{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-153094",
  "citation": "Res. 00774-2014 Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Ajuste de ingresos por intereses presuntivos y requisito de autorización específica ICT para deducción turística",
  "title_en": "Adjustment of Presumptive Interest Income and ICT Specific Authorization Requirement for Tourism Deduction",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte rechaza el recurso de casación de Multiplaza Escazú S.A. contra ajustes del impuesto sobre la renta del período 1999. En primer lugar, confirma la procedencia de la renta presuntiva del artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, pues los fondos girados a la relacionada Parque Central S.A. constituyeron un préstamo y no un aporte de capital; al no existir documento escrito, la presunción de devengo de intereses es absoluta e inadmite prueba en contrario. Se respalda la aplicación del principio de realidad económica (artículo 8 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) para desconocer la recalificación contable posterior como inversión. En segundo lugar, determina que el artículo 11 de la Ley 6990 (derogado) exigía dos autorizaciones del ICT para la deducción del 50% de la inversión turística: una genérica para la empresa emisora y otra específica para el inversionista. La falta de esta última impide gozar del incentivo fiscal. Además, la Sala descarta violación a la confianza legítima, pues oficios administrativos contrarios a un decreto ejecutivo superior no vinculan, y el silencio positivo no opera en materia tributaria por exclusión del artículo 367 inciso d) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.",
  "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court dismisses the cassation appeal of Multiplaza Escazú S.A. against income tax adjustments for the 1999 period. First, it upholds the application of presumptive income under Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, because funds transferred to the related company Parque Central S.A. constituted a loan, not a capital contribution; in the absence of a written document, the presumption of interest accrual is absolute and admits no evidence to the contrary. The use of the economic reality principle (Art. 8 of the Tax Code) to disregard the subsequent recharacterization as an investment is validated. Second, it rules that Article 11 of Law 6990 (repealed) required two authorizations from the Costa Rican Tourism Board (ICT) for deducting 50% of a tourism investment: a generic one for the issuing company and a specific one for the investor. Lack of the latter precludes the tax incentive. Additionally, the Chamber rejects claims that legitimate expectations were violated because contrary administrative opinions are subordinate to a higher-ranking executive decree, and positive silence does not apply in tax matters by virtue of Article 367(d) of the General Public Administration Law.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte",
  "date": "2014",
  "year": "2014",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "renta presuntiva",
    "intereses presuntivos",
    "realidad económica",
    "autorización genérica y específica",
    "silencio positivo",
    "LISR",
    "CNPT",
    "ICT"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 10",
      "law": "Ley 7092"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 8",
      "law": "Ley 4755"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 11",
      "law": "Ley 6990"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 12",
      "law": "Ley 6990"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 1",
      "law": "Decreto Ejecutivo 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 367",
      "law": "Ley 6227"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "impuesto sobre la renta",
    "renta presuntiva",
    "intereses presuntivos",
    "principio de realidad económica",
    "incentivos turísticos",
    "ICT",
    "autorización específica",
    "silencio positivo",
    "Ley 6990",
    "Ley 7092"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "income tax",
    "presumptive income",
    "presumptive interest",
    "economic reality principle",
    "tourism incentives",
    "ICT",
    "specific authorization",
    "positive silence",
    "Law 6990",
    "Law 7092"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "“Se presume, salvo prueba en contrario, que todo contrato de préstamo de financiamiento, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza o denominación, si existe documento escrito, devenga un interés no menor a la tasa activa de interés anual más alto que fije el Banco Central de Costa Rica… En los casos en que no exista documento escrito, ante la presunción no se aceptará prueba en contrario.” (Art. 10 LISR)\n\n“Si lo que se pretendía era aplicar la deducción del impuesto sobre la renta prevista en la norma, esa autorización lo era para que los terceros inversionistas que hayan adquirido acciones al amparo de beneficiario fiscal, procedieran a realizar la deducción correspondiente del tributo. Por ende, tenía que ser una autorización específica…”\n\n“…frente a este tipo de autorizaciones que son un presupuesto condicionante que sirve de base a un incentivo tributario, no aplica el silencio positivo que regulan los artículos 330 y 331 de la LGAP. Al estar frente a incentivos fiscales, es claro que la naturaleza jurídica del procedimiento es de índole tributaria…”",
  "excerpt_en": "“It is presumed, unless evidence to the contrary is provided, that any financing loan contract, regardless of its nature or denomination, if there is a written document, accrues interest at a rate not lower than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank of Costa Rica… In cases where there is no written document, no evidence to the contrary shall be admitted against the presumption.” (Art. 10 LISR)\n\n\"If the aim was to apply the income tax deduction provided by the rule, that authorization was for third-party investors who had acquired shares under the fiscal beneficiary status to proceed with the corresponding tax deduction. Therefore, it had to be a specific authorization…\"\n\n\"…for this type of authorization, which is a conditioning prerequisite serving as the basis for a tax incentive, the positive silence regulated by Articles 330 and 331 of the LGAP does not apply. When dealing with tax incentives, it is clear that the legal nature of the proceeding is tax-related…\"",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The First Chamber upheld the tax adjustments for presumptive interest and denied the tourism investment deduction because Multiplaza lacked the specific ICT authorization.",
    "summary_es": "La Sala Primera confirmó los ajustes tributarios por intereses presuntivos y negó la deducción por inversión turística al carecer Multiplaza de la autorización específica del ICT."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "In cases where there is no written document, no evidence to the contrary shall be admitted against the presumption.",
      "quote_es": "En los casos en que no exista documento escrito, ante la presunción no se aceptará prueba en contrario."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VI",
      "quote_en": "It was by applying the principle of economic reality that the Tax Administration determined an increase in the income tax that Multiplaza had to pay…",
      "quote_es": "Fue en aplicación del principio de realidad económica, que la Administración determinó un aumento en el impuesto sobre la renta que Multiplaza debió pagar…"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VIII",
      "quote_en": "More than a “mere derivative formality” as Multiplaza claims, it constitutes an indispensable requirement for the Tax Administration, in its audit and oversight functions, to verify whether the investment actually took place…",
      "quote_es": "Más que un “simple trámite derivado” como alega Multiplaza, constituye un requisito indispensable para que la Administración Tributaria, en sus funciones de fiscalización y control del fisco, verifique si en realidad la inversión se dio…"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IX",
      "quote_en": "When dealing with tax incentives, it is clear that the legal nature of the proceeding is tax-related, so the possibility of applying positive silence cannot be affirmed…",
      "quote_es": "Al estar frente a incentivos fiscales, es claro que la naturaleza jurídica del procedimiento es de índole tributaria, de allí que no podría afirmarse la posibilidad de aplicar el silencio positivo…"
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-10969",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7092  Art. 10"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-6530",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 4755  Art. 8"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-1388",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 6990  Art. 11"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-13231",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 6227  Art. 367"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-153094",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-10969",
      "norm_num": "7092",
      "norm_name": "Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "21/04/1988"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-1388",
      "norm_num": "6990",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Incentivos para el Desarrollo Turístico",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "15/07/1985"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-6530",
      "norm_num": "4755",
      "norm_name": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "03/05/1971"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-7241",
      "norm_num": "",
      "norm_name": "Reglamento de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta",
      "tipo_norma": "",
      "norm_fecha": ""
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“II.- Previo al\r\ndesarrollo de los planteamientos, esta Cámara debe advertir que por cuestiones\r\nde orden, el recurso se desarrollará según los temas que fueron objeto del\r\nproceso. Así, en la primera parte se conocerán todos aquellos agravios\r\nrelacionados con “el ajuste de ingresos por la aplicación de los intereses\r\npresuntivos del ordinal 10 de la LISR”; y en la segunda parte, los alegatos\r\nreferidos al “ajuste por inversiones del artículo 11 de la Ley 6990”. Asimismo, por estar\r\nrelacionados entre sí y para evitar reiteraciones innecesarias, los cargos\r\nserán conocidos conjuntamente en cada unos de esos dos grandes apartados. […]0\n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- La casacionista,\r\ninsiste, no prestó ni realizó ningún tipo de financiamiento de carácter\r\nsinalagmático a las compañías relacionadas, ya que lo realizado, fue un aporte\r\npatrimonial a dichas sociedades. La presunción del cardinal 10 de la LISR,\r\nrelata, al implicar la imputación de una tasa de interés, solo puede ser\r\naplicable a los financiamientos sinalagmáticos, nunca a los aportes de capital,\r\ncuya retribución típica, asegura, no es el interés, sino el dividendo. Al\r\ninterpretar de forma contraria el precepto 10 de la LISR, aduce, los juzgadores\r\nlesionaron los ordinales 6 del CNPT y 10 del CC. Asimismo, menciona, se\r\nvaloraron indebidamente las probanzas aportadas como lo son las certificaciones\r\ny hojas de trabajo del CPA, las declaraciones juradas de los representantes\r\ntanto de Multiplaza como de Parque Central y sus asientos contables. Sobre el\r\nparticular el Tribunal dispuso lo siguiente: “Debe reiterarse que, en la\r\nforma en que está redactado el numeral 10 ibídem, la presunción se aplica para\r\ncualquier tipo de financiamiento, y no solo el sinalagmático. Pero además, es\r\ncriterio de este Tribunal que la alegación de la actora no encuentra cabida en\r\nlos elementos demostrativos que constan en autos, siendo que más bien de ellos\r\nse acredita que, en la realidad, sí existió un préstamo entre la actora y su\r\nrelacionada Parque Central S.A. Veamos. De inicio tenemos que la propia actora\r\nadmite que realizó pagos en forma transitoria de contratistas que hicieron\r\ntrabajos para Parque Central S.A., mientras ésta lograba establecer su crédito\r\ncomercial y abrir sus cuentas corrientes, así como finiquitar su crédito\r\nbancario. Sea, el dinero se giró para pagos de obligaciones a cargo de la vinculada. Además,\r\nlo fue porque aquella no había establecido operaciones con bancos y mientras\r\naccesaba a créditos bancarios. Así, en la realidad fáctica el dinero se otorgó\r\no prestó para capital de trabajo. Aunado a lo anterior, resulta fundamental que\r\nla actora registró contablemente esas operaciones como una cuenta por cobrar. A\r\nsu vez, Parque Central S.A. registró la operación como una cuenta por pagar\r\n(folios 25 a\r\n46 del expediente judicial). Esto es, conforme a la realidad contable, las\r\nempresas vinculadas tenían un pasivo respecto de la actora. Si bien la\r\nsociedad accionante alega que dicha cuenta se registró como una inversión en\r\npatrimonio (y no como una deuda), lo cierto es que ello lo fue hasta el año\r\n2001, esto es, con posterioridad al período fiscal 1999…” (folio 147). Lo que procede en primer término es analizar la\r\nindebida valoración de prueba que acusa el representante de Multiplaza. Al\r\nrespecto, debe indicarse que contrario a lo que indica la empresa casacionista,\r\nen autos ha quedado demostrado que entre Multiplaza y su empresa relacionada\r\nParque Central, ha operado un préstamo mercantil en los términos expuestos por\r\nel Tribunal, más allá de que si se pactaron intereses o se realizaron\r\namortizaciones. Precisamente, analizadas a la luz de las reglas de la sana\r\ncrítica (ordinal 82 del CPCA), las certificaciones de contador público\r\nautorizado de las dos empresas, los papeles de trabajo, certificación de\r\nlibros, registros contables de la demandante, y declaraciones juradas de sus\r\nrepresentantes, arrojan como resultado que en el año 1999, los dineros girados\r\npor Multiplaza a Parque Central, se registraron en la contabilidad de dichas\r\nsociedades como un préstamo. Esa es la realidad económica que se desprende de\r\nlos documentos que para ese entonces contabilizaron el traslado del dinero. Al\r\nrespecto, la CCPA de la\r\n empresa Multiplaza indica: “…esta Compañía registro por\r\nmedio de sub-cuenta número 13191002 (Inversión parque Central S.A.) en la\r\ncuenta mayor 180-05-00-00 (Inversiones a Largo plazo) la suma de\r\n¢758.611.806,47… correspondientes a los dineros por cobrar mantenidos y\r\nregistrados de la\r\n empresa Parque Central S.A., por el periodo en estudio…”\r\n(folio 24). En ella se desprende cómo Multiplaza\r\nregistró esa inversión a largo plazo a Parque Central S.A. (desde el 1 de enero\r\nde 1999 al 31 de diciembre de 2001), por la suma de ¢758.611.806.47 y que corresponde\r\na los documentos por cobrar mantenidos y registrados de la empresa Parque Central.\r\nDe igual forma, tanto de las hojas de trabajo, certificación de libros y\r\nregistros contables de la demandante, se comprobó que desde un principio, esos\r\nmovimientos de dinero se registraron como una cuenta por cobrar a la empresa\r\nrelacionada. Fue hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2001, cuando ese saldo se trasladó\r\ny registró a una cuenta de Inversión de la empresa Parque Central.\r\nPor el otro extremo, la CCPA correspondiente a la empresa relacionada indica\r\nque “…esta Compañía registró una capitalización por medio de la cuenta\r\nnúmero 24121002 (Aportes Adicional Centro Comercial Multiplaza S.A.) la suma de\r\n¢758.611.806,47… correspondientes a los pasivos mantenidos y registrados de la empresa Centro Comercial\r\nMultiplza (sic) S.A., por el periodo en estudio…” (folio 23). En otros términos, es cierto que mediante la\r\ncuenta “Aportes Adicional Centro Comercial Multiplaza S.A.”, Parque Central\r\nregistró una capitalización por ¢758.611.806.47 respecto de los pasivos\r\nmantenidos y registrados de Multiplaza (desde el 1 de enero de 1999 al 31 de\r\ndiciembre de 2001); sin embargo, como bien lo analizó el Tribunal, también es\r\ncierto que de los papeles de trabajo, certificación de libros y registros\r\ncontables de esa empresa relacionada, se comprobó que el aporte adicional de la\r\nempresa actora se registró hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2001 y que ese saldo, en\r\nrealidad provenía de una cuenta por pagar a Multiplaza. Según lo transcrito y\r\nanalizado, no aprecia este órgano decisor, la indebida valoración de esas\r\nprobanzas, pues de ellas se infiere con claridad absoluta, que lo que se\r\nregistró desde un inicio en ambas empresa fue un préstamo y no otra operación o\r\nnegociación como un aporte de capital. Nótese incluso que en la declaración\r\njurada del representante de la sociedad Multiplaza, se señala: “…hasta el\r\ntreinta y uno de diciembre del año dos mil uno mi representada mantenía\r\nuna cuenta por cobrar con la empresa Parque Central\r\nS.A… por un monto de setecientos cincuenta y ocho millones setecientos once mil\r\nochocientos seis colones con cuarenta y siete céntimos…” (lo resaltado no es del documento original, folio 43). De esa\r\nforma y mediante prueba complementaria, quedó demostrado igualmente para el\r\nTribunal, la existencia de una cuenta por cobrar que mantenía la actora, nunca\r\nun aporte de capital entre sociedades. En esa misma declaración jurada, de\r\nseguido se asegura que en el año 2001, Multiplaza “…realizó un aporte de\r\ncapital adicional en la empresa Parque Central S.A., aportando la cuenta\r\npor cobrar indicada… razón por la cual se eliminó la cuenta por cobrar y la\r\nmisma se transformó en una inversión en Parque Central S.A…” (folio 43). No obstante, debe dejarse claro, fue hasta\r\nfinales del año 2011 que las empresas cuestionadas dispusieron modificar o\r\nvariar la naturaleza de aquella cuenta, pero para ese entonces, ya las\r\nactuaciones fiscalizadoras habían sido comunicadas a la actora junto con el\r\najuste realizado. Recuérdese que el periodo auditado era el del año 1999,\r\nmomento cuando los movimientos fueron registrados contablemente como una cuenta\r\npor cobrar por parte de Multiplaza y una cuenta por pagar que tenía Parque\r\nCentral. Aunque después se haya realizado la capitalización de ese pasivo y la\r\nmodificación de esos registros contables, la Administración se encontraba\r\nhabilitada para ignorarlos, puesto que de primera vista, los movimientos se\r\nreflejaron como una respuesta al ajuste efectuado por la Administración y no a\r\nla realidad económica subyacente que ha sido alegada por Multiplaza (aporte de\r\ncapital). En todo caso, la empresa actora tampoco acreditó que la realidad\r\neconómica era la de un aporte de capital, por el contrario, la prueba existente\r\ny debidamente valorada tanto por la Administración Tributaria\r\ncomo por el Tribunal, indicaban que lo que se presentó fue un préstamo de\r\nMultiplaza a su empresa relacionada. Consecuentemente, ante la existencia de un\r\npréstamo sin la existencia de un convenio escrito, lo procedente era aplicar la\r\npresunción del ordinal 10 de la\r\n LISR. Lleva razón el Tribunal cuando establece que no hay\r\nviolación de la norma analizada, porque no existe probanza de las\r\nmanifestaciones de la actora respecto del supuesto aporte que desde un inicio\r\nse presentó. Tales movimientos en ningún momento se registraron de esa forma en\r\nlos libros de contabilidad, se extrañan los estatutos de Parque Central que\r\nindiquen que su capital social fue incrementado (periodo fiscal 1999); la\r\nexistencia de acciones, beneficios y dividendos para Multiplaza en virtud de\r\ntal aporte (según los resultados económicos); o al menos, la existencia de algún\r\ndocumento que acredite la posición de la actora como un contrato asociativo.\r\nResulta primordial resaltar además, que fue Multiplaza tanto en sede\r\nadministrativa como en la demanda de este proceso, la que aceptó haber\r\nrealizado pagos en forma transitoria de contratistas los cuales hicieron\r\ntrabajos para Parque Central “con cargo a una cuenta por cobrar a esta\r\nempresa, mientras ésta lograba establecer su crédito comercial y abrir sus\r\ncuentas corrientes, así como finiquitar su crédito bancario”. El destino que\r\nse le dio al dinero, a la letra del ordinal 10 ibídem, refleja que lo que hubo\r\nfue un préstamo a la empresa relacionada para que aquella pudiera hacerle\r\nfrente a sus pasivos. De este modo, el error de hecho apuntado, en virtud de la\r\nindebida valoración de prueba, debe ser descartado, ya que tales probanzas en\r\nsu conjunto dicen de la existencia de un préstamo más que de un aporte de\r\ncapital entre empresas del mismo grupo económico. Consecuentemente, también\r\ndebe desestimarse la indebida aplicación de los cardinales 330 del CPC (en\r\nrealidad el 82 del CPCA) y 18 del Reglamento General de Gestión, Fiscalización\r\ny Recaudación Tributaria.\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- De seguido\r\ncorresponde conocer el agravio por violación directa de los artículos 10 de la\r\nLISR, 13 del RLISR, 6 y 8 del CNPT y 10 del CC. El canon 10 de la LISR, regula\r\nlo relativo a la renta neta presuntiva, de la siguiente forma: “Se presume,\r\nsalvo prueba en contrario, que todo contrato de préstamo de financiamiento,\r\ncualquiera que sea su naturaleza o denominación, si existe documento escrito,\r\ndevenga un interés no menor a la tasa activa de interés anual más alto que fije\r\nel Banco Central de Costa Rica, o, a falta de ésta, al promedio de las tasas\r\nactivas de interés anual de los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional. En los\r\ncasos en que no exista documento escrito, ante la presunción no se aceptará\r\nprueba en contrario. La Administración\r\n Tributaria podrá aplicar esta presunción en otras\r\nsituaciones aunque no exista contrato de préstamo, pero sí financiamiento,\r\nconforme se establezca en el reglamento de esta ley.” La norma no exige la\r\nexistencia de un contrato escrito, para aplicar la presunción relativa a los\r\nintereses. Asimismo, remite al Reglamento, a los efectos de definir el concepto\r\nde financiamiento (cuando no existe contrato de préstamo formalizado en un\r\ndocumento escrito), indispensable a fin de aplicar el contenido del ordinal. El\r\nmandato 13 del RLISR, en el párrafo segundo indica: “No se admite prueba en\r\ncontrario para la presunción que se establece, cuando no exista documento\r\nescrito. La Administración podrá aplicar la presunción a que se refiere el\r\nartículo 10 de la ley, si se produce financiamiento, aún cuando no exista\r\ncontrato de préstamo. Para los efectos de lo estipulado en el artículo 10 de\r\nley, se entiende por financiamiento toda acción u operación que genere\r\nfondos, que permitan al perceptor realizar las actividades de su giro normal,\r\nutilizando sus activos como garantía o como instrumentos negociables, o\r\nmediante la emisión de títulos valores u otros documentos o títulos comerciales.”\r\n(El destacado no corresponde al original). El canon, brinda la definición\r\nde financiamiento, en cuyo caso, cuando la Administración Tributaria\r\ndetermina su existencia, procede el cálculo de los intereses. En este asunto,\r\naplicando el ordinal 10 ibídem, la Administración Tributaria\r\ndeterminó que la entrega de recursos a sociedades relacionadas como Parque\r\nCentral, era asimilable a un préstamo, el cual genera intereses, según la\r\npresunción establecida en la norma citada. Como se indicó, fue la propia actora\r\nla que reconoció que con el dinero trasladado a Parque Central, esta última\r\npagó contratistas mientras lograba establecer sus propios créditos. Estos\r\ndineros fueron utilizados según lo anterior, para que la empresa relacionada se\r\nmantuviera en su giro habitual mientras conseguía préstamos bancarios para\r\nhacerle frente a sus gastos. Ahora, atendiendo a la definición del ordinal 13\r\ndel RLISR, financiamiento es toda acción u operación que genere fondos, que\r\npermitan al perceptor realizar las actividades de su giro normal, utilizando\r\nsus activos como garantía o como instrumentos negociables, o mediante la\r\nemisión de títulos valores u otros documentos o títulos comerciales. Para el\r\nTribunal: “Es evidente la necesidad de los dos primeros elementos (operación\r\nque genere fondos que permitan al preceptor realizar actividades de su giro\r\nnormal), sin embargo estimamos que el tercero, no es un requisito indispensable\r\npara determinar su existencia. Esto porque, en rigor, el financiamiento puede otorgarse\r\ncon o sin garantías, decisión que dependerá, en última instancia, del acreedor.\r\nPor ende, el otorgamiento de garantías debe valorarse en cada caso concreto,\r\npero su ausencia no podría tenerse como excluyente de la existencia del\r\nfinanciamiento porque, insistimos, éste bien puede darse sin aquella. Aunado a\r\nlo anterior, debe tenerse presente que si esta definición lo es para supuestos\r\nen que el financiamiento no conste por escrito, sería contradictorio exigir,\r\npara tales efectos, una garantía que normalmente se otorga por escrito…” (folio 150). En criterio de esta Sala, en el caso concreto\r\ndeben rescatarse varias situaciones. Primero. Sí hubo una operación que generó\r\nfondos a Parque Central y esos recursos a la vez, le permitieron realizar las\r\nactividades de su giro normal. Segundo. Así fue establecido en las\r\ncontabilidades de ambas empresas. Tercero. Multiplaza en ningún momento\r\nacreditó que al darse el traslado de los recursos, se hizo bajo la figura de un\r\naporte de capital. Ahora bien, el hecho de que no se hayan otorgado garantías,\r\nno desvirtúa la aplicación del precepto 10 ibídem, porque al no haber documento\r\nescrito de préstamo, la consecuencia de ello sería la inexistencia de una\r\ngarantía (accesoria) que también se debería otorgar por escrito. Pero no por\r\nello, el préstamo deja de surtir efectos como negocio principal que es. En todo\r\ncaso, no es de extrañar la ausencia de un respaldo de la deuda cuando se trata\r\nde empresas del mismo grupo económico como sucedió en el presente asunto. Pero\r\nse insiste, como el acuerdo a través del cual la actora le trasladó los\r\nrecursos a la sociedad indicada, no fue otorgado por escrito, no existe prueba\r\nque acredite que el préstamo haya sido a título gratuito y menos aún la\r\nexistencia de algún respaldo de la deuda. Como préstamo oneroso, encuadra en la\r\ndefinición del mandato 10 de la LIR, pues “Se presume, salvo prueba en\r\ncontrario, que todo contrato de préstamo de financiamiento, cualquiera que sea\r\nsu naturaleza o denominación, si existe documento escrito, devenga un interés\r\nno menor a la tasa activa de interés anual más alto que fije el Banco Central\r\nde Costa Rica, o, a falta de ésta, al promedio de las tasas activas de interés\r\nanual de los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional. En los casos en que no\r\nexista documento escrito, ante la presunción no se aceptará prueba en\r\ncontrario.” Recuérdese que el legislador previó dos hipótesis: la de\r\nun contrato de préstamo que conste por escrito, en cuyo caso se presume el\r\ndevengo de intereses, salvo prueba en contrario; o la de un contrato de\r\npréstamo que no se haya formalizado a través de la escritura, supuesto en el\r\ncual, la presunción de intereses no admite prueba en contrario, y por lo\r\ntanto, es absoluta. La norma también indica, que no importa la denominación que\r\nlas partes le hayan dado, lo relevante es que exista un préstamo (al respecto\r\nse puede consultar el fallo de esta Sala, no. 0001163-F-S1-2009 de las 11 horas\r\n20 minutos del 6 de noviembre de 2009). En el presente caso, no existe acuerdo\r\nescrito entre Multiplaza y Parque Central, por lo cual, atendiendo las razones\r\nindicadas a lo largo de esta resolución y en aplicación de la presunción del\r\ncanon 10 ibídem, no se admite prueba en contrario, respecto a la presunción de\r\nintereses. Con base en lo anterior, no se aprecia lesión del numeral 10 ibídem\r\ny 13 del Reglamento; este último si bien no debe ser aplicado por no ser\r\nestrictamente un financiamiento, sí complementa al primero en lo que a la\r\nfinalidad del préstamo se refiere (operación que generó fondos a Parque\r\nCentral, los cuales le permitieron realizar las actividades de su giro normal).\r\nA lo expuesto, ha de agregarse que de acuerdo con lo establecido en el cardinal\r\n496 del Código de Comercio, salvo pacto en contrario, toda operación de\r\npréstamo será retributiva y que el producto que se obtenga de tal\r\nfinanciamiento, serán los intereses. De ahí, es evidente, que contrario a lo\r\naducido por la recurrente, siendo que le correspondía la carga de la prueba, al\r\nno lograr acreditar que el financiamiento se hizo a título gratuito, lo\r\nprocedente era resolver como lo hizo el Tribunal, al estimar que la\r\nAdministración había hecho bien al presumir la generación de réditos.\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- Tampoco fueron\r\nlesionados en la resolución recurrida, los numerales 6, 8 del CNPT y 10 del CC,\r\ntanto en la interpretación del precepto 10 de la LISR y en la medida que se\r\nconsagra el principio de realidad económica. Como ya lo ha expuesto esta Sala,\r\nel numeral 8 del Código Tributario, recoge e incorpora al principio de realidad\r\neconómica como un método interpretativo, tal y como lo indica su epígrafe (“Interpretación\r\nde la norma que regula el hecho generador de la obligación tributaria”) y\r\ndesarrolla en su contenido. Con base en ese principio (puede consultarse el fallo\r\nde esta Cámara, no. 1181-F-S1-2009 de las 14 horas 48 minutos del 12 de\r\nnoviembre de 2009), su principal efecto es permitir, en materia tributaria, la\r\nprescindencia de las formas jurídicas o económicas adoptadas por el\r\ncontribuyente para valorar los hechos desde el punto de vista material, en\r\naquellos casos en que estima que éste busca disminuir el monto del tributo\r\nocultando la realidad material subyacente en el negocio. También, ha señalado: “VI.-\r\nLa elusión fiscal strictu sensu, puede ser considerada como la acción del\r\ncontribuyente que busca el uso indebido e inapropiado de las formas jurídicas\r\nque dispone la ley, para reducir o abstraerse de la obligación jurídico\r\ntributaria. En estos casos, el sujeto pasivo suscribe actos que en el fondo no\r\nconstituyen otra cosa que una simulación de un negocio jurídico, cuyo objeto no\r\nes el que se encuentra expresado, sino, el de evadir los tributos y reducir su\r\ndeber contributivo… Es por ello que dentro de la dinámica tributaria, el Código\r\nde Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios en sus numerales 8 y 12 implementa el\r\nprincipio de realidad económica, como mecanismo que permite a la Administración\r\nprescindir de las verdades formales y adentrarse en la relación privada a fin\r\nde tratar de desentrañar la realidad material subyacente en el negocio y de esa\r\nmanera, definir si la forma utilizada es un escudo para minimizar las cargas\r\nimpositivas, caso en el cual, se deberá ajustar ese deber a su correcto cauce,\r\no si por el contrario, es un acto lícito y legítimo. Para tal objeto el Fisco\r\ncuenta con amplias facultades de fiscalización e investigación, cuyo ejercicio,\r\nen caso de determinar que las medidas del contribuyente se direccionan en el\r\nfondo a reducir la base imponible del impuesto, le permiten hacer un traslado\r\nde cargos tributarios, que da inicio a un procedimiento para reajustar la base\r\nde cálculo y la tarifa del gravamen. Sobre este principio de realidad\r\neconómica, esta Sala ha indicado: \"Asimismo, para mayor ilustración, cabe\r\nseñalar que lo normal, tratándose de procedimientos elusivos de tributos, es\r\nque éstos adopten una apariencia disconforme con su real naturaleza.\r\nPrecisamente, para obviar tales procedimientos, la legislación tributaria ha\r\nrecogido el principio de la realidad económica, como instrumento de interpretación,\r\nen el artículo 8, párrafo 2, del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.\r\nSe desprende de la integración de dicha norma con el artículo 12 del Código de\r\nNormas y Procedimientos Tributarios, que esta última es aplicable aún cuando\r\nlas partes hayan adoptado una forma jurídica de convención no totalmente clara\r\npara la administración tributaria, pues ésta podrá prescindir de esa forma para\r\ndesentrañar el alcance que en la esfera tributaria pudiere tener el contrato\r\nsuscrito entre el contribuyente y un tercero, ajeno a la obligación impositiva.\r\nSe obvia de esa manera cualquier procedimiento elusivo perjudicial para el\r\nfisco, que ostente el carácter de un convenio o contrato. Así, del convenio que\r\nnos ocupa se extrae la conclusión de que, de aceptarse la tesis de la\r\nrecurrente, el convenio incidiría negativamente en los intereses del fisco, lo\r\nque no es permisible, precisamente, en virtud de la norma antes indicada. En\r\nconsecuencia, no se ha producido el comentado agravio que la actora señala en su\r\nrecurso, debiendo desestimarse.\" Sentencia no. 32 de las 10 horas 30\r\nminutos del 20 de marzo de 1992. Se trata de normas jurídicas que permiten\r\ndesentrañar la verdad real inmersa en las formas jurídicas que surten su\r\neficacia en la esfera tributaria, a fin de salvaguardar el deber de contribuir\r\ncon las cargas públicas y la igualdad impositiva. Estos mecanismos de\r\ndefensa legal presuponen un sistema de presunción que faculta a la Administración Tributaria\r\na interpretar de modo adecuado las formas jurídicas para desprender la objetiva\r\nvaloración de los hechos y por ende, de la realidad que se pretende ocultar.\r\nEn este sentido se pronuncia la resolución no. 76 de las 14 horas 20 minutos\r\ndel 12 de junio de 1991 de este mismo órgano colegiado” (El subrayado no es\r\ndel original, no. 825, de las 8 horas 45 minutos del 27 de octubre de 2006,\r\nreiterada por la no. 1256-F-S1-2009 de las 10 horas 10 minutos del 10 de\r\ndiciembre de 2009 y en la no. 617-F-S1-2010 de las 9 horas 10 minutos del 20 de\r\nmayo de 2010). Fue en aplicación del principio de realidad económica, que la\r\nAdministración determinó un aumento en el impuesto sobre la renta que\r\nMultiplaza debió pagar en el período fiscal del año 1999. Acreditó la\r\nexistencia de una vinculación entre la demandante y la compañía relacionada a\r\nla que concedió el préstamo ampliamente comentado, todo lo cual se repite,\r\npermitió a Parque Central, realizar actividades propias de su giro habitual, lo\r\nque permitía la aplicación de la renta presuntiva del ordinal 10 de la LISR por\r\nexistir el hecho base de un préstamo. Contrario a lo expuesto por el\r\nrecurrente, la realidad indicaba que la empresa actora realizó un préstamo y\r\nasí fue determinado por el Estado en el ajuste realizado. Sea, en aplicación de\r\nesta máxima, el Estado a través de la Administración Tributaria,\r\nprocedió a reclasificar el hecho generador de la obligación tributaria, y a\r\ninvestigar, en ejercicio de sus facultades de imperio, cuál era la realidad\r\neconómica de la cuenta denominada “Efectos por Cobrar a Compañías Afiliadas”,\r\ndeterminando que se trataba de un préstamo, al cual le resultaba aplicable la\r\npresunción cuestionada. En lo demás, no se ha vulnerado el principio de\r\nigualdad, pues no se ha demostrado que en una situación idéntica, la Administración Tributaria\r\nrealice un trato diferenciado. Tampoco se acreditó que en el periodo auditado,\r\nla actora realizó un aporte de capital, por lo que no era atendible el alegato\r\nde que en aplicación del principio de realidad económica, el ajuste debía\r\nrealizarse en beneficio del sujeto pasivo. Por los motivos esgrimidos, el\r\nrecurso de casación en este primer extremo deberá ser desestimado.\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- Sobre el\r\najuste por inversiones del artículo 11 de la Ley 6990. Dentro de este tema,\r\ncomo cuarto agravio, reprocha, violación directa por indebida\r\ninterpretación y aplicación de los derogados artículos 11 de la Ley de\r\nIncentivos para el Desarrollo Turístico (Ley 6990), 31 del Reglamento a esa\r\nLey, así como del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. […]\n\r\n\r\n\nVIII.- En términos\r\ngenerales, cuestiona, violación directa por indebida interpretación y\r\naplicación del derogado artículo 11 de la Ley de Incentivos para el Desarrollo\r\nTurístico (Ley 6990), 31 del Reglamento a esa Ley, así como del Decreto\r\nEjecutivo No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. Para disponer del incentivo fiscal\r\nmencionado en las normas, arguye, el inversionista requería solamente la\r\nautorización genérica que el ICT (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) otorgaba al\r\nhotel o empresa turística, y no la específica o derivada que exigió la\r\nAdministración y avaló el Tribunal. Acota, existen oficios de la propia Dirección General\r\nde Tributación Directa (no. 736-97) y del ICT (no. AL-2446-2010) respecto de\r\nese criterio. En todo caso, afirma, el ordinal 11 no exige dos autorizaciones y\r\nla más relevante era precisamente la que se orientaba a constatar las características\r\ndel proyecto en que se iba a invertir, de ahí que el Decreto consideraba esta\r\nautorización genérica como la principal, mientras que la otra, la específica,\r\nera de “mero trámite”. En su criterio, la prueba de que la\r\ninversión en acciones se dio y que se hizo en una empresa autorizada es algo\r\npara lo que no era imprescindible una autorización de la Comisión Reguladora,\r\npues le bastaría a la Administración Tributaria, en sus funciones\r\nordinarias de fiscalización, requerir la probanza de la suscripción y pago de\r\nlas acciones en un proyecto que contara con la autorización genérica. Lo\r\nprimero que debe analizarse es el contenido de las normas cuestionadas. El artículo 11 de la Ley de\r\nIncentivos para el Desarrollo Turístico, Ley 6990, del 15 de julio de 1985, en\r\nel Capítulo III, “Del Financiamiento”, disponía en el artículo 11\r\n(derogado por el artículo 14 de la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes,\r\nDerogatorias y Excepciones, no. 7293 de 3 de abril de 1992), lo siguiente: “Será\r\ndeducible del impuesto sobre la Renta, el cincuenta por ciento del monto\r\ninvertido en actividades turísticas de las señaladas en el artículo 3º de esta\r\nley, previa autorización de la comisión reguladora de turismo. Cuando dicha\r\ninversión se lleve a cabo a través de empresas ya constituidas, la inversión\r\ndeberá realizarse por medio de compra de acciones nominativas de sociedades\r\ndomiciliadas en el país con contrato turístico firmado. Las acciones así\r\nadquiridas deberán quedar en fideicomiso en un banco del Estado o en la Bolsa Nacional de\r\nValores, por un plazo no menor de dos años, sin posibilidad de disponer más que\r\nlos dividendos que produzcan. Cuando la inversión se realice en empresas\r\nnuevas, se deberá cumplir con los requisitos que en cada caso exija la comisión\r\nreguladora de turismo, de acuerdo con el tipo de inversión. En todo caso, no\r\npodrá deducirse por este concepto más de un veinticinco por ciento de la renta\r\nbruta del período en que se realice la inversión indicada”. Si se toma en\r\ncuenta el marco conceptual de la Ley que crea cualquier incentivo fiscal, es\r\nfácil concluir que su propósito es apoyar y potenciar una determinada\r\nactividad, en este caso la\r\n turística. A tono con esa orientación, el artículo 1 de la\r\nLey 6990 declara “…de utilidad pública la industria del turismo” y el\r\nnumeral 2 contempla sus fines, al disponer: “La presente ley tiene por\r\nobjeto establecer un proceso acelerado y racional de desarrollo de la actividad\r\nturística costarricense, para lo cual se establecen los incentivos y beneficios\r\nque se otorgarán como estímulo para la realización de programas y proyectos\r\nimportantes de dicha actividad”. Para el logro de sus objetivos entre otros\r\nincentivos y beneficios, permitía a las empresas turísticas la venta de\r\nacciones, para que pudieran generar nuevos recursos y afrontar su actividad;\r\nasimismo, y de relevancia para este asunto, es que la norma beneficiaba\r\nmediante un incentivo a los inversionistas de acciones de las empresas\r\nturísticas mencionadas en la ley, pues les dotaba la posibilidad de \r\ndeducir del impuesto sobre la renta hasta el 50% del monto invertido en la\r\ncompra de acciones, pero para ello, era requerida la autorización de la Comisión Reguladora\r\nde Turismo. Luego, mediante la derogatoria que sufrió el artículo (Ley no. 7293\r\nde 31 de marzo de 1992), a través de la Directriz no. 8 de 6 de octubre de\r\n1998, la Dirección\r\n General de Tributación suspendió los efectos de este artículo\r\nen todos sus extremos, en especial lo relativo al otorgamiento de beneficios,\r\nque ahí se señalaban, mientras se estudiaban los alcances de la derogatoria. Fue\r\nhasta que el Decreto no. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR, del 16 de mayo del 2000, reguló\r\nlo relativo a la aplicación del precepto 11 de la Ley 6990 en torno a los\r\ncontratos turísticos aprobados antes de la derogatoria. Este último\r\ndecreto, en su artículo 1º, realiza una diferencia entre autorización genérica\r\ny específica de la siguiente forma: “a) Autorización genérica: La\r\nautorización brindada por la Comisión Reguladora de Turismo a la empresa con\r\ncontrato turístico para que proceda a la venta de un determinado monto de\r\nacciones con beneficio fiscal, de conformidad con el plan de inversión\r\npresentado. b) Autorización específica.- La autorización brindada por la Comisión Reguladora\r\nde Turismo o el órgano en que esta delegue tal función a los terceros\r\ninversionistas que hayan adquirido acciones al amparo de beneficiario fiscal,\r\npara que procedan a realizar la deducción correspondiente del impuesto\r\nsobre la renta”. Para el Tribunal: “El artículo 11 no establece el tipo de\r\nautorización (genérica o específica) que se requería ni si lo era para el\r\nproyecto o ampliación de la empresa turística receptora de la inversión o para\r\nla específica inversión del particular que iba disfrutar el crédito; porque se\r\ntrata ambos, de supuestos diferentes que requerían, cada uno, de una\r\nautorización distinta pero proveniente, en los dos casos, de la Comisión Reguladora\r\nde Turismo. Así dependiendo de mi posición (empresa turística o inversionista),\r\nserá la autorización que requiera. A juicio de este Tribunal, si lo que se\r\npretendía era aplicar la deducción del impuesto sobre la renta prevista en la\r\nnorma, esa autorización lo era para que los terceros inversionistas que hayan\r\nadquirido acciones al amparo de beneficiario fiscal, procedieran a realizar la\r\ndeducción correspondiente del tributo. Por ende, tenía que ser una autorización\r\nespecífica en ese sentido que hiciera constar la existencia real de la\r\ninversión y el monto invertido por cada particular (en tanto podía haber más de\r\nuno por empresa turística), para luego poder establecer con la certeza\r\nrequerida, el monto que podría deducirse del tributo en cuestión…” (folio 153). En criterio de esta Cámara, tampoco lleva razón\r\nla casacionista en el argumento central de su recurso respecto de este tema, ya\r\nque ambas normas (11 Ley 6990 y 1 del Decreto 28676) se complementan y de ellas\r\nse desprende que son dos tipos de autorizaciones las requeridas, una dirigida a\r\nla empresa turística y la otra al inversionista. En este sentido, atendiendo a\r\nlos fines que informan la Ley 6990 y debido a que la exoneración se otorga en\r\nla medida en que se invierta en actividades turísticas (ordinal 3 ibídem) debe\r\nconsiderarse que el incentivo beneficia no solo a la empresa que se financia a\r\ntravés de esa inversión, sino también al tercero inversionista. Por un lado se\r\notorgó un estimulo al inversionista para que invirtiera en empresas turísticas,\r\npara que estas últimas contaran con los recursos financieros indispensables\r\npara operar. Por el otro, se le permite al segundo (inversionista), deducir del\r\nmonto que le corresponde pagar por Impuesto a la renta, el 50% de lo invertido.\r\nSi Multiplaza quería beneficiarse con el incentivo en la declaración del\r\nimpuesto sobre la renta correspondiente al período fiscal 1999 (aplicación del\r\ncrédito tributario por ¢129.069.000.00, que es el 50% del monto invertido\r\nen compra de acciones del Hotel Camino Real S.A.), en efecto requería de la\r\nautorización de la\r\n Comisión Reguladora de Turismo que se denominaba “autorización\r\nespecífica”. Considera esta Sala, el ordinal 11 de la Ley 6990, no es oscuro ni\r\nambiguo como estima el representante de Multiplaza, pues en el se menciona\r\nclaramente que para la procedencia del régimen favorable, será necesaria la “previa\r\nautorización de la\r\n Comisión Reguladora de Turismo”. Como se indicó, de las\r\nnormas analizadas se desprenden que son dos los beneficiados con en el supuesto\r\nregulado, sea la empresa y el inversionista -pueden ser varios-. Ahora, al\r\ntener implementado el ICT ambas autorizaciones, lo correspondiente era que la\r\nactora (en su posición de “inversionista”), haya obtenido la autorización\r\nrespectiva. Más que un “simple trámite derivado” como alega Multiplaza,\r\nconstituye un requisito indispensable para que la Administración Tributaria,\r\nen sus funciones de fiscalización y control del fisco, verifique si en realidad\r\nla inversión se dio, el grado de participación de la inversionista; para así\r\ndeterminar con precisión el monto exacto del beneficio. No tenía el Estado la\r\nobligación de requerir otra información para verificar la inversión como alega\r\nel recurrente, pues para ello, se instauró a lo interno del ICT, un\r\nprocedimiento que arrojaría la probanza adecuada para comprobar la inversión\r\n(autorización específica). Esa era la prueba por excelencia que un\r\ninversionista debía presentar para justificar el crédito indicado. En suma, la\r\ngenérica se daba a la empresa turística que desarrollara las actividades\r\ndefinidas en el numeral 3 de la Ley 6990, sea para que pudiera realizar la venta de un\r\ndeterminado monto de acciones con beneficio fiscal, de conformidad con el plan\r\nde inversión presentado (ordinal 1 inciso a) del Decreto no. 28676). Una\r\nvez otorgada aquella, lo que se desprende de las normas analizadas, por lógica\r\ny experiencia, no solo es la respectiva compra de las acciones por parte de\r\ntercero (s) inversionista (s), sino también, al amparo de beneficiario\r\nfiscal, la solicitud de la autorización específica, la cual les permitiría\r\nrealizar la deducción correspondiente del impuesto sobre la renta (cardinal 1\r\ninciso b) del Decreto no. 28676). \n\r\n\r\n\nIX.- El recurrente\r\nagrega, se valoraron indebidamente los oficios de la Dirección General\r\nde Tributación Directa (no. 736-97) y del Departamento Legal del ICT (no.\r\nDL-563-96 y AL-2446-2010) donde se indica que la autorización genérica era la\r\nreferida en el artículo 11 de la Ley 6990. Debido a la existencia de tales\r\ndocumentos, menciona, consideró que no era necesaria la autorización\r\nespecífica, por lo cual acusa lesionado los principios de seguridad jurídica y\r\nconfianza legítima. Este órgano decisor estima que no puede haber violación de\r\nlos principios mencionados, pues la interpretación del artículo 11 ibídem,\r\nrealizada por esas oficinas administrativas, quebrantaba a todas luces lo\r\ndispuesto en el Decreto no. 28676 norma vigente y aplicable al momento de\r\nrealizar la\r\n declaración. Este último decreto, no solo es posterior a los\r\noficios no. 736-97 y DL-563-9, sino también de superior rango dentro de la\r\njerarquía de fuentes del ordenamiento administrativo (precepto 6 de la LGAP).\r\nPor su parte, el oficio AL-2446-2010 del 14 de diciembre de 2010, pese a la\r\nexistencia del Reglamento indicado, desconoce y desaplica sus alcances, por lo\r\nque su contenido no tendría los efectos de exonerar el trámite indicado\r\n(autorización específica) a efectos de que la accionante procediera a\r\nrealizar la deducción correspondiente del impuesto sobre la renta. Asimismo,\r\nes claro que la actora conocía sobre la existencia de la autorización que se\r\nextraña en el proceso, pues en todo momento ha sostenido que la solicitó, pero\r\nque el ICT nunca contestó la\r\n gestión. Esta simple argumentación, como acertadamente lo\r\ndispuso el Tribunal, evidencia una contradicción en el alegato de Multiplaza,\r\npues por un lado arguye, la autorización requerida era la genérica, pero por el\r\notro dice, solicitó la específica, lo cual indica que sí conocía y gestionó\r\neste último requerimiento. La actora sabía y conocía sobre la existencia del\r\npermiso y su respectivo trámite a lo interno del Instituto. Consecuentemente,\r\ndebe ser desestimado el argumento referente a la violación al principio de\r\nconfianza legítima. Finalmente, en cuanto a este punto, esta Sala avala el\r\ncriterio del Tribunal de que no podría haber quebranto del principio de\r\nirretroactividad de los actos propios, porque en ninguno de los oficios mencionados se\r\ndeclaró algún derecho o beneficio a favor de Multiplaza. Se insiste, se trató\r\nde una interpretación legal contraria las normas 11 de la Ley 6990 y 1 del\r\nDecreto no. 28676, por lo cual la Administración Tributaria\r\nestaba facultada para desaplicarlos. En relación con esto último, también se\r\nrecrimina invasión de competencias de la Dirección General\r\nde Tributación al cuestionar la interpretación oficial de la Comisión Reguladora\r\nde Turismo, órgano integrante del ICT, que era a quien le correspondía fijar\r\nlas reglas para dicha autorización. En criterio del Tribunal “…tampoco se\r\nobserva que haya habido una invasión a la competencia del ICT. A este ente le\r\ncompete autorizar tanto a la empresa turística para que pueda vender sus\r\nacciones, como al inversionista que las ha adquirido, para que pueda aplicar la\r\ndeducción que la ley preve. Luego, la Administración Tributaria,\r\nen ejercicio de sus potestades de fiscalización verificará que los créditos y\r\ndeducciones aplicados sean conformes con el bloque de legalidad y lo autorizado\r\npor el ICT. En el caso concreto, se rechazó el crédito porque la accionante no\r\ncontaba con la autorización específica de la Comisión Reguladora\r\nde Turismo que le permitiera esa deducción. Por ende, la Administración Tributaria\r\nactuó bajo el marco competencial que el ordenamiento le ha fijado…” (folio 155). Para el período fiscal de 1999, Multiplaza\r\ncarecía de la autorización específica otorgada por la Comisión Reguladora\r\nde Turismo, requerida para que pudiera deducir el 50% de su inversión, del\r\nimpuesto sobre la renta.\r\n Esa autorización fue dispuesta por la Ley 6990 y el Decreto\r\nno. 28676, por lo que no era la Comisión Reguladora de Turismo quien podía\r\nescoger libremente cual de las dos era requerida para aplicar la deducción\r\ncorrespondiente. Cada una cumplía un fin y objetivo determinado, y en este\r\núltimo caso, la específica era la necesaria para cumplir los fines de la Ley\r\n6990, mientras estuvo vigente el incentivo. Ahora bien, respecto de ese crédito\r\nfiscal, le correspondía a la Administración Tributaria\r\nsu resguardo, protección y verificación posterior. Lo que hizo el Estado, fue\r\nfiscalizar y verificar el cumplimiento del requisito señalado, el cual era\r\nindispensable a efectos de disfrutar del incentivo. En ningún momento la Administración Tributaria\r\nanalizó validez de autorizaciones, sino precisamente su existencia,\r\nconcretamente la específica, dado que el beneficio del inversionista, es\r\nabsolutamente dependiente del acordado a la empresa turística. El Ministerio de\r\nHacienda es el competente para determinar la procedencia del beneficio, sea el\r\nencargado de verificar todos los aspectos tributarios relacionados con la Ley\r\nde Incentivos Turísticos, máxime que por excepción se estarían disminuyendo los\r\ningresos al fisco (ordinales 103 del CNPT, 62 del LISR y 12 de la Ley 6990). En\r\notras palabras, la función de fiscalización que el artículo 12 de la Ley 6990\r\notorgó al Instituto era únicamente de carácter administrativo, nunca tributaria,\r\nrazón por la cual carece de autorización legal para ejercer las atribuciones\r\nque el Código Tributario otorgó a la\r\n Administración Tributaria. Corresponde, entonces, al\r\nMinisterio de Hacienda verificar el correcto uso de los incentivos fiscales,\r\npor lo que solo la\r\n Administración Tributaria, respecto de esos tributos, dispone\r\nde potestad de fiscalización sobre ellos, por lo que puede ejercer las\r\npotestades que el Código Tributario le reconoce según lo dispuesto en los\r\nartículos 103 y siguientes ibídem. En este caso, esas potestades fueron\r\nejercidas correctamente respecto del inversionista, pues como contribuyente es\r\nel sujeto pasivo del tributo. En este tema, por último reclama, violación directa\r\npor aplicación indebida de los artículos 330 y 331 de la LGAP, 1 y 155 del\r\nCódigo Tributario, porque en su criterio operó un silencio positivo, debido a\r\nque la solicitud de autorización específica presentada desde el año 2000, aún\r\nno le ha sido respondida por parte del Instituto. Sobre este punto,\r\nconsideraron los jueces lo siguiente: ”…frente a\r\neste tipo de autorizaciones que son un presupuesto condicionante que sirve de\r\nbase a un incentivo tributario, no aplica el silencio positivo que regulan los\r\nartículos 330 y 331 de la\r\n LGAP. Al estar frente a incentivos fiscales, es claro que la\r\nnaturaleza jurídica del procedimiento es de índole tributaria, de allí que no\r\npodría afirmarse la posibilidad de aplicar el silencio positivo a dicha\r\nsolicitud, cuando la ley no lo prevé expresamente. Debe tenerse presente que el\r\nartículo 367 inciso d) de la LGAP excluye de la aplicación de ese cuerpo\r\nnormativo, en cuanto al procedimiento administrativo, todo lo concerniente a la\r\nmateria tributaria…” (folio 155). No lleva razón el\r\nrecurrente y se equivoca al invocar el quebranto de los artículos 330 y 331 de\r\nla LGAP, 1 y 155 del Código Tributario para amparar su “derecho”. Al hablarse\r\nde incentivos fiscales, ha dicho esta Cámara, es claro que la naturaleza\r\njurídica del procedimiento es de índole tributaria, de allí que no podría\r\nafirmarse la posibilidad de aplicar el silencio positivo a dicha solicitud,\r\nmáxime que en este sentido la ley no lo prevé expresamente. Cabe recordar\r\nque aquella Ley General, en el canon 367 inciso d), exime de la aplicación de\r\nese cuerpo normativo, en cuanto al procedimiento administrativo, todo lo\r\nconcerniente a la materia tributaria (resoluciones no. 001009-F-2006 de las 10\r\nhoras del 21 de diciembre de 2006 y no. 16 de las 15 horas del 12 de marzo de\r\n1980). También se ha insistido que para este tipo de casos, no pueden hacerse\r\nni razonamientos deductivos ni aplicarse la analogía (sentencia no. 811 de las\r\n9 horas 50 minutos del 3 de diciembre del 2003). Entonces, no debe\r\npretender Multiplaza, que a través del silencio positivo se le beneficie con el\r\nreconocimiento de un crédito a su favor, relacionado con el pago de un tributo,\r\nya que este sólo se puede conceder por vía legal. Recuérdese, los tributos se\r\nencuentran supeditados al principio de reserva legal, igual suerte corren las\r\nexenciones y beneficios, de allí que deban ser valoradas sin ningún apego a\r\ncriterio especial o específico, por lo que solo es procedente si cumple con el\r\nsupuesto que dispuso el legislador y con todos los requisitos legales\r\nestablecidos y analizados supra. Considera esta Sala que los ítems reclamados\r\npor el casacionista se encuentran inmersos en la Ley 6990, artículo 11, y en el\r\nDecreto no. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. En mérito de lo expuesto, en cuanto a este\r\nsegundo tema, los reparos también deben ser rechazados.”",
  "body_en_text": "II.- Before developing the arguments, this Chamber must note that, for the sake of order, the appeal will be addressed according to the topics that were the subject of the proceeding. Thus, in the first part, all those grievances related to “the income adjustment due to the application of the presumptive interest of section 10 of the LISR” will be heard; and in the second part, the allegations referring to the “investment adjustment under Article 11 of Law 6990.” Likewise, because they are interrelated and to avoid unnecessary repetition, the charges will be heard jointly in each of these two large sections. [...]\n\nIV.- The appellant insists that it did not provide or carry out any type of synallagmatic financing to the related companies, since what was done was an equity contribution (aporte patrimonial) to said companies. The presumption of section 10 of the LISR, it relates, by implying the imputation of an interest rate, can only be applicable to synallagmatic financings, never to capital contributions, whose typical remuneration, it assures, is not interest, but a dividend. By interpreting section 10 of the LISR in a contrary manner, it argues, the judges violated sections 6 of the CNPT and 10 of the CC. Likewise, it mentions, the evidence provided was improperly assessed, such as the certifications and work papers of the CPA, the sworn statements of the representatives of both Multiplaza and Parque Central, and their accounting entries. Regarding this, the Court ordered the following: “It must be reiterated that, in the form in which section 10 ibidem is drafted, the presumption applies to any type of financing, and not only synallagmatic financing. But furthermore, it is the opinion of this Court that the plaintiff’s allegation does not fit within the evidentiary elements contained in the record, since rather, they prove that, in reality, there was indeed a loan between the plaintiff and its related entity Parque Central S.A. Let us see. From the outset, we have that the plaintiff itself admits that it made payments on a temporary basis for contractors that did work for Parque Central S.A., while the latter managed to establish its commercial credit and open its checking accounts, as well as finalize its bank credit. That is, the money was disbursed to pay obligations for which the related party was responsible. Furthermore, it was because the latter had not established operations with banks and while it was accessing bank loans. Thus, in factual reality, the money was granted or lent for working capital. In addition to the above, it is fundamental that the plaintiff accounted for these operations as an account receivable. In turn, Parque Central S.A. recorded the operation as an account payable (pages 25 to 46 of the judicial file). That is, according to the accounting reality, the related companies had a liability (pasivo) with respect to the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff company alleges that said account was recorded as an investment in equity (and not as a debt), the truth is that this occurred only in the year 2001, that is, after the 1999 fiscal period…” (folio 147). What is appropriate in the first instance is to analyze the improper assessment of evidence that Multiplaza’s representative accuses. In this regard, it must be indicated that contrary to what the appellant company indicates, it has been demonstrated in the record that between Multiplaza and its related company Parque Central, a commercial loan operated under the terms set forth by the Court, regardless of whether interest was agreed upon or amortizations were made. Precisely, analyzed in light of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) (section 82 of the CPCA), the certified public accountant certifications of both companies, the working papers, book certification, accounting records of the plaintiff, and sworn statements of its representatives, yield the result that in the year 1999, the monies disbursed by Multiplaza to Parque Central were recorded in the accounting of said companies as a loan. That is the economic reality that emerges from the documents that at that time accounted for the transfer of money. In this regard, the CCPA of the company Multiplaza indicates: “…this Company recorded through sub-account number 13191002 (Investment Parque Central S.A.) in the general ledger account 180-05-00-00 (Long-term Investments) the sum of ₡758,611,806.47… corresponding to the monies receivable maintained and recorded from the company Parque Central S.A., for the period under study…” (folio 24). From this, it is evident how Multiplaza recorded that long-term investment in Parque Central S.A. (from January 1, 1999, to December 31, 2001), for the sum of ₡758,611,806.47, corresponding to the documents receivable maintained and recorded from the company Parque Central. Likewise, from both the working papers, book certification, and accounting records of the plaintiff, it was verified that from the beginning, these money movements were recorded as an account receivable from the related company. It was only on December 31, 2001, that this balance was transferred and recorded to an Investment account in the company Parque Central. On the other end, the CCPA corresponding to the related company indicates that “…this Company recorded a capitalization through account number 24121002 (Additional Contributions Centro Comercial Multiplaza S.A.) the sum of ₡758,611,806.47… corresponding to the liabilities (pasivos) maintained and recorded from the company Centro Comercial Multiplza [sic] S.A., for the period under study…” (folio 23). In other terms, it is true that through the account “Additional Contributions Centro Comercial Multiplaza S.A.,” Parque Central recorded a capitalization for ₡758,611,806.47 with respect to the liabilities maintained and recorded from Multiplaza (from January 1, 1999, to December 31, 2001); however, as the Court correctly analyzed, it is also true that from the working papers, book certification, and accounting records of that related company, it was verified that the additional contribution of the plaintiff company was recorded only on December 31, 2001, and that this balance, in reality, came from an account payable to Multiplaza. According to what has been transcribed and analyzed, this decision-making body does not perceive an improper assessment of those pieces of evidence, since from them it is inferred with absolute clarity that what was recorded from the beginning in both companies was a loan and not another operation or negotiation such as a capital contribution. Note even that in the sworn statement of the representative of the company Multiplaza, it is stated: “…until the thirty-first of December of the year two thousand one, my represented company maintained an account receivable with the company Parque Central S.A… for an amount of seven hundred fifty-eight million seven hundred eleven thousand eight hundred six colones with forty-seven céntimos…” (highlighting is not from the original document, folio 43). In this way and through complementary evidence, the existence of an account receivable maintained by the plaintiff was equally demonstrated to the Court, never a capital contribution between companies. In that same sworn statement, it is immediately assured that in the year 2001, Multiplaza “…made an additional capital contribution (aporte de capital) in the company Parque Central S.A., contributing the indicated account receivable… reason for which the account receivable was eliminated and it was transformed into an investment in Parque Central S.A…” (folio 43). However, it must be made clear, it was only at the end of the year 2001 that the questioned companies decided to modify or vary the nature of that account, but by then, the audit actions had already been communicated to the plaintiff along with the adjustment made. Recall that the audited period was the year 1999, a time when the movements were accounted for as an account receivable by Multiplaza and an account payable by Parque Central. Even if the capitalization of that liability (pasivo) and the modification of those accounting records occurred later, the Administration was empowered to disregard them, since at first glance, the movements were reflected as a response to the adjustment made by the Administration and not to the underlying economic reality alleged by Multiplaza (capital contribution). In any case, the plaintiff company also did not prove that the economic reality was that of a capital contribution; on the contrary, the existing evidence, duly assessed by both the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) and the Court, indicated that what occurred was a loan from Multiplaza to its related company. Consequently, given the existence of a loan without a written agreement, it was appropriate to apply the presumption of section 10 of the LISR. The Court is correct when it establishes that there is no violation of the analyzed rule, because there is no evidence of the plaintiff’s statements regarding the supposed contribution that existed from the beginning. Such movements were at no time recorded in that form in the accounting books; the bylaws of Parque Central indicating that its share capital (capital social) was increased (1999 fiscal period) are missing; the existence of shares, benefits, and dividends for Multiplaza by virtue of such contribution (according to the economic results); or at least, the existence of some document that accredits the plaintiff’s position such as an associative contract. It is also essential to highlight that it was Multiplaza, both in administrative proceedings and in the complaint of this process, that accepted having made payments on a temporary basis for contractors who did work for Parque Central “charged to an account receivable from this company, while the latter managed to establish its commercial credit and open its checking accounts, as well as finalize its bank credit.” The use given to the money, according to the letter of section 10 ibidem, reflects that what existed was a loan to the related company so that it could meet its liabilities (pasivos). In this way, the factual error pointed out, by virtue of the improper assessment of evidence, must be dismissed, since such evidence as a whole speaks of the existence of a loan rather than a capital contribution between companies of the same economic group. Consequently, the improper application of sections 330 of the CPC (in reality section 82 of the CPCA) and 18 of the General Regulation for Tax Management, Auditing, and Collection (Reglamento General de Gestión, Fiscalización y Recaudación Tributaria) must also be dismissed.\n\nV.- Next, it is appropriate to hear the grievance for direct violation of articles 10 of the LISR, 13 of the RLISR, 6 and 8 of the CNPT, and 10 of the CC. Section 10 of the LISR regulates matters relating to presumptive net income (renta neta presuntiva), as follows: “It is presumed, barring proof to the contrary, that any financing loan contract, whatever its nature or denomination, if there is a written document, earns interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank of Costa Rica, or, failing that, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System. In cases where there is no written document, upon this presumption no proof to the contrary shall be accepted. The Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) may apply this presumption in other situations even if there is no loan contract, but there is financing, as established in the regulation of this law.” The rule does not require the existence of a written contract to apply the presumption regarding interest. Likewise, it refers to the Regulation for the purposes of defining the concept of financing (when there is no loan contract formalized in a written document), which is essential to apply the content of the section. Section 13 of the RLISR, in the second paragraph, indicates: “No proof to the contrary is admitted for the presumption established when there is no written document. The Administration may apply the presumption referred to in article 10 of the law if financing occurs, even when there is no loan contract. For the purposes of what is stipulated in article 10 of the law, financing is understood as any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to perform the activities of its normal course of business, using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other documents or commercial instruments.” (The emphasis does not correspond to the original). The section provides the definition of financing, in which case, when the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) determines its existence, the calculation of interest proceeds. In this matter, applying section 10 ibidem, the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) determined that the delivery of resources to related companies such as Parque Central was assimilable to a loan, which generates interest, according to the presumption established in the cited rule. As indicated, it was the plaintiff itself that recognized that with the money transferred to Parque Central, the latter paid contractors while it managed to establish its own credits. According to the above, these monies were used so that the related company could continue in its usual course of business while it obtained bank loans to meet its expenses. Now, attending to the definition of section 13 of the RLISR, financing is any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to perform the activities of its normal course of business, using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other documents or commercial instruments. For the Court: “The need for the first two elements (operation that generates funds that allow the recipient to perform activities of its normal course of business) is evident; however, we estimate that the third is not an indispensable requirement to determine its existence. This is because, strictly speaking, financing can be granted with or without collateral, a decision that will depend, ultimately, on the creditor. Therefore, the granting of collateral must be assessed in each specific case, but its absence cannot be considered as excluding the existence of financing because, we insist, it can very well occur without it. In addition to the above, it must be kept in mind that if this definition is for cases in which the financing is not recorded in writing, it would be contradictory to require, for such purposes, collateral that is normally granted in writing…” (folio 150). In the opinion of this Chamber, in this specific case, several situations must be noted. First. There was indeed an operation that generated funds to Parque Central, and those resources, at the same time, allowed it to perform the activities of its normal course of business. Second. This is how it was established in the accounting of both companies. Third. Multiplaza at no time proved that when the transfer of resources occurred, it was done under the figure of a capital contribution. Now then, the fact that collateral was not granted does not invalidate the application of section 10 ibidem, because if there is no written loan document, the consequence of that would be the non-existence of (accessory) collateral that should also be granted in writing. But not because of this, the loan ceases to have effects as the principal business that it is. In any case, the absence of backing for the debt is not surprising when dealing with companies of the same economic group, as happened in this matter. But it is insisted, since the agreement through which the plaintiff transferred the resources to the indicated company was not granted in writing, there is no evidence proving that the loan was granted gratuitously, and even less the existence of any backing for the debt. As an onerous loan, it fits within the definition of section 10 of the LIR, since “It is presumed, barring proof to the contrary, that any financing loan contract, whatever its nature or denomination, if there is a written document, earns interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank of Costa Rica, or, failing that, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System. In cases where there is no written document, upon this presumption no proof to the contrary shall be accepted.” Recall that the legislator provided for two hypotheses: that of a loan contract recorded in writing, in which case the accrual of interest is presumed, barring proof to the contrary; or that of a loan contract that has not been formalized through writing, a scenario in which the presumption of interest does not admit proof to the contrary, and therefore, is absolute. The rule also indicates that the denomination given by the parties does not matter; what is relevant is that a loan exists (in this regard, one may consult the ruling of this Chamber, no. 0001163-F-S1-2009 at 11:20 a.m. on November 6, 2009). In the present case, there is no written agreement between Multiplaza and Parque Central, therefore, considering the reasons indicated throughout this resolution and in application of the presumption of section 10 ibidem, no proof to the contrary is admitted regarding the presumption of interest. Based on the foregoing, no violation of section 10 ibidem and 13 of the Regulation is perceived; the latter, although it should not be applied because it is not strictly a financing, does complement the former regarding the purpose of the loan (an operation that generated funds for Parque Central, which allowed it to perform the activities of its normal course of business). To the above, it must be added that in accordance with what is established in section 496 of the Commercial Code, barring an agreement to the contrary, every loan operation shall be remunerative and the product obtained from such financing shall be interest. Hence, it is evident that, contrary to what was argued by the appellant, since it bore the burden of proof, by failing to prove that the financing was granted gratuitously, it was appropriate to resolve as the Court did, by considering that the Administration had acted correctly in presuming the generation of interest.\n\nVI.- Nor were sections 6, 8 of the CNPT and 10 of the CC violated in the appealed resolution, both in the interpretation of section 10 of the LISR and insofar as the principle of economic reality (principio de realidad económica) is enshrined. As this Chamber has already stated, section 8 of the Tax Code incorporates the principle of economic reality as an interpretative method, as indicated by its heading (“Interpretation of the rule that regulates the triggering event of the tax obligation”) and developed in its content. Based on this principle (one may consult the ruling of this Chamber, no. 1181-F-S1-2009 at 2:48 p.m. on November 12, 2009), its main effect is to allow, in tax matters, disregarding the legal or economic forms adopted by the taxpayer to assess the facts from a material point of view, in those cases where it considers that the taxpayer seeks to reduce the amount of the tax by hiding the underlying material reality in the business. It has also stated: “VI.- Tax avoidance (elusión fiscal) strictu sensu, can be considered as the action of the taxpayer that seeks the undue and inappropriate use of legal forms provided by law, to reduce or abstract from the legal tax obligation. In these cases, the taxpayer subscribes to acts that at bottom constitute nothing more than a simulation of a legal transaction, whose object is not that which is expressed, but rather, that of evading taxes and reducing their contributory duty… It is for this reason that within the tax dynamic, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) in its sections 8 and 12 implements the principle of economic reality, as a mechanism that allows the Administration to disregard formal truths and delve into the private relationship in order to try to unveil the underlying material reality in the business and thereby define whether the form used is a shield to minimize tax burdens, in which case, that duty must be adjusted to its correct course, or if, on the contrary, it is a lawful and legitimate act. For this purpose, the Treasury has broad powers of audit and investigation, the exercise of which, in the event of determining that the taxpayer’s measures are directed at bottom to reduce the tax base of the tax, allows it to make a transfer of tax charges, which initiates a procedure to readjust the calculation base and the tax rate. On this principle of economic reality, this Chamber has indicated: \\\"Likewise, for greater illustration, it should be noted that what is normal, in the case of tax avoidance procedures, is that they adopt an appearance inconsistent with their real nature. Precisely, to obviate such procedures, tax legislation has adopted the principle of economic reality, as an instrument of interpretation, in article 8, paragraph 2, of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. It follows from the integration of said rule with article 12 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, that the latter is applicable even when the parties have adopted a legal form of agreement not entirely clear to the tax administration, since the latter may disregard that form to unveil the scope that the contract entered into between the taxpayer and a third party, outside the tax obligation, might have in the tax sphere. Any tax avoidance procedure detrimental to the treasury, which has the character of an agreement or contract, is thereby obviated. Thus, from the agreement that concerns us, the conclusion is drawn that, if the appellant's thesis were accepted, the agreement would negatively affect the interests of the treasury, which is not permissible, precisely, by virtue of the aforementioned rule. Consequently, the aforementioned grievance pointed out by the plaintiff in its appeal has not occurred, and must be dismissed.\\\" Judgment no. 32 at 10:30 a.m. on March 20, 1992. These are legal norms that allow unveiling the real truth immersed in legal forms that take effect in the tax sphere, in order to safeguard the duty to contribute to public burdens and tax equality. These legal defense mechanisms presuppose a system of presumption that empowers the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) to adequately interpret legal forms to deduce the objective assessment of the facts and therefore, of the reality that is intended to be hidden. In this sense, resolution no. 76 at 2:20 p.m. on June 12, 1991, from this same collegiate body is pronounced” (Underlining is not from the original, no. 825, at 8:45 a.m. on October 27, 2006, reiterated by no. 1256-F-S1-2009 at 10:10 a.m. on December 10, 2009, and in no. 617-F-S1-2010 at 9:10 a.m. on May 20, 2010). It was in application of the principle of economic reality that the Administration determined an increase in the income tax (impuesto sobre la renta) that Multiplaza should have paid in the 1999 fiscal period. It proved the existence of a relationship between the plaintiff and the related company to which it granted the widely discussed loan, all of which, it is repeated, allowed Parque Central to perform activities of its usual course of business, which permitted the application of the presumptive income (renta presuntiva) of section 10 of the LISR due to the existence of the basic fact of a loan. Contrary to what the appellant stated, reality indicated that the plaintiff company made a loan, and this was determined by the State in the adjustment made. That is, in application of this maxim, the State, through the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), proceeded to reclassify the triggering event of the tax obligation, and to investigate, in exercise of its sovereign powers, what the economic reality of the account called “Receivables from Affiliated Companies” was, determining that it was a loan, to which the questioned presumption was applicable. In other respects, the principle of equality has not been violated, since it has not been demonstrated that in an identical situation, the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) provides differential treatment. Nor was it proven that in the audited period, the plaintiff made a capital contribution, so the argument that in application of the principle of economic reality, the adjustment should be made for the benefit of the taxpayer, was not admissible. For the reasons argued, the cassation appeal on this first point must be dismissed.\n\nVII.- Regarding the investment adjustment under Article 11 of Law 6990. Within this topic, as a fourth grievance, it reproaches direct violation due to improper interpretation and application of the repealed articles 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development (Ley de Incentivos para el Desarrollo Turístico) (Law 6990), 31 of the Regulation to that Law, as well as Executive Decree No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. [...]\n\nVIII.- In general terms, it questions direct violation due to improper interpretation and application of the repealed article 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development (Law 6990), 31 of the Regulation to that Law, as well as Executive Decree No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. To have the tax incentive mentioned in the rules, it argues, the investor required only the generic authorization that the ICT (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) granted to the hotel or tourism company, and not the specific or derived one that the Administration required and the Court endorsed. It notes, there are official communications from the Directorate General of Direct Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación Directa) itself (no. 736-97) and from the ICT (no. AL-2446-2010) regarding this criterion. In any case, it affirms, section 11 does not require two authorizations, and the most relevant was precisely the one aimed at verifying the characteristics of the project in which the investment was to be made, hence the Decree considered this generic authorization as the main one, while the other, the specific one, was a “mere formality.” In its opinion, the proof that the investment in shares occurred and that it was made in an authorized company is something for which an authorization from the Regulating Commission (Comisión Reguladora) was not essential, since it would suffice for the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), in its ordinary audit functions, to require proof of the subscription and payment of the shares in a project that had the generic authorization. The first thing to analyze is the content of the questioned rules. Article 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development, Law 6990, of July 15, 1985, in Chapter III, “On Financing,” provided in article 11 (repealed by article 14 of the Regulatory Law of Current Exonerations, Derogations, and Exceptions, no. 7293 of April 3, 1992), the following: “Fifty percent of the amount invested in tourism activities as indicated in article 3 of this law shall be deductible from the Income Tax (Impuesto sobre la Renta), with prior authorization from the tourism regulating commission. When said investment is carried out through already constituted companies, the investment must be made through the purchase of nominative shares of companies domiciled in the country with a signed tourism contract. The shares thus acquired must be held in trust at a State bank or at the National Stock Exchange, for a period of no less than two years, with no possibility of disposing of more than the dividends they produce. When the investment is made in new companies, the requirements demanded in each case by the tourism regulating commission must be met, according to the type of investment. In any case, no more than twenty-five percent of the gross income (renta bruta) for the period in which the indicated investment is made may be deducted for this concept.”\n\nIf one takes into account the conceptual framework of the Law that creates any tax incentive, it is easy to conclude that its purpose is to support and strengthen a specific activity, in this case tourism. In keeping with that orientation, Article 1 of Law 6990 declares “…the tourism industry to be of public utility (utilidad pública)” and section 2 contemplates its purposes, providing: “The purpose of this law is to establish an accelerated and rational process for the development of Costa Rican tourism activity, for which the incentives and benefits to be granted as a stimulus for the undertaking of important programs and projects of said activity are established.” To achieve its objectives, among other incentives and benefits, it allowed tourism companies to sell shares, so that they could generate new resources and sustain their activity; likewise, and of relevance to this matter, the rule benefited investors in shares of the tourism companies mentioned in the law through an incentive, as it gave them the possibility of deducting from the income tax (impuesto sobre la renta) up to 50% of the amount invested in the purchase of shares, but for this, the authorization of the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo was required. Subsequently, through the repeal that the article underwent (Law no. 7293 of March 31, 1992), by means of Directive no. 8 of October 6, 1998, the Dirección General de Tributación suspended the effects of this article in all its aspects, especially that related to the granting of benefits indicated therein, while the scope of the repeal was being studied. It was not until Decree no. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR, of May 16, 2000, regulated the application of precept 11 of Law 6990 regarding tourism contracts approved before the repeal. This latter decree, in its Article 1, makes a distinction between generic authorization (autorización genérica) and specific authorization (autorización específica) as follows: “a) Generic authorization: The authorization granted by the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo to the company with a tourism contract so that it may proceed with the sale of a determined amount of shares with tax benefit, in accordance with the investment plan submitted. b) Specific authorization.- The authorization granted by the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo or the body to which it delegates such function to third-party investors who have acquired shares under the tax beneficiary status, so that they may proceed to make the corresponding deduction from the income tax.” For the Tribunal: “Article 11 does not establish the type of authorization (generic or specific) that was required nor whether it was for the project or expansion of the tourism company receiving the investment or for the specific investment of the individual who would enjoy the credit; because both are different scenarios that each required a different authorization but coming, in both cases, from the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo. Thus, depending on my position (tourism company or investor), that will be the authorization I require. In the judgment of this Tribunal, if what was intended was to apply the income tax deduction provided for in the rule, that authorization was so that the third-party investors who had acquired shares under the tax beneficiary status could proceed to make the corresponding deduction from the tax. Therefore, it had to be a specific authorization (autorización específica) in that sense that attested to the real existence of the investment and the amount invested by each individual (as there could be more than one per tourism company), in order to later be able to establish with the required certainty the amount that could be deducted from the tax in question…” (folio 153). In the opinion of this Chamber, the appellant is also incorrect in the central argument of her appeal regarding this issue, since both rules (11 Law 6990 and 1 of Decree 28676) complement each other and from them it is clear that two types of authorizations are required, one directed at the tourism company and the other at the investor. In this sense, attending to the purposes that inform Law 6990 and because the exemption is granted to the extent that investment is made in tourism activities (section 3 ibidem), it must be considered that the incentive benefits not only the company that is financed through that investment, but also the third-party investor. On the one hand, a stimulus was granted to the investor to invest in tourism companies, so that the latter would have the indispensable financial resources to operate. On the other hand, the latter (investor) is allowed to deduct from the amount they must pay for Income Tax, 50% of what was invested. If Multiplaza wished to benefit from the incentive in the income tax return (declaración del impuesto sobre la renta) corresponding to the 1999 tax period (application of the tax credit for ¢129,069,000.00, which is 50% of the amount invested in the purchase of shares of Hotel Camino Real S.A.), it indeed required the authorization from the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo which was called “specific authorization”. This Chamber considers that section 11 of Law 6990 is neither obscure nor ambiguous as Multiplaza's representative believes, because it clearly mentions that for the favorable regime to be applicable, the “prior authorization of the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo” will be necessary. As indicated, from the analyzed rules it is clear that two parties benefit in the regulated scenario, that is, the company and the investor—there may be several. Now, since the ICT had implemented both authorizations, what was appropriate was that the plaintiff (in its position as “investor”) had obtained the respective authorization. More than a “simple derived formality” as Multiplaza alleges, it constitutes an indispensable requirement so that the Administración Tributaria, in its functions of auditing and controlling the public treasury, may verify whether in reality the investment occurred, and the degree of participation of the investor; in order to precisely determine the exact amount of the benefit. The State did not have the obligation to request other information to verify the investment as the appellant claims, because for that purpose, a procedure was established within the ICT that would yield the appropriate proof to verify the investment (specific authorization). That was the evidence par excellence that an investor had to present to justify the indicated credit. In summary, the generic authorization was given to the tourism company that developed the activities defined in section 3 of Law 6990, that is, so that it could sell a determined amount of shares with tax benefit, in accordance with the investment plan submitted (section 1 subsection a) of Decree no. 28676). Once that was granted, what follows from the analyzed rules, by logic and experience, is not only the respective purchase of shares by the third-party investor(s), but also, under the tax beneficiary status, the request for the specific authorization, which would allow them to make the corresponding deduction from the income tax (section 1 subsection b) of Decree no. 28676).\n\nIX.- The appellant adds that the official letters from the Dirección General de Tributación Directa (no. 736-97) and from the Legal Department of the ICT (no. DL-563-96 and AL-2446-2010) where it is indicated that the generic authorization (autorización genérica) was the one referred to in Article 11 of Law 6990 were improperly evaluated. Due to the existence of such documents, she mentions that she considered the specific authorization (autorización específica) was not necessary, for which she accuses the violation of the principles of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and legitimate expectations (confianza legítima). This deciding body considers that there can be no violation of the mentioned principles, because the interpretation of Article 11 ibidem, carried out by those administrative offices, clearly contravened the provisions of Decree no. 28676, a rule in force and applicable at the time of filing the tax return (declaración). This latter decree is not only subsequent to official letters no. 736-97 and DL-563-9, but also of superior rank within the hierarchy of sources of administrative law (precept 6 of the LGAP). For its part, official letter AL-2446-2010 of December 14, 2010, despite the existence of the indicated Regulation, ignores and misapplies its scope, so its content would not have the effects of exempting the indicated formality (specific authorization) for purposes of the plaintiff proceeding to make the corresponding deduction from the income tax. Likewise, it is clear that the plaintiff knew about the existence of the authorization that is absent in the process, because it has at all times maintained that it requested it, but that the ICT never responded to the request. This simple argument, as the Tribunal correctly held, demonstrates a contradiction in Multiplaza's pleading, because on the one hand it argues that the authorization required was the generic one, but on the other hand it says it requested the specific one, which indicates that it did know about and processed this latter requirement. The plaintiff knew and was aware of the existence of the permit and its respective procedure within the Institute. Consequently, the argument regarding the violation of the principle of legitimate expectations must be dismissed. Finally, regarding this point, this Chamber endorses the Tribunal's criterion that there could be no violation of the principle of non-retroactivity of one's own acts, because in none of the mentioned official letters was any right or benefit declared in favor of Multiplaza. It is reiterated, it was a legal interpretation contrary to rules 11 of Law 6990 and 1 of Decree no. 28676, for which the Administración Tributaria was empowered to disapply them. In relation to this last point, an invasion of the powers of the Dirección General de Tributación is also reproached for questioning the official interpretation of the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo, a body forming part of the ICT, which was the one responsible for setting the rules for said authorization. In the Tribunal's opinion “…neither is it observed that there was an invasion of the ICT's competence. This entity is responsible for authorizing both the tourism company so that it can sell its shares, and the investor who has acquired them, so that they can apply the deduction that the law provides. Subsequently, the Administración Tributaria, in exercise of its supervisory powers, will verify that the credits and deductions applied are in accordance with the legal framework and what was authorized by the ICT. In the specific case, the credit was rejected because the plaintiff did not have the specific authorization from the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo that would allow that deduction. Therefore, the Administración Tributaria acted within the competence framework that the legal system has set for it…” (folio 155). For the 1999 tax period, Multiplaza lacked the specific authorization granted by the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo, required so that it could deduct 50% of its investment from the income tax. That authorization was established by Law 6990 and Decree no. 28676, so it was not the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo that could freely choose which of the two was required to apply the corresponding deduction. Each one fulfilled a specific purpose and objective, and in this latter case, the specific one was necessary to fulfill the purposes of Law 6990, while the incentive was in force. Now, regarding that tax credit, it was the Administración Tributaria's responsibility to safeguard, protect, and subsequently verify it. What the State did was to audit and verify compliance with the indicated requirement, which was indispensable for the purpose of enjoying the incentive. At no time did the Administración Tributaria analyze the validity of authorizations, but rather precisely their existence, specifically the specific one, given that the investor's benefit is absolutely dependent on that agreed to for the tourism company. The Ministry of Finance is the competent authority to determine the applicability of the benefit, that is, the entity in charge of verifying all tax aspects related to the Law of Tourism Incentives, especially since, by way of exception, revenues to the treasury would be decreased (sections 103 of the CNPT, 62 of the LISR, and 12 of Law 6990). In other words, the supervisory function that Article 12 of Law 6990 granted to the Institute was only of an administrative nature, never tax-related, which is why it lacks legal authorization to exercise the powers that the Tax Code (Código Tributario) granted to the Administración Tributaria. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Ministry of Finance to verify the correct use of fiscal incentives, so that only the Administración Tributaria, regarding those taxes, has supervisory power over them, and therefore may exercise the powers that the Tax Code recognizes to it according to the provisions of Articles 103 and following ibidem. In this case, those powers were correctly exercised regarding the investor, because as a taxpayer, they are the passive subject of the tax. On this issue, lastly, she claims a direct violation due to the improper application of Articles 330 and 331 of the LGAP, and 1 and 155 of the Tax Code, because in her opinion, a positive silence (silencio positivo) operated, due to the fact that the request for specific authorization submitted since the year 2000 has still not been answered by the Institute. On this point, the judges considered the following: “…regarding this type of authorizations that are a conditioning prerequisite serving as the basis for a tax incentive, the positive silence regulated by Articles 330 and 331 of the LGAP does not apply. When dealing with tax incentives, it is clear that the legal nature of the procedure is of a tax nature, hence the possibility of applying positive silence to said request could not be affirmed, when the law does not expressly provide for it. It must be borne in mind that Article 367 subsection d) of the LGAP excludes from the application of that regulatory body, regarding administrative procedure, everything concerning tax matters…” (folio 155). The appellant is incorrect and misspeaks by invoking the violation of Articles 330 and 331 of the LGAP, 1 and 155 of the Tax Code to protect her “right.” When speaking of tax incentives, this Chamber has said, it is clear that the legal nature of the procedure is of a tax nature, hence the possibility of applying positive silence to said request could not be affirmed, especially since in this sense the law does not expressly provide for it. It should be remembered that said General Law, in canon 367 subsection d), exempts from the application of that regulatory body, regarding administrative procedure, everything concerning tax matters (resolutions no. 001009-F-2006 of 10:00 a.m. on December 21, 2006, and no. 16 of 3:00 p.m. on March 12, 1980). It has also been insisted that for this type of case, neither deductive reasoning can be made nor analogy applied (judgment no. 811 of 9:50 a.m. on December 3, 2003). Therefore, Multiplaza should not claim that through positive silence it be benefited with the recognition of a credit in its favor, related to the payment of a tax, since this can only be granted through legal means. It should be remembered that taxes are subject to the principle of legal reservation (reserva legal), and exemptions and benefits suffer the same fate, hence they must be evaluated without any adherence to special or specific criteria, so that it is only applicable if it complies with the scenario provided by the legislator and with all the legal requirements established and analyzed supra. This Chamber considers that the items claimed by the appellant are contained in Law 6990, Article 11, and in Decree no. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. By virtue of the foregoing, regarding this second issue, the objections must also be rejected.”\n\nIn that same sworn statement, it is immediately asserted that in 2001, Multiplaza “<i>…made an additional capital contribution in the company Parque Central S.A., contributing the indicated account receivable… reason for which the account receivable was eliminated and it was transformed into an investment in Parque Central S.A.</i>…” (folio 43). However, it must be made clear that it was not until the end of 2011 that the questioned companies decided to modify or vary the nature of that account, but by that time, the audit actions had already been communicated to the plaintiff along with the adjustment made. It should be remembered that the audited period was the year 1999, at which time the transactions were recorded in the accounting records as an account receivable by Multiplaza and an account payable held by Parque Central. Even though the capitalization of that liability and the modification of those accounting records were subsequently carried out, the Administration was entitled to disregard them, since at first glance, the transactions were reflected as a response to the adjustment made by the Administration and not to the underlying economic reality that has been alleged by Multiplaza (capital contribution). In any case, the plaintiff company also did not prove that the economic reality was that of a capital contribution; on the contrary, the existing evidence, duly assessed by both the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) and the Court, indicated that what occurred was a loan from Multiplaza to its related company. Consequently, given the existence of a loan without a written agreement, the applicable course was to apply the presumption of article 10 of the LISR. The Court is correct when it establishes that there is no violation of the analyzed rule, because there is no proof of the plaintiff’s assertions regarding the supposed contribution that was presented from the beginning. Such transactions were never recorded in that manner in the accounting books; the bylaws of Parque Central indicating that its capital stock was increased are absent (fiscal period 1999); the existence of shares, benefits, and dividends for Multiplaza by virtue of such contribution (according to the economic results); or at least, the existence of some document accrediting the plaintiff's position, such as an associative contract. Furthermore, it is essential to highlight that it was Multiplaza, both in the administrative venue and in the lawsuit of this proceeding, that accepted having made temporary payments for contractors who performed work for Parque Central “<i>charged to an account receivable from this company, while it managed to establish its commercial credit and open its checking accounts, as well as finalize its bank loan</i>”. The use given to the money, literally applying article 10 ibidem, reflects that what occurred was a loan to the related company so that it could meet its liabilities. Thus, the alleged error of fact, by virtue of the improper assessment of evidence, must be dismissed, since such evidence as a whole indicates the existence of a loan rather than a capital contribution between companies of the same economic group. Consequently, the improper application of articles 330 of the CPC (in reality, 82 of the CPCA) and 18 of the General Regulation on Tax Management, Audit, and Collection (Reglamento General de Gestión, Fiscalización y Recaudación Tributaria) must also be dismissed.\n\n**V.-** Next, it is necessary to address the grievance of direct violation of articles 10 of the LISR, 13 of the RLISR, 6 and 8 of the CNPT, and 10 of the CC. Article 10 of the LISR regulates the matter of presumptive net income, in the following manner: <i>“It is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that any financing loan contract, whatever its nature or denomination, if a written document exists, accrues interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System. In cases where no written document exists, given the presumption, no evidence to the contrary shall be accepted.</i> <i>The Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) may apply this presumption in other situations even if no loan contract exists, but financing does exist, as established in the regulation of this law.”</i> The rule does not require the existence of a written contract to apply the presumption regarding interest. Likewise, it refers to the Regulation for the purpose of defining the concept of financing (when no loan contract formalized in a written document exists), which is essential to apply the content of the article. Article 13 of the RLISR, in the second paragraph, states: <i>“No evidence to the contrary is admitted for the established presumption when no written document exists. The Administration may apply the presumption referred to in article 10 of the law if financing occurs, even when no loan contract exists. For the purposes of what is stipulated in article 10 of the law, <b>financing is understood as any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal line of business, using its assets as guarantee or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other commercial documents or titles</b>.” </i>(The highlighting is not from the original). The article provides the definition of financing, in which case, when the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) determines its existence, the calculation of interest proceeds. In this matter, applying article 10 ibidem, the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) determined that the delivery of resources to related companies such as Parque Central was equivalent to a loan, which generates interest, according to the presumption established in the cited rule. As indicated, the plaintiff itself acknowledged that with the money transferred to Parque Central, the latter paid contractors while it managed to establish its own credits. These funds were used, according to the above, so that the related company could continue its habitual line of business while obtaining bank loans to meet its expenses. Now, in accordance with the definition in article 13 of the RLISR, financing is any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal line of business, using its assets as guarantee or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other commercial documents or titles. According to the Court: “<i>The need for the first two elements (an operation generating funds that allow the recipient to carry out activities of its normal line of business) is evident; however, we consider that the third is not an indispensable requirement for determining its existence. This is because, strictly speaking, financing can be granted with or without guarantees, a decision that will ultimately depend on the creditor. Therefore, the granting of guarantees must be assessed in each specific case, but its absence cannot be considered as excluding the existence of financing because, we insist, it can well exist without one. In addition to the above, it must be kept in mind that if this definition is for cases where financing is not documented in writing, it would be contradictory to require, for such purposes, a guarantee that is normally granted in writing…</i>” (folio 150). In the opinion of this Chamber, in this specific case, several situations must be highlighted. First. There was indeed an operation that generated funds for Parque Central, and those resources, in turn, allowed it to carry out the activities of its normal line of business. Second. This was established in the accounting records of both companies. Third. Multiplaza never proved that when the transfer of resources occurred, it was done under the figure of a capital contribution. That said, the fact that no guarantees were granted does not invalidate the application of article 10 ibidem, because given the absence of a written loan document, the consequence thereof would be the nonexistence of a guarantee (an accessory) which should also be granted in writing. But this does not mean the loan ceases to have effect as the principal transaction that it is. In any case, the absence of collateral for the debt is not surprising when dealing with companies of the same economic group, as occurred in this matter. But, it is reiterated, since the agreement through which the plaintiff transferred the resources to the indicated company was not granted in writing, there is no evidence proving that the loan was free of charge, and even less so the existence of any collateral for the debt. As a loan for consideration, it fits within the definition of article 10 of the LIR, since “<i>It is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that any financing loan contract, whatever its nature or denomination, if a written document exists, accrues interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System. In cases where no written document exists, given the presumption, no evidence to the contrary shall be accepted.” </i> It should be remembered that the legislator provided two scenarios: that of a loan contract documented in writing, in which case the accrual of interest is presumed, unless proven otherwise; or that of a loan contract that was not formalized through a written document, a scenario in which <u>the presumption of interest does not admit evidence to the contrary</u>, and is therefore absolute. The rule also indicates that the denomination the parties may have given it is irrelevant; what matters is that a loan exists (in this regard, see the ruling of this Chamber, No. 0001163-F-S1-2009 of 11:20 a.m. on November 6, 2009). In the present case, there is no written agreement between Multiplaza and Parque Central; therefore, considering the reasons indicated throughout this resolution and in application of the presumption of article 10 ibidem, no evidence to the contrary is admitted regarding the presumption of interest. Based on the foregoing, no violation of article 10 ibidem and article 13 of the Regulation is observed; the latter, although it should not be applied because it is not strictly a financing, does complement the former regarding the purpose of the loan (an operation that generated funds for Parque Central, which allowed it to carry out the activities of its normal line of business). To the above, it must be added that, in accordance with the provisions of article 496 of the Commercial Code, unless otherwise agreed, any loan transaction shall be remunerative and the product obtained from such financing shall be interest. Hence, it is evident that, contrary to what the appellant alleged, since it bore the burden of proof and failed to prove that the financing was made free of charge, the appropriate course was to resolve as the Court did, by considering that the Administration had acted correctly in presuming the generation of interest.\n\n**VI.-** Nor were articles 6, 8 of the CNPT, and 10 of the CC violated in the appealed resolution, both in the interpretation of article 10 of the LISR and insofar as the principle of economic reality (principio de realidad económica) is enshrined. As this Chamber has already stated, article 8 of the Tax Code incorporates the principle of economic reality as an interpretative method, as indicated by its heading (<i>“Interpretation of the rule regulating the taxable event of the tax obligation”</i>) and developed in its content. Based on this principle (see the ruling of this Chamber, No. 1181-F-S1-2009 of 2:48 p.m. on November 12, 2009), its main effect is to allow, in tax matters, the disregard of the legal or economic forms adopted by the taxpayer in order to assess the facts from a material point of view, in those cases where it is considered that the taxpayer seeks to reduce the amount of the tax by hiding the material reality underlying the transaction. It has also stated: <i>“VI.- Tax avoidance strictu sensu can be considered as the action of the taxpayer that seeks the undue and inappropriate use of the legal forms provided by law, to reduce or abstain from the legal tax obligation. In these cases, the taxpayer enters into acts that in substance constitute nothing more than a simulation of a legal transaction, whose purpose is not that which is expressed, but rather, to evade taxes and reduce their contributory duty… This is why, within the tax dynamic, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) in its articles 8 and 12 implements the principle of economic reality, as a mechanism that allows the Administration to disregard formal truths and delve into the private relationship in order to try to unravel the material reality underlying the transaction and thereby define whether the form used is a shield to minimize tax burdens, in which case, that duty must be adjusted to its correct course, or if, on the contrary, it is a lawful and legitimate act. For this purpose, the Tax Authority has broad powers of audit and investigation, the exercise of which, in the event of determining that the taxpayer's measures are fundamentally aimed at reducing the tax base, allows it to transfer tax charges, which initiates a procedure to readjust the calculation base and the tax rate. Regarding this principle of economic reality, this Chamber has indicated: &quot;Likewise, for further illustration, it should be noted that it is normal, in cases of tax avoidance procedures, for them to adopt an appearance inconsistent with their real nature. Precisely, to circumvent such procedures, tax legislation has incorporated the principle of economic reality, as an instrument of interpretation, in article 8, paragraph 2, of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). It follows from the integration of said rule with article 12 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), that the latter is applicable even when the parties have adopted a legal form of agreement not entirely clear to the tax administration, as it may disregard that form to unravel the scope that the contract signed between the taxpayer and a third party, outside the tax obligation, may have in the tax sphere. In this way, any tax avoidance procedure harmful to the Tax Authority, which has the character of an agreement or contract, is circumvented. Thus, from the agreement at hand, the conclusion is drawn that, if the appellant's thesis were accepted, the agreement would negatively affect the interests of the Tax Authority, which is not permissible, precisely, by virtue of the aforementioned rule. Consequently, the mentioned grievance that the plaintiff points out in its appeal has not occurred, and must be dismissed.&quot; Judgment No. 32 of 10:30 a.m. on March 20, 1992. These are legal rules that allow unraveling the real truth immersed in the legal forms that produce effects in the tax sphere, in order to safeguard the duty to contribute to public charges and tax equality. <u>These mechanisms of legal defense presuppose a system of presumption that empowers the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) to adequately interpret legal forms to deduce the objective assessment of the facts and, therefore, of the reality that is intended to be concealed.</u> This is stated in resolution No. 76 of 2:20 p.m. on June 12, 1991, of this same collegiate body” </i>(The underlining is not from the original, No. 825, of 8:45 a.m. on October 27, 2006, reiterated by No. 1256-F-S1-2009 of 10:10 a.m. on December 10, 2009, and in No. 617-F-S1-2010 of 9:10 a.m. on May 20, 2010). It was in application of the principle of economic reality that the Administration determined an increase in the income tax that Multiplaza should have paid in the fiscal period of 1999. It proved the existence of a relationship between the plaintiff and the related company to which it granted the extensively discussed loan, all of which, it is repeated, allowed Parque Central to carry out activities typical of its normal line of business, which permitted the application of the presumptive income under article 10 of the LISR due to the existence of the underlying fact of a loan. Contrary to what was stated by the appellant, the reality indicated that the plaintiff company made a loan, and this was determined by the State in the adjustment made. That is, in application of this maxim, the State, through the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), proceeded to reclassify the taxable event of the tax obligation, and to investigate, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, what the economic reality of the account called “<i>Effects Receivable from Affiliated Companies</i>” was, determining that it was a loan, to which the questioned presumption was applicable. As for the rest, the principle of equality has not been violated, since it has not been demonstrated that in an <u>identical</u> situation, the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) applies differential treatment. Nor was it proven that in the audited period, the plaintiff made a capital contribution; therefore, the argument that, in application of the principle of economic reality, the adjustment should have been made to the benefit of the taxpayer was not admissible. For the reasons stated, the appeal on cassation in this first part must be dismissed.\n\n**VII.-** **Regarding the adjustment for investments under article 11 of Law 6990**. Within this topic, as a **fourth** grievance, it reproaches direct violation due to improper interpretation and application of the repealed articles 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development (Ley de Incentivos para el Desarrollo Turístico, Law 6990), 31 of the Regulation to that Law, as well as Executive Decree No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. [...]\n\n**VIII.-** In general terms, it questions a direct violation due to improper interpretation and application of the repealed article 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development (Law 6990), 31 of the Regulation to that Law, as well as Executive Decree No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. To avail of the tax incentive mentioned in the rules, it argues, the investor only required the generic authorization that the ICT (Tourism Regulatory Commission, Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) granted to the hotel or tourism company, and not the specific or derived authorization that the Administration required and the Court endorsed. It notes that there exist official letters from the Directorate General of Direct Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación Directa) itself (No. 736-97) and from the ICT (No. AL-2446-2010) regarding that criterion. In any case, it affirms, article 11 does not require two authorizations, and the most relevant was precisely the one aimed at verifying the characteristics of the project in which the investment was to be made; hence, the Decree considered this generic authorization as the main one, while the other, the specific one, was a “<i>mere formality</i>”. In its opinion, proof that the investment in shares was made and that it was made in an authorized company is something for which an authorization from the Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora) was not essential, as it would be sufficient for the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), in its ordinary audit functions, to require proof of the subscription and payment of shares in a project that had the generic authorization. The first thing that must be analyzed is the content of the questioned rules. Article 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development, Law 6990, of July 15, 1985, in Chapter III, “<i>On Financing</i>”, stipulated in article 11 (repealed by article 14 of the Regulatory Law on Current Exemptions, Derogations, and Exceptions, No. 7293 of April 3, 1992), the following: “<i>Fifty percent of the amount invested in tourism activities mentioned in article 3 of this law shall be deductible from the Income Tax, with prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission. When such investment is made through already established companies, the investment must be made through the purchase of registered shares of companies domiciled in the country with a signed tourism contract. The shares thus acquired must be held in trust in a State bank or in the National Stock Exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores), for a period of no less than two years, without the possibility of disposing of more than the dividends they produce. When the investment is made in new companies, the requirements demanded in each case by the tourism regulatory commission must be met, according to the type of investment. In any case, no more than twenty-five percent of the gross income of the period in which the indicated investment is made may be deducted under this concept</i>”. If the conceptual framework of the Law that creates any tax incentive is taken into account, it is easy to conclude that its purpose is to support and promote a specific activity, in this case tourism. In line with that orientation, article 1 of Law 6990 declares “…<i>the tourism industry to be of public utility</i>” and article 2 contemplates its purposes, by stipulating: “<i>The purpose of this law is to establish an accelerated and rational process for the development of the Costa Rican tourism activity, for which the incentives and benefits are established that will be granted as a stimulus for the realization of important programs and projects in said activity</i>”. To achieve its objectives, among other incentives and benefits, it allowed tourism companies the sale of shares, so that they could generate new resources and address their activity; likewise, and of relevance to this matter, is that the rule benefited, through an incentive, the investors in shares of the tourism companies mentioned in the law, as it granted them the possibility of deducting from the income tax up to 50% of the amount invested in the purchase of shares, but for this, the authorization of the Tourism Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) was required. Later, following the repeal suffered by the article (Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992), through Directive No. 8 of October 6, 1998, the Directorate General of Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación) suspended the effects of this article in all its aspects, especially regarding the granting of benefits indicated therein, while the scope of the repeal was being studied. It was not until Decree No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR, of May 16, 2000, that the application of article 11 of Law 6990 was regulated regarding tourism contracts approved before the repeal. This last decree, in its article 1, makes a distinction between generic authorization and specific authorization in the following manner: “<i>a) Generic authorization: The authorization granted by the Tourism Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) to the company with a tourism contract so that it proceeds with the sale of a determined amount of shares with tax benefits, in accordance with the presented investment plan. b) Specific authorization.- The authorization granted by the Tourism Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) or the body to which it delegates this function, to the third-party investors who have acquired shares under the tax benefit, so that they proceed to make the corresponding deduction of the income tax</i>”. According to the Court: “<i>Article 11 does not establish the type of authorization (generic or specific) that was required, nor if it was for the project or expansion of the tourism company receiving the investment or for the specific investment of the individual who was going to enjoy the credit; because both are different scenarios that each required a different authorization, but originating, in both cases, from the Tourism Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo). Thus, depending on my position (tourism company or investor), the authorization I require will differ. In the opinion of this Court, if the intention was to apply the income tax deduction provided for in the rule, that authorization was for the third-party investors who had acquired shares under the tax benefit, to proceed to make the corresponding deduction of the tax. Therefore, it had to be a specific authorization in that sense, certifying the real existence of the investment and the amount invested by each individual (as there could be more than one per tourism company), in order to then be able to establish, with the required certainty, the amount that could be deducted from the tax in question</i>…” (folio 153). In the opinion of this Chamber, the appellant is also incorrect in the central argument of its appeal regarding this issue, since both rules (article 11 of Law 6990 and article 1 of Decree 28676) complement each other, and it follows from them that two types of authorizations are required: one directed to the tourism company and the other to the investor.\n\nIn this regard, attending to the purposes that inform Law 6990 and due to the fact that the exemption is granted to the extent that investment is made in tourism activities (subsection 3 ibidem), it must be considered that the incentive benefits not only the company that is financed through that investment, but also the third-party investor. On one hand, a stimulus was granted to the investor to invest in tourism companies, so that the latter could have the indispensable financial resources to operate. On the other, the latter (investor) is allowed to deduct from the amount it must pay for Income Tax, 50% of the amount invested. If Multiplaza wished to benefit from the incentive in the income tax return corresponding to the 1999 fiscal period (application of the tax credit for ¢129,069,000.00, which is 50% of the amount invested in the purchase of shares of Hotel Camino Real S.A.), it indeed required the authorization of the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo that was called “autorización específica” (specific authorization). This Chamber considers that subsection 11 of Law 6990 is not obscure or ambiguous as Multiplaza’s representative believes, since it clearly mentions that for the favorable regime to be applicable, the “previa autorización de la Comisión Reguladora de Turismo” (prior authorization of the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) will be necessary. As indicated, from the analyzed norms it follows that there are two beneficiaries in the regulated scenario, namely the company and the investor—there may be several. Now, since the ICT had implemented both authorizations, the corresponding action was for the plaintiff (in its position as “investor”) to have obtained the respective authorization. More than a “simple derived procedure” as Multiplaza claims, it constitutes an indispensable requirement so that the Administración Tributaria, in its oversight and control functions of the treasury, can verify whether the investment actually occurred, the degree of the investor’s participation; in order to precisely determine the exact amount of the benefit. The State did not have the obligation to request other information to verify the investment as the appellant claims, because for that purpose, a procedure was established within the ICT that would yield the adequate proof to verify the investment (autorización específica). That was the proof par excellence that an investor had to present to justify the indicated credit. In short, the generic one was given to the tourism company that developed the activities defined in numeral 3 of Law 6990, that is, so it could carry out the sale of a certain amount of shares with tax benefit, in accordance with the investment plan presented (subsection 1, subparagraph a) of Decree No. 28676). Once that was granted, what follows from the analyzed norms, by logic and experience, is not only the respective purchase of the shares by the third-party investor(s), but also, under the tax beneficiary status, the request for the autorización específica, which would allow them to make the corresponding deduction from the income tax (subsection 1, subparagraph b) of Decree No. 28676).\n\n**IX.-** The appellant adds that the official letters of the Dirección General de Tributación Directa (No. 736-97) and the ICT Legal Department (No. DL-563-96 and AL-2446-2010) were improperly evaluated, where it is indicated that the generic authorization was the one referred to in Article 11 of Law 6990. Due to the existence of such documents, it mentions, it considered that the autorización específica was not necessary, for which it accuses the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations (confianza legítima) of being injured. This deciding body considers that there cannot be a violation of the mentioned principles, because the interpretation of Article 11 ibidem, carried out by those administrative offices, clearly breached the provisions of Decree No. 28676, a norm in force and applicable at the time of making the declaration. This last decree is not only subsequent to official letters No. 736-97 and DL-563-96, but also of superior rank within the hierarchy of sources of the administrative legal system (precept 6 of the LGAP). For its part, official letter AL-2446-2010 of December 14, 2010, despite the existence of the indicated Regulation (Reglamento), disregards and disapplies its scope, so its content would not have the effects of exonerating the indicated procedure (autorización específica) so that the plaintiff could proceed to make the corresponding deduction from the income tax. Likewise, it is clear that the plaintiff knew about the existence of the authorization that is missing in the process, since it has at all times maintained that it requested it, but that the ICT never answered the request. This simple argumentation, as the Tribunal correctly determined, evidences a contradiction in Multiplaza’s claim, because on one hand it argues that the required authorization was the generic one, but on the other it says it requested the specific one, which indicates that it did know about and processed this last requirement. The plaintiff knew and was aware of the existence of the permit and its respective procedure within the Institute. Consequently, the argument regarding the violation of the principle of legitimate expectations (confianza legítima) must be dismissed. Finally, regarding this point, this Chamber endorses the Tribunal’s criterion that there could not be a breach of the principle of non-retroactivity of one’s own acts, because in none of the mentioned official letters was any right or benefit declared in favor of Multiplaza. It is reiterated, it was a legal interpretation contrary to norms 11 of Law 6990 and 1 of Decree No. 28676, for which the Administración Tributaria was empowered to disapply them. In relation to this last point, an invasion of the powers (competencias) of the Dirección General de Tributación is also reproached for questioning the official interpretation of the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo, an organ forming part of the ICT, which was the one responsible for setting the rules for said authorization. In the Tribunal’s criterion: “…neither is it observed that there was an invasion of the ICT’s powers (competencia). This entity is responsible for authorizing both the tourism company so that it can sell its shares, and the investor who has acquired them, so that the latter can apply the deduction that the law provides. Subsequently, the Administración Tributaria, in exercise of its oversight powers, will verify that the credits and deductions applied are in accordance with the legal framework (bloque de legalidad) and what was authorized by the ICT. In the specific case, the credit was rejected because the plaintiff did not have the autorización específica from the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo that would allow it that deduction. Therefore, the Administración Tributaria acted under the power framework (marco competencial) that the legal system has set for it…” (folio 155). For the 1999 fiscal period, Multiplaza lacked the autorización específica granted by the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo, required so it could deduct 50% of its investment from the income tax. That authorization was established by Law 6990 and Decree No. 28676, therefore it was not the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo that could freely choose which of the two was required to apply the corresponding deduction. Each one fulfilled a specific purpose and objective, and in this latter case, the specific one was necessary to fulfill the purposes of Law 6990, while the incentive was in force. Now, regarding that tax credit, it was the Administración Tributaria’s responsibility for its safeguarding, protection, and subsequent verification. What the State did was to oversee and verify compliance with the indicated requirement, which was indispensable for the purposes of enjoying the incentive. At no time did the Administración Tributaria analyze the validity of authorizations, but precisely their existence, specifically the specific one, given that the investor’s benefit is absolutely dependent on that agreed to the tourism company. The Ministry of Finance is the competent authority to determine the applicability of the benefit, that is, the entity responsible for verifying all tax aspects related to the Law of Tourism Incentives, especially since, by exception, revenues to the treasury would be decreased (subsections 103 of the CNPT, 62 of the LISR, and 12 of Law 6990). In other words, the oversight function that Article 12 of Law 6990 granted to the Institute was only of an administrative nature, never tax-related, which is why it lacks legal authorization to exercise the powers that the Tax Code granted to the Administración Tributaria. It corresponds, then, to the Ministry of Finance to verify the correct use of fiscal incentives, so only the Administración Tributaria, regarding those taxes, has oversight power over them, and therefore can exercise the powers that the Tax Code recognizes to it according to the provisions of Articles 103 and following ibidem. In this case, those powers were correctly exercised regarding the investor, since as a taxpayer it is the passive subject of the tax. On this topic, it lastly claims a direct violation due to the improper application of Articles 330 and 331 of the LGAP, 1 and 155 of the Tax Code, because in its criterion a positive silence (silencio positivo) operated, due to the fact that the request for autorización específica submitted since the year 2000 has not yet been answered by the Institute. On this point, the judges considered the following: ”…in the face of this type of authorizations which are a conditioning prerequisite that serves as the basis for a tax incentive, the positive silence (silencio positivo) regulated by Articles 330 and 331 of the LGAP does not apply. Being in the presence of fiscal incentives, it is clear that the legal nature of the procedure is of a tax nature, hence it could not be affirmed that there is a possibility of applying the positive silence (silencio positivo) to said request, when the law does not expressly provide for it. It must be kept in mind that Article 367, subparagraph d) of the LGAP excludes from the application of that normative body, regarding the administrative procedure, everything concerning tax matters…” (folio 155). The appellant is not right and is mistaken in invoking the breach of Articles 330 and 331 of the LGAP, 1 and 155 of the Tax Code to protect its “right”. When speaking of fiscal incentives, this Chamber has said, it is clear that the legal nature of the procedure is of a tax nature, hence it could not be affirmed that there is a possibility of applying the positive silence (silencio positivo) to said request, especially since in this sense the law does not expressly provide for it. It should be remembered that said General Law, in canon 367 subparagraph d), exempts from the application of that normative body, regarding the administrative procedure, everything concerning tax matters (resolutions No. 001009-F-2006 of 10:00 a.m. on December 21, 2006, and No. 16 of 3:00 p.m. on March 12, 1980). It has also been insisted that for this type of case, neither deductive reasoning can be made nor analogy applied (judgment No. 811 of 9:50 a.m. on December 3, 2003). Therefore, Multiplaza should not pretend that through positive silence (silencio positivo) it be benefited with the recognition of a credit in its favor, related to the payment of a tax, since this can only be granted by legal means. It must be remembered, taxes are subject to the principle of legal reserve, exemptions and benefits suffer the same fate, hence they must be evaluated without any adherence to special or specific criteria, so it is only admissible if it complies with the scenario that the legislator established and with all the legal requirements established and analyzed supra. This Chamber considers that the items claimed by the appellant are immersed in Law 6990, Article 11, and in Decree No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR.\n\nIn view of the foregoing, with respect to this second issue, the objections must also be dismissed.”\n\nIn this matter, applying subsection 10 ibid., the Tax Administration (la Administración Tributaria) determined that the delivery of resources to related companies such as Parque Central was akin to a loan, which generates interest, according to the presumption established in the cited rule. As indicated, the plaintiff itself acknowledged that with the money transferred to Parque Central, the latter paid contractors while it managed to establish its own credits. These funds were used, according to the foregoing, so that the related company could remain in its ordinary course of business while it obtained bank loans to meet its expenses. Now, in light of the definition in subsection 13 of the RLISR, financing is any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its ordinary course of business, using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other commercial documents or titles. For the Tribunal: “*It is evident that the first two elements are necessary (an operation that generates funds allowing the recipient to carry out activities of its ordinary course of business); however, we consider that the third is not an indispensable requirement to determine its existence. This is because, strictly speaking, financing can be granted with or without collateral, a decision that will ultimately depend on the creditor. Therefore, the granting of collateral must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, but its absence could not be taken as excluding the existence of financing because, we reiterate, the latter may well exist without the former. In addition to the above, it must be kept in mind that if this definition is for cases where the financing is not in writing, it would be contradictory to require, for such purposes, collateral that is normally granted in writing…*” (folio 150). In the opinion of this Chamber, in the specific case, several situations must be highlighted. First. There was indeed an operation that generated funds for Parque Central, and these resources, in turn, allowed it to carry out the activities of its ordinary course of business. Second. This was recorded in the accounting records of both companies. Third. Multiplaza never proved that the transfer of resources was made under the concept of a capital contribution. That said, the fact that no collateral was granted does not invalidate the application of precept 10 ibid., because in the absence of a written loan document, the consequence would be the non-existence of a collateral (accessory) which should also be granted in writing. But this does not mean the loan ceases to have effect as the principal transaction that it is. In any case, the absence of collateral for the debt is not surprising when dealing with companies of the same economic group, as occurred in the present matter. But it must be reiterated, since the agreement through which the plaintiff transferred the resources to the indicated company was not granted in writing, there is no proof demonstrating that the loan was gratuitous, and even less evidence of any backing for the debt. As an onerous loan, it fits the definition of mandate 10 of the LIR, because “*It is presumed, unless there is proof to the contrary, that any financing loan contract, whatever its nature or name, if a written document exists, bears interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank of Costa Rica, or, failing that, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System. In cases where no written document exists, given the presumption, no proof to the contrary shall be accepted.*” It should be recalled that the legislator provided for two scenarios: one of a loan contract recorded in writing, in which case the accrual of interest is presumed, unless there is proof to the contrary; or one of a loan contract that has not been formalized through a written instrument, a case in which the presumption of interest does not admit proof to the contrary, and therefore, is absolute. The rule also indicates that the name the parties may have given it is irrelevant; what matters is that a loan exists (in this regard, one may consult the judgment of this Chamber, No. 0001163-F-S1-2009 at 11:20 a.m. on November 6, 2009). In the present case, there is no written agreement between Multiplaza and Parque Central, therefore, considering the reasons stated throughout this resolution and in application of the presumption of canon 10 ibid., no proof to the contrary is admitted regarding the presumption of interest. Based on the foregoing, no injury to numeral 10 ibid. and 13 of the Regulation is perceived; the latter, while it should not be applied because it is not strictly a financing arrangement, does complement the former regarding the purpose of the loan (an operation that generated funds for Parque Central, which allowed it to carry out the activities of its ordinary course of business). To the foregoing, it must be added that according to the provisions of cardinal 496 of the Commercial Code, unless agreed otherwise, any loan transaction shall be for consideration, and the product obtained from such financing shall be interest. Hence, it is evident that, contrary to what the appellant argued, since the burden of proof corresponded to it, failing to prove that the financing was made gratuitously, the appropriate course was to resolve as the Tribunal did, finding that the Administration had acted correctly in presuming the generation of interest.\n\n**VI.-** Neither were numerales 6, 8 of the CNPT and 10 of the CC injured in the appealed resolution, both in the interpretation of precept 10 of the LISR and insofar as the principle of economic reality is enshrined. As this Chamber has already stated, numeral 8 of the Tax Code incorporates the principle of economic reality as an interpretative method, as indicated by its heading (“*Interpretation of the rule governing the taxable event of the tax obligation*”) and developed in its content. Based on this principle (one may consult the judgment of this Chamber, No. 1181-F-S1-2009 at 2:48 p.m. on November 12, 2009), its main effect is to allow, in tax matters, the disregard of the legal or economic forms adopted by the taxpayer in order to assess the facts from a material point of view, in those cases where it considers that the taxpayer seeks to reduce the amount of the tax by concealing the material reality underlying the transaction. It has also stated: “*VI.- Tax avoidance* stricto sensu *can be considered as the action of the taxpayer seeking the undue and inappropriate use of the legal forms provided by law, to reduce or exempt itself from the legal tax obligation. In these cases, the taxpayer enters into acts that essentially constitute nothing more than a simulation of a legal transaction, whose purpose is not that which is expressed, but rather, to evade taxes and reduce its contributory duty… It is for this reason that within the tax dynamic, the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures in its numerales 8 and 12 implements the principle of economic reality, as a mechanism that allows the Administration to disregard formal truths and delve into the private relationship in order to try to unravel the material reality underlying the transaction and thereby define whether the form used is a shield to minimize tax burdens, in which case, that duty must be adjusted to its correct course, or if, on the contrary, it is a lawful and legitimate act. For this purpose, the Tax Authority has broad powers of oversight and investigation, the exercise of which, in the event of determining that the taxpayer's measures are essentially aimed at reducing the tax base, allows it to make a transfer of tax charges, which initiates a procedure to readjust the calculation base and the tax rate. Regarding this principle of economic reality, this Chamber has indicated: “Likewise, for further illustration, it is worth noting that what is normal, in the case of tax avoidance schemes, is that they adopt an appearance inconsistent with their real nature. Precisely, to circumvent such schemes, tax legislation has adopted the principle of economic reality, as an instrument of interpretation, in article 8, paragraph 2, of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures. It follows from the integration of said rule with article 12 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, that the latter is applicable even when the parties have adopted a legal form of agreement not entirely clear to the Tax Administration (la Administración Tributaria), since the latter may disregard that form to unravel the scope that the contract entered into between the taxpayer and a third party, external to the tax obligation, may have in the tax sphere. Any tax avoidance scheme harmful to the tax authority, which has the character of an agreement or contract, is thus circumvented. From the agreement at hand, the conclusion is drawn that, if the appellant's thesis were accepted, the agreement would negatively affect the interests of the tax authority, which is not permissible, precisely by virtue of the rule indicated above. Consequently, the alleged injury that the plaintiff points out in its appeal has not occurred, and must be dismissed.” Judgment No. 32 at 10:30 a.m. on March 20, 1992. These are legal rules that allow the unraveling of the real truth immersed in the legal forms that take effect in the tax sphere, in order to safeguard the duty to contribute to public burdens and tax equality.* *These legal defense mechanisms presuppose a system of presumption that empowers the Tax Administration (la Administración Tributaria) to adequately interpret legal forms to derive the objective assessment of the facts and, therefore, of the reality that is intended to be hidden.* *In this sense, resolution No. 76 at 2:20 p.m. on June 12, 1991, from this same collegiate body pronounced itself.”* (The underlining is not from the original, No. 825, at 8:45 a.m. on October 27, 2006, reiterated by No. 1256-F-S1-2009 at 10:10 a.m. on December 10, 2009, and in No. 617-F-S1-2010 at 9:10 a.m. on May 20, 2010). It was in application of the principle of economic reality that the Administration determined an increase in the income tax that Multiplaza should have paid in the 1999 fiscal year. It proved the existence of a link between the plaintiff and the related company to which it granted the extensively discussed loan, all of which, it is repeated, allowed Parque Central to carry out activities of its ordinary course of business, which permitted the application of the presumptive income of ordinal 10 of the LISR because the basis fact of a loan existed. Contrary to what the appellant argued, reality indicated that the plaintiff company made a loan, and this was determined by the State in the adjustment made. That is, in application of this maxim, the State, through the Tax Administration (la Administración Tributaria), proceeded to reclassify the taxable event of the tax obligation, and to investigate, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, what the economic reality of the account called “*Receivables from Affiliated Companies*” was, determining that it was a loan, to which the questioned presumption was applicable. In other respects, the principle of equality has not been violated, since it has not been demonstrated that in an identical situation, the Tax Administration (la Administración Tributaria) applies differential treatment. Nor was it proven that in the audited period, the plaintiff made a capital contribution, so the argument that in application of the principle of economic reality, the adjustment should be made for the benefit of the taxpayer was not acceptable. For the reasons set forth, the cassation appeal on this first point must be dismissed.\n\n**VII.-** **On the adjustment for investments under article 11 of Law 6990**. Within this topic, as a **fourth** grievance, it reproaches direct violation due to improper interpretation and application of the repealed articles 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development (Ley de Incentivos para el Desarrollo Turístico, Ley 6990), 31 of the Regulation to that Law, as well as Executive Decree No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. [...]\n\n**VIII.-** In general terms, it questions direct violation due to improper interpretation and application of the repealed article 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development (Ley 6990), 31 of the Regulation to that Law, as well as Executive Decree No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. To benefit from the tax incentive mentioned in the rules, it argues, the investor only required the generic authorization that the ICT (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) granted to the hotel or tourism company, and not the specific or derived authorization that the Administration demanded and the Tribunal endorsed. It notes that there are official communications from the Directorate General of Direct Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación Directa) itself (No. 736-97) and from the ICT (No. AL-2446-2010) regarding that criterion. In any case, it affirms, ordinal 11 does not require two authorizations, and the most relevant was precisely the one aimed at verifying the characteristics of the project in which one was going to invest, hence the Decree considered this generic authorization as the main one, while the other, the specific one, was a “*mere formality*”. In its opinion, proof that the stock investment was made and that it was made in an authorized company is something for which an authorization from the Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora) was not essential, since it would suffice for the Tax Administration (la Administración Tributaria), in its ordinary oversight functions, to require proof of the subscription and payment of the shares in a project that had the generic authorization. The first thing that must be analyzed is the content of the questioned rules. Article 11 of the Law of Incentives for Tourism Development, Ley 6990, of July 15, 1985, in Chapter III, “*On Financing*”, provided in article 11 (repealed by article 14 of the Regulatory Law of Existing Exonerations, Derogations and Exceptions, No. 7293 of April 3, 1992), the following: “*Fifty percent of the amount invested in tourism activities mentioned in article 3 of this law shall be deductible from the Income Tax, subject to prior authorization from the tourism regulatory commission. When said investment is made through already established companies, the investment must be made through the purchase of nominative shares of companies domiciled in the country with a signed tourism contract. The shares thus acquired must be held in trust in a State bank or in the National Stock Exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores), for a term of no less than two years, with no possibility of disposing of more than the dividends they produce. When the investment is made in new companies, the requirements demanded in each case by the tourism regulatory commission must be met, according to the type of investment. In any case, no more than twenty-five percent of the gross income of the period in which said investment is made may be deducted for this concept*”. If the conceptual framework of the Law creating any tax incentive is taken into account, it is easy to conclude that its purpose is to support and promote a specific activity, in this case the tourism industry. In line with that orientation, article 1 of Ley 6990 declares “…*the tourism industry to be of public utility*” and numeral 2 contemplates its purposes, providing: “*The purpose of this law is to establish an accelerated and rational process of development of the Costa Rican tourism activity, for which the incentives and benefits are established that will be granted as a stimulus for the realization of important programs and projects of said activity*”. To achieve its objectives, among other incentives and benefits, it allowed tourism companies to sell shares, so that they could generate new resources and address their activity; likewise, and of relevance to this matter, the rule benefited investors in shares of the tourism companies mentioned in the law through an incentive, as it gave them the possibility of deducting from income tax up to 50% of the amount invested in the purchase of shares, but for this, the authorization of the Tourism Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) was required. Subsequently, after the repeal that the article underwent (Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992), through Directive No. 8 of October 6, 1998, the Directorate General of Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación) suspended the effects of this article in all its respects, especially regarding the granting of benefits indicated therein, while the scope of the repeal was studied. It was not until Decree No. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR, of May 16, 2000, that the application of precept 11 of Ley 6990 was regulated concerning tourism contracts approved before the repeal. This last decree, in its article 1, makes a distinction between generic and specific authorization as follows: “*a) Generic authorization: The authorization granted by the Tourism Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) to the company with a tourism contract so that it may proceed with the sale of a determined amount of shares with tax benefit, in accordance with the investment plan presented. b) Specific authorization.- The authorization granted by the Tourism Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) or the body to which it delegates this function, to third-party investors who have acquired shares under the tax benefit, so that they may proceed to make the corresponding deduction* *from the income tax*”. For the Tribunal: “*Article 11 does not establish the type of authorization (generic or specific) that was required, nor whether it was for the project or expansion of the tourism company receiving the investment or for the specific investment of the individual who would enjoy the credit; because they are both different scenarios, each requiring a different authorization, but both originating from the Tourism Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo). Thus, depending on my position (tourism company or investor), that will be the authorization I require. In the judgment of this Tribunal, if what was intended was to apply the income tax deduction provided for in the rule, that authorization was so that third-party investors who had acquired shares under the tax benefit could proceed to make the corresponding deduction from the tax. Therefore, it had to be a specific authorization in that sense, confirming the real existence of the investment and the amount invested by each individual (as there could be more than one per tourism company), in order to subsequently establish with the required certainty the amount that could be deducted from the tax in question*…” (folio 153). In the opinion of this Chamber, the cassation appellant is also incorrect in the central argument of its appeal regarding this issue, since both rules (11 Ley 6990 and 1 of Decree 28676) complement each other, and it is clear from them that two types of authorizations are required, one directed to the tourism company and the other to the investor. In this sense, considering the objectives informing Ley 6990 and because the exoneration is granted to the extent that investment is made in tourism activities (ordinal 3 ibid.), it must be considered that the incentive benefits not only the company that is financed through that investment, but also the third-party investor. On the one hand, a stimulus was granted to the investor to invest in tourism companies, so that the latter would have the indispensable financial resources to operate. On the other, the latter (investor) is allowed to deduct 50% of the invested amount from the amount it must pay for Income Tax. If Multiplaza wanted to benefit from the incentive in the income tax declaration corresponding to the 1999 fiscal year (application of a tax credit for ₡129,069,000.00, which is 50% of the amount invested in the purchase of shares of Hotel Camino Real S.A.), it indeed required the authorization from the Tourism Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo) called “specific authorization”. This Chamber considers that ordinal 11 of Ley 6990 is neither obscure nor ambiguous as Multiplaza's representative argues, since it clearly mentions that for the favorable regime to be applicable, the “*prior authorization of the Tourism Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Turismo)*” will be necessary. As indicated, it is clear from the analyzed rules that there are two beneficiaries in the regulated scenario, namely the company and the investor—there may be several. Now, since the ICT had implemented both authorizations, the corresponding action was for the plaintiff (in its position as “investor”) to have obtained the respective authorization. More than a “simple derived formality” as Multiplaza alleges, it constitutes an indispensable requirement for the Tax Administration (la Administración Tributaria), in its oversight and tax control functions, to verify whether the investment actually occurred, the degree of participation of the investor; in order to precisely determine the exact amount of the benefit. The State did not have the obligation to require other information to verify the investment, as the appellant alleges, because for that purpose, a procedure was established within the ICT that would provide the appropriate evidence to prove the investment (specific authorization). That was the proof par excellence that an investor had to present to justify the indicated credit. In summary, the generic authorization was given to the tourism company that developed the activities defined in numeral 3 of Ley 6990, that is, so that it could carry out the sale of a determined amount of shares with tax benefit, in accordance with the investment plan presented (ordinal 1 subsection a) of Decree No. 28676). Once that was granted, what follows from the analyzed rules, by logic and experience, is not only the respective purchase of the shares by the third-party investor(s), but also, under the tax benefit, the request for the specific authorization, which would allow them to make the corresponding deduction from the income tax (cardinal 1 subsection b) of Decree No. 28676).\n\n**IX.-** The appellant adds that the official communications from the Directorate General of Direct Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación Directa) (No. 736-97) and from the Legal Department of the ICT (No. DL-563-96 and AL-2446-2010) were improperly assessed, which indicate that the generic authorization was the one referred to in article 11 of Ley 6990. Due to the existence of such documents, it mentions that it considered the specific authorization was not necessary, and therefore accuses violation of the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations. This decision-making body considers that there cannot be a violation of the mentioned principles, since the interpretation of article 11 ibid., made by those administrative offices, clearly contravened the provisions of Decree No. 28676, a rule in force and applicable at the time of filing the declaration. This last decree is not only subsequent to official communications No. 736-97 and DL-563-9, but also of higher rank within the hierarchy of sources of the administrative legal order (precept 6 of the LGAP). For its part, official communication AL-2446-2010 of December 14, 2010, despite the existence of the indicated Regulation, disregards and misapplies its scope, so its content would not have the effect of exempting the indicated procedure (specific authorization) so that the plaintiff could proceed to make the corresponding deduction from the income tax. Likewise, it is clear that the plaintiff knew about the existence of the authorization that is missing in the process, since it has maintained at all times that it requested it, but that the ICT never responded to the petition. This simple argument, as the Tribunal correctly held, reveals a contradiction in Multiplaza's allegation, since on the one hand it argues that the required authorization was the generic one, but on the other, it says it requested the specific one, which indicates that it did know about and process this last requirement. The plaintiff knew and was aware of the existence of the permit and its respective procedure within the Institute.\n\nConsequently, the argument regarding the violation of the principle of legitimate expectations must be dismissed. Finally, on this point, this Chamber endorses the Trial Court's criterion that there could be no breach of the principle of non-retroactivity of one's own acts, because in none of the mentioned official letters was any right or benefit declared in favor of Multiplaza. We insist, it was a legal interpretation contrary to norms 11 of Ley 6990 and 1 of Decreto no. 28676, for which the Tax Administration was empowered to disapply them. In relation to the latter, an encroachment on the powers of the Directorate General of Taxation is also reproached for questioning the official interpretation of the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo, an organ forming part of the ICT, which was the one responsible for setting the rules for said authorization. In the Trial Court's criterion “…neither is it observed that there was an encroachment on the ICT's powers. This entity is responsible for authorizing both the tourism company so that it can sell its shares, and the investor who has acquired them, so that the latter can apply the deduction that the law provides. Subsequently, the Tax Administration, in the exercise of its oversight powers, will verify that the credits and deductions applied are in accordance with the block of legality and what was authorized by the ICT. In the specific case, the credit was rejected because the plaintiff did not have the specific authorization from the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo that would allow that deduction. Therefore, the Tax Administration acted within the competency framework that the legal system has set for it…” (folio 155). For the 1999 fiscal period, Multiplaza lacked the specific authorization granted by the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo, required so that it could deduct 50% of its investment, from the income tax. That authorization was provided for by Ley 6990 and Decreto no. 28676, so it was not the Comisión Reguladora de Turismo that could freely choose which of the two was required to apply the corresponding deduction. Each one fulfilled a specific purpose and objective, and in this latter case, the specific one was necessary to fulfill the purposes of Ley 6990, while the incentive was in force. Now, regarding that tax credit, its safeguarding, protection, and subsequent verification were the responsibility of the Tax Administration. What the State did was to oversee and verify compliance with the indicated requirement, which was indispensable for the purpose of enjoying the incentive. At no time did the Tax Administration analyze the validity of authorizations, but precisely their existence, specifically the specific one, given that the investor's benefit is absolutely dependent on that agreed upon for the tourism company. The Ministry of Finance is the competent entity to determine the appropriateness of the benefit, that is, the one in charge of verifying all tax aspects related to the Ley de Incentivos Turísticos, especially since, by exception, revenues to the treasury would be decreasing (ordinals 103 of the CNPT, 62 of the LISR, and 12 of Ley 6990). In other words, the oversight function that article 12 of Ley 6990 granted to the Institute was only of an administrative nature, never tax-related, which is why it lacks legal authorization to exercise the powers that the Tax Code granted to the Tax Administration. It is the responsibility, then, of the Ministry of Finance to verify the correct use of the tax incentives, so only the Tax Administration, with respect to those taxes, has oversight power over them, and can therefore exercise the powers that the Tax Code recognizes it according to the provisions of articles 103 and following ibidem. In this case, those powers were correctly exercised with respect to the investor, since as a taxpayer it is the passive subject of the tax. On this topic, it lastly claims a direct violation due to improper application of articles 330 and 331 of the LGAP, and 1 and 155 of the Tax Code, because in its opinion a positive silence operated, due to the fact that the specific authorization request submitted since the year 2000 has still not been answered by the Institute. On this point, the judges considered the following: ”…in the face of this type of authorization, which is a conditioning prerequisite serving as the basis for a tax incentive, the positive silence regulated by articles 330 and 331 of the LGAP does not apply. Being in the presence of tax incentives, it is clear that the legal nature of the procedure is of a tax nature, hence it could not be asserted that the possibility of applying positive silence to said request exists, when the law does not expressly provide for it. It must be kept in mind that article 367 subsection d) of the LGAP excludes from the application of that regulatory body, with regard to administrative procedure, everything concerning tax matters…” (folio 155). The appellant is not correct and is mistaken in invoking the breach of articles 330 and 331 of the LGAP, and 1 and 155 of the Tax Code to protect its “right.” When speaking of tax incentives, this Chamber has said, it is clear that the legal nature of the procedure is of a tax nature, hence the possibility of applying positive silence to said request could not be asserted, especially since the law does not expressly provide for it in this sense. It is worth recalling that said General Law, in canon 367 subsection d), exempts from the application of that regulatory body, with regard to administrative procedure, everything concerning tax matters (resolutions no. 001009-F-2006 of 10:00 a.m. on December 21, 2006, and no. 16 of 3:00 p.m. on March 12, 1980). It has also been insisted that for this type of case, neither deductive reasoning can be made nor analogy applied (judgment no. 811 of 9:50 a.m. on December 3, 2003). Therefore, Multiplaza must not seek, through positive silence, to be benefited with the recognition of a credit in its favor, related to the payment of a tax, since this can only be granted by legal means. Let it be remembered, taxes are subject to the principle of legal reserve, and exemptions and benefits suffer the same fate, hence they must be assessed without any attachment to special or specific criteria, and are only appropriate if they meet the premise established by the legislator and all the legal requirements established and analyzed supra. This Chamber considers that the items claimed by the appellant are encompassed in Ley 6990, article 11, and in Decreto no. 28676-MP-H-MEIC-TUR. By virtue of the foregoing, regarding this second topic, the objections must also be rejected.”"
}