{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-154186", "citation": "Res. 00013-2015 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria en el régimen policial y cómputo del plazo", "title_en": "Prescription of disciplinary power in the police regime and computation of the time limit", "summary_es": "La Sección IV del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo analiza, en el marco de un proceso de conocimiento, el régimen de empleo público, la naturaleza del régimen policial y, especialmente, la prescripción de la facultad disciplinaria en la fuerza pública. El tribunal distingue entre el empleo público, regido por una relación estatutaria y principios de derecho público, y el empleo privado. En cuanto a la fuerza pública, señala que los miembros de los cuerpos de policía están excluidos del Régimen de Servicio Civil, y su relación se rige por la Ley General de Policía (Ley N° 7410). En materia disciplinaria, la sentencia determina que el plazo de prescripción para sancionar faltas en el régimen policial es el establecido en el artículo 83 de la Ley 7410: un mes para faltas leves y dos años para faltas graves, plazo que se interrumpe con el inicio del procedimiento disciplinario. El tribunal adopta la posición de la Sala Segunda en cuanto al cómputo del plazo: este corre desde la comisión de los hechos hasta la apertura del expediente, y desde el informe respectivo hasta el dictado del acto sancionatorio. Se precisa que la no conclusión del procedimiento ordinario en el plazo no acarrea prescripción mientras se respeten los plazos de la Ley 7410, y se advierte sobre la necesidad de justicia pronta y cumplida para evitar la indefensión del administrado.", "summary_en": "Section IV of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal examines, within a declaratory process, the public employment regime, the nature of the police regime, and especially the prescription of disciplinary power in the police force. The court distinguishes between public employment, governed by a statutory relationship and public law principles, and private employment. Regarding the police force, it notes that members of police bodies are excluded from the Civil Service Regime, and their relationship is governed by the General Police Law (Law No. 7410). On disciplinary matters, the ruling determines that the prescription period for punishing offenses in the police regime is that established in Article 83 of Law 7410: one month for minor offenses and two years for serious offenses, interrupted by the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The court adopts the position of the Second Chamber regarding the computation of the time limit: it runs from the commission of the facts until the opening of the file, and from the respective report until the issuance of the sanctioning act. It clarifies that failure to conclude the ordinary procedure within the time limit does not entail prescription as long as the deadlines of Law 7410 are respected, and warns about the need for prompt and complete justice to prevent the defenselessness of the individual.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV", "date": "2015", "year": "2015", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "prescripción", "potestad disciplinaria", "fuerza pública", "relación estatutaria", "reserva de ley", "dies a quo", "interrupción del plazo", "justicia pronta y cumplida" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 140 inciso 16", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 83", "law": "Ley 7410" }, { "article": "Art. 603", "law": "Código de Trabajo" }, { "article": "Art. 102", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 3 inciso b", "law": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil" } ], "keywords_es": [ "Prescripción", "Potestad disciplinaria", "Fuerza pública", "Régimen policial", "Empleo público", "Ley General de Policía", "Artículo 83 Ley 7410", "Faltas disciplinarias", "Interrupción de prescripción", "Justicia pronta" ], "keywords_en": [ "Prescription", "Disciplinary power", "Police force", "Police regime", "Public employment", "General Police Law", "Article 83 Law 7410", "Disciplinary offenses", "Interruption of prescription", "Prompt justice" ], "excerpt_es": "Con la entrada en vigor de la citada ley Nº7410, se dispuso un capítulo referente al régimen disciplinario aplicable a los miembros de los cuerpos de policía. En una de sus normas, específicamente en el artículo ochenta y tres (según el último cambio en la numeración), se estableció el término de prescripción de los derechos y acciones para sancionar las faltas contra el régimen disciplinario, en la siguiente forma: \"Las faltas leves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La acción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario\".", "excerpt_en": "With the entry into force of Law No. 7410, a chapter was established on the disciplinary regime applicable to members of police bodies. In one of its rules, specifically Article 83 (according to the latest change in numbering), the term for prescription of rights and actions to punish offenses against the disciplinary regime was established as follows: \"Minor offenses shall prescribe in one month, and serious ones in two years. The action shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated.\"", "outcome": { "label_en": "Majority opinion", "label_es": "Voto de mayoría", "summary_en": "The court set the disciplinary prescription period in the police regime at one month for minor offenses and two years for serious ones, under Article 83 of Law 7410, interrupted by the initiation of proceedings.", "summary_es": "El tribunal fijó el plazo de prescripción disciplinaria en el régimen policial en un mes para faltas leves y dos años para graves, según el artículo 83 de la Ley 7410, interrumpiéndose con el inicio del procedimiento." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Sección VI, citando el Art. 83 Ley 7410", "quote_en": "Minor offenses shall prescribe in one month, and serious ones in two years. The action shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated.", "quote_es": "Las faltas leves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La acción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario." }, { "context": "Sección VI", "quote_en": "In accordance with the majority case law, we choose to consider that the period runs from the commission of the facts until the opening of the file, and from the respective report until the issuance of the administrative act by the superior.", "quote_es": "Conforme con la jurisprudencia mayoritaria optamos por considerar que el plazo corre desde la comisión de los hechos hasta la apertura del expediente y desde el informe respectivo y hasta el dictado del acto administrativo por el jerarca." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-66525", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7410 Art. 83" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-154186", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-21629", "norm_num": "7428", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "07/09/1994" }, { "doc_id": "norm-32708", "norm_num": "1581", "norm_name": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/05/1953" }, { "doc_id": "norm-47258", "norm_num": "8131", "norm_name": "Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "18/09/2001" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“IV. SOBRE LA\r\nRELACIÓN DE EMPLEO PÚBLICO: Ya en múltiples\r\nocasiones, esta jurisdicción y en especial esta Sección, ha señalado que e l\r\nrégimen de empleo público corresponde a un sistema de contratación de personal que\r\ndifiere sustancialmente del que presenta el sector privado, el cual tiene\r\nsustento en el numeral ciento noventa y dos de la Constitución Política; se\r\ntrata en esencia de un solo régimen regulado en diversos estatutos los que en\r\nesencia están sometidos a parámetros de constitucionalidad y legalidad, en\r\nespecial sobre los temas de proporcionalidad e igualdad. En ese marco, existen\r\nuna serie de derechos y obligaciones bajo una serie de principios como\r\nlegalidad, idoneidad comprobada, ausencia de libre disposición de la relación,\r\nsometimiento a los esquemas del derecho público, inamovilidad relativa, entre\r\notros ; salvo ciertos puestos expresamente regulados por ley o referenciados\r\npor el marco constitucional. En cuanto al retiro forzoso del sistema, la norma\r\nconstitucional establece como máxima el principio de estabilidad relativa, lo\r\nque lleva aparejado que solo ante falta en el servicio (dolo o culpa grave en\r\nlos términos de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) y los supuestos de\r\nreorganización del servicio público no es posible el rompimiento del\r\nvínculo. La base de ese imperativo normativo tiene sustento en la visión del constituyente de\r\ngenerar un servicio público eficiente y profesionalizado, alejándolo de los\r\nvaivenes políticos que habían imperado antes del marco constitucional de mil\r\nnovecientos cuarenta y nueve. De manera que si el funcionario fue contratado\r\nbajo el principio de idoneidad comprobada, el rompimiento del vínculo debe gestarse en situaciones\r\nexcepcionales y extraordinarias, debidamente justificada. En cuanto a las\r\ncausales, si bien algunas leyes establecen presupuestos normativos concretos\r\npropios de la relación que se trate (a manera de ejemplo la establecida en el\r\nEstatuto Policial, Ley 7410), lo normal es la existencia de una remisión\r\ndirecta legislativa a lo regulado por el artículo setenta y uno del Código de Trabajo.\r\nNaturalmente, el establecimiento de la falta debe ser constatada siguiendo el\r\nprocedimiento ordinario regulado en la Ley General de la Administración\r\nPública, al amparo de los artículos cincuenta y nueve y trescientos ocho de esa\r\nnorma legal, todo bajo las garantías del debido proceso y en especial del\r\nderecho de defensa. Retomando la diferencia entre los dos regímenes de empleo\r\nque conviven dentro de la Administración, es de recordar que en el régimen de\r\nempleo público no se aplica el principio del contrato realidad sustento del\r\nderecho laboral, se otorgan únicamente derechos contemplados en el estatuto, se\r\ndebe seguir el principio de formalidad de la activación administrativa,\r\ntransparencia, igualdad, y debido proceso para la imposición de sanciones\r\ndisciplinarias, nombramiento mediante concurso que otorga un derecho subjetivo,\r\nlas resoluciones del jerarca son actos administrativos y la entidad para la\r\ncual se presta el servicio tiene un patrimonio público y está sometido al\r\nderecho público en su organización y actividad y a los principios de eficiencia\r\ny eficacia. Por su parte, el régimen de empleo privado se describe como aquel\r\nen el cual las relaciones de servicio de la empresa son laborales comunes, las\r\nrelaciones de prestación de la empresa frente a los usuarios es privada, es\r\nregido por el principio de libertad de contratación, autonomía de la voluntad y\r\ndel contrato realidad, el derecho de reinstalación es excepcional, hay libertad\r\nde elección de los empleados, se pueden otorgar discrecionalmente más derechos\r\nque los mínimos establecidos por ley, hay potestad del patrono de despedir con\r\nresponsabilidad patronal, las resoluciones del órgano de dirección de la empresa\r\nson actos mercantiles, y la entidad para la cual se presta el servicio tiene un\r\npatrimonio privado y está sometido al derecho privado en su organización y\r\nactividad. Cabe advertir que por la doble capacidad de actuar resulta posible\r\nque la Administración presente empleados de una u otra modalidad, debiendo\r\ntenerse el mayor cuidado para establecer a cuál de los dos supuestos\r\ncorresponde cada caso en concreto. En dicho marco, la jurisprudencia\r\n(especialmente la constitucional) ha realizado una distinción marcada entre el\r\nrégimen de empleo particular (que en esa dicotomía podría ser empleado por la\r\nAdministración Pública de manera excepcional) y el de empleo público, sometido\r\na una relación estatutaria dentro de una relación de sujeción especial (Voto\r\nNo. 2006-17746 de la Sala Constitucional y voto 3267-2012 de las 16:01 horas\r\ndel 7 de marzo de 2012). No se puede olvidar que, como regla, estamos en\r\npresencia de una relación estatutaria (ver votos No. 9928-2010, 9928-2010 y\r\n6304-2012 de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), y solo de\r\nmanera excepcional al régimen de derecho privado, consecuentemente está\r\nsometida a principios que le resultan propios, de suerte que el sistema no es\r\nuna mera compilación de beneficios, sino también de tratamientos disimiles de\r\nmuchos de los tópicos del régimen que se lleguen a presentar. Siempre\r\nrespetándose los mínimos que el mismo ordenamiento constitucional y aquellos\r\ninstrumentos internacionales debidamente ratificados en el país; pues no se\r\ntrata de generar discriminaciones sino evidenciar las diferencias entre uno y\r\notro sistema. Eso determina que existan derechos y obligaciones diferentes, lo\r\nque lleva aparejado que el ordenamiento otorgue un tratamiento diverso. No está\r\ndemás indicar que si bien los principios generales del régimen de empleo público le resulta\r\naplicable a todo el sistema, se pueden generar asentos o diferentes\r\ntratamientos legales, que justifica la ausencia de unidad absoluta.\r\nBásicamente, el fundamento del tratamiento disímil se sustenta en la aplicación\r\ndel principio de legalidad, base fundamental del derecho administrativo y en\r\ngeneral del derecho público, entendido éste en su sentido positivo y negativo,\r\nen cuanto al primero que la Administración solo puede realizar aquello que se encuentre\r\nhabilitada y por el otro lado, se encuentra impedida para realizar aquello para\r\nlo cual no está facultada. Esa máxima jurídica permea todo el derecho\r\nestatutario y determina el debilitamiento de muchos de los institutos que son\r\npilar en el derecho laboral ordinario. De manera que no es posible aplicar\r\nplenamente los institutos del\r\nderecho laboral sin mayores distinciones sino que es imperativo realizar\r\ndiferencias que surgen de las características propias de la relación. Eso no\r\nquiere decir que dentro de la Administración no exista la posibilidad de luchas\r\nreivindicativas y que eventualmente se consagren derechos o beneficios\r\nespeciales o particulares, pero estos deben estar al menos autorizados en el\r\nbloque de legalidad y de constitucionalidad, es decir, deben tener un\r\nfundamento legítimo (ajustado a la ley) o acordado en forma proporcionada a los\r\nfines que se persigue con el servicio público que se presta. Naturalmente, en\r\ndichos casos, el reconocimiento debe venir señalado en normas de derecho público\r\ny no por institutos del\r\nderecho privado (ver voto 1992-1696 de la Sala Constitucional). No puede\r\nolvidarse que esos beneficios presentan un impacto en las finanzas públicas y\r\nconsecuentemente sobre la política económica del Estado, los cuales se encuentran\r\nsupeditados a una serie de principios de orden constitucional y legal que rigen\r\nla materia. De igual manera, existen determinadas materias en las que solo el\r\nlegislador puede regular apropiadamente, dado que se trata de una norma formal\r\ny material que cumple con los requisitos de su formación, de conformidad con el\r\nprincipio democrático y, en consecuencia, no puede el Poder Ejecutivo\r\nregularlos autónomamente (ver voto 1992-03550 de la Sala Constitucional). No\r\npodría una norma de menor rango modificar los preceptos legales que establecen\r\nuna forma ordenada de administrar y ejecutar los recursos públicos, mucho menos\r\nsi incide en el principio que emana del artículo ciento cuarenta inciso siete\r\nde la Constitución Política que impone al Presidente y Ministro de Gobierno,\r\ndisponer la inversión de las rentas nacionales de acuerdo con las leyes. De ahí\r\nque las Administraciones Públicas se encuentran controladas por el principio de\r\nlegalidad, lo que también sucede con mayor rigor con el principio de la legalidad\r\nfinanciera, dado que están de por medio fondos públicos, aspectos regulados en\r\nla ley de la materia (voto 3267-2012 de la Sala Constitucional). Esto es\r\nratificado por el artículo ciento siete de la Ley de Administración Financiera\r\ny Presupuestos Público. En consecuencia, se deberá conformar sustancialmente\r\ncon el ordenamiento jurídico, de manera que no existe una discrecionalidad\r\ntotal de la Administración Pública para crear fuentes de gastos, sino, por el\r\ncontrario, debe mediar una autorización legal. Es igualmente importante señalar\r\nque las obligaciones económicas de la Hacienda Pública se pueden originar en la\r\nLey, de igual manera, pueden originarse en las resoluciones jurisdiccionales\r\n(artículos 122 y 153 de la Constitución Política), y en los contratos y actos\r\nadministrativos cuando media alguna forma de obligaciones basadas en\r\ndeterminadas manifestaciones de la voluntad del Estado. Sin embargo, es\r\nimportante aclarar que esas manifestaciones no pueden ser entendidas desde un\r\npunto de vista civil o laboral privado, no solo por lo que se indicó supra,\r\nsino, por el contrario, dado que se refiere a formas contractuales cuyo origen\r\nprecisamente se encuentra en la ley o que la ley señala los mecanismos para\r\ngenerar estas obligaciones económicas. Por último, no está demás señalar\r\nque con fundamento en el principio de libertad de legislar que presenta el\r\ncuerpo parlamentario, e l legislador tiene amplias facultades para regular la\r\nconducta de los administrados y de sus servidores públicos, de manera que puede\r\nestablecer reglas jurídicas iguales a quienes están en iguales condiciones, e\r\nincluso establecer diferentes categorías o grupos entre las personas que se\r\nencuentran en idénticas condiciones. De manera que la desigualdad que\r\nesté desprovista de una justificación objetiva y razonable violenta la\r\nConstitución Política. (Al respecto véase los votos 1999-05236, Voto 3933-98 y\r\n2006-06347 todos de la Sala Constitucional). El\r\nRégimen de Servicio Civil es un sistema jurídico-administrativo, que busca\r\ngarantizar la eficiencia de la Administración Pública, el cual presenta\r\nsustento en los artículos ciento noventa y uno y ciento noventa y dos de la\r\ncarta fundamental. Se trata en efecto de un régimen de empleo cubierto por el\r\nDerecho Público. Dicho sistema de empleo público implica, necesariamente,\r\nconsecuencias derivadas de la naturaleza de esa relación, con principios\r\ngenerales propios, ya no solamente distintos a los del derecho laboral\r\n(privado), sino muchas veces contrapuestos a éstos. Las relaciones\r\nlaborales existentes entre el Estado y sus servidores deben concebirse como un\r\ntodo, regulado por principios, disposiciones y políticas generales, sin\r\ndistinción, salvo las excepciones expresamente contempladas por la ley,\r\nrespecto de los centros funcionales de los que dependan aquellos servidores. De\r\nmanera que entre el Estado y sus servidores públicos existe una relación\r\nespecial de empleo público, que encuentra su fundamento jurídico en la\r\nConstitución Política, llamada comúnmente “relación estatuaria”, que se rige por\r\nel Derecho Público. El apelativo estatutaria tiene sustento en tanto depende de\r\nun estatuto, con regulaciones especiales, que le otorga vigencia; normalmente\r\nel referido estatuto esta compuesto tanto por normas de orden legal como\r\nreglamentaria; naturalmente respetando el principio de reserva legal. En\r\nconcordancia con las normas anteriores, los artículos primero y segundo \r\ndel Estatuto de Servicio Civil, señala que “el Estatuto y sus reglamentos \r\nregularán las relaciones entre el Poder Ejecutivo y sus servidores”. Así, los\r\nfuncionarios de los distintos Ministerios y sus órganos desconcentrados estarán\r\nsujetos al régimen de Servicio Civil. El Régimen de Servicio Civil ha sido\r\ndiseñado por el constituyente como un régimen de empleo general al que se encuentran\r\nsometidos, como regla de principio, todos los funcionarios de los\r\nMinisterios que conforman el Estado. \n\r\n\r\n\nV: EN RÉGIMEN\r\nPOLICIAL: Si bien en principio se podría pensar que\r\ntodos los servidores públicos deben estar cubiertos por el Estatuto del\r\nServicio Civil, del artículo ciento novena y dos constitucional se desprende la\r\nposibilidad de que ciertos funcionarios sean excluídos del Régimen de Servicio\r\nCivil, sea a través de una norma legal o de la propia Constitución Política,\r\ncomo ocurre en el caso de los miembros de las fuerzas de policía. La exclusión\r\npor vía legal, debe tener su asidero, es decir una fundamentación que permita\r\ndeducir algún motivo por el cual se le otorga a esos servidores un régimen\r\ndiferente. La generación de este, lleva implícito la producción de derechos y\r\nobligaciones con diferentes asentos que no son propios del régimen general, de\r\nmanera que los institutos propios del régimen especial no podrían aplicarse al\r\ngeneral de manera indiscriminada y tampoco podrían aplicarse los generales al\r\nespecial, en aquellos supuestos donde se define la necesidad de creación de ese\r\nsistema como disgregado. Sobre este punto la Constitución Política en el\r\nartículo ciento cuarenta inciso uno y el Estatuto de Servicio Civil en el\r\nartículo tres inciso b) expresan que los funcionarios de la fuerzas de policía\r\nse encuentran excluídos del Régimen del Servicio Civil. La Carta Magna en\r\nlos artículos doce y ciento cuarenta inciso dieciséis, establece que en Costa\r\nRica existirán las fuerzas de policía que se requieran para la vigilancia y la\r\nconservación del orden público. A partir de lo expuesto, podemos señalar que la\r\nexclusión de los funcionarios del régimen de servicio civil sólo puede ser\r\nefectuada a través de una norma de rango legal que determine esa exclusión, por\r\nlo que podemos afirmar que en esta materia existe una reserva de ley, o de la\r\nmisma Constitución Política. En concordancia con las anteriores normas,\r\nel artículo seis de la en la Ley Nº 7410 de veintiséis de mayo de mil\r\nnovecientos noventa y cuatro Ley General de Policía enumera cuales son las\r\nfuerzas de policía encargadas de la seguridad pública nacional. Señala la\r\nnorma, lo siguiente: \"Son fuerzas de policía, encargadas de la\r\nseguridad pública, las siguientes: La guardia Civil, la Guardia de Asistencia\r\nRural, la Policía encargada de control de drogas no autorizadas y de\r\nactividades conexas, la Policía de Fronteras, la Policía de Migración y\r\nExtranjería, la Policía de Control Fiscal, la Dirección de Seguridad del\r\nEstado, la Policía de Tránsito, la Policía Penitenciaria y las demás fuerzas de\r\npolicía, cuya competencia esté prevista en la ley.\" Esta misma ley\r\nfija que su interés es regular “las relaciones entre el Poder Ejecutivo y los\r\nservidores miembros de las distintas fuerzas de policía, con el propósito de\r\ngarantizar la eficiencia en el mantenimiento de la seguridad pública y de\r\nproteger los derechos de estos servidores\". (artículo 50). A partir\r\nde ambas normas (la Constitución y la ley en comentario) es posible\r\nconceptualizar la fuerza pública como aquellos servidores públicos destinadas a\r\nla vigilancia y conservación de la seguridad pública, son depositarios de\r\nla autoridad, subordinados al poder civil. Estos funcionarios por la naturaleza\r\nde las funciones que cumplen deben estar armados, poseer preparación y\r\nadiestramiento especial, regirse por la disciplina que le es propia a estos\r\ncuerpos en razón de la naturaleza de sus funciones. Llevan consigo el poder de\r\npolicía que consiste en aquellas reglas de carácter coercitivo orientadas a la\r\nprotección del orden público (seguridad de las personas, bienes, e integridad\r\nfísica y moral de todos los habitantes del país). \n\r\n\r\n\nVI: LA PRESCRIPCIÓN\r\nDE LA FACULTAD DISCIPLINARIA EN LA FUERZA PÚBLICA:\r\nEl incumplimiento de los deberes del cargo genera para el servidor público una\r\nresponsabilidad que puede revestir carácter patrimonial, penal o disciplinario.\r\nEl primer tipo de responsabilidad, conforme a lo establecido en la Ley General\r\nde la Administración Pública (art. 199 y ss), surge cuando el empleado, con su\r\nactuación dolosa o por culpa grave, causa un daño económicamente evaluable a\r\nterceros o a la propia Administración. La responsabilidad penal presupone la\r\ncomisión de alguno de los delitos tipificados en la legislación penal. En\r\ncuanto a la disciplinaria, debe señalarse que en nuestro medio no existe un\r\nsolo régimen disciplinario en el ámbito de la función pública, pues las\r\nexigencias de protección de los bienes jurídicos relativos a la correcta\r\nprestación del servicio público, son distintos en muchos de los casos y en lo\r\nque atañe al plazo de la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria\r\nadministrativa, el régimen jurídico varía según se esté ante un servidor de la\r\nHacienda Pública o no, a un funcionario del régimen policial y aquellos que\r\nestán cubiertos por el sistema general del Estado. Las normas de los artículos\r\nnoventa y siete, noventa y ocho y noventa y nueve del Reglamento del Estatuto\r\nde Servicio Civil, perdieron eficacia jurídica en tanto establezcan derechos o\r\ndeberes diversos a lo señalado por el Código de Trabajo por un principio de\r\nreserva de ley. Como sabemos, la prescripción es la pérdida de un derecho\r\npor el acaecimiento simultáneamente de dos situaciones; una, la falta de acción\r\nu omisión (inercia administrativa), y la otra, el paso del tiempo. La prescripción,\r\nen términos generales, supone la concurrencia de tres elementos fundamentales:\r\na) inercia del titular de un derecho en su ejercicio; b) transcurso del tiempo\r\nfijado por el ordenamiento jurídico al efecto; y, c) alegación o excepción del\r\nsujeto pasivo de la relación jurídica, haciendo valer la prescripción. Ello\r\nsupone que no existe efecto liberatorio sí, pese a concurrir los dos primeros\r\npresupuestos, la articulación no se formula. Lo anterior porque la prescripción\r\natiende a un principio rogatorio y a diferencia de la caducidad (en términos\r\nprocesales), no puede ser considerada de oficio. La prescripción es una sanción\r\nante la inercia del titular, que coloca a su contraparte en una espera\r\nindefinida que solo le genera zozobra y inseguridad jurídica, que bajo el\r\nEstado democrático y liberal de derecho no puede ser permitido. En lo que\r\ntoca específicamente a las relaciones funcionariales, el ejercicio de la\r\npotestad correctiva del jerarca frente a los funcionarios que han cometido faltas\r\nsancionables, se encuentra sujeto a este factor de temporalidad, luego del\r\ncual, tal ejercicio no podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal, según se\r\ndirá, varía según se trate de la materia regulada y de la existencia de un\r\nrégimen jurídico especial que configure reglas particulares para tipos\r\nespecíficos de relaciones de empleo público. En consecuencia, esa potestad\r\ndisciplinaria (que se basa en la doctrina del ordinal 102 de la Ley General de\r\nla Administración Pública) no es irrestricta en el tiempo. A diferencia de\r\notras potestades públicas que por aspectos finalistas se consideran\r\nimprescriptibles, las que se refieren al ejercicio sancionatorio interno –como\r\nel que se examina en este caso– están sujetas a reglas de temporalidad en\r\nvirtud de las cuales pueden fenecer por el decurso del tiempo establecido por\r\nel ordenamiento jurídico sin concretarlas. Por ende, en este tipo de\r\nrelaciones, el titular del poder correctivo es el jerarca administrativo y el\r\nsujeto pasivo es el funcionario público, quien en esa medida, se encuentra\r\nsujeto a la potestad correctiva interna solo por el plazo que expresamente fije\r\nla normativa aplicable, vencido el cual, emerge su facultad de requerir el\r\nreconocimiento de la pérdida de la potestad jerárquica. Ahora bien, como\r\nse ha indicado en nuestra jurisprudencia administrativa, por regla general,\r\nsalvo la existencia de normativa especial al efecto (como es el caso de los\r\nservidores de la Hacienda Pública), la potestad para disciplinar las\r\ninfracciones de los servidores públicos prescribe en un mes (art. 603 del\r\nCódigo de Trabajo). El computo inicia o “ dies a quo”, a partir que la denuncia\r\no el informe que recomiende la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo\r\ndisciplinario, se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente\r\npara incoar el procedimiento respectivo. Por regla general, los plazos de\r\nprescripción se interrumpen, entre otras causas, por la iniciación del\r\nprocedimiento respectivo, con conocimiento del interesado; entendiéndose por\r\ntal, no la designación del órgano director que instruirá el procedimiento\r\nadministrativo, sino cuando aquél decreta su inicio y lo notifica a la parte\r\ninvestigada. Ahora bien, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el numeral 878 del\r\nCódigo Procesal Civil, “El efecto de la interrupción es inutilizar para\r\nla prescripción todo el tiempo corrido anteriormente” . Lo cual nos\r\nlleva a concluir, que una vez que aquella interrupción cesa, inicia de nuevo el\r\nplazo originalmente establecido. Cabe precisar, las causales de interrupción\r\n–que hacen que el plazo prescriptivo inicie de nuevo– solo pueden producir ese\r\nefecto en la medida en que ocurran antes del vencimiento del plazo a\r\ninterrumpir, pues aún ocurridas, si lo es vencido el plazo, la simple alegación\r\nde prescripción negativa lleva a la pérdida del ejercicio del derecho precluido\r\npor inercia en su ejercicio. Es doctrina jurídica bien establecida que solo la\r\nprescripción no cumplida puede interrumpirse. Ahora bien, debemos advertir que\r\nla jurisprudencia laboral emanada especialmente de la Sala Segunda de la Corte\r\nSuprema de Justicia, se ha orientado en dos sentidos, por un lado, se\r\ndeja abierta la posibilidad de que aún habiéndose producido la interrupción\r\naludida con el inicio del procedimiento disciplinario en los términos\r\nreferidos, sea factible que durante la tramitación del expediente\r\nadministrativo opere la prescripción de la potestad sancionadora, si éste\r\npermanece paralizado injustificadamente por el plazo prescriptivo, por causa no\r\nimputable al funcionario inculpado. Y una vez finalizada la instrucción del\r\nprocedimiento disciplinario por el órgano director designado al efecto, y desde\r\nel momento en que el expediente llega a manos del funcionario u órgano\r\ncompetente para imponer la sanción respectiva, y éste se encuentra en posición\r\nde decidir, y por ende, de ejercer de manera efectiva su potestad\r\ndisciplinaria, el plazo de prescripción vuelve a correr; lo que implica,\r\nnecesariamente, que la sanción disciplinaria debe ser impuesta -atribuida- por\r\nla entidad patronal dentro de aquél plazo; de lo contrario operaría lo que en\r\notros ordenamientos se denomina prescripción de la sanción. En el plazo\r\ngenérico de un mes que presenta el ejercicio de la función pública, obliga una\r\nactividad constante del órgano instructor en resolver el conflicto de la forma\r\nmás eficiente posible. Incluso, hay de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia en las cuales ha llegado a sostener, que aún en el caso de regímenes\r\nespeciales como en hacienda o fuerza policial, donde el plazo prescriptivo es\r\nde varios años, igual se aplica un plazo de prescripción entre los diferentes\r\nactos del procedimiento en un mes, en una interpretación a favor del\r\ntrabajador. La otra posición, sostiene que \"cuando la entidad\r\npatronal deba cumplir un determinado procedimiento o investigación de previo a\r\ndisciplinar a quienes figuren como trabajadores, ese plazo .... se contará a\r\npartir del momento en que el resultado de la respectiva investigación es puesta\r\nen conocimiento del funcionario u órgano competente para resolver\"\r\n(Sala Segunda, voto 1083-13 y 367-12). Naturalmente, entra la comisión de los\r\nhechos que motivan la supuesta falta y la apertura del procedimiento, si corre\r\nel plazo prescriptivo en esta tesis (Sala Segunda, votos 681-13 y 110-13); al\r\nigual que entre la recomendación y el acto sancionatorio (Sala Segunda, voto\r\n618-13). No obstante lo expuesto, conviene señalar que habría que\r\nanalizar en detalle cada caso en concreto, a fin de no incurrir en una\r\ninterpretación, respecto de la eventual prescripción de la potestad sancionadora,\r\nque vaya en desmedro del poder disciplinario que tiene la Administración\r\nrespecto de sus servidores, es decir, que implique que la mayoría de las\r\ninfracciones quedarán en la más completa impunidad. Más por otro lado, tampoco\r\nsería viable abrir las causales de permiten prorrogar el fenecimiento de la\r\nrelación laboral, al extremo que se tornen en transgresores del principio\r\njusticia pronta y cumplida en sede administrativa. Generando causas abiertas\r\nindefinidas, con los correspondientes efectos negativos para un administrado\r\nque debe vivir por muchos meses o años a la espera de una definición que\r\nresuelva su situación, con las condiciones de estres que llevan implícito un\r\nexpediente administrativo. Recuérdese que existen casos en que las faltas a\r\nsancionar tienen efectos continuados en el tiempo o de tracto sucesivo, como\r\ntambién se les llama; y en estos casos, conforme lo ha establecido la\r\njurisprudencia laboral, no opera la prescripción (Ver entre otras, las\r\nsentencias Nºs 230-92 de las 09:10 horas del 2 de octubre de 1992, 140-93 de\r\nlas 08:30 horas del 8 de julio de 1993, 2001-00149 de las 10:40 horas del 28 de\r\nfebrero, 472 de las 10:05 horas del 17 de agosto y 2001-00648 de las 10:20\r\nhoras del 31 de octubre, todas del 2001 y de la Sala Segunda de la Corte\r\nSuprema de Justicia). Con la entrada en vigor de la citada ley Nº7410, se\r\ndispuso un capítulo referente al régimen disciplinario aplicable a los miembros\r\nde los cuerpos de policía. En una de sus normas, específicamente en el artículo\r\nochenta y tres (según el último cambio en la numeración), se estableció el\r\ntérmino de prescripción de los derechos y acciones para sancionar las faltas\r\ncontra el régimen disciplinario, en la siguiente forma: \"Las faltas\r\nleves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La acción se\r\ninterrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario\".\r\nSobre la aplicación de dicho precepto, resulta claro que antes de la\r\npromulgación y vigencia de la referida Ley Nº 7410, los términos de\r\nprescripción que había que observar en la aplicación del régimen disciplinario,\r\nconcretamente en el caso de los miembros de los cuerpos de policía a que alude\r\nla indicada ley, eran los establecidos en el Código de Trabajo, específicamente\r\nlo dispuesto en su artículo seiscientos tres. Lo anterior ante la ausencia\r\nabsoluta de norma en la materia que de alguna forma pudiera regular el tema. No\r\nobstante, a partir de la vigencia de la ley, no resulta viable, jurídicamente,\r\nla aplicación de cualquier otro término de prescripción que no sea el contenido\r\nen la citada legislación, sea, el de un mes para las faltas leves y el de dos\r\naños para las faltas graves. Lo anterior en razón de que se trata de una ley de\r\nla República, vigente, posterior al Código de Trabajo, y de especial aplicación\r\npara los miembros de los cuerpos de policía determinados en ella. Es de\r\nprecisar que la Cámara de manera general se decanta en contradicción de plazos\r\nprescriptivos tan amplios y carentes de una coherencia con otras sanciones del\r\nmismo ordenamiento jurídico (a manera de ejemplo ese mismo plazo es el\r\nprescriptivo de las contravenciones), más por imperio de ley esta en la\r\nobligación de aplicarlo, no sin antes advertir a la Administración demandada\r\nque ese plazo no debe ser tomado nunca como un llamado a la arbitrariedad,\r\nnegligencia o desidia administrativa. Cabe recordar que no sólo en el caso de\r\nlos cuerpos policiales ha dispuesto el legislador plazos de prescripción mucho\r\nmás amplios para aplicar sanciones disciplinarias, sino también en otros\r\nrepartos administrativos, como resulta ser el artículo setenta y uno de la Ley\r\nOrgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Igualmente, la vigilancia y\r\nconservación del orden público, que constitucional y legalmente le corresponde\r\na las fuerzas de policía, constituyen funciones de suyo delicadas, dado el\r\npoder de policía y el carácter coercitivo que conllevan, de donde resulta\r\nprimordial alcanzar simetría entre la garantía de la seguridad ciudadana y el\r\nrespeto de los derechos fundamentales. Todo ello, como puede verse, involucra\r\nfunciones de alta sensibilidad, lo que explica, ciertamente, un plazo de\r\nprescripción más amplio. Debe quedar claro que la no conclusión de la\r\ninformación o instrucción por acto final en el plazo establecido en la Ley\r\nGeneral para el procedimiento ordinario, no acarrea caducidad o prescripción\r\nalguna, pues tal y como se ha venido señalando, la legislación aplicable en\r\nmateria de prescripción a los cuerpos de policía contemplados en la citada Ley\r\n7410, sea, dos años para las faltas graves, que se interrumpirá cuando se\r\ninicie el procedimiento disciplinario, el que se ajustará, en todo caso, a las\r\ngarantías del debido proceso. Véase que la norma fija un plazo de prescripción\r\ny no de caducidad, por su misma naturaleza puede ser interrumpido o suspendido\r\npor los supuestos que legalmente u objetivamente lo afectan; a diferencia de\r\nuna caducidad que no presenta tales atributos. Esta Sección del Tribunal se ha\r\nmanifestado abiertamente a favor de mantener la coherencia en las líneas\r\njurisprudenciales, a fin de no generar una inseguridad jurídica que lejos de\r\npermitir al justificable a que atenerse sirva para posiciones aisladas que\r\nordinariamente no prosperan ante el correspondiente recurso de alzada. Lo\r\nanterior, salvo -claro esta- que no sea jurídicamente sustentable. Es evidente\r\nque la norma especial en materia de la fuerza pública estableció un plazo\r\namplio de dos años, que se interrumpe por la apertura del expediente\r\nadministrativo, toda vez que la norma expresamente reza en ese sentido.\r\nConforme con la jurisprudencia mayoritaria optamos por considerar que el plazo\r\ncorre desde la comisión de los hechos hasta la apertura del expediente y desde\r\nel informe respectivo y hasta el dictado del acto administrativo por el\r\njerarca, tal y como lo ha expuesto la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de\r\nJusticia en jurisprudencia mayoritaria, en el entendido que durante el\r\ntranscurso del procedimiento administrativo la administración no esta en\r\nposibilidad de dictar acto alguno, en tanto el cumplimiento del procedimiento administrativo\r\nes requisito legal para adoptar el acto de forma válida. Eso explica el porqué\r\nel legislador presentó la debida diligencia en incluir la causal interruptora\r\nen la apertura del procedimiento, por ser el único que presentaba un verdadero\r\nefecto frente al caso en concreto. El cuestionamiento que surge de forma\r\ninmediata es que por el mencionado principio de justicia pronta y cumplida (del\r\nartículo cuarenta y uno constitucional) en sede administrativa, no es\r\njurídicamente viable dejar abierto y de forma indefinida el plazo para el\r\ntrámite del procedimiento administrativo. La sola posibilidad de habilitar un\r\nprocedimiento administrativo que dure años frente a un administrado que no\r\npuede hacer nada para que este se finiquite, resulta contrario a todo derecho […].”", "body_en_text": "IV. ON THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP: On multiple occasions, this jurisdiction and especially this Section has indicated that the public employment regime corresponds to a personnel recruitment system that differs substantially from that of the private sector, which is based on Article 192 of the Political Constitution; it is essentially a single regime regulated in various statutes which are fundamentally subject to parameters of constitutionality and legality, especially on matters of proportionality and equality. Within this framework, there exists a series of rights and obligations under a series of principles such as legality, proven suitability, absence of free disposition of the relationship, subjection to public law schemes, relative tenure, among others; except for certain positions expressly regulated by law or referenced by the constitutional framework. Regarding mandatory retirement from the system, the constitutional norm establishes the principle of relative stability as a maxim, which entails that the employment relationship can only be broken in the event of a fault in service (willful misconduct or gross negligence as defined in the General Public Administration Act) and in cases of reorganization of the public service. The basis of this normative imperative is grounded in the framers' vision of creating an efficient and professionalized public service, distancing it from the political fluctuations that had prevailed before the constitutional framework of 1949. Thus, if the official was hired under the principle of proven suitability, the breaking of the relationship must occur in exceptional and extraordinary situations, duly justified. As for the grounds, although some laws establish specific normative circumstances inherent to the relationship in question (for example, those established in the Police Statute, Law 7410), the norm is the existence of a direct legislative referral to what is regulated by Article 71 of the Labor Code. Naturally, the determination of the fault must be verified following the ordinary procedure regulated in the General Public Administration Act, under Articles 59 and 308 of that legal norm, all under the guarantees of due process and especially the right of defense. Returning to the difference between the two employment regimes that coexist within the Administration, it must be remembered that in the public employment regime the principle of the reality of the contract, which underpins labor law, does not apply; only rights contemplated in the statute are granted; the principle of formality of administrative action, transparency, equality, and due process must be followed for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions; appointment is through a competitive examination that grants a subjective right; the resolutions of the hierarch are administrative acts; and the entity for which the service is provided has public assets and is subject to public law in its organization and activity and to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness. On the other hand, the private employment regime is described as that in which the company's service relationships are ordinary labor relationships, the company's service provision relationships with users are private, it is governed by the principle of freedom of contract, party autonomy, and the reality of the contract, the right to reinstatement is exceptional, there is freedom of choice of employees, more rights than the minimums established by law may be discretionarily granted, the employer has the power to dismiss with employer liability, the resolutions of the company's management body are commercial acts, and the entity for which the service is provided has private assets and is subject to private law in its organization and activity. It should be noted that due to the dual capacity to act, it is possible for the Administration to have employees of one or the other modality, and the utmost care must be taken to establish which of the two scenarios applies to each specific case. Within this framework, jurisprudence (especially constitutional) has made a clear distinction between the private employment regime (which in this dichotomy could exceptionally be used by the Public Administration) and the public employment regime, subject to a statutory relationship within a special subjection relationship (Constitutional Chamber Ruling No. 2006-17746 and Ruling 3267-2012 of 16:01 on March 7, 2012). It cannot be forgotten that, as a rule, we are in the presence of a statutory relationship (see rulings No. 9928-2010, 9928-2010 and 6304-2012 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice), and only exceptionally to the private law regime; consequently, it is subject to principles that are its own, such that the system is not a mere compilation of benefits, but also of dissimilar treatments of many of the topics of the regime that may arise. Always respecting the minimums that the constitutional order itself and those international instruments duly ratified in the country establish; for it is not a matter of generating discrimination but of highlighting the differences between one system and the other. This determines that there are different rights and obligations, which entails that the legal order grants diverse treatment. It is not superfluous to indicate that although the general principles of the public employment regime are applicable to the entire system, different legal bases or treatments may be generated, which justifies the absence of absolute unity. Basically, the foundation of the dissimilar treatment is based on the application of the principle of legality, a fundamental basis of administrative law and public law in general, understood in its positive and negative sense, in that, regarding the first, the Administration can only do what it is authorized to do, and on the other hand, it is prevented from doing what it is not empowered to do. This legal maxim permeates all statutory law and determines the weakening of many of the institutes that are pillars of ordinary labor law. Therefore, it is not possible to fully apply the institutes of labor law without further distinctions; rather, it is imperative to make distinctions that arise from the specific characteristics of the relationship. This does not mean that within the Administration there is no possibility of vindicatory struggles and that special or particular rights or benefits may eventually be enshrined, but these must at least be authorized within the framework of legality and constitutionality, that is, they must have a legitimate foundation (in accordance with the law) or be agreed upon in a manner proportionate to the aims pursued with the public service provided. Naturally, in such cases, the recognition must come from public law norms and not from private law institutes (see Constitutional Chamber ruling 1992-1696). It cannot be forgotten that these benefits have an impact on public finances and consequently on the State's economic policy, which are subject to a series of constitutional and legal principles that govern the matter. Likewise, there are certain matters that only the legislator can appropriately regulate, given that it is a formal and material norm that meets the requirements of its formation, in accordance with the democratic principle, and consequently, the Executive Branch cannot regulate them autonomously (see Constitutional Chamber ruling 1992-03550). A lower-ranking norm could not modify the legal precepts that establish an orderly manner of administering and executing public resources, much less if it affects the principle emanating from Article 140, subsection 7 of the Political Constitution, which requires the President and the Government Minister to provide for the investment of national revenues in accordance with the laws. Hence, Public Administrations are controlled by the principle of legality, which also applies with greater rigor to the principle of financial legality, given that public funds are at stake, aspects regulated in the law of the matter (Constitutional Chamber ruling 3267-2012). This is ratified by Article 107 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Act. Consequently, it must substantially conform to the legal order, such that there is no total discretion on the part of the Public Administration to create sources of expenditure; rather, on the contrary, legal authorization must mediate. It is equally important to point out that the economic obligations of the Public Treasury can originate in Law; likewise, they can originate in jurisdictional resolutions (Articles 122 and 153 of the Political Constitution), and in contracts and administrative acts when some form of obligations based on certain manifestations of the State's will is involved. However, it is important to clarify that these manifestations cannot be understood from a civil or private labor law perspective, not only for the reasons indicated supra, but, on the contrary, because they refer to contractual forms whose origin is precisely found in the law or whose mechanisms for generating these economic obligations are indicated by law. Lastly, it is not superfluous to point out that, based on the principle of freedom to legislate that the parliamentary body possesses, the legislator has broad powers to regulate the conduct of citizens and its public servants, such that it can establish equal legal rules for those in equal conditions, and even establish different categories or groups among people who are in identical conditions. Thus, inequality that lacks an objective and reasonable justification violates the Political Constitution. (In this regard, see rulings 1999-05236, Ruling 3933-98 and 2006-06347, all of the Constitutional Chamber). The Civil Service Regime is a legal-administrative system that seeks to guarantee the efficiency of the Public Administration, which is based on Articles 191 and 192 of the fundamental charter. It is indeed an employment regime covered by Public Law. This public employment system necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, which are not only different from those of (private) labor law, but often opposed to them. The labor relations existing between the State and its servants must be conceived as a whole, regulated by principles, provisions, and general policies, without distinction, except for the exceptions expressly contemplated by law, regarding the functional centers on which those servants depend. Thus, between the State and its public servants there exists a special public employment relationship, which finds its legal foundation in the Political Constitution, commonly called a \"statutory relationship,\" which is governed by Public Law. The term statutory is supported insofar as it depends on a statute, with special regulations that give it validity; normally, the referred statute is composed of both legal and regulatory norms; naturally respecting the principle of legal reserve. In accordance with the previous norms, Articles 1 and 2 of the Civil Service Statute state that \"the Statute and its regulations shall regulate the relations between the Executive Branch and its servants.\" Thus, the officials of the various Ministries and their deconcentrated bodies shall be subject to the Civil Service regime. The Civil Service Regime has been designed by the framers as a general employment regime to which, as a general rule, all officials of the Ministries that make up the State are subject.\n\nV: ON THE POLICE REGIME: Although in principle one might think that all public servants must be covered by the Civil Service Statute, from Article 192 of the Constitution follows the possibility that certain officials be excluded from the Civil Service Regime, either through a legal norm or by the Political Constitution itself, as occurs in the case of members of the police forces. Exclusion by legal means must have a basis, that is, a rationale that allows deducing some reason why these servants are granted a different regime. The creation of this implicitly entails the production of rights and obligations with different foundations that are not typical of the general regime, so the institutes specific to the special regime could not be applied indiscriminately to the general one, nor could the general ones be applied to the special one, in those cases where the need for the creation of that system as a separate entity is defined. On this point, the Political Constitution in Article 140, subsection 1 and the Civil Service Statute in Article 3, subsection b) state that the officials of the police forces are excluded from the Civil Service Regime. The Magna Carta in Articles 12 and 140, subsection 16, establishes that in Costa Rica there shall exist the police forces required for the surveillance and preservation of public order. Based on the foregoing, we can point out that the exclusion of officials from the civil service regime can only be effected through a norm of legal rank that determines that exclusion; therefore, we can affirm that in this matter there exists a reserve of law, or by the Political Constitution itself. In accordance with the previous norms, Article 6 of Law No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, General Police Act, lists which are the police forces in charge of national public security. The norm states the following: \"The following are police forces in charge of public security: The Civil Guard, the Rural Assistance Guard, the Police in charge of control of unauthorized drugs and related activities, the Border Police, the Migration and Foreign Affairs Police, the Fiscal Control Police, the State Security Directorate, the Traffic Police, the Penitentiary Police, and the other police forces whose competence is provided for by law.\" This same law establishes that its purpose is to regulate \"the relations between the Executive Branch and the servant members of the different police forces, with the purpose of guaranteeing efficiency in the maintenance of public security and protecting the rights of these servants.\" (Article 50). Based on both norms (the Constitution and the law in question), it is possible to conceptualize the public force as those public servants intended for the surveillance and preservation of public security; they are depositaries of authority, subordinated to civil power. These officials, by the nature of the functions they perform, must be armed, possess special preparation and training, and be governed by the discipline specific to these bodies due to the nature of their functions. They carry with them the police power, which consists of those rules of a coercive nature aimed at protecting public order (security of persons, property, and the physical and moral integrity of all the country's inhabitants).\n\nVI: THE PRESCRIPTION OF THE DISCIPLINARY POWER IN THE PUBLIC FORCE: Failure to comply with the duties of the position generates liability for the public servant that can be of a patrimonial, criminal, or disciplinary nature. The first type of liability, in accordance with the provisions of the General Public Administration Act (Art. 199 et seq.), arises when the employee, by willful or grossly negligent conduct, causes economically assessable damage to third parties or to the Administration itself. Criminal liability presupposes the commission of one of the crimes defined in criminal legislation. Regarding disciplinary liability, it must be noted that in our environment there is no single disciplinary regime in the field of public service, because the requirements for protecting the legal interests relating to the correct provision of public service are different in many cases, and concerning the statute of limitations for the administrative disciplinary power, the legal regime varies depending on whether the person is a servant of the Public Treasury or not, an official of the police regime, or those covered by the general system of the State. The norms of Articles 97, 98, and 99 of the Regulations to the Civil Service Statute lost legal efficacy insofar as they established rights or duties different from those indicated by the Labor Code, due to a principle of legal reserve. As we know, prescription is the loss of a right due to the simultaneous occurrence of two situations: one, the lack of action or omission (administrative inertia), and the other, the passage of time. Prescription, in general terms, requires the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise; b) passage of the time set by the legal order for that purpose; and, c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, invoking the statute of limitations. This means that there is no releasing effect if, despite the concurrence of the first two conditions, the articulation is not formulated. The foregoing because prescription follows a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (in procedural terms), cannot be considered sua sponte. Prescription is a sanction against the inertia of the holder, which places its counterpart in an indefinite wait that only generates anxiety and legal insecurity, which under the democratic and liberal rule of law cannot be permitted. Regarding specifically employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the hierarch against officials who have committed sanctionable faults is subject to this factor of temporality, after which, such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit, as will be discussed, varies depending on the regulated matter and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, that disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of Article 102 of the General Public Administration Act) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that, for finalistic aspects, are considered imprescriptible, those referring to internal sanctioning action – such as the one examined in this case – are subject to rules of temporality by virtue of which they may expire due to the passage of the time established by the legal order without being implemented. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarch and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which, their power to request recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. Now, as has been indicated in our administrative jurisprudence, as a general rule, unless there is a special regulation to the contrary (as is the case of servants of the Public Treasury), the power to discipline the infractions of public servants prescribes in one month (Art. 603 of the Labor Code). The calculation begins, or \"dies a quo,\" from the moment the complaint or the report recommending the opening of an administrative disciplinary procedure is brought to the attention of the hierarch or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. As a general rule, the prescription periods are interrupted, among other causes, by the initiation of the respective procedure, with the knowledge of the interested party; this being understood not as the designation of the directing body that will instruct the administrative procedure, but when the hierarch decrees its commencement and notifies the investigated party. However, in accordance with the provisions of Article 878 of the Civil Procedure Code, \"The effect of the interruption is to render useless for the prescription all the time previously elapsed.\" Which leads us to conclude that once that interruption ceases, the originally established period begins anew. It should be specified that the grounds for interruption – which cause the prescriptive period to start anew – can only produce that effect insofar as they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occur, if the period has already expired, the simple allegation of negative prescription leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inertia in its exercise. It is well-established legal doctrine that only an unfulfilled prescription can be interrupted. Now, we must note that the labor jurisprudence emanating especially from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has been oriented in two directions. On one hand, the possibility remains open that even if the aforementioned interruption has occurred with the commencement of the disciplinary procedure under the referred terms, it may be feasible for the prescription of the sanctioning power to operate during the processing of the administrative file, if it remains unjustifiably paralyzed for the prescriptive period, for a reason not attributable to the accused official. And once the investigation of the disciplinary procedure by the directing body designated for that purpose is completed, and from the moment the file reaches the hands of the official or body competent to impose the respective sanction, and they are in a position to decide, and therefore, to effectively exercise their disciplinary power, the prescription period begins to run again; which necessarily implies that the disciplinary sanction must be imposed – attributed – by the employing entity within that period; otherwise, what in other legal systems is called prescription of the sanction would operate. The generic one-month period that the exercise of the public function presents obliges the investigating body to engage in constant activity to resolve the conflict as efficiently as possible. There are even rulings from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in which it has come to hold that even in the case of special regimes such as the treasury or police force, where the prescriptive period is several years, a prescription period of one month between the different acts of the procedure is equally applied, in an interpretation in favor of the worker. The other position holds that \"when the employing entity must complete a certain procedure or investigation prior to disciplining those who appear as workers, that period ... shall be counted from the moment the result of the respective investigation is brought to the attention of the official or body competent to resolve\" (Second Chamber, ruling 1083-13 and 367-12). Naturally, between the commission of the acts that motivate the alleged fault and the opening of the procedure, the prescriptive period does run in this thesis (Second Chamber, rulings 681-13 and 110-13); as well as between the recommendation and the sanctioning act (Second Chamber, ruling 618-13). Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is worth pointing out that each specific case would have to be analyzed in detail, so as not to incur in an interpretation, regarding the eventual prescription of the sanctioning power, that is detrimental to the disciplinary power that the Administration has over its servants, that is, that would imply that the majority of infractions would go completely unpunished. But on the other hand, it would also not be viable to expand the grounds that allow the termination of the employment relationship to be extended to the extreme that they become violative of the principle of prompt and complete justice in administrative proceedings. Generating indefinitely open cases, with the corresponding negative effects for a citizen who must live for many months or years awaiting a resolution that settles their situation, with the stress conditions that an administrative file entails. It should be remembered that there are cases in which the faults to be sanctioned have continuous effects over time or are of successive tract, as they are also called; and in these cases, as established by labor jurisprudence, prescription does not operate (See, among others, rulings Nos. 230-92 of 09:10 on October 2, 1992, 140-93 of 08:30 on July 8, 1993, 2001-00149 of 10:40 on February 28, 472 of 10:05 on August 17, and 2001-00648 of 10:20 on October 31, all from 2001 and from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). With the entry into force of the cited Law No. 7410, a chapter regarding the disciplinary regime applicable to members of the police forces was established. In one of its norms, specifically in Article 83 (according to the last change in numbering), the prescription period for the rights and actions to sanction faults against the disciplinary regime was established, in the following manner: \"Minor faults shall prescribe in one month and serious faults, in two years. The action shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated.\" Regarding the application of this precept, it is clear that before the enactment and entry into force of the referred Law No. 7410, the prescription terms that had to be observed in the application of the disciplinary regime, specifically in the case of the members of the police forces referred to by the indicated law, were those established in the Labor Code, specifically the provisions of Article 603 thereof. This was due to the absolute absence of a norm on the matter that could somehow regulate the subject. However, as of the law's entry into force, it is not legally viable to apply any prescription term other than the one contained in the cited legislation, i.e., one month for minor faults and two years for serious faults. The foregoing because it is a law of the Republic, in force, subsequent to the Labor Code, and of special application to the members of the police forces determined therein. It must be specified that the Chamber generally leans against such long prescriptive periods lacking coherence with other sanctions of the same legal system (for example, that same period is the prescriptive one for contraventions), but by force of law it is obliged to apply it, albeit not before warning the respondent Administration that this period should never be taken as a call for arbitrariness, negligence, or administrative indolence. It should be remembered that not only in the case of police bodies has the legislator provided for much longer prescription periods for applying disciplinary sanctions, but also in other administrative departments, such as Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic.\n\nLikewise, the surveillance and preservation of public order, which constitutionally and legally corresponds to the police forces, constitute inherently delicate functions, given the police power and coercive nature they entail, from which it becomes essential to achieve symmetry between the guarantee of citizen security and respect for fundamental rights. All of this, as can be seen, involves highly sensitive functions, which indeed explains a longer statute of limitations period. It must be clear that the failure to conclude the information or preliminary investigation (instrucción) by a final act within the period established in the General Law for the ordinary procedure does not result in any expiration (caducidad) or statute of limitations (prescripción), for, as has been indicated, the applicable legislation on the statute of limitations for the police forces contemplated in the cited Law 7410, that is, two years for serious offenses, which shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated, which shall, in any case, comply with the guarantees of due process. Note that the rule sets a statute of limitations period and not an expiration period, since by its very nature it can be interrupted or suspended by the circumstances that legally or objectively affect it; unlike an expiration period, which does not present such attributes. This Section of the Court has openly expressed itself in favor of maintaining coherence in jurisprudential lines, so as not to generate legal uncertainty that, far from allowing the justiciable party something to rely on, serves for isolated positions that ordinarily do not succeed upon the corresponding appeal. The foregoing, except—of course—if it is not legally sustainable. It is evident that the special rule in matters of the public force established a broad two-year period, which is interrupted by the opening of the administrative file (expediente administrativo), since the rule expressly states so. In accordance with the majority jurisprudence, we choose to consider that the period runs from the commission of the acts until the opening of the file and from the respective report until the issuance of the administrative act by the hierarchical superior, as set forth by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in majority jurisprudence, on the understanding that during the course of the administrative procedure the administration is not in a position to issue any act, insofar as compliance with the administrative procedure is a legal requirement for validly adopting the act. This explains why the legislator presented due diligence in including the interrupting cause at the opening of the procedure, as it was the only one that presented a true effect in the specific case. The question that immediately arises is that, by the aforementioned principle of prompt and complete justice (from Article 41 of the Constitution) in the administrative venue, it is not legally viable to leave the period for processing the administrative procedure open indefinitely. The mere possibility of enabling an administrative procedure that lasts for years against an administered party who can do nothing to conclude it, is contrary to all right […].\"\n\n**IV. ON THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP:** This jurisdiction, and especially this Section, has already indicated on multiple occasions that the public employment regime corresponds to a personnel contracting system that differs substantially from that of the private sector, which is grounded in Article 192 of the Constitución Política; it is essentially a single regime regulated in various statutes, which are in essence subject to parameters of constitutionality and legality, especially regarding the issues of proportionality and equality. Within this framework, there are a series of rights and obligations under a series of principles such as legality, proven suitability, absence of free disposition of the relationship, submission to public law schemes, relative immovability, among others; except for certain positions expressly regulated by law or referenced by the constitutional framework. Regarding forced removal from the system, the constitutional norm establishes the principle of relative stability as a maxim, which entails that the breaking of the bond is only possible due to a fault in the service (willful misconduct or gross negligence under the terms of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) and the cases of reorganization of the public service. The basis of this normative imperative is grounded in the constituent's vision of generating an efficient and professionalized public service, distancing it from the political fluctuations that had prevailed before the constitutional framework of 1949. Thus, if the official was hired under the principle of proven suitability, the breaking of the bond must arise in exceptional and extraordinary situations, duly justified. Regarding the grounds, although some laws establish specific normative assumptions specific to the relationship concerned (for example, the one established in the Estatuto Policial, Ley 7410), the norm is the existence of a direct legislative referral to what is regulated by Article 71 of the Código de Trabajo. Naturally, the establishment of the fault must be verified following the ordinary procedure regulated in the Ley General de la Administración Pública, under the protection of Articles 59 and 308 of that legal norm, all under the guarantees of due process and especially the right of defense. Returning to the difference between the two employment regimes that coexist within the Administration, it should be remembered that in the public employment regime the principle of the reality of the contract, which underpins labor law, does not apply; only rights contemplated in the statute are granted; the principle of formality of administrative action, transparency, equality, and due process must be followed for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions; appointment by competition grants a subjective right; the resolutions of the head of the entity are administrative acts; and the entity for which the service is provided has public assets and is subject to public law in its organization and activity and to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness. For its part, the private employment regime is described as that in which the company's service relations are common labor relations, the company's service provision relations vis-à-vis users are private, it is governed by the principle of freedom of contracting, autonomy of will, and the reality of the contract, the right to reinstatement is exceptional, there is freedom of choice of employees, more rights than the minimums established by law can be discretionarily granted, the employer has the power to dismiss with employer liability, the resolutions of the company's management body are commercial acts, and the entity for which the service is provided has private assets and is subject to private law in its organization and activity. It should be noted that due to the dual capacity to act, it is possible for the Administration to have employees of one or the other modality, and the greatest care must be taken to establish which of the two cases corresponds to each specific situation.\n\nWithin that framework, case law (especially constitutional case law) has made a marked distinction between the private employment regime (which, in that dichotomy, could be used by the Public Administration on an exceptional basis) and the public employment regime, subject to a statutory relationship within a relationship of special subjection (*Voto* No. 2006-17746 of the Constitutional Chamber and *Voto* 3267-2012 of 4:01 p.m. on March 7, 2012). It cannot be forgotten that, as a rule, we are in the presence of a statutory relationship (see *Votos* No. 9928-2010, 9928-2010, and 6304-2012 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice), and only exceptionally subject to the private law regime; consequently, it is subject to its own principles, such that the system is not a mere compilation of benefits, but also of dissimilar treatments of many of the topics of the regime that may arise. Always respecting the minimums that the constitutional order itself and those international instruments duly ratified in the country establish; for it is not a matter of generating discrimination but of evidencing the differences between one system and the other. That determines that different rights and obligations exist, which entails that the legal order grants a diverse treatment. It is worth noting that although the general principles of the public employment regime are applicable to the entire system, different foundations or legal treatments can be generated, which justifies the absence of absolute unity. Basically, the foundation of the dissimilar treatment is based on the application of the principle of legality, a fundamental basis of administrative law and of public law in general, understood in its positive and negative sense: as to the first, that the Administration can only do that which it is enabled to do, and on the other hand, it is prevented from doing that for which it is not empowered. That legal maxim permeates all statutory law and determines the weakening of many of the institutes that are pillars in ordinary labor law. Thus, it is not possible to fully apply the institutes of labor law without further distinctions; rather, it is imperative to make differentiations that arise from the characteristics inherent to the relationship. That does not mean that within the Administration there is no possibility of advocacy struggles and that special or particular rights or benefits may eventually be enshrined, but these must be at least authorized within the block of legality and constitutionality, that is, they must have a legitimate foundation (in accordance with the law) or be agreed upon in a manner proportional to the ends pursued by the public service being provided. Naturally, in such cases, the recognition must come from public law norms and not from private law institutes (see *Voto* 1992-1696 of the Constitutional Chamber). It cannot be forgotten that those benefits have an impact on public finances and consequently on the economic policy of the State, which are subject to a series of constitutional and legal principles governing the matter. Likewise, there are certain matters in which only the legislator can regulate appropriately, given that it is a formal and material norm that meets the requirements for its formation, in accordance with the democratic principle, and consequently, the Executive Branch cannot regulate them autonomously (see *Voto* 1992-03550 of the Constitutional Chamber). A lower-ranking norm could not modify the legal precepts that establish an orderly manner of administering and executing public resources, much less if it affects the principle emanating from article one hundred forty, subsection seven, of the Political Constitution, which imposes on the President and the Minister of Government the duty to order the investment of national revenues in accordance with the laws. Hence, Public Administrations are controlled by the principle of legality, which also occurs with greater rigor with the principle of financial legality, given that public funds are at stake, aspects regulated in the law on the matter (*Voto* 3267-2012 of the Constitutional Chamber). This is ratified by article one hundred seven of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law. Consequently, it must substantially conform to the legal order, such that there is no total discretion on the part of the Public Administration to create sources of expenditure, but rather, legal authorization must exist. It is equally important to point out that the economic obligations of the Public Treasury can originate in the Law, and likewise, they can originate in jurisdictional rulings (articles 122 and 153 of the Political Constitution), and in contracts and administrative acts when some form of obligations based on certain manifestations of the State's will exist. However, it is important to clarify that those manifestations cannot be understood from a private civil or labor law perspective, not only for what was indicated supra, but, on the contrary, given that it refers to contractual forms whose origin is precisely found in the law or where the law indicates the mechanisms to generate these economic obligations. Lastly, it is worth noting that based on the principle of legislative freedom held by the parliamentary body, the legislator has broad powers to regulate the conduct of those administered and its public servants, such that it can establish equal legal rules for those who are in equal conditions, and even establish different categories or groups among persons who are in identical conditions. Thus, inequality that is devoid of an objective and reasonable justification violates the Political Constitution. (In this regard, see *Votos* 1999-05236, *Voto* 3933-98, and 2006-06347, all from the Constitutional Chamber). The Civil Service Regime is a legal-administrative system that seeks to guarantee the efficiency of the Public Administration, which is supported by articles one hundred ninety-one and one hundred ninety-two of the fundamental charter. It is, in effect, an employment regime covered by Public Law. Said public employment system necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, now not only different from those of (private) labor law, but often opposed to them. The labor relations existing between the State and its servants must be conceived as a whole, regulated by general principles, provisions, and policies, without distinction, except for the exceptions expressly contemplated by law, regarding the functional centers on which those servants depend. Thus, between the State and its public servants there is a special public employment relationship, which finds its legal foundation in the Political Constitution, commonly called a \"statutory relationship,\" which is governed by Public Law. The designation \"statutory\" is supported insofar as it depends on a statute, with special regulations, which grants it validity; normally, the referred statute is composed of both legal and regulatory norms; naturally, respecting the principle of legal reserve. In concordance with the preceding norms, articles one and two of the Civil Service Statute state that “the Statute and its regulations shall regulate the relations between the Executive Branch and its servants.” Thus, the officials of the various Ministries and their decentralized organs shall be subject to the Civil Service regime. The Civil Service Regime has been designed by the constitutional framer as a general employment regime to which, as a rule, all the officials of the Ministries that comprise the State are subject.\n\n**V: ON THE POLICE REGIME:** Although in principle one might think that all public servants must be covered by the Civil Service Statute, from article one hundred ninety-two of the Constitution the possibility arises that certain officials may be excluded from the Civil Service Regime, whether through a legal norm or the Political Constitution itself, as occurs in the case of members of the police forces. Exclusion by legal means must have its basis, that is, a foundation that allows deducing some reason for which those servants are granted a different regime. The generation of the latter implicitly carries the production of rights and obligations with different foundations that are not proper to the general regime, such that the institutes proper to the special regime could not be applied to the general one indiscriminately, nor could the general ones be applied to the special one, in those cases where the need for creating that system as a disaggregated one is defined. On this point, the Political Constitution in article one hundred forty, subsection one, and the Civil Service Statute in article three, subsection b), state that officials of the police forces are excluded from the Civil Service Regime. The Magna Carta, in articles twelve and one hundred forty, subsection sixteen, establishes that in Costa Rica there shall be the police forces required for the surveillance and conservation of public order. From the foregoing, we can point out that the exclusion of officials from the civil service regime can only be effected through a legal-ranking norm that determines that exclusion, so we can affirm that in this matter there is a legal reserve, or a reserve deriving from the Political Constitution itself. In concordance with the preceding norms, article six of Law No. 7410 of May twenty-sixth, nineteen ninety-four, the General Police Law, lists which are the police forces charged with national public security. The norm states the following: \"*The following are police forces charged with public security: The Civil Guard, the Rural Assistance Guard, the Police charged with controlling unauthorized drugs and related activities, the Border Police, the Immigration and Alien Affairs Police, the Fiscal Control Police, the Directorate of State Security, the Traffic Police, the Penitentiary Police, and the other police forces whose competence is provided for by law*.\" This same law states that its interest is to regulate \"the relations between the Executive Branch and the servant members of the different police forces, with the purpose of guaranteeing efficiency in the maintenance of public security and of protecting the rights of these servants.\" (article 50). From both norms (the Constitution and the law under discussion), it is possible to conceptualize the public force as those public servants intended for the surveillance and conservation of public security; they are depositaries of authority, subordinate to civil power. These officials, by the nature of the functions they fulfill, must be armed, possess special preparation and training, and be governed by the discipline proper to these bodies due to the nature of their functions. They carry with them the police power, which consists of those coercive rules oriented to the protection of public order (security of persons, property, and the physical and moral integrity of all the inhabitants of the country).\n\n**VI: THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR DISCIPLINARY POWER IN THE PUBLIC FORCE:** The breach of the duties of the office generates for the public servant a liability that can be of a patrimonial, criminal, or disciplinary nature. The first type of liability, in accordance with the provisions of the General Law of Public Administration (art. 199 et seq.), arises when the employee, through willful misconduct or gross negligence, causes economically assessable damage to third parties or to the Administration itself. Criminal liability presupposes the commission of one of the crimes defined by criminal legislation. Regarding disciplinary liability, it must be noted that in our environment there is not a single disciplinary regime in the sphere of public service, because the requirements for protecting the legal interests related to the correct provision of the public service are different in many cases, and with respect to the statute of limitations period for the administrative disciplinary power, the legal regime varies depending on whether one is before a servant of the Public Treasury or not, an official of the police regime, or those who are covered by the general system of the State. The norms of articles ninety-seven, ninety-eight, and ninety-nine of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute lost legal efficacy insofar as they establish rights or duties different from those indicated by the Labor Code, by a principle of legal reserve. As we know, the statute of limitations is the loss of a right due to the simultaneous occurrence of two situations: one, the lack of action or omission (administrative inertia), and the other, the passage of time. The statute of limitations, in general terms, presupposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise; b) passage of the time set by the legal order for this purpose; and, c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, invoking the statute of limitations. This means that there is no liberatory effect if, despite the concurrence of the first two presuppositions, the articulation is not formulated. The foregoing because the statute of limitations adheres to a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered *ex officio*. The statute of limitations is a sanction for the inertia of the holder, which places its counterpart in indefinite waiting that only generates anxiety and legal uncertainty, which under the democratic and liberal state of law cannot be permitted. Regarding specifically employment relationships, the exercise of the corrective power of the hierarchical superior against officials who have committed sanctionable offenses is subject to this temporality factor, after which, such exercise may not be undertaken. This time limit, as will be stated, varies depending on the matter regulated and the existence of a special legal regime that configures particular rules for specific types of public employment relationships. Consequently, that disciplinary power (which is based on the doctrine of ordinal 102 of the General Law of Public Administration) is not unrestricted in time. Unlike other public powers that, due to finalistic aspects, are considered imprescriptible, those referring to internal sanctioning exercise – like the one examined in this case – are subject to temporality rules by virtue of which they may lapse due to the passage of the time established by the legal order without being realized. Therefore, in this type of relationship, the holder of the corrective power is the administrative hierarchical superior and the passive subject is the public official, who to that extent is subject to internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which, his or her power to demand recognition of the loss of hierarchical power emerges. Now, as has been indicated in our administrative case law, as a general rule, except for the existence of special regulations to that effect (as is the case of servants of the Public Treasury), the power to discipline the infractions of public servants is subject to a one-month statute of limitations (art. 603 of the Labor Code). The computation begins or \"*dies a quo*\", from the moment that the complaint or the report recommending the opening of an administrative disciplinary procedure is brought to the attention of the hierarchical superior or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. As a general rule, limitation periods are interrupted, among other causes, by the initiation of the respective procedure, with the knowledge of the interested party; understood as such, not the appointment of the directing body that will instruct the administrative procedure, but when the former decrees its start and notifies the investigated party. Now, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 878 of the Civil Procedure Code, *\"The effect of the interruption is to render useless for the statute of limitations all the time previously elapsed.\"* Which leads us to conclude that, once that interruption ceases, the originally established period begins anew. It should be specified that the causes for interruption – which make the limitation period start anew – can only produce that effect to the extent that they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occurred, if it is after the period has expired, the simple allegation of a negative statute of limitations leads to the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inertia in its exercise. It is well-established legal doctrine that only an unfulfilled statute of limitations can be interrupted. Now, we must warn that the labor case law emanating especially from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has been oriented in two directions: on the one hand, it leaves open the possibility that even if the interruption alluded to has occurred with the initiation of the disciplinary procedure in the referred terms, it may be feasible that during the processing of the administrative file the statute of limitations on the sanctioning power operates, if it remains unjustifiably paralyzed for the prescriptive period, for a reason not attributable to the accused official. And once the instruction of the disciplinary procedure by the directing body appointed for that purpose is concluded, and from the moment the file reaches the hands of the official or body competent to impose the respective sanction, and this body is in a position to decide, and therefore, to effectively exercise its disciplinary power, the limitation period begins to run again; which necessarily implies that the disciplinary sanction must be imposed – attributed – by the employer entity within that period; otherwise, what in other legal systems is called the statute of limitations for the sanction would operate. The generic one-month period for the exercise of the public function obliges constant activity by the instructing body to resolve the conflict in the most efficient manner possible. There are even rulings from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in which it has gone so far as to hold that even in the case of special regimes such as in the treasury or police force, where the prescriptive period is several years, a one-month limitation period between the different acts of the procedure likewise applies, in an interpretation in favor of the worker. The other position holds that \"*when the employer entity must comply with a certain procedure or investigation prior to disciplining those who are considered as workers, that period .... shall be counted from the moment in which the result of the respective investigation is brought to the attention of the official or body competent to resolve*\" (Second Chamber, *Voto* 1083-13 and 367-12). Naturally, between the commission of the facts motivating the alleged offense and the opening of the procedure, the prescriptive period does run under this thesis (Second Chamber, *Votos* 681-13 and 110-13); as well as between the recommendation and the sanctioning act (Second Chamber, *Voto* 618-13). Despite the foregoing, it should be noted that each specific case would have to be analyzed in detail, so as not to incur an interpretation regarding the eventual statute of limitations of the sanctioning power that runs to the detriment of the disciplinary power that the Administration has over its servants, that is, that would imply that the majority of infractions would remain in complete impunity. But on the other hand, it would not be viable either to open the causes that allow the peremption of the employment relationship to be extended to such an extreme that they become transgressors of the principle of prompt and complete justice in administrative venues. Generating indefinitely open cases, with the corresponding negative effects for a person subject to the administration who must live for many months or years awaiting a definition that resolves their situation, with the stress conditions that an administrative file implicitly carries. It should be remembered that there are cases in which the offenses to be sanctioned have effects that are continuous over time or of a successive tract, as they are also called; and in these cases, as established by labor case law, the statute of limitations does not operate (See, among others, judgments No. 230-92 of 09:10 a.m. on October 2, 1992, 140-93 of 08:30 a.m. on July 8, 1993, 2001-00149 of 10:40 a.m. on February 28, 472 of 10:05 a.m. on August 17, and 2001-00648 of 10:20 a.m. on October 31, all from 2001 and from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). With the entry into force of the cited Law No. 7410, a chapter was provided for concerning the disciplinary regime applicable to members of the police forces. In one of its norms, specifically in article eighty-three (according to the last change in numbering), the statute of limitations period for the rights and actions to sanction offenses against the disciplinary regime was established in the following form: \"*Minor offenses shall be subject to a one-month statute of limitations and serious ones to two years. The action shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated*.\" Regarding the application of said precept, it is clear that before the promulgation and effectiveness of the referred Law No. 7410, the limitation periods that had to be observed in the application of the disciplinary regime, specifically in the case of the members of the police forces alluded to in the indicated law, were those established in the Labor Code, specifically the provision of article six hundred three. The foregoing due to the absolute absence of a norm on the matter that could somehow regulate the subject. However, as of the law's effectiveness, it is not legally viable to apply any other statute of limitations period other than that contained in the cited legislation, that is, one month for minor offenses and two years for serious ones. The foregoing because it is a law of the Republic, in force, subsequent to the Labor Code, and of special application for the members of the police forces determined therein. It must be specified that the Chamber generally leans against limitation periods that are so broad and lacking coherence with other sanctions of the same legal order (by way of example, that same period is the prescriptive one for contraventions), but by mandate of law, it is obliged to apply it, not without first warning the respondent Administration that this period should never be taken as a call to arbitrariness, negligence, or administrative sloth. It should be remembered that not only in the case of police forces has the legislator provided for much broader limitation periods for applying disciplinary sanctions, but also in other administrative bodies, as proves to be the case of article seventy-one of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Likewise, the surveillance and conservation of public order, which constitutionally and legally corresponds to the police forces, constitute inherently delicate functions, given the police power and the coercive character they entail, whence it is essential to achieve symmetry between the guarantee of citizen security and respect for fundamental rights. All of this, as can be seen, involves highly sensitive functions, which certainly explains a broader statute of limitations period. It must be clear that the non-conclusion of the information or instruction by a final act within the period established in the General Law for the ordinary procedure does not entail any expiration (caducidad) or statute of limitations, since, as has been indicated, the applicable legislation on the statute of limitations for the police forces contemplated in the cited Law 7410, that is, two years for serious offenses, which shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated, which shall, in any case, be adjusted to the guarantees of due process. Note that the norm establishes a statute of limitations period and not an expiration (caducidad) period; by its very nature it can be interrupted or suspended by the circumstances that legally or objectively affect it; unlike an expiration (caducidad) which does not present such attributes. This Section of the Tribunal has openly declared itself in favor of maintaining coherence in jurisprudential lines, so as not to generate legal uncertainty that, far from allowing the litigant something to rely on, serves for isolated positions that ordinarily do not succeed on the corresponding appeal. The foregoing, unless – of course – it is not legally sustainable. It is evident that the special norm on the matter of the public force established a broad two-year period, which is interrupted by the opening of the administrative file, given that the norm expressly reads in that sense. In accordance with the majority case law, we opt to consider that the period runs from the commission of the facts until the opening of the file and from the respective report until the issuance of the administrative act by the hierarchical superior, as has been set forth by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in majority case law, on the understanding that during the course of the administrative procedure, the administration is not in a position to issue any act, insofar as compliance with the administrative procedure is a legal requirement to adopt the act in a valid manner. That explains why the legislator exercised due diligence in including the interrupting cause in the opening of the procedure, as it was the only one that presented a true effect vis-à-vis the specific case. The question that arises immediately is that, due to the aforementioned principle of prompt and complete justice (from article forty-one of the Constitution) in administrative venues, it is not legally viable to leave open and indefinitely the period for the processing of the administrative procedure. The mere possibility of enabling an administrative procedure that lasts for years against a person subject to the administration who can do nothing to bring it to a conclusion is contrary to all law [...].”" }