Constitución Política\r\nes la base fundamental para establecer tal distinción, al establecer lo\r\nsiguiente: “Artículo 191.- \n\r\n\r\n\nUn estatuto de servicio civil\r\nregulará las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, con el propósito\r\nde garantizar la eficiencia de la administración” y “Artículo 192.- Con las\r\nexcepciones que esta Constitución y el estatuto de servicio civil determinen,\r\nlos servidores públicos serán nombrados a base de idoneidad comprobada y sólo\r\npodrán ser removidos por las causales de despido justificado que exprese la\r\nlegislación de trabajo, o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, ya sea\r\npor falta de fondos o para conseguir una mejor organización de los mismos”. De conformidad con las indicadas\r\nnormas de rango constitucional se evidencia que el servidor del Estado y sus\r\nInstituciones, goza de los derechos de una regulación normativa propia,\r\nestabilidad relativa en el empleo - limitando el régimen de libre remoción propio\r\nde la regulación laboral privada- y de una carrera administrativa, junto con\r\nlos demás garantías existentes para las personas amparadas a un régimen de\r\nsubordinación, como son el pago de un salario, vacaciones, jornadas máximas,\r\nhuelga, etc. (haciendo la salvedad del derecho a la negociación colectiva,\r\nexcluida por votos 4453-2000 y 9690-2000 de la Sala Constitucional).\r\nEn el régimen de empleo público no se aplica el principio del contrato realidad\r\nsustento del derecho laboral, se otorgan únicamente derechos contemplados en el\r\nestatuto, se debe seguir el principio de formalidad de la activación\r\nadministrativa, transparencia, igualdad, y debido proceso para la imposición de\r\nsanciones disciplinarias, nombramiento mediante concurso que otorga un derecho subjetivo,\r\nlas resoluciones del jerarca son actos administrativos y la entidad para la\r\ncual se presta el servicio tiene un patrimonio público y está sometido al\r\nderecho público en su organización y actividad y a los principios de eficiencia\r\ny eficacia. Correlativo con las anteriores derechos, el servidor público posee\r\nuna serie de obligaciones de carácter funcionarial, inherentes a los fines públicos\r\nbuscados con su actividad y que deben orientar siempre su gestión, a fin de no\r\nincurrir en una falta personal generadora de responsabilidad disciplinaria. Sin\r\npretender ser exhaustivos, algunos de los deberes propios del régimen de empleo\r\npúblico, son: a) deber de probidad (art. 3 Ley contra\r\nla Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública),\r\nb) deber de cumplimiento de los principios del servicio público - continuidad,\r\neficiencia, adaptación al cambio en el régimen legal e igualdad de trato- (art. 4 Ley General de la Administración Pública),\r\nc) deber de cautelar un adecuado ambiente de control interno (art. 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno) d) deber de\r\nproteger el interés superior de los niños y las niñas (art.\r\n4 y 5 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) e) deber de cumplir el\r\nordenamiento jurídico (art. 13 y concordantes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública,\r\nart. 39.a del Estatuto de Servicio Civil), f) deber\r\nde dar pronta respuesta e información al usuario (art.\r\n5 y 10 de la Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites\r\nAdministrativos), g) deber de obediencia (art. 108 de\r\nla Ley General\r\nde la\r\n Administración Pública), h) deber de actuar con eficacia (art. 5 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera\r\ny Presupuestos Públicos) i) deber de guardar decoro y de brindar debida atención\r\nal usuario (art. 114 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública\r\ny art. 39. d) y e) del Estatuto de Servicio Civil) j)\r\ndeber de responder en caso de haber actuado con dolo o culpa grave (art. 199 y 211 Ley General de la Administración Pública)\r\nk) deber de acatar la\r\n Constitución Política (art. 11 de\r\ndicho cuerpo normativo). Adicionalmente, de manera supletoria, con base en el\r\nartículo nueve de la Ley\r\n General de la Administración Pública\r\ny cincuenta y uno del indicado Estatuto, le son aplicables a dicha relación de\r\nempleo público, de manera supletoria, las disposiciones propias del Código de\r\nTrabajo y demás disposiciones relacionadas con la relación de trabajo, como por\r\nempleo la Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, Ley de\r\nRegulación del Fumado, Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con\r\nDiscapacidad, entre otras. En este orden de ideas, si bien en materia de empleo\r\npúblico no podemos hablar de una plena integración del ordenamiento jurídico y\r\nprincipios en materia laboral habida cuenta de la existencia de una relación\r\nestatutaria y no contractual, (artículo 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública),\r\nno puede obviarse la existencia de líneas generales de orientación de la relación\r\nque son comunes, como por ejemplo, la aplicación del principio de buena fe\r\nentre ambas partes, contemplado en el artículo diecinueve del Código de\r\nTrabajo. En cuanto al ingreso, la norma constitucional establece como máxima el\r\nprincipio de idoneidad comprobada (ver votos de Sala Constitucional 12005-01,\r\n5113-01, 3502-94, 1704-92, entre muchos otros), de suerte que no basta con la\r\nprestación efectiva de la labor de manera eficiente y la acreditación de los\r\natestados correspondientes, sino que deben establecer una serie de requisitos\r\nque determinan que entre los diferentes postulantes la persona electa\r\nrepresenta aquella que mejor satisfaga los intereses públicos, bajo parámetros\r\nrazonablemente objetivos, aún cuando no se trata de un acto reglado en sí\r\nmismo. Valoración que se realiza en un momento determinado a partir de un\r\nregistro existente en esa fecha. Dicha regla de ingreso comprende tanto el\r\ninicio de la relación público laboral en propiedad, como el ascenso en los\r\ndiferentes niveles de la estructura; toda vez que la carrera administrativa está\r\nregida por el mismo principio. Con relación al régimen disciplinario a aplicar\r\nen caso de incumplimiento de dichos deberes, de conformidad con sendos votos de\r\nla Sala\r\n Constitucional, el principio de tipicidad se torna más laxo,\r\npor lo que no se requiere una específica tipificación legal de la conducta,\r\ndada la naturaleza misma de la situación jurídica de los servidores; básicamente\r\nambos principios tornan en una condición relativa, con relación al derecho\r\npenal y aceptan la existencia de normas de menor rango a la ley en sentido\r\nformal para establecer las conductas contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico (en\r\neste sentido, el voto 2007-013903 de las quince horas y veinticinco minutos del\r\ntres de octubre del dos mil siete y 2005-06616 de las veinte horas con\r\ncincuenta y ocho minutos del treinta y uno de mayo del dos mil cinco y 94-5594\r\nde las quince horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del veintisiete de setiembre de mil\r\nnovecientos noventa y cuatro de la Sala Constitucional).\r\nEn razón de lo anterior, son sancionables, tanto el incumplimiento de los\r\ndeberes funcionales generales, como las conductas tipificadas legalmente (a\r\nnivel de Estatuto correspondiente de Servicio Civil, Código de Trabajo, por\r\nejemplo), y aquellas que se encuentren contempladas en normas de carácter\r\ninferior, como las contenidas en los reglamentos autónomos de servicio o en los\r\ncasos en los cuales la tipificación se de con respecto a la sanción a imponer.\r\nLas anteriores consideraciones, sin perjuicio de que existen una serie de\r\nprincipios del derecho sancionatorio, de necesario\r\ncumplimiento en todos los casos, v.g.\r\nproporcionalidad, non bis in idem, inocencia, debido\r\nproceso, debida fundamentación de la resolución respectiva. En este orden de\r\nideas, es de advertir que en materia de definición de conductas que pueden ser\r\nconsideradas como parte de los deberes propios de los funcionarios públicos u\r\nobjeto de sanción en caso de incumplimiento, nuestro país posee un sistema\r\ndifuso, habida cuenta que las mismas no se encuentran detalladas en un solo\r\ncuerpo normativo, sino dispersas entre diferentes normas de distinto rango,\r\nprivando mayor especificidad en las normas reglamentarias que cada ente opte\r\npor dictar. Lo anterior, de conformidad con las potestades auto normativas de la Administración Pública,\r\ny de la imposibilidad de que por la vía legal se puedan normar todas y cada una\r\nde las conductas concretas en que incurren los servidores públicos, y en el\r\nentendido de que el ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria se encuentra\r\nlimitado por el marco general del ordenamiento supra\r\nlegal. De manera transversal a este conjunto de principios y normas de\r\ndiferente rango, en esta materia encontramos el interés público como un\r\nreferente constante en la adopción de cualquier decisión o conducta formal o\r\ninformal de la Administración con respecto a sus servidores. Dicho interés\r\nentendido de conformidad con el artículo ciento trece de la Ley General de la Administración Pública,\r\ndispone: \"1. El servidor público deberá desempeñar sus funciones de\r\nmodo que satisfagan primordialmente el interés público, el cual será\r\nconsiderado como la expresión de los intereses individuales coincidentes de los\r\nadministrados. 2. El interés público prevalecerá sobre el interés de la Administración Pública\r\ncuando pueda estar en conflicto. 3. En la apreciación del interés público se\r\ntendrá en cuenta, en primer lugar, los valores de seguridad jurídica y justicia\r\npara la comunidad y el individuo, a los que no puede en ningún caso anteponerse\r\nla mera conveniencia\". En razón de lo anterior, todo análisis en\r\nmateria de empleo público no debe obviar el análisis del cumplimiento del interés\r\npúblico en la adopción de la respectiva decisión administrativa, como\r\nfundamental referente de su motivación subyacente. Referente a los servidores\r\ninterinos, la jurisprudencia patria a sostenido la tesis de la estabilidad\r\nimpropia de los trabajadores interinos en el sector público, de suerte que si\r\nbien a los trabajadores en propiedad no procede su cese salvo en los supuestos\r\nde despido causado o por proceso de reestructuración, en el caso de los\r\nservidores temporales no pueden ser removidos de sus puestos para ser\r\nsustituidos por otros funcionarios, también designados provisionalmente, si no\r\nexiste una causa legítima para esa remoción, como sería que el propietario de\r\nla plaza regrese a ella, que se nombre, en propiedad y previo concurso, a\r\nalguien más; o que el segundo interino nombrado tenga mejores atestados (v las\r\nsentencias 867-91 de las 15:08 horas del 3 de mayo de 1991, 2005-11450 de las\r\n10:47 horas del 26 de agosto de 2005, 2006-4050 de las 16:02 horas del 28 de\r\nmarzo de 2006 y 2007-7650 de las 16:59 horas del 31 de mayo de 2007 de la Sala Constitucional).\r\nLa regla puede aplicarse, además, a aquellos casos en los que simplemente se\r\ndeje vencer el nombramiento a plazo del funcionario interino y el nuevo lapso\r\nde nombramiento se haga recaer en alguien más. \n\r\n\r\n\nV.-\n\r\n\r\n\nSobre los efectos del síndrome de\r\ndependencia del alcohol o de alguna droga, como causal objetiva de terminación\r\nde una relación de empleo público: Entiende este Colegio por este síndrome un\r\nconjunto de síntomas observados cuando un individuo consume en abundancia según\r\nsu capacidad física por un período prologando, reduce o detiene el consumo de\r\nalcohol u otra droga sea esta autorizada o no, en las condiciones ya dichas. El\r\nabuso de cualquier droga conduce a la tolerancia, dependencia física, y a un\r\nposterior síndrome de abstinencia. El síndrome de abstinencia es principalmente\r\ndebido a que el sistema nervioso central se mantiene en un estado de hiperexcitabilidad. A diferencia de la mayoría de los otros\r\nsíndromes de abstinencia provocado por otras drogas,\r\nen el caso del alcohol, éste puede llegar a ser fatal. El síndrome puede\r\nincluir una serie de síntomas neurológicos, con delírium trémens\r\nlo que puede conducir a una excitotoxicidad.\r\nInicialmente, el derecho trató el tema como una conducta inapropiada por sí,\r\nproducto de una vida licenciosa, más de manera reciente se ha considerado como\r\nuna enfermedad, con las correspondientes consecuencias jurídicas. Los efectos\r\nde la ingesta de licor por parte del trabajador, es tratada en la legislación\r\ncostarricense aplicable al régimen de empleo privado y supletoriamente al público,\r\ncomo parte de los supuestos de las conductas prohibidas contempladas en el artículo\r\nsetenta y dos inciso c) del Código de Trabajo. En este sentido, dicho cuerpo\r\nnormativo establece al respecto, lo siguiente: “Queda absolutamente\r\nprohibido a los trabajadores (…) c) Trabajar en estado de embriaguez o bajo\r\ncualquier otra condición análoga” De manera complementaria a dicha norma,\r\nel artículo ochenta y uno inciso i) del mismo código, prevé la reiteración de\r\nla conducta como causal de sanción disciplinaria, de la siguiente manera: “Cuando\r\nel trabajador después de que el patrono lo aperciba una vez, incurra en las\r\ncausales previstas por los incisos a, b, c, d y e del artículo 72 ” . Como se advierte, las\r\nnormas dichas contemplan el ejercicio de la actividad bajo el efecto del\r\nconsumo de licor, o sea la situación de embriaguez o ebriedad, mas no prevé en\r\ntales casos un despido per se, sino que requiere un\r\napercibimiento previo por parte del patrono. Lo anterior, en tanto que el\r\nlegislador no revistió de suficiente gravedad la conducta como para que\r\nprocediera un despido automático con la sola comisión de la falta dicha. Ambas\r\nnormas se aplican, no sólo a la persona que padece como tal el síndrome de\r\ndependencia del alcohol, sino también a quienes sufren de consecuencias\r\nocasionales o esporádicas con motivo del consumo del licor en el propio centro\r\nde trabajo. Con respecto al abandono de trabajo con motivo del indicado síndrome,\r\ndebe hacerse referencia a lo indicado en el inciso a) del mencionado artículo\r\nsetenta y dos, en tanto prohíbe: \"Abandonar el trabajo en horas de labor\r\nsin causa justificada o sin licencia del patrono\". Dicha norma se\r\naplica al servidor que en horas laborales se encontrase ingiriendo licor o bajo\r\nlos efectos de éste. En este caso, también el artículo ochenta y uno inciso\r\nprimero citado ut supra sería\r\nde aplicación y por consiguiente, se requiere la reiteración del acto, previo\r\napercibimiento, para que proceda el despido, de conformidad con lo indicado por\r\nla norma en mención. Con relación al trabajador que no se presenta a laborar, -\r\nincluido el caso en que dicha ausencia se da con motivo de la ingesta del\r\nlicor- el inciso g) del indicado artículo ochenta y uno, señala como causal de\r\nsanción, lo siguiente: \"Cuando el trabajador deje de asistir al trabajo\r\nsin permiso del patrono, sin causa justificada durante dos días consecutivos o\r\ndurante más de dos días alternos dentro del mismo mes- calendario\".\r\nComo un último supuesto en donde el indicado síndrome podría tener\r\nconsecuencias disciplinarias, sería la aplicación del inciso l) del artículo\r\nochenta y uno del Código de Trabajo, que establece: “Son causas justas que\r\nfacultan a patrono para dar por terminado el contrato de trabajo: l) Cuando el\r\ntrabajador incurra en cualquier otra falta grave a las obligaciones que le\r\nimponga el contrato”. En este caso estaríamos en el supuesto en el cual la\r\nindicada enfermedad posee una incidencia más directa en la ejecución de la\r\nrelación de trabajo y por ende el consumo de alcohol implica afectación a\r\nelementos propios del contrato realidad o de aquel que fuera suscrito, como por\r\nejemplo, disminución del rendimiento del trabajo, incidencia en accidentes de\r\ntrabajo, trastornos de conducta o afectación a relaciones interpersonales.\r\nEstos casos tienen implícito una mayor habitualidad en el consumo del licor y\r\nuna más sensible consecuencia de éste. Por su parte, con respecto a la existencia\r\nde normas concretas de aplicación al régimen de empleo público, es de advertir\r\nque el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y su reglamento son omisos al tratar en forma\r\nexplícita el síndrome de alcoholismo como conducta sancionable. En esta\r\nmateria, a nivel legal, únicamente se advierte en tal sentido, el artículo\r\nochenta y uno de la Ley\r\n General de Policía que establece como falta grave, \"La\r\nembriaguez habitual o el uso de drogas no autorizadas durante el servicio\".\r\nEn razón de lo anterior, también procedería por integración, la aplicación de\r\nlas indicadas normas del Código de Trabajo, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en\r\nel artículo doscientos seis del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, en tanto establece\r\nlo siguiente: \"En cuanto no contraríen el texto y los procedimientos\r\nreferentes a la organización del Tribunal, que contiene este título, se aplicarán\r\nsupletoriamente las disposiciones de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y del Código de\r\nTrabajo\". Han sido los votos de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia, los que han venido a completar dicho vacío respecto al tratamiento de\r\nla persona trabajadora alcohólica y los efectos de sus ausencias por tal\r\nmotivo, con algunas consideraciones de relevancia. En este orden de ideas, el\r\nvoto de la Sala Segunda\r\nde la Corte Suprema\r\nde Justicia, N° 182, de las 10:20 horas del 23 de\r\nmarzo del 2001, expresa con gran claridad el carácter de enfermedad del síndrome\r\nde dependencia del alcohol, e introduce una nueva condición para la adopción de\r\nmedidas sancionatorias para el trabajador que lo\r\npadezca de la siguiente manera: \n\r\n\r\n\n\" De los lineamientos que, sobre esta\r\nmateria, ha dictado la O.I.T., se extrae que debe dársele\r\nun trato distinto a la enfermedad del alcoholismo respecto de los demás\r\npadecimientos que puedan afectar al trabajador. Su especialidad consiste en\r\nque, tratándose de un enfermo alcohólico, sería recomendable que el empleador\r\nle brindase una oportunidad para que intente rehabilitarse, antes de proceder a\r\ndespedirlo por ese motivo...... La política patronal, entonces, no debería ser sancionatoria, sino más bien dirigida a presionar al\r\ntrabajador para que busque y obtenga ayuda. El artículo 29 de la Ley General de Salud, Nº 5395 de 30 de octubre de 1973 dispone: “Las personas con\r\ntrastornos emocionales severos así como las personas con dependencia del uso de\r\ndrogas u otras sustancias, incluidos los alcohólicos, podrán someterse\r\nvoluntariamente a tratamiento especializado ambulatorio o de internamiento en\r\nlos servicios de salud y deberán hacerlo cuando lo ordene la autoridad\r\ncompetente, por estimarlo necesario, según los requisitos que los reglamentos\r\npertinentes determinen” . De ello se desprende que, en nuestro país, el\r\nempleador no puede obligar al trabajador a someterse a tratamiento alguno, pero\r\nsí puede informarlo, asesorarlo o remitirlo para que lo reciba. Si el empleado\r\nse niega a colaborar, procede su despido sin mayores miramientos. Las\r\nconsideraciones expuestas, por su enorme trascendencia social y económica, sólo\r\ndeben tenerse para aquellos trabajadores que acrediten, por medios idóneos, ser\r\ndependientes del alcohol, y así se concluya luego de analizar su comportamiento\r\ngeneral en el desarrollo de la relación laboral. Como última observación, cabe\r\ndestacar que el alcoholismo es una enfermedad incurable, pero tratable. Por\r\nello, el que sea incurable no da licencia para consumir ni para justificar las\r\nfaltas en que, por ese motivo, incurran los trabajadores. Al empleador no se le\r\npuede imponer una carga de tal magnitud, sino tan sólo la de brindarle una\r\noportunidad al afectado, quien, si no la aprovecha y continúa dando problemas,\r\npuede perfectamente ser despedido (aunque, por ejemplo, presente un dictamen médico\r\nque haga constar sus problemas de salud provocados por el alcoholismo, con el\r\nfin de tratar de justificar sus ausencias). Es, entonces, dentro de estos\r\nlineamientos, que cabe considerar al alcoholismo-enfermedad como una falta\r\ngrave, en los términos del artículo 81 inciso l) del Código de Trabajo\". \n\r\n\r\n\nTambién pueden consultarse los votos\r\n375 de las 9:10 del 30 de julio de 2003; 286 de las 10:10 del 28 de abril del\r\n2004, 106 de las 9:30 del 18 de febrero del 2005; 387 de las 10:35 del 18 de\r\nmayo del 2005, 342-2009 de 29 de abril de 2009, 00183-2010 de 5 de febrero de\r\n2010, entre otros, de la\r\n indicada Sala. En el mismo orden de ideas, a partir del voto\r\n2010-1664 de las 15:08 horas del 27 de enero del 2010, la Sala Constitucional\r\nadopta la tesis de la\r\n Sala Segunda, al indicar lo siguiente: \n\r\n\r\n\n“ III. EL ALCOHOLISMO COMO ENFERMEDAD Y LA NECESIDAD DE OTORGARLE\r\nAL TRABAJADOR LA POSIBILIDAD DE REHABILITARSE. (…) en una reunión\r\nde Expertos en Ginebra, Suiza realizada en enero de 1995, se examinaron una\r\nserie de recomendaciones prácticas sobre el tratamiento de los problemas\r\nrelacionados con el consumo de alcohol y drogas en los lugares de trabajo.\r\nEstas pautas se encuentran recogidas en el documento conocido como Repertorio\r\nde recomendaciones prácticas de la Organización\r\n Internacional del Trabajo, sobre el tratamiento de cuestiones\r\nrelacionadas con el alcohol y drogas en el lugar de trabajo , Ginebra, 1996....\r\nDesde esta perspectiva, al considerarse al alcoholismo como un problema de\r\nsalud, se establece la obligación de tratarlo sin discriminación como otra\r\nenfermedad más y se enmarca su tratamiento dentro del alcance de los servicios\r\nde salud (públicos o privados) según corresponda. En este esquema de abordaje,\r\nse dispuso que los patronos, preferiblemente, deben conceder a los trabajadores\r\nalcohólicos, la oportunidad de someterse a rehabilitación para superar su\r\nenfermedad sin ningún tipo de discriminación, antes de aplicar sanciones\r\ndisciplinarias. Ciertamente, se reconoció la posibilidad del patrono de\r\nsancionar las conductas impropias del trabajador producto del consumo del\r\nalcohol u otras drogas, no obstante, de previo a la adopción de cualquier\r\nmedida disciplinaria, deberá remitir al trabajador para que se someta a\r\nrehabilitación y tratamiento, siendo que, en caso que no exista una respuesta\r\nafirmativa de su parte, podrá aplicar la sanción correspondiente conforme la\r\nlegislación vigente. (…) Dentro de este esquema, debe considerarse el papel que\r\njuega la rehabilitación de la persona alcohólica, el hecho de contar con un\r\ntrabajo estable, lo que le permite sentirse productivo y reducir el grado de zzación (sic) y estigmatización. Tanto es así, que en las\r\nrecomendaciones supra citadas, se reconoció que la\r\nestabilidad que ofrece un empleo se constituye, frecuentemente, en un factor\r\nimportante para facilitar la superación de los problemas relacionados con el\r\nconsumo de alcohol o de drogas. Al ser nuestro país miembro de la Organización\r\n Internacional del Trabajo, estas pautas, —aún (sic) cuando\r\ntienen carácter recomendativo— en atención al\r\nprincipio pro homine,\r\nsirven para integrar e interpretar el Derecho de la Constitución, en el tanto\r\notorgan mayor protección a los derechos fundamentales de las personas. (…) De\r\notra parte, en la Ley\r\n General de Salud, No.5395, en el artículo 29 se establece que\r\nlas personas con dependencia del uso de drogas u otras sustancias, incluidos\r\nlos alcohólicos, pueden someterse, voluntariamente, a tratamiento especializado\r\nambulatorio o de internamiento en los servicios de salud. De lo expuesto se\r\ndeduce que el patrono debe brindarle al trabajador la posibilidad de tratarse y\r\nrehabilitarse antes de aplicar el régimen disciplinario, de modo que si no\r\naprovecha tal oportunidad, podría, entonces, aplicar la sanción\r\ncorrespondiente. Eso sí, debe quedar claro que al trabajador le corresponderá\r\nacreditar por medios idóneos, su dependencia al alcohol y en su caso, estar\r\nrecibiendo tratamiento o terapia. ” \n\r\n\r\n\nAsimismo, en este sentido, entre\r\notros, podemos determinar el voto 08617-2011 de cinco horas y cincuenta y nueve\r\nminutos del veintiocho de junio de dos mil once de la misma Sala. Lo\r\nanteriormente resuelto por ambas Salas se desprende - y así se cita de manera\r\nexpresa- del documento denominado “Tratamiento de cuestiones relacionadas con\r\nel alcohol y las drogas en el lugar de trabajo ” aprobado por el Consejo de\r\nAdministración de la OIT en la\r\n reunión N°\r\n262, marzo-abril de 1995 y que tiene como antecedentes el documento de dicha\r\norganización denominado \"Iniciativas en el lugar de trabajo para prevenir\r\ny reducir los problemas causados por el alcohol y otras drogas\" de 1988.\r\nCon respecto a este tema, la Organización Internacional\r\ndel Trabajo, en concordancia con lo establecido por la Organización Mundial\r\nde la Salud (OMS) determinó que el alcoholismo es una enfermedad, y por ello,\r\ndebe brindársele la oportunidad al trabajador de someterse a tratamiento, esto\r\nde previo a aplicarle sanciones disciplinarias o el despido. En ese sentido, la\r\nOMS indicó: “- Las políticas y los programas en materia de consumo de\r\nalcohol y de drogas deberían promover la prevención, la reducción y el\r\ntratamiento de los problemas relacionados con el consumo de alcohol y de drogas\r\nque se plantean en el lugar de trabajo. Este repertorio se aplica a todos los\r\ntipos de empleo, públicos y privados, incluidos los del sector no estructurado.\r\nLa legislación y la política nacional relativas a estos problemas deberían\r\nestablecerse tras consulta con las organizaciones de empleadores y de\r\ntrabajadores más representativas. - Los problemas relacionados con el consumo\r\nde alcohol y de drogas deberían considerarse como problemas de salud y, por\r\nconsiguiente, tratarse, sin discriminación alguna, como cualquier otro problema\r\nde salud en el trabajo y quedar dentro del alcance de los servicio de salud (públicos\r\no privados), según corresponda. (…) - La estabilidad que ofrece un empleo es a\r\nmenudo un factor importante para facilitar la superación de los problemas\r\nrelacionados con el consumo de alcohol o de drogas. Por esta razón, los copartícipes\r\nsociales deberían reconocer el papel especial que el lugar de trabajo puede\r\ndesempeñar para ayudar a las personas que tienen estos problemas. - Los\r\ntrabajadores que quieran recibir tratamiento y rehabilitación para sus\r\nproblemas relacionados con el consumo de alcohol o de drogas no deberían ser\r\nobjeto de discriminación por parte del empleador y deberían gozar de la\r\nseguridad del empleo usual y de las mismas oportunidades de traslado y ascenso\r\nprofesional que sus colegas. - Debería reconocerse que el empleador tiene\r\nautoridad para sancionar a los trabajadores cuya conducta profesional sea\r\nimpropia como consecuencia de problemas relacionados con el consumo de alcohol\r\no de drogas. Sin embargo, es preferible que los remitan a los servicios de\r\nasesoramiento, tratamiento y rehabilitación en vez de aplicarles sanciones\r\ndisciplinarias. Si un trabajador no colaborara plenamente con el tratamiento,\r\nel empleador podrá tomar las medidas disciplinarias que considere oportunas. (…)”\r\n(el destacado es nuestro). Ahora bien, en aplicación de lo anterior, la Organización\r\n Internacional del Trabajo realizó las siguientes\r\nrecomendaciones: \" 9. Intervención y medidas disciplinarias 9.1.\r\nPreferencia por el tratamiento en vez de las medidas disciplinarias 9.1.1. El\r\nempleador debería considerar los problemas de alcohol o de drogas como un\r\nproblema de salud. En tales casos, el empleador debería normalmente ofrecer\r\nservicios de asesoramiento, tratamiento y rehabilitación a los trabajadores,\r\nantes de considerar la aplicación de medidas disciplinarias. 9.2. Papel del\r\nempleador en relación con la aplicación de medidas disciplinarias 9.2.1. Debería\r\nreconocerse que el empleador tiene autoridad para sancionar a los trabajadores\r\ncuya conducta profesional sea impropia como consecuencia de problemas\r\nrelacionados con el alcohol o las drogas. Sin embargo, es preferible que los\r\nremitan a los servicios de asesoramiento, tratamiento y rehabilitación en vez\r\nde aplicarles sanciones disciplinarias. Si un trabajador no colabora plenamente\r\ncon el tratamiento, el empleador podrá tomar las medidas disciplinarias que\r\nconsidere oportunas\". (dwt.oit.or.cr/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc). Estas consideraciones no pueden obviarse si\r\natendemos a lo dispuesto en el artículo quince del Código de Trabajo, en tanto\r\ndispone que \" Los casos no previstos en este Código, en sus Reglamentos\r\no en sus leyes supletorias o conexas, se resolverán de acuerdo con los\r\nprincipios generales de Derecho de Trabajo, la equidad, la costumbre o el uso\r\nlocales; y en defecto de éstos se aplicarán, por su orden, las disposiciones\r\ncontenidas en los Convenios y Recomendaciones adoptados por la Organización Internacional\r\nde Trabajo en cuanto no se opongan a las leyes del país, y los principios y\r\nleyes de derecho común”. Dicha norma es aplicable, de conformidad con el\r\nartículo nueve in fine de la\r\n Ley General de la Administración Pública\r\ny doscientos seis del Estatuto de Servicio Civil (principio general que también\r\nes aplicable a los entes públicos menores, en cuanto no dispongan de norma\r\nexpresa al respecto, sin perjuicio que el mismo ordenamiento jurídico\r\nadministrativo establece su prelación. De conformidad con lo anterior, se\r\nevidencia que para que las ausencias con motivo del alcoholismo-enfermedad\r\npuedan ser sancionadas, se requiere que el trabajador haya desaprovechado\r\noportunidades las brindadas previamente para su debida rehabilitación. No es\r\nposible entonces, la sanción al que padece la enfermedad de análisis, en tales\r\nsupuestos, dada la naturaleza de afectación crónica a la salud que ella\r\nsignifica, si antes no se le ha brindado al enfermo la opción de que acuda a\r\ntratamiento. La Sala\r\n Segunda lo ha expresado de la siguiente manera: \" la\r\npotestad sancionatoria del empleador para despedir al\r\ntrabajador alcohólico (enfermo-dependiente) procede cuando no hay una respuesta\r\npositiva de su parte, una vez que se le ha dado la opción de asesorarse,\r\ntratarse y rehabilitarse...\" \n\r\n\r\n\n(Voto 00820-2007 de 11:10 de 31 de\r\noctubre de 2007). Debe advertirse que nuestra Sala si bien se funda en lo\r\nresuelto por la\r\n Organización Internacional del Trabajo, no llega a su nivel\r\nde exigencia en el sentido de financiar, brindar o gestionar servicios para el\r\ndependiente del alcohol, sino que lo pide al patrono es dar la posibilidad u\r\nopción de que el trabajador pueda asesorarse o tratarse a fin de rehabilitarse.\r\nNo obstante, tampoco puede ser considerado el padecimiento como algo que debe\r\nser tolerado por siempre por el empleador, - no es un fuero que otorgue una\r\nestabilidad encubierta al trabajador- en tanto que una vez cumplida la\r\nposibilidad de rehabilitación y superación de la enfermedad, si ésta no fue\r\nexitosa, sí se abre la posibilidad de despido por tal motivo. Tampoco significa\r\nque se le releve del cumplimiento de las obligaciones inherentes al contrato de\r\ntrabajo o se le excuse por dicho motivo faltas, sino que al ser una enfermedad,\r\ncon base en la tutela al derecho a la salud, se otorga una posibilidad para que\r\nel afectado busque tratamiento, de manera tal que éste no incida aún más en sus\r\nrelaciones personales y laborales. Como se evidencia, la actuación de las\r\npartes en la relación de empleo, siempre estará en estos supuestos permeada por\r\nla buena fe, habida cuenta que la oportunidad brindada al trabajador es un límite\r\nno sólo para el patrono en cuanto al despido, sino también para aquel, en\r\ncuanto a su actuación general y cumplimiento de sus obligaciones laborales. Las\r\nanteriores consideraciones no enervan la posibilidad de que en caso de\r\nincurrirse en una falta grave - régimen de empleo privado- o actuarse con dolo\r\no culpa grave - empleo público- se apliquen sanciones disciplinarias con motivo\r\nde conductas originadas con motivo del síndrome de análisis. No es óbice\r\nindicar que la asistencia o permanencia en un centro de rehabilitación, debe\r\nestar orientada hacia un objetivo buscado por el sujeto que sufre el\r\npadecimiento. Es decir, no es procedente el internamiento por el internamiento mismo,\r\nsin un resultado al menos mediato y tangible. Si la persona busca ingresar a un\r\ncentro especializado, no deberá ser para justificar una ausencia ante su\r\npatrono o aparentar interés, sino que deberá tener un resultado positivo,\r\nevidente y evaluable, en su conducta y enfermedad, de manera tal que en un\r\nmediano plazo tenga incidencia no sólo en su ámbito personal, sino ante todo,\r\nlaboral, para garantizar su permanencia y ante todo, demostrar su buena fe e\r\ninterés en romper el círculo que le impide cumplir a cabalidad sus obligaciones\r\ncomo trabajador. Así, la participación en programas de prevención o\r\ntratamiento, deben ser orientados a promover cambios en el estilo de vida del\r\ntrabajador, con una actitud y conducta clara frente a su problema y con transparencia\r\nhacia su empleador. En este orden de ideas, los Tribunales de Trabajo han sido\r\nprudentes en cuanto al tema de las ausencias con motivo de la ingesta de licor,\r\ntal y como se desprende del voto 00127-2007 de 20 de marzo de 2007 del Tribunal\r\nde Trabajo Sección IV, en tanto indica: \n\r\n\r\n\n\"... si bien la regla general\r\nes que el trabajador está en la obligación de justificar su ausencia en el\r\nplazo de dos días (o aquél que dicte la normativa interna del ente de que se\r\ntrate), excepcionalmente se admiten casos en que puede realizarse tal\r\njustificación con posterioridad a ese término, cuando sea de imposible\r\ncumplimiento. En esa oportunidad se dijo que, dependiendo de su gravedad, un\r\nestado de ingesta alcohólica puede convertirse en una de esas situaciones, que\r\nimpiden cumplir con el plazo fijado para justificar la ausencia, si se toma en\r\ncuenta la situación que vive el alcohólico cuando entra en crisis: \"Bebe\r\nseguido durante días corridos; se emborracha ciegamente y sin remedio. Se\r\nolvida por completo de todo, la familia, el trabajo y hasta de comer y\r\nguarecerse\"\r\n(INSTITUTO NACIONAL SOBRE ALCOHOLISMO, Alcoholismo. Manual para educadores, San\r\nJosé, Enero, 1978, p.67). Sin embargo, en el caso concreto, no demostró el\r\nactor -como ineludiblemente le correspondía, artículo 317 del Código Procesal\r\nCivil- que durante todo el período en que se ausentó de su trabajo, se hubiese\r\nvisto afectado por una crisis alcohólica de una magnitud tal, que le impidiera\r\ncumplir con el mínimo de sus obligaciones laborales\". (En similar orden de\r\nideas, ver los votos número 182-2001 de las 10:20 horas, del 23 de marzo de\r\n2001, 00581-2007 de 3:30 de 22 de agosto de 2007 y 00123-2010 de 9:55 de 22 de\r\nenero de 2010 de la Sala\r\n Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). \n\r\n\r\n\nEn materia del régimen de empleo público\r\nno puede obviarse algunas consideraciones adicionales, en tanto que el Estatuto\r\nde Servicio Civil, en el artículo treinta y cinco, señala que: \"En\r\ntodos los casos, el servidor deberá notificar a su jefe inmediato lo antes\r\nposible, verbalmente o por escrito, las causas que le impiden asistir a su\r\ntrabajo. Por ninguna razón -salvo la de fuerza mayor- deberá esperar hasta el\r\nsegundo días de ausencia para notificarlo. Las ausencias al trabajo por\r\nenfermedad que excedan de cuatro días deberá justificarlas el servidor\r\nincapacitado con certificación emitida por la Caja Costarricense\r\nde Seguro Social, o en el Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Si la enfermedad lo\r\nafectara solamente hasta por cuatro días en un mismo mes calendario, podrá\r\njustificar dicha ausencia hasta por cuatro días por incapacidad que extienda el\r\nente asegurador o en su defecto, dictamen de un médico particular\".\r\nNorma que incluso presenta eco en el caso de los entes públicos menores, salvo\r\nque se presente una disposición diversa y especifica para su realidad. De\r\nconformidad con lo anterior, la justificación planteada por el servidor\r\nafectado por alcoholismo debe ser oportuna y por medio idóneo, excepto que por\r\nmotivos de crisis en su enfermedad se encuentre impedido. En tales casos, por principio\r\nde buena fe sería razonable aceptar una justificación tardía, debidamente\r\nacreditado, según lo indicado ut supra.\r\nDe manera adicional, no puede obviarse la existencia del interés público como\r\ninherente a toda relación de empleo público, por lo que en todo análisis, deberá\r\nponderarse éste a la par de la condición particular del servidor, habida cuenta\r\nque además de la oportunidad de tratamiento dicha, se debe valorar la eventual\r\nafectación que podría significar al interés de la colectividad, el hecho de que\r\nel funcionario desatienda dicha posibilidad y el demérito causado por la no\r\nprestación o cumplimiento defectuoso de sus obligaciones, así como el riesgo\r\nque podría significar la reiteración de una conducta para con los usuarios del\r\nservicio prestado. Hechas las anteriores consideraciones, procede entrar a\r\nresolver sobre el caso en específico sometido a conocimiento de este Tribunal. \n\r\n\r\n\nVI.-\n\r\n\r\n\nSobre el\r\nfondo del asunto: Conforme\r\ncon la pretensión acreditada por el señor actor, requiere como primera\r\npretensión el que se anule el procedimiento administrativo iniciado en su\r\ncontra, en virtud de corresponder a un acto persecutorio, lo que implicaría una\r\ndesviación de poder o al menos un vicio en el motivo de este, de suerte que no\r\nse fundamente su existencia. Al respecto advierte el Tribunal que el ente público\r\ndemandado actuó casi que complaciente durante un plazo de alrededor de un año,\r\npese a inconsistencias en la asistencia del Dr. Keith Aguilar. Dentro de dicho\r\nplazo es posible ubicar, como se aceptó como válida justificación el\r\ninternamiento en un centro de rehabilitación por un padecimiento aparentemente\r\nrelacionado con la ingesta de alcohol. Suma a lo antes dicho, que algunas de\r\nlas ausencias fueron justificadas con boletas de médico particular, pese que el\r\nordenamiento exige que dichos formularios sean validados por dispensarios de la Caja Costarricense\r\ndel Seguro Social o del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, según corresponda. En sí\r\nesos documentos (incapacidades de médico privado) no presentan el efecto incapacitante, más si evidencian una situación que podría\r\nser valorada por el patrono; en especial cuando fuere esporádica. Más en este\r\ncaso, las múltiples boletas sobre el particular, determinan que el accionante no tenía interés (o al menos no acreditó lo\r\ncontrario) de validar el documento privado conforme con el procedimiento legal.\r\nNo está demás agregar que por la profesión del actor, resulta imposible de\r\npretender interpretar que no conocía del tramite antes indicado, pues en su\r\ncondición de médico es lógico pensar (sana crítica racional) que conocía del\r\nprocedimiento antes expuesto. Al respecto la supuesta nulidad de las actas que\r\nsirvieron de base para la existencia del procedimiento, resulta ser un tema\r\nirrelevante, primero al no demostrarse, y por otro lado no menos importante, en\r\ntanto el principio de informalidad que cobija a la Administración determina que\r\nla nulidad sobre resulta procedente en aquellos vicios relevantes que afecten\r\nel derecho de defensa o que versen sobre aspectos sustanciales. En este caso,\r\nun acta como tal es una mera constancia de lo ocurrido, que bien puede\r\nreemplazarse prueba testimonial o por una constancia, de manera que se esta\r\ndando demasiada relevancia a un aspecto meramente formal. Amén de que según el\r\nrazonamiento del mismo actor, la supuesta nulidad se ubica en la falta de\r\ntestigos, como sí el ordenamiento exigiera una cantidad de testigos específica\r\npara una constancia de ausencia de un servidor. En cuanto a la supuesta\r\ncarencia de firmas, la situación apuntada fue argumentada sin que el órgano\r\njurisdiccional logre ubicar una constancia en dichas condiciones. En todo caso,\r\ny más relevante todavía, la Cámara tampoco logra ubicar que exista una\r\npersecución en la existencia de dicho procedimiento. Aún cuando el ente público,\r\nbajo alguno de sus personeros conocía de padecimiento del accionante,\r\neso no enerva la posibilidad de verificar las ausencias del actor, constatar si\r\ntodas se encuentran debidamente justificadas y en caso contrario establecer las\r\nsanciones disciplinarias que correspondan. Estamos en presencia de fondos públicos,\r\nlo que lleva aparejado que aún cuando no fuera causal de despido pretendiendo\r\ndarle alguna validez a las incapacidades de médico privado, lo cierto es que al\r\nno satisfacer los requisitos legales, estos documentos no habilitaban para el\r\npago de una incapacidad, lo que por sí ameritaba la existencia de un\r\nprocedimiento administrativo, en tanto acto ablatorio\r\no de gravámen en contra del actor. No puede olvidarse\r\nal respecto que el procedimiento administrativo es el mecanismo que presenta la\r\nAdministración para adoptar los actos administrativos formales que requiere, en\r\nconsecuencia se trata de una actividad lícita y normal; que en principio no\r\ndebería derivar necesariamente en responsabilidad alguna. Los sacrificios que\r\ndeben adoptar los particulares para afrontar ese tipo de procedimientos en\r\nprincipio se encuentran en la obligación de soportarlos, salvo en dos supuestos\r\ndiversos, cuando el procedimiento sea medio para encubrir una desviación de\r\npoder o un vicio en el motivo en general (en cuyo caso el acto se torna ilegítimo)\r\no en su defecto, cuando el sacrificio resulte tan especial, particular e\r\nintenso que aún siendo lícito por el principio de distribución de las cargas públicas,\r\nel particular no este en la obligación de soportarlo sin la correspondiente\r\nresponsabilidad. Conforme con el artículo trescientos diecisiete del Código\r\nProcesal Civil, es obligación de la parte que sostiene una aseveración dentro\r\nde un proceso el probar su dicho, no bastando con asegurarlo. Razonó en su\r\ndemanda el actor que por ser funcionario de confianza el no estaba supeditado a\r\nhorario alguno, lo que determina que la persecución se da desde el mismo\r\nmomento que la Administración estaba verificando el cumplimiento de su horario;\r\nal respecto este Colegio debe ser más que enfático. Un funcionario en régimen\r\nde confianza no es que no presente horario y que pueda hacer aquello que tenga\r\na bien con respecto al servicio que esta llamado a cumplir; pues a final de cuentas\r\nsiempre esta presente los fondos públicos. Siempre que se trata de un servidor\r\npúblico sus actividades esta supeditadas a la fiscalización en el ejercicio del\r\ncargo, lo que incluye verificar que se esta presentando a trabajar, pues bien\r\npodría ser que estuviera recibiendo un enriquecimiento injusto al cobrar un\r\nsalario por días que no ha prestado el servicio. Son dos cosas muy diferentes\r\nel ser funcionario de confianza a servidor a la libre sin ninguna vigilancia o\r\nsupervisión. Por el contrario, las reglas de control interno obligan a los\r\njerarcas subordinados para vigilar a sus subalterno,\r\nentre ellas esta el cumplimiento del horario y jornada, lo que lleva aparejado\r\nque incluso en servidores que no tienen que marcar horario igualmente deben ser\r\nvigilados en el cumplimiento de los fines y cometidos públicos. En este caso,\r\nel actor sostiene que el procedimiento administrativo resultaba injustificado,\r\nera fruto de una persecución en su contra o carecía del correspondiente motivo.\r\nMás sobre ninguno de esos tres escenarios se presentó prueba. Con respecto al\r\nacoso, baste decir que no sólo es necesaria su invocación, sino la demostración\r\nen juicio sobre sus presupuestos. Al respecto, el mismo ha sido definido por la Organización\r\n Internacional del Trabamo como una\r\n\"... acción verbal o psicológica de índole sistemática, repetida o\r\npersistente por la que, en el lugar de trabajo o en conexión con el trabajo, un\r\ngrupo de personas hiere a una víctima, la humilla, ofende o amedrenta (…)”. Con\r\nbase en lo anterior, la\r\n Sala Segunda ha indicado que estamos en presencia del acoso\r\nlaboral cuando se presente los siguientes presupuestos \"... a) que se\r\ntrate de alguna actitud, sin diferenciar si son gestos, palabras,\r\ncomportamientos; b) que sea un acto repetido, sistematizado; c) que sea un\r\nataque contra un trabajador, que degrade su ambiente de trabajo o ponga en\r\npeligro su empleo y, que atente contra su integridad, ya sea física o psicológica...\"\r\n(voto 2012-000984 de las diez horas quince minutos del\r\nveinticuatro de octubre de dos mil doce). Nada de esto ha sido demostrado en\r\njuicio y por consiguiente, no es de recibo este argumento de la parte actora.\r\nReiteramos que sobre la ausencia de motivo el Tribunal no logra ubicar ninguna\r\nconducta contraria a derecho, máxime cuando habían\r\nincapacidades disgregadas de varios días, además existe evidencia de que podría\r\nexistir afectaciones al servicio público. Existe un motivo anterior, de mayor\r\nrelevancia que impide aceptar la pretensión antes expuesta, como se ha indicado\r\nde manera reiterada la existencia de un procedimiento administrativo no genera\r\nestado por sí, se trata de un acto preparatorio, que no define estado o condición.\r\nSolo genera una expectativa de que eventualmente la Administración procederá a\r\ndictar un acto que bien puede ser negativo a los intereses del actor. Una\r\nposibilidad, sin seguridad alguna. Esa situación determina que el acto no\r\npretende un efecto susceptible de ser impugnado en esta sede. No esta de más\r\nagregar, que el actor cuando no fue prorrogado en su nombramiento en el Centro\r\nde Especialidades de la Caja ante un manifiesto abandono de trabajo que el\r\nmismo accionante realizó, si recibió un nombramiento\r\nulterior -varios meses después- en la región Huetar\r\n Norte, lo que nuevamente pone en evidencia que la supuesta\r\npersecución que reclama nunca se dió. Reiteramos que\r\nla Administración fue más que considerada con el actor en sus múltiples\r\nincapacidades, dejando al cubierto los aspectos propios a la ingesta de alcohol\r\nque pudiera estar afrontando el señor actor. Por último y no menos relevante,\r\nes de señalar que dicho procedimiento fue archivado por propia decisión de la\r\nAdministración al no poder ubicar al actor para notificarlo. Teniendo en cuenta\r\nque la existencia de un procedimiento administrativo archivado no genera estado\r\ncontrario a los intereses del gestionante por sí, en\r\ntanto no produce un efecto jurídico en la esfera del señor Keith Aguilar,\r\ncarece de todo interés absoluto alguna nulidad. La Administración rehusó\r\ngenerar algún efecto adverso a los intereses del gestionante.\r\nDe esa manera la excepción de falta de interés actual opuesta por la demandada\r\ndeba acogerse sin mayores cuestionamientos, en tanto aún aceptando que la\r\nexistencia de un procedimiento administrativo presenta efectos propios (lo que\r\ncomo ya indicamos también rechazamos) lo cierto es que al haber sido archivado\r\nel mismo carece de todo interés actual. Debiendo rechazarse la pretensión por\r\neste motivo. Como segunda pretensión se requiere la anulación de la renuncia\r\ndel señor actor. Al respecto los motivos de dicha nulidad se hicieron ver\r\ncon respecto a un supuesto vicio en la voluntad. Un acto jurídico se reputa voluntario\r\ncuando es serio, manifestado, sincero, libre y espontáneo. Si falla cualquiera\r\nde estas características estamos frente a un acto jurídico que no producirá sus\r\nefectos propios. Teniendo en cuenta estas características: es posible que\r\nexistan obstáculos en el discernimiento (la inmadurez y la insania),\r\nobstáculos en la intención (el error o ignorancia y el dolo) y obstáculos en la\r\nlibertad (la violencia, la simulación y el fraude, aunque algunos estudiosos\r\ndel derecho incluyen a la lesión). Cuando se presenten vicios del\r\nconsentimiento aquellos actos jurídicos que no hayan sido realizados con\r\nintención y libertad; mientras que los realizados sin discernimiento serán\r\nactos jurídicos inexistentes. En Derecho, se denominan vicios de la voluntad,\r\nvicios del consentimiento o vicios de los actos voluntarios a ciertos defectos\r\ncongénitos de ellos, susceptibles de producir la invalidez de los actos que los\r\npadecen. El error es la falsa representación mental de un objeto de\r\nconocimiento por ignorancia, o falta de conocimiento pleno sobre un objeto, o\r\npor falta de raciocinio, una intelección defectuosa. En este caso, no quedó\r\nclaro del argumento del señor actor exactamente cual tipo de error es el que se\r\nesta argumentando, a efectos de su valoración. Así no se indica si fue que el\r\nactor no sabía cual eran los efectos de su renuncia o sin por el contrario fue\r\npresionado para eso, de suerte que el efecto pretendido fuera diverso.\r\nCuriosamente, en ambos casos, la lógica sería que el señor actor debería\r\nproceder a reintegrar desde el momento que le fue depositado el importe que\r\ncorrespondiera a preaviso o cesantía, lo que no se encuentra acreditado.\r\nIncluso de la misma demanda se infiere que es el mismo actor quien pretendía se\r\nle cancelaran sus extremos laborales en virtud de encontrarse sin medios de\r\nvida desde hacía varios meses y que estos incluían todos los rubros que pudiera\r\nrecuperar. Lo que en la especie representó el pago de la cesantía por varios\r\nmillones de colones. Suma a lo antes dicho que a efectos de pedir la nulidad\r\ntampoco se invoca el incumplimiento especifico de alguno de los extremos de\r\nprocedimiento para conocer de las personas trabajadores que ingerir licor, según\r\nla normativa indicada en el considerando anterior. En pocas palabras, esta Cámara\r\nno logra ubicar un motivo de nulidad o vicio alguno en la voluntad que\r\ndetermine la invalidez de la renuncia antes dicha. De esa manera dicha pretensión\r\nno presenta abrigo y debe ser rechazada. Si considera este órgano\r\njurisdiccional que deben realizarse algunas aclaraciones. Entiende el Tribunal\r\nque al actor se le canceló cesantía en virtud de que se trataba de una relación\r\nde larga data que llegó a su fin por una situación no achacable (falta del\r\nactor) al señor actor; debiendo suponerse que debe existir alguna reglamentación\r\ninterna que obligaba a cancelar ese rubro. Téngase al respecto que el actor no\r\nfue prorrogado en su nombramiento no por la imposición de una sanción\r\ndisciplinaria que así lo dispusiera sino porque se dió\r\nel vencimiento de la relación laboral que presentaba en un momento en el cual\r\nel interesado llevaba varios días de ausencia injustificada, lo que hacía\r\npresumir que había abandono laboral evidente. En dicho marco, la Administración\r\ndefine no prorrogar el nombramiento sobre un puesto de confianza, en virtud de\r\nestarse presentando afectaciones al servicio público. Dicho acto no fue\r\nimpugnado por el interesado e incluso, logro gestionar meses después, para\r\nconseguir un nombramiento interino en la región huetar\r\nnorte, donde a final de cuentas también presenta inconsistencias en su\r\nasistencia. De manera ulterior y sin poder evidenciar que hubiera presión\r\ncontra el referido señor, presenta su renuncia. Lo anterior pues si se trataba\r\nde una mera renuncia del actor no procedería bajo las reglas generales del\r\nderecho privado o público, la cancelación de ese extremo. Ahora bien, en el\r\nexpediente aportado es posible constatar como el señor actor fue orientado a\r\npresentar su renuncia a fin de cancelarle sus extremos laborales, en tanto\r\nestaba vigente la relación de servicio. En esa condición podía encontrarse la\r\ncesantía, más no así presentaban la misma condición, los otros extremos como\r\nvacaciones, aguinaldo o salario escolar. En una buena técnica esos extremos\r\ndesde el momento que se había interrumpido el vínculo laboral, podían ser\r\nrequeridos por el interesado en el momento que lo tuviese a bien. La retención\r\ntemporal de esos extremos podría tener alguna justificante de orden social en\r\nlo diverso a las vacaciones, en la medida de pretender que el trabajador\r\nrecibiera lo correspondiente junto con los demás trabajadores ordinarios\r\n(aguinaldo y salario escolar), teniendo en cuenta el fin social que mueve a\r\nesos beneficios. Más en el caso de las vacaciones resulta injustificable. La\r\ndemandada debió cancelar ese extremo desde el mismo momento que fuera\r\nsolicitado, en tanto es un rubro carente de toda discusión. Otra preocupación\r\nque nos embarga es respecto a la información otorgada con respecto a la\r\nrenuncia del actor. La Administración de manera diligente orientó al señor accionante que para recibir el beneficio económico que\r\nesperaba debía renunciar, más no tuvo el correspondiente interés en informarle\r\nsi existía o no un plazo por el cual no puede laborar con esa administración en\r\nconcreto o de manera general. La Administración debe actuar con la debida\r\ntransparencia, lo que en este caso se cumplió. Desde la órbita del derecho\r\nlaboral ordinario esa renuncia solo hubiera traído aparejado la cancelación de\r\nlos extremos que constituyen derechos laborales (lo que dejaba por fuera el\r\npreaviso y la cesantía) lo que determinaría que el trabajador podría regresar a\r\nnuevo nombramiento en el momento que lo tuviera a bien, en tanto existiera algún\r\npuesto en el cual ser promoviera su nombramiento. Más en este caso se canceló\r\nel rubro de cesantía, es de suponer que por una norma interna propia de la Caja Costarricense\r\ndel Seguro Social. Los alcances de esa disposición particular debieron ser\r\nexplicados al momento de orientar al interesado a presentar su renuncia, si es\r\nque le produjeron algún efecto adverso. Esos aspectos determinan que la litigancia del actor no sean de\r\nmanera absoluta de mala fe. Con respecto a la pretensión se reinstalación la\r\nmisma fue razonada como derivada, de la nulidad invocada o de la persecución\r\nexpuesta, pero ambas motivaciones fueron rechazadas. De manera que esta\r\nsolicitud debe seguir la misma suerte. En tanto fue el mismo actor quien\r\nrenunció a partir de una situación que le resulta afín a sus intereses en aquel\r\nmomento, como lo es el pago de la liquidación, no es posible pretender\r\nreinstalar al señor accionante. Además debe indicarse\r\nque según expusieron los partes en el proceso, el doctor Keith Aguilar era\r\nfuncionario nombrado interino en puesto de confianza. Como tal se trata de un\r\ncargo de libre remoción, lo que impediría ser nuevamente nombrado en dicho\r\ncargo. Incluso, en un adecuado razonamiento no existiría un puesto específico\r\nal cual regresar, en la medida que el cargo en concreto no presenta un titular\r\npor su condición de confianza en lo que refiere a la condición del Centro de\r\nEspecialidades de la\r\n Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social y con respecto al puesto\r\nocupado en la región huetar norte, la condición era\r\nde interino en sustitución de un titular que se encontraba de vacaciones. De\r\nhecho a la fecha, este órgano jurisdiccional no tiene conocimiento a partir del\r\nexpediente administrativo de la existencia de algún limitante para que el actor\r\nregrese a algún puesto de la Caja demandada, en tanto satisfaga los requisitos\r\ny su perfil profesional corresponda a este, lo anterior además de la existencia\r\nde algún puesto sin titular o alguno en sustitución de este. De manera que de\r\nlo visible en la carpeta no es posible inferir que fruto de un actuar\r\nadministrativo no sea posible que el accionante logre\r\nconseguir otro cargo interino o eventualmente en propiedad, si satisface los\r\nrequisitos del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo. Lo que si resulta\r\nimposible de acceder a la reinstalación de un cargo sobre el cual no presenta\r\nderecho alguno. La cuarta solicitud tiene fundamento en que se cancelen los\r\nsalarios dejados de percibir desde la fecha del veintiuno de junio de dos mil nueve\r\nhasta su reinstalación más todas las garantías laborales, salario escolar,\r\naguinaldo y cuotas de la CCSS. Al respecto nuevamente estamos\r\nen presencia de una pretensión subsidiaria a las antes indicada, que como tal\r\ndebe ser rechazada al depender de otra que ha corrido la misma suerte. Siendo\r\nque el actor no ha logrado conseguir una resolución a su favor en cuanto a la\r\nnulidad peticionada, tampoco es posible considerar una reinstalación en el\r\npuesto y menos aún un pago de salarios caídos. Vease\r\ncomo sobre el puesto en el Centro de Especialidades Médicas, lo que se dió fue que la Administración tomo ese puesto para otras\r\nfunciones, siendo que el tercero interesado Calderón Céspedes lo esta ocupando\r\npara cumplir esas funciones. Sin que se pueda demostrar en el expediente que\r\nesa persona no presenta los atestados idóneos para esas actividades o que el señor\r\nKeith Aguilar presentaba mejores condiciones que este. Las actividades en el\r\nCentro de Especialidades no fueron retomadas por el nuevo interino. Mientras\r\nque en lo referente al puesto en la región huetar\r\nnorte, el nombramiento fue de manera transitoria en tanto se cubrían las\r\nvacaciones de otro funcionario quien se encontraba de vacaciones. En dicho\r\nmarco no es posible ubicar la existencia de algún derecho con respecto a\r\nnombramiento en especifico que permita el\r\nreconocimiento de salarios dejados de percibir. Debiendo ser rechazada. Con\r\nrespecto a la antepenúltima solicitud, a saber el pago del daño moral subjetivo\r\ny daño moral objetivo, ambos deben rechazarse. Como ya se indicó la\r\nexistencia del procedimiento administrativo resultó ser una conducta lícita y\r\nnormal, que si bien genera alguna afectación en los particulares no es posible\r\nindemnizar en condiciones normales en tanto el particular esta en la obligación\r\nde soportar. Lo pretendido por el actor no presenta abrigo en el ordenamiento\r\npatrio debiendo ser rechazado sin mayores cuestionamientos. No duda este órgano\r\nque el afrontar un procedimiento administrativo debe generar alguna afectación\r\nen el plano subjetivo, aún cuando se este seguro que no se va a dictar acto en\r\ncontra de los intereses personales; pero el ordenamiento jurídico no permite un\r\nreconocimiento patrimonial en esos casos, cuando el actor incurre en una\r\nconducta antijurídica. De suerte que nuevamente caemos en una falta de derecho.\r\nPor último es de indicar con respecto al daño moral objetivo, que no existe\r\nprueba al respecto que permita indicar que la imagen del señor accionante se vió afectada por\r\neste procedimiento, lo que determina un rechazo de esa solicitud conforme con\r\nel canon trescientos diecisiete del Código Procesal Civil. Referente al\r\nreconocimiento de intereses de indexación, la solicitud presenta un efecto\r\nderivado del reconocimiento de algún extremo de orden económico, los que en el\r\ncaso concreto no se han dado, por lo que debe rechazarse. Por último con\r\nrespecto a la relación laboral del señor Keith Aguilar y al pago de diferencias\r\nen los extremos laborales, el señor actor nunca llega a señalar con claridad\r\ncuales son los rubros que estaban mal calculados o los extremos que considera\r\nque se le adeudan en concreto, lo llega a señalar un rubro general a efectos de\r\nque el Tribunal determine de manera oficiosa cual extremo resulta faltante. Es\r\nde precisar sobre ese particular que este órgano jurisdiccional no puede\r\nsustituir a la parte, quien esta llamado a precisar con claridad esos rubros si\r\npretende que le sean reconocidos. En el juicio oral y público la única aclaración\r\nque se realizó fue que no se aseguraba la existencia de algún adeudo, sino que\r\nla solicitud tenía asidero en la eventualidad de que existiera algún remanente\r\npendiente. En esa condición se impone el rechazo de la solicitud sin mayores\r\ncuestionamientos.”",
  "body_en_text": "**IV.- Regarding the public employment regime:** Doctrine has established that \"the State possesses a single personality. It is a single legal entity, which can carry out activities governed by public law; or by private law (...) It is known that the State has two modes of action: one under the legal regime of public law; and another under the regime of private law.\" (González Ballar Rafael. Límites del derecho administrativo. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, page 95, 97; in the same sense Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, Tesis de derecho administrativo. Editorial Stradtmann, S.A, volume I, San José, 1998, page 85). Thus, \"every public entity, by the mere fact of being so, has the capacity to perform acts and business within the reach of private individuals, with the limitations and prohibitions established by law and the general principles of law.\" (Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, IBID, page 85). This position has been endorsed by the Courts of Justice on various occasions (by way of example, see from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Voto number 2006-03002, at ten hours and forty minutes on March ninth, two thousand six, as well as the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in voto number 10 at 15:45 hours on February 6, 1998). In this manner, depending on whether the Public Administration operates within the sphere of public law or private law, its labor regime will be one of public employment or private employment. The public employment regime corresponds to a personnel hiring system that differs substantially from that found in the private sector, which is based on Article one hundred ninety-two of the Political Constitution; it is essentially a single regime regulated by various statutes which, in essence, are subject to constitutionality and legality parameters, especially regarding the issues of proportionality and equality. Within this framework, there are a series of rights and obligations (see votes of the Constitutional Chamber 2883-96, 1420-91 and 1918-00) of a very diverse nature that define the relationship as diametrically different (see vote of the Constitutional Chamber 492317-03), under a series of principles such as legality, proven suitability, absence of free disposition of the relationship, subjection to public law schemes, relative job stability (inamovilidad relativa), right to reinstatement (in this regard, see votes 2012-6225 and 2000-04951 of the Constitutional Chamber), among others. Articles one hundred ninety-one and one hundred ninety-two of the Political Constitution form the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by establishing the following: \"Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration\" and \"Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, either due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.\" In accordance with the indicated constitutional norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of its own regulatory regime, relative stability in employment - limiting the regime of free removal characteristic of private labor regulation - and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons covered by a subordination regime, such as payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (with the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber). In the public employment regime, the principle of the real contract (contrato realidad), the foundation of labor law, is not applied; only rights contemplated in the statute are granted; the principle of formality of administrative activation, transparency, equality, and due process must be followed for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions; appointment through a competitive process that grants a subjective right; the resolutions of the hierarch are administrative acts; and the entity for which the service is provided has public assets and is subject to public law in its organization and activity and to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness. Correlative to the above rights, the public servant possesses a series of obligations of a functional nature, inherent to the public purposes sought by his activity and which must always guide his performance, so as not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary liability. Without attempting to be exhaustive, some of the duties characteristic of the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública), b) duty to comply with the principles of public service - continuity, efficiency, adaptation to change in the legal regime, and equality of treatment- (Art. 4 Ley General de la Administración Pública), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno) d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Art. 4 and 5 of the Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and concordant articles of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, Art. 39.a of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), h) duty to act effectively (Art. 5 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos) i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil) j) duty to respond in case of having acted with fraud or gross negligence (Art. 199 and 211 Ley General de la Administración Pública) k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, on a supplementary basis, based on Article nine of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and fifty-one of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Código de Trabajo and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, on a supplementary basis, such as the Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, the Ley de Regulación del Fumado, the Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad, among others. In this line of thought, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters, given the existence of a statutory and not contractual relationship, (Article 111 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), the existence of general guidelines for the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article nineteen of the Código de Trabajo. Regarding entry, the constitutional norm establishes as a maxim the principle of proven suitability (see votes of the Constitutional Chamber 12005-01, 5113-01, 3502-94, 1704-92, among many others), such that the effective provision of the work efficiently and the accreditation of the corresponding qualifications are not sufficient; rather, a series of requirements must be established that determine that among the different applicants, the elected person represents the one who best satisfies the public interests, under reasonably objective parameters, even though it is not a fully regulated act in itself. This assessment is carried out at a specific moment based on a record existing at that date. Said entry rule includes both the start of the public employment relationship in a permanent capacity and the promotion through the different levels of the structure; since the administrative career is governed by the same principle. In relation to the disciplinary regime to be applied in case of breach of said duties, in accordance with numerous votes of the Constitutional Chamber, the principle of specificity becomes more flexible, so a specific legal classification of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants; basically, both principles become a relative condition, in relation to criminal law, and accept the existence of norms of a lower rank than the law in the formal sense to establish conduct contrary to the legal system (in this sense, vote 2007-013903 at fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes on October third, two thousand seven and 2005-06616 at twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes on May thirty-first, two thousand five and 94-5594 at fifteen hours and forty-eight minutes on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four of the Constitutional Chamber). By reason of the foregoing, sanctionable conduct includes both the breach of general functional duties and legally classified conduct (at the level of the corresponding Estatuto de Servicio Civil, Código de Trabajo, for example), and those that are contemplated in norms of a lower rank, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations or in cases where the classification is given with respect to the sanction to be imposed. The foregoing considerations are without prejudice to the existence of a series of principles of sanctioning law, which are mandatory in all cases, e.g., proportionality, non bis in idem, presumption of innocence, due process, and adequate reasoning of the respective resolution. In this line of thought, it should be noted that in matters of defining conduct that can be considered as part of the duties of public officials or subject to sanction in case of non-compliance, our country has a diffuse system, given that these are not detailed in a single normative body but are dispersed among different norms of different ranks, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to issue. This is in accordance with the self-regulatory powers of the Public Administration, and the impossibility that every single concrete conduct incurred by public servants can be regulated through legislation, and with the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal system. Across this set of principles and norms of different ranks, in this matter, we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any decision or formal or informal conduct by the Administration regarding its servants. Said interest, understood in accordance with Article one hundred thirteen of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, provides: \"1. The public servant must perform his functions in such a way that they primarily satisfy the public interest, which will be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the assessment of the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be considered, first and foremost, to which mere convenience can in no case be preferred.\" By reason of the foregoing, any analysis in public employment matters must not ignore the analysis of the fulfillment of the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference point for its underlying motivation. Referring to temporary (interinos) servants, national jurisprudence has held the thesis of the improper stability of temporary workers in the public sector, such that while permanent (en propiedad) workers cannot be dismissed except in cases of justified dismissal or a restructuring process, in the case of temporary servants, they cannot be removed from their positions to be replaced by other also provisionally appointed officials, if there is no legitimate cause for that removal, such as the permanent holder of the position returning to it, someone else being appointed permanently and through a prior competitive process; or the second appointed temporary worker having better qualifications (see judgments 867-91 at 15:08 hours on May 3, 1991, 2005-11450 at 10:47 hours on August 26, 2005, 2006-4050 at 16:02 hours on March 28, 2006 and 2007-7650 at 16:59 hours on May 31, 2007 of the Constitutional Chamber). This rule may also be applied to those cases where the fixed-term appointment of the temporary official is simply allowed to expire and the new appointment period is assigned to someone else.\n\n**V.-**\n\n**On the effects of alcohol or drug dependence syndrome as an objective cause for termination of a public employment relationship:** This Chamber understands this syndrome as a set of symptoms observed when an individual who consumes abundantly according to his physical capacity for a prolonged period, reduces or stops the consumption of alcohol or another drug, whether authorized or not, under the conditions already mentioned. The abuse of any drug leads to tolerance, physical dependence, and a subsequent withdrawal syndrome. The withdrawal syndrome is mainly due to the central nervous system being maintained in a state of hyperexcitability. Unlike most other withdrawal syndromes caused by other drugs, in the case of alcohol, this can be fatal. The syndrome can include a series of neurological symptoms, with delirium tremens which can lead to excitotoxicity. Initially, the law treated the issue as inappropriate conduct in itself, the product of a licentious life, but recently it has been considered a disease, with the corresponding legal consequences. The effects of alcohol consumption by the worker are treated in Costa Rican legislation applicable to the private employment regime and supplementarily to the public one, as part of the cases of prohibited conduct contemplated in Article seventy-two, subsection c) of the Código de Trabajo. In this sense, said normative body establishes the following regarding this matter: \"It is absolutely prohibited for workers (...) c) To work in a state of drunkenness or under any other analogous condition.\" Complementarily to said norm, Article eighty-one, subsection i) of the same code, provides the reiteration of the conduct as a cause for disciplinary sanction, in the following manner: \"When the worker, after the employer has warned him once, incurs the grounds provided for in subsections a, b, c, d and e of Article 72.\" As noted, said norms contemplate the performance of the activity under the effect of alcohol consumption, that is, the situation of intoxication or drunkenness, but do not provide for a dismissal per se in such cases, but rather require a prior warning from the employer. This is because the legislator did not deem the conduct sufficiently serious for an automatic dismissal to proceed upon the sole commission of said fault. Both norms apply not only to the person who suffers from the alcohol dependence syndrome as such, but also to those who suffer occasional or sporadic consequences due to alcohol consumption in the workplace itself. Regarding the abandonment of work due to the indicated syndrome, reference must be made to what is indicated in subsection a) of the mentioned Article seventy-two, as it prohibits: \"Abandoning work during working hours without justified cause or without the employer's permission.\" Said norm is applied to the servant who, during working hours, is consuming alcohol or is under its effects. In this case, Article eighty-one, first subsection cited ut supra would also be applicable and, consequently, the reiteration of the act is required, following a prior warning, for the dismissal to proceed, in accordance with what is indicated by the norm in question. In relation to the worker who does not show up for work - including the case where such absence occurs due to alcohol consumption - subsection g) of the indicated Article eighty-one, indicates the following as a cause for sanction: \"When the worker fails to attend work without the employer's permission, without justified cause, for two consecutive days or for more than two alternate days within the same calendar month.\" As a final scenario where the indicated syndrome could have disciplinary consequences, it would be the application of subsection l) of Article eighty-one of the Código de Trabajo, which establishes: \"The following are just causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract: l) When the worker incurs any other serious fault against the obligations imposed on him by the contract.\" In this case, we would be in the scenario where the indicated illness has a more direct impact on the execution of the employment relationship and, therefore, alcohol consumption implies an affectation of elements inherent to the real contract (contrato realidad) or the one that was signed, such as, for example, a decrease in work performance, incidence in work accidents, behavioral disorders, or affectation of interpersonal relationships. These cases imply greater regularity in alcohol consumption and a more sensitive consequence thereof. For its part, regarding the existence of specific norms applicable to the public employment regime, it should be noted that the Estatuto de Servicio Civil and its regulations are silent on explicitly treating alcoholism syndrome as sanctionable conduct. In this matter, at the legal level, only Article eighty-one of the Ley General de Policía, which establishes as a serious fault \"Habitual intoxication or the use of unauthorized drugs during service,\" points in this direction. By reason of the foregoing, the application of the indicated norms of the Código de Trabajo would also proceed by way of integration, in accordance with the provisions of Article two hundred six of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil, insofar as it establishes the following: \"To the extent they do not contradict the text and the procedures concerning the organization of the Tribunal, contained in this title, the provisions of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and the Código de Trabajo shall be applied supplementarily.\" It has been the votes of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that have come to fill this vacuum regarding the treatment of the alcoholic worker and the effects of his absences for this reason, with some relevant considerations. In this line of thought, the vote of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 182, at 10:20 hours on March 23, 2001, expresses with great clarity the nature of alcohol dependence syndrome as an illness, and introduces a new condition for the adoption of sanctioning measures for the worker suffering from it, as follows:\n\n\"From the guidelines that the I.L.O. has issued on this matter, it follows that a distinct treatment must be given to the illness of alcoholism compared to other ailments that may affect the worker. Its special nature consists in the fact that, in the case of an alcoholic patient, it would be advisable for the employer to offer him an opportunity to try to rehabilitate himself, before proceeding to dismiss him for this reason...... The employer's policy, then, should not be punitive, but rather directed toward pressuring the worker to seek and obtain help. Article 29 of the Ley General de Salud, No. 5395 of October 30, 1973, provides: 'Persons with severe emotional disorders as well as persons with dependence on the use of drugs or other substances, including alcoholics, may voluntarily submit to specialized outpatient treatment or internment in health services and must do so when ordered by the competent authority, when deemed necessary, according to the requirements determined by the pertinent regulations.' From this, it can be deduced that, in our country, the employer cannot force the worker to submit to any treatment, but can inform, advise, or refer him to receive it. If the employee refuses to cooperate, his dismissal without further consideration shall proceed. The considerations set forth, due to their enormous social and economic significance, should only be taken into account for those workers who prove, by suitable means, to be dependent on alcohol, and after analyzing their general behavior in the development of the employment relationship. As a final observation, it is worth highlighting that alcoholism is an incurable but treatable disease. Therefore, the fact that it is incurable does not grant license to consume nor to justify the faults that workers incur for that reason. The employer cannot be imposed a burden of such magnitude, but only that of offering an opportunity to the affected person, who, if he does not take advantage of it and continues causing problems, can perfectly be dismissed (although, for example, he may present a medical report attesting to his health problems caused by alcoholism, in order to try to justify his absences). It is, then, within these guidelines, that alcoholism-disease should be considered a serious fault, in the terms of Article 81, subsection l) of the Código de Trabajo.\"\n\nVotes 375 at 9:10 on July 30, 2003; 286 at 10:10 on April 28, 2004, 106 at 9:30 on February 18, 2005; 387 at 10:35 on May 18, 2005, 342-2009 of April 29, 2009, 00183-2010 of February 5, 2010, among others, of the indicated Chamber, may also be consulted. In the same line of thought, from vote 2010-1664 at 15:08 hours on January 27, 2010, the Constitutional Chamber adopts the thesis of the Second Chamber, by stating the following:\n\n\"III. ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE AND THE NEED TO GRANT THE WORKER THE POSSIBILITY TO REHABILITATE. (…) at a meeting of Experts in Geneva, Switzerland, held in January 1995, a series of practical recommendations on the treatment of problems related to alcohol and drug consumption in the workplace were examined. These guidelines are collected in the document known as the Code of Practice of the International Labour Organization on the management of alcohol- and drug-related issues in the workplace, Geneva, 1996.... From this perspective, by considering alcoholism as a health problem, the obligation to treat it without discrimination like any other disease is established, and its treatment is framed within the scope of health services (public or private) as appropriate. In this approach scheme, it was provided that employers, preferably, should grant alcoholic workers the opportunity to undergo rehabilitation to overcome their disease without any type of discrimination, before applying disciplinary sanctions. Certainly, the possibility for the employer to sanction improper conduct by the worker resulting from alcohol or other drug consumption was recognized; however, prior to the adoption of any disciplinary measure, the employer must refer the worker to undergo rehabilitation and treatment; if there is no affirmative response on his part, the employer may apply the corresponding sanction in accordance with current legislation. (…) Within this scheme, the role played by the rehabilitation of the alcoholic person, and the fact of having stable employment, which allows him to feel productive and reduce the degree of zzation (sic) and stigmatization, must be considered. So much so that, in the recommendations cited above, it was recognized that the stability offered by a job is often an important factor in facilitating the overcoming of problems related to alcohol or drug consumption. As our country is a member of the International Labour Organization, these guidelines —even though they are recommendatory in nature— in consideration of the pro homine principle, serve to integrate and interpret the Law of the Constitution, insofar as they grant greater protection to the fundamental rights of persons. (…) Furthermore, the Ley General de Salud, No. 5395, in Article 29, establishes that persons with dependence on the use of drugs or other substances, including alcoholics, may voluntarily submit to specialized outpatient treatment or internment in health services. From the above, it follows that the employer must offer the worker the possibility of being treated and rehabilitated before applying the disciplinary regime, such that if he does not take advantage of such opportunity, the employer could then apply the corresponding sanction. Indeed, it must be clear that it is incumbent upon the worker to prove, by suitable means, his dependence on alcohol and, where appropriate, to be receiving treatment or therapy.\"\n\nLikewise, in this sense, among others, we can point to vote 08617-2011 at five hours and fifty-nine minutes on June twenty-eighth, two thousand eleven of the same Chamber. The foregoing resolved by both Chambers follows - and is thus expressly cited - from the document called \"Tratamiento de cuestiones relacionadas con el alcohol y las drogas en el lugar de trabajo\" approved by the Governing Body of the ILO at meeting No. 262, March-April 1995, and which has as its antecedent the 1988 document of said organization called \"Iniciativas en el lugar de trabajo para prevenir y reducir los problemas causados por el alcohol y otras drogas\". Regarding this issue, the International Labour Organization, in accordance with what was established by the World Health Organization (WHO), determined that alcoholism is a disease, and therefore, the worker must be given the opportunity to undergo treatment, this prior to applying disciplinary sanctions or dismissal. In that sense, the WHO stated: \"- Policies and programs concerning alcohol and drug consumption should promote the prevention, reduction, and treatment of problems related to alcohol and drug consumption that arise in the workplace. This code applies to all types of employment, public and private, including those in the unstructured sector. National legislation and policy relating to these problems should be established after consultation with the most representative employers' and workers' organizations. - Problems related to alcohol and drug consumption should be considered as health problems and, therefore, treated, without any discrimination, like any other health problem at work and fall within the scope of health services (public or private), as appropriate. (…) - The stability offered by a job is often an important factor in facilitating the overcoming of problems related to alcohol or drug consumption.\"\n\nFor this reason, social partners should recognize the special role that the workplace can play in helping people who have these problems. - Workers who wish to receive treatment and rehabilitation for their problems related to alcohol or drug use should not be subject to discrimination by the employer and should enjoy the usual job security and the same opportunities for transfer and professional promotion as their colleagues. - It should be recognized that the employer has the authority to discipline workers whose professional conduct is improper as a result of problems related to alcohol or drug use. However, it is preferable to refer them to counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation services rather than applying disciplinary sanctions. If a worker does not fully cooperate with treatment, the employer may take such disciplinary measures as it deems appropriate. (...)” (emphasis added). Now, in application of the foregoing, the International Labour Organization made the following recommendations: \"9. Intervention and disciplinary measures 9.1. Preference for treatment over disciplinary measures 9.1.1. The employer should consider alcohol or drug problems as a health problem. In such cases, the employer should normally offer counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation services to workers, before considering the application of disciplinary measures. 9.2. The employer’s role in relation to the application of disciplinary measures 9.2.1. It should be recognized that the employer has the authority to discipline workers whose professional conduct is improper as a result of problems related to alcohol or drugs. However, it is preferable to refer them to counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation services rather than applying disciplinary sanctions. If a worker does not fully cooperate with treatment, the employer may take such disciplinary measures as it deems appropriate.\" (dwt.oit.or.cr/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc). These considerations cannot be ignored if we heed the provisions of Article fifteen of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), insofar as it provides that \"Cases not provided for in this Code, in its Regulations, or in its supplementary or related laws, shall be resolved in accordance with the general principles of Labor Law, equity, local custom or usage; and failing these, the provisions contained in the Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labour Organization shall be applied, in order, provided they do not conflict with the laws of the country, and the principles and laws of common law.\" Said rule is applicable, in accordance with Article nine in fine of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and two hundred and six of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) (a general principle that is also applicable to minor public entities, insofar as they do not have an express rule on the matter, without prejudice that the administrative legal system itself establishes its order of precedence). In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that for absences due to alcoholism-as-illness to be subject to sanction, the worker must have previously failed to take advantage of opportunities offered for his proper rehabilitation. It is not possible, then, to sanction someone suffering from the illness under analysis, in such circumstances, given the chronic nature of the health condition it entails, if the patient has not first been given the option to seek treatment. The Second Chamber has expressed it as follows: \"the employer's disciplinary power to dismiss the alcoholic worker (sick-dependent) is applicable when there is no positive response on his part, once he has been given the option to seek advice, treatment, and rehabilitation...\" (Voto 00820-2007 of 11:10 of October 31, 2007). It should be noted that our Chamber, while basing itself on what was resolved by the International Labour Organization, does not reach its level of requirement regarding financing, providing, or managing services for the alcohol-dependent person, but rather asks the employer to give the possibility or option for the worker to seek advice or treatment in order to rehabilitate. However, the condition cannot be considered something that must be tolerated forever by the employer—it is not a special protection (fuero) that grants disguised job stability to the worker—insofar as once the possibility of rehabilitation and overcoming the illness has been fulfilled, if it was not successful, the possibility of dismissal for that reason does open up. Nor does it mean that the worker is relieved of compliance with the obligations inherent to the employment contract or that faults are excused for that reason, but rather that, being an illness, based on the protection of the right to health, a possibility is granted for the affected person to seek treatment, so that it does not further affect his personal and work relationships. As is evident, the conduct of the parties in the employment relationship, in these circumstances, will always be permeated by good faith, given that the opportunity given to the worker is a limit not only for the employer regarding dismissal, but also for him, regarding his general conduct and compliance with his labor obligations. The foregoing considerations do not negate the possibility that in the event of committing a serious fault—private employment regime—or acting with willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave)—public employment—disciplinary sanctions may be applied due to conduct originating from the syndrome under analysis. It is no obstacle to indicate that attendance or stay in a rehabilitation center must be oriented towards an objective sought by the subject suffering from the condition. That is, internment for internment's sake is not appropriate, without at least a mediate and tangible result. If the person seeks to enter a specialized center, it should not be to justify an absence before his employer or feign interest, but rather it must have a positive, evident, and evaluable result in his conduct and illness, such that in the medium term it has an impact not only on his personal sphere, but above all, on his work sphere, to guarantee his permanence and, above all, to demonstrate his good faith and interest in breaking the cycle that prevents him from fully meeting his obligations as a worker. Thus, participation in prevention or treatment programs must be oriented to promote changes in the worker's lifestyle, with a clear attitude and conduct regarding his problem and with transparency towards his employer. In this vein, the Labor Courts have been prudent regarding the issue of absences due to alcohol intake, as is evident from vote 00127-2007 of March 20, 2007 of the Labor Court, Section IV, insofar as it states:\n\n\"... although the general rule is that the worker is obliged to justify his absence within the deadline of two days (or that dictated by the internal regulations of the entity in question), exceptionally cases are admitted in which such justification can be made after that term, when compliance is impossible. On that occasion it was said that, depending on its severity, a state of alcoholic intake can become one of those situations that prevent compliance with the deadline set to justify the absence, if the situation experienced by the alcoholic when entering a crisis is taken into account: 'He drinks continuously for days on end; he gets blindly and hopelessly drunk. He completely forgets everything, family, work, and even eating and sheltering' (NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOLISM, Alcoholismo. Manual para educadores, San José, January, 1978, p.67). However, in the specific case, the plaintiff did not demonstrate—as inevitably corresponded to him, Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil)—that during the entire period he was absent from his work, he was affected by an alcoholic crisis of such magnitude that it prevented him from meeting the minimum of his labor obligations.\" (In a similar vein, see votes number 182-2001 of 10:20 a.m., of March 23, 2001, 00581-2007 of 3:30 of August 22, 2007, and 00123-2010 of 9:55 of January 22, 2010 of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice).\n\nRegarding the public employment regime, some additional considerations cannot be overlooked, insofar as the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), in Article thirty-five, states that: \"In all cases, the public servant shall notify his immediate superior as soon as possible, verbally or in writing, of the causes that prevent him from attending his work. For no reason—except that of force majeure—should he wait until the second day of absence to notify it. Absences from work due to illness exceeding four days must be justified by the incapacitated public servant with a certification issued by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, or by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros). If the illness affects him only for up to four days in the same calendar month, he may justify said absence for up to four days by a disability certificate issued by the insuring entity or, failing that, a private doctor's opinion.\" A rule that even finds an echo in the case of minor public entities, unless a different and specific provision exists for their reality. In accordance with the foregoing, the justification presented by the public servant affected by alcoholism must be timely and by suitable means, except if due to crisis reasons in his illness he is prevented. In such cases, by good faith principle, it would be reasonable to accept a late justification, duly accredited, as indicated ut supra. Additionally, the existence of public interest as inherent to all public employment relationships cannot be overlooked, so in every analysis, this must be weighed alongside the particular condition of the public servant, given that in addition to the said treatment opportunity, the potential affectation that the official's disregard of said possibility could mean for the interest of the community must be assessed, as well as the demerit caused by the non-provision or defective fulfillment of his obligations, and the risk that the reiteration of conduct could mean for the users of the service provided. Having made the foregoing considerations, we now proceed to resolve the specific case submitted to this Court's knowledge.\n\nVI.-\n\nOn the merits of the case: According to the claim made by the plaintiff, his first request is for the annulment of the administrative procedure initiated against him, by virtue of it corresponding to a persecutory act, which would imply a deviation of power (desviación de poder) or at least a defect in the motive thereof, such that its existence is unfounded. In this regard, the Court notes that the defendant public entity acted almost complacently for a period of about a year, despite inconsistencies in the attendance of Dr. Keith Aguilar. Within said period, it is possible to locate, as the internment in a rehabilitation center for a condition apparently related to alcohol intake was accepted as a valid justification. Added to the above, some of the absences were justified with private doctor's notes, even though the legal system requires that said forms be validated by dispensaries of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund or the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), as applicable. In themselves, those documents (private doctor’s disability certificates) do not have an incapacitating effect, but they do evidence a situation that could be assessed by the employer; especially when it was sporadic. But in this case, the multiple notes on the matter determine that the plaintiff had no interest (or at least did not prove otherwise) in validating the private document in accordance with the legal procedure. It is not superfluous to add that given the plaintiff's profession, it is impossible to interpret that he was unaware of the aforementioned process, since in his capacity as a doctor it is logical to think (sound rational criticism) that he knew of the previously described procedure. In this regard, the alleged nullity of the records that served as the basis for the existence of the procedure turns out to be an irrelevant issue, first because it was not demonstrated, and on the other hand, no less importantly, inasmuch as the principle of informality that covers the Administration determines that nullity is only appropriate for those relevant defects that affect the right of defense or that concern substantial aspects. In this case, a record as such is a mere verification of what occurred, which can easily be replaced by testimonial evidence or a certificate, so too much relevance is being given to a merely formal aspect. Besides, according to the plaintiff's own reasoning, the alleged nullity lies in the lack of witnesses, as if the legal system required a specific number of witnesses for a certificate of a public servant's absence. Regarding the alleged lack of signatures, the situation pointed out was argued without the judicial body being able to locate a certificate under said conditions. In any case, and even more relevantly, the Court also cannot locate the existence of persecution in the existence of said procedure. Even though the public entity, through some of its officials, knew of the plaintiff's condition, that does not negate the possibility of verifying the plaintiff's absences, confirming if all are duly justified, and otherwise establishing the corresponding disciplinary sanctions. We are in the presence of public funds, which entails that even if it were not a cause for dismissal, attempting to give some validity to private doctor's disability certificates, the truth is that by not meeting the legal requirements, these documents did not authorize payment for a disability, which in itself merited the existence of an administrative procedure, as an act imposing a burden (acto ablatorio) or lien against the plaintiff. It cannot be forgotten in this regard that the administrative procedure is the mechanism presented by the Administration to adopt the formal administrative acts it requires; consequently, it is a lawful and normal activity; which in principle should not necessarily lead to any liability. The sacrifices that individuals must make to face these types of procedures are, in principle, part of the obligation to bear them, except in two different circumstances: when the procedure is a means to conceal a deviation of power (desviación de poder) or a defect in the motive in general (in which case the act becomes illegitimate) or failing that, when the sacrifice is so special, particular, and intense that even though it is lawful, by the principle of distribution of public burdens, the individual is not obliged to bear it without the corresponding liability. Pursuant to Article three hundred and seventeen of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), it is the obligation of the party asserting a claim within a proceeding to prove his statement, it not being enough to assert it. The plaintiff reasoned in his complaint that being a confidence official he was not subject to any schedule, which determines that the persecution occurred from the very moment the Administration was verifying compliance with his schedule; in this regard, this Court must be more than emphatic. A public servant in a confidence regime does not mean he has no schedule and can do as he pleases regarding the service he is called to fulfill; because, in the end, public funds are always present. Whenever it concerns a public servant, his activities are subject to oversight in the exercise of the position, which includes verifying that he is showing up to work, as it could well be that he was receiving unjust enrichment by collecting a salary for days he did not provide the service. Being a confidence official and being a servant at will without any surveillance or supervision are two very different things. On the contrary, internal control rules oblige subordinate heads to supervise their subordinates, among them the fulfillment of the schedule and working day, which entails that even public servants who do not have to clock in must still be monitored in the fulfillment of public ends and purposes. In this case, the plaintiff maintains that the administrative procedure was unjustified, was the result of persecution against him, or lacked the corresponding motive. Yet no evidence was presented on any of these three scenarios. Regarding harassment, suffice it to say that not only is its invocation necessary, but also the demonstration in trial of its presuppositions. In this regard, it has been defined by the International Labour Organization as a \"... verbal or psychological action of a systematic, repeated, or persistent nature by which, in the workplace or in connection with work, a group of people hurts a victim, humiliates, offends, or intimidates them (…)”. Based on the above, the Second Chamber has indicated that we are in the presence of workplace harassment when the following presuppositions are present \"... a) that it involves some attitude, without differentiating whether they are gestures, words, behaviors; b) that it be a repeated, systematized act; c) that it be an attack against a worker, that degrades their work environment or endangers their employment and that threatens their integrity, whether physical or psychological...\" (vote 2012-000984 of ten hours fifteen minutes of October twenty-fourth, two thousand twelve). None of this has been demonstrated in trial, and consequently, this argument of the plaintiff's side is not acceptable. We reiterate that regarding the absence of motive, the Court cannot locate any conduct contrary to law, especially when there were scattered disability certificates for several days; furthermore, there is evidence that there could be impacts on the public service. There is a prior motive, of greater relevance that prevents accepting the aforementioned claim. As has been repeatedly stated, the existence of an administrative procedure does not generate a legal status by itself; it is a preparatory act, which does not define status or condition. It only generates an expectation that eventually the Administration will proceed to issue an act that may well be negative to the plaintiff's interests. A possibility, without any certainty. This situation determines that the act does not seek an effect susceptible to being challenged in this venue. It is not superfluous to add that when the plaintiff's appointment was not extended at the Specialties Center of the Fund (Caja) due to a clear job abandonment that the plaintiff himself committed, he did receive a subsequent appointment—several months later—in the Huetar Norte region, which again shows that the alleged persecution he claims never occurred. We reiterate that the Administration was more than considerate with the plaintiff in his multiple disabilities, leaving aside the aspects related to alcohol intake that Mr. plaintiff might be facing. Lastly, and no less relevant, it must be noted that said procedure was archived by the Administration's own decision upon being unable to locate the plaintiff to notify him. Bearing in mind that the existence of an archived administrative procedure does not, by itself, generate a status contrary to the petitioner's interests, insofar as it does not produce a legal effect in the sphere of Mr. Keith Aguilar, any nullity lacks all absolute interest. The Administration refused to generate any adverse effect on the petitioner's interests. Therefore, the exception of lack of current interest raised by the defendant must be accepted without further questioning, inasmuch as even accepting that the existence of an administrative procedure has its own effects (which, as we have already indicated, we also reject), the truth is that having been archived, it lacks all current interest. The claim must be rejected for this reason. As a second claim, the annulment of Mr. plaintiff's resignation is requested. In this regard, the reasons for said nullity were raised concerning an alleged defect in the will (vicio en la voluntad). A legal act is considered voluntary when it is serious, manifested, sincere, free, and spontaneous. If any of these characteristics fail, we are facing a legal act that will not produce its intended effects. Considering these characteristics: there may be obstacles in discernment (immaturity and insanity), obstacles in intention (error or ignorance and willful misconduct (dolo)), and obstacles in freedom (violence, simulation, and fraud, although some legal scholars include lesion). When defects of consent (vicios del consentimiento) arise, those are legal acts that have not been performed with intention and freedom; while those performed without discernment will be non-existent legal acts. In Law, defects of the will (vicios de la voluntad), defects of consent (vicios del consentimiento), or defects of voluntary acts are certain congenital defects thereof, which are susceptible to causing the invalidity of the acts that suffer them. Error is the false mental representation of an object of knowledge due to ignorance, or lack of full knowledge about an object, or due to lack of reasoning, a defective understanding. In this case, it was not clear from the plaintiff's argument exactly what type of error is being argued, for purposes of its assessment. Thus, it is not indicated whether the plaintiff did not know what the effects of his resignation were, or whether, on the contrary, he was pressured into it, such that the intended effect was different. Curiously, in both cases, the logic would be that the plaintiff should proceed to refund the amount corresponding to notice or severance pay from the moment it was deposited to him, which is not accredited. Even from the complaint itself, it is inferred that it was the plaintiff himself who sought the payment of his labor entitlements by virtue of being without means of livelihood for several months, and that these included all items he could recover. Which in the specific case represented the payment of severance pay of several million colones. Added to the above, in order to request nullity, the specific breach of any of the procedural ends for dealing with workers who consume alcohol, according to the regulations indicated in the preceding whereas clause (considerando), is also not invoked. In short, this Court cannot locate a ground for nullity or any defect in the will (vicio en la voluntad) that determines the invalidity of the aforementioned resignation. Thus, said claim has no support and must be rejected. However, this judicial body does consider that some clarifications must be made. The Court understands that the plaintiff was paid severance pay by virtue of the fact that it was a long-standing relationship that came to an end due to a situation not attributable (fault of the plaintiff) to Mr. plaintiff; it must be assumed that there must be some internal regulation that obliged the payment of that item. Note in this regard that the plaintiff's appointment was not extended, not due to the imposition of a disciplinary sanction ordering it, but because the employment relationship he had expired at a time when the interested party had several days of unjustified absence, which led to the presumption that there was evident job abandonment. Within this framework, the Administration decided not to extend the appointment to a confidence position, by virtue of affectations to the public service occurring. This act was not challenged by the interested party, and he even managed, months later, to obtain an interim appointment in the Huetar Norte region, where in the end he also had inconsistencies in his attendance. Subsequently, and without being able to evidence that there was pressure against the aforementioned individual, he submitted his resignation. The foregoing because if it were a mere resignation by the plaintiff, the payment of that item would not proceed under the general rules of private or public law. Now then, in the case file provided, it is possible to verify that Mr. plaintiff was guided to submit his resignation in order to have his labor entitlements paid, as the service relationship was in effect. In that condition, severance pay could be found, but the other items such as vacation, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), or school salary did not present the same condition. With good technique, those items, from the moment the employment relationship had been interrupted, could be requested by the interested party at the time he deemed appropriate. The temporary withholding of those items could have some social justification regarding items other than vacation, to the extent of trying to ensure the worker received the corresponding amount together with the other regular workers (Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) and school salary), bearing in mind the social purpose that drives those benefits. But in the case of vacation days, it is unjustifiable. The defendant should have paid that item from the very moment it was requested, as it is an item without any discussion. Another concern that occupies us is regarding the information provided concerning the plaintiff's resignation. The Administration diligently advised the plaintiff that to receive the economic benefit he expected, he had to resign, but it did not have the corresponding interest in informing him whether or not there was a period during which he could not work for that administration specifically or in general. The Administration must act with due transparency, which in this case was fulfilled. From the scope of ordinary labor law, that resignation would only have entailed the payment of items that constitute labor rights (which would leave out notice and severance pay), which would determine that the worker could return to a new appointment at the time he deemed appropriate, as long as there was a position in which his appointment could be promoted. But in this case, the item of severance pay was paid; it is to be supposed based on an internal rule of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. The scope of that particular provision should have been explained at the time the interested party was advised to submit his resignation, if it produced any adverse effect on him. These aspects determine that the plaintiff's litigation is not absolutely in bad faith. Regarding the claim for reinstatement, it was reasoned as derived from the invoked nullity or the alleged persecution, but both grounds were rejected. Therefore, this request must follow the same fate. Insofar as it was the plaintiff himself who resigned from a situation that suited his interests at that time, such as the payment of the settlement, it is not possible to seek to reinstate the plaintiff. Furthermore, it must be indicated that, as the parties in the process stated, Dr. Keith Aguilar was a public servant appointed interim in a confidence position. As such, it is a freely removable position, which would prevent him from being appointed again to said position. Even in adequate reasoning, there would be no specific position to return to, to the extent that the specific position does not have a permanent holder due to its confidence nature regarding the condition at the Specialties Center of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, and regarding the position held in the Huetar Norte region, the condition was interim, replacing a permanent holder who was on vacation. In fact, to date, this judicial body is not aware, from the administrative file, of the existence of any limitation for the plaintiff to return to a position at the defendant Fund, as long as he meets the requirements and his professional profile corresponds to it, in addition to the existence of a vacant position or one replacing a holder.\n\nThus, from what is visible in the file, it is not possible to infer that, as a result of an administrative action, the claimant would be unable to obtain another interim position or eventually a permanent one, if he satisfies the requirements of the administrative legal system. What is indeed impossible is to access reinstatement to a position to which he holds no right whatsoever. The fourth request is based on the payment of lost wages from the date of June twenty-first, two thousand nine, until his reinstatement, plus all labor guarantees, school salary, Christmas bonus, and contributions to the CCSS. In this regard, we are once again in the presence of a claim subsidiary to those previously indicated, which as such must be rejected since it depends on another that has met the same fate. Given that the plaintiff has not managed to obtain a resolution in his favor regarding the requested nullity, it is also not possible to consider a reinstatement to the position and even less a payment of back pay. It is observed that, regarding the position at the Centro de Especialidades Médicas, what occurred was that the Administration took that position for other functions, and the interested third party Calderón Céspedes is occupying it to fulfill those functions. It cannot be demonstrated in the case file that this person does not possess the suitable credentials for those activities or that Mr. Keith Aguilar presented better qualifications than him. The activities at the Centro de Especialidades were not taken up by the new interim appointee. Meanwhile, regarding the position in the Huetar Norte region, the appointment was made on a temporary basis while covering the vacation of another official who was on leave. Within that framework, it is not possible to locate the existence of any right with respect to a specific appointment that would allow the recognition of lost wages. It must be rejected. With respect to the third-to-last request, namely the payment of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) and objective moral damages (daño moral objetivo), both must be rejected. As already indicated, the existence of the administrative proceeding turned out to be a lawful and normal conduct, which, although it generates some impact on individuals, is not possible to indemnify under normal conditions insofar as the individual has the obligation to bear it. What is claimed by the plaintiff finds no shelter in the national legal system and must be rejected without further questioning. This body does not doubt that facing an administrative proceeding must generate some impact on the subjective plane, even when one is certain that an act will not be issued against personal interests; but the legal system does not allow a pecuniary recognition in those cases, when the plaintiff engages in unlawful conduct. Consequently, we again fall into a lack of right. Finally, it must be indicated with respect to objective moral damages (daño moral objetivo), that there is no evidence in this regard that would allow indicating that the image of the plaintiff was affected by this proceeding, which determines a rejection of that request in accordance with canon three hundred seventeen of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). Regarding the recognition of indexation interests, the request presents an effect derived from the recognition of some economic aspect, which in the specific case have not occurred, and therefore must be rejected. Lastly, with respect to the employment relationship of Mr. Keith Aguilar and the payment of differences in labor aspects, the plaintiff never clearly specifies which items were miscalculated or the specific aspects he considers are owed to him; he indicates a general item for the Court to determine ex officio which aspect is missing. It must be specified on this particular point that this jurisdictional body cannot substitute the party, who is called upon to clearly specify those items if he intends for them to be recognized. In the public oral trial, the only clarification made was that the existence of any debt was not assured, but rather that the request was grounded on the eventuality of some pending remainder. Under that condition, the rejection of the request is imposed without further questioning.”\n\nRegarding the disciplinary regime to be applied in the event of a breach of said duties, in accordance with various rulings of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the principle of specificity becomes more relaxed, meaning a specific legal classification of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of public servants; basically, both principles become a relative condition concerning criminal law and accept the existence of norms of a lower rank than a law in the formal sense to establish conduct contrary to the legal system (in this regard, ruling 2007-013903 of fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes of October third, two thousand seven, and 2005-06616 of twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes of May thirty-first, two thousand five, and 94-5594 of fifteen hours forty-eight minutes of September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four, from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). By reason of the foregoing, both the breach of general functional duties and legally classified conduct (at the level of the corresponding Civil Service Statute, Labor Code, for example), as well as those contemplated in lower-ranking norms, such as those contained in the autonomous service regulations or in cases where the classification is made with respect to the sanction to be imposed, are sanctionable. The foregoing considerations, without prejudice to the existence of a series of principles of sanctioning law, of mandatory compliance in all cases, e.g., proportionality, non bis in idem, innocence, due process, due substantiation of the respective resolution. In this line of thought, it should be noted that regarding the definition of conduct that can be considered part of the duties inherent to public officials or subject to sanction in case of breach, our country has a diffuse system, given that such conduct is not detailed in a single regulatory body, but rather dispersed among different norms of varying rank, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to issue. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory powers of the Public Administration (Administración Pública), and the impossibility that via legal means, each and every concrete conduct committed by public servants can be regulated, and with the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal order. Transversal to this set of principles and norms of different rank, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any decision or formal or informal conduct by the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest, understood in accordance with Article 113 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), provides: \"1. The public servant must perform their duties in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered parties. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration (Administración Pública) when they may be in conflict. 3. In the appreciation of the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, first and foremost, to which mere convenience can in no case be placed before\". By reason of the foregoing, any analysis in the matter of public employment must not overlook the analysis of compliance with the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference for its underlying motivation. Regarding interim servants, national jurisprudence has sustained the thesis of the improper stability of interim workers in the public sector, such that while permanent employees cannot be terminated except in cases of dismissal for cause or through a restructuring process, in the case of temporary servants, they cannot be removed from their positions to be replaced by other officials, also provisionally appointed, if there is no legitimate cause for said removal, such as the permanent holder of the position returning to it, someone else being appointed to the position permanently and through a competitive process; or that the second appointed interim has better credentials (see judgments 867-91 of 15:08 hours of May 3, 1991, 2005-11450 of 10:47 hours of August 26, 2005, 2006-4050 of 16:02 hours of March 28, 2006, and 2007-7650 of 16:59 hours of May 31, 2007, from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). The rule may also be applied to those cases in which the interim official's fixed-term appointment is simply allowed to expire and the new appointment period is granted to someone else.\n\n**V.-**\n\n**On the effects of alcohol or drug dependence syndrome, as an objective cause for the termination of a public employment relationship:** This Board understands this syndrome as a set of symptoms observed when an individual who consumes abundantly according to their physical capacity over a prolonged period reduces or stops the consumption of alcohol or another drug, whether authorized or not, under the conditions already stated. The abuse of any drug leads to tolerance, physical dependence, and a subsequent withdrawal syndrome. The withdrawal syndrome is mainly due to the central nervous system remaining in a state of hyperexcitability. Unlike most other withdrawal syndromes caused by other drugs, in the case of alcohol, it can be fatal. The syndrome can include a series of neurological symptoms, with delirium tremens which can lead to excitotoxicity. Initially, the law treated the issue as inappropriate conduct in itself, the product of a licentious life, but more recently it has been considered an illness, with the corresponding legal consequences. The effects of alcohol intake by the worker are treated in the Costa Rican legislation applicable to the private employment regime and supplementarily to the public one, as part of the scenarios of prohibited conduct contemplated in Article 72, subsection c) of the Labor Code. In this sense, said regulatory body establishes the following in this regard: \"*Workers are absolutely prohibited from (...) c) Working in a state of intoxication or under any other analogous condition*\" Complementarily to said norm, Article 81, subsection i) of the same code, provides for the reiteration of the conduct as a cause for disciplinary sanction, in the following manner: \"*When the worker, after the employer has warned them once, incurs the causes provided for in subsections a, b, c, d, and e of Article 72\". As can be noted, said norms contemplate the exercise of activity under the effect of alcohol consumption, that is, a situation of inebriation or drunkenness, but they do not provide for a dismissal per se in such cases, but rather require a prior warning by the employer. The foregoing, insofar as the legislator did not deem the conduct sufficiently serious for an automatic dismissal to proceed upon the mere commission of said fault. Both norms apply, not only to the person who suffers from the alcohol dependence syndrome as such, but also to those who suffer occasional or sporadic consequences as a result of alcohol consumption in the workplace itself. Regarding abandonment of work due to the indicated syndrome, reference must be made to what is indicated in subsection a) of the aforementioned Article 72, as it prohibits: \"Abandoning work during working hours without justified cause or without the employer's license\". Said norm applies to the servant who, during working hours, was found to be drinking alcohol or under its effects. In this case, Article 81, subsection i) cited above would also be applicable and, consequently, the reiteration of the act, after a prior warning, is required for dismissal to proceed, in accordance with what is indicated by the norm in question. Regarding the worker who does not show up for work – including the case in which said absence is due to alcohol intake – subsection g) of the indicated Article 81 points out the following as a cause for sanction: \"*When the worker fails to attend work without the employer's permission, without justified cause, for two consecutive days or for more than two alternate days within the same calendar month*\". As a final scenario where the indicated syndrome could have disciplinary consequences, it would be the application of subsection l) of Article 81 of the Labor Code, which establishes: \"*The following are just causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract: l) When the worker incurs any other serious breach of the obligations imposed by the contract*\". In this case, we would be in the scenario where the indicated illness has a more direct impact on the execution of the employment relationship and, therefore, alcohol consumption implies an effect on elements inherent to the employment reality contract or the one that was signed, such as, for example, decreased work performance, incidence in workplace accidents, behavioral disorders, or impact on interpersonal relationships. These cases implicitly involve greater regularity in alcohol consumption and a more significant consequence thereof. For its part, regarding the existence of concrete norms applicable to the public employment regime, it should be noted that the Civil Service Statute and its regulations are silent on explicitly treating the syndrome of alcoholism as sanctionable conduct. In this matter, at the legal level, only Article 81 of the General Law of Police is noted in this sense, which establishes as a serious fault, \"*Habitual intoxication or the use of unauthorized drugs during service*\". For the foregoing reason, the indicated norms of the Labor Code would also proceed by integration, in accordance with the provisions of Article 206 of the Civil Service Statute, as it establishes the following: \"*To the extent they do not contradict the text and the procedures referring to the organization of the Tribunal, contained in this title, the provisions of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the Labor Code shall be applied supplementarily*\". It has been the rulings of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice that have come to fill said gap regarding the treatment of the alcoholic worker and the effects of their absences for this reason, with some relevant considerations. In this line of thought, ruling of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 182, of 10:20 hours of March 23, 2001, expresses with great clarity the illness character of the alcohol dependence syndrome, and introduces a new condition for the adoption of sanctioning measures for the worker who suffers from it, in the following manner:\n\n\"*From the guidelines that the I.L.O. has issued on this matter, it is extracted that a different treatment must be given to the illness of alcoholism compared to other ailments that may affect the worker. Its special nature consists in that, regarding an alcoholic patient, it would be recommendable for the employer to provide them an opportunity to try to rehabilitate, before proceeding to dismiss them for that reason...... The employer's policy, then, should not be sanctioning, but rather directed at pressuring the worker to seek and obtain help. Article 29 of the General Health Law, No. 5395 of October 30, 1973, provides: “Persons with severe emotional disorders as well as persons with dependence on the use of drugs or other substances, including alcoholics, may voluntarily submit to specialized outpatient or inpatient treatment in health services and must do so when ordered by the competent authority, deeming it necessary, according to the requirements that the pertinent regulations determine”. From this, it is inferred that, in our country, the employer cannot oblige the worker to undergo any treatment, but can inform, advise, or refer them so that they receive it. If the employee refuses to cooperate, their dismissal proceeds without further consideration. The considerations outlined, due to their enormous social and economic significance, must only be held for those workers who prove, by suitable means, to be alcohol-dependent, and this is concluded after analyzing their general behavior in the development of the labor relationship. As a final observation, it should be highlighted that alcoholism is an incurable, but treatable, illness. Therefore, its incurability does not give license to consume alcohol nor to justify the faults that workers incur for this reason. An employer cannot be imposed such a burden of magnitude, but only that of giving an opportunity to the affected person, who, if they do not take advantage of it and continue causing problems, can perfectly be dismissed (even if, for example, they present a medical opinion attesting to their health problems caused by alcoholism, in order to try to justify their absences). It is, then, within these guidelines, that alcoholism-as-illness must be considered a serious fault, in the terms of Article 81, subsection l) of the Labor Code*\".\n\nThe following rulings can also be consulted: 375 of 9:10 of July 30, 2003; 286 of 10:10 of April 28, 2004; 106 of 9:30 of February 18, 2005; 387 of 10:35 of May 18, 2005; 342-2009 of April 29, 2009; 00183-2010 of February 5, 2010, among others, from the indicated Chamber. In the same line of thought, starting from ruling 2010-1664 of 15:08 hours of January 27, 2010, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) adopts the thesis of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda), by indicating the following:\n\n“*III. ALCOHOLISM AS AN ILLNESS AND THE NEED TO GRANT THE WORKER THE POSSIBILITY TO REHABILITATE. (...) at a meeting of Experts in Geneva, Switzerland, held in January 1995, a series of practical recommendations were examined on the treatment of problems related to the consumption of alcohol and drugs in the workplace. These guidelines are collected in the document known as the Repertory of practical recommendations of the International Labor Organization, on the treatment of issues related to alcohol and drugs in the workplace, Geneva, 1996.... From this perspective, when considering alcoholism as a health problem, the obligation is established to treat it without discrimination like any other illness and its treatment is framed within the scope of health services (public or private) as appropriate. In this approach scheme, it was arranged that employers, preferably, should grant alcoholic workers the opportunity to undergo rehabilitation to overcome their illness without any type of discrimination, before applying disciplinary sanctions. Certainly, the possibility of the employer sanctioning the worker's improper conduct resulting from the consumption of alcohol or other drugs was recognized; however, prior to adopting any disciplinary measure, they must refer the worker to undergo rehabilitation and treatment, and if there is no affirmative response on their part, they may apply the corresponding sanction in accordance with current legislation. (…) Within this scheme, the role played by the rehabilitation of the alcoholic person must be considered, the fact of having a stable job, which allows them to feel productive and reduces the degree of zzación (sic) and stigmatization. So much so, that in the aforementioned recommendations, it was recognized that the stability offered by employment frequently constitutes an important factor in facilitating the overcoming of problems related to the consumption of alcohol or drugs. As our country is a member of the International Labor Organization, these guidelines—even though they have a recommendatory nature—in consideration of the pro homine principle, serve to integrate and interpret the Law of the Constitution, insofar as they grant greater protection to the fundamental rights of individuals. (…) On the other hand, in the General Health Law, No. 5395, Article 29 establishes that persons with dependence on the use of drugs or other substances, including alcoholics, may voluntarily submit to specialized outpatient or inpatient treatment in health services. From the foregoing, it is deduced that the employer must offer the worker the possibility of getting treated and rehabilitated before applying the disciplinary regime, so that if they do not take advantage of such an opportunity, the employer may then apply the corresponding sanction. However, it must be clear that the worker will be responsible for proving, by suitable means, their alcohol dependence and, if applicable, that they are receiving treatment or therapy.*”\n\nLikewise, in this sense, among others, we can determine ruling 08617-2011 of five hours and fifty-nine minutes of June twenty-eighth, two thousand eleven, from the same Chamber. The previously resolved by both Chambers is derived from—and is thus expressly cited—the document called \"Treatment of issues related to alcohol and drugs in the workplace,\" approved by the ILO Governing Body at its 262nd session, March-April 1995, and which has as antecedents the document of said organization called \"Workplace initiatives to prevent and reduce problems caused by alcohol and other drugs\" from 1988. Regarding this topic, the International Labor Organization, in agreement with what was established by the World Health Organization (WHO), determined that alcoholism is an illness, and therefore, the opportunity must be given to the worker to undergo treatment, this prior to applying disciplinary sanctions or dismissal. In that sense, the WHO indicated: “- *Policies and programs on alcohol and drug consumption should promote the prevention, reduction, and treatment of problems related to alcohol and drug consumption that arise in the workplace. This repertory applies to all types of employment, public and private, including those in the unstructured sector. National legislation and policy relating to these problems should be established after consultation with the most representative employers' and workers' organizations. - Problems related to alcohol and drug consumption should be considered health problems and, therefore, treated, without any discrimination, like any other health problem at work and fall within the scope of health services (public or private), as appropriate. (…) - The stability offered by employment is often an important factor in facilitating the overcoming of problems related to alcohol or drug consumption. For this reason, social partners should recognize the special role that the workplace can play in helping people who have these problems. - Workers who wish to receive treatment and rehabilitation for their problems related to alcohol or drug consumption should not be subject to discrimination by the employer and should enjoy the usual job security and the same opportunities for transfer and professional advancement as their colleagues. - It should be recognized that the employer has the authority to sanction workers whose professional conduct is improper as a consequence of problems related to alcohol or drug consumption. However, it is preferable that they be referred to counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation services instead of applying disciplinary sanctions. If a worker does not fully cooperate with the treatment, the employer may take the disciplinary measures they deem appropriate. (…)*” (emphasis is ours). Now, in application of the foregoing, the International Labor Organization made the following recommendations: \" 9. *Intervention and disciplinary measures 9.1. Preference for treatment over disciplinary measures 9.1.1. The employer should consider alcohol or drug problems as a health problem. In such cases, the employer should normally offer counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation services to workers, before considering the application of disciplinary measures. 9.2. Role of the employer in relation to the application of disciplinary measures 9.2.1. It should be recognized that the employer has the authority to sanction workers whose professional conduct is improper as a consequence of problems related to alcohol or drugs. However, it is preferable that they be referred to counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation services instead of applying disciplinary sanctions. If a worker does not fully cooperate with the treatment, the employer may take the disciplinary measures they deem appropriate*\". (dwt.oit.or.cr/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc). These considerations cannot be ignored if we consider what is provided in Article 15 of the Labor Code, as it establishes that \"*Cases not provided for in this Code, in its Regulations, or in its supplementary or related laws, shall be resolved in accordance with the general principles of Labor Law, equity, local custom, or usage; and in the absence of these, the provisions contained in the Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labor Organization shall be applied, in that order, insofar as they do not oppose the laws of the country, and the principles and laws of common law*”. Said norm is applicable, in accordance with Article 9 in fine of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Article 206 of the Civil Service Statute (a general principle that is also applicable to minor public entities, insofar as they do not have an express norm in this regard, without prejudice that the administrative legal system itself establishes its precedence). In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that for absences due to alcoholism-as-illness to be sanctioned, it is required that the worker has squandered opportunities previously provided for their due rehabilitation. It is not possible, then, to sanction the person suffering from the illness under analysis, in such scenarios, given the nature of the chronic health impact that it signifies, if the patient has not been previously offered the option to attend treatment.\n\nThe Second Chamber has expressed it as follows: \"the employer's disciplinary power to dismiss an alcoholic worker (ill-dependent) is appropriate when there is no positive response on his part, once he has been given the option to seek advice, treatment, and rehabilitation...\". (Voto 00820-2007 of 11:10 of October 31, 2007). It should be noted that while our Chamber bases its decision on the resolutions of la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, it does not reach its level of requirement in terms of financing, providing, or managing services for the alcohol-dependent person, but rather requires the employer to provide the possibility or option for the worker to seek advice or treatment in order to rehabilitate. However, the condition cannot be considered something that must be tolerated forever by the employer—it is not a jurisdictional immunity (fuero) that grants disguised employment stability to the worker—inasmuch as once the possibility of rehabilitation and overcoming the illness has been provided, if it was not successful, the possibility of dismissal for that reason does become available. Neither does it mean that the worker is relieved of fulfilling the obligations inherent to the employment contract or excused for absences on those grounds, but rather that, being an illness, based on the protection of the right to health, an opportunity is granted for the affected person to seek treatment, so that it does not further impact his personal and work relationships. As is evident, the conduct of the parties in the employment relationship, in these scenarios, will always be permeated by good faith, given that the opportunity provided to the worker is a limit not only for the employer regarding dismissal but also for the worker, concerning his general conduct and fulfillment of his work obligations. The foregoing considerations do not undermine the possibility that, in the event of committing a serious misconduct—private employment regime—or acting with willful intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave)—public employment—disciplinary sanctions may be applied due to behaviors originating from the syndrome under analysis. It is not an obstacle to indicate that assistance to or permanence in a rehabilitation center must be oriented toward an objective sought by the subject suffering from the condition. That is, internment for internment's sake is not appropriate, without at least a mediate and tangible result. If the person seeks entry to a specialized center, it should not be to justify an absence before his employer or feign interest, but should have a positive, evident, and evaluable result in his conduct and illness, such that in the medium term it has an impact not only on his personal sphere but, above all, on his work sphere, to guarantee his permanence and, above all, demonstrate his good faith and interest in breaking the cycle that prevents him from fully fulfilling his obligations as a worker. Thus, participation in prevention or treatment programs must be oriented to promote changes in the worker's lifestyle, with a clear attitude and conduct towards his problem and with transparency towards his employer. In this vein, the Labor Courts have been prudent regarding the issue of absences due to alcohol intake, as can be inferred from voto 00127-2007 of March 20, 2007 of the Labor Court Section IV, which states:\n\n\"... although the general rule is that the worker is obliged to justify his absence within two days (or that established by the internal regulations of the entity in question), cases are exceptionally admitted where such justification can be made after that term, when compliance is impossible. On that occasion it was said that, depending on its severity, a state of alcoholic intake can become one of those situations that prevent compliance with the deadline set to justify the absence, if one considers the situation the alcoholic experiences when in crisis: 'He drinks continuously for days on end; he gets blind drunk and without remedy. He completely forgets everything, his family, his work, and even eating and sheltering'\" (INSTITUTO NACIONAL SOBRE ALCOHOLISMO, Alcoholism. Manual for educators, San José, January, 1978, p.67). However, in the specific case, the plaintiff did not demonstrate—as was unavoidably his burden, Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil)—that during the entire period he was absent from work, he was affected by an alcoholic crisis of such magnitude that it prevented him from meeting the minimum of his work obligations.\" (In a similar vein, see votes number 182-2001 of 10:20 a.m., of March 23, 2001, 00581-2007 of 3:30 p.m. of August 22, 2007 and 00123-2010 of 9:55 a.m. of January 22, 2010 of the Second Chamber of la Corte Suprema de Justicia).\n\nRegarding the public employment regime, some additional considerations cannot be ignored, inasmuch as the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), in Article thirty-five, states: \"In all cases, the public servant must notify his immediate superior as soon as possible, verbally or in writing, of the causes that prevent him from attending work. For no reason—except in cases of force majeure—should he wait until the second day of absence to notify. Absences from work due to illness exceeding four days must be justified by the incapacitated public servant with a certification issued by la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, or by the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. If the illness affects him only for up to four days in the same calendar month, he may justify said absence for up to four days by a medical certificate (incapacidad) issued by the insuring entity or, failing that, by a private physician's opinion.\" This rule is even echoed in the case of smaller public entities, unless a different and specific provision exists for their reality. In accordance with the foregoing, the justification presented by the public servant affected by alcoholism must be timely and by suitable means, except when, due to reasons of crisis in his illness, he is impeded. In such cases, by the principle of good faith, it would be reasonable to accept a late justification, duly accredited, as indicated ut supra. Additionally, the existence of the public interest as inherent to any public employment relationship cannot be ignored, so in every analysis, this must be weighed alongside the particular condition of the public servant, considering that besides the opportunity for said treatment, the potential impact that the fact that the official neglects said possibility and the demerit caused by the non-provision or defective fulfillment of his obligations could mean for the interest of the community, as well as the risk that the reiteration of conduct could pose to the users of the service provided. Having made the foregoing considerations, it is appropriate to proceed to resolve the specific case submitted for the knowledge of this Court.\n\n**VI.-**\n\n**On the merits of the matter:** In accordance with the claim filed by the plaintiff, he requests as his **first claim that the administrative proceeding** initiated against him be annulled, by virtue of corresponding to a persecutory act, which would imply a misuse of power (desviación de poder) or at least a defect in its grounds (vicio en el motivo), such that its existence is unfounded. In this regard, the Court notes that the defendant public entity acted almost complacently for a period of approximately one year, despite inconsistencies in Dr. Keith Aguilar's attendance. Within said period, it is possible to locate that internment in a rehabilitation center for a condition apparently related to alcohol intake was accepted as valid justification. Adding to the above, some of the absences were justified with notes from a private physician, even though the legal system requires that such forms be validated by dispensaries of la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, as applicable. In themselves, those documents (private physician's medical certificates) do not have a disabling effect, but they do evidence a situation that could be assessed by the employer; especially when sporadic. However, in this case, the multiple notes on the matter determine that the plaintiff had no interest (or at least did not prove otherwise) in validating the private document according to the legal procedure. It is worth adding that due to the plaintiff's profession, it is impossible to pretend to interpret that he did not know the aforementioned procedure, for in his condition as a physician, it is logical to think (sound rational criticism) that he knew the procedure described above. Regarding the alleged nullity of the minutes (actas) that served as the basis for the existence of the proceeding, it turns out to be an irrelevant issue, firstly because it was not demonstrated, and secondly, no less important, inasmuch as the principle of informality that protects the Administration determines that nullity is only appropriate for those relevant defects that affect the right of defense or that concern substantial aspects. In this case, a minute as such is a mere record of what occurred, which can easily be replaced by testimonial evidence or by a record, so too much relevance is being given to a purely formal aspect. Besides, according to the plaintiff's own reasoning, the alleged nullity lies in the lack of witnesses, as if the legal system required a specific number of witnesses for a record of a public servant's absence. Regarding the alleged lack of signatures, the indicated situation was argued without this court being able to locate any record in such conditions. In any case, and even more relevantly, the Chamber also fails to find that a persecution exists in the existence of said proceeding. Even if the public entity, through some of its officials, knew of the plaintiff's condition, that does not undermine the possibility of verifying the plaintiff's absences, ascertaining if all were duly justified, and, if not, establishing the corresponding disciplinary sanctions. We are in the presence of public funds, which entails that even if it were not grounds for dismissal—trying to give some validity to private physician's medical certificates—the truth is that, by not satisfying the legal requirements, these documents did not authorize payment for an incapacity, which in itself warranted the existence of an administrative proceeding, as an ablatory or burdensome act against the plaintiff. It cannot be forgotten in this regard that the administrative proceeding is the mechanism the Administration has to adopt the formal administrative acts it requires; consequently, it is a lawful and normal activity that, in principle, should not necessarily result in any liability. The sacrifices that individuals must adopt to face such proceedings are, in principle, an obligation they must bear, except in two different scenarios: when the proceeding is a means to conceal a misuse of power or a general defect in the grounds (in which case the act becomes illegitimate), or failing that, when the sacrifice is so special, particular, and intense that, even though lawful due to the principle of distribution of public burdens, the individual is not obliged to bear it without the corresponding liability. In accordance with Article three hundred seventeen of the Code of Civil Procedure, the party asserting a claim within a proceeding has the obligation to prove its statement, mere assertion not being sufficient. The plaintiff reasoned in his complaint that, being a confidential employee (funcionario de confianza), he was not subject to any schedule, which determines that the persecution exists from the very moment the Administration was verifying compliance with his schedule; this Court must be more than emphatic in this regard. A confidential official is not one who has no schedule and can do as he pleases regarding the service he is called to perform; for ultimately, public funds are always present. Whenever a public servant is involved, his activities are subject to oversight in the exercise of his position, which includes verifying that he is reporting to work, since he could well be receiving unjust enrichment by collecting a salary for days he has not provided service. Being a confidential official and being an unrestricted public servant without any oversight or supervision are two very different things. On the contrary, internal control rules oblige hierarchical superiors to monitor their subordinates; among these rules is compliance with the work schedule and working hours, which entails that even public servants who do not have to clock in must still be monitored in the fulfillment of public purposes and tasks. In this case, the plaintiff maintains that the administrative proceeding was unjustified, was the result of persecution against him, or lacked the corresponding grounds. But no evidence was presented for any of these three scenarios. Regarding harassment, suffice it to say that not only is its invocation necessary, but also the demonstration at trial of its prerequisites. In this regard, it has been defined by la Organización Internacional del Trabajo as an \"... systematic, repeated, or persistent verbal or psychological action by which, in the workplace or in connection with work, a group of people hurts a victim, humiliates, offends, or intimidates them (…).” Based on the foregoing, the Second Chamber has indicated that we are in the presence of workplace harassment when the following prerequisites are present \"... a) that it is some attitude, without differentiating if they are gestures, words, behaviors; b) that it is a repeated, systematized act; c) that it is an attack against a worker, which degrades his work environment or endangers his employment and, that attempts against his integrity, whether physical or psychological...\" (vote 2012-000984 of ten hours fifteen minutes of October twenty-fourth, two thousand twelve). None of this has been demonstrated at trial and, consequently, this argument by the plaintiff is not acceptable. We reiterate that regarding the absence of grounds, the Court fails to locate any unlawful conduct, especially when there were medical certificates (incapacidades) scattered over several days, and there is evidence that there could be impacts on the public service. There is a prior, more relevant reason that prevents accepting the aforementioned claim; as repeatedly stated, the existence of an administrative proceeding does not create a definitive legal standing on its own; it is a preparatory act that does not define a status or condition. It only generates an expectation that eventually the Administration will proceed to issue an act that may well be negative to the plaintiff's interests. A possibility, without any certainty. That situation determines that the purports an effect not susceptible to being challenged in this forum. It is worth adding that when the plaintiff was not renewed in his appointment at the Specialties Center (Centro de Especialidades) of the Caja before a manifest abandonment of work that the plaintiff himself committed, he did receive a later appointment—several months later—in the Huetar Norte region, which again makes it evident that the alleged persecution he claims never occurred. We reiterate that the Administration was more than considerate with the plaintiff in his multiple medical certificates, leaving covered the aspects related to alcohol intake that the plaintiff might have been facing. Lastly, and no less relevantly, it must be pointed out that said proceeding was archived by the Administration's own decision due to its inability to locate the plaintiff to notify him. Considering that the existence of an archived administrative proceeding does not, by itself, create a legal standing contrary to the interests of the petitioner (gestionante), insofar as it does not produce a legal effect in the sphere of Mr. Keith Aguilar, any nullity lacks all absolute interest. The Administration refused to generate any adverse effect to the interests of the petitioner. Thus, the objection of lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) raised by the defendant must be accepted without further question, inasmuch as, even accepting that the existence of an administrative proceeding has its own effects (which, as already indicated, we also reject), the truth is that, having been archived, it lacks all current interest. The claim must be rejected for this reason. **As a second claim, the annulment of the plaintiff's resignation is requested.** In this regard, the grounds for said nullity were argued regarding an alleged defect in consent. A legal act is deemed voluntary when it is serious, expressed, sincere, free, and spontaneous. If any of these characteristics fails, we are facing a legal act that will not produce its intended effects. Considering these characteristics: it is possible for there to be obstacles in discernment (immaturity and insanity), obstacles in intention (error or ignorance and willful intent—dolo), and obstacles in freedom (violence, simulation, and fraud, although some legal scholars include lesion). When defects of consent occur, those legal acts are not performed with intention and freedom; while those performed without discernment will be non-existent legal acts. In Law, certain congenital defects of voluntary acts are called defects of will (vicios de la voluntad), defects of consent (vicios del consentimiento), or defects of voluntary acts, which are capable of producing the invalidity of the acts that suffer them. An error is the false mental representation of an object of knowledge due to ignorance, or lack of full knowledge about an object, or due to lack of reasoning, a defective intellection. In this case, it was not clear from the plaintiff's argument exactly what type of error is being argued for its assessment. Thus, it is not indicated whether the plaintiff did not know what the effects of his resignation were, or if, on the contrary, he was pressured into it, so that the intended effect was different. Curiously, in both cases, the logic would be that the plaintiff should proceed to repay from the moment the amount corresponding to notice (preaviso) or severance pay (cesantía) was deposited to him, which is not proven. Even from the complaint itself, it is inferred that it is the plaintiff himself who sought to have his employment entitlements paid out by virtue of having been without means of livelihood for several months and that these included all items he could recover. Which in the specific case represented the payment of severance pay of several million colones. Adding to the above, in order to request nullity, the specific non-compliance with any of the procedural requirements for dealing with workers who ingest alcohol, according to the regulations indicated in the previous whereas clause, is not invoked. In short, this Chamber fails to locate any ground for nullity or any defect of will that determines the invalidity of the aforementioned resignation. Therefore, said claim lacks support and must be rejected. This court considers that some clarifications must be made. The Court understands that the plaintiff was paid severance pay by virtue of it being a long-standing employment relationship that came to an end due to a situation not attributable (fault of the plaintiff) to the plaintiff; it must be assumed that there must be some internal regulation that obliged the payment of that item. Note in this regard that the plaintiff was not renewed in his appointment, not due to the imposition of a disciplinary sanction that so ordered, but because the expiration of the employment relationship he had occurred at a time when the interested party had several days of unjustified absence, which led to the presumption that there was evident job abandonment. In this framework, the Administration decided not to renew the appointment to a confidential position, by virtue of impacts on the public service occurring. Said act was not challenged by the interested party, and he even managed, months later, to obtain an interim appointment in the Huetar Norte region, where, ultimately, he also presented inconsistencies in his attendance. Subsequently, and without being able to evidence that there was pressure against the referred individual, he submitted his resignation. The foregoing, because if it were a mere resignation by the plaintiff, the payment of that item would not be appropriate under the general rules of private or public law. Now, in the provided case file, it is possible to verify how the plaintiff was guided to submit his resignation in order to have his employment entitlements paid to him, while the service relationship was in effect. Severance pay could be found in that condition, but the other items, such as vacations (vacaciones), Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), or school salary (salario escolar), did not present the same condition. In good practice, these items could have been requested by the interested party at any time he saw fit, from the moment the employment relationship was interrupted. The temporary withholding of those items could have some social justification for items other than vacations, to the extent of trying to ensure that the worker received the corresponding payment along with the other ordinary workers (Christmas bonus and school salary), considering the social purpose that drives those benefits. But in the case of vacations, it is unjustifiable. The defendant should have paid that item from the very moment it was requested, as it is an item devoid of any discussion. Another concern that overwhelms us relates to the information provided regarding the plaintiff's resignation. The Administration diligently guided the plaintiff that, to receive the economic benefit he expected, he needed to resign, but it did not have the corresponding interest in informing him whether or not there was a period during which he could not work for this specific Administration or in general. The Administration must act with due transparency, which was fulfilled in this case. From the perspective of ordinary labor law, that resignation would only have entailed the payment of the items that constitute labor rights (which would exclude notice and severance pay), which would determine that the worker could return to a new appointment whenever he saw fit, as long as there was some position in which his appointment could be promoted. But in this case, the severance pay item was paid; it must be assumed under an internal rule specific to la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social. The scope of that particular provision should have been explained at the time the interested party was guided to submit his resignation, if it caused him any adverse effect. These aspects determine that the plaintiff's litigation is not absolutely in bad faith. **Regarding the claim for reinstatement, it was reasoned as derivative**, from the invoked nullity or the alleged persecution, but both grounds were rejected. So this request must meet the same fate. Insofar as it was the plaintiff himself who resigned based on a situation that aligned with his interests at that time, namely the payment of his settlement, it is not possible to seek to reinstate the plaintiff. Furthermore, it must be indicated that according to what the parties stated during the proceeding, Dr. Keith Aguilar was an official appointed to an interim confidential position. As such, it is a position of free removal, which would prevent him from being appointed to said position again. Even, upon sound reasoning, there would be no specific position to return to, to the extent that the specific position does not have a fixed incumbent due to its confidential nature, concerning the status at the Specialties Center of la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, and regarding the position held in the Huetar Norte region, the status was as an interim substitute for a permanent incumbent who was on vacation. In fact, to date, this court does not have knowledge from the administrative file of the existence of any limitation preventing the plaintiff from returning to some position at the defendant Caja, provided he meets the requirements and his professional profile corresponds to it, this in addition to the existence of a position without a fixed incumbent or some substitute for one. So, from what is visible in the file, it is not possible to infer that, as a result of an administrative action, it is impossible for the plaintiff to manage to obtain another interim position or, eventually, a permanent one (en propiedad), if he satisfies the requirements of the administrative legal system. What is impossible is to grant reinstatement to a position to which he has no right. **The fourth request is based on the payment of wages left unearned from June twenty-first, two thousand nine until his reinstatement, plus all employment guarantees, school salary, Christmas bonus, and CCSS contributions.** In this regard, we are again in the presence of a subsidiary claim to those previously indicated, which, as such, must be rejected as it depends on another that has met the same fate.\n\nSince the plaintiff has not succeeded in obtaining a resolution in his favor regarding the requested nullity, it is also not possible to consider a reinstatement to the position and even less so a payment of back pay (salarios caídos). See how, regarding the position at the Centro de Especialidades Médicas, what occurred was that the Administration took that position for other functions, and the interested third party Calderón Céspedes is occupying it to perform those functions. It cannot be demonstrated in the case file (expediente) that this person does not possess the suitable credentials for those activities or that Mr. Keith Aguilar presented better qualifications than him. The activities at the Centro de Especialidades were not resumed by the new interim appointee. Meanwhile, regarding the position in the Huetar Norte region, the appointment was temporary while covering the vacation leave of another official who was on vacation. Within this framework, it is not possible to locate the existence of any right with respect to a specific appointment that would allow the recognition of uncollected salaries. It must be rejected. With respect to the third-to-last request, namely the payment of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) and objective moral damages (daño moral objetivo), both must be rejected. As already indicated, the existence of the administrative procedure proved to be lawful and normal conduct, which, although it generates some affectation for individuals, is not indemnifiable under normal conditions insofar as the individual has the duty to bear it. What the plaintiff seeks finds no shelter in the national legal system and must be rejected without further question. This body has no doubt that facing an administrative procedure must generate some affectation on a subjective level, even when one is certain that no act will be issued against one’s personal interests; but the legal system does not allow financial recognition in such cases, when the plaintiff engages in unlawful conduct (conducta antijurídica). Thus, we again fall into a lack of right. Finally, it must be indicated with respect to objective moral damages, that there is no proof in this regard that would allow us to indicate that the image of the plaintiff was affected by this procedure, which determines a rejection of that request in accordance with canon three hundred seventeen of the Civil Procedure Code. Regarding the recognition of indexation interests, the request presents an effect derived from the recognition of some economic claim, which in this specific case have not occurred, so it must be rejected. Finally, with respect to the employment relationship of Mr. Keith Aguilar and the payment of differences in labor claims, the plaintiff never clearly states which items were miscalculated or the specific claims he considers are owed to him; he merely states a general item so that the Court may determine on its own motion (de manera oficiosa) which claim is missing. It must be specified on this point that this jurisdictional body cannot substitute for the party, who is required to clearly specify those items if he intends for them to be recognized. In the oral and public trial, the only clarification made was that the existence of any debt was not being asserted, but rather that the request was based on the eventuality that some pending remainder existed. Under that condition, the rejection of the request is mandatory without further question.\"\n\n\"IV.- Regarding the public employment regime: Doctrinally it has been established that \"the State possesses a single personality. It is a single legal entity, which may carry out activities governed by public law or by private law (...) It is known that the State has two modes of action: one under the legal regime of public law, and another under the regime of private law.\" (González Ballar Rafael. Límites del derecho administrativo. Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2008, pages 95, 97; in the same sense Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, Tesis de derecho administrativo. Editorial Stradtmann, S.A, tomo I, San José, 1998, page 85). Thus, \"every public entity, by the mere fact of being so, has the capacity to carry out acts and transactions available to private individuals, with the limitations and prohibitions established by law and the general principles of law.\" \n\n. (Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, IBID, page 85). A position that has been endorsed by the Courts of Justice on different occasions (by way of example, it is possible to see from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) Voto number 2006-03002, of ten hours and forty minutes on March ninth, two thousand six, as well as the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), in voto number 10 at 15:45 hours on February 6, 1998). In this way, depending on whether the Public Administration (Administración Pública) operates within the sphere of public law or private law, its labor regime will be one of public employment or private employment. The public employment regime corresponds to a personnel hiring system that differs substantially from that of the private sector, which is based on numeral one hundred ninety-two of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política); it is essentially a single regime regulated by various statutes which are essentially subject to parameters of constitutionality and legality, especially on matters of proportionality and equality. Within that framework, there exists a series of rights and obligations (see votos of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) 2883-96, 1420-91 and 1918-00) of a very diverse nature that defines the relationship as diametrically different (see voto of Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) 492317-03), under a series of principles such as legality, proven suitability, absence of free disposition of the relationship, subjection to the schemes of public law, relative lifetime tenure (inamovilidad), right of reinstatement (in this regard see votos 2012-6225 and 2000-04951 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)), among others.\n\nArticles one hundred ninety-one and one hundred ninety-two of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by establishing the following: “<i>Article 191.- <o:p></o:p></i></span></p>\n\n<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.0pt;\nmargin-left:0cm;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none'><i><span\nlang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'>A civil service statute will regulate the relations between the State and public servants, with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration” and “Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the same</span></i><span\nlang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'>”. In accordance with the indicated constitutional-rank norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of a specific regulatory framework, relative stability in employment – limiting the regime of free removal typical of private labor regulation – and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons covered by a subordination regime, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (with the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). In the public employment regime, the principle of the reality of the contract (contrato realidad) that underpins labor law is not applied; only rights contemplated in the statute are granted; the principle of formality of administrative activation, transparency, equality, and due process must be followed for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions; appointment is by competition which grants a subjective right; the decisions of the hierarchical superior are administrative acts; and the entity for which the service is provided has a public patrimony and is subject to public law in its organization and activity and to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness. Correlative to the aforementioned rights, the public servant possesses a series of employment-related obligations (obligaciones de carácter funcionarial), inherent to the public purposes sought by their activity and which must always guide their management, so as not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary liability. Without intending to be exhaustive, some of the duties inherent to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (art. 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Administration (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública)), b) duty to comply with the principles of public service - continuity, efficiency, adaptation to change in the legal regime and equality of treatment - (art. 4 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), c) duty to safeguard an adequate internal control environment (art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno)) d) duty to protect the best interests of children (art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia)) e) duty to comply with the legal system (art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil)), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of the Citizen from the Excess of Requirements and Administrative Procedures (Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos)), g) duty of obedience (art. 108 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), h) duty to act with effectiveness (art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos)) i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (art. 114 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil)) j) duty to respond in case of having acted with fraud (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) (art. 199 and 211 General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)) k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (art. 11 of said regulatory body). Additionally, in a supplementary manner, based on article nine of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and fifty-one of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and other provisions related to the labor relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship in a supplementary manner, such as for example the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching (Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia), the Law Regulating Smoking (Ley de Regulación del Fumado), the Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad), among others. In this vein, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters given the existence of a statutory (estatutaria) and not contractual relationship (article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), one cannot ignore the existence of general guidelines for the relationship that are common, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in article nineteen of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Regarding entry into service, the constitutional norm establishes the principle of proven suitability as the maximum standard (see votes of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) 12005-01, 5113-01, 3502-94, 1704-92, among many others), so that the effective performance of the work efficiently and the accreditation of the corresponding qualifications is not enough; rather, a series of requirements must be established to determine that among the various applicants, the elected person represents the one who best satisfies public interests, under reasonably objective parameters, even though it is not a strictly regulated act in itself. An evaluation that is carried out at a specific moment based on a record existing at that date. Said entry rule encompasses both the commencement of the public employment relationship with tenure (en propiedad) and promotion through the different levels of the structure, since the administrative career is governed by the same principle. Regarding the disciplinary regime to be applied in the event of breach of said duties, in accordance with various votes of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the principle of specificity (tipicidad) becomes more flexible, so that a specific legal classification of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants; basically, both principles turn into a relative condition in relation to criminal law and accept the existence of norms of a lower rank than a law in the formal sense to establish conduct contrary to the legal system (in this sense, vote 2007-013903 of fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes of the third of October of two thousand seven and 2005-06616 of twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes of the thirty-first of May of two thousand five and 94-5594 of fifteen hours forty-eight minutes of the twenty-seventh of September of nineteen ninety-four of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). By reason of the foregoing, both the breach of general functional duties and legally classified conduct (at the level of the corresponding Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), for example), and those contemplated in norms of a lower rank, such as those contained in the autonomous service regulations or in cases where the classification is regarding the sanction to be imposed, are sanctionable. The foregoing considerations are without prejudice to the fact that there exists a series of principles of sanctioning law (derecho sancionatorio), which must be observed in all cases, e.g., proportionality, non bis in idem, innocence, due process, due justification of the respective resolution. In this vein, it should be noted that in matters of defining conduct that may be considered part of the duties inherent to public officials (funcionarios públicos) or subject to sanction in case of breach, our country possesses a diffuse system, given that such conduct is not detailed in a single regulatory body but dispersed among different norms of varying rank, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to issue. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory powers of Public Administration (la Administración Pública), and the impossibility of regulating by legal means each and every specific conduct incurred by public servants, and on the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal legal system. Transversally to this set of principles and norms of different ranks, in this matter we find the public interest (interés público) as a constant reference point in the adoption of any decision or formal or informal conduct of the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest, understood in accordance with article one hundred thirteen of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), provides: <i>&quot;1. The public servant shall perform their functions in such a way as to primarily satisfy the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of Public Administration (la Administración Pública) when it may be in conflict. 3. In the appreciation of the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, in the first place, to which mere convenience cannot under any circumstances be given precedence</i>&quot;. By reason of the foregoing, any analysis in matters of public employment must not obviate the analysis of compliance with the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference point for its underlying motivation. Regarding interim servants (servidores interinos), the national jurisprudence has upheld the thesis of the improper stability (estabilidad impropia) of interim workers in the public sector, such that while workers with tenure cannot be dismissed except in cases of caused dismissal or by restructuring process, in the case of temporary servants, they cannot be removed from their positions to be replaced by other officials, also provisionally appointed, if there is no legitimate cause for that removal, such as that the permanent holder of the position returns to it, that someone else is appointed with tenure and after a prior competition, or that the second interim appointed has better qualifications (see the judgments 867-91 of 15:08 hours of May 3, 1991, 2005-11450 of 10:47 hours of August 26, 2005, 2006-4050 of 16:02 hours of March 28, 2006 and 2007-7650 of 16:59 hours of May 31, 2007 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)). The rule can also be applied to those cases in which the fixed-term appointment of the interim official is simply allowed to expire and the new appointment period is conferred on someone else. <o:p></o:p></span></p>\n\n<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.0pt;\nmargin-left:0cm;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none'><b><span\nlang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'>V.-<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n\n<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.0pt;\nmargin-left:0cm;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none'><b><span\nlang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'>Regarding the effects of alcohol or drug dependence syndrome, as an objective cause for termination of a public employment relationship: </span></b><span lang=ES-PE\nstyle='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'>This Panel understands this syndrome as a set of symptoms observed when an individual who has consumed heavily according to their physical capacity for a prolonged period reduces or stops the consumption of alcohol or another drug, whether authorized or not, under the aforementioned conditions. The abuse of any drug leads to tolerance, physical dependence, and a subsequent withdrawal syndrome. The withdrawal syndrome is mainly due to the central nervous system being maintained in a state of hyperexcitability. Unlike most other withdrawal syndromes caused by other drugs, in the case of alcohol, it can be fatal. The syndrome may include a series of neurological symptoms, with delirium tremens which can lead to excitotoxicity. Initially, the law treated the issue as inappropriate conduct per se, the product of a licentious life, but more recently it has been considered a disease, with the corresponding legal consequences. The effects of the intake of liquor by the worker are treated in Costa Rican legislation applicable to the private employment regime and supplementarily to the public one, as part of the cases of prohibited conduct contemplated in article seventy-two subsection c) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). In this sense, said regulatory body establishes in this regard, the following: “<i>It is absolutely prohibited for workers (…) c) To work in a state of drunkenness or under any other analogous condition</i>” Complementary to said norm, article eighty-one subsection i) of the same code, provides for the reiteration of the conduct as a cause for disciplinary sanction, in the following manner: “<i>When the worker, after the employer has warned them once, incurs the causes provided for in subsections a, b, c, d and e of article 72 </i>”. As can be seen, the said norms contemplate the exercise of the activity under the effect of liquor consumption, that is, the situation of drunkenness or intoxication, but do not provide in such cases for a dismissal per se, but rather require a prior warning (apercibimiento) by the employer. The foregoing, insofar as the legislator did not deem the conduct sufficiently serious for an automatic dismissal to proceed upon the single commission of said fault. Both norms apply not only to the person who suffers as such from alcohol dependence syndrome, but also to those who suffer occasional or sporadic consequences due to the consumption of liquor in the workplace itself. Regarding the abandonment of work due to the indicated syndrome, reference must be made to what is indicated in subsection a) of the aforementioned article seventy-two, insofar as it prohibits: &quot;Abandoning work during working hours without justified cause or without the employer's permission&quot;</i>. Said norm applies to the servant who during working hours was ingesting liquor or under its effects. In this case, article eighty-one subsection one cited ut supra would also be applicable and consequently, the reiteration of the act, after prior warning, is required for the dismissal to proceed, in accordance with what is indicated by the norm in mention. Regarding the worker who fails to report to work – including the case in which said absence occurs due to the intake of liquor – subsection g) of the indicated article eighty-one, points out as a cause for sanction, the following: &quot;<i>When the worker fails to attend work without the employer's permission, without justified cause, for two consecutive days or for more than two alternate days within the same calendar month</i>&quot;. As a last situation where the indicated syndrome could have disciplinary consequences, would be the application of subsection l) of article eighty-one of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which establishes: “<i>The following are just causes that empower the employer to terminate the employment contract: l) When the worker incurs any other serious breach of the obligations imposed by the contract</i>”. In this case, we would be in the situation in which the indicated disease has a more direct impact on the execution of the work relationship and therefore alcohol consumption implies an affectation to elements inherent to the reality of the contract or to the one that was signed, such as, for example, a decrease in work performance, an impact on workplace accidents, behavioral disorders or an affectation on interpersonal relationships. These cases implicitly involve a greater regularity in the consumption of liquor and a more sensitive consequence thereof. For its part, with respect to the existence of specific norms applicable to the public employment regime, it should be noted that the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and its regulation are silent in explicitly treating alcoholism syndrome as sanctionable conduct. In this matter, at the legal level, only article eighty-one of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía) is noted in this sense, which establishes as a serious fault, <i>&quot;Habitual drunkenness or the use of unauthorized drugs during service</i>&quot;. By reason of the foregoing, the application of the indicated norms of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) would also proceed by integration, in accordance with what is provided in article two hundred six of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), insofar as it establishes the following: <i>&quot;Insofar as they do not contravene the text and the procedures referring to the organization of the Tribunal contained in this title, the provisions of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) shall apply supplementarily&quot;</i>. The votes of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) have been the ones that have come to fill said gap regarding the treatment of the alcoholic worker and the effects of their absences for such reason, with some relevant considerations. In this vein, vote of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), N° 182, of 10:20 hours on March 23, 2001, expresses very clearly the character of alcohol dependence syndrome as a disease, and introduces a new condition for the adoption of sanctioning measures (medidas sancionatorias) for the worker who suffers from it, as follows: <o:p></o:p></span></p>\n\n<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.0pt;\nmargin-left:0cm;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none'><span\nclass=GramE><i><span lang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'>&quot; From</span></i></span><i><span\nlang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'> the guidelines that the I.L.O. has issued on this matter, it is extracted that a different treatment must be given to the disease of alcoholism with respect to other ailments that may affect the worker. Its special nature consists in the fact that, in the case of an alcoholic patient, it would be advisable for the employer to offer them an opportunity to try to rehabilitate themselves, before proceeding to dismiss them for that reason...... The employer's policy, then, should not be sanctioning (sancionatoria), but rather aimed at pressuring the worker to seek and obtain help. Article 29 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), Nº 5395 of October 30, 1973 provides: “Persons with severe emotional disorders as well as persons with dependence on the use of drugs or other substances, including alcoholics, may voluntarily submit to specialized outpatient or inpatient treatment in health services and shall do so when ordered by the competent authority, when deemed necessary, according to the requirements determined by the pertinent regulations”. It follows from this that, in our country, the employer cannot force the worker to submit to any treatment, but can inform, advise, or refer them to receive it. If the employee refuses to cooperate, their dismissal proceeds without further consideration. The exposed considerations, due to their enormous social and economic significance, should only be considered for those workers who accredit, by suitable means, being dependent on alcohol, and so it is concluded after analyzing their general behavior in the development of the employment relationship. As a final observation, it should be noted that alcoholism is an incurable but treatable disease. Therefore, the fact that it is incurable does not give license to consume nor to justify the faults in which, for that reason, workers incur. The employer cannot be imposed such a great burden, but only that of providing an opportunity to the affected person, who, if they do not take advantage of it and continue causing problems, can perfectly be dismissed (even if, for example, they present a medical opinion certifying their health problems caused by alcoholism, in order to try to justify their absences). It is, then, within these guidelines, that alcoholism-as-disease should be considered as a serious fault, in the terms of article 81 subsection l) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)&quot;. </span></i><span\nlang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n\n<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.0pt;\nmargin-left:0cm;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none'><span\nlang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'>Also consultable are votes 375 of 9:10 on July 30, 2003; 286 of 10:10 on April 28, 2004; 106 of 9:30 on February 18, 2005; 387 of 10:35 on May 18, 2005; 342-2009 of April 29, 2009; 00183-2010 of February 5, 2010, among others, of the indicated Chamber. In the same vein, based on vote 2010-1664 of 15:08 hours on January 27, 2010, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) adopts the thesis of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda), stating the following: <o:p></o:p></span></p>\n\n<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.0pt;\nmargin-left:0cm;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none'><span\nclass=GramE><i><span lang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'>“ III</span></i></span><i><span\nlang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'>. ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE AND THE NEED TO GRANT THE WORKER THE POSSIBILITY OF REHABILITATION. (…) in a meeting of Experts in Geneva, Switzerland held in January 1995, a series of practical recommendations were examined on the treatment of problems related to the consumption of alcohol and drugs in the workplace. These guidelines are collected in the document known as the Repertory of Practical Recommendations of the International Labor Organization, on the treatment of issues related to alcohol and drugs in the workplace, Geneva, 1996.... From this perspective, considering alcoholism as a health problem, the obligation to treat it without discrimination like any other disease is established, and its treatment is framed within the scope of health services (public or private) as appropriate. In this approach scheme, it was provided that employers, preferably, should grant alcoholic workers the opportunity to undergo rehabilitation to overcome their disease without any type of discrimination, before applying disciplinary sanctions. Certainly, the possibility of the employer sanctioning inappropriate conduct by the worker resulting from the consumption of alcohol or other drugs was recognized, however, prior to the adoption of any disciplinary measure, they must refer the worker to undergo rehabilitation and treatment, it being the case that, in the event there is no affirmative response from them, they may apply the corresponding sanction in accordance with current legislation. (…) Within this scheme, the role played by the rehabilitation of the alcoholic person, the fact of having stable employment, which allows them to feel productive and reduce the degree of zzación (sic) and stigmatization, must be considered. So much so that in the supra cited recommendations, it was recognized that the stability offered by a job frequently constitutes an important factor in facilitating the overcoming of problems related to the consumption of alcohol or drugs. As our country is a member of the International Labor Organization, these guidelines, —even (sic) though they have a recommendatory nature— in attention to the pro homine principle, serve to integrate and interpret the Law of the Constitution, insofar as they grant greater protection to the fundamental rights of persons.</span></i></p>\n\nOn the other hand, the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), No. 5395, Article 29 establishes that persons dependent on the use of drugs or other substances, including alcoholics, may voluntarily submit to specialized outpatient or inpatient treatment in health services. From the foregoing, it follows that the employer must offer the worker the possibility of treatment and rehabilitation before applying the disciplinary regime, so that if the worker does not take advantage of such opportunity, the employer may then apply the corresponding sanction. However, it must be clear that it is the worker's responsibility to prove, by suitable means, his or her alcohol dependency and, as applicable, that he or she is receiving treatment or therapy.\"\n\nLikewise, in this regard, among others, we can cite vote 08617-2011 of five hours and fifty-nine minutes of June twenty-eighth, two thousand eleven, from the same Chamber. What has been previously resolved by both Chambers derives—and is expressly cited as such—from the document entitled \"Treatment of alcohol- and drug-related issues in the workplace\" approved by the ILO Governing Body at its 262nd Session, March-April 1995, which has as its background the said organization's 1988 document entitled \"Initiatives in the workplace to prevent and reduce the problems caused by alcohol and other drugs\". Regarding this issue, the International Labour Organization, in accordance with what was established by the World Health Organization (WHO), determined that alcoholism is a disease, and therefore, the worker must be given the opportunity to undergo treatment, prior to applying disciplinary sanctions or dismissal. In that regard, the WHO stated: \"- *Policies and programs on alcohol and drug use should promote the prevention, reduction, and treatment of problems related to alcohol and drug use that arise in the workplace. This code applies to all types of employment, public and private, including those in the unstructured sector. National legislation and policy relating to these problems should be established after consultation with the most representative employers' and workers' organizations. - Problems related to alcohol and drug use should be considered health problems and, therefore, treated, without any discrimination, like any other health problem at work and fall within the scope of health services (public or private), as appropriate. (...) - The stability offered by a job is often an important factor in facilitating the overcoming of problems related to alcohol or drug use. For this reason, the social partners should recognize the special role that the workplace can play in helping people with these problems. - Workers who wish to receive treatment and rehabilitation for their problems related to alcohol or drug use should not be subject to discrimination by the employer and should enjoy the usual job security and the same opportunities for transfer and professional advancement as their colleagues. - It should be recognized that the employer has authority to sanction workers whose professional conduct is improper as a consequence of problems related to alcohol or drug use. However, it is preferable to refer them to counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation services rather than to apply disciplinary sanctions. If a worker does not cooperate fully with the treatment, the employer may take the disciplinary measures it deems appropriate. (...)*\" (emphasis is ours). Now then, in application of the foregoing, the International Labour Organization made the following recommendations: \" 9. *Intervention and disciplinary measures 9.1. Preference for treatment over disciplinary measures 9.1.1. The employer should consider alcohol or drug problems as a health problem. In such cases, the employer should normally offer counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation services to workers, before considering the application of disciplinary measures. 9.2. Role of the employer in relation to the application of disciplinary measures 9.2.1. It should be recognized that the employer has authority to sanction workers whose professional conduct is improper as a consequence of problems related to alcohol or drugs. However, it is preferable to refer them to counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation services rather than to apply disciplinary sanctions. If a worker does not cooperate fully with the treatment, the employer may take the disciplinary measures it deems appropriate*\". (dwt.oit.or.cr/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc). These considerations cannot be ignored if we heed the provisions of article fifteen of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), insofar as it provides that \"*Cases not covered by this Code, its Regulations, or its supplementary or related laws, shall be resolved in accordance with the general principles of Labor Law, equity, local custom or usage; and in default of these, the provisions contained in the Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labour Organization shall be applied, in order, provided they do not contradict the country's laws, and the principles and laws of common law*\". Said rule is applicable, in accordance with article nine in fine of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and two hundred six of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) (a general principle that is also applicable to minor public entities, insofar as they do not have an express rule on the matter, without prejudice to the fact that the administrative legal system itself establishes its order of precedence). In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that for absences due to alcoholism-disease to be sanctionable, it is required that the worker has previously failed to take advantage of the opportunities provided for his or her due rehabilitation. It is not possible, then, to sanction the person suffering from the disease under analysis, in such cases, given the nature of the chronic health condition it represents, if the sick person has not first been given the option to seek treatment. The Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) has expressed it as follows: \"*the employer's sanctioning power to dismiss the alcoholic worker (sick-dependent) is permissible when there is no positive response on his or her part, once the option to seek counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation has been given..*.\"\n\n(Vote 00820-2007 of 11:10 of October 31, 2007). It should be noted that our Chamber, while basing its decision on what was resolved by the International Labour Organization, does not reach its level of requirement in terms of financing, providing, or managing services for the alcohol-dependent person, but rather asks the employer to give the worker the possibility or option to seek counseling or treatment in order to rehabilitate. However, the condition cannot be considered something that must be tolerated forever by the employer—it is not a protection (fuero) that grants a concealed stability to the worker—since once the possibility of rehabilitation and overcoming the disease has been exhausted, if this was not successful, the possibility of dismissal for this reason is indeed opened. Nor does it mean that the worker is relieved of fulfilling the obligations inherent to the employment contract or excused from faults for this reason, but rather that, being a disease, based on the protection of the right to health, an opportunity is granted for the affected person to seek treatment, so that the disease does not further impact his or her personal and work relationships. As is evident, the actions of the parties in the employment relationship will always be permeated by good faith in these cases, given that the opportunity provided to the worker is a limit not only for the employer regarding dismissal, but also for the worker, regarding his or her general conduct and fulfillment of labor obligations. The foregoing considerations do not nullify the possibility that, in the event of committing a serious fault—private employment regime—or acting with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave)—public employment—disciplinary sanctions may be applied for conduct originating from the syndrome under analysis. It is not an obstacle to indicate that attendance or permanence in a rehabilitation center must be oriented toward an objective sought by the subject suffering the condition. That is, inpatient treatment (internamiento) for its own sake, without at least a mediate and tangible result, is not permissible. If the person seeks to enter a specialized center, it should not be to justify an absence before the employer or to feign interest, but rather it should have a positive, evident, and evaluable result in his or her conduct and disease, such that in a medium term it impacts not only his or her personal sphere, but above all, the work sphere, to guarantee his or her permanence and, above all, to demonstrate good faith and interest in breaking the cycle that prevents him or her from fully satisfying obligations as a worker. Thus, participation in prevention or treatment programs must be oriented towards promoting changes in the worker's lifestyle, with a clear attitude and conduct regarding his or her problem and with transparency towards the employer. In this line of thought, the Labor Courts have been judicious regarding the issue of absences due to liquor intake, as derived from vote 00127-2007 of March 20, 2007, from the Labor Court, Section IV, which states:\n\n\"*... although the general rule is that the worker is obliged to justify his or her absence within two days (or that dictated by the internal regulations of the entity in question), exceptionally, cases are admitted where such justification can be made after that term, when compliance is impossible. On that occasion, it was said that, depending on its severity, a state of alcoholic intake can become one of those situations that prevent compliance with the deadline set to justify the absence, if one considers the situation the alcoholic experiences when entering a crisis: 'Drinks continuously for days on end; gets blindly and hopelessly drunk. Completely forgets everything, family, work, and even eating and taking shelter*\" (NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOLISM, Alcoholism. Manual for educators, San José, January, 1978, p.67). However, in the specific case, the plaintiff did not demonstrate—as was unavoidably his responsibility, article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil)—that during the entire period he was absent from work, he was affected by an alcoholic crisis of such magnitude that it prevented him from fulfilling the minimum of his labor obligations\". (In a similar line of thought, see votes number 182-2001 of 10:20 hours, of March 23, 2001, 00581-2007 of 3:30 of August 22, 2007, and 00123-2010 of 9:55 of January 22, 2010, from the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia)).\n\nIn matters of the public employment regime, some additional considerations cannot be ignored. The Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), in article thirty-five, states that: \"*In all cases, the employee must notify his or her immediate supervisor as soon as possible, verbally or in writing, of the causes preventing him or her from attending work. For no reason—except force majeure—should he or she wait until the second day of absence to notify. Absences from work due to illness exceeding four days must be justified by the incapacitated employee with a certification issued by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), or by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros). If the illness affects him or her only for up to four days in the same calendar month, he or she may justify said absence for up to four days with an incapacity certificate issued by the insuring entity or, in its absence, a private physician's opinion*\". A rule that even has an echo in the case of minor public entities, unless a different and specific provision applies for their reality. In accordance with the foregoing, the justification presented by the employee affected by alcoholism must be timely and by suitable means, except when due to crisis reasons in his or her disease, he or she is prevented. In such cases, by the principle of good faith, it would be reasonable to accept a late justification, duly accredited, as indicated ut supra. Additionally, the existence of the public interest as inherent to every public employment relationship cannot be ignored, so that in every analysis, this must be weighed alongside the particular condition of the employee, given that besides the said opportunity for treatment, the potential impact that the official's disregard of this possibility could mean for the collective interest must be assessed, as well as the demerit caused by the non-provision or defective fulfillment of his or her obligations, as well as the risk that the reiteration of conduct could mean for the users of the service provided. Having made the foregoing considerations, it is now appropriate to proceed to resolve the specific case submitted to the knowledge of this Tribunal.\n\n**VI.-**\n\n**On the merits of the case:** In accordance with the claim filed by the plaintiff, he requires as his **first claim** that the administrative proceeding initiated against him be annulled, by virtue of it being a persecutory act, which would imply an abuse of power (desviación de poder) or at least a defect in the motive thereof, such that its existence is unfounded. In this regard, the Tribunal notes that the defendant public entity acted almost complacently for a period of about a year, despite inconsistencies in Dr. Keith Aguilar's attendance. Within this period, it is possible to locate, as was accepted as valid justification, the inpatient treatment (internamiento) in a rehabilitation center for a condition apparently related to alcohol intake. Adding to the above, that some of the absences were justified with private physician's slips, although the legal system requires that such forms be validated by dispensaries of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social) or the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), as applicable. In themselves, those documents (private physician's incapacity certificates) do not have the incapacitating effect, but they do evidence a situation that could be evaluated by the employer; especially when it is sporadic. Moreover, in this case, the multiple slips on the matter determine that the plaintiff had no interest (or at least did not prove otherwise) in validating the private document according to the legal procedure. It is worth adding that, given the plaintiff's profession, it is impossible to pretend to interpret that he did not know of the procedure indicated above, as in his condition as a physician, it is logical to think (sound rational criticism) that he knew of the procedure set forth above. In this regard, the alleged nullity of the records that served as the basis for the existence of the proceeding proves to be an irrelevant issue, first because it was not demonstrated, and secondly, no less important, insofar as the principle of informality that protects the Administration determines that nullity is only permissible for those relevant defects that affect the right of defense or that concern substantial aspects. In this case, a record as such is a mere certificate of what occurred, which can well be replaced by testimonial evidence or by a certification, so that too much importance is being given to a merely formal aspect. Besides the fact that according to the plaintiff's own reasoning, the alleged nullity lies in the lack of witnesses, as if the legal system required a specific number of witnesses for a certificate of an employee's absence. As for the alleged lack of signatures, the situation pointed out was argued without this jurisdictional body being able to locate a certificate under such conditions. In any case, and even more importantly, the Chamber also cannot find that there was persecution in the existence of said proceeding. Even if the public entity, through some of its representatives, knew of the plaintiff's condition, that does not nullify the possibility of verifying the plaintiff's absences, confirming whether they are all duly justified, and if not, establishing the corresponding disciplinary sanctions. We are in the presence of public funds, which entails that even if it were not grounds for dismissal, seeking to give some validity to private physician's incapacity certificates, the truth is that by not satisfying the legal requirements, these documents did not qualify for the payment of an incapacity, which in itself warranted the existence of an administrative proceeding, as an act of deprivation (acto ablatorio) or burden (gravamen) against the plaintiff. It cannot be forgotten in this regard that the administrative proceeding is the mechanism the Administration has to adopt the formal administrative acts it requires; consequently, it is a lawful and normal activity; which in principle should not necessarily lead to any liability. The sacrifices that individuals must adopt to face this type of proceeding are, in principle, an obligation they must bear, except in two different scenarios: when the proceeding is a means to conceal an abuse of power (desviación de poder) or a defect in the motive in general (in which case the act becomes illegitimate), or alternatively, when the sacrifice is so special, particular, and intense that, even being lawful under the principle of distribution of public burdens, the individual is not obliged to bear it without the corresponding liability. In accordance with article three hundred seventeen of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), it is the obligation of the party asserting a claim within a process to prove its statement; merely asserting it is not enough. The plaintiff reasoned in his complaint that, being a confidential official, he was not subject to any schedule, which determines that the persecution exists from the very moment the Administration was verifying compliance with his schedule; in this regard, this Court must be more than emphatic. A confidential official does not lack a schedule and may do whatever he pleases regarding the service he is called to fulfill; because ultimately, public funds are always present. Whenever a public servant is involved, his activities are subject to oversight in the exercise of the position, which includes verifying that he is showing up for work, as it could well be that he was receiving unjust enrichment by collecting a salary for days he has not provided service. Being a confidential official and being a completely free, unsupervised servant are two very different things. On the contrary, internal control rules obligate subordinate heads to supervise their subordinates; among these is compliance with the schedule and workday, which entails that even for employees who do not have to clock in, they must still be supervised in fulfilling the public ends and tasks. In this case, the plaintiff maintains that the administrative proceeding was unjustified, was the result of persecution against him, or lacked the corresponding motive. But no evidence was presented regarding any of these three scenarios. Regarding harassment, it suffices to say that not only is its invocation necessary, but also the demonstration in court of its presuppositions. In this regard, it has been defined by the International Labour Organization as \"... a systematic, repeated, or persistent verbal or psychological action by which, in the workplace or in connection with work, a group of people injures a victim, humiliates, offends, or intimidates them (…)\". Based on the foregoing, the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) has indicated that we are in the presence of workplace harassment when the following presuppositions are present \"... a) that it concerns some attitude, without differentiating whether they are gestures, words, behaviors; b) that it be a repeated, systematized act; c) that it be an attack against a worker, that degrades their work environment or endangers their employment and, that attacks their integrity, whether physical or psychological...\" (vote 2012-000984 of ten hours fifteen minutes of October twenty-fourth, two thousand twelve). None of this has been demonstrated in court and, consequently, this argument from the plaintiff is not admissible. We reiterate that regarding the absence of motive, the Tribunal cannot find any conduct contrary to law, especially when there were disaggregated incapacity certificates of several days, and there is evidence that there could be effects on the public service. There is a prior, more relevant reason that prevents accepting the claim set forth above; as has been repeatedly indicated, the existence of an administrative proceeding does not generate a legal state by itself; it is a preparatory act that does not define a state or condition. It only generates an expectation that the Administration may eventually proceed to issue an act that could well be negative to the plaintiff's interests. A possibility, without any certainty. That situation determines that the act does not claim an effect susceptible to being challenged in this venue. It is worth adding that the plaintiff, when his appointment at the Caja's Centro de Especialidades was not renewed due to a manifest abandonment of work that the plaintiff himself carried out, he did receive a subsequent appointment—several months later—in the Huetar Norte region, which again shows that the alleged persecution he claims never occurred. We reiterate that the Administration was more than considerate with the plaintiff regarding his multiple incapacity certificates, covering the aspects related to the alcohol intake that the plaintiff might be facing. Lastly, and no less relevant, it must be pointed out that said proceeding was archived by the Administration's own decision as it could not locate the plaintiff to notify him. Bearing in mind that the existence of an archived administrative proceeding does not generate a legal state contrary to the interests of the petitioner by itself, insofar as it does not produce a legal effect in the sphere of Mr. Keith Aguilar, any nullity lacks all absolute interest. The Administration refused to generate any adverse effect to the petitioner's interests. In this way, the defense of lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) raised by the defendant must be accepted without further questioning, since even accepting that the existence of an administrative proceeding has its own effects (which, as we have already indicated, we also reject), the truth is that having been archived, it lacks all current interest. The claim must be rejected for this reason. **As a second claim, the annulment of the plaintiff's resignation is required.** In this regard, the reasons for said nullity were put forward concerning an alleged defect in consent (vicio en la voluntad). A juridical act (acto jurídico) is deemed voluntary when it is serious, expressed, sincere, free, and spontaneous. If any of these characteristics are lacking, we are facing a juridical act that will not produce its own effects. Considering these characteristics: it is possible that there are obstacles in discernment (immaturity and insanity (insania)), obstacles in intention (error or ignorance and deceit (dolo)), and obstacles in freedom (violence, simulation, and fraud, although some legal scholars include lesion). When defects in consent (vicios del consentimiento) are present, the juridical acts that have not been performed with intention and freedom are affected; while those performed without discernment will be non-existent juridical acts. In Law, certain congenital defects of voluntary acts are called defects of will (vicios de la voluntad), defects of consent (vicios del consentimiento) or defects of voluntary acts, which are susceptible to producing the invalidity of the acts that suffer from them. Error is the false mental representation of an object of knowledge due to ignorance, or lack of full knowledge about an object, or due to a lack of reasoning, a defective understanding. In this case, it was not clear from the plaintiff's argument exactly what type of error is being argued, for the purposes of its assessment.\n\nThus, it is not indicated whether the plaintiff did not know the effects of his resignation, or if, on the contrary, he was pressured into it, such that the intended effect was different. Curiously, in both cases, the logic would be that the plaintiff should have reimbursed the amount corresponding to notice or severance pay (cesantía) from the moment it was deposited, which has not been proven. Even from the complaint itself, it is inferred that it was the plaintiff himself who sought the payment of his labor entitlements because he had been without means of livelihood for several months, and that these included all items he could recover. This in the case at hand represented the payment of severance pay (cesantía) amounting to several million colones. Add to the foregoing that, for purposes of seeking nullity, no specific violation of any of the procedural requirements for dealing with workers who ingest alcohol, according to the regulations cited in the preceding whereas clause, is invoked. In short, this Chamber cannot locate any ground for nullity or any defect in consent that would determine the invalidity of the aforementioned resignation. Therefore, this claim lacks merit and must be dismissed.\n\nThis jurisdictional body does consider that some clarifications must be made. The Court understands that the plaintiff was paid severance pay (cesantía) because it involved a long-standing employment relationship that ended due to a situation not attributable to the plaintiff (through the plaintiff’s own fault); it must be assumed that some internal regulation obliged the payment of that item. Note in this regard that the plaintiff’s appointment was not extended, not because of the imposition of a disciplinary sanction that so ordered, but because the employment relationship expired at a moment when the interested party had had several days of unjustified absence, which led to the presumption of evident job abandonment. Within that framework, the Administration decided not to extend an appointment to a position of trust, due to the affectations being caused to the public service. That act was not challenged by the interested party, and he even managed, months later, to obtain an interim appointment in the Huetar Norte region, where he ultimately also presented inconsistencies in his attendance. Subsequently, and without being able to demonstrate that there had been pressure against the said individual, he submitted his resignation. The foregoing because if it were merely a resignation by the plaintiff, the payment of that item would not proceed under the general rules of private or public law. Now, in the submitted file, it is possible to verify how the plaintiff was guided to submit his resignation in order to receive payment of his labor entitlements, as long as the employment relationship was in force. Severance pay (cesantía) could fall under that condition, but the other items such as vacation, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), or school salary (salario escolar) did not. Under proper practice, those items, from the moment the employment relationship was interrupted, could have been demanded by the interested party at the time he deemed convenient. The temporary withholding of those items could have some social justification, different from vacation, to the extent of seeking that the worker receive the corresponding amounts together with the other ordinary workers (Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) and school salary (salario escolar)), taking into account the social purpose driving those benefits. But in the case of vacation, it is unjustifiable. The defendant should have paid that item from the very moment it was requested, as it is an item beyond all dispute. Another concern that weighs upon us is regarding the information provided concerning the plaintiff’s resignation. The Administration diligently guided the plaintiff that, in order to receive the economic benefit he expected, he had to resign, but it did not show a corresponding interest in informing him whether or not there was a period during which he could not work for that specific Administration or in general. The Administration must act with due transparency, which in this case was complied with. From the sphere of ordinary labor law, that resignation would have only entailed the payment of items constituting labor rights (which excluded notice and severance pay (cesantía)), which would mean that the worker could return to a new appointment at the time he deemed convenient, provided there existed some position for which his appointment could be promoted. But in this case, the item of severance pay (cesantía) was paid; it must be assumed, due to an internal rule specific to the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social. The implications of that particular provision should have been explained when guiding the interested party to submit his resignation, if they produced any adverse effect for him. These aspects determine that the plaintiff’s litigation is not absolutely in bad faith.\n\nWith regard to the claim for reinstatement, it was reasoned as derived from the invoked nullity or the alleged persecution, but both motivations were rejected. Consequently, this request must suffer the same fate. Inasmuch as it was the plaintiff himself who resigned based on a situation that aligned with his interests at that time, such as the payment of his settlement, it is not possible to seek the reinstatement of the plaintiff. Furthermore, it must be noted that as the parties stated in the proceedings, Dr. Keith Aguilar was an official appointed on an interim basis in a position of trust. As such, it is a position of free removal, which would prevent him from being appointed to that post again. Indeed, under sound reasoning, there would be no specific post to which to return, as the specific post does not have a permanent holder due to its nature as a position of trust with respect to the condition at the Centro de Especialidades of the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, and with respect to the post held in the Huetar Norte region, the condition was as an interim substitute for a permanent holder who was on vacation. In fact, to date, this jurisdictional body does not know, from the administrative file, of the existence of any limitation preventing the plaintiff from returning to any post of the defendant Caja, provided he satisfies the requirements and his professional profile corresponds to it, in addition to the existence of an unoccupied post or one for substitution. Therefore, from what is visible in the file, it is not possible to infer that, as a result of administrative conduct, the plaintiff cannot manage to obtain another interim or eventually permanent post, if he satisfies the requirements of the administrative legal system. What is indeed impossible is to gain access to the reinstatement to a post over which he holds no right whatsoever.\n\nThe fourth request is based on the payment of lost wages from the date of June twenty-first, two thousand nine, until his reinstatement, plus all labor guarantees, school salary (salario escolar), Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), and CCSS contributions. In this regard, again, we are in the presence of a claim subsidiary to those previously indicated, which as such must be dismissed, as it depends on another that has suffered the same fate. Since the plaintiff has not managed to obtain a favorable ruling regarding the petitioned nullity, it is also impossible to consider a reinstatement to the post and even less a payment of back pay. Observe how, regarding the post at the Centro de Especialidades Médicas, what occurred was that the Administration took that post for other functions, with the interested third party Calderón Céspedes occupying it to fulfill those functions. Without it being demonstrable in the file that this person does not have the suitable credentials for those activities, or that Mr. Keith Aguilar had better qualifications than him. The activities at the Centro de Especialidades were not taken over by the new interim appointee. Meanwhile, regarding the post in the Huetar Norte region, the appointment was on a temporary basis to cover the vacation of another official who was on leave. Within that framework, it is not possible to locate the existence of any right regarding a specific appointment that would allow the recognition of lost wages. It must be dismissed.\n\nRegarding the penultimate claim, namely the payment of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) and objective moral damages (daño moral objetivo), both must be dismissed. As already indicated, the existence of the administrative proceeding turned out to be lawful and normal conduct, which, although it generates some affectation to private individuals, cannot be compensated under normal conditions, as the private individual is obliged to bear it. What the plaintiff seeks lacks support in the national legal system and must be dismissed without further questioning. This body does not doubt that facing an administrative proceeding must generate some affectation on a subjective level, even when one is certain that no act will be issued against one’s personal interests; but the legal system does not allow patrimonial recognition in those cases when the plaintiff incurred in unlawful conduct. So we again fall into a lack of right. Finally, it must be indicated with respect to objective moral damages (daño moral objetivo), that there is no proof in this regard to indicate that the image of the plaintiff was affected by this proceeding, which determines a dismissal of that request in accordance with canon three hundred seventeen of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nRegarding the recognition of indexing interests (intereses de indexación), the request has an effect derived from the recognition of some economic item, which in the specific case has not occurred, so it must be dismissed. Finally, with respect to the employment relationship of Mr. Keith Aguilar and the payment of differences in labor entitlements, the plaintiff never clearly specifies which items were wrongly calculated or the specific entitlements he considers are owed to him; he merely points to a general item so that the Court determines on its own initiative which item is missing. On this point, it must be clarified that this jurisdictional body cannot substitute for the party, who is called upon to specify those items clearly if he seeks their recognition. In the oral and public hearing, the only clarification made was that the existence of a debt was not assured, but rather that the request was grounded in the possibility that some pending remainder existed. Under that condition, the dismissal of the request without further questioning is imposed.\""
}