{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-159253", "citation": "Res. 01679-2016 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal II Circuito Judicial de San José", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "El recurso de apelación del actor civil sobre responsabilidad solidaria plena se declara sin lugar", "title_en": "Civil plaintiff's appeal for full joint liability dismissed", "summary_es": "La resolución aborda un recurso de apelación interpuesto por el actor civil en un proceso penal por lesiones culposas derivadas de un accidente de tránsito. El recurrente solicitaba que se modificara la sentencia de primera instancia para extender la responsabilidad civil de los demandados civiles de manera solidaria plena, sin limitar la responsabilidad de Scotia Leasing al valor del vehículo, argumentando que el vehículo era utilizado para la comercialización de mariscos, lo que encuadraría en el inciso b) del artículo 188 de la Ley de Tránsito. El tribunal realiza un exhaustivo análisis jurisprudencial sobre la evolución del criterio de responsabilidad civil del propietario registral que no conduce el vehículo causante del daño, abarcando desde la Ley de Tránsito N° 5930 de 1976 hasta la Ley N° 9078 de 2012. Se examina críticamente la distinción jurisprudencial entre responsabilidad limitada al valor del vehículo (cuando el conductor carece de licencia o hay explotación comercial) y responsabilidad solidaria plena, concluyendo que la Sala Constitucional ha establecido que, en todos los casos, la responsabilidad del propietario registral se limita al vehículo, sin distinciones. Por tanto, se declara sin lugar el recurso, confirmando la limitación de responsabilidad al vehículo.", "summary_en": "The ruling addresses an appeal filed by the civil plaintiff in a criminal case for negligent injury arising from a traffic accident. The appellant sought to modify the trial court's judgment to extend the civil liability of the civil defendants to full joint liability, without limiting Scotia Leasing's responsibility to the value of the vehicle, arguing that the vehicle was used for the commercialization of seafood, which would fall under subsection b) of Article 188 of the Traffic Law. The court conducts an exhaustive jurisprudential analysis of the evolution of the criterion on the civil liability of the registered owner who is not driving the vehicle causing the damage, covering from Traffic Law No. 5930 of 1976 to Law No. 9078 of 2012. It critically examines the jurisprudential distinction between liability limited to the value of the vehicle (when the driver lacks a license or there is commercial exploitation) and full joint liability, concluding that the Constitutional Chamber has established that, in all cases, the registered owner's liability is limited to the vehicle, without distinctions. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, confirming the limitation of liability to the vehicle.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal II Circuito Judicial de San José", "date": "12/12/2016", "year": "2016", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "responsabilidad solidaria plena", "propietario registral", "gravamen legal", "actor civil", "inciso b) del artículo 188", "Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia", "Sala Constitucional", "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus" ], "article_citations": [ { "law": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres", "article": "7", "doc_id": "norm-20421", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7331", "article": "7", "doc_id": "norm-20421", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres", "article": "38", "doc_id": "norm-20421", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7331", "article": "38", "doc_id": "norm-20421", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres", "article": "39", "doc_id": "norm-20421", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7331", "article": "39", "doc_id": "norm-20421", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres", "article": "188", "doc_id": "norm-20421", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 7331", "article": "188", "doc_id": "norm-20421", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reforma parcial de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, N° 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993", "article": "1", "doc_id": "norm-64633", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 8696", "article": "1", "doc_id": "norm-64633", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Reforma parcial de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, N° 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993", "article": "2", "doc_id": "norm-64633", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 8696", "article": "2", "doc_id": "norm-64633", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial", "article": "7", "doc_id": "norm-73504", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 9078", "article": "7", "doc_id": "norm-73504", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial", "article": "188", "doc_id": "norm-73504", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 9078", "article": "188", "doc_id": "norm-73504", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial", "article": "189", "doc_id": "norm-73504", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 9078", "article": "189", "doc_id": "norm-73504", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial", "article": "190", "doc_id": "norm-73504", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 9078", "article": "190", "doc_id": "norm-73504", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial", "article": "191", "doc_id": "norm-73504", "source": "metadata" }, { "law": "Ley 9078", "article": "191", "doc_id": "norm-73504", "source": "metadata" } ], "keywords_es": [ "responsabilidad civil propietario registral", "accidente de tránsito", "responsabilidad solidaria", "valor del vehículo", "recurso de apelación", "actor civil", "Ley de Tránsito 7331", "Ley de Tránsito 9078", "jurisprudencia Sala Tercera", "responsabilidad objetiva", "gravamen vehículo" ], "keywords_en": [ "civil liability registered owner", "traffic accident", "joint liability", "vehicle value", "appeal", "civil plaintiff", "Traffic Law 7331", "Traffic Law 9078", "Third Chamber jurisprudence", "strict liability", "vehicle lien" ], "excerpt_es": "En razón de lo anterior, se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto por el señor [Nombre [Nombre1]], en su condición de actor civil.\n\nLo criticable de esta posición jurisprudencial (la que atañe al primer supuesto supra reseñado, es decir, que la responsabilidad civil del dueño del vehículo permite conducir a una persona carente de licencia, debe limitarse al vehículo en sí) es que se construye a partir de argumentos poco sólidos que irrespetan el principio hermenéutico que prohíbe distinguir donde la norma no lo hace (Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus).\n\nEllo permite comprender que la posición jurisprudencial de la Sala Constitucional si bien “prohíja” la interpretación sostenida por la Sala de Casación, termina definiendo una solución distinta, esto es, eliminar las distinciones que ésta hizo y, simple y llanamente señalar que (se entiende que para todos los casos) la responsabilidad del propietario registral, aún tratándose de una explotación comercial o industrial, o de un transporte público, no es plena sino más bien limitada al vehículo.", "excerpt_en": "By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal filed by Mr. [Nombre [Nombre1]], in his capacity as civil plaintiff, is dismissed.\n\nWhat is objectionable about this jurisprudential position (the one concerning the first scenario mentioned above, that is, that the civil liability of the vehicle owner who allows a person without a license to drive must be limited to the vehicle itself) is that it is built on weak arguments that fail to respect the hermeneutic principle that prohibits distinguishing where the law does not (Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus).\n\nThis allows us to understand that the jurisprudential position of the Constitutional Chamber, although it “endorses” the interpretation maintained by the Criminal Cassation Chamber, ends up defining a different solution, that is, eliminating the distinctions it made and, simply and plainly stating that (it is understood that for all cases) the liability of the registered owner, even in cases of commercial or industrial exploitation, or public transportation, is not full but rather limited to the vehicle.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The civil plaintiff's appeal is dismissed, confirming that Scotia Leasing's civil liability is limited to the value of the vehicle.", "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación del actor civil, confirmando que la responsabilidad civil de Scotia Leasing se limita al valor del vehículo." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "What is objectionable about this jurisprudential position (the one concerning the first scenario mentioned above, that is, that the civil liability of the vehicle owner who allows a person without a license to drive must be limited to the vehicle itself) is that it is built on weak arguments that fail to respect the hermeneutic principle that prohibits distinguishing where the law does not (Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus).", "quote_es": "Lo criticable de esta posición jurisprudencial (la que atañe al primer supuesto supra reseñado, es decir, que la responsabilidad civil del dueño del vehículo permite conducir a una persona carente de licencia, debe limitarse al vehículo en sí) es que se construye a partir de argumentos poco sólidos que irrespetan el principio hermenéutico que prohíbe distinguir donde la norma no lo hace (Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus)." }, { "context": "Considerando III", "quote_en": "This allows us to understand that the jurisprudential position of the Constitutional Chamber, although it “endorses” the interpretation maintained by the Criminal Cassation Chamber, ends up defining a different solution, that is, eliminating the distinctions it made and, simply and plainly stating that (it is understood that for all cases) the liability of the registered owner, even in cases of commercial or industrial exploitation, or public transportation, is not full but rather limited to the vehicle.", "quote_es": "Ello permite comprender que la posición jurisprudencial de la Sala Constitucional si bien “prohíja” la interpretación sostenida por la Sala de Casación, termina definiendo una solución distinta, esto es, eliminar las distinciones que ésta hizo y, simple y llanamente señalar que (se entiende que para todos los casos) la responsabilidad del propietario registral, aún tratándose de una explotación comercial o industrial, o de un transporte público, no es plena sino más bien limitada al vehículo." } ], "cites": [ { "id": "norm-20421", "citation": "Ley 7331", "title_en": "Traffic Law on Public Land Routes", "title_es": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres", "doc_type": "law", "date": "13/04/1993", "year": "1993" }, { "id": "norm-64633", "citation": "Ley 8696", "title_en": "Law 8696 — Partial Reform of the Traffic Law", "title_es": "Reforma parcial de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, N° 7331,", "doc_type": "law", "date": "17/12/2008", "year": "2008" }, { "id": "norm-73504", "citation": "Ley 9078", "title_en": "Law on Public Roads and Road Safety", "title_es": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial", "doc_type": "law", "date": "04/10/2012", "year": "2012" } ], "cited_by": [ { "id": "norm-20421", "citation": "Ley 7331", "title_en": "Traffic Law on Public Land Routes", "title_es": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres", "doc_type": "law", "date": "13/04/1993", "year": "1993" }, { "id": "norm-64633", "citation": "Ley 8696", "title_en": "Law 8696 — Partial Reform of the Traffic Law", "title_es": "Reforma parcial de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, N° 7331,", "doc_type": "law", "date": "17/12/2008", "year": "2008" }, { "id": "norm-73504", "citation": "Ley 9078", "title_en": "Law on Public Roads and Road Safety", "title_es": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial", "doc_type": "law", "date": "04/10/2012", "year": "2012" } ], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-20421", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres" }, { "target_id": "norm-64633", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Reforma parcial de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, N° 7331, de 13 de abril de 1993" }, { "target_id": "norm-73504", "kind": "cited_norm", "label": "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial" } ], "external": [ { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-50154", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-50154" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-51150", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-51150" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-51380", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-51380" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-53292", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-53292" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-54018", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-54018" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-55312", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-55312" }, { "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-56430", "url": "", "kind": "related_voto", "label": "", 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"tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "04/10/2012" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [ "sen-1-0034-50154", "sen-1-0034-51150", "sen-1-0034-51380", "sen-1-0034-53292", "sen-1-0034-54018", "sen-1-0034-55312", "sen-1-0034-56430", "sen-1-0034-173453", "sen-1-0034-490964" ], "temas_y_subtemas": [ { "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Propietario registral responde solidariamente hasta por el valor del vehículo causante del daño" } ], "id": 2, "nombre": "Responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible" }, { "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Propietario registral responde solidariamente hasta por el valor del vehículo causante del daño en accidente de tránsito" } ], "id": 3, "nombre": "Lesión culposa" }, { "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Análisis en el caso del dueño registral del automóvil en accidente de tránsito" } ], "id": 1, "nombre": "Responsabilidad solidaria derivada del hecho punible" }, { "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Análisis sobre la responsabilidad civil del propietario registral del vehículo" } ], "id": 4, "nombre": "Daños y perjuicios derivados de accidente de tránsito terrestre" } ], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“III. Recurso de apelación interpuesto por [Nombre [Nombre1]]. El recurrente plantea que la sentencia tiene diferentes yerros, de [Nombre2] o s cuales algunos pueden ser considerados errores materiales, pero otros que dejan la sentencia sin fundamentación. En el primer reclamo, se plantea la incongruencia entre el análisis de la responsabilidad civil solidaria contenido en la sentencia y la parte dispositiva de esta. Según indica, en el cuerpo de la sentencia se tiene por probado el nexo causal entre la conducta culposa del imputado, el accidente y las lesiones sufridas por él, condenándose en forma solidaria y completa a los demandados civiles. Se comprobó que el vehículo conducido por el imputado y codemandado civil era propiedad de Scotia Leasing S.A. y únicamente se utilizaba para la comercialización de mariscos. Pese a lo anterior, en la parte dispositiva de la sentencia, en forma \" contradictoria y sorpresiva \" , según así lo califica el actor civil, el tribunal modifica la condenatoria civil, estableciendo que los demandados civiles si bien responden solidariamente, pero en forma restringida, limitando la responsabilidad civil de [Nombre2] dueño del vehícul o al valor del camión, lo cual constituye una responsabilidad civil restringida. Señala que la acción civil y en las conclusiones esbozadas al finalizar el debate, se fue muy claro en solicitar la condenatoria civil solidaria plena, de manera que todos los demandados civiles respondieran solidariamente por los daños, perjuicios y costas ocasionadas en relación con el delito. Haciendo uso de citas jurisprudenciales de las Salas Primera y Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, explica el señor [Nombre3] que, habiéndose determinado la responsabilidad subjetiva del conductor, nace la responsabilidad objetiva de los propietarios del vehículo conducido por el conductor responsable, siendo todos los demandados civiles solidariamente responsables frente la víctima , quien podrá escoger contra qui é n dirige su acción. Explica que en el caso concreto, debe aplicarse lo dispuesto por el artículo 188 de la Ley de tránsito, que establece la responsabilidad plena y solidaria al propietario del vehículo causante del daño, a diferencia de la responsabilidad civil restringida, que pesa sobre el propietario del vehículo causante de la colisión o del delito, en el caso de que sea un tercero el que conducía el automotor, ya que, quedó acreditado que el imputado, al momento de los hechos, trabajaba como chofer de la empresa Exportadora P.M.T, empresa comercializadora de mariscos, lo cual implica que se está en presencia del inciso b) del artículo 188 de la Ley de Tránsito. Solicita que sea declarado con lugar el recuso de apelación y se modifique lo fallado únicamente en cuanto a que se extienda la responsabilidad civil de los condenados, de manera que sea solidaria plena sin distinciones, a todos los rubros condenados en la sentencia, sin limitar la responsabilidad de “Scotia Leasing” al valor del vehículo. Posición de [Nombre2] a demandad a civi [Nombre2] Scotia Leasing . No existe manifestación alguna en cuanto al recurso interpuesto por el actor civil. El reclamo se declara sin lugar. Pese a lo resuelto en el considerando anterior, en donde se anula la sentencia en cuanto a los extremos penales y civiles, pero sólo en lo relativo al imputado y codemandado civil [Nombre4] lo cierto es que civilmente, la sentencia no fue recurrida por la co demandada Scotia Leasing, razón por la cual, para efectos de esta, la condena civil está firme. El reproche del recurrente tal cual se expuso, es la decisión del juzgador en cuanto a que dispuso la responsabilidad “hasta por el valor del vehículo”. Es importante reseñar cuál es el origen del criterio jurídico que, amparado en los artículos 7 y 188 inciso b) de la Ley de Tránsito N° 7331 (derogada por la Ley N° 9078, pero vigente al momento del percance que aquí se investiga), el recurrente [[Nombre5] ] echa de menos y solicita sea aplicado en este caso. Nos referimos a aquel que indica que la responsabilidad civil del propietario registral del vehículo involucrado en un accidente, el cual no conduce al momento en que éste ocurre, y con el cual se causa un daño, no es plena sino limitada “al valor” de dicho vehículo (en realidad, limitada al vehículo en sí). Al respecto debe indicarse, de entrada, que tal regla no aparece contenida de modo expreso en ninguna norma legal, siendo que en realidad se trata de una creación jurisprudencial surgida de la interpretación de los artículos 38 y 39 de la Ley de Tránsito N° 5930 de 1976, y que ha sido sostenida por la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia desde la década de los años ochenta. Tales artículos señalaban lo siguiente: “Artículo 38.- El conductor de un vehículo será responsable por los daños y perjuicios que se deriven de un accidente que le fuere imputable por dolor, falta, negligencia o imprudencia. También lo será el dueño del vehículo que permitiere que una persona carente de la respectiva licencia lo conduzca. Además, todos aquellos que, por cualquier título explotaren vehículos en una empresa industrial o comercial, o en el transporte remunerado de personas o carga, responderán, solidariamente con el conductor, de los daños y perjuicios que se originaren en un accidente, en que ese conductor fuere responsable. Artículo 39.- El vehículo con el cual se cause un daño se entenderá gravado, a las resultas del mismo y a la orden de la autoridad que conozca del proceso respectivo, quien ordenará anotar al margen del asiento de inscripción del vehículo, dicho gravamen. El gravamen así establecido, será preferente a cualquiera otra garantía, inscrita o no, por la cual responda el vehículo”. Asimismo, debe aclararse que en lo que se refiere a la materia de tránsito, posteriormente se promulgaron dos leyes: la N° 7331 del 13 de abril de 1993, y la N° 9078 del 26 de octubre de 2012, mismas que, en lo esencial, no variaron su redacción en torno a la cuestión jurídica que aquí se analiza. En efecto, tal criterio consiste en lo siguiente: “[…] se alega la errónea aplicación del artículo 38 de la Ley de Tránsito por cuanto, señala la recurrente, su conducta no se encuentra enmarcada dentro de las que taxativamente señala el numeral citado y que dan lugar a responsabilidad por daños y perjuicios en forma solidaria, siendo aplicable, más bien el artículo 39 del mismo cuerpo legal, como propietaria del vehículo que conducía la encartada, y a quien se le condenó al pago de una suma superior al millón y medio de colones. En el reproche llevar razón la quejosa. Es cierto como lo afirma, que le ha sido erróneamente aplicado el artículo 38 de la Ley de Tránsito pues no se desprende de los hechos probados que la imputada [Nombre6]. careciera de licencia a la fecha de los acontencimientos; que el vehículo estuviera dedicado a la explotación en empresa industrial, comercial o al transporte remunerado de personas o carga, por lo que [Nombre7]. no está obligada a responder solidariamente de los daños reclamados en la acción civil. Resulta aplicable en el presente caso, el artículo 39 de la Ley de Tránsito, en virtud del cual la responsabilidad de Doña [Nombre8]. queda limitada al valor de su vehículo, debiendo entenderse que lo que queda gravado es el vehículo mismo, con gravamen legal preferente a cualquier otra garantía, inscrita o no por la cual aquel responda. Ya esta Sala se ha pronunciado en igual sentido, ver entre otras: [Placa1] . de las 10:45 hrs. del 22 de octubre de 1982 y [Placa2] de las 9:30 hrs. del 18 de setiembre de 1987. Por lo expuesto debe acogerse el reclamo y declarárse que en relación con la señora [Nombre9]., es tan solo su vehículo [Placa3] . el que permanecerá gravado en los términos de ley a las resultas del accidente, y no que es responsable solidaria, con la conductora del mismo, señora [Nombre10]. […]” (cfr. Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto N° 350-F-90 de las 09:30 horas del 23 de noviembre de 1990). Como se advierte, a partir de lo dispuesto en el artículo 38 antes citado, y a efectos de establecer los alcances de la responsabilidad civil del propietario registral (cuando éste no es la persona que conduce el vehículo con el que se causa el accidente que genera daños a terceros), la Sala Penal distinguía dos hipótesis, siendo que en ambas dicha responsabilidad era accesoria a la del conductor, es decir, dependía y surgía a partir de que se determinara la responsabilidad de éste como causante del accidente, por mediar de su parte dolo o culpa. Tales hipótesis serían las siguientes: i) cuando permite que una persona carente de la respectiva licencia conduzca el vehículo; y ii) cuando sea una empresa que explote el vehículo industrial o comercialmente, o se trate de transporte remunerado de personas o de carga. Las dos últimas hipótesis estarían comprendidas en la primera, de modo que hasta parece tratarse de un reiteración. Ahora bien, partiendo de estas dos hipótesis bien diferenciadas, y a partir de lo dispuesto por el artículo 39 que se analiza (donde se indicaba que el vehículo con el cual se causaba el daño se entendería gravado a las resultas del mismo), la jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera estimaba que en la primera de ellas la responsabilidad civil del propietario registral no era plena sino limitada “al valor del vehículo” (es decir, al vehículo en sí), mientras que en el segundo supuesto se estaba ante una responsabilidad civil objetiva, solidaria y plena (es decir, el dueño registral respondía junto con el conductor por el monto total de la condenatoria civil, incluso con todo su patrimonio). Tal criterio se reitera y mantiene, entre otros, en los siguientes votos: 254-F-92, de las 09:00 del 19 de junio de 1992; 485-F-92, de las 08:40 horas del 23 de octubre de 1992; 313-F-95 de las 11:10 horas del 26 de mayo de 1995; y 167-F-97 de las 15:30 horas del 27 de febrero de 1997. Lo criticable de esta posición jurisprudencial (la que atañe al primer supuesto supra reseñado, es decir, que la responsabilidad civil del dueño del vehículo permite conducir a una persona carente de licencia, debe limitarse al vehículo en sí) es que se construye a partir de argumentos poco sólidos que irrespetan el principio hermenéutico que prohíbe distinguir donde la norma no lo hace (Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus). Así, se establece la referida regla a pesar de que la misma no se extrae del contenido de los numerales 38 y 39 de la Ley de Tránsito N° 5939 de 1976. En efecto, conforme a una interpretación gramatical, si se leen con cuidado estos artículos se advierte que tal regla no aparece descrita en ninguna de esas dos disposiciones, siendo que ni siquiera podría extraerse a partir de una interpretación analógica o teleológica. Aunado a ello, no podría afirmarse que tal limitación a la responsabilidad civil del propietario registral, referida a la primera hipótesis del artículo 38, deriva del artículo 39 (en cuanto dispone que se debe mantener gravado el vehículo a las resultas del daño causado). De nuevo, se debe hacer notar que este numeral no hace tal distinción, pues lo que indica, simplemente, es que el vehículo con el cual se cause un daño se entenderá gravado a las resultas del mismo, sin que el legislador lo delimite o circunscriba sólo a la primera hipótesis. De ello se tendría, entonces, que ese gravamen se deberá disponer para ambos supuestos del artículo 38. Además, la sola previsión legal de ese gravamen, de ningún modo implicaría (pues el legislador no lo señaló así) que, al plantear su reclamo civil, la víctima sólo podrá perseguir dicho bien. Continuando con evolución jurisprudencial que aquí se analiza, se tiene que a partir del texto de la ley de tránsito N° 9078 del 13 de abril de 1993, donde se introdujeron algunas modificaciones no esenciales ni significativas, la Sala de Casación Penal mantuvo el mismo criterio. Respecto de la cuestión jurídica que aquí se analiza, en los artículo 7, 188, 189, 190 y 191 de esta ley se estableció lo siguiente: “ARTÍCULO 7.- En todo hecho de tránsito, en el cual se encuentre involucrado un vehículo, el propietario registral será el responsable civil objetivo de las consecuencias que se deriven del uso, la manipulación, la posesión o la tenencia del vehículo, aun cuando él no haya sido el conductor del vehículo y el responsable del hecho no sea identificado en un proceso de tránsito; salvo que dicho propietario registral demuestre haber vendido el automotor, por medio de escritura pública con fecha anterior al hecho que se investiga. De oponerse la salvedad indicada o cualquier otra legítimamente válida, la autoridad procederá, en el primer caso, a realizar todos los trámites necesarios para la notificación y puesta en conocimiento de los hechos al nuevo propietario documental, a fin de continuar contra este el proceso correspondiente. Para determinar la responsabilidad civil solidaria del propietario, la gestión se realizará, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 187 y siguientes de esta Ley”. “ARTÍCULO 188.- Responderán solidariamente con el conductor: a) El dueño de un vehículo que permita que lo conduzca una persona carente de la respectiva licencia o bajo los efectos del licor o drogas enervantes. b) Las personas físicas o jurídicas que, por cualquier título, exploten vehículos con fines comerciales o industriales, incluyendo el transporte público. c) El propietario que permita que las [Placa4] de su vehículo sean utilizadas por otro vehículo al que no le han sido asignadas, o no las entregue a la Dirección General de Transporte Público, para su custodia, si el vehículo al que le fueron asignadas, queda imposibilitado permanentemente para circular. d) Toda persona, física o jurídica, que importe, ensamble, produzca o comercialice vehículos automotores, en caso de que el accidente de tránsito tenga como causa la omisión, en el vehículo o los vehículos involucrados en el hecho de tránsito, de las respectivas medidas de seguridad, comprendidas en el artículo 32 de esta Ley. (Así reformado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1°, punto 28) de la ley N° 8779 del 17 de setiembre de 2009). e) El dueño de un vehículo que obligue o permita la circulación con exceso de carga por parte de vehículos de carga liviana y pesada, de acuerdo con los parámetros establecidos en la respectiva reglamentación”. [Así adicionado el inciso anterior por el artículo 2°, inciso ñ) de la ley N° 8696 de 17 de diciembre de 2008; así corrida la numeración del artículo por el inciso a) del numeral 2° de la ley N° 8696 de 17 de diciembre de 2008, que lo traspasó del 187 al 188]. “ARTÍCULO 189.- El vehículo con el cual se cause un daño, se mantendrá gravado a resultas del proceso respectivo y a la orden de la autoridad judicial que conozca de éste. Esa autoridad ordenará anotarlo al margen del asiento de la inscripción del vehículo, en caso de que esté inscrito; si no lo está, ordenará el cierre de fronteras o la detención del vehículo el que puede entregarse en depósito judicial, todo con la finalidad de asegurar las resultas del juicio. La autoridad judicial expedirá el mandamiento para su anotación, inmediatamente después de recibido el parte o la denuncia. El Registro de la Propiedad de Vehículos Automotores anotará el gravamen, tan pronto como reciba el mandamiento y así lo comunicará al tribunal competente, el que debe verificar la anotación, para lo cual llevará un control exacto y detallado. En la comunicación de anotado, el Registro indicará el nombre y dirección de quien figure como propietario del vehículo. El incumplimiento de estas disposiciones se considerará falta grave, por parte de los funcionarios respectivos, quienes serán responsables por los perjuicios que cause la falta de anotación del gravamen, de conformidad con los principios establecidos en la Ley de la Administración Pública” (Así corrida su numeración por el inciso a) del artículo 2° de la ley N° 8696 de 17 de diciembre de 2008, que lo traspasó del artículo 188 al 189). “ARTÍCULO 190.- La acción para el resarcimiento de los daños y perjuicios que se ocasionen con el accidente y el cobro de las costas, deben ser establecidos por el perjudicado o su representante, ante el tribunal civil competente” [Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la ley No.7833 de 29 de setiembre de 1998, y así corrida su numeración por el inciso a) del artículo 2° de la ley N° 8696 de 17 de diciembre de 2008, que lo traspasó del artículo 189 al 190]. “ARTÍCULO 191.- Para establecer y gestionar la responsabilidad civil solidaria de los terceros en los términos de la presente Ley, el perjudicado o interesado deberá acudir al despacho judicial a reclamar su derecho, en las siguientes condiciones: en el caso de conductores infractores dentro de los ocho (8) días posteriores a su declaración y en el caso de propietarios, dentro de los ocho (8) días siguientes a la notificación del contenido del artículo 161 de esta Ley. Para tal efecto, el interesado deberá aportar al proceso el nombre y las calidades de la persona contra la cual se dirige la acción, el CED1 , así como el lugar donde se le puede notificar. Si se trata de una persona jurídica, deberá aportarse el nombre del representante legal, el domicilio social y el lugar donde notificarla. De no aportarse todos los datos completos o si se aportan fuera del plazo señalado, la gestión se tendrá por no interpuesta, el interesado deberá hacer valer sus derechos en el proceso civil correspondiente. Recibida la gestión, el despacho procederá a la notificación del demandado y, al efecto, le otorgará, a partir de la notificación, ocho (8) días para que ejerza su defensa, sin perjuicio de su participación posterior en la audiencia. El juez decisor resolverá en sentencia sobre la procedencia o no de la gestión” [Así reformado por el inciso u) del artículo 1° de la ley N° 8696 de 17 de diciembre de 2008, y así corrida su numeración por el inciso a) del artículo 2° de la ley N° 8696 de 17 de diciembre de 2008, que lo traspasó del artículo 190 al 191]. A partir de esta normativa (que en nada difiere de lo regulado en la actual Ley de Tránsito, N° 9078, publicada en el Alcance 165 a La Gaceta N° 207 del 28 de octubre de 2012), la Sala Penal mantuvo el criterio de que, en el caso de la hipótesis prevista en el artículo 7 (que, en esencia, es la misma contenida en la primera parte del artículo 38 de la ley anterior, a saber, cuando no se identifique al conductor) la responsabilidad civil del dueño registral no será plena sino limitada “al valor” del vehículo (en realidad, al vehículo en sí). Así lo indicó, por ejemplo, en los votos N° 149-F-96, de las 09:45 horas del 12 de abril de 1996 y CED2 ° de las 10:55 horas del 27 de marzo de 1998. En este último se aprecia ‒incluso‒ un notorio error, pues pese a que se concluye que no existía explotación comercial ni industrial por tratarse de un camión que brindaba el servicio de recolección de basura al costo, es decir, sin obtener lucro o ganancia, se mantuvo la condena civil contra el propietario registral “hasta por el valor del vehículo”, cuando en realidad la misma ni siquiera procedía. En esa misma línea se dictó también el voto 2010-00367, pese a que ‒en principio‒ el propietario registral era una empresa (de donde es presumible que estaba explotando el camión con el cual se generó el accidente y se causó el daño): “[…] La decisión de condenar a la empresa propietaria del automotor, únicamente en cuanto al valor de éste se ampara en el principio de legalidad y no es una decisión en perjuicio de los interese de las víctimas como lo indica el quejoso. Si bien es cierto, los artículos 187 de la Ley de Tránsito y 106 del Código Penal, determinan la solidaridad en la responsabilidad civil conjuntamente con los autores del hecho punible relativa al pago de los daños y perjuicios, ello se refiere a situaciones o causales taxativamente señaladas, dentro de las que no se incluye la causa en cuestión, en los demás casos, conforme a la normativa de tránsito vigente al momento de los hechos – ley número 7331 – la responsabilidad civil de los terceros demandados civiles se encuentra determinada hasta por el valor del vehículo con el cual se cause el daño – artículo 188 – no pudiendo gravarse otros bienes, salvo los del demandado civil, pues aun cuando el numeral 263 del Código Procesal Penal, permite al actor civil formular la solicitud de embargo en el escrito de constitución o con posterioridad, sin perjuicio de la facultad de solicitarlo preventivamente, se requiere que los bienes sujetos a embargo, se encuentren registralmente a nombre del demandado civil, ostentándose adicionalmente la condición de acusado, o estar contemplado dentro de los presupuestos de solidaridad civil, lo que no sucede en autos […]” (cfr. Sala Tercera, voto N° 2010-000367 de las 08:48 horas del 07 de mayo de 2010). Conviene además citar el voto N° 2001-000523 del Tribunal de Casación Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, N° 2001-000523 de las 10:15 horas del 13 de julio de 2001, donde también se prohíja el criterio de la Sala Penal que aquí se comenta. Llama la atención de estos jueces de apelación que en dicho pronunciamiento se indica (a partir de un argumento poco sólido, conforme la línea jurisprudencial que viene analizándose) que de la relación de los artículos 7, 188 y 187 de la Ley de Tránsito N° 7331 “debe entenderse” que es el vehículo el que responde (con respecto al propietario registral) por el monto de las indemnizaciones, sin que siquiera se intente precisar por qué debe entenderse tal cosa: “[…] La fundamentación que da el juzgador en lo relativo a que no son aplicables los Arts. 187 de la Ley de Tránsito y 1045 y 1048 del Código Civil es impecable. En lo relativo a la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Casación correspondiente a la responsabilidad objetiva en accidentes de tránsito, la misma ha sido establecida cuando se trata de un vehículo que es utilizado para una explotación comercial, lo que no se tiene por probado en este asunto. Por ello en cuanto al alegato de que L.A.M. debe responder civilmente junto con L.S.A. por la totalidad de los daños no lleva razón la parte impugnante. Menciona el impugnante Art. 7 de la Ley de Tránsito, que indica: “En los casos de accidentes de tránsito, será responsable civil, la persona que aparezca como propietaria del vehículo en el Registro, o aquella cuyo documento de traspaso tuviera la última fecha cierta o la fecha de otorgamiento de la escritura anterior al suceso, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 187 de esta ley”. Dicho artículo debe ser analizado en relación con el Art. 188 de la Ley de Tránsito, que dispone: “El vehículo con el cual se cause un daño, se mantendrá gravado a resultas del proceso respectivo…”. Por su parte el Art. 192 de la misma ley establece: “El gravemen a que se refiere el artículo 188 de esta Ley procederá, aunque el conductor no sea el dueño, o no aparezca como tal en el Registro Público de la Propiedad de Vehículos Automotores”. De la relación de dichos artículos debe entenderse que se dispone una responsabilidad objetiva del propietario del vehículo, en cuanto el automotor responde por el monto de las indemnizaciones civiles. Se trata desde esta perspectiva de una responsabilidad civil objetiva que no responde de la indemnización plenaria, sino se limita a un gravamen del vehículo para responder del monto de la indemnización, de modo que si la misma supera el monto sobre el que eventualmente sea rematado el vehículo, no existirá una responsabilidad adicional del propietario del vehículo. Véase al respecto el voto 315-98 del 27-3-1998, dispuesto por la Sala Tercera de la Corte, en donde estimó como apropiado que la responsabilidad del propietario se limitara en el caso concreto al monto del vehículo. Por su parte la Sala Constitucional en el voto 2248-96 del 14 de mayo de 1996 aceptó la tesis de la Procuraduría General de la República la misma había dicho: “En cuanto al gravamen determinado en la Ley de Tránsito, señala que el legislador lo estableció en aras de dar protección a un interés público, y así dispuso que las autoridades de tránsito, en forma oficiosa, gravaran como medida cautelar los vehículos involucrados en toda colisión, con el fin de que respondieran con su valor por las resultas del proceso. Así, el propietario de un vehículo responde de manera objetiva por los daños producidos con su automotor, siempre que se acredite la responsabilidad de la persona que lo conducía, ya sea el mismo propietario o un tercero. La figura bajo estudio, a su juicio no es irrazonable ni desproporcionada, por lo que a juicio de la Procuraduría no rozan la Constitución Política en cuanto al principio de propiedad privada”. Dijo la Sala sobre ello: “En cuanto a la posible violación al derecho de propiedad, la Sala estima que lleva razón la Procuraduría al señalar que el legislador estableció ese gravamen en aras de dar protección a un interés público, y que la disposición no es irrazonable. Es la regla general que se afecte la cosa con la que se cometió el delito, que en el caso en estudio, es el vehículo”. De acuerdo con lo anterior debe declararse con lugar este reclamo, debiéndose declarar con lugar la acción civil presentada en contra de la demandada civil L.D.A.M., pero limitada su responsabilidad civil a responder con su vehículo Mitsubishi Lancer placas [Placa5], debiendo dicho vehículo permanecer gravado para responder del pago de la indemnización fijada por el a quo y ordenándose anotar dicho gravamen al margen del asiento de inscripción del vehículo (Arts. 188 y 191 de la Ley de Tránsito) […]” (cfr. Tribunal de Casación Penal de Goicoechea, voto N° 2001-00523 de las 10:15 horas del 13 de julio de 2001; la transcripción es literal). Es más, en esta misma línea se tiene el voto del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago, N° 2014-00362 de las 14:00 horas del 11 de agosto de 2014. En dicho pronunciamiento se explica que en el tema que aquí nos ocupa (responsabilidad civil del propietario registral que no conducía el vehículo con el que se provocaron el accidente y los daños), la Ley de Tránsito N° 9078 no le introdujo modificaciones esenciales a la N° 7331, y se razona que la misma distingue tres hipótesis distintas de responsabilidad objetiva del dueño registral, siendo que en las dos primeras existe una responsabilidad sujetiva (por culpa) del conductor, mientras que en la tercera se trata de una responsabilidad sin culpa: A) Cuando el conductor no logra ser identificado: la responsabilidad objetiva del propietario se limita hasta por el valor del vehículo, “por ser lo lógico”, ya que el artículo 200 de la ley N° 9078 dispone que el vehículo se mantendrá gravado (norma que se corresponde con el 188 de la Ley anterior, N° 7331). Al respecto se cita el voto de la Sala 3ª N° 2010-00367 (en el cual, según se explicó supra, se resolvió que la responsabilidad civil de la empresa propietaria registral se limita “al valor del vehículo” (al vehículo en sí). B) Cuando sí se identifica al conductor: conforme al 199 de la Ley 9078, se trataría de una responsabilidad solidaria plena (no limitada al valor del vehículo, sino que afecta la totalidad del patrimonio), la cual no es autónoma sino que depende no sólo de que se determine la responsabilidad subjetiva del conductor, sino que ‒además‒ se den varias hipótesis (que el dueño permita que su vehículo sea conducido por una persona sin licencia o bajos los efectos del licor o drogas, que medie explotación comercial, industrial o transporte público, etc). C) Explotación comercial o industrial, aun sin culpa: conforme al artículo 1048 inciso 5° del Código Civil se trataría de una responsabilidad objetiva plena. Así, en lo que se refiere a la hipótesis que se identifica como “A)”, de nuevo se utiliza un argumento muy débil y poco sólido para limitar la responsabilidad civil del dueño registral al vehículo, a saber, que ello “resulta lógico” debido a que el vehículo se mantendrá gravado, perdiéndose de vista que tal gravamen también deberá mantenerse en las circunstancias de la hipótesis “B)”. De acuerdo con todo este recuento, se tiene que -en principio- esa responsabilidad civil limitada al “valor del vehículo” (en realidad, al vehículo en sí) operaría sólo en la hipótesis “A)” comentada. No obstante, debe indicarse que la Sala Constitucional (jurisprudencia vinculante) si bien prohijó también el criterio sostenido por la Sala Tercera, lo hizo de una manera distinta, pues ni siquiera distinguió las distintas hipótesis antes reseñadas, sino que (a la luz de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7331 de 1993, que -se reitera- en este punto no fue esencialmente modificada por la Ley N° 9078 de 2012) simple y sencillamente estableció que la responsabilidad del dueño registral se limita al vehículo: “[…] En el caso en estudio, no hay infracción alguna del derecho al acceso a la justicia para encontrar satisfacción en los daños, máxime que las normas que permiten establecer el gravámen (sic) del vehículo (artículos 159 y 188 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) están vigentes, garantizando con ello la debida indemnización que corresponde al propietario del vehículo, la cual en todo caso –debe aclararse- tiene sus límites, toda vez que responde hasta el valor del vehículo, toda vez que solidaria o subsidiaria –vale decir, accesoria- respecto de la responsabilidad del conductor, que a su vez depende de su culpabilidad en el plano penal de tránsito […]” (cfr. SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA, voto N° 2000-05517 de las 14:50 horas del 05 de julio de 2000). Lo curioso de este antecedente es que el “caso en estudio” se refiere a juicio de tránsito promovido por quienes que interponen la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra una persona física (conductor del vehículo causante del accidente) y una empresa de transportes (propietaria registral), de donde parece que se trataría de un supuesto de explotación comercial o de transporte público de personas [hipótesis “B)” antes comentada], lo que ‒conforme al criterio jurisprudencial de la Sala Tercera‒ determinaría una responsabilidad civil objetiva, solidaria y plena, es decir, no limitada “al valor del vehículo”. Ello permite comprender que la posición jurisprudencial de la Sala Constitucional si bien “prohíja” la interpretación sostenida por la Sala de Casación, termina definiendo una solución distinta, esto es, eliminar las distinciones que ésta hizo y, simple y llanamente señalar que (se entiende que para todos los casos) la responsabilidad del propietario registral, aún tratándose de una explotación comercial o industrial, o de un transporte público, no es plena sino más bien limitada al vehículo. En razón de lo anterior, se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto por el señor [Nombre [Nombre1]], en su condición de actor civil.”", "body_en_text": "**\"III. Appeal filed by [Name [Name1]].** The appellant argues that the judgment contains various errors, some of which may be considered material errors, but others leave the judgment without foundation. In the first claim, the inconsistency is raised between the analysis of joint and several civil liability contained in the judgment and its operative part. According to his statement, the body of the judgment considers the causal link between the culpable conduct of the accused, the accident, and the injuries suffered by him to be proven, with the civil defendants being fully and jointly condemned. It was proven that the vehicle driven by the accused and civil co-defendant was owned by Scotia Leasing S.A. and was used exclusively for the marketing of seafood. Despite the foregoing, in the operative part of the judgment, in a manner that the civil plaintiff describes as \"contradictory and surprising,\" the court modifies the civil condemnation, establishing that while the civil defendants are jointly and severally liable, this liability is restricted, limiting the civil liability of [Name2], owner of the vehicle, to the value of the truck, which constitutes restricted civil liability. He points out that in the civil action and in the conclusions outlined at the end of the trial, it was made very clear that full joint and several civil condemnation was being requested, so that all civil defendants would be jointly and severally liable for the damages, losses, and costs caused in relation to the crime. Citing case law from the First and Third Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice, Mr. [Name3] explains that, having determined the subjective liability of the driver, the objective liability of the owners of the vehicle driven by the responsible driver arises, making all civil defendants jointly and severally liable to the victim, who may choose against whom to direct the action. He explains that in this specific case, the provisions of Article 188 of the Traffic Law (Ley de tránsito) must be applied, which establishes full and joint liability for the owner of the vehicle causing the damage, unlike the restricted civil liability that falls on the owner of the vehicle causing the collision or the crime in cases where a third party was driving the motor vehicle, since it was proven that the accused, at the time of the events, worked as a driver for the company Exportadora P.M.T, a seafood marketing company, which implies that subsection b) of Article 188 of the Traffic Law applies. He requests that the appeal be granted and the ruling be modified solely to extend the civil liability of the convicted parties so that it is full, joint, and without distinctions for all items awarded in the judgment, without limiting the liability of \"Scotia Leasing\" to the value of the vehicle.\n\n**Position of [Name2] as civil defendant Scotia Leasing.** There is no statement whatsoever regarding the appeal filed by the civil plaintiff.\n\n**The claim is declared without merit.** Despite what was resolved in the preceding considerando, where the judgment is annulled regarding the criminal and civil aspects, but only in relation to the accused and civil co-defendant [Name4], the truth is that civilly, the judgment was not appealed by the co-defendant Scotia Leasing, which is why, for the purposes of this entity, the civil condemnation is final. The appellant's reproach, as stated, is the judge's decision to order liability \"up to the value of the vehicle.\"\n\nIt is important to review the origin of the legal criterion that, supported by Articles 7 and 188 subsection b) of Traffic Law No. 7331 (repealed by Law No. 9078, but in force at the time of the incident investigated here), the appellant [[Name5]] claims is missing and requests be applied in this case. We refer to the criterion indicating that the civil liability of the registered owner of the vehicle involved in an accident, who was not driving at the time it occurred and with which damage was caused, is not full but limited \"to the value\" of said vehicle (in reality, limited to the vehicle itself). In this regard, it must be stated initially that such a rule is not expressly contained in any legal norm, as it is actually a jurisprudential creation arising from the interpretation of Articles 38 and 39 of Traffic Law No. 5930 of 1976, and it has been upheld by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice since the 1980s.\n\nThese articles stated the following: \"Article 38.- The driver of a vehicle shall be liable for the damages and losses arising from an accident attributable to him due to intent, fault, negligence, or imprudence. The owner of the vehicle who allows a person lacking the respective license to drive it shall also be liable. Furthermore, all those who, by any title, exploit vehicles in an industrial or commercial enterprise, or in the remunerated transportation of persons or cargo, shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver for the damages and losses originating from an accident for which that driver was responsible. Article 39.- The vehicle with which damage is caused shall be understood to be encumbered, for the results thereof and to the order of the authority hearing the respective proceeding, who shall order this encumbrance to be noted in the margin of the vehicle's registration entry. The encumbrance thus established shall have preference over any other guarantee, registered or not, for which the vehicle is liable.\"\n\nLikewise, it must be clarified that regarding traffic matters, two laws were subsequently enacted: No. 7331 of April 13, 1993, and No. 9078 of October 26, 2012, which, essentially, did not vary their wording regarding the legal issue analyzed here.\n\nIndeed, this criterion consists of the following: \"[...] the erroneous application of Article 38 of the Traffic Law is alleged because, the appellant points out, her conduct is not framed within those exhaustively indicated by the cited numeral that give rise to joint and several liability for damages and losses, with Article 39 of the same legal body being more applicable, as the owner of the vehicle driven by the accused, and who was ordered to pay a sum exceeding one and a half million colones. The complainant is correct in her reproach. It is true, as she claims, that Article 38 of the Traffic Law has been erroneously applied to her because it does not emerge from the proven facts that the accused [Name6] lacked a license on the date of the events; nor that the vehicle was dedicated to exploitation in an industrial or commercial enterprise or to the remunerated transportation of persons or cargo, therefore [Name7] is not obligated to be jointly and severally liable for the damages claimed in the civil action. Article 39 of the Traffic Law is applicable in this case, by virtue of which the liability of Mrs. [Name8] is limited to the value of her vehicle, it being understood that what is encumbered is the vehicle itself, with a legal encumbrance preferential to any other guarantee, registered or not, for which it is liable. This Chamber has already ruled in the same sense, see among others: [Placa1] at 10:45 a.m. on October 22, 1982, and [Placa2] at 9:30 a.m. on September 18, 1987. Based on the foregoing, the claim must be upheld and it must be declared that in relation to Mrs. [Name9], it is only her vehicle [Placa3] that shall remain encumbered under the terms of the law for the results of the accident, and not that she is jointly and severally liable with the driver of the same, Mrs. [Name10]. [...]\" (cf. Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, ruling No. 350-F-90 of 09:30 hours on November 23, 1990).\n\nAs noted, based on the provisions of Article 38 cited above, and for the purpose of establishing the scope of the civil liability of the registered owner (when this person is not the one driving the vehicle with which the accident causing damage to third parties is caused), the Criminal Chamber distinguished two hypotheses, in both of which said liability was accessory to that of the driver, that is, it depended on and arose from the determination of the driver's liability as the cause of the accident, due to intent or fault on their part. These hypotheses would be the following: i) when the owner allows a person lacking the respective license to drive the vehicle; and ii) when it is a company that exploits the vehicle industrially or commercially, or it involves the remunerated transport of persons or cargo. The latter two hypotheses would be included in the first, so much so that it even seems to be a reiteration. Now, based on these two well-differentiated hypotheses, and from the provisions of Article 39 under analysis (where it indicated that the vehicle with which the damage was caused would be understood to be encumbered for its results), the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber considered that in the first of them, the civil liability of the registered owner was not full but limited \"to the value of the vehicle\" (that is, to the vehicle itself), while in the second case, it involved an objective, joint, and full civil liability (that is, the registered owner was liable together with the driver for the total amount of the civil award, even with all their assets). This criterion is reiterated and maintained, among others, in the following rulings: 254-F-92, of 09:00 on June 19, 1992; 485-F-92, of 08:40 hours on October 23, 1992; 313-F-95 of 11:10 hours on May 26, 1995; and 167-F-97 of 15:30 hours on February 27, 1997.\n\nWhat is objectionable about this jurisprudential position (the one concerning the first hypothesis outlined supra, that is, that the civil liability of the vehicle owner who allows an unlicensed person to drive must be limited to the vehicle itself) is that it is built on weak arguments that disrespect the hermeneutical principle that prohibits distinguishing where the norm does not (Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus). Thus, the referenced rule is established despite the fact that it is not extracted from the content of numerals 38 and 39 of Traffic Law No. 5939 of 1976. Indeed, according to a literal interpretation, if these articles are read carefully, it is noted that such a rule is not described in either of these two provisions, and it could not even be extracted through an analogical or teleological interpretation. In addition to this, it could not be affirmed that such a limitation on the civil liability of the registered owner, referring to the first hypothesis of Article 38, derives from Article 39 (insofar as it provides that the vehicle must remain encumbered for the results of the damage caused). Again, it must be noted that this numeral does not make such a distinction, as it simply indicates that the vehicle with which damage is caused shall be understood to be encumbered for its results, without the legislator delimiting or circumscribing it only to the first hypothesis. From this, it would follow, then, that this encumbrance must be ordered for both scenarios of Article 38. Furthermore, the mere legal provision of that encumbrance would in no way imply (as the legislator did not state so) that, when filing their civil claim, the victim can only pursue that specific asset.\n\nContinuing with the jurisprudential evolution analyzed here, it is noted that based on the text of Traffic Law No. 7331 of April 13, 1993, where some non-essential or significant modifications were introduced, the Criminal Cassation Chamber maintained the same criterion. Regarding the legal issue analyzed here, Articles 7, 188, 189, 190, and 191 of this law established the following: \"ARTICLE 7.- In any traffic incident involving a vehicle, the registered owner shall be the objectively civilly liable party for the consequences arising from the use, manipulation, possession, or tenancy of the vehicle, even when they were not the driver of the vehicle and the responsible party is not identified in a traffic proceeding; unless said registered owner demonstrates having sold the motor vehicle, by means of a public deed dated prior to the incident under investigation. If the indicated exception or any other legally valid one is raised, the authority shall proceed, in the first case, to carry out all necessary procedures for the notification and informing of the facts to the new documented owner, in order to continue the corresponding proceeding against them. To determine the joint and several civil liability of the owner, the action shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 187 and following of this Law.\"\n\n\"ARTICLE 188.- The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: a) The owner of a vehicle who allows it to be driven by a person lacking the respective license or under the effects of liquor or narcotic drugs. b) The natural or legal persons who, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transport. c) The owner who allows the [Placa4] of their vehicle to be used by another vehicle to which they have not been assigned, or does not surrender them to the General Directorate of Public Transport for safekeeping, if the vehicle to which they were assigned is permanently disabled from circulating. d) Any natural or legal person who imports, assembles, produces, or markets motor vehicles, in case the traffic accident is caused by the omission, in the vehicle or vehicles involved in the traffic incident, of the respective safety measures, included in Article 32 of this Law. (Thus amended the preceding subsection by Article 1, point 28) of Law No. 8779 of September 17, 2009). e) The owner of a vehicle who forces or allows circulation with excess load by light and heavy-duty cargo vehicles, according to the parameters established in the respective regulations.\" [Thus added the preceding subsection by Article 2, subsection ñ) of Law No. 8696 of December 17, 2008; thus renumbered the article by subsection a) of numeral 2 of Law No. 8696 of December 17, 2008, which transferred it from 187 to 188].\n\n\"ARTICLE 189.- The vehicle with which damage is caused shall remain encumbered for the results of the respective proceeding and to the order of the judicial authority hearing it. That authority shall order it to be noted in the margin of the vehicle's registration entry, if it is registered; if not, it shall order the closure of borders or the detention of the vehicle, which may be delivered in judicial deposit, all with the purpose of securing the results of the trial. The judicial authority shall issue the order for its notation immediately after receiving the report or complaint. The Motor Vehicle Property Registry shall note the encumbrance as soon as it receives the order and shall notify the competent court, which must verify the notation, for which it shall maintain an exact and detailed control. In the notification of notation, the Registry shall indicate the name and address of the person listed as the vehicle owner. Non-compliance with these provisions shall be considered serious misconduct by the respective officials, who shall be responsible for the damages caused by the lack of notation of the encumbrance, in accordance with the principles established in the Law of Public Administration\" (Thus renumbered by subsection a) of Article 2 of Law No. 8696 of December 17, 2008, which transferred it from Article 188 to 189).\n\n\"ARTICLE 190.- The action for the compensation of damages and losses caused by the accident and the collection of costs must be established by the injured party or their representative before the competent civil court\" [Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 7833 of September 29, 1998, and thus renumbered by subsection a) of Article 2 of Law No. 8696 of December 17, 2008, which transferred it from Article 189 to 190].\n\n\"ARTICLE 191.- To establish and manage the joint and several civil liability of third parties under the terms of this Law, the injured or interested party must appear before the judicial office to claim their right, under the following conditions: in the case of offending drivers, within eight (8) days following their statement, and in the case of owners, within eight (8) days following the notification of the content of Article 161 of this Law. For this purpose, the interested party must provide the process with the name and qualifications of the person against whom the action is directed, the CED1, as well as the place where they can be notified. If it is a legal entity, the name of the legal representative, the corporate domicile, and the place for notification must be provided. If all the complete data is not provided or if it is provided outside the indicated period, the action shall be deemed not filed, and the interested party must assert their rights in the corresponding civil proceeding. Once the action is received, the office shall proceed to notify the defendant and, for this purpose, shall grant them, from the notification, eight (8) days to exercise their defense, without prejudice to their subsequent participation in the hearing. The deciding judge shall resolve in the judgment on the appropriateness or not of the action\" [Thus amended by subsection u) of Article 1 of Law No. 8696 of December 17, 2008, and thus renumbered by subsection a) of Article 2 of Law No. 8696 of December 17, 2008, which transferred it from Article 190 to 191].\n\nBased on this normative framework (which differs in no way from what is regulated in the current Traffic Law, No. 9078, published in Supplement 165 to La Gaceta No. 207 of October 28, 2012), the Criminal Chamber maintained the criterion that, in the case of the hypothesis provided for in Article 7 (which, in essence, is the same as that contained in the first part of Article 38 of the previous law, namely, when the driver is not identified), the civil liability of the registered owner shall not be full but limited \"to the value\" of the vehicle (in reality, to the vehicle itself). This was indicated, for example, in rulings No. 149-F-96, of 09:45 hours on April 12, 1996, and CED2 of 10:55 hours on March 27, 1998. In the latter, a notable error is even observed because, despite concluding that there was no commercial or industrial exploitation as it was a truck providing garbage collection service at cost, that is, without obtaining profit or gain, the civil condemnation against the registered owner was maintained \"up to the value of the vehicle,\" when in reality it should not have even proceeded. In that same line, ruling 2010-00367 was also issued, even though—in principle—the registered owner was a company (from which it is presumable that it was exploiting the truck with which the accident was generated and the damage caused): \"[...] The decision to condemn the company owning the motor vehicle only up to its value is supported by the principle of legality and is not a decision detrimental to the interests of the victims as the complainant indicates. While it is true that Articles 187 of the Traffic Law and 106 of the Penal Code determine joint liability in civil liability together with the perpetrators of the punishable act regarding the payment of damages and losses, this refers to exhaustively indicated situations or causes, within which the cause in question is not included; in other cases, according to the traffic regulations in force at the time of the events – Law number 7331 – the civil liability of the third-party civil defendants is determined up to the value of the vehicle with which the damage is caused – Article 188 – and other assets cannot be encumbered, except those of the civil defendant, because even though numeral 263 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows the civil plaintiff to formulate the seizure request in the complaint document or subsequently, without prejudice to the power to request it preventively, it is required that the assets subject to seizure are registered in the name of the civil defendant, additionally holding the status of accused, or being contemplated within the assumptions of civil joint liability, which does not occur in the case file [...]\" (cf. Third Chamber, ruling No. 2010-000367 of 08:48 hours on May 7, 2010).\n\nIt is also worth citing ruling No. 2001-000523 of the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, No. 2001-000523 of 10:15 hours on July 13, 2001, where the criterion of the Criminal Chamber commented on here is also adopted. It catches the attention of these appellate judges that said pronouncement indicates (based on a weak argument, according to the jurisprudential line being analyzed) that from the relationship of Articles 7, 188, and 187 of Traffic Law No. 7331, \"it must be understood\" that it is the vehicle that is liable (with respect to the registered owner) for the amount of the compensations, without even attempting to specify why such a thing must be understood: \"[...] The grounding provided by the judge regarding the non-applicability of Arts. 187 of the Traffic Law and 1045 and 1048 of the Civil Code is impeccable. Regarding the case law of the Cassation Court corresponding to objective liability in traffic accidents, it has been established when dealing with a vehicle used for commercial exploitation, which has not been proven in this matter. Therefore, regarding the allegation that L.A.M. must be civilly liable together with L.S.A. for the totality of the damages, the contesting party is not correct. The appellant mentions Art. 7 of the Traffic Law, which indicates: 'In cases of traffic accidents, the civilly liable party shall be the person appearing as the vehicle owner in the Registry, or the person whose transfer document had the latest certain date or the date of execution of the deed prior to the event, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 187 of this law.' This article must be analyzed in relation to Art. 188 of the Traffic Law, which provides: 'The vehicle with which damage is caused shall remain encumbered for the results of the respective proceeding...' In turn, Art. 192 of the same law establishes: 'The encumbrance referred to in Article 188 of this Law shall proceed, even if the driver is not the owner, or does not appear as such in the Public Registry of Motor Vehicle Property.' From the relationship of these articles, it must be understood that an objective liability is provided for the vehicle owner, insofar as the motor vehicle is liable for the amount of the civil compensations. From this perspective, it is a matter of objective civil liability that does not answer for the full compensation but is limited to an encumbrance on the vehicle to answer for the compensation amount, so that if this exceeds the amount for which the vehicle is eventually auctioned, there will be no additional liability for the vehicle owner. See in this regard ruling 315-98 of March 27, 1998, issued by the Third Chamber of the Court, where it deemed appropriate that the owner's liability be limited in the specific case to the amount of the vehicle. For its part, the Constitutional Chamber in ruling 2248-96 of May 14, 1996, accepted the thesis of the Attorney General's Office, which had stated: 'Regarding the encumbrance determined in the Traffic Law, it points out that the legislator established it for the sake of protecting a public interest, and thus provided that traffic authorities, ex officio, encumber as a precautionary measure the vehicles involved in any collision, so that they may answer with their value for the results of the process. Thus, the owner of a vehicle is objectively liable for the damages caused with their motor vehicle, provided the liability of the person driving it is proven, whether the owner themselves or a third party. The figure under study, in its opinion, is not unreasonable or disproportionate, so in the opinion of the Attorney General's Office, it does not affect the Political Constitution regarding the principle of private property.' The Chamber stated on this: 'Regarding the possible violation of property rights, the Chamber considers that the Attorney General's Office is correct in pointing out that the legislator established this encumbrance for the sake of protecting a public interest, and that the provision is not unreasonable. It is the general rule that the thing with which the crime was committed be affected, which in the case under study, is the vehicle.' In accordance with the above, this claim must be granted, and the civil action filed against the civil defendant L.D.A.M. must be granted, but her civil liability must be limited to answering with her Mitsubishi Lancer vehicle license plate [Placa5], and said vehicle must remain encumbered to answer for the payment of the compensation set by the a quo, and it must be ordered that this encumbrance be noted in the margin of the vehicle's registration entry (Arts. 188 and 191 of the Traffic Law) [...]\" (cf. Criminal Cassation Court of Goicoechea, ruling No. 2001-00523 of 10:15 hours on July 13, 2001; the transcription is literal).\n\nMoreover, in this same line, there is the ruling of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of Cartago, No. 2014-00362 of 14:00 hours on August 11, 2014. In that pronouncement, it is explained that on the issue that concerns us here (civil liability of the registered owner who was not driving the vehicle with which the accident and damages were caused), Traffic Law No. 9078 did not introduce essential modifications to No. 7331, and it reasons that it distinguishes three different hypotheses of objective liability of the registered owner, with subjective (fault-based) liability of the driver existing in the first two, while the third involves liability without fault: A) When the driver cannot be identified: the objective liability of the owner is limited up to the value of the vehicle, \"as is logical,\" since Article 200 of Law No. 9078 provides that the vehicle shall remain encumbered (a norm that corresponds to 188 of the previous Law, No. 7331). In this regard, ruling 2010-00367 of Chamber III is cited (in which, as explained supra, it was resolved that the civil liability of the registered owner company is limited \"to the value of the vehicle\" (to the vehicle itself)). B) When the driver is indeed identified: according to 199 of Law 9078, this would involve full joint and several liability (not limited to the value of the vehicle, but affecting the entirety of the assets), which is not autonomous but depends not only on determining the subjective liability of the driver, but also—in addition—on several hypotheses occurring (that the owner allows their vehicle to be driven by a person without a license or under the effects of liquor or drugs, that commercial, industrial exploitation, or public transport is involved, etc.). C) Commercial or industrial exploitation, even without fault: according to Article 1048, subsection 5 of the Civil Code, this would involve full objective liability. Thus, regarding the hypothesis identified as \"A)\", a very weak and weak argument is again used to limit the civil liability of the registered owner to the vehicle, namely, that this \"is logical\" because the vehicle shall remain encumbered, losing sight of the fact that such an encumbrance must also be maintained in the circumstances of hypothesis \"B)\".\n\nAccording to this entire recounting, it is understood that—in principle—that civil liability limited to the \"value of the vehicle\" (in reality, to the vehicle itself) would operate only in the commented hypothesis \"A)\".\n\nHowever, it must be noted that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (binding jurisprudence), while also endorsing the criterion upheld by the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera), did so in a different manner, as it did not even distinguish the different hypotheses outlined above, but rather (in light of the validity of Law No. 7331 of 1993, which—it is reiterated—was not essentially modified on this point by Law No. 9078 of 2012) simply and plainly established that the registered owner's liability is limited to the vehicle: “[…] In the case under study, there is no violation whatsoever of the right of access to justice to obtain satisfaction for damages, especially since the rules that allow establishing the lien (gravamen) on the vehicle (articles 159 and 188 of the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes) are in force, thereby guaranteeing the due compensation owed to the vehicle owner, which in any case—it must be clarified—has its limits, since it responds up to the value of the vehicle, given that it is joint and several or subsidiary—that is to say, accessory—with respect to the driver's liability, which in turn depends on their culpability in the criminal traffic sphere […]” (cf. CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE, Vote No. 2000-05517 of 14:50 hours on July 5, 2000). The curious thing about this precedent is that the \"case under study\" refers to a traffic lawsuit filed by those bringing the unconstitutionality action against a natural person (driver of the vehicle causing the accident) and a transport company (registered owner), from which it appears it would be a case of commercial exploitation or public transport of persons [hypothesis “B)” discussed above], which—according to the jurisprudential criterion of the Third Chamber—would determine an objective, joint, several, and full civil liability, that is, not limited \"to the value of the vehicle.\" This allows one to understand that the jurisprudential position of the Constitutional Chamber, while “endorsing” the interpretation upheld by the Court of Cassation, ends up defining a different solution, that is, eliminating the distinctions it made and, simply and plainly stating that (understood to be for all cases) the liability of the registered owner, even in cases of commercial or industrial exploitation, or public transport, is not full but rather limited to the vehicle. By reason of the foregoing, the appeal filed by Mr. [Name [Name1]], in his capacity as civil plaintiff, is declared without merit.\n\nIt strikes these appellate judges that in said ruling it is indicated (based on a weak argument, in line with the jurisprudential line being analyzed) that from the relationship of articles 7, 188, and 187 of the Transit Law No. 7331 “it must be understood” that it is the vehicle that is liable (with respect to the registered owner (propietario registral)) for the amount of the damages, without even attempting to specify why such a thing must be understood: “[…] The reasoning provided by the judge regarding the non-applicability of Arts. 187 of the Transit Law and 1045 and 1048 of the Civil Code is impeccable. Regarding the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation corresponding to strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) in traffic accidents, it has been established when a vehicle is used for a commercial operation, which has not been proven in this matter. Therefore, regarding the argument that L.A.M. must be held civilly liable along with L.S.A. for the entirety of the damages, the appealing party is incorrect. The appellant mentions Art. 7 of the Transit Law, which states: ‘In cases of traffic accidents, the person who appears as the owner of the vehicle in the Registry, or the person whose transfer document had the last certain date or the date of granting of the deed prior to the event, shall be civilly liable, without prejudice to the provisions of article 187 of this law.’ Said article must be analyzed in relation to Art. 188 of the Transit Law, which provides: ‘The vehicle with which damage is caused shall remain encumbered pending the outcome of the respective proceeding…’ For its part, Art. 192 of the same law establishes: ‘The encumbrance referred to in article 188 of this Law shall proceed, even if the driver is not the owner, or does not appear as such in the Public Registry of Motor Vehicle Property.’ From the relationship of said articles, it must be understood that a strict liability of the vehicle owner is provided for, insofar as the motor vehicle is liable for the amount of civil damages. From this perspective, it is a strict civil liability that does not answer for full compensation, but is limited to an encumbrance on the vehicle to answer for the amount of the compensation, so that if the compensation exceeds the amount for which the vehicle is eventually auctioned, there will be no additional liability of the vehicle owner. See in this regard ruling 315-98 of 27-3-1998, issued by the Third Chamber of the Court, where it deemed it appropriate that the owner's liability be limited in the specific case to the value of the vehicle. For its part, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in ruling 2248-96 of May 14, 1996, accepted the thesis of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), which had stated: ‘Regarding the encumbrance determined in the Transit Law, it points out that the legislator established it in order to protect a public interest, and thus provided that transit authorities, on their own motion, encumber as a precautionary measure the vehicles involved in any collision, so that they would answer with their value for the outcome of the proceeding. Thus, the owner of a vehicle is strictly liable for the damages caused by his motor vehicle, provided that the liability of the person driving it, whether the owner himself or a third party, is proven. The figure under study, in its opinion, is not unreasonable or disproportionate, so in the judgment of the Attorney General's Office it does not infringe upon the Political Constitution regarding the principle of private property.’ The Chamber stated regarding this: ‘Regarding the possible violation of the right to property, the Chamber considers that the Attorney General's Office is correct in pointing out that the legislator established that encumbrance in order to protect a public interest, and that the provision is not unreasonable. It is the general rule that the object with which the crime was committed be affected, which in the case under study, is the vehicle.’ In accordance with the foregoing, this claim must be granted, and the civil action filed against the civil defendant L.D.A.M. must be granted, but her civil liability limited to answering with her Mitsubishi Lancer vehicle, license plate [Placa5]; said vehicle must remain encumbered to answer for the payment of the compensation set by the lower court (a quo), and it is ordered that said encumbrance be noted in the margin of the vehicle's registration entry (Arts. 188 and 191 of the Transit Law) […]” (cf. Criminal Cassation Court of Goicoechea, ruling No. 2001-00523 of 10:15 a.m. on July 13, 2001; the transcription is literal). Moreover, along these same lines is the ruling of the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court of Cartago, No. 2014-00362 of 2:00 p.m. on August 11, 2014. In said ruling, it is explained that on the issue before us (civil liability of the registered owner who was not driving the vehicle that caused the accident and damages), Transit Law No. 9078 did not introduce essential modifications to Law No. 7331, and it reasons that it distinguishes three different hypotheses of strict liability of the registered owner, with the first two involving subjective liability (for fault) of the driver, while the third involves liability without fault: A) When the driver cannot be identified: the strict liability of the owner is limited to the value of the vehicle, “as is logical,” since article 200 of Law No. 9078 provides that the vehicle shall remain encumbered (a rule corresponding to article 188 of the previous Law, No. 7331). In this regard, ruling No. 2010-00367 of the Third Chamber is cited (in which, as explained supra, it was resolved that the civil liability of the registered owner company is limited “to the value of the vehicle” (to the vehicle itself)). B) When the driver is identified: pursuant to article 199 of Law No. 9078, this would be full joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) (not limited to the value of the vehicle, but affecting the entirety of the assets), which is not autonomous but depends not only on the subjective liability of the driver being determined but also on several hypotheses being met (that the owner allows his vehicle to be driven by a person without a license or under the effects of alcohol or drugs, that a commercial, industrial, or public transport operation is involved, etc.). C) Commercial or industrial operation, even without fault: pursuant to article 1048 subsection 5 of the Civil Code, this would be full strict liability. Thus, with regard to the hypothesis identified as “A),” a very weak and unsound argument is again used to limit the civil liability of the registered owner to the vehicle, namely, that this “is logical” because the vehicle will remain encumbered, losing sight of the fact that such encumbrance must also be maintained in the circumstances of hypothesis “B).” According to this entire account, it is understood that—in principle—that civil liability limited to the “value of the vehicle” (in reality, to the vehicle itself) would operate only in hypothesis “A)” as discussed. However, it should be noted that the Constitutional Chamber (binding jurisprudence), while also endorsing the criterion upheld by the Third Chamber, did so in a different manner, as it did not even distinguish the various hypotheses outlined above, but rather (in light of the validity of Law No. 7331 of 1993, which—it is reiterated—was not essentially modified in this point by Law No. 9078 of 2012) simply and plainly established that the liability of the registered owner is limited to the vehicle: “[…] In the case under study, there is no violation whatsoever of the right of access to justice to find satisfaction for damages, especially since the rules allowing the establishment of the encumbrance (sic) of the vehicle (articles 159 and 188 of the Transit Law on Public Land Routes) are in force, thereby guaranteeing the due compensation owed by the vehicle owner, which in any case—it must be clarified—has its limits, as it answers up to the value of the vehicle, since it is joint and several or subsidiary—that is to say, ancillary—with respect to the driver's liability, which in turn depends on his culpability in the criminal transit sphere […]” (cf. CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE, ruling No. 2000-05517 of 2:50 p.m. on July 5, 2000). The curious thing about this precedent is that the “case under study” refers to a traffic lawsuit filed by those bringing the unconstitutionality action against a natural person (driver of the vehicle causing the accident) and a transport company (registered owner), which suggests it would be a case of commercial operation or public transport of persons [hypothesis “B)” discussed above], which—according to the jurisprudential criterion of the Third Chamber—would determine strict, joint and several, and full civil liability, that is, not limited “to the value of the vehicle.” This allows for the understanding that the jurisprudential position of the Constitutional Chamber, while “endorsing” the interpretation upheld by the Court of Cassation, ends up defining a different solution, that is, eliminating the distinctions the latter made and simply and plainly indicating that (it is understood for all cases) the liability of the registered owner, even in the case of commercial or industrial operation, or public transport, is not full but rather limited to the vehicle. By reason of the foregoing, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by Mr. [Name [Name1]], in his capacity as civil plaintiff, is dismissed.”\n\nof October 22, 1982, and [Placa2] at 9:30 a.m. on September 18, 1987. In light of the foregoing, the claim must be upheld, and it must be declared that with respect to Mrs. [Nombre9], only her vehicle [Placa3] shall remain encumbered under the terms of the law for the results of the accident, and not that she is jointly and severally liable with its driver, Mrs. [Nombre10]. […]” (cf. Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, opinion N° 350-F-90 of 09:30 hours on November 23, 1990). As noted, based on the provisions of Article 38 cited above, and for the purpose of establishing the scope of the civil liability of the registered owner (when this person is not the individual driving the vehicle that causes the accident resulting in damages to third parties), the Criminal Chamber distinguished two scenarios, and in both, such liability was accessory (accesoria) to that of the driver, that is, it depended on and arose from a determination of the driver's liability as the cause of the accident, due to willful misconduct or fault on their part. These scenarios were the following: i) when the owner allows a person without the respective license to drive the vehicle; and ii) when it is a company that commercially or industrially exploits the vehicle, or in the case of paid transport of persons or cargo. The last two scenarios would be included in the first, such that it even appears to be a reiteration. Now then, based on these two clearly differentiated scenarios, and from the provisions of Article 39 under analysis (which stated that the vehicle with which the damage was caused would be considered encumbered for the results thereof), the jurisprudence of the Third Chamber considered that in the first scenario, the registered owner's civil liability was not full but rather limited \"to the value of the vehicle\" (es decir, al vehículo en sí), while in the second scenario, it involved objective, joint and several, and full civil liability (that is, the registered owner answered together with the driver for the total amount of the civil judgment, even with all of their assets). This criterion is reiterated and maintained, among others, in the following opinions: 254-F-92, of 09:00 on June 19, 1992; 485-F-92, of 08:40 hours on October 23, 1992; 313-F-95 of 11:10 hours on May 26, 1995; and 167-F-97 of 15:30 hours on February 27, 1997. What is objectionable about this jurisprudential position (that which concerns the first scenario outlined supra, that is, that the civil liability of the vehicle owner who allows a person without a license to drive must be limited to the vehicle itself) is that it is constructed from weak arguments that disrespect the hermeneutic principle that prohibits making distinctions where the rule does not (Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus). Thus, the referred rule is established even though it cannot be extracted from the content of Articles 38 and 39 of the Traffic Law N° 5939 of 1976. Indeed, according to a grammatical interpretation, if these articles are read carefully, one notes that such a rule does not appear described in either of those two provisions, and it could not even be extracted through an analogical or teleological interpretation. In addition to this, it could not be affirmed that such a limitation on the registered owner's civil liability, referring to the first scenario of Article 38, derives from Article 39 (insofar as it provides that the vehicle must be kept encumbered for the results of the damage caused). Again, it must be noted that this article does not make such a distinction, because what it indicates, simply, is that the vehicle with which damage is caused will be considered encumbered for its results, without the legislator delimiting or circumscribing it only to the first scenario. From this, it would then follow that this encumbrance must be ordered for both scenarios of Article 38. Furthermore, the mere legal provision of that encumbrance would in no way imply (since the legislator did not indicate it so) that, when filing their civil claim, the victim can only pursue said asset. Continuing with the jurisprudential evolution analyzed here, it is noted that based on the text of Traffic Law N° 9078 of April 13, 1993, where some non-essential or significant modifications were introduced, the Criminal Cassation Chamber maintained the same criterion. Regarding the legal question analyzed here, Articles 7, 188, 189, 190, and 191 of this law established the following: \"ARTICLE 7.- In any traffic incident in which a vehicle is involved, the registered owner shall be the objectively civilly liable party for the consequences derived from the use, manipulation, possession, or tenure of the vehicle, even when they were not the driver of the vehicle and the person responsible for the incident is not identified in a traffic proceeding; unless said registered owner proves having sold the motor vehicle, by means of a public deed dated prior to the incident under investigation. If the indicated exception or any other legally valid one is raised, the authority shall proceed, in the first case, to carry out all necessary procedures for notifying and informing the new documented owner of the facts, in order to continue the corresponding proceeding against them. To determine the joint and several civil liability of the owner, the action shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 187 and following of this Law.\" \"ARTICLE 188.- The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: a) The owner of a vehicle who allows it to be driven by a person lacking the respective license or under the effects of alcohol or enervating drugs. b) Natural or legal persons who, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transportation. c) The owner who allows the [Placa4] of their vehicle to be used by another vehicle to which they have not been assigned, or does not deliver them to the Dirección General de Transporte Público for safekeeping, if the vehicle to which they were assigned is permanently prevented from circulating. d) Any natural or legal person who imports, assembles, produces, or commercializes motor vehicles, in the event that the traffic accident is caused by the omission, in the vehicle or vehicles involved in the traffic incident, of the respective safety measures included in Article 32 of this Law. (Thus amended the previous subsection by Article 1°, point 28) of Law N° 8779 of September 17, 2009). e) The owner of a vehicle who forces or allows circulation with excess load by light and heavy cargo vehicles, according to the parameters established in the respective regulation.\" [Thus added the previous subsection by Article 2°, subsection ñ) of Law N° 8696 of December 17, 2008; thus the article's numbering was shifted by subsection a) of numeral 2° of Law N° 8696 of December 17, 2008, which transferred it from 187 to 188]. \"ARTICLE 189.- The vehicle with which damage is caused shall remain encumbered for the results of the respective proceeding and at the order of the judicial authority hearing it. That authority shall order it to be annotated in the margin of the vehicle's registration entry, in the event it is registered; if it is not, it shall order border closure or the detention of the vehicle, which may be delivered in judicial deposit, all for the purpose of securing the results of the trial. The judicial authority shall issue the order for its annotation immediately after receiving the incident report or complaint. The Registro de la Propiedad de Vehículos Automotores shall annotate the encumbrance as soon as it receives the order and shall notify the competent court accordingly, which must verify the annotation, for which it shall keep an exact and detailed control. In the notification of annotation, the Registry shall indicate the name and address of the person registered as the vehicle owner. Non-compliance with these provisions shall be considered a serious fault on the part of the respective officials, who shall be responsible for the damages caused by the lack of annotation of the encumbrance, in accordance with the principles established in the Ley de la Administración Pública\" (Thus its numbering was shifted by subsection a) of Article 2° of Law N° 8696 of December 17, 2008, which transferred it from Article 188 to 189). \"ARTICLE 190.- The action for compensation for damages and losses caused by the accident and the collection of costs must be filed by the injured party or their representative before the competent civil court\" [Thus amended by Article 1º of Law No. 7833 of September 29, 1998, and thus its numbering was shifted by subsection a) of Article 2° of Law N° 8696 of December 17, 2008, which transferred it from Article 189 to 190]. \"ARTICLE 191.- To establish and pursue the joint and several civil liability of third parties under the terms of this Law, the injured or interested party must appear before the judicial office to claim their right, under the following conditions: in the case of offending drivers, within eight (8) days after their statement, and in the case of owners, within eight (8) days following notification of the content of Article 161 of this Law. For this purpose, the interested party must provide to the proceeding the name and particulars of the person against whom the action is directed, the CED1, as well as the place where they can be notified. If it is a legal entity, the name of the legal representative, the corporate domicile, and the place to notify them must be provided. If all the complete data is not provided or if it is provided outside the indicated time limit, the action shall be deemed not filed, and the interested party must enforce their rights in the corresponding civil proceeding. Once the action is received, the office shall proceed to notify the defendant and, for this purpose, shall grant them, from the notification, eight (8) days to exercise their defense, without prejudice to their subsequent participation in the hearing. The deciding judge shall resolve in the judgment on the appropriateness or not of the action\" [Thus amended by subsection u) of Article 1° of Law N° 8696 of December 17, 2008, and thus its numbering was shifted by subsection a) of Article 2° of Law N° 8696 of December 17, 2008, which transferred it from Article 190 to 191]. Based on this regulatory framework (which in no way differs from what is regulated in the current Traffic Law, N° 9078, published in Supplement 165 to La Gaceta N° 207 of October 28, 2012), the Criminal Chamber maintained the criterion that, in the case of the scenario provided for in Article 7 (which, in essence, is the same contained in the first part of Article 38 of the previous law, namely, when the driver is not identified), the registered owner's civil liability shall not be full but rather limited \"to the value\" of the vehicle (in reality, to the vehicle itself). This was indicated, for example, in opinions N° 149-F-96, of 09:45 hours on April 12, 1996, and CED2 ° of 10:55 hours on March 27, 1998. In the latter, a notorious error is even observed, for although it concludes that there was no commercial or industrial exploitation because it involved a truck providing garbage collection service at cost, that is, without obtaining profit or gain, the civil judgment against the registered owner was maintained \"up to the value of the vehicle,\" when in reality it was not even appropriate. In that same line, opinion 2010-00367 was also issued, even though – in principle – the registered owner was a company (from which it is presumed that it was exploiting the truck with which the accident was generated and the damage caused): \"[…] The decision to condemn the company owning the motor vehicle, only as to its value, is supported by the principle of legality and is not a decision to the detriment of the victims' interests as the complainant indicates. While it is true that Articles 187 of the Traffic Law and 106 of the Penal Code determine joint and several civil liability together with the perpetrators of the punishable act regarding the payment of damages and losses, this refers to situations or exhaustively specified causes, among which the cause in question is not included. In other cases, according to the traffic regulations in force at the time of the events – Law number 7331 – the civil liability of third-party civil defendants is determined up to the value of the vehicle with which the damage is caused – Article 188 – and other assets cannot be encumbered, except those of the civil defendant, because even though Article 263 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the civil actor to formulate the request for attachment in the initial pleading or subsequently, without prejudice to the power to request it preventively, it is required that the assets subject to attachment be registered in the name of the civil defendant, additionally holding the status of accused, or be contemplated within the presumptions of civil solidarity, which does not occur in the case file […]\" (cf. Third Chamber, opinion N° 2010-000367 of 08:48 hours on May 7, 2010). It is also appropriate to cite opinion N° 2001-000523 of the Criminal Cassation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, N° 2001-000523 of 10:15 hours on July 13, 2001, where the Criminal Chamber's criterion discussed here is also endorsed. It draws the attention of these appellate judges that in said pronouncement it is indicated (based on a weak argument, consistent with the jurisprudential line under analysis) that from the relationship of Articles 7, 188, and 187 of Traffic Law N° 7331, \"it must be understood\" that it is the vehicle that answers (with respect to the registered owner) for the amount of the compensation, without even attempting to specify why such a thing must be understood: \"[…] The reasoning given by the judge regarding the non-applicability of Arts. 187 of the Traffic Law and 1045 and 1048 of the Civil Code is impeccable. Regarding the jurisprudence of the Cassation Court corresponding to objective liability in traffic accidents, it has been established when dealing with a vehicle used for commercial exploitation, which has not been proven in this matter. Therefore, regarding the allegation that L.A.M. must be civilly liable together with L.S.A. for the totality of the damages, the challenging party is not correct. The challenger mentions Art. 7 of the Traffic Law, which indicates: 'In cases of traffic accidents, the civilly liable person shall be the person appearing as the vehicle owner in the Registry, or whose transfer document has the latest certain date or the date of execution of the deed prior to the event, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 187 of this law.' Said article must be analyzed in relation to Art. 188 of the Traffic Law, which provides: 'The vehicle with which damage is caused shall remain encumbered for the results of the respective proceeding…'. For its part, Art. 192 of the same law establishes: 'The encumbrance referred to in Article 188 of this Law shall proceed, even if the driver is not the owner, or does not appear as such in the Registro Público de la Propiedad de Vehículos Automotores.' From the relationship of said articles, it must be understood that an objective liability of the vehicle owner is provided, insofar as the motor vehicle answers for the amount of civil compensation. From this perspective, it is a civil objective liability that does not answer for full compensation but is limited to an encumbrance on the vehicle to answer for the amount of compensation, so that if it exceeds the amount for which the vehicle is eventually auctioned, there will be no additional liability of the vehicle owner. See in this regard opinion 315-98 of March 27, 1998, issued by the Third Chamber of the Court, where it deemed appropriate that the owner's liability be limited in the specific case to the value of the vehicle. For its part, the Constitutional Chamber in opinion 2248-96 of May 14, 1996, accepted the thesis of the Procuraduría General de la República which had stated: 'Regarding the encumbrance determined in the Traffic Law, it notes that the legislator established it for the sake of protecting a public interest, and thus provided that traffic authorities, ex officio, encumber as a precautionary measure the vehicles involved in every collision, so that they answer with their value for the results of the proceeding. Thus, the owner of a vehicle answers objectively for the damages produced with their motor vehicle, provided the liability of the person driving it, whether the owner themselves or a third party, is proven. The figure under study, in its judgment, is not unreasonable or disproportionate, so that in the opinion of the Procuraduría, they do not impinge upon the Political Constitution regarding the principle of private property.' The Chamber stated on this matter: 'Regarding the possible violation of the right to property, the Chamber considers that the Procuraduría is correct in noting that the legislator established that encumbrance for the sake of protecting a public interest, and that the provision is not unreasonable. It is the general rule that the thing with which the crime was committed be affected, which in the case under study, is the vehicle.' In accordance with the foregoing, this claim must be granted, and the civil action filed against civil defendant L.D.A.M. must be granted, but her civil liability is limited to answering with her Mitsubishi Lancer vehicle, plates [Placa5], said vehicle must remain encumbered to answer for the payment of the compensation set by the lower court, and the annotation of said encumbrance in the margin of the vehicle's registration entry is ordered (Arts. 188 and 191 of the Traffic Law) […]\" (cf. Criminal Cassation Court of Goicoechea, opinion N° 2001-00523 of 10:15 hours on July 13, 2001; the transcription is literal). Furthermore, in this same line is the opinion of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of Cartago, N° 2014-00362 of 14:00 hours on August 11, 2014. In said pronouncement, it is explained that regarding the subject at hand (civil liability of the registered owner who was not driving the vehicle that caused the accident and damages), Traffic Law N° 9078 did not introduce essential modifications to N° 7331, and it is reasoned that it distinguishes three different scenarios of objective liability for the registered owner, wherein in the first two there is subjective liability (due to fault) of the driver, while in the third it is a matter of liability without fault: A) When the driver cannot be identified: the owner's objective liability is limited to the value of the vehicle, \"because it is logical,\" since Article 200 of Law N° 9078 provides that the vehicle shall remain encumbered (a rule that corresponds to Article 188 of the previous Law, N° 7331). In this regard, the opinion of the 3rd Chamber N° 2010-00367 is cited (in which, as explained supra, it was resolved that the civil liability of the registered owning company is limited \"to the value of the vehicle\" (to the vehicle itself)). B) When the driver is identified: pursuant to Article 199 of Law 9078, it would involve full joint and several liability (not limited to the value of the vehicle, but affecting the entire assets), which is not autonomous but depends not only on a determination of the driver's subjective liability, but also – additionally – on several scenarios occurring (that the owner allows their vehicle to be driven by a person without a license or under the effects of alcohol or drugs, that there is commercial, industrial, or public transport exploitation, etc.). C) Commercial or industrial exploitation, even without fault: pursuant to Article 1048, subsection 5° of the Civil Code, it would involve full objective liability. Thus, in what refers to the scenario identified as \"A)\", a very weak and insubstantial argument is again used to limit the registered owner's civil liability to the vehicle, namely, that this \"is logical\" because the vehicle shall remain encumbered, losing sight of the fact that such an encumbrance must also be maintained under the circumstances of scenario \"B)\". According to this entire account, it is understood that – in principle – that civil liability limited to the \"value of the vehicle\" (in reality, to the vehicle itself) would operate only in scenario \"A)\" discussed. Nevertheless, it must be indicated that the Constitutional Chamber (binding jurisprudence), while also endorsing the criterion held by the Third Chamber, did so in a different manner, for it did not even distinguish the different scenarios outlined above, but rather (in light of the validity of Law N° 7331 of 1993, which – it is reiterated – was not essentially modified on this point by Law N° 9078 of 2012) simply and plainly established that the registered owner's liability is limited to the vehicle: \"[…] In the case under study, there is no infringement of the right of access to justice to find satisfaction for damages, especially since the rules that allow for establishing the encumbrance on the vehicle (Articles 159 and 188 of the Law of Traffic on Public Land Routes) are in force, thereby guaranteeing the due compensation that corresponds to the vehicle owner, which in any case – it must be clarified – has its limits, since it answers up to the value of the vehicle, given that it is joint and several or subsidiary – that is, accessory (accesoria) – with respect to the driver's liability, which in turn depends on their culpability in the criminal traffic context […]\" (cf. CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE, opinion N° 2000-05517 of 14:50 hours on July 5, 2000). The curious thing about this precedent is that the \"case under study\" refers to a traffic trial brought by those filing the unconstitutionality action against a natural person (driver of the vehicle causing the accident) and a transport company (registered owner), from which it appears it would be a case of commercial exploitation or public transportation of persons [scenario \"B)\" discussed above], which – according to the jurisprudential criterion of the Third Chamber – would determine objective, joint and several, and full civil liability, that is, not limited \"to the value of the vehicle.\" This allows for the understanding that the jurisprudential position of the Constitutional Chamber, while \"endorsing\" the interpretation held by the Cassation Chamber, ends up defining a different solution, that is, eliminating the distinctions the latter made and, simply and plainly, indicating that (it is understood for all cases) the registered owner's liability, even in the case of commercial or industrial exploitation, or public transportation, is not full but rather limited to the vehicle. On the foregoing grounds, the appeal filed by Mr. [Nombre [Nombre1]], in his capacity as civil plaintiff, is dismissed.\"" }