{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-155149",
  "citation": "Res. 01031-2015 Sala Segunda de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Sevicia como causal de divorcio acreditada por violencia psicológica contra el esposo",
  "title_en": "Cruelty as grounds for divorce proven through psychological violence against the husband",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte confirmó la sentencia que declaró el divorcio por sevicia, acogiendo la reconvención del esposo demandado. Determinó que la conducta de la esposa —insultos, gritos, amenazas y actos humillantes— configuró violencia psicológica sistemática y continua, aun después de la separación de hecho, lo que acreditó la causal del artículo 48.4 del Código de Familia. Rechazó la excepción de caducidad porque los hechos se prolongaron hasta antes de la interposición de la reconvención y valoró la prueba conforme al artículo 8 del mismo código (sana crítica en familia). Además, aclaró que, si bien la Convención de Belém do Pará protege especialmente a la mujer, la sevicia puede probarse también contra el varón cuando exista violencia física o moral. La Sala destacó el ánimo aflictivo, la persistencia de las agresiones y el daño moral como elementos determinantes para confirmar el divorcio.",
  "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court upheld the divorce decree based on cruelty, granting the husband’s counterclaim. It found that the wife’s conduct — insults, threats, and humiliating acts — constituted systematic psychological violence that continued even after their separation, thus proving the ground under Article 48(4) of the Family Code. The chamber rejected the lapse defense because the acts persisted until shortly before the counterclaim was filed, and it evaluated the evidence under Article 8 of the same Code (sound judgment in family matters). It also clarified that, while the Belém do Pará Convention affords special protection to women, cruelty can also be proven against men when physical or moral violence exists. The chamber emphasized the intentional infliction of suffering, the persistent nature of the aggression, and the moral damage as decisive factors.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte",
  "date": "2015",
  "year": "2015",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "sevicia",
    "caducidad",
    "sana crítica",
    "Código de Familia",
    "reconvención",
    "daño moral",
    "violencia psicológica",
    "Convención de Belém do Pará"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 8",
      "law": "Código de Familia"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 11",
      "law": "Código de Familia"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 34",
      "law": "Código de Familia"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 48 inciso 4",
      "law": "Código de Familia"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 49",
      "law": "Código de Familia"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 51",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 11",
      "law": "Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos"
    },
    {
      "article": null,
      "law": "Convención de Belem do Pará"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "Sevicia",
    "Divorcio",
    "Violencia doméstica",
    "Caducidad",
    "Valoración de la prueba",
    "Código de Familia",
    "Convención de Belém do Pará",
    "Violencia psicológica",
    "Daño moral",
    "Sana crítica"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "Cruelty",
    "Divorce",
    "Domestic violence",
    "Lapse",
    "Assessment of evidence",
    "Family Code",
    "Belém do Pará Convention",
    "Psychological violence",
    "Moral damage",
    "Sound judgment"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Según la doctrina y la jurisprudencia, la sevicia, en tanto causal de divorcio, se configura, por la violencia física o moral empleada por uno de los cónyuges en perjuicio del otro o de sus hijos, ya sea por medio de hechos o de palabras, o bien por acciones u omisiones, las que siendo altamente mortificantes perturban tanto la salud física como mental y por consiguiente hacen prácticamente imposible la vida en pareja. […] Debe tratarse de uno o de varios actos gravemente infamantes y ofensivos y no de situaciones de poca trascendencia o aisladas.\n\nEl hecho de que se dé una importancia preponderante en relación con la protección de los derechos de la mujer debido a la tendencia histórica y social a su vulnerabilidad, no significa que en determinados casos, la sevicia se presente también en contra del varón, para lo cual habrá que acudir al caso específico, la prueba y las condiciones concretas de como se dieron los hechos.",
  "excerpt_en": "According to doctrine and case law, cruelty as a ground for divorce is constituted by physical or moral violence used by one spouse against the other or their children, whether by acts or words, or by actions or omissions, which being highly distressing disturb both physical and mental health and therefore make life together practically impossible. … It must involve one or several seriously defamatory and offensive acts and not trivial or isolated situations.\n\nThe fact that preponderant importance is given to the protection of women’s rights due to their historical and social vulnerability does not mean that, in certain cases, cruelty cannot also occur against the man, in which case one must look to the specific case, the evidence, and the concrete circumstances of how the events occurred.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Second Chamber dismissed the plaintiff's cassation appeal and upheld the judgment that granted the counterclaim, decreeing the divorce on grounds of cruelty.",
    "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda declaró sin lugar el recurso de casación de la actora y confirmó la sentencia que acogió la reconvención declarando el divorcio por sevicia."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "…cruelty, as a ground for divorce, is constituted by physical or moral violence used by one spouse against the other or their children, whether by acts or words, or by actions or omissions, which being highly distressing disturb both physical and mental health and therefore make life together practically impossible.",
      "quote_es": "…la sevicia, en tanto causal de divorcio, se configura, por la violencia física o moral empleada por uno de los cónyuges en perjuicio del otro o de sus hijos, ya sea por medio de hechos o de palabras, o bien por acciones u omisiones, las que siendo altamente mortificantes perturban tanto la salud física como mental y por consiguiente hacen prácticamente imposible la vida en pareja."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "…however, the fact that preponderant importance is given to the protection of women’s rights due to their historical and social vulnerability does not mean that, in certain cases, cruelty cannot also occur against the man…",
      "quote_es": "…no obstante, el hecho de que se dé una importancia preponderante en relación con la protección de los derechos de la mujer debido a la tendencia histórica y social a su vulnerabilidad, no significa que en determinados casos, la sevicia se presente también en contra del varón…"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "…from the evidence analyzed it follows that the counter-defendant deliberately uttered hurtful words and phrases to her spouse; her insults toward him sparked the arguments, without any violent reaction on the part of the defendant having been shown.",
      "quote_es": "…de la prueba analizada se deduce que la reconvenida le profería palabras y frases hirientes a su cónyuge en forma deliberada, sus insultos hacia él generaban las discusiones, sin que se haya demostrado una reacción violenta del demandado en respuesta a ello."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-155149",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-12443",
      "norm_num": "7130",
      "norm_name": "Código Procesal Civil",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "16/08/1989"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "norm_num": "0",
      "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política",
      "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política",
      "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-970",
      "norm_num": "5476",
      "norm_name": "Código de Familia",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "21/12/1973"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“IV.- ACERCA DE LA VALORACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA EN MATERIA DE FAMILIA: En esta materia, la prueba debe ser apreciada de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo segundo del artículo 8 del Código de Familia, según el cual “los jueces… interpretarán las probanzas sin sujeción a las reglas positivas de la prueba común, atendiendo todas las circunstancias y los elementos de convicción que los autos suministren; pero, en todo caso, deberán hacerse constar las razones de la valoración”. En este sentido, quien juzga no está en total libertad para valorar los elementos de prueba, sino que, además de hacerlo con base en parámetros de sana crítica, debe realizarlo en forma integral y exponer las razones que justifiquen sus conclusiones. Sobre este tema, esta Sala ha indicado: “…en esta materia, el artículo 8 citado introdujo una modificación en el sistema de apreciación y valoración de las pruebas distinto al vigente según las normas del Derecho Civil. De acuerdo con esta disposición, en la jurisdicción familiar las pruebas deben valorarse sin sujeción a las reglas positivas de la prueba común, atendiendo todas las circunstancias y los elementos de convicción que los autos suministren y haciendo constar las razones de valoración. Corresponde entonces al juez de familia, un ejercicio intelectual en la apreciación de las probanzas, en el cual le sirven de apoyo las reglas de la lógica, de la psicología y de la experiencia cotidiana en un marco de referencia dado; lo cual excluye cualquier arbitrariedad, siempre ilegítima y espuria”. (Voto n.° 20, de las 10:10 horas del 26 de enero de 2005). En ese entendido, el operador jurídico, al interpretar la normativa concerniente a esta rama del Derecho, siempre debe tomar en consideración aquellos intereses que se estatuyen como principios fundamentales y exponer los motivos que le hicieron llegar a determinada conclusión. Con base en estas premisas, deberá realizarse el análisis de la prueba constante en autos, cuya valoración, por parte del tribunal, la recurrente considera que fue errada. \n\nV.- ASPECTOS GENERALES RESPECTO A LA SEVICIA COMO CAUSAL DE DIVORCIO: Es importante acotar que con la unión matrimonial se constituye una comunidad de vida entre los esposos, la cual genera derechos, deberes y responsabilidades recíprocos para ambos contrayentes. Los deberes pueden ser tanto patrimoniales como extra patrimoniales. En lo que respecta a esa segunda categoría, se cuenta, entre otros, con los deberes de fidelidad, respeto y auxilio mutuo. El respeto entre ambos cónyuges constituye un elemento esencial para garantizar las buenas relaciones conyugales, así como un confortable ambiente en el que se desarrolle la vida familiar. Consecuentemente, cada uno de los consortes debe mantener, respecto del otro, una consideración tal que garantice el cumplimiento de dichos cometidos con el fin de salvaguardar el aprecio de su cónyuge como persona y así lograr la estabilidad matrimonial. El Código de Familia, en el inciso 4) de su artículo 48, enumera la sevicia como una de las causales de divorcio, pero es el juzgador, a la luz de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia sobre el tema, quien está llamado a precisar sus alcances, pues no es cualquier hecho o su reiteración, aun cuando sea reprochable, el que puede invocarse como justificante de la disolución del vínculo matrimonial. Lo anterior, por cuanto el ordenamiento jurídico tutela con especial interés la preservación del instituto del matrimonio, en tanto se le considera como la base esencial de la familia y, esta, a su vez, como el elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, merecedora de protección por parte del Estado (artículos 51 y 52 de la Constitución Política). Para valorar los hechos en que se fundamenta una acción de divorcio, se debe tomar en consideración que el numeral 52 mencionado contempla el principio de la igualdad de derechos entre los cónyuges. En el mismo sentido, para los casos específicos de esa parte de la población, esta Sala ha tomado en consideración el punto 1 del artículo 16 de la “Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer”, ratificada por Costa Rica por ley número 6968, del 2 de octubre de 1984. Esas reglas son, a su vez, recogidas y desarrolladas por el Código de Familia, el cual, en su artículo 11, dispone que el matrimonio tiene por objeto la vida en común, la cooperación y el mutuo auxilio, y el numeral 34 siguiente estipula: “Los esposos comparten la responsabilidad y el gobierno de la familia. Conjuntamente deben regular los asuntos domésticos, proveer a la educación de sus hijos y preparar su porvenir. Asimismo están obligados a respetarse, a guardarse fidelidad y a socorrerse mutuamente. […]”. Ese respeto que debe siempre imperar en el seno familiar, está referido no solo a la integridad física de una persona, sino también a su bienestar psíquico y moral, con igualdad de derechos y de oportunidades, principios consagrados en términos generales en los artículos 33 y 40 de la Constitución Política. La protección contra la discriminación, los tratos crueles y degradantes en perjuicio de la integridad física, psíquica y moral de una persona, encuentran sustento en el derecho fundamental a que se le respete su honra y su dignidad, tal y como también lo expresan los artículos 5 y 11 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos. En consecuencia, se puede concluir que cuando esos valores son gravemente incumplidos por algunos de los cónyuges, ello puede dar lugar a la declaración de la separación judicial o del divorcio, según las pretensiones de la parte afectada. Esta Sala, en la sentencia número 32, de las 14:20 horas del 12 de enero de 2001, dispuso: “La paz en el ámbito familiar y los efectos que su ausencia provoca, es un problema que afecta a la sociedad en general; debiendo considerarse siempre para resolver la litis, la aludida igualdad entre cónyuges y el derecho, de todos los miembros de la familia, a vivir en un ambiente libre de violencia, garante de su desarrollo integral. Con el afán de tutelar los derechos humanos de todas las personas y en especial de las mujeres, se han dictado diversas normas a nivel nacional e internacional que tratan de erradicar la violencia y la discriminación que ellas han sufrido, históricamente, en todos los ámbitos (familiar, político, social, etc). En la búsqueda de una respuesta justa a la realidad de nuestra sociedad, tratándose de la invocación de violencia en perjuicio de la esposa, debemos acudir a la normativa especial a su respecto. A los efectos de valorar la existencia de una sevicia invocada como fundamento del divorcio, interesa conocer el tema de la violencia doméstica, particularmente de la sufrida por la cónyuge a causa de su esposo; la cual, no siempre es física, sino que también puede ser sexual y psicológica. Según la doctrina y la jurisprudencia, la sevicia, en tanto causal de divorcio, se configura, por la violencia física o moral empleada por uno de los cónyuges en perjuicio del otro o de sus hijos, ya sea por medio de hechos o de palabras, o bien por acciones u omisiones, las que siendo altamente mortificantes perturban tanto la salud física como mental y por consiguiente hacen prácticamente imposible la vida en pareja. […] Debe tratarse de uno o de varios actos gravemente infamantes y ofensivos y no de situaciones de poca trascendencia o aisladas”. Ahora bien, como se dijo, para el particular caso de la violencia en perjuicio de la mujer, se ha tomado en cuenta el concepto que contiene la “Convención Interamericana para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia contra la mujer” ( Convención de Belem do Pará) -adoptada por la Organización de Estados Americanos, el 9 de junio de 1994 y vigente en el país por Ley número 7499, del 2 de mayo de 1995-; no obstante, el hecho de que se dé una importancia preponderante en relación con la protección de los derechos de la mujer debido a la tendencia histórica y social a su vulnerabilidad, no significa que en determinados casos, la sevicia se presente también en contra del varón, para lo cual habrá que acudir al caso específico, la prueba y las condiciones concretas de como se dieron los hechos, todo en armonía con lo expuesto líneas atrás en cuanto a los aspectos normativos y conceptuales. Bajo esas premisas, deberá determinarse si quedó debidamente acreditada la sevicia invocada por el accionado reconventor en el caso bajo estudio. \n\nVI.-SOBRE LA CADUCIDAD DE LA CAUSAL DE SEVICIA EN EL PRESENTE ASUNTO: La apoderada de la actora señala, como parte de sus reproches, que debió acogerse la excepción de caducidad opuesta por esa parte, ya que los hechos que pudieron configurar la causal de sevicia cesaron desde antes del año previo a la interposición de la reconvención, es decir, esta última no se interpuso sino hasta después de transcurrido el año que dispone el numeral 49 del Código de Familia. En ese sentido, alega una errónea valoración de la prueba. Esta Sala considera que no lleva razón en su alegato pues se trató efectivamente de hechos que si se llegaran a determinar como configurativos de esa causal –según se analizará en el siguiente considerando-, se siguieron dando en el tiempo aun con posterioridad a la separación de la pareja y antes de la interposición de la reconvención. Nótese que el incidente presentado por la salida del hogar de la hija [[Nombre1] ], generó hechos reveladores de la constante y actual agresión, según se desprende de los testimonios de [[Nombre1] ] y [[Nombre2] ], los cuales se analizarán más adelante. Ese acontecimiento tuvo lugar el 1° de mayo de 2006, a raíz de lo cual, el accionado interpuso una denuncia de violencia doméstica el 21 de junio de 2006 (folio 2205 del tomo III) y procedió a contrademandar el 27 de junio siguiente (sello de recibido a folio 278 tomo I). De la declaración de aquella primera testigo, precisamente, se infiere que su salida de la casa ocurrió cuando ya se había interpuesto la demanda que dio origen a este proceso, y que ese abandono del hogar tuvo relación casualmente con la actitud de su madre y el enfado de esta por la relación cordial que ella tenía con su papá, lo cual lleva a concluir que los hechos se siguieron presentando después de la separación de la pareja y antes de que la hija abandonara la casa. La deponente afirmó también que la accionante les hablaba mal de su papá cuando los llevaba a la escuela y ella temía que llegara a tratarla igual a como trataba al demandado. Lo anterior hace concluir que la conducta de la accionante ha sido una constante en el trato hacia el cónyuge, con quien necesariamente tuvo que relacionarse para coordinar las visitas de los dos hijos menores a este y la entrega del dinero de la manutención, como lo refirió el deponente [[Nombre3] ], todo lo cual es razonable que se continuara dando durante ese periodo comprendido entre la separación de la pareja y la interposición de la reconvención. Nótese que en este asunto no se desprende que la sevicia haya cesado durante algún tiempo ni que haya habido un cambio en la actitud de la accionante, sino que las ofensas y vejaciones de ella hacia el marido se han mantenido al punto de llegar a su trabajo a reclamar de mala manera el dinero para la manutención suya y de los hijos que seguían viviendo con ella. Todo lo anterior representan indicios claros y no desvirtuados de que poco tiempo antes del planteamiento de la reconvención se seguían presentando los hechos alegados por el accionado reconventor. Así las cosas, se debe avalar lo dispuesto por el tribunal en cuanto a este tema.\n\nVII.- ACERCA DE LA DEMOSTRACIÓN DE LA CAUSAL DE SEVICIA ALEGADA POR EL DEMANDADO RECONVENTOR: Los demás agravios de la recurrente se dirigen a desacreditar la prueba constante en autos a los efectos de concluir que no quedó demostrada la causal de sevicia alegada por el demandado reconventor, así como a atacar la valoración de los elementos probatorios efectuada por el tribunal, razón por la cual –en el recurso- se citaron partes del contenido de esos elementos y las posibles conclusiones derivadas de ellos, según su posición. Con fundamento en los reclamos de la apoderada de la actora, una vez analizadas las pruebas indicadas por la recurrente, la Sala llega a la conclusión de que, no existen motivos suficientes para variar lo que viene resuelto. Así las cosas, debe concluirse que en el caso bajo análisis, sí quedó demostrada la causal de sevicia por las razones que se explicarán. En lo que respecta a la prueba testimonial, la impugnante deja ver una posible complacencia en la declaración de las hijas para favorecer los intereses del padre, quien se ha convertido en su apoyo económico. No obstante, de esos testimonios no se infieren vicios de complacencia, pues aún con toda la cercanía al padre, estos coinciden en que la salida del hogar de este se vio condicionada por la actitud de la actora, circunstancia que incluso continuó después de la separación de hecho. En ese sentido, relataron los momentos cuando esta le reprochaba de una manera violenta situaciones injustificadas como la falta de dinero e incluso le llegó a tirar su comida en el plato del perro. La testigo [[Nombre4] ] relató: “Cuando viví con mis padres normalmente cuando estábamos en el Colegio en las noches cuando llegaba mi padre después de trabajar y los domingos cuando estaba en casa mi madre siempre peleaba con él, le decía que era un hijueputa, desgraciado porque ella quería cosas y él no se las quería dar, me refiero a dinero, y no es que él no se las quisiera dar, sino que no tenía dinero. El carácter temperamento entre ellos mi madre siempre ha sido muy, mucho más agresiva, hiriente cuando dice las cosas, no le importa decir cosas y delante de quien, mi padre se quedaba calladito. […] Aunque viviera en España, siempre he sabido que mi madre sigue agrediendo, siempre le decía hijueputa, al resto de mi familia, porque mis hermanitos o papi o mi madre misma me empezaba gritar por teléfono y me decía que papi era un desgraciado, un hijueputa, que se iba a llevar a [[Nombre5] ]. Mis hermanas me llamaban llorando y me contaban que mi mamá las trataba muy mal ellas me llamaban llorando”. (Folios 332-334). Por su parte, [[Nombre6] ] refirió: “Cuando nos hicimos adolescentes empezaron los problemas pues ella empezó a ser muy dura con nosotros y con mi papá. Era dura pues nos hizo tomar partido entre mi papá y yo. Ella decía que él era mentiroso manipulador cobarde imbécil y le contaba a todo el mundo y le decía”. Dijo que cada vez que conversaba con ella, esta hablaba mal del accionado, le decía que no era buen padre y cuando lo veía le gritaba. Entre otras cosas, le decía que era un desgraciado y que lo iba a mandar a la cárcel por ser un ladrón. Además, la testigo informó que la actora le enviaba a su esposo correos electrónicos con copia a las hijas donde le reiteraba que iba a ir a la cárcel y lo iba a hacer pasar un mal rato por lo desgraciado que era. Asimismo, si le guardaba comida a él y estaba enojada, se la terminaba dando a los perros. La declarante mencionó que, a raíz de eso, su padre ha sufrido depresión y ha tenido tratamiento psicológico. Agregó que el cambio en el temperamento de su madre empezó uno o dos años antes de la separación. (Folios 368-372). La testigo [[Nombre1] ] expuso que su papá se fue de la casa porque su mamá lo trataba muy mal, recuerda gritos e insultos, se enojaba si las hijas pasaban mucho tiempo con él. A ella le hablaba mal de su papá. Además, cuando la echó de la casa, todos los vecinos se dieron cuenta. Señaló que al venir el accionado a recogerla ese día, ella le gritaba cosas, luego lo llamó para decirle que era un mal padre. Ella siempre iniciaba la provocación con un comentario degradante hacia él y casi siempre él se quedaba callado y dejaba que lo insultara. La deponente indicó que le decía desgraciado, mal padre, huevón, hijo de puta, entre otras cosas. Refirió que el día que salió de la casa, una vecina y su abuela se dieron cuenta y la gente que pasaba oía los gritos de la actora. Coincidió con su hermana en que si tenía comida lista y se enojaba, se la tiraba en el plato de los perros. Igualmente, lo amenazaba con demandas. La testigo declaró que ha notado a su padre triste. Asimismo, contó que lo malinformaba con los hijos, les decía que era un mal padre y siempre lo molestaba en ese aspecto. (Folios 373-375). El hecho de que las testigos no mencionen fechas concretas ni se ubiquen los acontecimientos relatados en espacio y tiempo no es motivo para excluir esos testimonios como válidos y aptos para tener por acreditada la causal referida. Por otra parte, como se dijo, los hechos relatados por las testigos en cuanto al posible adulterio de su padre son irrelevantes, toda vez que eso no forma parte de la base fáctica objeto de análisis por parte de la Sala, como se aclaró anteriormente. De modo que tampoco esa fue la causal en que la actora fundamentó su demanda. Igual consecuencia debe atribuirse al hecho de que no se le incluyera en las esquelas periodísticas por la muerte del padre y la madre del accionado. Si bien la deponente [[Nombre7] ] señaló que la actora era una mujer dedicada a su hogar (folios 366-367), ello no implica que se descarte la comisión de los hechos que relataron las hijas, quienes -por su cercanía y por formar parte del núcleo familiar- fueron afectadas directas de esa conducta y observaron los hechos referentes a la situación que afectó a su padre. Tampoco es suficiente para tener por indemostrada la causal de sevicia el hecho de que las testigos no recordaran el nombre del profesional que trató a su papá por problemas de depresión, ni que lograran ubicar más contemporáneamente los hechos en su nueva declaración con respecto a la demanda de violencia doméstica. El hecho de que posteriormente se archivaran las medidas de protección decretadas en un proceso de violencia doméstica contra la actora, no significa que los hechos no hayan sucedido y poco importa -para los efectos concretos de este asunto- si la madre del accionado estuvo incluida dentro de dichas medidas o no. En razón del tema que requiere demostración para esta Sala, no resulta de importancia si las testigos y el accionado instaron adecuadamente los órganos administrativos y judiciales en relación con una presunta problemática que afectaba al hijo menor y que se le trató de imputar a la progenitora. El testimonio de [[Nombre8] ] –folios 402 a 404- no aporta ningún elemento de trascendencia en cuanto al tema a demostrar. La declarante [[Nombre2] ] indicó que la actora es una persona difícil, dada la forma de ser ella. Dijo haber estado presente en la casa de su madre –quien vive cerca- el día que la demandante echó a [[Nombre1] ] de la casa y ese día también trató mal al accionado, le decía que era un mal padre. Relató que la accionante una vez la llamó a ella para que fuera a la casa y le habló mal del demandado y le dijo que estaba loco. (Folios 451-454). En cuanto al deponente [[Nombre3] ], este también fue claro en los actos de sevicia cometidos por la actora. El hecho de que sea compañero del accionado u ocupe un puesto en las empresas no significa que haya faltado a la verdad, más bien, ese testimonio es útil para constar que efectivamente los actos y ofensas hacia el demandado continuaron después de la separación e incluso tienen el efecto de acreditar la suficiente contemporaneidad para declinar la caducidad por considerarse que se trató de una causal reiterada en el tiempo. Relató que la actora llamaba a la empresa para exigir dineros de forma bastante fuerte, utilizando improperios y amenazas al accionado. Pedía que le pasaran a “ese imbécil” y algunas veces lo trató de “hijueputa” y [Nombre9]. Dijo que cuando ella llama y habla con él se escuchan los gritos. Relató que la demandante ha llegado a la empresa y frente a empleados y clientes le grita [Nombre9], irresponsable, lo amenaza con denunciarlo. Ha llegado a la compañía e irrumpe en forma abrupta. (Folios 454-457). También, el hecho de que en la esquela no se haya incluido a la actora y se haya mencionado a la compañera del demandado no es relevante -como se dijo- para lo que ante esta Sala es objeto de análisis, ya que no se está determinando la acreditación o existencia de la causal de sevicia de parte del cónyuge, ni tampoco un posible adulterio. Independientemente de la forma como el accionado saliera del domicilio conyugal y aun si hubiera sido por acuerdo de ambos (véase testimonio de [[Nombre7] ] del folio 366 al 367), lo verdaderamente relevante son los motivos que determinaron esa salida, los cuales tuvieron que ver con los constantes pleitos generados por la actora y el maltrato verbal contra su esposo. Ahora bien, de los anteriores testimonios se desprende un proceder de la demandante que tiene un ánimo aflictivo, requerido para que se configurara la causal referida. Al analizar las declaraciones, se infiere la comisión de la referida circunstancia sin que se concluya que se trató de hechos aislados surgidos como respuesta a discusiones entre la pareja. Como se puede concluir, se trata de sucesos sistemáticos y persistentes con la finalidad de ofender y producir escarnio, por ende, capaces de generar un menoscabo en la moral o psiquis del accionado. Como se indicó anteriormente, de la prueba analizada se deduce que la reconvenida le profería palabras y frases hirientes a su cónyuge en forma deliberada, sus insultos hacia él generaban las discusiones, sin que se haya demostrado una reacción violenta del demandado en respuesta a ello. Es reprochable que a pesar de ser su esposo y tener varios hijos en común, la actora desobedeciera deliberadamente el deber de respeto conyugal y no mostrara la mínima voluntad de arreglar razonablemente las desavenencias que pudieran existir, lo cual afectó también a la prole. De la prueba no se muestran siquiera visos ocasionales de que la accionante tratara de buscar un diálogo adecuado con su esposo para resolver diferencias, sino que es claro su constante ataque mediante gritos, ofensas y amenazas, de ahí que se estime acreditada la sevicia. Asimismo, por los motivos expuestos, se estima razonable que toda esa situación le haya producido un daño moral como lo estimaron los juzgadores de instancia. Luego, todas estas circunstancias, analizadas a la luz de la sana crítica racional, deben ser consideradas como manifestaciones de violencia verbal y psicológica en contra del demandado. Además, es claro que denotan una situación reiterativa que ha afectado emocionalmente a la persona ofendida. Como es posible observar, no se trataba de simples respuestas a discusiones, sino que las ejecutaba con un ánimo de ofender y mortificar, al punto de amenazarlo temerariamente con denunciarlo por cuestiones relacionadas con las empresas que nunca llegó a explicar, a tratarlo de mal padre e irrumpir violentamente en las instalaciones de la compañía delante de clientes y empleados. Es evidente que todas esas circunstancias, como parte de un ciclo de violencia, afectaron negativamente el estado emocional del consorte, lo cual consta documentado también en las diligencias de solicitud de medidas de protección que él se vio obligado a interponer (folios 2204-2341) y la atención psicológica que debió recibir de manera particular (folios 273-276). Debe indicarse que la prueba analizada anteriormente es suficiente para tener por acreditada la sevicia y no existen indicios para resolver en forma distinta, de ahí que las afirmaciones de la recurrente carezcan de sustento. La apoderada de la actora alega también la errónea valoración de otros elementos probatorios; sin embargo, por lo que se dirá, ello no es suficiente para variar lo resuelto. En lo que respecta a la confesional del demandado, no se infiere ningún elemento que vaya en contra de los intereses del confesante y que respalde los alegatos de la recurrente (folios 395-402). Nótese que la confesión solamente prueba plenamente en contra de los intereses de quien la rinde, no a su favor (artículo 338 del Código Procesal Civil), además de los matices que deben tomarse en cuenta en esta materia, según se explicó en un considerando anterior. Además, como se ha insistido, las manifestaciones que la parte actora pretende extraer de ella no tienen que ver con el tema a demostrar en el presente asunto, como son las relacionadas con una posible sevicia en su contra o el adulterio del esposo. En relación con la prueba pericial forense, lo que allí se explica son posibles motivos que podrían incidir en la personalidad de las personas evaluadas, pero en modo alguno pueden tomarse como fundamento único para afirmar que una persona haya mentido en su declaración o en sus aseveraciones. Ya se dejó claro que los testimonios de las hijas no fueron complacientes y esta otra prueba no cambia dicha conclusión. Lo indicado en dicha pericia referente al adulterio y a una posible conducta impulsiva e irritable del accionado, ya se indicó que no tiene relación con lo que aquí se pretende demostrar, además de que, respecto a esto último, de la demás prueba no se desprende una manifestación de esa posible conducta contra la actora. En lo atinente al daño moral, esta prueba da apenas un elemento, no el definitivo para su procedencia, pues este se puede inferir incluso de los propios hechos ilícitos que han perjudicado a la persona solicitante en sus afecciones más íntimas, así como en su integridad física o psíquica. Más bien, de esta prueba se constata el alejamiento de las hijas en relación con su madre, lo cual se debe contrastar con lo manifestado por estas en sus declaraciones testimoniales para comprender aun más el contexto de esos testimonios. Los dictámenes privados son apenas un factor complementario para tomar en consideración, pero ellos no son ni fueron determinantes para fallar el presente asunto, lo cual, en todo caso, se ha hecho tomando en cuenta la integridad del acervo probatorio. El hecho de que el médico tratante sea familiar del accionado no demerita por completo esa prueba en cuanto a los posibles problemas de depresión que sufre, los cuales, como se dijo, se han valorado no solo con base en ese elemento probatorio. Por su parte, el dictamen aportado por la actora revela aspectos que, como se dijo, no corresponde analizar a la Sala en cuanto a esta concreta impugnación. De tal forma, al haberse acreditado la causal de sevicia alegada por el accionado reconventor, debe mantenerse lo resuelto por el tribunal.”",
  "body_en_text": "**IV.- REGARDING THE ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE IN FAMILY MATTERS:** In this area, evidence must be assessed in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 8 of the Código de Familia, according to which *“judges… shall interpret the evidence without subjection to the positive rules of common evidence, taking into account all the circumstances and the elements of conviction that the case file provides; but, in every case, the reasons for the assessment must be recorded.”* In this sense, the adjudicator is not entirely free to assess the evidentiary elements; rather, in addition to doing so based on sound judgment (sana crítica) standards, they must do so comprehensively and set forth the reasons justifying their conclusions. On this topic, this Chamber has stated: *“…in this area, the aforementioned Article 8 introduced a modification to the system of appreciation and assessment of evidence different from that in force under Civil Law norms. According to this provision, in family jurisdiction, evidence must be assessed without subjection to the positive rules of common evidence, taking into account all the circumstances and the elements of conviction that the case file provides and recording the reasons for the assessment. It is then incumbent upon the family judge to perform an intellectual exercise in the appreciation of the evidence, supported by the rules of logic, psychology, and everyday experience within a given frame of reference; which excludes any arbitrariness, always illegitimate and spurious.”* (Voto n.° 20, of 10:10 a.m. on January 26, 2005). In that understanding, the legal operator, when interpreting the regulations concerning this branch of Law, must always take into consideration those interests established as fundamental principles and set forth the reasons that led them to a particular conclusion. Based on these premises, the analysis of the evidence in the case file must be carried out, the assessment of which by the court is considered erroneous by the appellant.\n\n**V.- GENERAL ASPECTS REGARDING CRUELTY (SEVICIA) AS A GROUND FOR DIVORCE:** It is important to note that the marital union constitutes a community of life between the spouses, which generates reciprocal rights, duties, and responsibilities for both contracting parties. The duties can be both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. Regarding that second category, there are, among others, the duties of fidelity, respect, and mutual assistance. Respect between both spouses constitutes an essential element to guarantee good conjugal relations, as well as a comfortable environment in which family life develops. Consequently, each of the consorts must maintain, with respect to the other, such consideration as to guarantee the fulfillment of said purposes in order to safeguard the esteem for their spouse as a person and thus achieve marital stability. The Código de Familia, in subsection 4) of its Article 48, lists cruelty (sevicia) as one of the grounds for divorce, but it is the judge, in light of the doctrine and jurisprudence on the subject, who is called upon to specify its scope, since it is not just any act or its repetition, even when reprehensible, that can be invoked as justification for the dissolution of the marital bond. The foregoing, because the legal system protects with special interest the preservation of the institution of marriage, insofar as it is considered the essential basis of the family, and the family, in turn, as the natural element and foundation of society, deserving of protection by the State (Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitución Política). To assess the facts on which a divorce action is based, it must be taken into consideration that the aforementioned Article 52 contemplates the principle of equal rights between spouses. In the same vein, for the specific cases of that part of the population, this Chamber has taken into consideration point 1 of Article 16 of the “Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer”, ratified by Costa Rica by Law number 6968, of October 2, 1984. These rules are, in turn, collected and developed by the Código de Familia, which, in its Article 11, provides that marriage has as its object life in common, cooperation, and mutual assistance, and the following Article 34 stipulates: “The spouses share the responsibility and governance of the family. Jointly they must regulate domestic matters, provide for the education of their children, and prepare their future. Likewise, they are obliged to respect each other, to remain faithful, and to mutually support each other. […]”. That respect, which must always prevail within the family bosom, refers not only to the physical integrity of a person but also to their psychological and moral well-being, with equal rights and opportunities, principles enshrined in general terms in Articles 33 and 40 of the Constitución Política. Protection against discrimination, cruel, and degrading treatment to the detriment of the physical, psychological, and moral integrity of a person finds support in the fundamental right to have their honor and dignity respected, as also expressed in Articles 5 and 11 of the Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos. Consequently, it can be concluded that when those values are seriously breached by one of the spouses, this may give rise to a declaration of judicial separation or divorce, according to the claims of the affected party. This Chamber, in judgment number 32, of 2:20 p.m. on January 12, 2001, held: “Peace in the family sphere and the effects its absence provokes is a problem that affects society in general; the aforementioned equality between spouses and the right of all family members to live in an environment free of violence, guaranteeing their integral development, must always be considered when resolving the dispute. In the desire to protect the human rights of all persons and especially of women, various norms have been issued at the national and international levels that try to eradicate the violence and discrimination they have historically suffered in all spheres (family, political, social, etc.). In the search for a just response to the reality of our society, when dealing with the invocation of violence to the detriment of the wife, we must resort to the special regulations in this regard. For the purposes of assessing the existence of cruelty (sevicia) invoked as grounds for divorce, it is of interest to know the subject of domestic violence, particularly that suffered by the spouse at the hands of her husband; which is not always physical but can also be sexual and psychological. According to doctrine and jurisprudence, cruelty (sevicia), as a ground for divorce, is configured by the physical or moral violence employed by one of the spouses to the detriment of the other or their children, whether by means of acts or words, or by actions or omissions, which, being highly mortifying, disturb both physical and mental health and, consequently, make life as a couple practically impossible. […] It must involve one or more seriously defamatory and offensive acts and not situations of little importance or isolated ones.” Now then, as stated, for the particular case of violence to the detriment of women, the concept contained in the “Convención Interamericana para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia contra la mujer” (Convención de Belém do Pará) - adopted by the Organization of American States on June 9, 1994, and in force in the country by Law number 7499, of May 2, 1995 - has been taken into account; however, the fact that preponderant importance is given to the protection of women's rights due to the historical and social tendency towards their vulnerability does not mean that, in certain cases, cruelty (sevicia) also occurs against the man, for which one must look at the specific case, the evidence, and the concrete conditions of how the events occurred, all in harmony with what was stated above regarding the normative and conceptual aspects. Under these premises, it must be determined whether the cruelty (sevicia) invoked by the defendant-counterclaimant was duly proven in the case under study.\n\n**VI.- ON THE LAPSE OF THE GROUNDS OF CRUELTY (SEVICIA) IN THE PRESENT MATTER:** The representative of the plaintiff points out, as part of her reproaches, that the defense of lapse (caducidad) raised by that party should have been granted, since the acts that could constitute the grounds of cruelty (sevicia) ceased more than one year before the filing of the counterclaim; that is, the latter was not filed until after the year provided for in Article 49 of the Código de Familia had elapsed. In that sense, she alleges an erroneous assessment of the evidence. This Chamber considers that her argument is unfounded because these were indeed acts that, if determined to constitute that ground – as will be analyzed in the following recital (considerando) –, continued to occur over time even after the couple’s separation and before the filing of the counterclaim. Note that the incident arising from the daughter [[Nombre1] ] leaving home generated events revealing the constant and current aggression, as shown by the testimonies of [[Nombre1] ] and [[Nombre2] ], which will be analyzed later. That event took place on May 1, 2006, as a result of which the defendant filed a domestic violence complaint on June 21, 2006 (folio 2205 of Volume III) and proceeded to counterclaim on the following June 27 (receipt stamp on folio 278 Volume I). From the statement of that first witness, precisely, it is inferred that her departure from the house occurred when the claim that gave rise to this process had already been filed, and that this abandonment of the home was casually related to her mother’s attitude and her anger over the cordial relationship she had with her father, which leads to the conclusion that the acts continued to occur after the couple’s separation and before the daughter left home. The deponent also affirmed that the plaintiff spoke ill of their father to them when she took them to school, and she feared she would come to treat her the same way she treated the defendant. The foregoing leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff’s conduct has been a constant in her treatment of the spouse, with whom she necessarily had to interact to coordinate the visits of the two minor children to him and the delivery of maintenance money, as referred to by deponent [[Nombre3] ]; all of which makes it reasonable that it continued to occur during that period between the couple’s separation and the filing of the counterclaim. Note that in this matter, it does not appear that the cruelty (sevicia) ceased for any period, nor that there was a change in the plaintiff’s attitude; instead, the offenses and humiliations from her towards her husband continued to the point of coming to his work to rudely demand money for her own and their children’s maintenance who continued to live with her. All of the foregoing represents clear and unrefuted indications that shortly before the filing of the counterclaim, the acts alleged by the defendant-counterclaimant continued to occur. This being the case, the court’s decision on this issue must be endorsed.\n\n**VII.- REGARDING THE PROOF OF THE GROUNDS OF CRUELTY (SEVICIA) ALLEGED BY THE DEFENDANT-COUNTERCLAIMANT:** The appellant’s remaining grievances are aimed at discrediting the evidence in the case file for the purpose of concluding that the grounds of cruelty (sevicia) alleged by the defendant-counterclaimant were not proven, as well as attacking the assessment of the evidentiary elements made by the court, which is why – in the appeal – parts of the content of those elements and the possible conclusions derived from them were cited, according to her position. Based on the claims of the plaintiff’s representative, once the evidence indicated by the appellant has been analyzed, the Chamber reaches the conclusion that there are insufficient grounds to vary what has been decided. Thus, it must be concluded that in the case under analysis, the grounds of cruelty (sevicia) were indeed proven for the reasons that will be explained. Regarding the testimonial evidence, the challenger reveals a possible complacency in the daughters' statements to favor the father's interests, who has become their economic support. However, no defects of complacency are inferred from those testimonies, since even with all their closeness to the father, they coincide that his departure from the home was conditioned by the plaintiff’s attitude, a circumstance that even continued after the de facto separation. In that sense, they recounted the moments when she reproached him in a violent manner for unjustified situations such as a lack of money and even threw his food into the dog’s bowl. Witness [[Nombre4] ] recounted: “When I lived with my parents, normally when we were in high school at night when my father came home after work, and on Sundays when he was home, my mother would always fight with him, calling him a son of a bitch (hijueputa), wretched, because she wanted things and he didn’t want to give them to her, I mean money, and it’s not that he didn’t want to give them to her, but that he didn’t have money. As for the character between them, my mother has always been much, much more aggressive, hurtful when she says things, she doesn’t care about saying things and in front of whomever, my father would stay silent. […] Even though I lived in Spain, I always knew that my mother continues to be aggressive, she would always call him a son of a bitch (hijueputa), to the rest of my family, because my little siblings or my dad or my mother herself would start yelling at me on the phone and tell me that dad was a wretch, a son of a bitch (hijueputa), that he was going to take [[Nombre5] ] away. My sisters would call me crying and tell me that my mom treated them very badly, they would call me crying.” (Folios 332-334). For her part, [[Nombre6] ] stated: “When we became teenagers the problems started because she began to be very harsh with us and with my dad. She was harsh because she made us take sides between my dad and me. She said he was a lying, manipulative, cowardly, imbecile and told everyone and told him.” She said that every time she spoke with her, she spoke ill of the defendant, told her he was not a good father, and when she saw him, she screamed at him. Among other things, she called him a wretch and said she would send him to jail for being a thief. Furthermore, the witness reported that the plaintiff sent her husband emails copied to the daughters where she reiterated that he was going to jail and that she was going to make him have a bad time because of how wretched he was. Likewise, if she had saved food for him and was angry, she would end up giving it to the dogs. The declarant mentioned that, as a result, her father has suffered depression and has had psychological treatment. She added that the change in her mother's temperament began one or two years before the separation. (Folios 368-372). Witness [[Nombre1] ] stated that her father left the house because her mother treated him very badly, she remembers shouting and insults, she would get angry if the daughters spent a lot of time with him. She spoke ill of her father to her. Moreover, when she threw her out of the house, all the neighbors found out. She pointed out that when the defendant came to pick her up that day, she shouted things at him, later called him to tell him he was a bad father. She always initiated the provocation with a degrading comment towards him and almost always he remained silent and let her insult him. The deponent indicated that she called him wretch, bad father, lazybones (huevón), son of a bitch, among other things. She recounted that the day she left the house, a neighbor and her grandmother found out, and people passing by heard the plaintiff’s shouts. She coincided with her sister that if she had food ready and got angry, she would throw it into the dog’s bowl. Equally, she threatened him with lawsuits. The witness declared that she has noticed her father is sad. Likewise, she told that she misinformed him with the children, telling them he was a bad father and always bothered him in that aspect. (Folios 373-375). The fact that the witnesses do not mention specific dates or locate the recounted events in space and time is not a reason to exclude those testimonies as valid and suitable for having the referred ground as proven. On the other hand, as stated, the events recounted by the witnesses regarding their father’s possible adultery are irrelevant, since that does not form part of the factual basis under analysis by the Chamber, as previously clarified. Thus, nor was that the ground on which the plaintiff based her claim. The same consequence must be attributed to the fact that she was not included in the newspaper obituaries for the death of the defendant’s father and mother. While deponent [[Nombre7] ] indicated that the plaintiff was a woman dedicated to her home (folios 366-367), this does not imply that the commission of the acts recounted by the daughters is discarded, who – due to their closeness and being part of the family nucleus – were directly affected by that conduct and observed the events relating to the situation that affected their father. Nor is the fact that the witnesses did not remember the name of the professional who treated their father for depression problems, nor that they could locate the events more recently in their new statement regarding the domestic violence claim, sufficient to deem the grounds of cruelty (sevicia) unproven. The fact that the protection measures decreed in a domestic violence proceeding against the plaintiff were later archived does not mean that the events did not happen, and it matters little – for the specific purposes of this matter – whether the defendant's mother was included within those measures or not. Given the issue requiring proof for this Chamber, it is not important whether the witnesses and the defendant properly pursued administrative and judicial bodies in relation to a presumed problem affecting the minor son that was attempted to be attributed to the mother. The testimony of [[Nombre8] ] – folios 402 to 404 – does not provide any significant element regarding the issue to be proven. The declarant [[Nombre2] ] indicated that the plaintiff is a difficult person, given her way of being. She said she was present at her mother’s house – who lives nearby – the day the plaintiff threw [[Nombre1] ] out of the house, and that day she also treated the defendant badly, telling him he was a bad father. She recounted that the plaintiff once called her to come to the house and spoke ill of the defendant to her and said he was crazy. (Folios 451-454). As for the deponent [[Nombre3] ], he was also clear about the acts of cruelty (sevicia) committed by the plaintiff. The fact that he is a colleague of the defendant or holds a position in the companies does not mean he was untruthful; rather, that testimony is useful to confirm that indeed the acts and offenses towards the defendant continued after the separation and even have the effect of proving sufficient contemporaneity to decline the lapse (caducidad) as it is considered that it was a ground reiterated over time. He recounted that the plaintiff called the company to demand money in a very strong manner, using insults and threats towards the defendant. She asked to be put through to “that imbecile” and sometimes called him “son of a bitch (hijueputa)” and [Nombre9]. He said that when she calls and speaks with him, the shouts can be heard. He recounted that the plaintiff has come to the company and, in front of employees and clients, shouts [Nombre9], irresponsible, threatening to report him. She has come to the company and burst in abruptly. (Folios 454-457). Also, the fact that the plaintiff was not included in the obituary and the defendant's partner was mentioned is not relevant – as stated – for the matter under analysis by this Chamber, since the proof or existence of grounds of cruelty (sevicia) on the part of the spouse, nor a possible adultery, is being determined. Regardless of the manner in which the defendant left the conjugal domicile, and even if it was by mutual agreement (see testimony of [[Nombre7] ] from folio 366 to 367), what is truly relevant are the reasons that determined that departure, which had to do with the constant quarrels generated by the plaintiff and the verbal abuse against her husband. Now then, from the foregoing testimonies, a conduct on the part of the plaintiff emerges that possesses the intent to cause affliction required for the referred ground to be configured. When analyzing the statements, the commission of the referred circumstance is inferred without concluding that these were isolated events arising in response to arguments between the couple. As can be concluded, they are systematic and persistent events with the purpose of offending and causing scorn, therefore, capable of generating impairment to the defendant’s morals or psyche. As indicated previously, from the analyzed evidence it is deduced that the counter-defendant purposely uttered hurtful words and phrases to her spouse, her insults towards him generated the arguments, without a violent reaction by the defendant in response being demonstrated. It is reprehensible that, despite being her husband and having several children in common, the plaintiff deliberately disobeyed the duty of conjugal respect and did not show the minimum will to reasonably settle any disagreements that might exist, which also affected the offspring. The evidence does not even show occasional glimpses that the plaintiff tried to seek an adequate dialogue with her husband to resolve differences; rather, her constant attack through shouting, offenses, and threats is clear, hence the cruelty (sevicia) is deemed proven. Likewise, for the reasons stated, it is deemed reasonable that this whole situation caused him moral damage (daño moral) as the trial judges considered. Therefore, all these circumstances, analyzed in light of rational sound judgment (sana crítica), must be considered as manifestations of verbal and psychological violence against the defendant. Furthermore, it is clear that they denote a recurring situation that has emotionally affected the offended person. As can be observed, these were not simple responses to arguments, but she executed them with an intent to offend and mortify, to the point of recklessly threatening him with reporting him on matters related to the companies that she never came to explain, treating him as a bad father, and violently bursting into the company's premises in front of clients and employees. It is evident that all these circumstances, as part of a cycle of violence, negatively affected the emotional state of the consort, which is also documented in the proceedings for the request for protection measures that he was forced to file (folios 2204-2341) and the psychological care he had to receive privately (folios 273-276). It must be noted that the evidence analyzed above is sufficient to have the cruelty (sevicia) as proven, and there are no indications to resolve otherwise, hence the appellant's affirmations lack support. The representative of the plaintiff also alleges the erroneous assessment of other evidentiary elements; however, for what will be stated, this is not sufficient to vary the decision. Regarding the confessional evidence of the defendant, no element is inferred that goes against the interests of the confessant and supports the appellant's claims (folios 395-402). Note that a confession only provides full proof against the interests of the one making it, not in their favor (Article 338 of the Código Procesal Civil), in addition to the nuances that must be taken into account in this area, as explained in a previous recital (considerando). Moreover, as has been insisted, the statements the plaintiff seeks to extract from it are not related to the issue to be proved in the present matter, such as those related to possible cruelty (sevicia) against her or the husband's adultery. In relation to the forensic expert evidence, what is explained there are possible reasons that could influence the personality of the evaluated persons, but in no way can they be taken as the sole basis to affirm that a person lied in their statement or assertions. It has already been made clear that the daughters' testimonies were not complacent, and this other evidence does not change that conclusion. What was indicated in said expert report referring to adultery and a possible impulsive and irritable conduct of the defendant has already been indicated as unrelated to what is intended to be proved here, besides the fact that, regarding the latter, from the rest of the evidence, no manifestation of that possible conduct against the plaintiff emerges. Regarding moral damage (daño moral), this evidence provides but one element, not the definitive one for its applicability, since this can even be inferred from the illicit acts themselves that have harmed the requesting person in their most intimate affections, as well as in their physical or psychological integrity. Rather, from this evidence, the distancing of the daughters from their mother is confirmed, which must be contrasted with what was stated by them in their testimonial statements to better understand the context of those testimonies. The private expert reports (dictámenes) are merely a complementary factor to take into consideration, but they are not and were not decisive for deciding the present matter, which, in any case, has been done taking into account the entirety of the evidentiary collection. The fact that the treating physician is a relative of the defendant does not completely detract from that evidence regarding the possible depression problems he suffers, which, as stated, have been assessed not only based on that evidentiary element. For its part, the expert report provided by the plaintiff reveals aspects that, as stated, are not for the Chamber to analyze regarding this specific challenge. Thus, the grounds of cruelty (sevicia) alleged by the defendant-counterclaimant having been proven, the court's decision must be upheld.”\n\nIn that understanding, the legal operator, when interpreting the regulations concerning this branch of Law, must always take into consideration those interests that are established as fundamental principles and explain the reasons that led him to reach a particular conclusion. Based on these premises, the analysis of the evidence contained in the case file must be carried out, the assessment of which, by the court, the appellant considers was erroneous.\n\n**V.- GENERAL ASPECTS REGARDING CRUELTY (SEVICIA) AS A GROUND FOR DIVORCE:** It is important to note that with the marital union, a community of life is constituted between the spouses, which generates reciprocal rights, duties, and responsibilities for both contracting parties. The duties can be both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. With respect to that second category, these include, among others, the duties of fidelity, respect, and mutual assistance. Respect between both spouses constitutes an essential element to guarantee good marital relations, as well as a comfortable environment in which family life develops. Consequently, each of the consorts must maintain, regarding the other, a consideration such that it guarantees the fulfillment of said objectives in order to safeguard the regard for their spouse as a person and thus achieve marital stability. The *Family Code (Código de Familia)*, in subsection 4) of its article 48, lists cruelty (sevicia) as one of the grounds for divorce, but it is the judge, in light of the doctrine and jurisprudence on the subject, who is called upon to specify its scope, for it is not just any act or its repetition, even when reprehensible, that can be invoked as justification for the dissolution of the marital bond. The foregoing, because the legal system protects with special interest the preservation of the institution of marriage, insofar as it is considered the essential basis of the family and, this, in turn, as the natural element and foundation of society, deserving of protection by the State (articles 51 and 52 of the *Political Constitution (Constitución Política)*). To assess the facts on which a divorce action is based, it must be taken into consideration that the aforementioned numeral 52 contemplates the principle of equal rights between spouses. In the same vein, for the specific cases of that part of the population, this Chamber has taken into consideration point 1 of article 16 of the *\"Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women\"*, ratified by Costa Rica through Law No. 6968, of October 2, 1984. These rules are, in turn, collected and developed by the *Family Code (Código de Familia)*, which, in its article 11, provides that marriage has as its object life in common, cooperation, and mutual assistance, and the following numeral 34 stipulates: *\"The spouses share the responsibility and governance of the family. Jointly they must regulate domestic affairs, provide for the education of their children, and prepare their future. Likewise, they are obligated to respect each other, to remain faithful, and to mutually aid each other. [...]\".* That respect which must always prevail within the family bosom refers not only to the physical integrity of a person, but also to their psychological and moral well-being, with equality of rights and opportunities, principles generally enshrined in articles 33 and 40 of the *Political Constitution (Constitución Política).* Protection against discrimination, cruel and degrading treatment to the detriment of the physical, psychological, and moral integrity of a person, finds support in the fundamental right to have one's honor and dignity respected, as also expressed in articles 5 and 11 of the *American Convention on Human Rights*. Consequently, it can be concluded that when those values are seriously breached by one of the spouses, this may give rise to the declaration of judicial separation or divorce, according to the claims of the affected party. This Chamber, in judgment number 32, at 14:20 hours on January 12, 2001, ruled: *\"Peace in the family sphere and the effects its absence provokes, is a problem that affects society in general; always having to consider, in resolving the dispute, the aforementioned equality between spouses and the right of all family members to live in an environment free of violence, guaranteeing their integral development. With the aim of protecting the human rights of all people and especially of women, various norms have been enacted at the national and international level that try to eradicate the violence and discrimination that they have historically suffered in all spheres (family, political, social, etc.). In the search for a just response to the reality of our society, in the case of the invocation of violence to the detriment of the wife, we must turn to the special regulations regarding her. For the purposes of assessing the existence of cruelty (sevicia) invoked as a ground for divorce, it is of interest to know the subject of domestic violence, particularly that suffered by the spouse due to her husband; which is not always physical, but can also be sexual and psychological. According to doctrine and jurisprudence, cruelty (sevicia), as a ground for divorce, is configured by the physical or moral violence employed by one of the spouses to the detriment of the other or their children, whether through acts or words, or by actions or omissions, which being highly mortifying disturb both physical and mental health and consequently make life as a couple practically impossible. [...] It must involve one or several acts that are gravely infamous and offensive and not situations of little importance or isolated incidents.\"* Now then, as stated, for the particular case of violence to the detriment of women, the concept contained in the *\"Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women\"* (*Convention of Belém do Pará*) - adopted by the Organization of American States on June 9, 1994, and in force in the country through Law No. 7499 of May 2, 1995 - has been taken into account; however, the fact that preponderant importance is given to the protection of women's rights due to the historical and social tendency towards their vulnerability does not mean that, in certain cases, cruelty (sevicia) may also occur against the man, for which one must turn to the specific case, the evidence, and the concrete conditions of how the facts occurred, all in harmony with what was set forth above regarding the normative and conceptual aspects. Under those premises, it must be determined whether the cruelty (sevicia) invoked by the defendant-counterclaimant in the case under study was duly proven.\n\n**VI.- ON THE EXPIRATION (CADUCIDAD) OF THE GROUND OF CRUELTY (SEVICIA) IN THE PRESENT MATTER:** The attorney for the plaintiff points out, as part of her objections, that the exception of expiration (caducidad) filed by that party should have been granted, since the facts that could constitute the ground of cruelty (sevicia) ceased more than one year before the filing of the counterclaim, that is, the latter was not filed until more than one year had elapsed as provided by numeral 49 of the Family Code (Código de Familia). In that sense, she alleges an erroneous assessment of the evidence. This Chamber considers that her argument is unfounded because it indeed involved facts that, if determined to be constitutive of that ground – as will be analyzed in the following recital (considerando) – continued to occur over time even after the couple's separation and before the filing of the counterclaim. Note that the incident presented regarding the daughter [Name1] leaving the home generated facts revealing constant and current aggression, as inferred from the testimonies of [Name1] and [Name2], which will be analyzed later. That event took place on May 1, 2006, as a result of which the defendant filed a domestic violence complaint on June 21, 2006 (folio 2205 of volume III) and proceeded to counterclaim on the following June 27 (receipt stamp on folio 278 volume I). From the statement of that first witness, precisely, it is inferred that her departure from the house occurred when the lawsuit that gave rise to this process had already been filed, and that this abandonment of the home was causally related to her mother's attitude and her anger at the cordial relationship she had with her father, which leads to the conclusion that the facts continued to occur after the couple's separation and before the daughter left the house. The deponent also affirmed that the plaintiff spoke ill of her father when she took them to school and she feared that she would come to treat her the same way she treated the defendant. The foregoing leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff's conduct has been a constant in her treatment of the spouse, with whom she necessarily had to interact to coordinate the visits of the two minor children to him and the delivery of maintenance money, as stated by the deponent [Name3], all of which makes it reasonable that this continued to occur during that period between the couple's separation and the filing of the counterclaim. Note that in this matter, it is not evident that the cruelty (sevicia) ceased for any period nor that there was a change in the plaintiff's attitude, but rather that her offenses and vexations towards her husband have continued to the point of arriving at his workplace to demand, in a bad manner, money for her own maintenance and that of the children who continued living with her. All of the foregoing represents clear and unrefuted indications that shortly before the filing of the counterclaim, the facts alleged by the defendant-counterclaimant were still occurring. This being the case, what was ordered by the court regarding this issue must be upheld.\n\n**VII.- REGARDING THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE GROUND OF CRUELTY (SEVICIA) ALLEGED BY THE DEFENDANT-COUNTERCLAIMANT:** The appellant's other grievances are aimed at discrediting the evidence contained in the case file in order to conclude that the ground of cruelty (sevicia) alleged by the defendant-counterclaimant was not demonstrated, as well as attacking the assessment of the evidentiary elements carried out by the court, which is why – in the appeal – parts of the content of those elements and the possible conclusions derived from them were cited, according to her position. Based on the claims of the plaintiff's attorney, once the evidence indicated by the appellant was analyzed, the Chamber reaches the conclusion that there are no sufficient reasons to vary what was decided. This being so, it must be concluded that in the case under analysis, the ground of cruelty (sevicia) was indeed demonstrated for the reasons that will be explained. With respect to the testimonial evidence, the challenger reveals a possible bias (complacencia) in the daughters' statements to favor the interests of the father, who has become their financial support. However, from those testimonies, no defects of bias (complacencia) are inferred, because even with all the closeness to the father, they coincide that his departure from the home was conditioned by the plaintiff's attitude, a circumstance that even continued after the de facto separation. In that sense, they recounted the moments when she reproached him in a violent manner for unjustified situations such as the lack of money and even threw his food into the dog's bowl. The witness [Name4] testified: *\"When I lived with my parents, normally when we were in school, at night when my father arrived after work and on Sundays when he was at home, my mother always fought with him, she told him he was a son of a bitch (hijueputa), a wretch because she wanted things and he didn't want to give them to her, I mean money, and it's not that he didn't want to, but that he didn't have money. The character temperament between them, my mother has always been much, much more aggressive, hurtful when she says things, she doesn't care about saying things and in front of whom, my father would stay very quiet. [...] Even though I lived in Spain, I always knew that my mother kept attacking, she always called him a son of a bitch (hijueputa), and the rest of my family, because my little siblings or daddy or my mother herself would start yelling at me on the phone and tell me that daddy was a wretch, a son of a bitch (hijueputa), that she was going to take [Name5] away. My sisters would call me crying and tell me that my mom treated them very badly, they called me crying.\"* (Folios 332-334). For her part, [Name6] stated: *\"When we became teenagers the problems started because she began to be very harsh with us and with my dad. She was harsh because she made us take sides between my dad and her. She said that he was a liar, manipulator, coward, imbecile and she told everyone and told him so.\"* She said that every time she spoke with her, she spoke badly of the defendant, told her he was not a good father, and when she saw him she yelled at him. Among other things, she called him a wretch and that she was going to send him to jail for being a thief. Additionally, the witness reported that the plaintiff sent her husband emails with copies to the daughters where she reiterated that he was going to jail and that she was going to make him have a bad time for the wretch he was. Likewise, if she kept food for him and was angry, she would end up giving it to the dogs. The declarant mentioned that, as a result of this, her father has suffered depression and has had psychological treatment. She added that her mother's temperament began to change one or two years before the separation. (Folios 368-372). The witness [Name1] stated that her dad left the house because her mom treated him very badly, she remembers screams and insults, she got angry if the daughters spent a lot of time with him. She spoke badly to her about her dad. Additionally, when she threw her out of the house, all the neighbors found out. She pointed out that when the defendant came to pick her up that day, she was yelling things at him, later she called him to say he was a bad father. She always initiated the provocation with a degrading comment towards him and he almost always stayed quiet and let her insult him. The deponent indicated that she called him a wretch, bad father, lazy ass (huevón), son of a bitch, among other things. She recounted that the day she left the house, a neighbor and her grandmother found out, and the people passing by heard the plaintiff's screams. She agreed with her sister that if she had food ready and she got angry, she threw it into the dogs' bowl. Equally, she threatened him with lawsuits. The witness declared that she has noticed her father is sad. Likewise, she recounted that she misinformed him about the children, told them he was a bad father, and always bothered him in that regard. (Folios 373-375). The fact that the witnesses do not mention specific dates nor place the recounted events in space and time is not a reason to exclude those testimonies as valid and suitable to consider the referred ground as proven. On the other hand, as stated, the facts recounted by the witnesses regarding the possible adultery of their father are irrelevant, since that is not part of the factual basis under analysis by the Chamber, as was clarified earlier. So that was also not the ground on which the plaintiff based her lawsuit. The same consequence must be attributed to the fact that she was not included in the newspaper obituaries for the death of the defendant's father and mother. Although the deponent [Name7] pointed out that the plaintiff was a woman dedicated to her home (folios 366-367), this does not imply discarding the commission of the acts recounted by the daughters, who - due to their closeness and forming part of the family nucleus - were directly affected by that conduct and observed the facts concerning the situation that affected their father. Nor is the fact that the witnesses did not remember the name of the professional who treated their father for depression problems sufficient to consider the ground of cruelty (sevicia) unproven, nor that they were more able to place the facts contemporaneously in their new statement with respect to the domestic violence complaint. The fact that the protection measures decreed in a domestic violence proceeding against the plaintiff were subsequently archived does not mean that the events did not happen, and it matters little - for the specific purposes of this matter - whether the defendant's mother was included within said measures or not. Due to the subject matter that requires demonstration for this Chamber, it is not important whether the witnesses and the defendant duly initiated administrative and judicial bodies in relation to a presumed problem affecting the minor son that was attempted to be imputed to the mother. The testimony of [Name8] – folios 402 to 404 – does not provide any significant element regarding the issue to be proven. The declarant [Name2] indicated that the plaintiff is a difficult person, given her way of being. She said she was present at her mother's house – who lives nearby – the day the plaintiff threw [Name1] out of the house, and that day she also treated the defendant badly, telling him he was a bad father. She recounted that the plaintiff once called her to come to the house and spoke badly of the defendant to her, and said he was crazy. (Folios 451-454). As for the deponent [Name3], he was also clear about the acts of cruelty (sevicia) committed by the plaintiff. The fact that he is a colleague of the defendant or holds a position in the companies does not mean he has spoken falsely; rather, that testimony is useful to verify that indeed the acts and offenses towards the defendant continued after the separation and even have the effect of proving sufficient contemporaneity to dismiss the expiration (caducidad) because it was considered a ground that was reiterated over time. He recounted that the plaintiff called the company to demand money in a very harsh manner, using profanities and threats against the defendant. She would ask to speak to *\"that imbecile\"* and sometimes she called him a *\"son of a bitch (hijueputa)\"* and [Name9]. He said that when she calls and speaks to him, the screams can be heard. He recounted that the plaintiff has come to the company and, in front of employees and clients, yells [Name9], irresponsible, and threatens to report him. She has arrived at the company and bursts in abruptly. (Folios 454-457). Also, the fact that the plaintiff was not included in the obituary and the defendant's partner was mentioned is not relevant - as stated - for what is under analysis before this Chamber, since it is not determining the proof or existence of the ground of cruelty (sevicia) on the part of the spouse, nor possible adultery. Regardless of how the defendant left the marital domicile and even if it had been by mutual agreement (see [Name7]'s testimony from folio 366 to 367), what is truly relevant are the reasons that determined that departure, which had to do with the constant fights generated by the plaintiff and the verbal abuse against her husband. Now then, from the foregoing testimonies, a behavior of the plaintiff emerges that has an afflictive intent, required for the referred ground to be configured. Upon analyzing the statements, the commission of the referred circumstance is inferred without concluding that they were isolated incidents arising as a response to arguments between the couple. As can be concluded, it involves systematic and persistent events with the purpose of offending and producing scorn, thus capable of generating damage to the morality or psyche of the defendant. As indicated earlier, from the evidence analyzed, it is deduced that the counterclaim defendant deliberately uttered hurtful words and phrases towards her spouse, her insults towards him generated the arguments, without it having been demonstrated that the defendant reacted violently in response. It is reprehensible that despite being his wife and having several children in common, the plaintiff deliberately disobeyed the duty of marital respect and did not show the minimum willingness to reasonably settle the disagreements that might exist, which also affected the offspring. From the evidence, not even occasional glimpses are shown that the plaintiff tried to seek adequate dialogue with her husband to resolve differences, but rather her constant attack through screams, offenses, and threats is clear, hence it is deemed that cruelty (sevicia) is proven. Likewise, for the reasons stated, it is deemed reasonable that this entire situation caused him moral damage as estimated by the instance judges. Then, all these circumstances, analyzed in light of sound rational criticism, must be considered manifestations of verbal and psychological violence against the defendant. Furthermore, it is clear they denote a repetitive situation that has emotionally affected the offended person. As can be observed, they were not mere responses to arguments, but she carried them out with an intent to offend and mortify, to the point of recklessly threatening to report him for matters related to the companies that she never explained, calling him a bad father, and violently bursting into the company's premises in front of clients and employees. It is evident that all these circumstances, as part of a cycle of violence, negatively affected the emotional state of the consort, which is also documented in the proceedings for the request for protection measures that he was forced to file (folios 2204-2341) and the psychological care he had to receive privately (folios 273-276). It should be noted that the evidence analyzed above is sufficient to consider the cruelty (sevicia) as proven and there are no indications to resolve differently, hence the appellant's affirmations lack support. The plaintiff's attorney also alleges the erroneous assessment of other evidentiary elements; however, for what will be said, this is not sufficient to vary what was decided. With respect to the defendant's confession, no element is inferred that goes against the confessant's interests and that supports the appellant's allegations (folios 395-402). Note that the confession only fully proves against the interests of the one who makes it, not in their favor (article 338 of the *Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil)*), in addition to the nuances that must be taken into account in this matter, as explained in a previous recital (considerando). Furthermore, as has been insisted, the declarations that the plaintiff seeks to extract from it have nothing to do with the issue to be demonstrated in this matter, such as those related to possible cruelty (sevicia) against her or her husband's adultery. In relation to the forensic expert evidence, what is explained there are possible motives that could affect the personality of the evaluated persons, but in no way can they be taken as a sole basis to affirm that a person lied in their statement or assertions. It has already been made clear that the daughters' testimonies were not biased (complacientes) and this other evidence does not change that conclusion. What was indicated in said expert report referring to adultery and a possible impulsive and irritable conduct of the defendant has already been indicated as not related to what is sought to be demonstrated here, besides which, regarding the latter, a manifestation of that possible conduct against the plaintiff is not evident from the rest of the evidence. Regarding moral damage, this evidence provides just one element, not the definitive one for its admissibility, for this can be inferred even from the illegal acts themselves that have harmed the applicant in their most intimate affections, as well as in their physical or psychological integrity. Rather, from this evidence, the estrangement of the daughters in relation to their mother is verified, which must be contrasted with what was stated by them in their testimonial statements to understand even more the context of those testimonies. The private medical reports are only a complementary factor to be taken into consideration, but they are not and were not determinative for deciding this matter, which, in any case, has been done taking into account the entirety of the evidentiary body. The fact that the treating physician is a relative of the defendant does not completely detract from that evidence regarding the possible depression problems he suffers, which, as stated, have been assessed not only based on that evidentiary element. For its part, the report provided by the plaintiff reveals aspects that, as stated, are not for the Chamber to analyze regarding this specific challenge.\n\nThus, since the ground of cruelty (sevicia) alleged by the counterclaiming defendant has been proven, the decision reached by the court must be upheld.”</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>\n\nShe indicated that when the respondent came to pick her up that day, she was shouting things at him, and later she called him to tell him he was a bad father. She always initiated the provocation with a degrading comment toward him, and he would almost always remain silent and let her insult him. The deponent stated that she would call him a wretch, a bad father, a lazy bum (huevón), a son of a bitch, among other things. She recounted that the day she left the house, a neighbor and her grandmother noticed, and people passing by heard the plaintiff’s shouting. She agreed with her sister that if she had food ready and became angry, she would throw it into the dogs’ dish. Likewise, she threatened him with lawsuits. The witness declared that she has noticed her father is sad. She also related that she would misinform him regarding the children, would tell them he was a bad father, and always bothered him in that regard. (Folios 373-375). The fact that the witnesses do not mention specific dates and the recounted events are not situated in space and time is not a reason to exclude those testimonies as valid and suitable to consider the alleged ground as proven. On the other hand, as stated, the facts recounted by the witnesses regarding their father’s possible adultery are irrelevant, since that does not form part of the factual basis under analysis by this Chamber, as clarified previously. Thus, that was not the ground on which the plaintiff based her claim either. The same consequence must be attributed to the fact that she was not included in the newspaper obituaries for the death of the respondent’s father and mother. Although deponent [[Nombre7]] indicated that the plaintiff was a woman dedicated to her home (folios 366-367), this does not imply that the commission of the acts recounted by the daughters is dismissed, since they—due to their closeness and because they form part of the family nucleus—were directly affected by that conduct and observed the facts relating to the situation that affected their father. Nor is the fact that the witnesses did not remember the name of the professional who treated their father for problems of depression sufficient to consider the ground of cruelty (sevicia) as unproven, nor that they were able to situate the events more contemporaneously in their new declaration regarding the domestic violence complaint. The fact that the protection measures decreed in a domestic violence proceeding against the plaintiff were later archived does not mean that the events did not occur, and it matters little—for the specific purposes of this matter—whether the respondent’s mother was included within said measures or not. By reason of the topic that requires demonstration for this Chamber, it is not important whether the witnesses and the respondent properly brought proceedings before administrative and judicial bodies in relation to an alleged problem affecting the minor son that was attempted to be imputed to the mother. The testimony of [[Nombre8]]—folios 402 to 404—does not provide any element of significance regarding the topic to be demonstrated. Declarant [[Nombre2]] indicated that the plaintiff is a difficult person, given her way of being. She said she was present at her mother’s house—who lives nearby—the day the plaintiff threw [[Nombre1]] out of the house, and that day she also treated the respondent badly, telling him he was a bad father. She related that the plaintiff once called her to come to the house and spoke ill of the respondent and told her he was crazy. (Folios 451-454). As for deponent [[Nombre3]], he was also clear about the acts of cruelty (sevicia) committed by the plaintiff. The fact that he is the respondent’s colleague or holds a position in the companies does not mean that he has failed to tell the truth; rather, that testimony is useful to confirm that indeed the acts and offenses against the respondent continued after the separation and even have the effect of accrediting sufficient contemporaneity to decline expiry, considering that it was a ground reiterated over time. He related that the plaintiff would call the company to demand money in a rather forceful manner, using insults and threats against the respondent. She would ask to speak to <span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“ese imbécil”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> and sometimes called him </span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">“hijueputa”</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> and [Nombre9]. He said that when she calls and speaks with him, the shouting can be heard. He related that the plaintiff has come to the company and, in front of employees and clients, yells at him [Nombre9], irresponsible, and threatens to report him. She has arrived at the company and bursts in abruptly. (Folios 454-457). Also, the fact that the plaintiff was not included in the obituary and the respondent’s partner was mentioned is not relevant—as stated—for what is under analysis before this Chamber, since this is not determining the accreditation or existence of the ground of cruelty by the spouse, nor a possible adultery. Regardless of how the respondent left the marital home, and even if it had been by mutual agreement (see testimony of [[Nombre7]] from folio 366 to 367), what is truly relevant are the reasons that determined that departure, which had to do with the constant quarrels generated by the plaintiff and the verbal abuse against her husband. Now, from the foregoing testimonies, a conduct of the plaintiff can be inferred that possesses an afflictive intent (ánimo aflictivo), required for the referred ground to be established. Upon analyzing the declarations, the commission of the referred circumstance is inferred, without concluding that they were isolated events arising as a response to arguments between the couple. As can be concluded, these are systematic and persistent events with the purpose of offending and producing scorn, therefore, capable of generating a detriment to the respondent’s morale or psyche. As indicated previously, from the evidence analyzed, it is deduced that the counter-defendant intentionally uttered hurtful words and phrases to her spouse; her insults toward him generated the arguments, without a violent reaction from the respondent in response thereto having been demonstrated. It is reprehensible that, despite being her husband and having several children in common, the plaintiff deliberately disobeyed the duty of marital respect and displayed not even the minimum willingness to reasonably settle any disagreements that might exist, which also affected the offspring. The evidence does not even show occasional glimpses that the plaintiff tried to seek adequate dialogue with her husband to resolve differences; rather, her constant attack through shouting, offenses, and threats is clear, hence the cruelty (sevicia) is deemed proven. Likewise, for the reasons stated, it is considered reasonable that this entire situation caused him moral harm, as the lower court judges determined. Then, all these circumstances, analyzed in light of sound rational criticism, must be considered as manifestations of verbal and psychological violence against the respondent. Furthermore, it is clear that they denote a repetitive situation that has emotionally affected the offended person. As can be observed, these were not simple responses to arguments, but rather she executed them with an intent to offend and mortify, to the point of recklessly threatening to report him for matters related to the companies that she never explained, calling him a bad father, and violently bursting into the company’s premises in front of clients and employees. It is evident that all these circumstances, as part of a cycle of violence, negatively affected the emotional state of the spouse, which is also documented in the proceedings for the request for protection measures that he was forced to file (folios 2204-2341) and the psychological care he had to receive privately (folios 273-276). It must be indicated that the evidence analyzed above is sufficient to deem the cruelty (sevicia) accredited, and there are no indications to resolve otherwise; hence, the appellant’s assertions lack support. The plaintiff’s legal representative also alleges the erroneous assessment of other probative evidence; however, for reasons that will be stated, this is not sufficient to vary what has been decided. With regard to the respondent’s judicial confession, no element can be inferred that goes against the confessant’s interests and supports the appellant’s arguments (folios 395-402). Note that a confession only fully proves against the interests of the person rendering it, not in their favor (article 338 of the <span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic\">Código Procesal Civil</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">), in addition to the nuances that must be taken into account in this matter, as explained in a previous considerando. Moreover, as has been repeatedly stated, the statements that the plaintiff seeks to extract from it are unrelated to the topic to be demonstrated in the present matter, such as those relating to possible cruelty against her or the husband’s adultery. In relation to the forensic expert evidence, what is explained there are possible motives that could influence the personality of the persons evaluated, but in no way can they be taken as the sole basis to affirm that a person lied in their declaration or in their assertions. It has already been made clear that the daughters’ testimonies were not complacent, and this other evidence does not change that conclusion. What is indicated in said expert opinion regarding adultery and a possible impulsive and irritable conduct of the respondent has already been indicated as unrelated to what is sought to be demonstrated here, in addition to the fact that, regarding the latter, the other evidence does not reveal a manifestation of that possible conduct against the plaintiff. Regarding moral harm, this evidence provides merely one element, not the definitive one for its appropriateness, since this can be inferred even from the very illicit acts that have harmed the requesting person in their most intimate affections, as well as in their physical or psychological integrity. Rather, from this evidence the distancing of the daughters in relation to their mother is confirmed, which must be contrasted with what was stated by them in their witness declarations to understand even more the context of those testimonies. The private expert opinions are merely a complementary factor to take into consideration, but they are not and were not determinative for deciding the present matter, which, in any case, has been done taking into account the entirety of the body of evidence. The fact that the treating physician is a relative of the respondent does not completely diminish that evidence regarding the possible depression problems he suffers, which, as stated, have been assessed not solely based on that element of proof. For its part, the expert opinion submitted by the plaintiff reveals aspects that, as stated, are not for this Chamber to analyze regarding this specific challenge. Thus, the ground of cruelty (sevicia) alleged by the respondent counterclaimant having been proven, the ruling of the court must be upheld.”</span></p><p style=\\\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\\\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>\""
}