{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-157270", "citation": "Res. 00581-2016 Sala Segunda de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "El salario escolar como derecho fundamental frente a la política salarial del Banco Central", "title_en": "School salary as a fundamental right against the Central Bank's wage policy", "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia resolvió un recurso de casación en un proceso ordinario laboral donde un trabajador del Banco Central de Costa Rica reclamaba el pago del salario escolar, que la entidad había suprimido para nuevos ingresos a partir de 1999, basándose en su autonomía para fijar su propio régimen salarial según el artículo 28 inciso m de su Ley Orgánica. La Sala analizó la naturaleza constitucional y convencional del salario, reafirmando que éste es un derecho fundamental irrenunciable, protegido por los artículos 56 y 57 de la Constitución Política y los Convenios 94 y 95 de la OIT, y que el salario escolar, originado en una política general del Estado en 1994 y luego incorporado en el decreto ejecutivo 23907-H, es un componente salarial más, calculado sobre el salario total y pagadero en enero, no una mera gratificación disponible. Tras examinar la doctrina de la descentralización y la tutela administrativa, y con base en jurisprudencia constitucional previa (votos 3309-94, 1822-2001), la Sala concluyó que el Banco Central, pese a su autonomía, no está exento de acatar las políticas salariales generales del Poder Ejecutivo y que no puede suprimir el salario escolar amparándose en normas internas de inferior jerarquía, por lo que declaró improcedente la eliminación del pago, confirmando la obligación de reconocerlo al actor y a todos los servidores públicos activos sin distinción.", "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice resolved an appeal in an ordinary labor proceeding where a Central Bank of Costa Rica employee claimed the school salary, which the bank had discontinued for new hires starting in 1999, citing its autonomy to set its own wage regime under Article 28(m) of its Organic Law. The Chamber analyzed the constitutional and conventional nature of wages, reaffirming that wages are a fundamental, non-waivable right protected by Articles 56 and 57 of the Political Constitution and ILO Conventions 94 and 95, and that the school salary—originally established as a general state policy in 1994 and later incorporated into Executive Decree 23907-H—is an integral wage component calculated on total salary and payable in January, not a mere discretionary bonus. After examining the doctrine of decentralization and administrative guardianship, and based on prior constitutional case law (votes 3309-94, 1822-2001), the Chamber concluded that the Central Bank, despite its autonomy, is not exempt from complying with the Executive Branch's general wage policies and cannot eliminate the school salary using lower-ranking internal rules, thus ruling the suppression unlawful and confirming the obligation to pay it to the plaintiff and all active public servants without distinction.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte", "date": "2016", "year": "2016", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "salario escolar", "sobresueldo", "aguinaldo", "empleo público", "tutela administrativa", "Autonomía funcional", "Política salarial del Estado", "Principio de legalidad" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 56", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 57", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 50", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 28", "law": "Ley 7558" } ], "keywords_es": [ "salario escolar", "Banco Central de Costa Rica", "derecho laboral", "política salarial", "autonomía administrativa", "tutela administrativa", "derechos fundamentales", "empleo público", "Constitución Política", "OIT", "Convenio 94", "Convenio 95", "decreto 23907-H", "Ley Orgánica del Banco Central", "irrenunciabilidad", "descentralización" ], "keywords_en": [ "school salary", "Central Bank of Costa Rica", "labor law", "wage policy", "administrative autonomy", "administrative oversight", "fundamental rights", "public employment", "Political Constitution", "ILO", "Convention 94", "Convention 95", "Decree 23907-H", "Central Bank Organic Law", "non-waivability", "decentralization" ], "excerpt_es": "El derecho al salario es un instituto que se debe apoyar en principios y valores consagrados constitucionalmente y en los convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, como lo son: la solidaridad, la igualdad y la participación de todos en la vida económica del país. [...] Así las cosas, se estima que el Banco Central de Costa Rica, a pesar de su autonomía funcional y financiera, no quedó excluido del deber de reconocer el salario escolar a sus empleados, independientemente de la variación en el régimen salarial que estatuyó internamente a partir de enero de 1999 y la fecha de ingreso de los funcionarios a la institución -entre ellos el actor-. Lo anterior, por cuanto la creación y el pago de ese sobresueldo, inicialmente, tuvo su origen en una política general de salarios del Estado que no excluyó expresamente a ninguna institución o entidad del sector público, de manera que tampoco se ha dictado, hasta la fecha, normativa alguna en sentido contrario y, por ende, ese fundamento debe primar aun por las disposiciones internas de cada entidad y las reformas posteriores a estas que se hayan hecho al interior de su estructura. Es claro que los funcionarios del Banco Central, antes de ser empleados de la entidad, forman parte de la categoría general de servidores públicos activos y a esa población -sin excepción, limitación o condición futura alguna- iba dirigida la política salarial beneficiadora en virtud de la cual tuvo origen el salario escolar.", "excerpt_en": "The right to wages is an institution that must be based on constitutionally enshrined principles and values and on the conventions of the International Labour Organization, such as: solidarity, equality, and participation of all in the country's economic life. [...] In light of this, it is held that the Central Bank of Costa Rica, despite its functional and financial autonomy, was not excluded from the duty to recognize the school salary to its employees, regardless of the variation in the wage regime it internally established as of January 1999 and the date when officials joined the institution—including the plaintiff. This is because the creation and payment of this additional wage originally stemmed from a general state wage policy that did not expressly exclude any public-sector institution or entity, and, moreover, to date no regulation to the contrary has been enacted, meaning that this foundation must prevail even over each entity's internal provisions and any subsequent reforms made within their structure. It is clear that Central Bank officials, before being employees of the entity, form part of the general category of active public servants, and the beneficial wage policy that gave rise to the school salary was directed at that population—without any exception, limitation, or future condition whatsoever.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Suppression unlawful", "label_es": "Improcedente supresión", "summary_en": "The Chamber holds that the Central Bank could not eliminate the school salary for its employees based on its internal autonomy, as this right stems from a general state wage policy and superior constitutional precepts.", "summary_es": "La Sala declara que el Banco Central no podía eliminar el salario escolar a sus empleados basándose en su autonomía interna, pues este derecho deriva de una política salarial general del Estado y de preceptos constitucionales superiores." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "IV. ANÁLISIS DEL CASO", "quote_en": "The school salary does not constitute a wage withholding paid on a deferred basis each January, but rather an additional wage component calculated on the total salary earned by workers, whose payment is made in a lump sum in January of the following year based on the same wage components used to calculate the thirteenth month.", "quote_es": "El salario escolar no constituye una retención salarial que se paga en forma diferida en cada mes de enero, sino que es un componente salarial más calculado sobre el salario total que perciben las personas trabajadoras y cuyo pago se realiza en forma acumulada en el mes de enero del año siguiente con base en los mismos componentes salariales que se toman en cuenta para computar el décimo tercer mes." }, { "context": "III. ASPECTOS GENERALES SOBRE EL SALARIO", "quote_en": "The right to wages is an institution that must be based on constitutionally enshrined principles and values and on the conventions of the International Labour Organization, such as solidarity, equality, and participation of all in the country's economic life.", "quote_es": "El derecho al salario es un instituto que se debe apoyar en principios y valores consagrados constitucionalmente y en los convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, como lo son: la solidaridad, la igualdad y la participación de todos en la vida económica del país." }, { "context": "IV. ANÁLISIS DEL CASO", "quote_en": "The Central Bank of Costa Rica, despite its functional and financial autonomy, was not excluded from the duty to recognize the school salary to its employees [...] the creation and payment of this additional wage originally stemmed from a general state wage policy that did not expressly exclude any public-sector institution or entity.", "quote_es": "El Banco Central de Costa Rica, a pesar de su autonomía funcional y financiera, no quedó excluido del deber de reconocer el salario escolar a sus empleados [...] la creación y el pago de ese sobresueldo, inicialmente, tuvo su origen en una política general de salarios del Estado que no excluyó expresamente a ninguna institución o entidad del sector público." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-40928", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7558 Art. 28" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-157270", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-32708", "norm_num": "1581", "norm_name": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/05/1953" }, { "doc_id": "norm-40928", "norm_num": "7558", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "03/11/1995" }, { "doc_id": "norm-47258", "norm_num": "8131", "norm_name": "Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "18/09/2001" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“III.- ASPECTOS GENERALES SOBRE EL SALARIO: En primer término, se considera transcendental efectuar un análisis en torno al salario a nivel constitucional y de los instrumentos internacionales de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo. Lo anterior, debido a que la defensa de la parte demandada a lo largo de este proceso se ha centrado en la imposibilidad manifiesta de no reconocerle el salario escolar al accionante dada la política salarial instaurada en el banco accionado a partir del año mil novecientos noventa y nueve, la cual permite a la junta directiva acordar su propio presupuesto. En este estadio, y con una nueva visión del tema, se estima que dicha tesis deja de lado la génesis constitucional del salario y sus efectos en el campo del derecho positivo para su implementación. Expliquemos esto. La Sala Constitucional, en el voto número 5374 del año 2003, al interpretar el numeral 57 de la Carta Magna, estableció: “…Cabe señalar que los derechos sociales, conforme a la moderna concepción, pueden ser ‘incondicionados’ o ‘condicionados’. En el caso de los primeros, que son los que interesan en este caso, se trata de derechos que conciernen a relaciones jurídicas que se instituyen espontáneamente, es decir, sobre la libre iniciativa de las partes, refiriéndose a ellos para cualificar el tipo o la calidad de determinadas prestaciones debidas. Tal es el caso del derecho a una retribución suficiente, el derecho al descanso, entre otros. Esta categoría de derechos, da pie a prestaciones positivas a cargo de la parte patronal, pueden hacerse valer por parte de sus derechohabientes frente a la contraparte de la relación. Es decir, el simple hecho de su reconocimiento constitucional, hace que se entiendan incorporados, de forma automática, en el marco de la relación laboral o de empleo público, según se trate”. (Lo destacado y subrayado es nuestro). Ya en el marco de la indisponibilidad de los denominados incentivos salariales adicionales, la misma Sala indicó: “...Bien se indicó que la remuneración del trabajo está garantizada por nuestra Constitución en los artículos 56 y 57, y se considera como una retribución al trabajo realizado. De acuerdo a las garantías contenidas en nuestra Constitución y los principios que informan la materia laboral, la remuneración al trabajo es una garantía irrenunciable e indisponible para las partes, con mucho más cuando sea en detrimento de los trabajadores. Es por lo anteriormente expuesto que el patrono no puede suprimir ese derecho…”. (Votos números 7451-94 y 458-96). De igual forma, el convenio número 94, del 29 de junio de 1949, de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, denominado “Convenio sobre las cláusulas de trabajo (en los contratos celebrados por autoridades públicas)”, establece en su artículo 2, que “ Los contratos a los cuales se aplique el presente Convenio deberán contener cláusulas que garanticen a los trabajadores interesados salarios (comprendidas las asignaciones), horas de trabajo y demás condiciones de empleo no menos favorables que las establecidas para un trabajo de igual naturaleza en la profesión o industria interesada de la misma región: …(a) por medio de un contrato colectivo o por otro procedimiento reconocido de negociación entre las organizaciones de empleadores y de trabajadores que representen respectivamente una proporción considerable de los empleadores y de los trabajadores de la profesión o de la industria interesada;(b) por medio de un laudo arbitral; o(c) por medio de la legislación nacional .2. Cuando las condiciones de trabajo mencionadas en el párrafo precedente no estén reguladas en la región donde se efectúe el trabajo en una de las formas indicadas anteriormente, las cláusulas que se incluyan en los contratos deberán garantizar a los trabajadores interesados salarios (comprendidas las asignaciones), horas de trabajo y demás condiciones de empleo no menos favorables que: (a) las establecidas por medio de un contrato colectivo o por otro procedimiento reconocido de negociación, por medio de un laudo arbitral o por la legislación nacional, para un trabajo de la misma naturaleza en la profesión o industria interesadas, de la región análoga más próxima; o(b) el nivel general observado por los empleadores que, perteneciendo a la misma profesión o a la misma industria que el contratista, se encuentren en circunstancias análogas.…”. (Lo destacado es nuestro). Igualmente, el Convenio 95, denominado “Convenio sobre la protección del salario”, emitido el 1 de julio de 1949, definió en su artículo 1 que el salario es “… la remuneración o ganancia, sea cual fuere su denominación o método de cálculo, siempre que pueda evaluarse en efectivo, fijada por acuerdo o por la legislación nacional, y debida por un empleador a un trabajador en virtud de un contrato de trabajo, escrito o verbal, por el trabajo que este último haya efectuado o deba efectuar o por servicios que haya prestado o deba prestar…”. También el artículo 6 de ese convenio señala que se deberá prohibir que los empleadores limiten en forma alguna la libertad del trabajador de disponer de su salario. Tales disposiciones analizadas integralmente con nuestra Constitución Política, permiten inferir que es contrario a los derechos fundamentales al salario, toda disposición interna que limite el disfrute del mismo por parte de la persona trabajadora. El recordado autor Víctor Ardón refiere en su obra “El salario y otras formas de retribución” que, independientemente de cualquier consideración jurídica o económica, se debe tener siempre presente que la retribución es un derecho fundamental de todo trabajador y, que es obligación del Estado costarricense, disponer el “mayor bienestar a todos los habitantes del país, organizando y estimulando la producción y el más adecuado reparto de la riqueza”, debiendo “procurar que todos tengan ocupación honesta y útil, debidamente remunerada”, tal y como lo establecen los numerales 50 y 56 de nuestra Constitución Política. El citado autor señala como antecedente jurisprudencial el voto número 2635-91 de la misma Sala Constitucional, en que se analiza que “El derecho al trabajo en su dimensión colectiva implica un mandato a los poderes públicos de procurar que todas las personas tengan ocupación honesta y útil y se apoya, como ya lo ha indicado esta Sala en forma reiterada, en principios y valores asumidos constitucionalmente como lo son la solidaridad, la igualdad real y efectiva y la participación de todos en la vida económica del país. En su dimensión individual se concreta en el derecho de tener acceso a un determinado puesto, si se cumplen los requisitos necesarios que se exigen para la clase de labor que se pretende desempeñar“. Todos estos lineamientos jurisprudenciales y normativos nos permiten vislumbrar que el derecho al salario es un instituto que se debe apoyar en principios y valores consagrados constitucionalmente y en los convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, como lo son: la solidaridad, la igualdad y la participación de todos en la vida económica del país. En ese sentido, el capital y el trabajo se deben desarrollar a partir de los márgenes de la razón y proporcionalidad, que son principios constitucionales que rigen al derecho del trabajo. Ardón nos señala que “…la legislación laboral costarricense, ha estructurado el salario a partir de dos conceptos básicos conocidos como ‘salario base’ y ‘complementos salariales’, a pesar de que en la realidad socio laboral, la estructura salarial se ha tornado muy compleja. Esta situación nos ha obligado a enfrentar un proceso de adaptación y de cambio de tales sistemas, según las transformaciones de las empresas y de los sectores productivos. Asimismo, este proceso de adaptación flexible ha generado una multiplicidad de modelos salariales, que produce que nuestra legislación sea del todo insuficiente para solventar necesidades”. En el marco de la administración pública toda persona debe ser remunerada de acuerdo con el servicio que presta. En ese sentido, el autor Gastón Jeze indica que la asignación periódica de una suma de dinero con arreglo de una tarifa establecida conforme a las leyes y reglamentos para su obtención, en razón de la actividad para un servicio público, determina su condición de salario (“Principios generales del Derecho Administrativo”, Editorial De Palma, Buenos Aires, Argentina, página 406). Asimismo, Marienhoff señala que la naturaleza salarial, dentro de las relaciones de empleo público, deriva de la relación contractual y de una contraprestación de parte del Estado (MARIENHOFF, Miguel, “Tratado de Derecho Administrativo”, Tomo III-B, Editorial Argentina, Buenos Aires, pág. 208). Ahora bien, con respecto a los componentes que integran el salario de los funcionarios públicos, dichos componentes se fijan de acuerdo a la naturaleza de las funciones y de las características personales de la persona servidora, de acuerdo con las circunstancias que establece la ley. En cuanto a estos complementos, los mismos pueden ser clasificados de distintas formas: a) compensaciones de acuerdo a la forma de pago: se subdividen en indemnizaciones y gratificaciones. Las primeras tienen como objetivo retribuir al funcionario los gastos ocasionados por el servicio; las segundas, buscan pagar los servicios prestados en circunstancias especiales o que sobrepasan el normal desempeño del funcionario público; b) compensaciones de acuerdo al cargo: se subdividen en 1) prestaciones fuera del lugar ordinario de trabajo (zonaje, que se puede cancelar por día o por mes para pagar gastos de alojamiento, gastos de viaje, etcétera); 2) por representar a la administración: son sumas de dinero que percibe el funcionario en suma fija o por periodos, para que pueda realizar efectivamente su labor (gastos de representación); 3) prestaciones por trabajos especiales o excepcionales: se fija la remuneración con ocasión del salario percibido. Específicamente, en cuanto a la regulación del salario escolar en el sector público, esta Sala ha seguido la hipótesis de que dicho salario no constituye una retención salarial que se paga en forma diferida en cada mes de enero, sino que es un componente salarial más, calculado sobre el salario total que perciben las personas trabajadoras y cuyo pago se realiza en forma acumulada en el mes de enero del año siguiente con base en los mismos componentes salariales que se toman en cuenta para computar el décimo tercer mes, tema que será desarrollado en el siguiente apartado.\n\nIV.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO: Antes de entrar a valorar los reproches que el representante del banco accionado plantea contra la sentencia del Tribunal, es importante aclarar que en este asunto no está en discusión la facultad que tiene el Banco Central de Costa Rica de establecer -por sí mismo- su propio régimen salarial, sino que, de acuerdo con las pretensiones esbozadas en la demanda, lo verdaderamente trascendente de dilucidar es si el salario escolar que reclama el actor podía y puede dejar de ser reconocido por parte de la entidad accionada a partir de esa nueva política salarial instaurada en la entidad a partir del año 1999. Lo anterior es así porque no existe duda de que, por la naturaleza del banco demandado, su junta directiva tiene la atribución de acordar su propio presupuesto, así como de dictar las políticas referentes a clasificación y valoración de puestos (artículo 28 inciso m de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central), pero también debe tomarse en consideración la naturaleza y origen del salario escolar a nivel general. Así, en primer término, esta Sala ha dejado claro el criterio de que el salario escolar no constituye una retención salarial que se paga en forma diferida en cada mes de enero, sino que es un componente salarial más calculado sobre el salario total que perciben las personas trabajadoras y cuyo pago se realiza en forma acumulada en el mes de enero del año siguiente con base en los mismos componentes salariales que se toman en cuenta para computar el décimo tercer mes (en ese sentido, consúltense –entre otras- las sentencias números 833 de las 9:40 horas del 12 de octubre, 1055 de las 9:35 horas del 21 de diciembre; ambas de 2011, y la número 667 de las 10:00 horas del 10 de agosto de 2012). Asimismo, en una sentencia más reciente como es la número 1232, de las 10:00 horas del 4 de noviembre de 2015, esta Sala hizo un recuento histórico del mencionado extremo, para lo cual se indicó: “El antecedente normativo de este componente salarial en el sector público es el Acuerdo de Política Salarial para el Sector Público, suscrito por los representantes de la Comisión Negociadora de Salarios del Sector Público el 23 de julio de 1994, en donde se establece como uno de los principales componentes de la política de salarios crecientes, el salario escolar. A partir de ese Acuerdo, la Dirección General de Servicio Civil dictó la resolución DG-062-94 de 5 de agosto de 1994, en la que se conceptuó al salario escolar como un ajuste adicional al aumento de salarios otorgado a partir del 1° de julio de 1994, consistente en un porcentaje del salario nominal que sería pagado en forma acumulativa, en el mes de enero de cada año. En esa resolución se dispuso: ‘Artículo 1°- Crear un componente salarial denominado ‘Salario Escolar’ el cual consistirá en un porcentaje calculado sobre el salario nominal de cada trabajador. El mismo será acumulativo y se regirá de conformidad con lo siguiente: a. A partir del 1° de julio de 1994 y hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1994, se calculará como un sobresueldo equivalente a un uno veinticinco por ciento (1.25%) del salario nominal mensual y el pago del mismo corresponderá al acumulado de dicho período. b. Para efectos del cálculo del sobresueldo que aquí se crea, se tomarán en cuenta los salarios devengados por el trabajador en el período correspondiente, exceptuando en dicho salario nominal, otros componentes salariales que también dependan y/o se calculen en función del monto del salario total del servidor. Artículo 2°. Este componente salarial está sujeto a las cargas sociales de ley’. Por su parte, mediante resolución AP-34-94, de 26 de agosto de 1994, la Autoridad Presupuestaria hizo extensiva esa resolución a las instituciones y empresas públicas cubiertas bajo su ámbito. Ese acuerdo dice expresamente: ‘CONSIDERANDO: …/… Que la Autoridad Presupuestaria facultada por su Ley de Creación y los Lineamientos Generales de Política Salarial y Empleo para 1994, considera conveniente hacer extensiva la Resolución DG-062-94, a las Instituciones y Empresas Públicas cubiertas bajo su ámbito… DISPONE: ‘Crear un componente salarial denominado Salario Escolar, que consiste en un porcentaje calculado sobre el salario nominal de cada trabajador. 2.- El porcentaje será acumulativo y se regirá de conformidad con lo siguiente: a- A partir del 1° de julio de 1994 y hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1994, se calculará como un sobresueldo equivalente al 1.25% (uno veinticinco por ciento) del salario nominal mensual y se hará un solo pago en el mes de enero de 1995, correspondiente a dicho período. b.- Salario nominal es la suma del salario base, aumentos anuales, dedicación exclusiva o prohibición y carrera profesional. 3.- Este componente salarial será presupuestado en una subpartida denominada ‘Salario Escolar’ en la partida Servicios Personales y está sujeto a las cargas sociales de ley…’. Con ocasión de la resolución DG-062-94, en fecha 9 de setiembre de 1994, el Departamento de Salarios e Incentivos de la mencionada Dirección General de Servicio Civil, emitió la circular SI-04-94-0, en la cual se definió: ‘Salario Escolar: plus salarial que se acumula en forma anual, consiste en un porcentaje calculado sobre el salario nominal de cada trabajador. Salario Nominal: todos los componentes del salario que le corresponden al servidor por el desempeño de un puesto, excepto las sumas adicionales que se reconozcan en función misma del salario nominal, excluye el salario en especie’. En virtud de una serie de dudas planteadas, la Dirección General de Servicio Civil dictó la resolución DG-005-95 de 9:00 horas de 12 de enero de 1995, mediante la cual modificó los artículos 1° y 2° citados, en el siguiente sentido: ‘Artículo 1°. Crear el ‘Salario Escolar’, el cual consistirá en un porcentaje calculado sobre el salario de cada servidor, el mismo será acumulativo y se regirá de conformidad con lo siguiente: a. A partir del 1° de julio de 1994 y hasta el 31 de diciembre del mismo año, éste corresponde a un porcentaje de uno veinticinco (1.25%) adicional al aumento general otorgado a partir del 1° de julio de 1994, con lo cual se completa el 8% de aumento acordado, en la negociación salarial del Sector Público para el segundo semestre de 1994. B. Para efectos de cálculo se tomarán en consideración los mismos componentes salariales que se utilizan para determinar el aguinaldo. Artículo 2°. El ‘Salario Escolar’ está sujeto a las cargas sociales de ley’. A partir de esa resolución DG-005-95 el cálculo del salario escolar se realiza tomando en consideración los mismos componentes salariales que se utilizan para calcular el aguinaldo, y sobre la base de estos se fija un porcentaje que se paga en el mes de enero del año siguiente, y que para esa época se fijó en un 1.171%. Posteriormente, la misma Dirección emitió otras resoluciones a través de las cuales se fue aumentando gradualmente el porcentaje de cálculo del beneficio hasta un 3.58% del salario total (mediante resolución de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil DG-054-96 de las 16:00 horas del 3 de julio de 1996); y finalmente se incrementó una vez más, fijándolo en un 8.19% del salario total; porcentaje con el que se calcula este extremo en las relaciones de empleo público hasta el día de hoy (esto a partir de 1998, en virtud de lo dispuesto por la resolución de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil DG-136-97 de las 14:30 horas del 5 de diciembre de 1997), prescrita en estos términos: ‘Artículo 1.- Modifíquese la Resolución DG-041-97 del 01-07-97, de forma que se incremente el porcentaje de salario escolar en un uno cincuenta y ocho por ciento (1,58%), adicional al seis setenta y cinco por ciento (6,75%) existente, con lo cual se completa un ocho punto treinta y tres por ciento (8,33%) mensual que corresponde a un salario anual de manera que este beneficio ajustado de acuerdo con la metodología definida al efecto, queja fijado en un ocho diecinueve por ciento (8,19%) del salario total de los servidores públicos. Artículo 2. La aplicación de este porcentaje de acuerdo con la metodología establecida en el Oficio SI-002-95 es sobre todas las sumas que legalmente se tengan como salario. Artículo 3. Para efectos de pago este beneficio se establece como un acumulado mensual (de enero a diciembre) sobre el salario total, pagadero en el mes de enero de cada año”. De especial importancia resulta mencionar que esas resoluciones se vieron plasmadas en el decreto ejecutivo número 23907-H, el cual dispuso: “Se adiciona a la Partida de Servicios Personales el rubro Salario Escolar, para identificar el gasto por ajuste adicional, para los servidores activos, el aumento de salario otorgado a partir del 1° de julio de 1994, que consiste en un porcentaje del salario nominal de dichos servidores, para que sea pagado en forma acumulativa en el mes de enero de cada año”. Como se desprende de lo anterior, el verdadero origen del salario escolar no fue propiamente la referida resolución DG-062-94 de 5 de agosto de 1994 de la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, sino que esta se dictó con fundamento en un “Acuerdo de Política Salarial para el Sector Público” suscrito el 23 de julio de 1994 por los representantes de la Comisión Negociadora de Salarios del Sector Público, en virtud de la cual, esta figura se estableció como uno de los principales componentes de la política de salarios crecientes del gobierno de turno, tal como se infiere de los considerandos de la mencionada resolución, y cuyo fin era incrementar el poder de compra de los salarios y adecuarlos a la realidad económica frente a la inflación, como un apoyo económico a las familias para afrontar los gastos del proceso educativo de sus integrantes. Ese acuerdo de política salarial se fue adaptando a las distintas normativas internas de las instituciones públicas, tan es así que el banco accionado lo reconoció desde su génesis hasta el año 1998, cuando justificó su supresión a los nuevas relaciones que iniciaran a partir de enero de 1999 con base en una nueva escala salarial global que respetaba los mínimos legales. Asimismo, esa política finalmente se incluyó en un decreto ejecutivo general, como se explicó anteriormente, el cual es fuente de Derecho. Lo anterior es razonable si se estima que el Estado debe actuar de conformidad con el principio de legalidad que comprende -en uno de sus mayores niveles jerárquicos- a las normas constitucionales. Entre ellas, el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política que establece el deber del Estado de procurar el mayor bienestar a todos los habitantes del país, mediante la organización y estímulo de la producción y el más adecuado reparto de la riqueza. En ese sentido, se estatuye al Estado como garante y defensor de ese derecho. Además, el numeral 56 ídem proclama el acceso al trabajo como un derecho del individuo y garantiza el derecho de libre elección de las fuentes remunerativas. Por su parte, el artículo 57 siguiente regula lo referente al salario mínimo y al principio de igualdad salarial, para lo cual declara la irrenunciabilidad de los indicados derechos y beneficios acorde con una política permanente de solidaridad nacional (artículo 74). Dicha competencia de fijación de los salarios mínimos se le ha encomendado al Consejo Nacional de Salarios como organismo técnico creado por ley 832 del 4 de noviembre de 1949. Por último, el inciso 20 del artículo 140 constitucional deja abierta la obligación del gobierno de cumplir con los demás deberes encomendados y dispone el ejercicio de las otras atribuciones que le confieren la Constitución y las leyes. Luego, el Banco Central de Costa Rica, según el artículo 1° de su ley orgánica, es una institución autónoma de derecho público con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propio que forma parte del Sistema Bancario Nacional. Es evidente que dicha entidad, a pesar de su naturaleza de ente autónomo con personalidad jurídica propia, funge claramente como “cajero del Estado” en virtud de lo dispuesto en dicha ley. De hecho, el numeral 99 de la referida normativa, al definir sus operaciones con el Estado, lo enmarca -de acuerdo con sus funciones- como consejero financiero, agente fiscal y banco-cajero del Estado. Ahora bien, de acuerdo con la doctrina, no puede desconocerse la referencia que se hace en el Derecho Administrativo a figuras como la descentralización y la tutela administrativa, aspectos muy relacionados con la naturaleza de la entidad accionada y su relación con el Estado como ente central. Para Ortiz Ortiz, la descentralización “implica una atribución de competencia –o personalidad jurídica -, a título último, definitivo y exclusivo, en virtud de una regla del ordenamiento… descentralizar es transferir o crear una competencia en otro sujeto”. (ORTIZ ORTIZ, Eduardo. Tesis de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. San José, Editorial Stradtmann, 1998, p. 313). Por su parte, la tutela administrativa se entiende como “la relación de subordinación que corre entre Estado y entes menores”. (Ibid. p. 323). Según Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, “los entes públicos menores, ciertamente, ejercitan potestades de imperio y persiguen fines públicos, no obstante el ente público mayor o la Administración Pública Central los controla o tutela mediante el ejercicio de las potestades de dirección, programación o planificación y control”. ( Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I, parte general. Medellín, Colombia, Biblioteca Jurídica Diké, 2002, p. 9). Asimismo, para este mismo autor recién citado, “la tutela administrativa,… no es incompatible con la autonomía, al contrario, la presupone…”, para lo cual cita el voto de la Sala Constitucional número 3309-94 en ese sentido. (Op. Cit., p. 22). De conformidad con Ortiz Ortiz, “el Estado no puede dar órdenes ni cursar instrucciones al ente menor” , salvo casos excepcionales, pero la autonomía funcional tampoco significa total independencia del ente menor con respecto al Estado, pues, pese a ella resulta posible en cierta forma para este último ejercer una potestad de dirección y de contralor sobre el ente centro de acción distinto del Estado. (Ortiz, op.cit., p. 318). Según este mismo autor, los artículos 188 y 189 de la Constitución Política no dicen nada sobre la tutela ni sobre las relaciones entre Estado y entes menores; sin embargo, las leyes orgánicas de estos últimos han interpretado erróneamente ese fundamento normativo como una prohibición de la función contralora del Estado (op. cit., página 324). Ernesto Jinesta Lobo explica que “…las leyes a las que se refiere el Constituyente son, básicamente, la Ley de Planificación Nacional y la Ley General de la Administración Pública, sobre todo a ésta última que en sus artículos 26, 27, 98, 99 y 100 establece el contenido y los alcances de la dirección y coordinación…”. ( Op cit., p. 100). El autor [Nombre1] , antes mencionado, también ha explicado potestades concretas relacionadas con dicha tutela como lo son las de programar, dirigir, formular planes, fijar metas coordinadas o referidas unas a otras en mutua independencia para alcanzar un resultado de equilibrio o balance y la obtención de un fin público determinado. En ese sentido, se destaca la potestad de dirección por medio de directrices como forma para llevar a cabo los programas o planes. (Op. Cit., páginas 330-335). El mencionado autor Jinesta Lobo refiere que “la planificación orienta la actuación y gestión administrativas definiendo los grandes objetivos, metas y fines por alcanzar y los métodos o modos para lograrlos eficientemente”. (Op. Cit. , p. 25). Sobre ese marco teórico es que se considera que el Estado sí puede instaurar una política salarial general -como lo hizo en 1994- mediante un plan nacional tendiente a incrementar los salarios de los servidores del Estado y sus instituciones descentralizadas que incluyera el salario escolar como una forma de compensar las necesidades estudiantiles de sus integrantes en época de erogación de esos gastos. Así las cosas, se estima que el Banco Central de Costa Rica, a pesar de su autonomía funcional y financiera, no quedó excluido del deber de reconocer el salario escolar a sus empleados, independientemente de la variación en el régimen salarial que estatuyó internamente a partir de enero de 1999 y la fecha de ingreso de los funcionarios a la institución -entre ellos el actor-. Lo anterior, por cuanto la creación y el pago de ese sobresueldo, inicialmente, tuvo su origen en una política general de salarios del Estado que no excluyó expresamente a ninguna institución o entidad del sector público, de manera que tampoco se ha dictado, hasta la fecha, normativa alguna en sentido contrario y, por ende, ese fundamento debe primar aun por las disposiciones internas de cada entidad y las reformas posteriores a estas que se hayan hecho al interior de su estructura. Es claro que los funcionarios del Banco Central, antes de ser empleados de la entidad, forman parte de la categoría general de servidores públicos activos y a esa población -sin excepción, limitación o condición futura alguna- iba dirigida la política salarial beneficiadora en virtud de la cual tuvo origen el salario escolar. A mayor abundamiento, el denominado salario escolar al ser una clase de salario y, por ende, derivar su naturaleza de normativa de rango constitucional (artículos 56 y 57) y de los Convenios números 94 y 95 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, no puede ser obviada su implementación como componente salarial por una norma de menor jerarquía como lo es el numeral 28, inciso m, de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central, ya que, de ser así, se infringiría la jerarquía de las fuentes normativas derivada del artículo 6 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Es preciso señalar que en el voto número 496, de las 09:40 horas, del 17 de setiembre de 2003, esta Sala analizó la naturaleza del Banco Central y su relación con el Poder Ejecutivo en materia salarial, para lo cual indicó: “Por otro lado, según el artículo primero de su Ley Orgánica (N° 7558 de 3 de noviembre de 1995), el Banco Central de Costa Rica es una institución autónoma de derecho público, con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propios, integrante del Sistema Bancario Nacional. El inciso m) del artículo 28 de esa ley faculta a la Junta Directiva para dictar sus propias políticas en materia de clasificación y valoración de puestos. Por su parte, el inciso 4) del numeral 34 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional (N° 1644 de 26 de setiembre de 1953) le otorga competencia a la Junta Directiva del banco para crear las plazas y servicios indispensables para el debido funcionamiento de la institución y fijar las respectivas remuneraciones. Lo anterior implica que el ente demandado tiene la capacidad de darse su propio régimen salarial. […]Como bien lo resolvió el Tribunal, el Banco Central, como institución autónoma que es, no tiene plena autonomía en materia salarial, por tratarse de materia de gobierno. Sin embargo, vale la pena hacer ciertas aclaraciones. Ya se dijo que la ley le otorga a la Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica la competencia para fijar los salarios de sus servidores (inciso 4) del artículo 34 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional). Sin embargo, para ello debe sujetarse a las directrices que al efecto dicte el Poder Ejecutivo, por las razones que a continuación se expondrán. La Sala Constitucional, en el Voto N°1822 de las 15:46 horas del 7 de marzo del 2001 (…), manifestó: ‘De los antecedentes transcritos, se colige que al ser la materia salarial parte de la política de gobierno, corresponde entonces al Poder Ejecutivo adoptar con carácter vinculante las decisiones en ese campo del sector público centralizado, quedando las entidades autónomas sometidas a las directrices de carácter general que en materia de salarios dicte ese Poder de la República’. Para comprender los verdaderos alcances de esa resolución debe hacerse referencia, en primer lugar, a las siguientes normas. En primer lugar, el artículo 188 de la Constitución Política, que dice: ‘Las instituciones autónomas del Estado gozan de independencia administrativa y están sujetas a la ley en materia de gobierno. Sus directores responden por su gestión’. Luego, el numeral 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional establece: ‘Los bancos del Estado enumerados en el artículo anterior son instituciones autónomas de derecho público, con personería jurídica propia e independencia en materia de administración. Están sujetos a la ley en materia de gobierno y deben actuar en estrecha colaboración con el Poder Ejecutivo, coordinando sus esfuerzos y actividades (...)’. Por otro lado, resulta fundamental transcribir los antecedentes dictados por esa otra Sala sobre la materia, dentro de los que cabe citar el Voto N° 3309 de las 15 horas del 5 de julio de 1994: ‘La autonomía administrativa de las instituciones descentralizadas constituidas en el Título XIV de la Constitución, es una garantía frente al accionar del Poder Ejecutivo Central, más no frente a la ley en materia de Gobierno. Antes de la reforma operada al artículo 188 de la Constitución, no era posible someter a las instituciones autónomas a la política general del Estado en cuanto a las materias puestas bajo su competencia… […] Esto quiere decir que las instituciones autónomas no gozan de una garantía de autonomía constitucional irrestricta, toda vez que la ley, aparte de definir su competencia, puede someterlas a directrices derivadas de políticas de desarrollo que ésta misma encomiende al Poder Ejecutivo Central, siempre que, desde luego, no se invada con ello ni la esfera de la autonomía administrativa propiamente dicha, ni la competencia de la misma Asamblea o de otros órganos constitucionales como la Contraloría General de la República. […] De esta manera, la reforma hizo constitucionalmente posible someter a las entidades autónomas en general a los criterios de planificación nacional y en particular, someterlas a las directrices de carácter general dictadas desde el Poder Ejecutivo central o de órganos de la Administración Central (llamados a complementar o a fiscalizar esa política general). […] Definida la política salarial como parte de la política de gobierno, es necesario reiterar que cuando el constituyente descentralizó el Poder Ejecutivo, procuró evitar las injerencias arbitrarias y antitécnicas en cuanto a la gestión de cada una de esas instituciones, definida por ley. Pero no optó el legislador constituyente por crear un régimen salarial o laboral segregado del Poder Ejecutivo central, pues no hay duda que el Título XV, Capítulo Unico de la Constitución Política tiene como antecedente inmediato, la práctica anterior de destituir masivamente a los funcionarios y empleados estatales con ocasión de cada cambio de gobierno’. […] Por último, en el Voto N° 3089 de las 15 horas del 12 de mayo de 1998 se señaló: ‘… Por esta causa, es que todos los órganos que forman el aparato estatal como Estado Constitucional de Derecho, deben someterse a los criterios de ‘planificación nacional’ y en particular a las directrices de carácter general dictadas por el Poder Ejecutivo -Gobierno- (arts. 140.3,8 C. P.), para cumplir, entre otros, con los mandatos constitucionales de procurar el mayor bienestar para todos los habitantes del país organizando y estimulando la producción y el más adecuado reparto de la riqueza (art. 50 C.P.), como también de que todos tengan ocupación -como derecho del individuo y una obligación con la sociedad- honesta y útil, debidamente remunerada, e impedir que por causa de ella se establezcan condiciones que en forma alguna menoscaben la libertad o la dignidad del hombre o degraden su trabajo a la condición de simple mercancía (art. 56 C. P.). El Poder Ejecutivo -Gobierno-, como organización jurídica y política, es el que se encarga de organizar, dirigir y encauzar a la sociedad en todos sus aspectos político, jurídico, económico y social. La función ejecutiva es una tarea esencial del Gobierno en sus distintos órganos o ministerios, como lo es también la directiva política de fijar los objetivos y metas de la acción coordinada en los demás entes públicos, proponiendo los medios y métodos para conseguir esos objetivos. Es también función esencial del Poder Ejecutivo orientar, coordinar y supervisar el aparato de la Administración (art. 140.8, CP) y dictar normas generales que no son solo simple ejecución de normas legales sino delimitantes (art. 140.2, CP). En cuanto a esto último, se trata de normas de ejecución -decretos reglamentarios- que contribuyen a hacer posible la ejecución de su fuente de legitimación, sean las leyes emanadas de la Asamblea Legislativa. La política de salarios derivada de las relaciones de servicio -entre la Administración y sus servidores (art. 112 LGAP), como régimen estatal de empleo público, uniforme y universal, es, por supuesto, parte integrante de la política de gobierno (SSC N.° 2294 de las 14:48 horas del 19 de agosto, 1992). (…) De modo que, es menester concluir, respecto de este primer extremo, el legislador ha pretendido, en ejercicio de las atribuciones que le otorgó el poder constituyente originario, crear un régimen salarial público único, previendo, precisamente, los efectos que sobre las finanzas públicas y por ende, para el país en general, producen los desequilibrios derivados de las relaciones de servicio entre la Administración y los servidores públicos. Ello, entonces, hace plenamente justificable y constitucional el someter a criterios uniformes -a través de directrices- todo lo concerniente a la política salarial de la Administración Pública, que, por lo demás, es de fijación periódica para que el servidor público pueda hacerle frente, en forma regular e ininterrumpida, a los deberes de subsistencia de su familia (arts. 56 y 57 C.P.). En consecuencia, es constitucional que la Autoridad Presupuestaria, como órgano derivado del Poder Ejecutivo, dicte las directrices de la política salarial del Estado en ejercicio de sus funciones, con el propósito de proteger a dichos servidores y garantizar la eficiencia de la Administración Pública, las que debe proponer al Poder Ejecutivo, para que éste las imponga a toda la Administración Pública, entendida como la constituida por el Estado y los demás entes públicos (art. 1 LGAP), satisfaciendo, de esta manera, los mandatos constitucionales de los artículos 50, 56 y 62 de la Constitución Política y 22 de la Declaración Universidad de Derechos Humanos’. Ya en el considerando anterior se indicó que, por decisión del legislador, el Banco Central de Costa Rica no está sujeto a las directrices que emita la Autoridad Presupuestaria, que es el órgano encargado de fijar las políticas salariales para el sector descentralizado. Pero, por otro lado, la Sala Constitucional, en los pronunciamientos transcritos, afirmó que la política salarial es parte de un ‘régimen estatal de empleo público uniforme y universal’. Es decir, existe un principio constitucional según el cual debe existir una política salarial uniforme para toda la Administración Pública. Sin embargo, la contradicción no es más que aparente, ya que la Autoridad Presupuestaria no tiene una competencia exclusiva y excluyente para la definición de la política salarial, sino que tan sólo es un órgano auxiliar de carácter técnico del Poder Ejecutivo, y, como tal, carece de un verdadero poder directivo. Es, en definitiva, el Poder Ejecutivo quien ejerce la dirección política del Estado y de los demás entes públicos, por lo que le corresponde fijar la política salarial aplicable a los bancos estatales, por medio de directrices, las que, por su propia naturaleza, han de ser de corte genérico, de tal modo que no se lesione la autonomía administrativa de que gozan dichos entes, que incluso los faculta para fijar las remuneraciones de sus funcionarios. Por ello, no puede afirmarse que en virtud del artículo 6 de la Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República, los bancos estatales, y dentro de ellos el demandado, estén excluidos de cualquier política estatal en esta materia (…)”. (Fin de la trascripción). En respuesta a ciertos agravios concretos del recurrente, si bien es cierto la Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos establece que las disposiciones de esa ley no serán aplicables a los bancos públicos ni al Instituto Nacional de Seguros, excepto en lo correspondiente al trámite de aprobación de sus presupuestos, por lo que de acuerdo con el artículo 21 de de esa misma normativa tampoco estarían sujetos al control de la Autoridad Presupuestaria, debe también tomarse en cuenta la naturaleza sui generis que tiene el Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus diferencias con los demás bancos públicos comerciales. De otra parte, de los artículos 1 y 2 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil –mencionados en el recurso- no se infiere la exclusión expresa del Banco Central respecto a esa normativa, aunque esa situación deberá ponderarse con las normas específicas a que se hizo alusión anteriormente. Por último, los votos de la Sala Constitucional que invoca el recurrente se refieren a las resoluciones de recursos de amparo donde se trata el tema del principio de libertad salarial, sin que en ellos se analice concretamente lo relacionado con el salario escolar. Incluso, de estos se desprende que la Sala Constitucional deja claro que su análisis es desde el punto de vista del derecho de la Constitución porque expresamente remite a la vía ordinaria para resolver pretensiones concretas con respectos a los reclamos de los recurrentes.”", "body_en_text": "**III. GENERAL ASPECTS REGARDING SALARY:** First, it is considered essential to carry out an analysis of salary at the constitutional level and under the international instruments of the International Labour Organization. The foregoing, because the defense of the defendant party throughout this process has focused on the manifest impossibility of not recognizing the school salary for the plaintiff given the salary policy established in the defendant bank as of the year nineteen ninety-nine, which allows its board of directors to agree upon its own budget. At this stage, and with a new vision of the subject, it is considered that said thesis disregards the constitutional genesis of the salary and its effects in the field of positive law for its implementation. Let us explain this. The Constitutional Chamber, in Vote number 5374 of the year 2003, when interpreting numeral 57 of the Magna Carta, established: “…It should be noted that social rights, according to the modern conception, can be ‘unconditional’ or ‘conditional’. In the case of the former, which are those of interest in this case, these are rights that concern legal relationships that are established spontaneously, that is, on the free initiative of the parties, referring to them to qualify the type or quality of certain due benefits. Such is the case of the right to a sufficient remuneration, the right to rest, among others. This category of rights, giving rise to positive obligations on the part of the employer, can be asserted by their beneficiaries against the counterparty to the relationship. That is, the simple fact of their constitutional recognition means they are understood to be incorporated, automatically, within the framework of the labor or public employment relationship, as the case may be”. (The emphasis and underlining are ours). Already within the framework of the unwaivability of so-called additional salary incentives, the same Chamber indicated: “...It was rightly indicated that remuneration for work is guaranteed by our Constitution in Articles 56 and 57, and is considered as a compensation for the work performed. According to the guarantees contained in our Constitution and the principles informing labor law, remuneration for work is an inalienable and unwaivable guarantee for the parties, much more so when it is to the detriment of workers. It is for the foregoing that the employer cannot suppress that right…”. (Votes numbers 7451-94 and 458-96). Likewise, Convention No. 94, of June 29, 1949, of the International Labour Organization, called “Convention concerning Labour Clauses (in Contracts entered into by Public Authorities)”, establishes in its Article 2, that “Contracts to which this Convention applies shall include clauses guaranteeing to the workers concerned wages (including allowances), hours of work and other conditions of labour which are not less favourable than those established for work of the same character in the trade or industry concerned in the same district: …(a) by collective agreement or by other recognised machinery of negotiation between organisations of employers and workers representative respectively of substantial proportions of the employers and workers in the trade or industry concerned;(b) by arbitration award; or(c) by national laws or regulations.2. Where the conditions of labour referred to in the preceding paragraph are not regulated in the district where the work is carried on in one of the manners indicated above, the clauses to be included in contracts shall guarantee to the workers concerned wages (including allowances), hours of work and other conditions of labour which are not less favourable than: (a) those established by collective agreement or by other recognised machinery of negotiation, by arbitration, or by national laws or regulations, for work of the same character in the trade or industry concerned in the nearest appropriate district; or(b) the general level observed by employers who, belonging to the same trade or industry as the contractor, are in comparable circumstances.…”. (The emphasis is ours). Equally, Convention 95, called “Convention concerning the Protection of Wages”, issued on July 1, 1949, defined in its Article 1 that salary is “… the remuneration or earnings, however designated or calculated, capable of being expressed in terms of money and fixed by agreement or by national laws or regulations, which are payable by virtue of a written or unwritten contract of employment by an employer to an employed person for work done or to be done or for services rendered or to be rendered…”. Also, Article 6 of that convention indicates that employers shall be prohibited from limiting in any manner the freedom of the worker to dispose of his wages. Such provisions, analyzed integrally with our Political Constitution, allow us to infer that any internal provision that limits the enjoyment of the salary by the working person is contrary to the fundamental rights to salary. The remembered author Víctor Ardón states in his work “El salario y otras formas de retribución” that, independently of any legal or economic consideration, it must always be kept in mind that remuneration is a fundamental right of every worker and that it is the obligation of the Costa Rican State to provide the “greatest well-being to all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth”, and it must “procure that everyone has honest and useful occupation, duly remunerated”, just as established by numerals 50 and 56 of our Political Constitution. The cited author points out as a jurisprudential antecedent Vote number 2635-91 of the same Constitutional Chamber, in which it is analyzed that “The right to work in its collective dimension implies a mandate to the public authorities to procure that all persons have honest and useful occupation and is supported, as this Chamber has already repeatedly indicated, by principles and values constitutionally assumed such as solidarity, real and effective equality, and the participation of all in the economic life of the country. In its individual dimension it is concretized in the right to have access to a specific position, if the necessary requirements demanded for the type of work intended to be performed are met.” All these jurisprudential and normative guidelines allow us to glimpse that the right to salary is an institute that must be supported by principles and values enshrined constitutionally and in the conventions of the International Labour Organization, such as: solidarity, equality, and the participation of all in the economic life of the country. In that sense, capital and labor must develop from the margins of reason and proportionality, which are constitutional principles governing labor law. Ardón points out to us that “…Costa Rican labor legislation has structured the salary based on two basic concepts known as ‘base salary’ (salario base) and ‘salary supplements’ (complementos salariales), despite the fact that in the socio-labor reality, the salary structure has become very complex. This situation has forced us to face a process of adaptation and change of such systems, according to the transformations of companies and productive sectors. Likewise, this flexible adaptation process has generated a multiplicity of salary models, which makes our legislation entirely insufficient to meet needs.” Within the framework of public administration, every person must be remunerated according to the service they provide. In that sense, the author Gastón Jeze indicates that the periodic allocation of a sum of money according to a rate established in accordance with laws and regulations for its obtaining, by reason of the activity for a public service, determines its condition as salary (“Principios generales del Derecho Administrativo”, Editorial De Palma, Buenos Aires, Argentina, page 406). Likewise, Marienhoff indicates that the salary nature, within public employment relations, derives from the contractual relationship and from a consideration on the part of the State (MARIENHOFF, Miguel, “Tratado de Derecho Administrativo”, Tomo III-B, Editorial Argentina, Buenos Aires, p. 208). Now, with respect to the components that make up the salary of public officials, these components are fixed according to the nature of the functions and the personal characteristics of the serving person, in accordance with the circumstances established by law. Regarding these supplements, they can be classified in different ways: a) compensations according to the form of payment: they are subdivided into allowances and bonuses. The former aim to compensate the official for expenses incurred by the service; the latter seek to pay for services rendered in special circumstances or those that exceed the normal performance of the public official; b) compensations according to the position: they are subdivided into 1) benefits outside the ordinary place of work (zone pay, which can be paid per day or per month to pay for lodging expenses, travel expenses, etc.); 2) for representing the administration: they are sums of money that the official receives in a fixed sum or in periods, so that they can effectively perform their work (representation expenses); 3) benefits for special or exceptional work: the remuneration is fixed based on the salary received. Specifically, regarding the regulation of the school salary (salario escolar) in the public sector, this Chamber has followed the hypothesis that said salary does not constitute a salary withholding paid on a deferred basis each month of January, but rather is an additional salary component, calculated on the total salary received by working persons and whose payment is made in accumulated form in the month of January of the following year based on the same salary components taken into account to compute the thirteenth-month bonus, a topic that will be developed in the following section.\n\n**IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE:** Before proceeding to assess the reproaches that the representative of the defendant bank raises against the judgment of the Court, it is important to clarify that in this matter, the authority of the Banco Central de Costa Rica to establish -by itself- its own salary regime is not under discussion, but rather that, in accordance with the claims outlined in the lawsuit, what is truly essential to elucidate is whether the school salary claimed by the plaintiff could and can cease to be recognized by the defendant entity starting from that new salary policy established in the entity as of the year 1999. The foregoing is so because there is no doubt that, due to the nature of the defendant bank, its board of directors has the authority to agree upon its own budget, as well as to dictate policies regarding classification and valuation of positions (Article 28, subsection m of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central), but the nature and origin of the school salary at a general level must also be taken into consideration. Thus, in the first place, this Chamber has made clear the criterion that the school salary does not constitute a salary withholding paid on a deferred basis each month of January, but rather is an additional salary component calculated on the total salary received by working persons and whose payment is made in accumulated form in the month of January of the following year based on the same salary components taken into account to compute the thirteenth-month bonus (in that sense, consult –among others– judgments numbers 833 of 9:40 a.m. on October 12, 1055 of 9:35 a.m. on December 21, both of 2011, and number 667 of 10:00 a.m. on August 10, 2012). Likewise, in a more recent judgment such as number 1232, of 10:00 a.m. on November 4, 2015, this Chamber made a historical recount of the mentioned extreme, for which it was indicated: “The normative antecedent of this salary component in the public sector was a resolution of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, specifically, resolution DG-062-94 of 8:00 a.m. on August 5, 1994, in which the school salary was conceptualized as an additional adjustment to the salary increase granted as of July 1, 1994, consisting of a percentage of the nominal salary that would be paid in cumulative form, in the month of January of each year, according to what was agreed in the ‘Acuerdo de Política Salarial para el Sector Público’, signed on July 23, 1994 by the representatives of the Comisión Negociadora de Salarios del Sector Público, where this figure was established as one of the main components of the policy of increasing salaries. In that resolution it was ordered: ‘Article 1- Create a salary component called ‘School Salary’ (Salario Escolar) which will consist of a percentage calculated on the nominal salary of each worker. It will be cumulative and will be governed in accordance with the following: a. Starting July 1, 1994 and until December 31, 1994, it will be calculated as a supplementary salary (sobresueldo) equivalent to one twenty-five hundredths of one percent (1.25%) of the monthly nominal salary and its payment will correspond to the accumulated amount of said period. b. For purposes of calculating the supplementary salary created herein, the salaries earned by the worker in the corresponding period will be taken into account, excepting from said nominal salary, other salary components that also depend on and/or are calculated based on the amount of the servant’s total salary. Article 2. This salary component is subject to statutory social charges.’ On the other hand, through resolution AP-34-94, of August 26, 1994, the Autoridad Presupuestaria extended that resolution to the institutions and public companies covered under its scope. That agreement expressly states: ‘WHEREAS: …/… That the Autoridad Presupuestaria, empowered by its Creation Law and the General Guidelines of Salary and Employment Policy for 1994, considers it advisable to extend Resolution DG-062-94 to the Institutions and Public Companies covered under its scope… ORDAINS: ‘Create a salary component called School Salary (Salario Escolar), which consists of a percentage calculated on the nominal salary of each worker. 2.- The percentage will be cumulative and will be governed in accordance with the following: a- Starting July 1, 1994 and until December 31, 1994, it will be calculated as a supplementary salary equivalent to 1.25% (one twenty-five hundredths of one percent) of the monthly nominal salary and a single payment will be made in the month of January 1995, corresponding to said period. b.- Nominal salary is the sum of the base salary (salario base), annual increases (aumentos anuales), exclusive dedication or prohibition (dedicación exclusiva or prohibición), and professional career (carrera profesional). 3.- This salary component will be budgeted in a sub-item called ‘School Salary’ (Salario Escolar) in the Personnel Services item and is subject to statutory social charges…’. On the occasion of resolution DG-062-94, on September 9, 1994, the Department of Salaries and Incentives of the aforementioned Dirección General de Servicio Civil issued circular SI-04-94-0, in which it was defined: ‘School Salary (Salario Escolar): salary bonus (plus salarial) that accumulates annually, consisting of a percentage calculated on the nominal salary of each worker. Nominal Salary (Salario Nominal): all the salary components that correspond to the servant for the performance of a position, except the additional sums recognized based on the nominal salary itself, excludes salary in kind (salario en especie).’ By virtue of a series of questions raised, the Dirección General de Servicio Civil issued resolution DG-005-95 at 9:00 a.m. on January 12, 1995, through which it modified Articles 1 and 2 cited, in the following sense: ‘Article 1. Create the ‘School Salary’ (Salario Escolar), which will consist of a percentage calculated on the salary of each servant. It will be cumulative and will be governed in accordance with the following: a. Starting July 1, 1994 and until December 31 of the same year, this corresponds to a percentage of one twenty-five hundredths (1.25%) additional to the general increase granted as of July 1, 1994, with which the 8% increase agreed upon in the salary negotiation of the Public Sector for the second semester of 1994 is completed. B. For calculation purposes, the same salary components used to determine the year-end bonus will be taken into consideration. Article 2. The ‘School Salary’ (Salario Escolar) is subject to statutory social charges.’ Starting from that resolution DG-005-95, the calculation of the school salary is carried out taking into consideration the same salary components used to calculate the year-end bonus, and based on these, a percentage is set that is paid in the month of January of the following year, and which for that time was set at 1.171%. Subsequently, the same Directorate issued other resolutions through which the percentage for calculating the benefit was gradually increased to 3.58% of the total salary (through resolution of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil DG-054-96 at 4:00 p.m. on July 3, 1996); and finally, it was increased once more, setting it at 8.19% of the total salary; a percentage with which this item is calculated in public employment relations to this day (this starting from 1998, by virtue of what was ordered by resolution of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil DG-136-97 at 2:30 p.m. on December 5, 1997), prescribed in these terms: ‘Article 1.- Modify Resolution DG-041-97 of 07-01-97, so that the percentage of school salary is increased by one point fifty-eight percent (1.58%), additional to the existing six point seventy-five percent (6.75%), with which a monthly eight point thirty-three percent (8.33%) is completed, which corresponds to an annual salary, so that this adjusted benefit, in accordance with the methodology defined for this purpose, is fixed at eight point nineteen percent (8.19%) of the total salary of public servants. Article 2. The application of this percentage in accordance with the methodology established in Official Letter SI-002-95 is on all sums that legally constitute salary. Article 3. For payment purposes, this benefit is established as a monthly accumulation (from January to December) on the total salary, payable in the month of January of each year.’ It is of special importance to mention that these resolutions were reflected in Decreto Ejecutivo number 23907-H, which ordered: ‘The item School Salary is added to the Personnel Services Item, to identify the expenditure for an additional adjustment, for active servants, to the salary increase granted as of July 1, 1994, which consists of a percentage of the nominal salary of said servants, so that it is paid cumulatively in the month of January of each year.’ As can be deduced from the foregoing, the true origin of the school salary was not properly the referred resolution DG-062-94 of August 5, 1994 of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, but rather this was issued based on a ‘Agreement on Salary Policy for the Public Sector’ signed on July 23, 1994 by the representatives of the Comisión Negociadora de Salarios del Sector Público, by virtue of which this figure was established as one of the main components of the increasing wage policy of the government of the time, as inferred from the whereas clauses of the mentioned resolution, and whose purpose was to increase the purchasing power of salaries and adapt them to the economic reality in the face of inflation, as economic support for families to face the expenses of the educational process of their members. That salary policy agreement was adapted to the different internal regulations of public institutions, so much so that the defendant bank recognized it from its genesis until the year 1998, when it justified its suppression for new relationships starting January 1999 based on a new global salary scale that respected legal minimums. Likewise, that policy was finally included in a general Decreto Ejecutivo, as explained previously, which is a source of Law. The foregoing is reasonable if it is considered that the State must act in accordance with the principle of legality that encompasses -at one of its highest hierarchical levels- constitutional norms. Among them, Article 50 of the Political Constitution that establishes the duty of the State to procure the greatest well-being for all the inhabitants of the country, through the organization and stimulation of production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. In that sense, the State is established as the guarantor and defender of that right. Furthermore, numeral 56 also proclaims access to work as a right of the individual and guarantees the right of free choice of remunerative sources. For its part, the following Article 57 regulates matters regarding the minimum wage and the principle of salary equality, for which it declares the inalienability of the indicated rights and benefits in accordance with a permanent policy of national solidarity (Article 74). Said competence for setting minimum wages has been entrusted to the Consejo Nacional de Salarios as a technical body created by law 832 of November 4, 1949. Finally, subsection 20 of Article 140 of the Constitution leaves open the government's obligation to fulfill the other assigned duties and provides for the exercise of the other powers conferred upon it by the Constitution and the laws. Then, the Banco Central de Costa Rica, according to Article 1 of its Organic Law, is an autonomous institution of public law with legal personality and its own assets that forms part of the National Banking System. It is evident that said entity, despite its nature as an autonomous entity with its own legal personality, clearly functions as the “cashier of the State” by virtue of what is ordered in said law. In fact, numeral 99 of the referred regulation, when defining its operations with the State, frames it -in accordance with its functions- as financial advisor, fiscal agent and banker-cashier of the State. Now then, according to the doctrine, the reference made in Administrative Law to figures such as decentralization and administrative oversight (tutela administrativa), aspects closely related to the nature of the defendant entity and its relationship with the State as the central entity, cannot be ignored. For Ortiz Ortiz, decentralization “implies an attribution of competence –or legal personality –, on an ultimate, definitive and exclusive title, by virtue of a rule of the legal system… to decentralize is to transfer or create a competence in another subject”. (ORTIZ ORTIZ, Eduardo. Tesis de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. San José, Editorial Stradtmann, 1998, p. 313). For its part, administrative oversight is understood as “the relationship of subordination that runs between the State and minor entities”. (Ibid. p. 323). According to Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, “the minor public entities, certainly, exercise powers of authority and pursue public purposes, notwithstanding the major public entity or the Central Public Administration controls or oversees them through the exercise of powers of direction, programming or planning, and control”. (Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I, part general. Medellín, Colombia, Biblioteca Jurídica Diké, 2002, p. 9). Likewise, for this same recently cited author, “administrative oversight,… is not incompatible with autonomy, on the contrary, it presupposes it…”, for which he cites the vote of the Constitutional Chamber number 3309-94 in that sense. (Op. Cit., p. 22). In accordance with Ortiz Ortiz, “the State cannot give orders nor issue instructions to the minor entity”, except in exceptional cases, but functional autonomy does not mean total independence of the minor entity with respect to the State either, for, despite it, it is possible in a certain way for the latter to exercise a power of direction and control over the entity acting as a center of action distinct from the State. (Ortiz, op.cit., p. 318). According to this same author, Articles 188 and 189 of the Political Constitution say nothing about oversight nor about the relations between the State and minor entities; however, the organic laws of the latter have erroneously interpreted that normative foundation as a prohibition of the oversight function of the State (op. cit., page 324). Ernesto Jinesta Lobo explains that “…the laws referred to by the Constituent are, basically, the Ley de Planificación Nacional and the Ley General de la Administración Pública, especially the latter which in its Articles 26, 27, 98, 99 and 100 establishes the content and scope of direction and coordination…”. (Op cit., p. 100). The author [Nombre1], mentioned before, has also explained concrete powers related to said oversight such as those of programming, directing, formulating plans, setting coordinated goals or goals referred to each other in mutual independence to achieve a result of equilibrium or balance and the attainment of a specific public purpose. In that sense, the power of direction through directives as a way to carry out the programs or plans is highlighted. (Op. Cit., pages 330-335). The mentioned author Jinesta Lobo states that “planning guides administrative action and management by defining the great objectives, goals and purposes to be achieved and the methods or ways to achieve them efficiently”. (Op. Cit. , p. 25). It is on this theoretical framework that it is considered that the State can indeed establish a general salary policy -as it did in 1994- through a national plan aimed at increasing the salaries of the servants of the State and its decentralized institutions that included the school salary as a way to compensate for the student needs of its members at the time of incurring those expenses. This being the case, it is considered that the Banco Central de Costa Rica, despite its functional and financial autonomy, was not excluded from the duty to recognize the school salary for its employees, independently of the variation in the salary regime that it internally established as of January 1999 and the date of entry of the officials to the institution -among them the plaintiff-. The foregoing, because the creation and payment of that supplementary salary, initially, had its origin in a general salary policy of the State that did not expressly exclude any institution or entity of the public sector, so that no regulation to the contrary has been issued to date either and, therefore, that foundation must prevail even over the internal provisions of each entity and the subsequent reforms to these that may have been made within its structure. It is clear that the officials of the Banco Central, before being employees of the entity, are part of the general category of active public servants and it was to that population -without any exception, limitation, or future condition- that the beneficial salary policy by virtue of which the school salary originated was directed. For greater abundance, since the so-called school salary is a type of salary and, therefore, derives its nature from regulations of constitutional rank (Articles 56 and 57) and from Conventions numbers 94 and 95 of the International Labour Organization, its implementation as a salary component cannot be obviated by a norm of lower hierarchy such as numeral 28, subsection m, of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central, since, if so, the hierarchy of normative sources derived from Article 6 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública would be infringed. It is necessary to point out that in Vote number 496, of 09:40 a.m., on September 17, 2003, this Chamber analyzed the nature of the Banco Central and its relationship with the Executive Branch in salary matters, for which it indicated: “On the other hand, according to Article one of its Organic Law (N° 7558 of November 3, 1995), the Banco Central de Costa Rica is an autonomous institution of public law, with legal personality and its own assets, a member of the National Banking System. Subsection m) of Article 28 of that law empowers the Board of Directors to dictate its own policies regarding classification and valuation of positions. For its part, subsection 4) of numeral 34 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional (N° 1644 of September 26, 1953) grants competence to the Board of Directors of the bank to create the positions and services indispensable for the due functioning of the institution and set the respective remunerations. The foregoing implies that the defendant entity has the capacity to establish its own salary regime.\n\nAs the Court rightly resolved, the Central Bank, as an autonomous institution, does not have full autonomy in salary matters, as this is a matter of government. However, it is worth making certain clarifications. It has already been stated that the law grants the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica the competence to set the salaries of its employees (subsection 4) of article 34 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System). However, to do so, it must adhere to the guidelines issued for this purpose by the Executive Branch, for the reasons that will be set forth below. The Constitutional Chamber, in Ruling No. 1822 of 3:46 p.m. on March 7, 2001 (…), stated: ‘From the transcribed background, it is inferred that since salary matters are part of government policy, it is therefore the responsibility of the Executive Branch to adopt binding decisions in this field for the centralized public sector, leaving autonomous entities subject to the general guidelines on salary matters issued by that Branch of the Republic’. To understand the true scope of that resolution, reference must be made, first, to the following regulations. First, article 188 of the Political Constitution, which states: ‘The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of government. Their directors are responsible for their management’. Next, numeral 2 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System establishes: ‘The State banks listed in the previous article are autonomous institutions under public law, with their own legal personality and independence in matters of administration. They are subject to the law in matters of government and must act in close collaboration with the Executive Branch, coordinating their efforts and activities (...)’. Furthermore, it is essential to transcribe the precedents issued by that other Chamber on the matter, among which Ruling No. 3309 of 3:00 p.m. on July 5, 1994, can be cited: ‘The administrative autonomy of the decentralized institutions constituted under Title XIV of the Constitution is a guarantee against the actions of the Central Executive Branch, but not against the law in matters of Government. Before the reform made to article 188 of the Constitution, it was not possible to subject autonomous institutions to the general policy of the State regarding matters placed under their competence… […] This means that autonomous institutions do not enjoy a guarantee of unrestricted constitutional autonomy, since the law, apart from defining their competence, may subject them to directives derived from development policies that the law itself entrusts to the Central Executive Branch, provided, of course, that this does not invade either the sphere of administrative autonomy proper, or the competence of the Assembly itself or of other constitutional bodies such as the Comptroller General of the Republic. […] In this way, the reform made it constitutionally possible to subject autonomous entities in general to national planning criteria and, in particular, to subject them to the general guidelines issued by the central Executive Branch or by Central Administration bodies (called upon to complement or oversee that general policy). […] Having defined salary policy as part of government policy, it is necessary to reiterate that when the constituent decentralized the Executive Branch, it sought to avoid arbitrary and anti-technical interference in the management of each of those institutions, as defined by law. But the constituent legislator did not opt to create a salary or labor regime segregated from the central Executive Branch, as there is no doubt that Title XV, Sole Chapter of the Political Constitution has as its immediate antecedent the previous practice of mass dismissal of state officials and employees with each change of government’. […] Finally, in Ruling No. 3089 of 3:00 p.m. on May 12, 1998, it was noted: ‘… For this reason, all bodies that make up the state apparatus as a Constitutional State of Law must submit to the criteria of ‘national planning’ and in particular to the general guidelines issued by the Executive Branch -Government- (arts. 140.3,8 C. P.), to fulfill, among others, the constitutional mandates of ensuring the greatest well-being for all inhabitants of the country by organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth (art. 50 C.P.), as well as ensuring that everyone has employment—as a right of the individual and an obligation to society—that is honest and useful, duly remunerated, and preventing conditions from being established because of it that in any way diminish the freedom or dignity of man or degrade his work to the condition of a simple commodity (art. 56 C. P.). The Executive Branch -Government-, as a legal and political organization, is responsible for organizing, directing, and channeling society in all its political, legal, economic, and social aspects. The executive function is an essential task of the Government in its various bodies or ministries, as is the political directive of setting the objectives and goals of coordinated action in the other public entities, proposing the means and methods to achieve those objectives. It is also an essential function of the Executive Branch to guide, coordinate, and supervise the Administration apparatus (art. 140.8, CP) and to issue general rules that are not merely simple execution of legal norms but delimiting ones (art. 140.2, CP). Regarding this last point, these are execution norms—regulatory decrees—that help make possible the execution of their source of legitimacy, that is, the laws emanating from the Legislative Assembly. Salary policy derived from service relations—between the Administration and its employees (art. 112 LGAP), as a uniform and universal state regime of public employment, is, of course, an integral part of government policy (SSC N.° 2294 of 2:48 p.m. on August 19, 1992). (…) Therefore, it is necessary to conclude, regarding this first point, that the legislator has sought, in exercise of the powers granted by the original constituent power, to create a single public salary regime, precisely foreseeing the effects that imbalances derived from service relations between the Administration and public employees have on public finances and, therefore, for the country in general. This, then, makes it fully justifiable and constitutional to subject everything concerning the salary policy of the Public Administration to uniform criteria—through guidelines—which, moreover, is set periodically so that the public employee can regularly and uninterruptedly meet the subsistence duties of his family (arts. 56 and 57 C.P.). Consequently, it is constitutional for the Budgetary Authority, as a body derived from the Executive Branch, to issue the guidelines for the State’s salary policy in exercise of its functions, with the purpose of protecting said employees and guaranteeing the efficiency of the Public Administration, which it must propose to the Executive Branch, so that the latter imposes them on the entire Public Administration, understood as that constituted by the State and other public entities (art. 1 LGAP), thus satisfying the constitutional mandates of articles 50, 56, and 62 of the Political Constitution and 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. The previous considering paragraph already indicated that, by decision of the legislator, the Central Bank of Costa Rica is not subject to the guidelines issued by the Budgetary Authority, which is the body responsible for setting salary policies for the decentralized sector. But, on the other hand, the Constitutional Chamber, in the transcribed pronouncements, affirmed that salary policy is part of a ‘uniform and universal state regime of public employment’. That is, there is a constitutional principle according to which a uniform salary policy must exist for the entire Public Administration. However, the contradiction is only apparent, since the Budgetary Authority does not have exclusive and exclusionary competence for defining salary policy, but is merely a technical auxiliary body of the Executive Branch, and, as such, lacks true directive power. Ultimately, it is the Executive Branch that exercises the political direction of the State and the other public entities, and it is therefore its responsibility to set the salary policy applicable to state banks, through guidelines, which, by their very nature, must be generic in nature, in such a way that the administrative autonomy enjoyed by those entities—which even empowers them to set the remuneration of their officials—is not harmed. Therefore, it cannot be affirmed that by virtue of article 6 of the Law for the Modernization of the Financial System of the Republic, the state banks, and within them the defendant, are excluded from any state policy in this matter (…)”. (End of transcription). In response to certain specific grievances of the appellant, while it is true that the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets establishes that the provisions of that law shall not be applicable to public banks or the National Insurance Institute, except regarding the procedure for approval of their budgets, and that therefore, according to article 21 of that same regulation, they would also not be subject to the control of the Budgetary Authority, the *sui generis* nature of the Central Bank of Costa Rica and its differences from the other commercial public banks must also be taken into account. Furthermore, from articles 1 and 2 of the Civil Service Statute—mentioned in the appeal—the express exclusion of the Central Bank from that regulation is not inferred, although this situation must be weighed against the specific norms alluded to previously. Lastly, the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber invoked by the appellant refer to resolutions of amparo remedies where the issue of the principle of salary freedom is addressed, without them specifically analyzing the matter related to the school salary. In fact, it is clear from these that the Constitutional Chamber makes it clear that its analysis is from the viewpoint of Constitutional Law because it expressly refers to the ordinary jurisdiction to resolve specific claims regarding the demands of the appellants.”\n\nIII.- GENERAL ASPECTS REGARDING SALARY: First, it is considered transcendental to carry out an analysis regarding salary at the constitutional level and regarding the international instruments of the International Labor Organization. This is because the defense of the defendant party throughout this process has centered on the manifest impossibility of not recognizing the school salary (salario escolar) for the plaintiff given the salary policy established in the defendant bank as of the year nineteen ninety-nine, which allows the board of directors to agree upon its own budget. At this stage, and with a new vision of the topic, it is estimated that this thesis ignores the constitutional genesis of salary and its effects in the field of positive law for its implementation. Let us explain this. The Constitutional Chamber, in ruling number 5374 of the year 2003, when interpreting numeral 57 of the Magna Carta, established: “…It should be noted that social rights, according to the modern conception, can be ‘unconditional’ or ‘conditional’. In the case of the former, which are the ones of interest in this case, these are rights that concern legal relationships that are instituted spontaneously, that is, on the free initiative of the parties, referring to them to qualify the type or quality of certain due benefits. Such is the case of the right to sufficient remuneration, the right to rest, among others. This category of rights, giving rise to positive benefits on the part of the employer, can be enforced by their right-holders against the counterparty in the relationship. That is, the simple fact of their constitutional recognition means they are understood to be incorporated, automatically, within the framework of the labor or public employment relationship, as the case may be”. (The emphasis and underlining are ours). Already within the framework of the unavailability of the so-called additional salary incentives, the same Chamber indicated: “...It was rightly indicated that remuneration for work is guaranteed by our Constitution in articles 56 and 57, and is considered as a compensation for the work performed. According to the guarantees contained in our Constitution and the principles that inform labor matters, remuneration for work is an unwaivable and unavailable guarantee for the parties, much more so when it is to the detriment of the workers. It is for the foregoing that the employer cannot suppress that right…”. (Rulings numbers 7451-94 and 458-96). Likewise, Convention number 94, of June 29, 1949, of the International Labor Organization, called “Convention concerning Labour Clauses (in Contracts concluded by Public Authorities)”, establishes in its article 2 that “Contracts to which this Convention applies shall include clauses guaranteeing to the workers concerned wages (including allowances), hours of work and other conditions of employment not less favourable than those established for work of the same character in the trade or industry concerned in the same district: … (a) by collective agreement or by other recognized machinery of negotiation between organizations of employers and workers representing respectively a substantial proportion of the employers and workers in the trade or industry concerned; (b) by arbitration award; or (c) by national laws or regulations. 2. Where the conditions of employment referred to in the preceding paragraph are not regulated in the district where the work is carried out in one of the manners mentioned above, the clauses to be included in contracts shall guarantee to the workers concerned wages (including allowances), hours of work and other conditions of employment not less favourable than: (a) those established by a collective agreement or by other recognized machinery of negotiation, by arbitration award or by national laws or regulations, for work of the same character in the trade or industry concerned in the nearest appropriate district; or (b) the general level observed by employers who, belonging to the same trade or industry as the contractor, are in similar circumstances.…”. (The emphasis is ours). Similarly, Convention 95, called “Convention concerning the Protection of Wages”, issued on July 1, 1949, defined in its article 1 that salary is “… the remuneration or earnings, however designated or calculated, capable of being expressed in terms of money and fixed by mutual agreement or by national laws or regulations, which are payable by virtue of a written or unwritten contract of employment by an employer to an employed person for work done or to be done or for services rendered or to be rendered…”. Also article 6 of that convention indicates that employers shall be prohibited from limiting in any manner the freedom of the worker to dispose of his wages. Such provisions, analyzed integrally with our Political Constitution, allow us to infer that any internal provision that limits the enjoyment thereof by the working person is contrary to the fundamental rights to salary. The recalled author Víctor Ardón refers in his work “El salario y otras formas de retribución” (Salary and other forms of remuneration) that, independently of any legal or economic consideration, it must always be kept in mind that remuneration is a fundamental right of every worker and that it is the obligation of the Costa Rican State to provide “the greatest well-being to all inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth”, and must “ensure that all have honest and useful occupation, duly remunerated”, as established by numerals 50 and 56 of our Political Constitution. The cited author points out as a jurisprudential antecedent ruling number 2635-91 of the same Constitutional Chamber, in which it is analyzed that “The right to work in its collective dimension implies a mandate to the public authorities to ensure that all persons have honest and useful occupation and is based, as this Chamber has already repeatedly indicated, on principles and values assumed constitutionally such as solidarity, real and effective equality, and the participation of all in the economic life of the country. In its individual dimension, it is realized in the right to have access to a specific position, if the necessary requirements demanded for the type of work to be performed are met“. All these jurisprudential and normative guidelines allow us to glimpse that the right to salary is an institution that must be based on constitutionally enshrined principles and values and in the conventions of the International Labor Organization, such as: solidarity, equality, and the participation of all in the economic life of the country. In that sense, capital and labor must develop within the margins of reason and proportionality, which are constitutional principles governing labor law. Ardón points out to us that “…Costa Rican labor legislation has structured salary based on two basic concepts known as ‘base salary’ and ‘salary supplements’, despite the fact that in the socio-labor reality, the salary structure has become very complex. This situation has forced us to face a process of adaptation and change of such systems, according to the transformations of companies and productive sectors. Likewise, this process of flexible adaptation has generated a multiplicity of salary models, which makes our legislation entirely insufficient to meet needs”. Within the framework of public administration, every person must be remunerated according to the service they provide. In that sense, author Gastón Jeze indicates that the periodic assignment of a sum of money according to a rate established in accordance with laws and regulations for its obtainment, by reason of the activity for a public service, determines its condition as salary (“Principios generales del Derecho Administrativo”, Editorial De Palma, Buenos Aires, Argentina, page 406). Likewise, Marienhoff points out that the salary nature, within public employment relations, derives from the contractual relationship and from a consideration on the part of the State (MARIENHOFF, Miguel, “Tratado de Derecho Administrativo”, Tomo III-B, Editorial Argentina, Buenos Aires, p. 208). Now then, regarding the components that make up the salary of public officials, these components are set according to the nature of the functions and the personal characteristics of the employee, in accordance with the circumstances established by law. As for these supplements, they can be classified in different ways: a) compensations according to the form of payment: subdivided into indemnifications and gratuities. The former aim to reimburse the official for expenses caused by the service; the latter seek to pay for services rendered in special circumstances or that exceed the normal performance of the public official; b) compensations according to the position: subdivided into 1) benefits outside the ordinary place of work (zoning allowance, which can be paid daily or monthly to pay for accommodation expenses, travel expenses, etc.); 2) for representing the administration: are sums of money that the official receives in a fixed sum or periodically, so that they can effectively perform their work (representation expenses); 3) benefits for special or exceptional work: remuneration is fixed on the occasion of the salary received. Specifically, regarding the regulation of the school salary (salario escolar) in the public sector, this Chamber has followed the hypothesis that said salary does not constitute a salary withholding paid in a deferred manner each January, but rather is one more salary component, calculated on the total salary received by working persons and whose payment is made in an accumulated manner in the month of January of the following year based on the same salary components taken into account to calculate the thirteenth month, a topic that will be developed in the following section.\n\nIV.- ANALYSIS OF THE CASE: Before assessing the criticisms that the representative of the defendant bank raises against the Court’s judgment, it is important to clarify that in this matter, the power of the Central Bank of Costa Rica to establish—by itself—its own salary regime is not under discussion, but rather, according to the claims outlined in the lawsuit, what is truly crucial to elucidate is whether the school salary claimed by the plaintiff could and can cease to be recognized by the defendant entity based on that new salary policy established in the entity as of the year 1999. The foregoing is so because there is no doubt that, due to the nature of the defendant bank, its board of directors has the power to agree upon its own budget, as well as to dictate policies regarding job classification and evaluation (article 28 subsection m of the Organic Law of the Central Bank), but the nature and origin of the school salary at a general level must also be taken into consideration. Thus, first, this Chamber has made clear the criterion that the school salary does not constitute a salary withholding paid in a deferred manner each January, but rather is one more salary component calculated on the total salary received by working persons and whose payment is made in an accumulated manner in the month of January of the following year based on the same salary components taken into account to calculate the thirteenth month (in this sense, consult—among others—judgments numbers 833 of 9:40 a.m. on October 12, 1055 of 9:35 a.m. on December 21; both of 2011, and number 667 of 10:00 a.m. on August 10, 2012). Likewise, in a more recent judgment such as number 1232, of 10:00 a.m. on November 4, 2015, this Chamber made a historical recount of the aforementioned point, for which it was stated: “The normative antecedent of this salary component in the public sector is the Salary Policy Agreement for the Public Sector, signed by the representatives of the Public Sector Salary Negotiating Commission on July 23, 1994, where the school salary is established as one of the main components of the growing salary policy. Based on that Agreement, the General Directorate of Civil Service issued resolution DG-062-94 of August 5, 1994, in which the school salary was conceptualized as an additional adjustment to the salary increase granted as of July 1, 1994, consisting of a percentage of the nominal salary that would be paid accumulatively, in the month of January of each year. That resolution stated: ‘Article 1- Create a salary component called ‘School Salary’ (Salario Escolar) which shall consist of a percentage calculated on the nominal salary of each worker. It shall be cumulative and governed in accordance with the following: a. From July 1, 1994, until December 31, 1994, it shall be calculated as a bonus (sobresueldo) equivalent to one point twenty-five percent (1.25%) of the monthly nominal salary and the payment thereof shall correspond to the accumulated amount for said period. b. For the purposes of calculating the bonus created herein, the salaries earned by the worker in the corresponding period shall be taken into account, excepting from said nominal salary other salary components that also depend on and/or are calculated based on the total salary amount of the employee. Article 2. This salary component is subject to legal social charges.’ For its part, through resolution AP-34-94, of August 26, 1994, the Budgetary Authority extended that resolution to the institutions and public companies covered under its scope.\n\nThat agreement expressly states: \"CONSIDERING: …/… That the Budgetary Authority, empowered by its Law of Creation and the General Guidelines for Salary and Employment Policy for 1994, deems it appropriate to extend Resolution DG-062-94 to the Institutions and Public Enterprises covered under its scope… DECREES: 'To create a salary component (componente salarial) called School Salary, which consists of a percentage calculated on the nominal salary of each worker. 2.- The percentage shall be cumulative and shall be governed in accordance with the following: a- From July 1, 1994, through December 31, 1994, it shall be calculated as a supplementary salary equivalent to 1.25% (one point twenty-five percent) of the monthly nominal salary and shall be paid in a single payment in the month of January 1995, corresponding to said period. b.- Nominal salary is the sum of the base salary, annual increases, exclusive dedication or prohibition, and professional career. 3.- This salary component shall be budgeted in a sub-item called 'School Salary' within the Personal Services item and is subject to the statutory social charges…' On the occasion of Resolution DG-062-94, on September 9, 1994, the Department of Salaries and Incentives of the aforementioned General Directorate of Civil Service issued Circular SI-04-94-0, in which it defined: 'School Salary: a salary supplement that is accumulated annually, consisting of a percentage calculated on the nominal salary of each worker. Nominal Salary: all the salary components that correspond to the employee for the performance of a position, except for additional sums recognized as a function of the nominal salary itself; it excludes salary in kind.' By virtue of a series of doubts raised, the General Directorate of Civil Service issued Resolution DG-005-95 at 9:00 a.m. on January 12, 1995, by which it modified the cited Articles 1 and 2, in the following sense: 'Article 1. To create the 'School Salary,' which shall consist of a percentage calculated on the salary of each employee; it shall be cumulative and shall be governed in accordance with the following: a. From July 1, 1994, through December 31 of the same year, this corresponds to a percentage of one point twenty-five (1.25%) in addition to the general increase granted as of July 1, 1994, thereby completing the 8% increase agreed upon in the Public Sector salary negotiation for the second half of 1994. B. For calculation purposes, the same salary components used to determine the Christmas bonus shall be taken into consideration. Article 2. The 'School Salary' is subject to the statutory social charges.' As of that Resolution DG-005-95, the calculation of the school salary is carried out taking into consideration the same salary components used to calculate the Christmas bonus, and based on these, a percentage is set that is paid in the month of January of the following year, and which at that time was set at 1.171%. Subsequently, the same Directorate issued other resolutions through which the calculation percentage of the benefit was gradually increased to 3.58% of the total salary (by Resolution DG-054-96 of the General Directorate of Civil Service at 4:00 p.m. on July 3, 1996); and it was finally increased once more, setting it at 8.19% of the total salary; a percentage with which this item is calculated in public employment relations to this day (this as of 1998, by virtue of the provisions of Resolution DG-136-97 of the General Directorate of Civil Service at 2:30 p.m. on December 5, 1997), prescribed in the following terms: 'Article 1.- Modify Resolution DG-041-97 of 07-01-97, so as to increase the school salary percentage by one point fifty-eight percent (1.58%), in addition to the existing six point seventy-five percent (6.75%), thereby completing an eight point thirty-three percent (8.33%) monthly amount corresponding to an annual salary, such that this benefit, adjusted in accordance with the methodology defined for this purpose, is set at eight point nineteen percent (8.19%) of the total salary of public employees. Article 2. The application of this percentage, in accordance with the methodology established in Official Communication SI-002-95, is on all sums that are legally considered salary. Article 3. For payment purposes, this benefit is established as a monthly accumulation (from January to December) on the total salary, payable in the month of January of each year.' It is especially important to mention that these resolutions were embodied in Executive Decree No. 23907-H, which provided: \"The School Salary item is added to the Personal Services Item, to identify the expense for additional adjustment, for active employees, the salary increase granted as of July 1, 1994, which consists of a percentage of the nominal salary of said employees, to be paid cumulatively in the month of January of each year.\" As can be inferred from the foregoing, the true origin of the school salary was not properly the referred Resolution DG-062-94 of August 5, 1994, of the General Directorate of Civil Service, but rather that it was issued based on a \"Salary Policy Agreement for the Public Sector\" signed on July 23, 1994, by the representatives of the Public Sector Salary Negotiating Commission, by virtue of which this figure was established as one of the main components of the incumbent government's policy of increasing salaries, as inferred from the recitals of the mentioned resolution, and whose purpose was to increase the purchasing power of salaries and adapt them to the economic reality in the face of inflation, as economic support for families to meet the expenses of the educational process of their members. That salary policy agreement was adapted to the various internal regulations of public institutions, so much so that the defendant bank recognized it from its genesis until 1998, when it justified its elimination for new relationships starting in January 1999 based on a new global salary scale that respected the statutory minimums. Likewise, that policy was finally included in a general executive decree, as explained above, which is a source of Law. The foregoing is reasonable if it is considered that the State must act in accordance with the principle of legality, which includes—at one of its highest hierarchical levels—the constitutional norms. Among them, Article 50 of the Political Constitution, which establishes the State's duty to procure the greatest well-being for all inhabitants of the country, through the organization and stimulation of production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. In that sense, the State is established as guarantor and defender of that right. Furthermore, Article 56 ibidem proclaims access to work as a right of the individual and guarantees the right of free choice of remunerative sources. For its part, the following Article 57 regulates what refers to the minimum wage and the principle of salary equality, for which it declares the non-waivability of the indicated rights and benefits in accordance with a permanent policy of national solidarity (Article 74). This authority for setting minimum wages has been entrusted to the National Wage Council as a technical body created by Law 832 of November 4, 1949. Finally, subsection 20 of Article 140 of the Constitution leaves open the government's obligation to fulfill the other entrusted duties and provides for the exercise of the other attributions conferred upon it by the Constitution and the laws. Then, the Central Bank of Costa Rica, according to Article 1 of its organic law, is an autonomous institution of public law with legal personality and its own patrimony that forms part of the National Banking System. It is evident that said entity, despite its nature as an autonomous entity with its own legal personality, clearly functions as the \"State's cashier\" by virtue of the provisions of said law. In fact, Article 99 of the referred regulation, when defining its operations with the State, frames it—in accordance with its functions—as financial advisor, fiscal agent, and banker-cashier of the State. Now then, according to the doctrine, the reference made in Administrative Law to figures such as decentralization and administrative oversight cannot be ignored, aspects closely related to the nature of the defendant entity and its relationship with the State as central entity. For Ortiz Ortiz, decentralization \"implies an attribution of competence—or legal personality—on a final, definitive, and exclusive basis, by virtue of a rule of the legal system… to decentralize is to transfer or create a competence in another subject.\" (ORTIZ ORTIZ, Eduardo. Tesis de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. San José, Editorial Stradtmann, 1998, p. 313). For its part, administrative oversight is understood as \"the relationship of subordination that runs between the State and minor entities.\" (Ibid. p. 323). According to Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, \"the minor public entities, certainly, exercise sovereign powers and pursue public purposes, notwithstanding the major public entity or the Central Public Administration controls or oversees them through the exercise of powers of direction, programming or planning, and control.\" (Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I, parte general. Medellín, Colombia, Biblioteca Jurídica Diké, 2002, p. 9). Likewise, for this same author just cited, \"administrative oversight… is not incompatible with autonomy; on the contrary, it presupposes it…,\" for which he cites ruling number 3309-94 of the Constitutional Chamber in that sense. (Op. Cit., p. 22). In accordance with Ortiz Ortiz, \"the State cannot give orders nor issue instructions to the minor entity,\" except in exceptional cases, but functional autonomy also does not mean total independence of the minor entity with respect to the State, since, despite it, it is possible in a certain way for the latter to exercise a power of direction and oversight over the entity, a center of action distinct from the State. (Ortiz, op. cit., p. 318). According to this same author, Articles 188 and 189 of the Political Constitution say nothing about oversight or about relations between the State and minor entities; however, the organic laws of the latter have erroneously interpreted that normative basis as a prohibition of the State's oversight function (op. cit., page 324). Ernesto Jinesta Lobo explains that \"…the laws to which the Constituent refers are, basically, the National Planning Law and the General Law of Public Administration, above all the latter, which in its Articles 26, 27, 98, 99, and 100 establishes the content and scope of direction and coordination….\" (Op cit., p. 100). The author [Name1], previously mentioned, has also explained specific powers related to said oversight, such as those of programming, directing, formulating plans, setting coordinated goals or goals referred one to another in mutual independence to achieve a result of equilibrium or balance and the attainment of a specific public purpose. In that sense, the power of direction by means of directives as a way to carry out programs or plans is highlighted. (Op. Cit., pages 330-335). The aforementioned author Jinesta Lobo refers that \"planning guides administrative action and management, defining the great objectives, goals, and ends to be achieved and the methods or ways to achieve them efficiently.\" (Op. Cit., p. 25). It is on this theoretical framework that it is considered that the State can indeed institute a general salary policy—as it did in 1994—through a national plan aimed at increasing the salaries of the State's employees and its decentralized institutions, which included the school salary as a way to compensate the educational needs of its members during the time of disbursement of those expenses. Such being the case, it is considered that the Central Bank of Costa Rica, despite its functional and financial autonomy, was not excluded from the duty to recognize the school salary for its employees, regardless of the variation in the salary regime that it internally established as of January 1999 and the date of entry of the officials to the institution—among them the plaintiff—. The foregoing, because the creation and payment of that supplementary salary initially had its origin in a general State salary policy that did not expressly exclude any institution or entity of the public sector, such that, to date, no regulation to the contrary has been issued either and, therefore, that basis must prevail even over the internal provisions of each entity and the subsequent reforms to these that may have been made within its structure. It is clear that the officials of the Central Bank, before being employees of the entity, form part of the general category of active public employees, and to that population—without any exception, limitation, or future condition—the benefiting salary policy by virtue of which the school salary originated was directed. Abundantly, the so-called school salary, being a class of salary and, therefore, deriving its nature from constitutional-level regulations (Articles 56 and 57) and from Conventions Numbers 94 and 95 of the International Labour Organization, its implementation as a salary component cannot be obviated by a norm of lower hierarchy such as is Article 28, subsection m, of the Organic Law of the Central Bank, since, if that were the case, the hierarchy of normative sources derived from Article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration would be infringed. It is necessary to point out that in ruling number 496, at 9:40 a.m. on September 17, 2003, this Chamber analyzed the nature of the Central Bank and its relationship with the Executive Branch in salary matters, for which it indicated: \"On the other hand, according to the first article of its Organic Law (No. 7558 of November 3, 1995), the Central Bank of Costa Rica is an autonomous institution of public law, with its own legal personality and patrimony, a member of the National Banking System. Subsection m) of Article 28 of that law empowers the Board of Directors to dictate its own policies on matters of job classification and valuation. For its part, subsection 4) of Article 34 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (No. 1644 of September 26, 1953) grants competence to the Bank's Board of Directors to create the positions and services essential for the proper functioning of the institution and to set the respective remunerations. The foregoing implies that the defendant entity has the capacity to establish its own salary regime. […] As the Tribunal correctly resolved, the Central Bank, as an autonomous institution that it is, does not have full autonomy in salary matters, as this is a matter of government. However, it is worth making certain clarifications. It has already been said that the law grants the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica the competence to set the salaries of its employees (subsection 4) of Article 34 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System). However, to do so, it must adhere to the directives issued by the Executive Branch for this purpose, for the reasons that will be set forth below. The Constitutional Chamber, in Ruling No. 1822 at 3:46 p.m. on March 7, 2001 (…), stated: 'From the transcribed background, it is inferred that since salary matters are part of government policy, it therefore falls to the Executive Branch to adopt, with binding character, the decisions in that field for the centralized public sector, with autonomous entities being subject to the directives of a general nature that in salary matters are dictated by that Branch of the Republic.' To understand the true scope of that resolution, reference must be made, first of all, to the following norms. In the first place, Article 188 of the Political Constitution, which says: 'The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of government. Their directors are responsible for their management.' Then, Article 2 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System establishes: 'The banks of the State listed in the previous article are autonomous institutions of public law, with their own legal personality and independence in matters of administration. They are subject to the law in matters of government and must act in close collaboration with the Executive Branch, coordinating their efforts and activities (…)'. On the other hand, it is fundamental to transcribe the background rulings issued by that other Chamber on the matter, among which Ruling No. 3309 at 3:00 p.m. on July 5, 1994, can be cited: 'The administrative autonomy of the decentralized institutions constituted in Title XIV of the Constitution is a guarantee against the actions of the Central Executive Branch, but not against the law in matters of Government. Before the reform made to Article 188 of the Constitution, it was not possible to subject autonomous institutions to the general policy of the State regarding the matters placed under their competence… […] This means that autonomous institutions do not enjoy a guarantee of unrestricted constitutional autonomy, since the law, apart from defining their competence, can subject them to directives derived from development policies that the law itself entrusts to the Central Executive Branch, provided, of course, that this does not invade either the sphere of administrative autonomy as such, or the competence of the Assembly itself or of other constitutional bodies such as the Comptroller General of the Republic. […] In this way, the reform made it constitutionally possible to subject autonomous entities in general to the criteria of national planning and, in particular, to subject them to directives of a general nature dictated by the central Executive Branch or by bodies of the Central Administration (called upon to complement or to oversee that general policy). […] Once salary policy is defined as part of government policy, it is necessary to reiterate that when the constituent decentralized the Executive Branch, they sought to avoid arbitrary and anti-technical interference in the management of each of those institutions, defined by law. But the constituent legislator did not opt to create a salary or labor regime segregated from the central Executive Branch, since there is no doubt that Title XV, Sole Chapter of the Political Constitution has as its immediate antecedent the previous practice of mass dismissals of state officials and employees on the occasion of each change of government.' […] Finally, in Ruling No. 3089 at 3:00 p.m. on May 12, 1998, it was pointed out: '… For this reason, it is that all the bodies that form the state apparatus as a Constitutional State of Law must submit to the criteria of 'national planning' and, in particular, to the directives of a general nature dictated by the Executive Branch -Government- (arts. 140.3,8 C. P.), to fulfill, among others, the constitutional mandates of procuring the greatest well-being for all inhabitants of the country by organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth (art. 50 C.P.), as well as that everyone shall have an occupation—as a right of the individual and an obligation to society—that is honest and useful, duly remunerated, and to prevent that, because of it, conditions are established that in any way impair the freedom or dignity of man or degrade his work to the condition of a simple commodity (art. 56 C. P.). The Executive Branch -Government-, as a juridical and political organization, is the one in charge of organizing, directing, and channeling society in all its political, juridical, economic, and social aspects. The executive function is an essential task of the Government in its different organs or ministries, as is the political directive function of setting the objectives and goals of coordinated action in the other public entities, proposing the means and methods to achieve those objectives. It is also an essential function of the Executive Branch to guide, coordinate, and supervise the apparatus of the Administration (art. 140.8, CP) and to dictate general norms that are not simply the execution of legal norms but delimiting ones (art. 140.2, CP). Regarding the latter, these are execution norms -regulatory decrees- that contribute to making possible the execution of their source of legitimacy, that is, the laws emanating from the Legislative Assembly. The salary policy derived from service relationships—between the Administration and its employees (art. 112 LGAP), as a uniform and universal state public employment regime—is, of course, an integral part of government policy (SSC No. 2294 at 2:48 p.m. on August 19, 1992). (…) So, it is necessary to conclude, regarding this first point, the legislator has sought, in exercise of the attributions granted by the original constituent power, to create a unique public salary regime, precisely foreseeing the effects that the imbalances derived from the service relations between the Administration and public employees produce on public finances and, therefore, for the country in general. This, then, makes fully justifiable and constitutional the subjection to uniform criteria—through directives—of everything concerning the salary policy of the Public Administration, which, moreover, must be periodically set so that the public employee can face, in a regular and uninterrupted manner, the subsistence duties of his family (arts. 56 and 57 C.P.). Consequently, it is constitutional that the Budgetary Authority, as an organ derived from the Executive Branch, dictates the directives of the State's salary policy in the exercise of its functions, with the purpose of protecting said employees and guaranteeing the efficiency of the Public Administration, which it must propose to the Executive Branch, so that the latter imposes them on the entire Public Administration, understood as that constituted by the State and the other public entities (art. 1 LGAP), thereby satisfying the constitutional mandates of Articles 50, 56, and 62 of the Political Constitution and 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' In the preceding recital, it was already indicated that, by decision of the legislator, the Central Bank of Costa Rica is not subject to the directives issued by the Budgetary Authority, which is the body responsible for setting salary policies for the decentralized sector. But, on the other hand, the Constitutional Chamber, in the transcribed pronouncements, affirmed that salary policy is part of a 'uniform and universal state public employment regime.' That is, a constitutional principle exists according to which there must be a uniform salary policy for the entire Public Administration. However, the contradiction is merely apparent, since the Budgetary Authority does not have exclusive and exclusionary competence for the definition of salary policy, but rather is only an auxiliary technical body of the Executive Branch, and, as such, lacks real directive power. It is, ultimately, the Executive Branch that exercises the political direction of the State and of the other public entities, for which reason it corresponds to it to set the salary policy applicable to state banks, by means of directives, which, by their very nature, must be of a generic character, such that the administrative autonomy enjoyed by said entities is not harmed, which even empowers them to set the remunerations of their officials. Therefore, it cannot be affirmed that by virtue of Article 6 of the Law for the Modernization of the Financial System of the Republic, state banks, and among them the defendant, are excluded from any state policy in this matter (…).\" (End of the transcription). In response to certain specific grievances of the appellant, while it is true that the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets establishes that the provisions of that law shall not be applicable to public banks or to the National Insurance Institute, except for what corresponds to the approval process of their budgets, such that in accordance with Article 21 of that same regulation they would also not be subject to the control of the Budgetary Authority, the sui generis nature of the Central Bank of Costa Rica and its differences from other commercial public banks must also be taken into account. On the other hand, from Articles 1 and 2 of the Civil Service Statute—mentioned in the appeal—an express exclusion of the Central Bank with respect to that regulation is not inferred, although that situation must be weighed against the specific norms alluded to earlier. Finally, the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber invoked by the appellant refer to the resolutions of amparo appeals where the topic of the principle of salary freedom is discussed, without them specifically analyzing what is related to the school salary.\n\nIn fact, from these it follows that the Constitutional Chamber makes it clear that its analysis is from the standpoint of constitutional law because it expressly refers to the ordinary jurisdiction to resolve specific claims regarding the grievances of the appellants.\"

 

\n\n2.- The percentage shall be cumulative and shall be governed in accordance with the following: a- From July 1, 1994, and until December 31, 1994, it shall be calculated as a salary supplement equivalent to 1.25% (one point twenty-five percent) of the monthly nominal salary and a single payment shall be made in the month of January 1995, corresponding to said period. b.- Nominal salary is the sum of the base salary, annual increases, exclusive dedication or prohibition, and professional career. 3.- This salary component shall be budgeted in a sub-line item called ‘Salario Escolar’ in the Servicios Personales line item and is subject to statutory social charges…’. On the occasion of resolution DG-062-94, on September 9, 1994, the Department of Salaries and Incentives of the aforementioned Dirección General de Servicio Civil issued circular SI-04-94-0, in which it was defined: ‘Salario Escolar: a salary supplement that accumulates annually, consisting of a percentage calculated on the nominal salary of each worker. Nominal Salary: all salary components corresponding to the employee for performing a position, except for the additional sums recognized as a function of the nominal salary itself; it excludes salary in kind’. By virtue of a series of doubts raised, the Dirección General de Servicio Civil issued resolution DG-005-95 at 9:00 a.m. on January 12, 1995, whereby it amended Articles 1° and 2° aforementioned, in the following sense: ‘Article 1°. To create the ‘Salario Escolar’, which shall consist of a percentage calculated on the salary of each employee; it shall be cumulative and shall be governed in accordance with the following: a. From July 1, 1994, and until December 31 of the same year, it corresponds to a percentage of one point twenty-five percent (1.25%) additional to the general increase granted as of July 1, 1994, thereby completing the 8% agreed increase in the salary negotiation of the Public Sector for the second semester of 1994. B. For calculation purposes, the same salary components used to determine the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) shall be taken into consideration. Article 2°. The ‘Salario Escolar’ is subject to statutory social charges’. As of that resolution DG-005-95, the calculation of the Salario Escolar has been performed taking into consideration the same salary components used to calculate the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), and based on these, a percentage is fixed that is paid in the month of January of the following year, and which at that time was set at 1.171%. Subsequently, the same Directorate issued other resolutions through which the calculation percentage of the benefit was gradually increased up to 3.58% of the total salary (by resolution of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil DG-054-96 at 4:00 p.m. on July 3, 1996); and finally, it was increased once more, setting it at 8.19% of the total salary; a percentage with which this item is calculated in public employment relations to this day (this as of 1998, by virtue of the provisions of the resolution of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil DG-136-97 at 2:30 p.m. on December 5, 1997), prescribed in these terms: ‘Article 1.- Let Resolution DG-041-97 of 01-07-97 be amended, so that the Salario Escolar percentage is increased by one point fifty-eight percent (1.58%), additional to the existing six point seventy-five percent (6.75%), thereby completing an eight point thirty-three percent (8.33%) monthly which corresponds to an annual salary, so that this benefit, adjusted according to the methodology defined for that purpose, is fixed at eight point nineteen percent (8.19%) of the total salary of public employees. Article 2. The application of this percentage, according to the methodology established in Official Letter SI-002-95, is on all sums that are legally considered salary. Article 3. For payment purposes, this benefit is established as a monthly accrual (from January to December) on the total salary, payable in the month of January of each year.” It is of special importance to mention that these resolutions were embodied in the Executive Decree number 23907-H, which provided: “The Salario Escolar item is added to the Partida de Servicios Personales, to identify the expenditure for additional adjustment, for active employees, the salary increase granted as of July 1, 1994, which consists of a percentage of the nominal salary of said employees, to be paid cumulatively in the month of January of each year.” As is evident from the foregoing, the true origin of the Salario Escolar was not properly the cited resolution DG-062-94 of August 5, 1994 of the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, but rather that this was issued based on a “Acuerdo de Política Salarial para el Sector Público” signed on July 23, 1994, by the representatives of the Comisión Negociadora de Salarios del Sector Público, by virtue of which, this figure was established as one of the main components of the growing salaries policy of the incumbent government, as is inferred from the recitals (considerandos) of the mentioned resolution, and whose purpose was to increase the purchasing power of salaries and adapt them to the economic reality in the face of inflation, as economic support for families to face the expenses of the educational process of their members. That salary policy agreement was adapted to the different internal regulations of public institutions, so much so that the defendant bank recognized it from its genesis until the year 1998, when it justified its suppression for new relationships starting in January 1999 based on a new global salary scale that respected legal minimums. Likewise, that policy was finally included in a general executive decree, as explained above, which is a source of Law. The foregoing is reasonable if it is considered that the State must act in accordance with the principio de legalidad which comprises—at one of its highest hierarchical levels—constitutional norms. Among them, Article 50 of the Constitución Política establishes the State’s duty to procure the greatest well-being for all inhabitants of the country, through the organization and stimulation of production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. In that sense, the State is instituted as guarantor and defender of that right. Moreover, numeral 56 of the same proclaims access to work as an individual right and guarantees the right of free choice of remunerative sources. For its part, the following Article 57 regulates matters related to the minimum wage and the principio de igualdad salarial, for which it declares the inalienability of said rights and benefits in accordance with a permanent policy of national solidarity (Article 74). Said authority to set minimum wages has been entrusted to the Consejo Nacional de Salarios as a technical body created by Law 832 of November 4, 1949. Finally, subsection 20 of Article 140 of the Constitution leaves open the government’s obligation to fulfill the other duties entrusted and provides for the exercise of the other powers conferred upon it by the Constitution and the laws. In turn, the Banco Central de Costa Rica, according to Article 1 of its organic law, is an autonomous institution of public law with its own legal personality and patrimony that forms part of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. It is evident that said entity, despite its nature as an autonomous entity with its own legal personality, clearly acts as “cashier of the State” by virtue of the provisions of said law. In fact, numeral 99 of the referenced regulation, when defining its operations with the State, frames it—in accordance with its functions—as financial advisor, fiscal agent, and bank-cashier of the State. Now then, according to the doctrine, one cannot ignore the reference made in Administrative Law to figures such as descentralización and administrative tutela, aspects very related to the nature of the defendant entity and its relationship with the State as a central entity. For Ortiz Ortiz, descentralización “implies an attribution of competence—or legal personality—, in a final, definitive, and exclusive capacity, by virtue of a rule of the legal system… to decentralize is to transfer or create a competence in another subject.” (ORTIZ ORTIZ, Eduardo. Tesis de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. San José, Editorial Stradtmann, 1998, p. 313). For its part, administrative tutela is understood as “the relationship of subordination that exists between the State and lesser entities.” (Ibid. p. 323). According to Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, “the lesser public entities, certainly, exercise powers of authority and pursue public ends, notwithstanding that the greater public entity or the Central Public Administration controls or tutelates them through the exercise of the powers of direction, programming or planning, and control.” (Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I, parte general. Medellín, Colombia, Biblioteca Jurídica Diké, 2002, p. 9). Likewise, for this same author just cited, “administrative tutela,… is not incompatible with autonomía, on the contrary, it presupposes it…”, for which he cites the vote of the Sala Constitucional number 3309-94 in that sense. (Op. Cit., p. 22). In accordance with Ortiz Ortiz, “the State cannot give orders or issue instructions to the lesser entity,” except in exceptional cases, but functional autonomía also does not mean total independence of the lesser entity with respect to the State, since, despite it, it is possible in a certain way for the latter to exercise a power of direction and oversight over the entity, a center of action distinct from the State. (Ortiz, op.cit., p. 318). According to this same author, Articles 188 and 189 of the Constitución Política say nothing about tutela or about the relations between the State and lesser entities; however, the organic laws of the latter have erroneously interpreted that normative foundation as a prohibition of the oversight function of the State (op. cit., page 324). Ernesto Jinesta Lobo explains that “…the laws to which the Constituent refers are, basically, the Ley de Planificación Nacional and the Ley General de la Administración Pública, especially the latter which in its Articles 26, 27, 98, 99 and 100 establishes the content and scope of direction and coordination….” (Op cit., p. 100). The author [Nombre1], previously mentioned, has also explained concrete powers related to said tutela such as those of programming, directing, formulating plans, setting coordinated goals or goals referred to one another in mutual independence to achieve a result of equilibrium or balance and the obtaining of a specific public end. In that sense, the power of direction through directrices is highlighted as a way to carry out programs or plans. (Op. Cit., pages 330-335). The mentioned author Jinesta Lobo states that “planning guides administrative action and management by defining the major objectives, goals, and ends to be achieved and the methods or means to achieve them efficiently.” (Op. Cit., , p. 25). It is on this theoretical framework that it is considered that the State can indeed establish a general salary policy—as it did in 1994—through a national plan aimed at increasing the salaries of the employees of the State and its decentralized institutions, which included the Salario Escolar as a way of compensating for the educational needs of its members during the time of the erogation of those expenses. This being the case, it is considered that the Banco Central de Costa Rica, despite its functional and financial autonomía, was not excluded from the duty to recognize the Salario Escolar to its employees, independently of the variation in the salary regime that it internally established as of January 1999 and the date of entry of the officials to the institution—among them the plaintiff—. The foregoing, because the creation and payment of that salary supplement, initially, had its origin in a general salary policy of the State that did not expressly exclude any institution or entity of the public sector, so that no regulation to the contrary has been issued to date either, and, therefore, that foundation must prevail even over the internal provisions of each entity and the subsequent reforms to these that may have been made within its structure. It is clear that the officials of the Banco Central, before being employees of the entity, form part of the general category of active public employees, and it was to that population—without any exception, limitation, or future condition—that the beneficiary salary policy, by virtue of which the Salario Escolar originated, was directed. To further elaborate, the so-called Salario Escolar, being a type of salary and, therefore, deriving its nature from constitutional-level norms (Articles 56 and 57) and from Conventions numbers 94 and 95 of the International Labour Organization, its implementation as a salary component cannot be obviated by a norm of lower hierarchy such as numeral 28, subsection m, of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central, since, if it were so, the hierarchy of normative sources derived from Article 6 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública would be infringed. It is necessary to point out that in vote number 496, at 09:40 a.m., of September 17, 2003, this Chamber analyzed the nature of the Banco Central and its relationship with the Poder Ejecutivo in salary matters, for which it indicated: “On the other hand, according to Article one of its Ley Orgánica (No. 7558 of November 3, 1995), the Banco Central de Costa Rica is an autonomous institution of public law, with its own legal personality and patrimony, a member of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. Subsection m) of Article 28 of that law empowers the Board of Directors to issue its own policies regarding job classification and evaluation. For its part, subsection 4) of numeral 34 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional (No. 1644 of September 26, 1953) grants authority to the Bank’s Board of Directors to create the positions and services indispensable for the proper functioning of the institution and to set the respective remunerations. The foregoing implies that the defendant entity has the capacity to create its own salary regime. […] As the Court correctly resolved, the Banco Central, as an autonomous institution that it is, does not have full autonomía in salary matters, as it is a matter of government. However, it is worth making certain clarifications. It has already been said that the law grants the Board of Directors of the Banco Central de Costa Rica the authority to set the salaries of its employees (subsection 4) of Article 34 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional). However, for that purpose, it must subject itself to the directrices issued to that effect by the Poder Ejecutivo, for the reasons that will be set forth below. The Sala Constitucional, in Vote No. 1822 at 3:46 p.m. on March 7, 2001 (…), stated: ‘From the transcribed background, it is inferred that since salary matters are part of government policy, it is then for the Poder Ejecutivo to adopt, with binding character, the decisions in that field of the centralized public sector, with the autonomous entities being subjected to the general directrices in salary matters issued by that Power of the Republic.’ To understand the true scope of that resolution, reference must be made, first, to the following norms. First, Article 188 of the Constitución Política, which states: ‘The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of government. Their directors are responsible for their management.’ Then, numeral 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional establishes: ‘The State banks listed in the previous article are autonomous institutions of public law, with their own legal personality and independence in administrative matters. They are subject to the law in matters of government and must act in close collaboration with the Poder Ejecutivo, coordinating their efforts and activities (…)’. On the other hand, it is fundamental to transcribe the precedents issued by that other Chamber on the matter, among which it is worth citing Vote No. 3309 at 3:00 p.m. on July 5, 1994: ‘The administrative autonomía of the decentralized institutions constituted in Title XIV of the Constitution, is a guarantee against the actions of the Central Poder Ejecutivo, but not against the law in matters of Government. Before the amendment made to Article 188 of the Constitution, it was not possible to subject autonomous institutions to the general policy of the State regarding the matters placed under their jurisdiction… […] This means that autonomous institutions do not enjoy a guarantee of unrestricted constitutional autonomía, since the law, apart from defining their jurisdiction, can subject them to directrices derived from development policies that it entrusts to the Central Poder Ejecutivo, provided that, of course, this does not invade either the sphere of administrative autonomía proper nor the jurisdiction of the Assembly itself or of other constitutional bodies such as the Contraloría General de la República. […] In this way, the amendment made it constitutionally possible to subject autonomous entities in general to the criteria of national planning and, in particular, to subject them to the general directrices issued by the central Poder Ejecutivo or by bodies of the Central Administration (called to complement or supervise that general policy). […] Having defined salary policy as part of government policy, it is necessary to reiterate that when the constituent decentralized the Poder Ejecutivo, it sought to avoid arbitrary and anti-technical interference in the management of each of those institutions, defined by law. But the constituent legislator did not choose to create a salary or labor regime segregated from the central Poder Ejecutivo, as there is no doubt that Title XV, Single Chapter of the Constitución Política has as its immediate antecedent the prior practice of massively dismissing state officials and employees on the occasion of each change of government.’ […] Finally, in Vote No. 3089 at 3:00 p.m. on May 12, 1998, it was stated: ‘… For this reason, it is that all the bodies that form the state apparatus as a Constitutional State of Law must submit to the criteria of ‘national planning’ and, in particular, to the general directrices issued by the Poder Ejecutivo -Government- (arts. 140.3,8 C.P.), to fulfill, among others, the constitutional mandates to procure the greatest well-being for all inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth (art. 50 C.P.), as well as that all have honest and useful occupation—as a right of the individual and an obligation to society—duly remunerated, and to prevent that, because of it, conditions are established that in any way diminish the freedom or the dignity of man or degrade his work to the condition of simple merchandise (art. 56 C.P.). The Poder Ejecutivo -Government-, as a legal and political organization, is the one in charge of organizing, directing, and channeling society in all its political, legal, economic, and social aspects. The executive function is an essential task of the Government in its different bodies or ministries, as is also the political directive function of setting the objectives and goals of coordinated action in the other public entities, proposing the means and methods to achieve those objectives. It is also an essential function of the Poder Ejecutivo to guide, coordinate, and supervise the apparatus of the Administration (art. 140.8, CP) and to issue general norms that are not only simple execution of legal norms but also delimiting ones (art. 140.2, CP). Regarding the latter, it concerns execution norms—regulatory decrees—that contribute to making possible the execution of their source of legitimacy, that is, the laws emanating from the Legislative Assembly. The salary policy derived from service relations—between the Administration and its employees (art. 112 LGAP), as a regime of state public employment, uniform and universal, is, of course, an integral part of government policy (SSC No. 2294 at 2:48 p.m. on August 19, 1992). (…) So that, it is necessary to conclude, regarding this first point, the legislator has sought, in exercise of the powers granted by the original constituent power, to create a single public salary regime, foreseeing, precisely, the effects that imbalances arising from service relations between the Administration and public employees produce on public finances and, consequently, for the country in general. That, then, makes it fully justifiable and constitutional to subject everything concerning the salary policy of the Public Administration to uniform criteria—through directrices—, which, furthermore, is subject to periodic determination so that the public employee can face, in a regular and uninterrupted manner, the duties of subsistence for his family (arts. 56 and 57 C.P.). Consequently, it is constitutional that the Autoridad Presupuestaria, as a body derived from the Poder Ejecutivo, issues the directrices of the State’s salary policy in the exercise of its functions, for the purpose of protecting said employees and guaranteeing the efficiency of the Public Administration, which it must propose to the Poder Ejecutivo, so that it imposes them on the entire Public Administration, understood as that constituted by the State and the other public entities (art. 1 LGAP), thus satisfying the constitutional mandates of Articles 50, 56, and 62 of the Constitución Política and 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ Already in the previous recital, it was indicated that, by decision of the legislator, the Banco Central de Costa Rica is not subject to the directrices issued by the Autoridad Presupuestaria, which is the body in charge of setting salary policies for the decentralized sector. But, on the other hand, the Sala Constitucional, in the transcribed pronouncements, affirmed that the salary policy is part of a ‘uniform and universal state regime of public employment.’ That is to say, there exists a constitutional principle according to which there must be a uniform salary policy for the entire Public Administration. However, the contradiction is merely apparent, since the Autoridad Presupuestaria does not have exclusive and excluding authority for the definition of salary policy, but rather it is only an auxiliary technical body of the Poder Ejecutivo, and, as such, lacks true directive power. It is, ultimately, the Poder Ejecutivo that exercises the political direction of the State and of the other public entities, for which reason it is its responsibility to set the salary policy applicable to the state banks, through directrices, which, by their very nature, must be of a generic type, so as not to harm the administrative autonomía that those entities enjoy, which even empowers them to set the remunerations of their officials. Therefore, it cannot be affirmed that by virtue of Article 6 of the Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República, the state banks, and among them the defendant, are excluded from any state policy in this matter (…).” (End of the transcription). In response to certain specific grievances of the appellant, while it is true the Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos establishes that the provisions of that law shall not be applicable to public banks nor to the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, except regarding the process for approving their budgets, for which, according to Article 21 of that same regulation, they would also not be subject to the control of the Autoridad Presupuestaria, the sui generis nature that the Banco Central de Costa Rica has and its differences from the other commercial public banks must also be taken into account. On the other hand, from Articles 1 and 2 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil—mentioned in the appeal—the express exclusion of the Banco Central from that regulation is not inferred, although that situation must be weighed against the specific norms alluded to previously. Finally, the votes of the Sala Constitucional invoked by the appellant refer to the resolutions of recurso de amparo cases where the issue of the principio de libertad salarial is addressed, without them specifically analyzing what is related to the Salario Escolar. Indeed, from these it can be inferred that the Sala Constitucional makes it clear that its analysis is from the point of view of Constitutional law because it expressly refers to the ordinary jurisdiction to resolve specific claims regarding the complaints of the appellants.” \n\n \n" }