{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-160976", "citation": "Res. 00077-2017 Sala Primera de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Validez de reglamento municipal sobre infraestructura de telecomunicaciones celulares", "title_en": "Validity of municipal regulation on cellular telecommunications infrastructure", "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica resolvió un recurso de casación interpuesto por la Municipalidad de Curridabat contra una sentencia que anuló su Reglamento para la Normalización de la Infraestructura de Telecomunicaciones Celulares. El Tribunal de instancia consideró que el reglamento carecía de motivación y que la municipalidad se había extralimitado en su potestad reglamentaria. La Sala revocó dicha decisión, restableciendo la validez del reglamento. Fundamentó su fallo en la autonomía municipal consagrada en los artículos 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política, que otorga a los gobiernos locales la competencia para regular los servicios e intereses cantonales, incluyendo el control urbano y ambiental. Señaló que el reglamento perseguía finalidades legítimas de sostenibilidad ambiental y urbanística, mejorando la disponibilidad y calidad del servicio de telefonía celular. Además, aplicó la inversión de la carga probatoria del artículo 109 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, concluyendo que la empresa actora no demostró que la regulación fuera contraria a derecho o técnicamente inadecuada. La Sala condenó a la actora al pago de las costas procesales y personales.", "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court resolved a cassation appeal filed by the Municipality of Curridabat against a ruling that annulled its Regulation for the Normalization of Cellular Telecommunications Infrastructure. The lower court had found the regulation lacked proper justification and that the municipality had exceeded its regulatory powers. The Chamber reversed that decision, restoring the regulation's validity. Its holding was grounded in the municipal autonomy enshrined in Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, which grants local governments the authority to regulate cantonal services and interests, including urban and environmental control. The Chamber noted that the regulation pursued legitimate goals of environmental and urban sustainability, improving the availability and quality of cellular telephone service. Furthermore, it applied the reversal of the burden of proof under Article 109 of the Biodiversity Law, concluding that the plaintiff company failed to demonstrate that the regulation was unlawful or technically inadequate. The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte", "date": "2017", "year": "2017", "topic_ids": [], "primary_topic_id": null, "es_concept_hints": [ "autonomía municipal", "potestad reglamentaria", "inversión de la carga de la prueba", "Ley de Biodiversidad", "impacto visual", "uso de suelo", "casación" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 169", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 170", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 15", "law": "Ley de Planificación Urbana" }, { "article": "Art. 19", "law": "Ley de Planificación Urbana" }, { "article": "Art. 109", "law": "Ley de Biodiversidad" } ], "keywords_es": [ "autonomía municipal", "potestad reglamentaria", "infraestructura de telecomunicaciones", "postes", "impacto visual", "medio ambiente", "Ley de Biodiversidad", "carga de la prueba", "casación", "Curridabat" ], "keywords_en": [ "municipal autonomy", "regulatory power", "telecommunications infrastructure", "poles", "visual impact", "environment", "Biodiversity Law", "burden of proof", "cassation", "Curridabat" ], "excerpt_es": "lleva razón el casacionista cuando acusa quebranto de los numerales 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política, por cuanto el Tribunal desconoció las atribuciones asignadas por el constituyente a los ayuntamientos (...) la decisión de cómo regular la prestación del servicio de telefonía celular, mediante postes ubicados en sitios públicos, es de su encargo, lo cual materializó en las normas reglamentarias cuestionadas. (...) Considérese, al estar involucrado el ambiente (entorno urbano, uso de suelo, paisaje), aplica la inversión de la carga probatoria contenida en el artículo 109 de la Ley de Biodiversidad. En este predicado, debió la actora demostrar que las regulaciones establecidas contrarían el derecho en este particular, lo cual no hizo.", "excerpt_en": "The appellant is correct in alleging a violation of Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, since the Court disregarded the powers assigned by the framers to local councils (...) the decision on how to regulate the provision of cellular telephone service, by way of poles located on public sites, is its responsibility, which it materialized in the contested regulatory provisions. (...) Considering that the environment is involved (urban surroundings, land use, landscape), the reversal of the burden of proof contained in Article 109 of the Biodiversity Law applies. Under this predicate, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that the established regulations are contrary to the law in this regard, which it failed to do.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Granted", "label_es": "Con lugar", "summary_en": "The cassation appeal is granted, the contested judgment is annulled, and the Curridabat municipal regulation on cellular telecommunications infrastructure is restored to full validity.", "summary_es": "Se acoge el recurso de casación, se anula la sentencia impugnada y se restablece la validez del reglamento municipal de infraestructura de telecomunicaciones celulares de Curridabat." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando XXIV", "quote_en": "considering that the environment is involved (urban surroundings, land use, landscape), the reversal of the burden of proof contained in Article 109 of the Biodiversity Law applies.", "quote_es": "al estar involucrado el ambiente (entorno urbano, uso de suelo, paisaje), aplica la inversión de la carga probatoria contenida en el artículo 109 de la Ley de Biodiversidad." }, { "context": "Considerando XXIV", "quote_en": "the decision on how to regulate the provision of cellular telephone service, by way of poles located on public sites, is its responsibility, which it materialized in the contested regulatory provisions.", "quote_es": "la decisión de cómo regular la prestación del servicio de telefonía celular, mediante postes ubicados en sitios públicos, es de su encargo, lo cual materializó en las normas reglamentarias cuestionadas." }, { "context": "Considerando XXIV", "quote_en": "it is, fundamentally, a local regulatory power, rooted in the essential core of its autonomy, which drives the council to govern itself according to the cantonal interests it is called upon to protect, including urban and environmental control, the surroundings, and the ecologically balanced environment.", "quote_es": "se trata, en lo fundamental, de una potestad regulatoria local, radicada sobre el núcleo esencial de su autonomía, que motiva al ayuntamiento a gobernarse según los intereses cantonales que está llamado a tutelar, incluyendo el control urbano, ambiental, el entorno y el ambiente ecológicamente equilibrado." }, { "context": "Considerando XXIV", "quote_en": "the intended purpose, in objectifying the regulation of cellular telecommunications infrastructure, is to increase service availability, improve its quality, and ensure affordable prices, in respect of and in harmony with environmental and urban sustainability, taking into account its visual and environmental impact on the urban and natural surroundings.", "quote_es": "la finalidad perseguida, al objetivar la regulación de la infraestructura de telecomunicaciones celulares, para aumentar la disponibilidad del servicio, mejorar su calidad y asegurar precios asequibles, en respecto y armonía a la sostenibilidad ambiental y urbanística, tomando en cuenta su impacto visual y medioambiental en el entorno urbano y natural." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-160976", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-35669", "norm_num": "4240", "norm_name": "Ley de Planificación Urbana", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "15/11/1968" }, { "doc_id": "norm-39796", "norm_num": "7788", "norm_name": "Ley de Biodiversidad", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "30/04/1998" }, { "doc_id": "norm-63431", "norm_num": "8642", "norm_name": "Ley General de Telecomunicaciones", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "04/06/2008" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“XXIV.- Con todo y lo expuesto, lleva\r\nrazón el casacionista cuando acusa quebranto de los\r\nnumerales 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política, por cuanto el Tribunal\r\ndesconoció las atribuciones asignadas por el constituyente a los ayuntamientos,\r\naplicable en el caso concreto a la demandada, respecto a la administración de\r\nlos intereses y servicios locales en su cantón, a través de una autonomía\r\ncorporativa que igualmente asigna la Carta Magna. En este sentido, la decisión\r\nde cómo regular la prestación del servicio de telefonía celular, mediante\r\npostes ubicados en sitios públicos, es de su encargo, lo cual materializó en\r\nlas normas reglamentarias cuestionadas. Por lo demás, de la lectura del\r\nReglamento, en su “Considerando”, es notoria la finalidad perseguida, al\r\nobjetivar la regulación de la infraestructura de telecomunicaciones celulares,\r\npara aumentar la disponibilidad del servicio, mejorar su calidad y asegurar\r\nprecios asequibles, en respecto y armonía a la sostenibilidad ambiental y\r\nurbanística, tomando en cuenta su impacto visual y medioambiental en el entorno\r\nurbano y natural, en beneficio del interés colectivo del cantón de Curridabat. Ello,\r\nmotivada en que los avances tecnológicos han propiciado la aparición de nuevos\r\nservicios de comunicaciones y la multiplicación de instalaciones de\r\ntelecomunicaciones, lo cual supone el referido impacto visual y medioambiental\r\nde aquel entorno. De allí, el contenido de la conducta administrativa ha\r\nradicado en la creación del Reglamento, al establecer los parámetros para regir\r\nla normalización del sistema de estructuras soportantes de radiobases\r\npara las telecomunicaciones celulares, en lo atinente al uso de suelo,\r\natendiendo la conformidad con la ubicación, forma y condición constructiva y la\r\nexplotación comercial. Estos elementos están consignados en la referida\r\nnormativa y vienen a justificar su validez, en tanto se fundamenta, asimismo,\r\nen la necesidad que consideró la Administración Municipal, dentro de su\r\ncompetencia y bajo el presupuesto de su autonomía en materia de planificación y\r\nadministración territorial, de establecer los parámetros que regulen la\r\nnormalización de la infraestructura soportante para las telecomunicaciones\r\ncelulares, según también se expresó en el Reglamento. De este modo, la conducta\r\nadministrativa se ajustó a los preceptos alusivos a los elementos y a la validez\r\ndel acto administrativo, previstos en la Ley General de la Administración\r\nPública; de interés para este asunto, en los numerales 128 a 136. Como lo denunció\r\nel recurrente, esta última disposición legal fue conculcada por el Tribunal. Por\r\nlo expuesto, éste no lleva razón al estimar que el Reglamento no se motivó. Considérese\r\nademás la base jurídica que acuerpó al ayuntamiento\r\npara apoyar el dictado de la aludida reglamentación: “…en la Carta Magna,\r\nArtículos 169 y 170, así como los artículos 15, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28,\r\n32,33 34, 36, 38, 39, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63 y 64 y siguientes de la Ley de\r\nPlanificación Urbana, así como los Artículos 13, 59 y del 190, al 198, de la\r\nLey General de la Administración Pública”. De todo ello, los citados\r\npreceptos constitucionales resaltan la autonomía municipal, en cuya virtud, el\r\nmunicipio puede adoptar decisiones propias y administrase en orden a su\r\npersonería jurídica y patrimonio propio, a lo que le resulta viable el dictado\r\nde normas locales. De este modo, dentro de las competencias del Concejo\r\nMunicipal está, precisamente, la emisión de Reglamentos. Así lo contempla el\r\nCódigo Municipal en los artículos 2, 4 y 13, que encuentran égida\r\nconstitucional en los susodichos preceptos 169 y 170 de la Carta Política. Se\r\ntrata, en lo fundamental, de una potestad regulatoria local, radicada sobre el\r\nnúcleo esencial de su autonomía, que motiva al ayuntamiento a gobernarse según\r\nlos intereses cantonales que está llamado a tutelar, incluyendo el control\r\nurbano, ambiental, el entorno y el ambiente ecológicamente equilibrado, de\r\nconsuno con los numerales 41 y 50 de la Constitución Política y según se\r\narmoniza con la Ley de Planificación Urbana, por ejemplo, en sus artículos 4 y\r\n15. El primero estatuye la competencia del Concejo Municipal para dictar\r\ndisposiciones normativas. El segundo preceptúa que, conforme al canon 169 de la\r\nConstitución Política, se reconoce competencia y autoridad a los gobiernos\r\nmunicipales, para planificar y controlar el desarrollo urbano, dentro de los\r\nlímites de su territorio jurisdiccional y, en consecuencia, cada uno de ellos\r\ndispondrá lo que proceda para implantar un plan regulador y los reglamentos de\r\ndesarrollo urbano conexos, en las áreas donde deba regir, sin perjuicio de\r\nextender todos o algunos de sus efectos a otros sectores en que primen razones\r\ncalificadas para establecer un determinado régimen contralor. De igual manera,\r\nel artículo 19 Ibid., autoriza la promulgación de\r\nreglas procesales para el acatamiento de planes de regulación y para la protección\r\nde los intereses de la salud, seguridad, comodidad y bienestar de la comunidad.\r\nEs decir, su competencia se extiende a la emisión de normativa reglamentaria. En\r\nel caso concreto, la actora reconoce en su demanda, la accionada cumplió con la\r\nexigencia de consulta pública no vinculante del Reglamento, lo cual se ratifica\r\ncon vista en la Gaceta número 121 del 23 de junio de 2011. Ello evidencia cómo,\r\naunada a la potestad reglamentaria propia de ese ayuntamiento, su ejercicio\r\nconsideró la opinión colectiva al someterlo a su conocimiento. Se decantó por\r\nregular en el sentido dicho, sin que ello vulnere el respaldo constitucional y\r\nlegal que al efecto le ampara. En el sub lite, el Tribunal no tomó en cuenta ese espectro\r\nnormativo. Además, según lo informa el impugnante, desconoció que la entidad\r\naccionada bien podía escoger el empleo de las redes estructurales soportantes\r\nque, según la técnica, conviniera para el cabal cumplimiento del servicio de\r\ncomunicación celular. Entre ellas, como lo dispone el mandato 6, inciso 18), de\r\nla Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, que el casacionista\r\naduce quebrantado, los postes, dentro de la definición de “Recursos escasos”\r\ny como parte de la infraestructura requerida para operar las redes de\r\ntelecomunicaciones. También lo acotó el recurrente, no precisa establecer si\r\nlas estructuras de torres son o no aptas para ese fin, ni si deben incluirse\r\nsitios privados de instalación, porque la base de este caso se debe examinar a\r\npartir de si los postes en zonas públicas cumplen su cometido. Es por esto\r\nmismo que resulta atendible la inconformidad del impugnante respecto al hecho 6\r\ntenido por no probado en el fallo recurrido, en virtud el cual, para el órgano\r\nsentenciador, no se probó que las torres de telecomunicaciones sean\r\ntécnicamente inapropiadas, generen contaminación visual o aumenten el costo del\r\nservicio de telecomunicaciones en Curridabat. Esos aspectos son de\r\nconsideración municipal en virtud de consistir materia relacionada con su\r\nquehacer como gobierno local. Por todo ello, tampoco lleva razón el Tribunal al\r\nconsiderar que la accionada extralimitó su discrecionalidad y potestad\r\nreglamentaria. Antes bien, es respetable su decisión de estimar adecuada a esos\r\npropósitos la infraestructura de postes en zonas públicas, según se reguló en\r\nla normativa cuestionada que el Tribunal anuló, obligándola a adoptar\r\npropuestas y disposiciones de entes que no le resultan vinculantes,\r\ninfringiendo, según lo denuncia la demandada, las susodichas normas jurídicas y\r\nsu potestad reglamentaria en esta materia. Además, la actora en modo alguno ha\r\npatentizado razones contundentes, como para desmeritar la adecuación técnica o\r\nfuncional de la utilización de postería en sitios\r\npúblicos respecto a la prestación del correspondiente servicio. Considérese, al\r\nestar involucrado el ambiente (entorno urbano, uso de suelo, paisaje), aplica\r\nla inversión de la carga probatoria contenida en el artículo 109 de la Ley de\r\nBiodiversidad. En este predicado, debió la actora demostrar que las\r\nregulaciones establecidas contrarían el derecho en este particular, lo cual no\r\nhizo, como tampoco que la adecuación técnica y funcional, contenida en esas\r\nregulaciones, no permite el cabal cumplimiento del respectivo servicio de\r\ntelecomunicaciones. En cuanto a la privación que dice haber sufrido de sus\r\nderechos, en el recurso de casación que presentó, reconoció cómo otra compañía\r\nprestataria de servicios similares a los que ofrece, se ajustó a las\r\ndisposiciones reglamentarias y logró concretar su actividad mercantil. Esto es,\r\nlas personas físicas y jurídicas con intereses comerciales y expectativas\r\neconómicas, a desarrollar en el correspondiente cantón, deberán ajustarse a las\r\nreglas establecidas como derivación del ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria\r\ndel ayuntamiento; de no hacerlo, no procede alegar quebranto de derechos, en\r\ntanto no se ajustaron a esa normativa.\n\r\n\r\n\nXXV.- En\r\nmérito de lo indicado procede acoger el recurso de la demandada. Se deberá\r\nanular la sentencia impugnada. Fallando por el fondo, se rechazarán los\r\nextremos de la demanda acogidos por el Tribunal, para declararla sin lugar en\r\nsu totalidad. Corresponderá a la actora el pago de las costas personales y\r\nprocesales. Sobre este particular, el precepto 193 del CPCA,\r\nestablece la facultad de exonerar cuando la sentencia se dicta en virtud de\r\npruebas cuya existencia, verosímilmente, no haya conocido la contraria y, por\r\nesa causa, se haya ajustado la oposición de la parte. Además, cuando por la\r\nnaturaleza de lo debatido haya existido, a juicio del Tribunal, suficiente\r\nmotivo para litigar. La regla establecida en el canon 194 siguiente, no\r\ncontiene una facultad para exonerar sino una imposición. Aplica cuando la parte\r\nvencedora incurrió en plus petitio. Como facultad que\r\nes, el Tribunal no incurre en quebranto normativo alguno cuando dispone\r\napartarse de ella. Por lo demás, no se cumple el supuesto de hecho para\r\nconsiderar la existencia de plus petitio como motivo\r\nde exoneración. De allí la condenatoria impuesta en esta sede.”", "body_en_text": "XXIV.- With all of the foregoing, the appellant (casacionista) is correct in alleging a violation of Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, because the Court disregarded the powers assigned by the constituent power to the municipal councils, applicable in this specific case to the defendant, regarding the administration of local interests and services in its canton, through a corporate autonomy that is likewise assigned by the Magna Carta. In this sense, the decision of how to regulate the provision of cellular telephone service, by means of poles located on public sites, is its responsibility, which it materialized in the challenged regulatory provisions. Furthermore, from a reading of the Regulation, in its “Considering”, the pursued purpose is notorious, by objectivizing the regulation of cellular telecommunications infrastructure, to increase the availability of the service, improve its quality and ensure affordable prices, in respect and harmony with environmental and urban sustainability, considering its visual and environmental impact on the urban and natural surroundings, for the benefit of the collective interest of the canton of Curridabat. This was motivated by the fact that technological advances have led to the emergence of new communications services and the multiplication of telecommunications facilities, which entails the aforementioned visual and environmental impact on that environment. Hence, the content of the administrative conduct has resided in the creation of the Regulation, establishing the parameters to govern the standardization of the system of supporting structures for radio base stations (radiobases) for cellular telecommunications, regarding land use (uso de suelo), addressing conformity with the location, form and constructive condition and commercial exploitation. These elements are set forth in the cited regulations and serve to justify their validity, as they are also based on the necessity the Municipal Administration considered, within its competence and under the premise of its autonomy in territorial planning and administration matters, to establish the parameters that regulate the standardization of supporting infrastructure for cellular telecommunications, as was also expressed in the Regulation. In this way, the administrative conduct conformed to the precepts alluding to the elements and validity of the administrative act, provided for in the General Public Administration Act; of interest to this matter, in Articles 128 to 136. As the appellant alleged, this latter legal provision was violated by the Court. In light of the foregoing, the Court is not correct in holding that the Regulation lacked a statement of reasons. Consider further the legal basis that supported the municipal council in issuing the aforementioned regulation: “…in the Magna Carta, Articles 169 and 170, as well as Articles 15, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63 and 64 et seq. of the Urban Planning Act (Ley de Planificación Urbana), as well as Articles 13, 59 and from 190 to 198 of the General Public Administration Act”. From all this, the cited constitutional precepts highlight municipal autonomy, under which the municipality may adopt its own decisions and administer itself according to its own legal personality and own assets, for which the issuance of local rules is feasible. Thus, within the competences of the Municipal Council is, precisely, the issuance of Regulations. The Municipal Code so contemplates in Articles 2, 4 and 13, which find constitutional shelter in the aforementioned precepts 169 and 170 of the Political Charter. This is, fundamentally, a local regulatory power, rooted in the essential core of its autonomy, which compels the municipal council to govern itself according to the cantonal interests it is called to protect, including urban and environmental control, the surroundings and an ecologically balanced environment, in accordance with Articles 41 and 50 of the Political Constitution and as harmonized with the Urban Planning Act, for example, in its Articles 4 and 15. The former establishes the competence of the Municipal Council to issue regulatory provisions. The latter prescribes that, pursuant to canon 169 of the Political Constitution, competence and authority is recognized to municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their jurisdictional territory and, consequently, each of them shall order whatever is appropriate to implement a regulatory plan and the related urban development regulations (reglamentos de desarrollo urbano), in the areas where it must govern, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors where qualified reasons prevail to establish a specific control regime. Likewise, Article 19 Ibid., authorizes the enactment of procedural rules for compliance with regulation plans and for the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort and well-being of the community. That is, its competence extends to the issuance of regulatory provisions. In the specific case, the plaintiff acknowledges in its complaint that the defendant complied with the requirement of a non-binding public consultation of the Regulation, which is confirmed by reference to Gazette No. 121 of June 23, 2011. This demonstrates how, coupled with the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) inherent to that municipal council, its exercise considered the collective opinion by subjecting it to their knowledge. It decided to regulate in the manner described, without this violating the constitutional and legal backing that protects it in this regard. In the sub lite, the Court did not take that normative spectrum into account. Furthermore, as reported by the challenger, it overlooked that the defendant entity could well choose the use of supporting structural networks that, according to technical standards, were suitable for the full performance of the cellular communication service. Among them, as provided in Article 6, subsection 18), of the General Telecommunications Act, which the appellant alleges was violated, poles, within the definition of “Scarce Resources (Recursos escasos)” and as part of the infrastructure required to operate telecommunications networks. The appellant also noted, it is not necessary to establish whether tower structures are or are not suitable for that purpose, nor whether private installation sites should be included, because the basis of this case must be examined from whether poles in public areas fulfill their purpose. This is precisely why the appellant’s disagreement regarding fact 6, held as unproven in the appealed judgment, is admissible, by virtue of which, for the adjudicating body, it was not proven that telecommunications towers are technically inappropriate, generate visual pollution or increase the cost of telecommunications service in Curridabat. Those aspects are for municipal consideration by virtue of constituting matters related to its work as local government. For all these reasons, the Court is also incorrect in considering that the defendant exceeded its discretion and regulatory power. Rather, its decision to deem pole infrastructure in public areas adequate for those purposes is respectable, as was regulated in the challenged regulation that the Court annulled, forcing it to adopt proposals and provisions from entities that are not binding upon it, thereby violating, as the defendant alleges, the aforementioned legal rules and its regulatory power in this matter. Furthermore, the plaintiff has in no way demonstrated compelling reasons to detract from the technical or functional suitability of using pole infrastructure (postería) on public sites with respect to the provision of the corresponding service. It should be considered that, since the environment is involved (urban surroundings, land use, landscape), the reversal of the burden of proof contained in Article 109 of the Biodiversity Act applies. Under this premise, the plaintiff should have demonstrated that the established regulations contravene the law in this particular, which it did not do, nor did it demonstrate that the technical and functional suitability contained in those regulations does not allow the full performance of the respective telecommunications service. As for the deprivation of its rights it claims to have suffered, in the cassation appeal it filed, it acknowledged how another company providing services similar to those it offers, adjusted to the regulatory provisions and succeeded in materializing its commercial activity. That is to say, natural and legal persons with commercial interests and economic expectations, to be developed in the corresponding canton, must adjust to the established rules as a derivation of the exercise of the municipal council’s regulatory power; if they do not, it is not appropriate to claim a violation of rights, as long as they did not adjust to those regulations.\n\n\nXXV.- By virtue of what has been indicated, the defendant’s appeal should be granted. The appealed judgment must be reversed. Ruling on the merits, the portions of the complaint upheld by the Court shall be rejected, in order to dismiss it in its entirety. The plaintiff shall be liable for the payment of personal and procedural costs. On this matter, precept 193 of the CPCA establishes the power to exempt when the judgment is handed down by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party, verisimilarly, may not have known, and for that reason, the party's opposition was adjusted. Also, when due to the nature of the matter debated there existed, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate. The rule established in following canon 194 does not contain a power to exempt but rather an imposition. It applies when the winning party incurred in excessive claim (plus petitio). As a power that it is, the Court incurs in no normative violation when it decides to depart from it. Moreover, the factual assumption to consider the existence of excessive claim as a ground for exemption is not met. Hence the cost order imposed at this instance.\n\nHence the conviction imposed in this venue.”

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nRather, its decision to deem the pole (postería) infrastructure in public areas adequate for those purposes is respectable, as it was regulated in the questioned provision that the Court annulled, obligating it to adopt proposals and provisions of entities that are not binding upon it, thereby infringing, as the defendant denounces, the aforementioned legal rules and its regulatory authority (potestad reglamentaria) in this matter. Moreover, the plaintiff has in no way demonstrated compelling reasons to detract from the technical or functional suitability of the use of poles (postería) in public sites regarding the provision of the corresponding service. Consider, since the environment is involved (urban surroundings, land use, landscape), the reversal of the burden of proof contained in Article 109 of the Biodiversity Law applies. Under this predicate, the plaintiff should have demonstrated that the established regulations contravene the law in this particular, which it did not do, nor did it show that the technical and functional suitability contained in those regulations does not permit the full performance of the respective telecommunications service. As for the deprivation of its rights it claims to have suffered, in the cassation appeal it filed, it acknowledged how another company providing services similar to those it offers complied with the regulatory provisions and managed to carry out its commercial activity. That is, natural and legal persons with commercial interests and economic expectations to be developed in the corresponding canton must conform to the rules established as a derivation of the exercise of the local government's regulatory authority (potestad reglamentaria); failing to do so, it is improper to allege infringement of rights, as long as they did not conform to that body of rules.\n\n**XXV.-** By virtue of the foregoing, the defendant's appeal must be granted. The contested judgment must be annulled. Ruling on the merits, the claims of the lawsuit upheld by the Court shall be rejected, and the lawsuit shall be declared without merit in its entirety. The plaintiff shall bear the personal and procedural costs. On this particular, precept 193 of the CPCA establishes the power to exonerate when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence, plausibly, the opposing party was unaware of and, for that reason, that party's opposition was adjusted. Furthermore, when due to the nature of the matter debated, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient cause to litigate. The rule established in canon 194 below does not contain a power to exonerate but rather an imposition. It applies when the winning party incurred in excessive claim (plus petitio). As a power, the Court does not incur in any regulatory breach when it decides to depart from it. Moreover, the factual supposition for considering the existence of excessive claim (plus petitio) as a ground for exoneration is not met. Hence the condemnation imposed in this venue.”" }