{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-161758",
  "citation": "Res. 00095-2017 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Exención del impuesto sobre la renta para instituciones religiosas — criterio objetivo del destino de los ingresos",
  "title_en": "Income tax exemption for religious institutions — objective criterion of income destination",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI, desestima las pretensiones de la Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica contra ajustes y sanciones tributarias por los períodos fiscales 2004-2006. La asociación alegaba que su condición de institución religiosa la eximía totalmente del impuesto sobre la renta, incluyendo actividades lucrativas como la docencia y venta de librería. El Tribunal aclara la distinción entre ‘no sujeción’ (no realización del hecho generador) y ‘exención’ (dispensa legal de pago pese a existir hecho generador), y concluye que el artículo 3 inciso b) de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta establece una exención objetiva y limitada: solo los ingresos destinados al mantenimiento del culto o a servicios de asistencia social sin fines de lucro están excluidos. La actora no probó ese destino ni acreditó ser una asociación declarada de utilidad pública según el inciso ch). Respecto a la actividad docente privada no universitaria, el Tribunal rechaza que exista exención por no estar prevista en el inciso h) del artículo 2, que expresamente grava la educación universitaria privada. Finalmente, desestima la alegada violación a la libertad de culto, señalando que es un asunto de control de legalidad ordinaria y que la exención fiscal no forma parte del contenido esencial de ese derecho fundamental.",
  "summary_en": "The Contentious Administrative Tribunal, Section VI, dismisses the claims of the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica against tax adjustments and penalties for fiscal years 2004-2006. The association argued that its status as a religious institution exempted it entirely from income tax, including for-profit activities such as teaching and bookstore sales. The Tribunal clarifies the distinction between 'non-subjection' (non-occurrence of the taxable event) and 'exemption' (legal waiver of payment despite the taxable event occurring), and holds that Article 3(b) of the Income Tax Law establishes an objective and limited exemption: only income used for the maintenance of worship or for non-profit social assistance services is excluded. The plaintiff failed to prove such use or to establish that it was an association declared of public utility under paragraph (ch). Regarding private non-university education, the Tribunal rejects any exemption as not provided for in Article 2(h), which expressly taxes private university education. Finally, it dismisses the alleged violation of religious freedom, noting that the matter is one of ordinary legality control and that tax exemption is not part of the essential core of that fundamental right.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI",
  "date": "2017",
  "year": "2017",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "no sujeción vs. exención",
    "hecho generador",
    "renta producto",
    "carga de la prueba",
    "in dubio pro fisco",
    "principio de taxatividad de las exoneraciones",
    "bloque de legalidad"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 1",
      "law": "Ley 7092"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 2 inciso h",
      "law": "Ley 7092"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 3 inciso b",
      "law": "Ley 7092"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 3 inciso ch",
      "law": "Ley 7092"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 62",
      "law": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 140",
      "law": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 2",
      "law": "Ley 7293"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 75",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "Impuesto sobre la Renta",
    "exención tributaria",
    "no sujeción",
    "institución religiosa",
    "libertad de culto",
    "actividad lucrativa",
    "carga de la prueba",
    "docencia privada",
    "asociación sin fines de lucro",
    "utilidad pública",
    "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "Income Tax",
    "tax exemption",
    "non-subjection",
    "religious institution",
    "religious freedom",
    "for-profit activities",
    "burden of proof",
    "private education",
    "non-profit association",
    "public utility",
    "Contentious Administrative Tribunal"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Al tenor de lo anterior, cualquier actividad que genere un lucro o utilidad a una institución religiosa -cualquiera que sea su credo- que tenga una finalidad diversa a los dos únicos supuestos indicados, se entiende que está gravada con el impuesto sobre la renta, según definición del hecho generador, en los términos del transcrito numeral 1 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta. Así las cosas, no lleva razón en su alegación la Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica, en cuanto estima que por su sola condición de ser una institución religiosa -en tanto realiza actividades de culto en diversos centros en el país-, no está obligada al pago del impuesto sobre la renta, en lo que refiere a actividades lucrativas, que en este caso lo son la educativa y la venta de artículos de librería.\n\nCon fundamento en lo anterior, para esta Autoridad Jurisdiccional no resulta posible entender la lógica del razonamiento propuesto por la Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica, de derivar una exoneración fiscal de la enseñanza educativa privada de los niveles preescolar, primaria y secundaria, al no estar contenidos de manera expresa en el inciso h) del canon 2 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta su gravación a este tributo.\n\nEn todo caso, no desprende que los conceptos de \"no sujeción\" y \" exención tributaria\" formen parte del contenido esencial de la libertad de culto de las instituciones religiosas, como se desprende a simple vista del desarrollo que sobre esta libertad pública ha hecho la Sala Constitucional en su jurisprudencia.",
  "excerpt_en": "Accordingly, any activity that generates profit or gain for a religious institution —whatever its creed— that has a purpose other than the two indicated exceptions, is understood to be subject to income tax, as defined by the taxable event in the terms of Article 1 of the Income Tax Law. Thus, the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica is not correct in arguing that its mere status as a religious institution —insofar as it conducts worship activities in various centers in the country— means it is not required to pay income tax on for-profit activities, which in this case are teaching and the sale of bookstore items.\n\nBased on the foregoing, this Court cannot accept the logic proposed by the plaintiff, which seeks to derive a tax exemption for private education at the preschool, primary, and secondary levels, since those levels are not expressly included in paragraph (h) of Article 2 of the Income Tax Law as being subject to this tax.\n\nIn any case, it cannot be concluded that the concepts of 'non-subjection' and 'tax exemption' form part of the essential core of religious freedom for religious institutions, as is evident from the development of this public freedom in the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Court dismisses the religious association's claims and upholds the tax adjustments and penalties, as it failed to prove the objective exemption for for-profit income or an exemption for non-university teaching activities.",
    "summary_es": "El Tribunal desestima las pretensiones de la asociación religiosa y confirma los ajustes y sanciones tributarias, al no acreditar la exención objetiva para los ingresos lucrativos ni la exoneración para actividades docentes no universitarias."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando IX.Tercero",
      "quote_en": "The exclusion from this tax does not depend on the subjective element or the particular condition of the taxpayer, as argued by the plaintiff association —in this case, being a religious institution— to cover all the activities it carries out, even when they generate profit.",
      "quote_es": "La exclusión de este tributo no atiende al elemento subjetivo o condición particular del contribuyente, como arguye la asociación actora, en este caso, de ser una institución religiosa, para comprender, como pretende la accionante, todas las actividades por ella realizadas, aún y cuando generen lucro."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IX.Tercero",
      "quote_en": "Only the income allocated to the maintenance of worship —which was recognized in the challenged tax actions— and that allocated to non-profit social assistance services […] is income not subject to income tax.",
      "quote_es": "Sólo los ingresos que destine al mantenimiento del culto -que fueron reconocidos en las actuaciones tributarias impugnadas- y las destinadas a servicios de asistencia social sin fines de lucro [...] es el ingreso que no está gravado por el impuesto sobre la renta."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando XI",
      "quote_en": "It is not possible to follow the logic proposed by the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica, seeking to derive a tax exemption for private education at the preschool, primary, and secondary levels, since those levels are not expressly included in paragraph (h) of Article 2 of the Income Tax Law.",
      "quote_es": "No resulta posible entender la lógica del razonamiento propuesto por la Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica, de derivar una exoneración fiscal de la enseñanza educativa privada de los niveles preescolar, primaria y secundaria, al no estar contenidos de manera expresa en el inciso h) del canon 2 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IX.Sétimo",
      "quote_en": "It cannot be concluded that the concepts of 'non-subjection' and 'tax exemption' form part of the essential core of religious freedom for religious institutions.",
      "quote_es": "No se desprende que los conceptos de 'no sujeción' y 'exención tributaria' formen parte del contenido esencial de la libertad de culto de las instituciones religiosas."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-10969",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7092  Art. 1"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-32135",
        "kind": "concept_anchor",
        "label": "Ley 7293  Art. 2"
      }
    ],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-161758",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
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  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-10969",
      "norm_num": "7092",
      "norm_name": "Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "21/04/1988"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-2683",
      "norm_num": "5338",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Fundaciones",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "28/08/1973"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-32135",
      "norm_num": "7293",
      "norm_name": "Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "31/03/1992"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-46631",
      "norm_num": "8114",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "04/07/2001"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-5967",
      "norm_num": "7097",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario N° 7097",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "18/08/1988"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-6530",
      "norm_num": "4755",
      "norm_name": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "03/05/1971"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "“IX.- SUPUESTO DE NO SUJECIÓN REGULADO EN EL ARTÍCULO 3\r\nINCISO B) DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA.- El tema de fondo\r\nque comprende esta cuestión está centrado a determinar si la condición de\r\ninstitución religiosa de la asociación actora abarca o comprende todas las\r\nactividades que ella realiza, indistintamente si es o no principal y si es o no\r\nde carácter lucrativa, esto, al amparo de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3 inciso\r\nb) de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta. Para dilucidar este punto, se debe atender\r\na lo establecido en la norma legal de referencia, que en su literalidad dice en\r\nlo que interesa a este asunto: \n\r\n\r\n\n\"Artículo\r\n3.- Entidades no sujetas al impuesto:\n\r\n\r\n\n...\n\r\n\r\n\nb) Los\r\npartidos políticos y las instituciones religiosas cualquiera que sea su credo,\r\npor los ingresos que obtengan para el mantenimiento del culto y por los\r\nservicios de asistencia social que presten sin fines de lucro.\n\r\n\r\n\n... \n\r\n\r\n\nch) Las\r\norganizaciones sindicales, las fundaciones, las asociaciones declaradas de\r\nutilidad pública por el Poder Ejecutivo, siempre y cuando los ingresos que\r\nobtengan, así como su patrimonio, se destinen en su totalidad, exclusivamente\r\npara fines públicos o de beneficiencia y que, en\r\nningún caso, se distribuyan directa o indirectamente entre sus integrantes.\n\r\n\r\n\n...\"\r\n(El resaltado no es del original.)\n\r\n\r\n\nDe esta\r\ndisposición y a efectos de poder atender al cuestionamiento que se hace en este\r\nproceso, es necesario hacer las siguientes consideraciones:\n\r\n\r\n\nPrimero: Se advierte que a\r\nlo largo de las diversas intervenciones, tanto de la parte actora como de la\r\nrepresentación estatal, han utilizado de manera indistinta los conceptos\r\njurídicos de exoneración y no sujeción. Esto no es correcto, por tener\r\nimplicaciones jurídicas diversas, como explicamos a continuación. Para entender\r\nla distinción de estos conceptos jurídicos, debemos tener clara la definición\r\nde tributo, en tanto la no sujeción y la exoneración refieren a supuestos\r\nde no exigibilidad de aquella obligación, pero por circunstancias diversas.\r\nAsí, el tributo es la prestación coercitiva y obligatoria, comúnmente en\r\ndinero, que en ejercicio de su poder de imperio o soberanía territorial, el\r\nEstado exige a los contribuyentes (sujetos económicos a él sometidos), con el\r\nobjeto de obtener los recursos necesarios para el cumplimiento de los fines\r\npúblicos y para el sostenimiento de los gastos públicos. (En tal sentido puede\r\nverse la definición dada en el artículo 4 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos\r\nTributarios.) El establecimiento de las obligaciones tributarias, en todos sus\r\nelementos conformadores, es materia reservada a la ley formal y material, como\r\nestablece el numeral 5 del Código Tributario. Así, corresponde a la ley\r\ndeterminar quien es el sujeto pasivo u obligado al pago del tributo\r\n(contribuyente); el objeto o bien sobre el que recae la obligación, que\r\nes el patrimonio o riqueza que se grava; el hecho generador, que es la\r\ncondición (hecho o negocio) cuya realización u omisión genera el nacimiento de\r\nla obligación tributaria y la base imponible o tarifa del tributo. Sobre\r\nesta base es que se procede entonces a la distinción de los conceptos\r\nenunciados:\n\r\n\r\n\ni.- La no\r\nsujeción -que en principio es lo regulado en el artículo 3 inciso b) de la\r\nLey del Impuesto sobre la Renta-, puede ser conceptualizada\r\ncomo la no realización del hecho imponible descrito en la norma tributaria,\r\npor lo cual, no nace la situación jurídica prevista en el tributo, o lo\r\nque es lo mismo, la ausencia de la obligación tributaria por no estar cubierta\r\nla situación particular, en la determinación del tributo, conforme a la\r\nprevisión legal, ya sea en su elemento subjetivo, objetivo o en el hecho\r\ngenerador. Es dable considerar que al definir el hecho imponible los elementos determinadores (o delimitadores) del tributo, éste puede\r\ndejar por fuera de su ámbito una gama infinita de situaciones y de personas que\r\nno quedan sometidas al tributo en cuestión. Ahora bien, cuando una norma\r\nrefiere a supuestos de no sujeción de un tributo, en modo alguno puede\r\ntenérsele como precepto de exclusión del tributo al que refiere, sino más bien\r\ncomo normas aclaratorias o interpretativas del tributo, en tanto tienden a\r\nesclarecer la gestión tributaria de los órganos administrativos y de la\r\nsituación de los administrados. Bien puede afirmarse que se trata de normas de\r\ndelimitación del hecho generador, pero en un sentido negativo, esto es,\r\nlimitándose a aclarar que determinadas hipótesis no están comprendidas en la\r\ndescripción del hecho generador. Queda claro que si no existieran normas de\r\n\"no sujeción\", el resultado jurídico sería el mismo, sea, la\r\ninexistencia de obligaciones tributarias en los supuestos que las normas de\r\nsujeción lo detallan. \n\r\n\r\n\nii.- Por\r\nsu parte, la exoneración o exención tributaria puede ser entendida o definida como la dispensa legal\r\n-al ser materia también reservada a la ley, como está expresamente establecido\r\nen el inciso b) del artículo 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos\r\nTributarios- de la obligación tributaria -como lo define el artículo 61 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos\r\nTributarios-. Así, la exención no incide sobre el nacimiento de la obligación\r\ntributaria, porque el hecho generador del tributo sí se produce; pero no se\r\ngenera la obligación, porque la exoneración en lo que incide es en su no\r\nexigibilidad, cabalmente en virtud de la dispensa legal establecida. Nótese\r\nademás que el párrafo primero del artículo 62 del Código Tributario exige que\r\ntratándose del establecimiento de las exoneraciones o exenciones tributarias,\r\nla ley que las establezca \"... debe especificar las condiciones\r\ny los requisitos fijados para otorgarlas, los beneficiarios, las mercancías,\r\nlos tributos que comprende, si es total o parcial, el plazo de su duración, y\r\nsi al final o en el transcurso de dicho período se pueden liberar las\r\nmercancías o si deben liquidar los impuestos, o bien si se puede autorizar el\r\ntraspaso a terceros y bajo qué condiciones.\" Esto hace que en\r\ntratándose de exoneraciones, no resulte posible crear supuestos de exención por\r\nanalogía, como dice el párrafo segundo del numeral 6 del Código de referencia,\r\ny \"(A)unque haya\r\ndisposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los\r\ntributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación\", conforme al 63\r\ndel mismo Código. Así, se trata de supuestos taxativamente establecidos en la\r\nley (principio de taxatividad de las exoneraciones),\r\ncuya definición en todos sus elementos debe estar definida de manera clara y\r\ncompleta en la ley. En este sentido, la Sala\r\nPrimera en sentencia 1118-F-S1-2015, estableció en lo que considera esta\r\nCámara, como de relevancia para el presente pronunciamiento: \n\r\n\r\n\n\"…\r\nEn suma, solo por vía legal pueden crearse [las exenciones], su\r\nfuente de origen debe reunir las condiciones señaladas en el numeral 62 del\r\ncitado Código y solo surten efectos si ocurre el hecho que ha sido preestablecido\r\npara su ocurrencia. Por tanto, al igual que los tributos se encuentran sujetos\r\na un principio de reserva legal, también lo están las exenciones y beneficios,\r\nen cuya fuente de creación, deben enunciarse los elementos básicos que la\r\ndelimitan. De este modo, el juzgador debe analizar en cada caso, con el cuidado\r\nde rigor, si el supuesto de hecho propuesto por el sujeto pasivo encuadra y\r\ncoincide con el hecho exento dispuesto por la norma que prevé el beneficio,\r\ndentro de su contenido material. […]\"\n\r\n\r\n\nSegundo: Interesa ahora\r\nreferirnos a los criterios de sujeción que rigen al impuesto sobre la renta en\r\nnuestro país, en la forma regulada en la Ley 7092, del veinticuatro de marzo de\r\nmil novecientos ochenta y ocho, vigente a partir del diecinueve de mayo\r\nsiguiente y sus reformas. Y es que en ejercicio de\r\nla potestad tributaria de que goza el Estado, tiene plena competencia para\r\nfijar los tributos en su jurisdicción, lo cual, obviamente comprende la\r\ndeterminación de los criterios de sujeción para su imposición, esto es, los\r\nelementos que determinan qué renta o sujeto está sometido al poder tributario\r\ndel Estado. Es así como, los criterios de sujeción pueden ser personales o reales; donde\r\nlos primeros (personales) hacen referencia a situaciones en las que\r\nexiste un vínculo relacionado con la propia naturaleza del individuo o\r\ncontribuyente, de manera que la sujeción a las leyes tributarias de un\r\ndeterminado Estado están definidas por la condición de nacional o residente\r\nfiscal del sujeto pasivo; y los segundos (reales) se centra en el criterio de la\r\nfuente de la renta, es decir, la vinculación con las leyes tributarias nace\r\na consecuencia de la generación de renta. Del contenido del numeral primero de\r\nla Ley 7092 de referencia, es posible concluir que el criterio adoptado por el\r\nlegislador fue el real, en tanto en su literalidad dispone:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"Artículo\r\n1.- Impuesto que comprende la ley, hecho generador y materia imponible.\r\nSe establece un impuesto sobre las utilidades de las empresas y de las\r\npersonas físicas que desarrollen actividades lucrativas. (Así\r\nadicionado ampliado por el artículo 102 de la Ley de Presupuesto número 7097,\r\ndel primero de de setiembre de mil novecientos\r\nochenta y ocho.) \n\r\n\r\n\nEl\r\nhecho generador del impuesto sobre las utilidades referidas en el párrafo\r\nanterior, es la percepción de rentas en dinero o en especie, continuas u\r\nocasionales, provenientes de cualquier fuente costarricense.\r\n(Así reformado por artículo 102 de la Ley de Presupuesto número No. 7097,\r\ndel primero de de setiembre de mil novecientos ochenta\r\ny ocho.) \n\r\n\r\n\nEste\r\nimpuesto también grava los ingresos, continuos o eventuales, de fuente\r\ncostarricense, percibidos o devengados por personas físicas o jurídicas\r\ndomiciliadas en el país; así como cualquier otro ingreso o beneficio de fuente\r\ncostarricense no exceptuado por ley, entre ellos los ingresos que perciban\r\nlos beneficiarios de contratos de exportación por certificados de abono\r\ntributario. La condición de domiciliados en el país se determinará conforme al\r\nreglamento. Lo dispuesto en esta ley no será aplicable a los mecanismos de\r\nfomento y compensación ambiental establecidos en la Ley Forestal, No.7575, del\r\n13 de febrero de 1996. (Así modificado este párrafo tercero por\r\nel artículo 1º de la Ley número 7838, del cinco de octubre de mil novecientos\r\nnoventa y ocho.) \n\r\n\r\n\nPara\r\nlos efectos de lo dispuesto en los párrafos anteriores, se entenderá por\r\nrentas, ingresos o beneficios de fuente costarricense, los provenientes de\r\nservicios prestados, bienes situados, o capitales utilizados en el territorio nacional,\r\nque se obtengan durante el período fiscal de acuerdo con las disposiciones de\r\nesta ley.\" (El subrayado no es del original).\n\r\n\r\n\nAsí, el factor decisivo en este tributo es la producción de\r\nrenta de fuente costarricense, no quién la genera. El legislador\r\ndefinió o sustentó el tributo en el concepto de renta producto, que refiere\r\na la riqueza que proviene únicamente de los factores productivos (tierra,\r\ntrabajo y capital) a disposición del contribuyente y que éste, con su actividad\r\neconómica, ha puesto en operación; y por excepción, incorpora algunos elementos\r\ndel sistema de renta ingreso cuando grava, por ejemplo, algunos supuestos de\r\nganancias de capital y de rentas gratuitas en el impuesto sobre remesas al\r\nexterior. Este principio de sujeción a la renta producto en nuestro sistema\r\nimpositivo a las utilidades ha sido confirmado por la Sala Primera de la Corte\r\nSuprema de Justicia en sus precedentes, así por ejemplo en la sentencia número\r\n728-F-S1-2014, de las ocho horas cincuenta minutos del cinco de junio del dos\r\nmil catorce, con las siguientes consideraciones:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"(...) Como ya\r\nlo ha indicado esta Cámara, el esquema tributario nacional sigue, para la\r\ndefinición del elemento material del tributo (hecho generador) el concepto de\r\n“renta-producto”, como se puede observar en la sentencia 1334-F-S1-2011 de las\r\n10 horas 5 minutos del 20 de octubre de 2011. El artículo 1 de la LISR es claro al respecto. Define el hecho generador como\r\n“la percepción de rentas en dinero o en especie, continuas u ocasionales,\r\nprovenientes de cualquier fuente costarricense”, así como “los ingresos,\r\ncontinuos o eventuales, de fuente costarricense, percibidos o devengados por\r\npersonas físicas o jurídicas domiciliadas en el país; así como cualquier otro\r\ningreso o beneficio de fuente costarricense no exceptuado por ley”, y aclara lo\r\nque se debe entender por renta, ingresos o beneficios, incorporando en esa\r\núltima definición legal el esquema de renta producto, al decir que estos son\r\naquellos “provenientes de servicios prestados, bienes situados o capitales\r\nutilizados en el territorio nacional, que se obtengan durante el período fiscal\r\nde acuerdo a las disposiciones de esta ley.” Nótese que los términos servicios,\r\nbienes y capitales se corresponden esencialmente con los factores de producción\r\n(trabajo, tierra y capital) vinculados con el esquema de renta producto. (...)\".\n\r\n\r\n\nSobre la base de este criterio de sujeción -actividad lucrativa\r\nde fuente costarricense- la ley determina el resto de los elementos esenciales\r\ndel tributo, que para mayor comprensión de la situación se detallan, y que\r\nresultan de interés para el análisis de la cuestión planteada:\n\r\n\r\n\ni.-\r\nElemento subjetivo del tributo: Es el artículo 2 de\r\nla Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta el que establece quienes son contribuyentes\r\ndel impuesto de la renta, siendo su rasgo definitorio, según el enunciado\r\ngeneral para todos los casos el que \"... realicen actividades o\r\nnegocios de carácter lucrativo en el país\", reiterándose con esto, el\r\nhecho generador del tributo. A continuación hace una enunciación de diversos\r\nsujetos, sobre la base de distintos parámetros, así, según la forma de\r\norganización tratándose de personas jurídicas -las \"personas\r\njurídicas legalmente constituidas, las sociedades de hecho, las sociedades de\r\nactividades profesionales, las empresas del Estado y las cuentas en\r\nparticipación que halla en el país\" (inciso a)-; personas jurídicas\r\npara la administración de bienes -los \"fideicomisos y encargos de\r\nconfianza constituidos conforme con la legislación costarricense\"\r\n(inciso c) y las \" sucesiones, mientras permanezcan indivisas\"\r\n(inciso ch)-; que realicen su actividad o estén\r\ndomiciliadas en el territorio nacional: -las \"sucursales, agencias\r\ny otros establecimientos permanentes que operen en Costa Rica, de personas no\r\ndomiciliadas en el país que haya en él\" (inciso b); las \"empresas\r\nindividuales de responsabilidad limitada y las empresas individuales que actúen\r\nen el país\" (inciso d); las \" personas físicas domiciliadas en\r\nCosta Rica, independientemente de la nacionalidad y del lugar de celebración de\r\nlos contratos\" inciso e)-; por el tipo de actividad que realicen:\r\n-los \"profesionales que presten sus servicios en forma liberal\"\r\n(inciso f); \"(T)odas aquellas personas físicas o jurídicas que no estén\r\nexpresamente incluidas en los incisos anteriores, pero que desarrollen\r\nactividades lucrativas en el país\" (inciso g) y finalmente con adición\r\nrealizada al tenor del inciso a) del artículo 21 de la Ley de\r\nSimplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria, número 8114, de cuatro de julio\r\ndel dos mil uno y vigente a partir del nueve de julio siguiente), se agregó el\r\nsupuesto del inciso h) a esta norma, para comprender de manera expresa a este\r\ntributo a los \"entes que se dediquen a la prestación privada de\r\nservicios de educación universitaria, independientemente de la forma jurídica\r\nadoptada.\" \n\r\n\r\n\nii.- Determinación del elemento\r\nobjetivo de la fuente costarricense: Por su parte, el artículo\r\n54 de la misma ley establece qué debe entenderse como renta de\r\nfuente costarricense, que está gravado con el impuesto de utilidades o de\r\nrenta. Así hace la siguiente enunciación: las provenientes de bienes inmuebles\r\nsituados en el territorio nacional (inciso a); las producidas por el empleo de\r\ncapitales, bienes o derechos invertidos o utilizados en el país (inciso b); las\r\noriginadas en actividades civiles, comerciales, bancarias, industriales,\r\nagropecuarias, forestales, pesqueras, mineras o explotación de cualquier\r\ndepósito natural, los provenientes de servicios públicos, del ejercicio de\r\nservicios profesionales desarrolladas o gestionadas dentro del territorio de la\r\nRepública cuando la remuneración sea salario, dieta, honorarios,\r\ngratificaciones, regalías, ventajas, comisiones, o cualquier forma de pago\r\noriginada en una relación laboral, así como las pensiones, jubilaciones y\r\nsemejantes (inciso c); aguinaldo (inciso ch); pagos o\r\ncréditos que se realicen para el uso de patentes, suministros de fórmulas,\r\nmarcas de fábrica, privilegios, franquicias, regalías, reafinanzamiento\r\ny primas de seguros de cualquier clase (inciso d). Esta determinación se\r\ncompleta con los supuestos del numeral 55, que enlista casos especiales\r\nque se consideran también como rentas de fuente costarricense. \n\r\n\r\n\nTercero: A la luz de las\r\nanteriores consideraciones, no queda más que considerar que, aún y cuando el\r\nnumeral 3 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta sea titulado como supuestos de\r\nno sujeción de este tributo (entendiendo por tal, que no se produce el hecho\r\ngenerador, según se explicó supra), no estamos ante\r\ntal supuesto. Nótese que la norma enuncia una serie de situaciones, en las\r\ncuales, se entiende que no genera la obligación del pago del impuesto en\r\ncuestión, pero esa consecuencia lo es por enunciación expresa de la ley, en\r\ncada uno de los supuestos enunciados, respecto de los cuales, no obstante haber\r\nrenta o utilidad, no se genera la obligación al pago del tributo; lo que se\r\nasemeja más bien al instituto jurídico de la exención fiscal (según definición\r\ndada previamente). Y es que en efecto, en lo que interesa a este asunto, en lo\r\nque refiere al inciso b) del artículo 3 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta (supra transcrito), se advierte\r\nque de manera expresa, clara y concreta se indica que tratándose de\r\ninstituciones religiosas, \"cualquiera que sea su credo\", y\r\nusando una rigurosa y correcta terminología jurídica-tributaria, no resultan gravadas\r\nal impuesto sobre la renta, \"los\r\ningresos que obtengan para el mantenimiento del culto y por los servicios de\r\nasistencia social que presten sin fines de lucro.\" La exclusión de este tributo no atiende al\r\nelemento subjetivo o condición particular del contribuyente, como arguye la\r\nasociación actora, en este caso, de ser una institución religiosa, para\r\ncomprender, como pretende la accionante, todas las\r\nactividades por ella realizadas, aún y cuando generen lucro, como pretende la accionante. Al contrario, el criterio definido por el\r\nlegislador es de tipo objetivo, en este caso definido por el destino de\r\nlos ingresos, pero muy concretos y precisos -se reitera-, únicamente aquellos\r\nse usen para el mantenimiento del culto y/o para servicios de asistencia social,\r\nsin fines de lucro. Al tenor de lo anterior, cualquier actividad que genere un\r\nlucro o utilidad a una institución religiosa -cualquiera que sea su credo- que\r\ntenga una finalidad diversa a los dos únicos supuestos indicados, se entiende\r\nque está gravada con el impuesto sobre la renta, según definición del hecho\r\ngenerador, en los términos del transcrito numeral 1\r\nde la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta. Así las cosas, no lleva razón en su\r\nalegación la Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica, en cuanto\r\nestima que por su sola condición de ser una institución religiosa -en tanto\r\nrealiza actividades de culto en diversos centros en el país-, no está obligada\r\nal pago del impuesto sobre la renta, en lo que refiere a actividades\r\nlucrativas, que en este caso lo son la educativa y la venta de artículos de\r\nlibrería. Conforme a la normativa que rige este tributo, sólo los ingresos que\r\ndestine al mantenimiento del culto -que fueron reconocidos en las actuaciones\r\ntributarias impugnadas- y las destinadas a servicios de asistencia social sin\r\nfines de lucro -lo que no fue acreditado, ni en los procedimientos\r\nadministrativos tributarios seguidos en contra de quien acciona ni en esta\r\nsede, tratándose de los períodos fiscales dos mil cuatro, dos mil cinco y dos mil\r\nseis, hecho no probado 1.)-, es el ingreso que no está gravado por el\r\nimpuesto sobre la renta.\n\r\n\r\n\nCuarto: Asimismo, esta\r\nCámara de Juzgadores se pronuncia sobre la situación de la actora en relación\r\ncon lo dispuesto en el artículo 3 inciso ch) de la\r\nLey del Impuesto sobre la Renta. Y es que en consonancia con lo dicho en el\r\nacápite anterior, igual consideración debe de hacerse de lo regulado en este\r\nprecepto. Es decir, tampoco se está ante un supuesto de no sujeción del\r\ntributo, sino de exoneración, porque el hecho generador se produce, pero al\r\ntenor del contenido de la norma, no se genera la obligación a su pago en el\r\nsupuesto regulado. Y tampoco se está ante una exclusión de la obligación tributaria\r\npor la condición particular del sujeto pasivo, sea, la de tratarse de personas\r\njurídicas organizadas como asociaciones -entiéndase, conforme a la Ley de\r\nAsociaciones, número 218, del ocho de agosto de mil novecientos treinta y ocho\r\ny sus reformas-, sobre la que pesa una declaratoria de interés público de parte\r\ndel Poder Ejecutivo; sino que el precepto expresa y claramente define que la\r\nactividad lucrativa por la que perciben ingresos estos sujetos que está\r\nexcluida de la obligación tributaria, lo es únicamente en razón del destino de\r\naquella actividad, sea, \" cuando los\r\ningresos que obtengan, así como su patrimonio, se destinen en su totalidad,\r\nexclusivamente para fines públicos o de beneficiencia\r\ny que, en ningún caso, se distribuyan directa o indirectamente entre sus\r\nintegrantes.\" Al tenor de lo anterior, no resultó posible para la\r\nAdministración Tributaria reconocer la exclusión al tributo de marras a la\r\nactora, en tanto está organizada como una asociación, en los términos de la Ley\r\nde cita; por dos razones concretas, primero por no contar con aquella\r\ndeclaración de utilidad pública -emanada del Poder Ejecutivo-, y segundo, por\r\nno haber acreditado tampoco que en los períodos fiscales indicados -dos mil\r\ncuatro, dos mil cinco y dos mil seis- haya destinado la totalidad de su\r\npatrimonio e ingresos, exclusivamente a fines públicos o de beneficiencia,\r\ny que en modo alguno distribuyera, directa o indirectamente aquellos ingresos,\r\nentre sus integrantes -hecho no probado 2.)-.\n\r\n\r\n\nQuinto: Llegados a este\r\npunto, y en razón de las alegaciones que hace la asociación actora sobre la\r\ncarga de la prueba, debemos decir lo siguiente. En efecto, atrás ha quedado ya\r\nel alegato de la máxima in dubio pro fisco, que en su visión clásica\r\nllevaba a concluir que en la materia fiscal, la carga de la prueba recaía, en\r\ntodos los supuestos, única y exclusivamente sobre el contribuyente. Es claro\r\nque tal posición no encuentra sustento en las normas que regulan esta materia. En\r\neste sentido, conforme disponía el numeral 19 del Reglamento General de Gestión\r\nFiscalización y Recaudación Tributaria, Decreto Ejecutivo número 29264-H, del\r\nveinticuatro de enero del dos mil uno, vigente a partir del siete de febrero\r\ndel dos mil uno al uno de abril del dos mil catorce (por cuanto el dos de abril\r\ndel dos mil catorce entró a regir el Reglamento de Procedimientos Tributarios,\r\nDecreto Ejecutivo número 28277-H, del siete de marzo del dos mil catorce, que\r\nderogó de manera expresa la anterior regulación reglamentaria), señalaba que la\r\ncarga probatoria incumbe al Fisco en lo que atañe a los hechos constitutivos de\r\nla obligación tributaria material y al sujeto pasivo respecto de los hechos\r\nimpeditivos, modificativos o extintivos de ese deber contributivo. Este\r\ntratamiento fue posteriormente incorporado y reconocido en la Ley, mediante la\r\nreforma realizada por la Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria,\r\nnúmero 9069, del diez de setiembre del dos mil doce\r\n(vigente a partir del veintiocho de setiembre\r\nsiguiente), de manera que ahora el párrafo segundo del numeral 140 del Código\r\nTributario dice en su literalidad:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"La\r\ncarga de la prueba incumbe a la Administración Tributaria respecto de los\r\nhechos constitutivos de la obligación tributaria material, mientras que incumbe\r\nal contribuyente respecto de los hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos\r\nde la obligación tributaria. En ese sentido, corresponderá a este último, según\r\nel caso, demostrar los hechos o actos que configuren sus costos, gastos,\r\npasivos, créditos fiscales, exenciones, no sujeciones, descuentos y, en\r\ngeneral, los beneficios fiscales que alega existentes en su favor.\"\n\r\n\r\n\nEs precisamente en atención al contenido e implicaciones del\r\nprincipio de la carga de la prueba en el ámbito tributario, que no lleva razón\r\nla parte actora en su alegato. Nótese que fue en ejercicio de la potestad\r\nfiscalizadora que asiste a la Administración Tributaria, que ésta determinó que\r\nen los períodos fiscales dos mil cuatro, dos mil cinco y dos mil seis, la\r\nactora había omitido la declaración y pago del tributo sobre ingresos que sí\r\nestán gravados. Correspondía entonces a la accionante\r\nentonces acreditar las causas de exención, conforme a la normativa que rige la\r\nmateria -incisos b) y ch) del artículo 3 de la Ley\r\ndel Impuesto sobre la Renta, según lo explicado anteriormente-, en este\r\ncaso, que aquellos ingresos, en su totalidad se hubiesen destinado para el\r\nmantenimiento del culto o para servicios de asistencia social sin fines de\r\nlucro -inciso b)- o que era una asociación declarada de interés público por el\r\nPoder Ejecutivo, cuyo patrimonio en su totalidad se hubiese destinado a fines\r\npúblicos o de de beneficencia y no se hubiese hecho ninguna distribución, ni\r\ndirecta ni indirecta entre sus miembros -inciso ch-,\r\nnada de lo cual fue probado, se repite ni en sede administrativa ni en la\r\njurisdiccional -hechos no probados 1.) y 2.)-.\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nSexto: Finalmente, la\r\nactora aludió en su defensa que es una asociación sin fines de lucro, conforme\r\na sus estatutos internos, al tenor de lo cual, no reparte dividendos entre sus\r\nagremiados; motivo por el cual no resulta posible gravar ninguna de sus\r\nactividades que coadyuvan a la consecución de su fin esencial. Al respecto\r\nconviene indicar que no basta en este sentido la simple referencia al Estatuto\r\nde la asociación accionante, por cuanto, no sólo no\r\nfue aportado a los autos -se repite, ni en sede administrativa ni en esta\r\ninstancia jurisdiccional-, no bastando su supuesta transcripción\r\nde alguno de sus articulados en alguno de los escritos en sede administrativa;\r\nsino porque aún y cuando la finalidad de la asociación actora sea la promoción\r\ny divulgación del evangelio y en principio no reparta dividendos o ganancias\r\nentre sus miembros, es lo cierto que conforme a la forma jurídica que adoptó,\r\nno se excluye el fin de lucro en este tipo de organizaciones sociales, en los\r\ntérminos permitidos en el artículo primero de la Ley de Asociaciones, en tanto\r\nfaculta que este tipo de sujetos pueden tener cualquier fin lícito, así por\r\nejemplo científico, artístico, deportivo, benéficos, de recreo, y \"... que\r\nno tengan por único y exclusivo objeto el lucro y la ganancia\"\r\n(el resaltado no es del original.) De manera que al tenor del mandato legal, no\r\nresulta prohibido el lucro en las organizaciones sociales conformadas bajo la\r\nforma jurídica de asociaciones, solo que se aclara que este fin -el de lucro y\r\nganancia-, no puede ser el único, ni el principal. De lo anterior, se deduce\r\ncon claridad que la actora sí puede realizar actividades lucrativas, como en\r\nefecto lo acreditó la Administración Tributaria en su fiscalización y\r\nprocedimientos. Una vez más se debe decir que no probó la accionante el destino de aquellos ingresos, conforme al\r\nmandato legal de referencia -supra explicado- única\r\nmanera para tenerla como no obligada al pago del tributo de mérito.\n\r\n\r\n\nSétimo: Finalmente,\r\nresultan desacertadas las alegaciones que hace la asociación actora en relación\r\na que a la infracción y violación de la libertad de culto, si no se reconoce su\r\n\"no sujeción\" al impuesto de la renta, por ser una institución\r\nreligiosa. Al respecto deben hacerse dos precisiones:\n\r\n\r\n\ni.- Este Tribunal\r\nContencioso Administrativo realiza un control de legalidad de la actuación\r\nadministrativa sometida a conocimiento, conforme al mandato del artículo 49 de\r\nla Constitución Política y desarrolla el numeral primero del Código Procesal\r\nContencioso Administrativo. Se pide en este proceso la revisión de diversos\r\nactos de la Administración Tributaria, por la que, primero, se le determinaron\r\najustes en las declaraciones del impuesto sobre la renta presentadas por la\r\naquí accionante en los períodos fiscales dos mil\r\ncuatro, dos mil cinco y dos mil seis; y luego, se le impusieron las sanciones\r\ntributarias, correspondientes a aquellos ajustes. Se trata de un control que\r\nutiliza como parámetro el bloque de juridicidad o de legalidad del ordenamiento\r\njurídico Administrativo, cuya escala jerárquica inicia con la Constitución\r\nPolítica (normas y principios que de esta dimanan), y luego están, en orden\r\nriguroso, los tratados internacionales, las leyes y las disposiciones reglamentarias,\r\nen la forma prevista en el numeral 6 de la Ley General de la Administración\r\nPública; y que se nutre también de las normas no escritas, estas son la\r\njurisprudencia, principios y costumbre (artículo 7 de la misma Ley General) y\r\ncompletan este orden, las reglas de la ciencia y de la técnica (artículos 16.1\r\nen relación con el 158.4 Ibídem.) Así las cosas, el\r\ncontrol que se ha verificado en esta ocasión y las conclusiones a las que se ha\r\nllegado (que la actora está obligada al pago del impuesto sobre la renta, en\r\nrelación a las actividades lucrativas que realiza, en los períodos que refieren\r\na las actuaciones tributarias impugnadas, y que refieren a la docencia y venta\r\nde artículos de librería), son de mera legalidad, sobre la base de la normativa\r\naplicable al caso. En todo caso, no desprende que los conceptos de \"no\r\nsujeción\" y \" exención tributaria\" formen parte del\r\ncontenido esencial de la libertad de culto de las instituciones religiosas,\r\ncomo se desprende a simple vista del desarrollo que sobre esta libertad pública\r\nha hecho la Sala Constitucional en su jurisprudencia. Así, a modo de ejemplo,\r\nbasta citar lo señalado en sentencia número 3173-93,\r\nde las catorce horas con cincuenta y siete minutos del seis de julio de mil\r\nnovecientos noventa y tres:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"VII. La libertad religiosa\r\nencierra, en su concepto genérico, un haz complejo de facultades. En este\r\nsentido, en primer lugar se refiere al plano individual, es decir, la\r\nlibertad de conciencia, que debe ser considerado como un derecho público\r\nsubjetivo individual, esgrimido frente al Estado, para exigirle abstención y\r\nprotección de ataques de otras personas o entidades. Consiste en la\r\nposibilidad, jurídicamente garantizada, de acomodar el sujeto, su conducta\r\nreligiosa y su forma de vida a lo que prescriba su propia convicción, sin ser\r\nobligado a hacer cosa contraria a ella. En segundo lugar, se refiere al plano\r\nsocial, la libertad de culto, que se traduce en el derecho a practicar\r\nexternamente la creencia hecha propia. Además la integran la libertad de proselitismo\r\no propaganda, la libertad de congregación o fundación, la libertad de\r\nenseñanza, el derecho de reunión y asociación y los derechos de las comunidades\r\nreligiosas, etc.\n\r\n\r\n\n VIII. La libertad de culto, en\r\ncuanto manifestación externa de la libertad religiosa, comprende el derecho a\r\nmantener lugares de culto y a practicarlo, tanto dentro de recintos como en el\r\nexterior, siempre dentro de las limitaciones establecidas por el ordenamiento,\r\nsea por norma constitucional o norma legal. En este sentido, es el mismo texto\r\nconstitucional que permite el libre ejercicio en la República de otros cultos\r\n-de la religión católica-, siempre y cuando \"no se opongan a la moral\r\nuniversal, ni a las buenas costumbres\" (artículo 75).\"\n\r\n\r\n\nii.- No obstante lo\r\ndicho, si la parte actora tiene duda en relación a si la normativa legal que ha\r\nsido aplicada al subjudice es contraria a la libertad\r\nde culto, contenida en el numeral 75 de la Carta Fundamental, ello es un asunto\r\nque no puede resolver esta Autoridad Jurisdiccional, debiendo acudir la\r\ninteresada, si bien lo tiene, ante la Sala Constitucional, por tener reservado\r\ny concentrado esa instancia, el control de constitucionalidad al tenor del\r\nmandato constitucional del artículo 10, y que desarrollan los artículos\r\nprimero, 2 inciso b) y 73 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción\r\nConstitucional. Sobre este aspecto, el juez Hess\r\nAraya pone nota adicional.\n\r\n\r\n\nX.- Es con fundamento\r\nen las anteriores consideraciones y razones, que esta Cámara de Juzgadores\r\ndesestiman la primera pretensión subsidiaria, por no encontrar yerro en la\r\ninterpretación que la Administración Tributaria hizo del artículo 3 inciso b)\r\nde la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta.\n\r\n\r\n\nXI.- DE LA GRAVACIÓN\r\nAL IMPUESTO DE LA RENTA DE LA ACTIVIDAD DOCENTE PRIVADA.- Se procede con el\r\nanálisis de la segunda pretensión subsidiaria, atinente a si la Administración\r\nTributaria hizo o no una adecuada interpretación y aplicación del inciso h) del\r\nartículo 2 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, que en su literalidad dispone\r\nen lo que interesa a este asunto:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"Artículo 2.- Contribuyentes.\n\r\n\r\n\nIndependientemente de la nacionalidad, del domicilio y del lugar\r\nde la constitución de las personas jurídicas o de la reunión de sus juntas\r\ndirectivas o de la celebración de los contratos, son contribuyentes todas las\r\nempresas públicas o privadas que realicen actividades o negocios de carácter\r\nlucrativo en el país:\n\r\n\r\n\n...\n\r\n\r\n\nh) Los entes que se dediquen a la\r\nprestación privada de servicios de educación universitaria, independientemente\r\nde la forma jurídica adoptada; para ello deberán presentar la declaración\r\nrespectiva. De lo dispuesto en esta norma, se exceptúa el ente creado mediante\r\nla Ley Nº 7044, de 29 de setiembre de 1986.\"\r\n(Así adicionado el inciso a) del artículo 21 de la Ley de\r\nSimplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria, número 8114, del cuatro de julio del\r\ndos mil uno.)\n\r\n\r\n\nPara\r\natender a este punto son útiles también las referencias que ya se hicieron\r\nsobre los elementos sustanciales del tributo en cuestión, esto es al hecho\r\ngenerador (\"percepción de rentas en dinero o en especie, continuas u\r\nocasionales, provenientes de cualquier fuente costarricense\", según párrafo segundo del artículo primero de la\r\nLey número 7092) y el sujeto pasivo (quien realice una actividad\r\no negocio lucrativo, enunciado del numeral 2.) También lo es lo explicado en\r\nrelación al concepto y régimen jurídico de las exoneraciones tributarias, esto\r\nes, que están reservadas a la ley -formal y material- (inciso b) del artículo 5\r\ndel Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), y que su determinación debe\r\nser clara, precisa y concreta en todos sus elementos y condiciones (artículo 62\r\ndel Código Tributario.) Con fundamento en lo anterior, para esta Autoridad\r\nJurisdiccional no resulta posible entender la lógica del razonamiento propuesto\r\npor la Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica, de derivar una\r\nexoneración fiscal de la enseñanza educativa privada de los niveles preescolar,\r\nprimaria y secundaria, al no estar contenidos de manera expresa en el inciso h)\r\ndel canon 2 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta su gravación\r\na este tributo. Al igual que en lo que refiere al punto de la carga de la\r\nprueba en materia tributaria, la parte actora invierte el sentido de la lógica\r\ny del entendimiento de los conceptos jurídicos involucrados, en este caso, de\r\nla forma cómo se determinan los tributos -y con ellos sus elementos\r\nconformadores-, y las exoneraciones fiscales. En este caso, el hecho generador\r\ndel impuesto sobre la renta está claro, no siendo necesario enlistar cada una\r\nde las actividades y negocios que generan renta o lucro, de fuente\r\ncostarricense. Por el contrario, esta delimitación y precisión sí es necesaria\r\ntratándose de las exoneraciones fiscales. Así, no hay duda que la actividad\r\ndocente en todos los niveles en que se imparte en el país, está afecta al pago\r\ndel impuesto sobre la renta, sin excepción. Llegados a este punto debemos\r\nprecisar los antecedentes de la situación fiscal de las fundaciones, por\r\nreferir a éstas la disposición en comentario. Así, al tenor de lo establecido\r\nen el artículo 10 de la Ley de Fundaciones, número 5338, del veintiocho de\r\nagosto de mil novecientos setenta y tres, se había dispuesto una exoneración practicamente total para estas personas jurídicas, del\r\nsiguiente modo:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"Las\r\nfundaciones estarán exentas del pago de derechos de inscripción y de impuestos\r\nnacionales y municipales, salvo los arancelarios, que sólo los podrá exonerar\r\nen cada caso el Ministerio de Hacienda, según la clase de bienes que se trate y\r\nsu destino.\"\n\r\n\r\n\nSin\r\nembargo, por mandato del artículo 1 de la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones\r\nVigentes y Excepciones número 7293, del treinta y uno de marzo de mil\r\nnovecientos noventa y dos, vigente a partir del tres de abril siguiente, se\r\ndispuso la derogatoria de\n\r\n\r\n\n\"... todas\r\nlas exenciones tributarias objetivas y subjetivas previstas en las diferentes\r\nleyes, decretos y normas legales referentes, entre otros impuestos, a los\r\nderechos arancelarios, a las ventas, a la renta, al consumo, al territorial, a\r\nla propiedad de vehículos, con las excepciones que indique la presente Ley. En\r\nvirtud de lo dispuesto, únicamente quedarán vigentes las exenciones tributarias\r\nque se mencionan en el artículo siguiente.\"\n\r\n\r\n\nEs así\r\ncomo de manera concreta, en el artículo 2 de la citada Ley número 7293 se\r\nexceptuó de la derogatoria anterior, y tratándose de las fundaciones,\r\núnicamente los siguientes supuestos:\n\r\n\r\n\n\"d) Se\r\nconceden en favor de instituciones, fundaciones y asociaciones sin actividades\r\nlucrativas, que se dediquen a la atención integral de menores de edad en estado\r\nde abandono, de ambulación o en riesgo social y que estén debidamente inscritas\r\nen el Registro Público\";\n\r\n\r\n\ny \n\r\n\r\n\n\"e) Se\r\nconceden en favor de instituciones, empresas públicas y privadas, fundaciones y\r\nasociaciones sin actividades lucrativas que se dediquen a la recolección y\r\ntratamiento de basura y a la conservación de los recursos naturales y del\r\nambiente, así como a cualquier otra actividad básica en el control de la\r\nhigiene ambiental y de la salud pública.\"\n\r\n\r\n\nAl\r\ntenor de estas disposiciones, se restringió el ámbito de exoneraciones de las\r\nfundaciones, a los supuestos indicados, entendiendo que en todo lo demás,\r\nestaban sujetas al poder tributario del Estado y las municipalidades. Sin\r\nembargo, en esta misma regulación, el legislador modificó algunos preceptos\r\ntributarios, y en concreto, por su numeral 15 modificó el artículo 3 de la Ley\r\ndel Impuesto sobre la Renta, comprendiendo en esta reforma, el presupuesto del\r\ninciso ch) previamente comentado, de manera que\r\nestableció la no obligatoriedad del pago al impuesto sobre la renta, tratándose\r\nde las fundaciones, se reitera, \"... declaradas de utilidad pública por\r\nel Poder Ejecutivo, siempre y cuando los ingresos que obtengan, así como su\r\npatrimonio, se destinen en su totalidad, exclusivamente para fines públicos o\r\nde beneficiencia y que, en ningún caso, se\r\ndistribuyan directa o indirectamente entre sus integrantes\", que es el\r\nmismo presupuesto ya comentado de las asociaciones. Ahora bien, es con ocasión\r\nde la adición del inciso h) del artículo 2 de la Ley número 7092, que se dio\r\ncon la promulgación de la Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria, número\r\n8114, del cuatro de julio del dos mil uno, que de manera expresa se gravó a\r\ntodas las instituciones privadas \"... que se\r\ndediquen a la prestación privada de servicios de educación universitaria,\r\nindependientemente de la forma jurídica adoptada; ...\" De esta disposición es claro que no\r\nresulta posible derivar del texto de este inciso h), la exoneración que\r\ndefiende la accionante -de la actividad docente en\r\nlos niveles de preescolar, primaria y secundaria-, por no adecuarse a la forma\r\ny exigencias que la ley exige para su establecimiento. Adicionalmente,\r\ncontrario a lo externado por la parte actora, la Sala Constitucional en su\r\nsentencia número 6509-2002, de las catorce horas cincuenta y tres minutos del\r\ntres de julio del año dos mil dos, no indicó ni reconoció de la existencia de\r\nla exoneración del impuesto sobre la renta de la enseñanza privada a nivel\r\npreescolar, de primero y segundo ciclo. La lectura que propone la actora es\r\nparcializada y antojadiza, en tanto refiere a una cita que hiciera el Tribunal\r\nConstitucional de un precedente propio, y que refiere a una consulta\r\nlegislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad, cabalmente sobre el proyecto de\r\nLey de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, es decir, no implicó el\r\nanálisis de la normativa vigente al momento de la situación. Nótese además que\r\ncon ocasión de la indicada reforma, sea la dada por Ley 8114, no se estableció\r\nninguna exoneración del impuesto de la renta a los sujetos que se dediquen a la\r\nactividad preescolar, de primero y segundo ciclo. En consonancia con lo\r\nindicado, es que la segunda pretensión subsidiaria formulada por la Asociación\r\nIglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica debe ser desestimada, por no ser\r\nconforme a derecho la lectura y propuesta que ella hace del numeral 2 inciso h)\r\nde la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, llevando razón la Administración\r\nTributaria en su criterio externado en las actuaciones que se impugnan en este\r\nproceso.”",
  "body_en_text": "**IX.- CASE OF NON-SUBJECTION REGULATED IN ARTICLE 3, SUBSECTION B) OF THE INCOME TAX LAW.-** The substantive issue encompassed by this question is centered on determining whether the condition of religious institution of the plaintiff association covers or comprises all the activities it carries out, regardless of whether or not it is principal and whether or not it is for-profit, under the protection of the provisions of Article 3, subsection b) of the Income Tax Law. To elucidate this point, one must look at what is established in the referenced legal provision, which literally states, in what is relevant to this matter:\n\n\"\nArticle 3.- Entities not subject to the tax:\n\n...\n\nb) Political parties and religious institutions, whatever their creed, for the income they obtain for the maintenance of worship and for the social assistance services they provide on a non-profit basis.\n\n...\n\nch) Union organizations, foundations, associations declared of public utility (utilidad pública) by the Executive Branch, provided that the income they obtain, as well as their assets, are entirely and exclusively destined for public or charitable purposes and that, in no case, are distributed directly or indirectly among their members.\n\n...\"\n(Highlighting is not from the original.)\n\nFrom this provision and for the purpose of addressing the questioning raised in this proceeding, the following considerations must be made:\n\nFirst: It is noted that throughout the various interventions, both by the plaintiff and the state representation, the legal concepts of exemption (exoneración) and non-subjection (no sujeción) have been used interchangeably. This is not correct, as they have different legal implications, as we explain below. To understand the distinction between these legal concepts, we must be clear on the definition of tax (tributo), since non-subjection (no sujeción) and exemption (exoneración) refer to cases of non-enforceability of that obligation, but due to different circumstances. Thus, the tax (tributo) is the coercive and mandatory payment, commonly in money, which, in the exercise of its power of imperium or territorial sovereignty, the State demands from taxpayers (economic subjects subject to it), with the purpose of obtaining the necessary resources for fulfilling public purposes and for the maintenance of public expenditures. (In this sense, see the definition given in Article 4 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures.) The establishment of tax obligations, in all their constituent elements, is a matter reserved to formal and material law, as established in numeral 5 of the Tax Code. Thus, it is up to the law to determine who is the taxable person (contribuyente) or person obligated to pay the tax; the object or property upon which the obligation falls, which is the wealth that is taxed; the taxable event (hecho generador), which is the condition (fact or transaction) whose realization or omission generates the birth of the tax obligation; and the tax base (base imponible) or rate of the tax. It is on this basis that we proceed to the distinction of the stated concepts:\n\ni.- Non-subjection (no sujeción) - which in principle is what is regulated in Article 3, subsection b) of the Income Tax Law - can be conceptualized as the non-realization of the taxable event described in the tax rule, whereby the legal situation provided for in the tax does not arise, or what is the same, the absence of the tax obligation because the particular situation is not covered in the determination of the tax, according to the legal provision, whether in its subjective element, objective element, or in the taxable event. It is feasible to consider that by defining the taxable event, the determining (or delimiting) elements of the tax, it may leave out of its scope an infinite range of situations and persons that are not subject to the tax in question. Now, when a rule refers to cases of non-subjection (no sujeción) to a tax, it can in no way be taken as a precept of exclusion from the tax to which it refers, but rather as clarifying or interpretative rules of the tax, insofar as they tend to clarify the tax management of the administrative bodies and the situation of the administered parties. It can well be stated that these are rules delimiting the taxable event, but in a negative sense, that is, merely clarifying that certain hypotheses are not included in the description of the taxable event. It is clear that if there were no \"non-subjection\" rules, the legal result would be the same, i.e., the non-existence of tax obligations in the cases that the subjection rules detail.\n\nii.- For its part, the tax exoneration or exemption (exoneración or exención tributaria) can be understood or defined as the legal dispensation - it being a matter also reserved to the law, as expressly established in subsection b) of Article 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures - of the tax obligation - as defined in Article 61 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures -. Thus, the exemption (exención) does not affect the birth of the tax obligation, because the taxable event of the tax does occur; but the obligation is not generated because what the exoneration (exoneración) affects is its non-enforceability, precisely by virtue of the established legal dispensation. Note also that the first paragraph of Article 62 of the Tax Code requires that in the case of the establishment of tax exonerations or exemptions (exenciones tributarias), the law that establishes them \"... must specify the conditions and requirements set for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or whether the taxes must be settled, or whether transfer to third parties may be authorized and under what conditions.\" This means that in the case of exonerations (exoneraciones), it is not possible to create exemption cases by analogy, as stated in the second paragraph of numeral 6 of the referenced Code, and \"(E)ven if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation,\" according to Article 63 of the same Code. Thus, these are cases exhaustively established in the law (principle of exhaustiveness of exonerations, principio de taxatividad de las exoneraciones), whose definition in all its elements must be clearly and completely defined in the law. In this sense, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) in judgment 1118-F-S1-2015, established what this Court considers relevant for the present pronouncement:\n\n\"… In short, only by legal means can [exemptions] be created, their source of origin must meet the conditions indicated in numeral 62 of the cited Code, and they only take effect if the event that has been pre-established for their occurrence takes place. Therefore, just as taxes are subject to a principle of legal reserve, so too are exemptions and benefits, in whose source of creation, the basic elements that delimit it must be enunciated. In this way, the judge must analyze in each case, with rigorous care, whether the factual scenario proposed by the taxable person fits and coincides with the exempt event provided for by the rule that stipulates the benefit, within its material content. […]\"\n\nSecond: It is now relevant to refer to the subjection criteria governing the income tax in our country, in the form regulated in Law 7092, of March twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred eighty-eight, effective as of May nineteenth of the following year, and its amendments. And it is that in the exercise of the tax authority (potestad tributaria) that the State enjoys, it has full competence to set the taxes in its jurisdiction, which, obviously, includes the determination of the subjection criteria for their imposition, that is, the elements that determine what income or subject is subject to the taxing power of the State. Thus, subjection criteria can be personal or real; where the former (personal) refer to situations where there is a link related to the very nature of the individual or taxpayer, so that subjection to the tax laws of a given State is defined by the status of national or fiscal resident of the taxable person; and the latter (real) focus on the criterion of the source of income, that is, the link with the tax laws arises as a consequence of the generation of income. From the content of numeral one of the referenced Law 7092, it is possible to conclude that the criterion adopted by the legislator was the real one, as it literally states:\n\n\"\nArticle 1.- Tax covered by the law, taxable event, and taxable matter. A tax is established on the profits of companies and individuals who carry out for-profit activities. (As added and expanded by Article 102 of Budget Law number 7097, of September first, nineteen hundred eighty-eight.)\n\nThe taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax on the profits referred to in the preceding paragraph is the receipt of income in cash or in kind, continuous or occasional, from any Costa Rican source. (As amended by Article 102 of Budget Law number No. 7097, of September first, nineteen hundred eighty-eight.)\n\nThis tax also levies continuous or eventual income from a Costa Rican source, received or accrued by individuals or legal entities domiciled in the country; as well as any other income or benefit from a Costa Rican source not excepted by law, including the income received by beneficiaries of export contracts for tax credit certificates. The condition of being domiciled in the country shall be determined according to the regulation. The provisions of this law shall not apply to the environmental promotion and compensation mechanisms established in the Forestry Law, No. 7575, of February 13, 1996. (As modified, this third paragraph by Article 1 of Law number 7838, of October fifth, nineteen hundred ninety-eight.)\n\nFor the purposes of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, income or benefits from a Costa Rican source shall be understood as those coming from services rendered, property located, or capital used in the national territory, which are obtained during the fiscal period in accordance with the provisions of this law.\" (Underlining is not from the original).\n\nThus, the decisive factor in this tax is the production of income from a Costa Rican source, not who generates it. The legislator defined or based the tax on the concept of income-product (renta producto), which refers to the wealth that comes solely from the productive factors (land, labor, and capital) available to the taxpayer and which the latter, through their economic activity, has put into operation; and by exception, it incorporates some elements of the income-income system when it taxes, for example, certain cases of capital gains and gratuitous income in the tax on remittances abroad. This principle of subjection to income-product (renta producto) in our system of taxing profits has been confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in its precedents, as for example in judgment number 728-F-S1-2014, at eight hours and fifty minutes on June fifth, two thousand fourteen, with the following considerations:\n\n\"(...) As this Chamber has already indicated, the national tax scheme follows, for the definition of the material element of the tax (taxable event), the concept of 'income-product' (renta-producto), as can be seen in judgment 1334-F-S1-2011 at 10 hours 5 minutes on October 20, 2011. Article 1 of the LISR is clear in this regard. It defines the taxable event as 'the receipt of income in cash or in kind, continuous or occasional, from any Costa Rican source,' as well as 'continuous or eventual income, from a Costa Rican source, received or accrued by individuals or legal entities domiciled in the country; as well as any other income or benefit from a Costa Rican source not excepted by law,' and it clarifies what should be understood by income or benefits, incorporating into that final legal definition the income-product scheme, by stating that these are those 'coming from services rendered, property located, or capital used in the national territory, which are obtained during the fiscal period in accordance with the provisions of this law.' Note that the terms services, property, and capital correspond essentially to the factors of production (labor, land, and capital) linked to the income-product scheme. (...)\".\n\nOn the basis of this subjection criterion - for-profit activity from a Costa Rican source - the law determines the rest of the essential elements of the tax, which, for a better understanding of the situation, are detailed, and which are of interest for the analysis of the issue raised:\n\ni.- Subjective element of the tax: It is Article 2 of the Income Tax Law that establishes who are the taxpayers of the income tax, its defining feature being, according to the general statement for all cases, those who \"... carry out activities or businesses of a for-profit nature in the country,\" reiterating thereby the taxable event of the tax. It then makes an enumeration of various subjects, based on different parameters, thus, according to the form of organization in the case of legal entities - \"legal entities legally constituted, de facto partnerships, professional activity partnerships, State enterprises, and joint venture accounts that are in the country\" (subsection a)-; legal entities for the administration of property - \"trusts and fiduciary assignments constituted in accordance with Costa Rican legislation\" (subsection c) and \"estates, while they remain undivided\" (subsection ch)-; that carry out their activity or are domiciled in the national territory: - the \"branches, agencies, and other permanent establishments operating in Costa Rica, of persons not domiciled in the country that exist here\" (subsection b); the \"individual limited liability enterprises and individual enterprises that operate in the country\" (subsection d); \"individuals domiciled in Costa Rica, regardless of nationality and the place of execution of the contracts\" (subsection e)-; by the type of activity they carry out: -\"professionals who provide their services on a freelance basis\" (subsection f); \"(A)ll those individuals or legal entities that are not expressly included in the preceding subsections, but who carry out for-profit activities in the country\" (subsection g) and finally, with an addition made pursuant to subsection a) of Article 21 of the Law on Tax Simplification and Efficiency, number 8114, of July fourth, two thousand one, effective as of July ninth following), the scenario of subsection h) was added to this rule, to expressly include in this tax the \"entities engaged in the private provision of university education services, regardless of the legal form adopted.\"\n\nii.- Determination of the objective element of the Costa Rican source: In turn, Article 54 of the same law establishes what should be understood as income from a Costa Rican source, which is taxed with the profits or income tax. It thus makes the following enumeration: those coming from real estate located in the national territory (subsection a); those produced by the use of capitals, goods, or rights invested or used in the country (subsection b); those originating in civil, commercial, banking, industrial, agricultural, forestry, fishing, mining activities, or the exploitation of any natural deposit, those from public services, from the exercise of professional services developed or managed within the territory of the Republic when the remuneration is salary, per diem, fees, bonuses, royalties, advantages, commissions, or any form of payment originating from an employment relationship, as well as pensions, retirement benefits, and the like (subsection c); annual bonus (aguinaldo) (subsection ch); payments or credits made for the use of patents, supply of formulas, trademarks, privileges, franchises, royalties, refinancing, and insurance premiums of any kind (subsection d). This determination is completed with the scenarios of numeral 55, which lists special cases that are also considered income from a Costa Rican source.\n\nThird: In light of the foregoing considerations, the only conclusion is that, even though numeral 3 of the Income Tax Law is titled as cases of non-subjection to this tax (understanding by such that the taxable event does not occur, as explained supra), we are not dealing with such a case. Note that the rule sets forth a series of situations, in which it is understood that the obligation to pay the tax in question is not generated, but that consequence is due to the express statement of the law, in each of the stated cases, with respect to which, despite there being income or profit, the obligation to pay the tax is not generated; which is more akin to the legal institute of tax exemption (exención fiscal) (according to the definition given previously). And indeed, in what is relevant to this matter, regarding subsection b) of Article 3 of the Income Tax Law (transcribed supra), it is noted that it expressly, clearly, and concretely indicates that in the case of religious institutions, \"whatever their creed,\" and using rigorous and correct legal-tax terminology, they are not taxed with the income tax, on \"the income they obtain for the maintenance of worship and for the social assistance services they provide on a non-profit basis.\" The exclusion from this tax does not depend on the subjective element or particular condition of the taxpayer, as the plaintiff association argues, in this case, being a religious institution, to include, as the plaintiff intends, all the activities carried out by it, even if they generate a profit. On the contrary, the criterion defined by the legislator is objective, in this case defined by the destination of the income, but very specific and precise - it is reiterated -, only those used for the maintenance of worship and/or for social assistance services, on a non-profit basis. In light of the above, any activity that generates a profit for a religious institution - whatever its creed - that has a purpose different from the two sole indicated cases, is understood to be taxed with the income tax, according to the definition of the taxable event, in the terms of the transcribed numeral 1 of the Income Tax Law. Thus, the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica is not correct in its allegation that by its mere condition of being a religious institution - insofar as it carries out worship activities in various centers in the country - it is not obligated to pay the income tax, regarding for-profit activities, which in this case are educational activities and the sale of bookstore articles. According to the regulations governing this tax, only the income destined for the maintenance of worship - which was recognized in the challenged tax actions - and that destined for social assistance services on a non-profit basis - which was not accredited, neither in the administrative tax proceedings followed against the plaintiff nor in this venue, in the case of the fiscal periods two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six, unproven fact 1.) - is the income that is not levied by the income tax.\n\nFourth: Likewise, this Chamber of Judges rules on the situation of the plaintiff in relation to the provisions of Article 3, subsection ch) of the Income Tax Law. And in line with what was said in the previous section, the same consideration must be made regarding what is regulated in this precept. That is to say, it is also not a case of non-subjection (no sujeción) to the tax, but of exemption (exoneración), because the taxable event occurs, but according to the content of the rule, the obligation to pay it is not generated in the regulated scenario. Nor is it a case of exclusion from the tax obligation due to the particular condition of the taxable person, i.e., that of being legal entities organized as associations - understand, in accordance with the Associations Law, number 218, of August eighth, nineteen hundred thirty-eight, and its amendments -, on which a declaration of public interest by the Executive Branch is pending; rather, the precept expressly and clearly defines that the for-profit activity through which these subjects receive income, which is excluded from the tax obligation, is so solely by reason of the destination of that activity, i.e., \"provided that the income they obtain, as well as their assets, are entirely and exclusively destined for public or charitable purposes and that, in no case, are distributed directly or indirectly among their members.\" In light of the above, it was not possible for the Tax Administration to grant the exclusion from the tax in question to the plaintiff, insofar as it is organized as an association, in the terms of the cited Law; for two specific reasons: first, because it does not have that declaration of public utility - emanating from the Executive Branch -, and second, because it also failed to prove that in the indicated fiscal periods - two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six - it had destined the entirety of its assets and income exclusively for public or charitable purposes, and that it in no way distributed, directly or indirectly, that income among its members - unproven fact 2.)-.\n\nFifth: Having reached this point, and by reason of the allegations made by the plaintiff association regarding the burden of proof (carga de la prueba), we must state the following. Indeed, the argument of the maxim in dubio pro fisco, which in its classical view led to the conclusion that in tax matters, the burden of proof lay, in all cases, solely and exclusively on the taxpayer, is now obsolete. It is clear that such a position finds no support in the rules governing this matter. In this sense, as provided in numeral 19 of the General Regulation on Tax Oversight Management and Collection, Executive Decree number 29264-H, of January twenty-fourth, two thousand one, effective from February seventh, two thousand one, to April first, two thousand fourteen (since on April second, two thousand fourteen, the Regulation of Tax Procedures, Executive Decree number 28277-H, of March seventh, two thousand fourteen, came into effect, which expressly repealed the previous regulatory regulation), it indicated that the evidentiary burden (carga probatoria) corresponds to the Treasury regarding the constitutive facts of the material tax obligation and to the taxable person regarding the impeding, modifying, or extinguishing facts of that contributive duty. This treatment was subsequently incorporated and recognized in the Law, through the reform carried out by the Law for Strengthening Tax Management, number 9069, of September tenth, two thousand twelve (effective as of September twenty-eighth following), so that now the second paragraph of numeral 140 of the Tax Code literally states:\n\n\"The burden of proof (carga de la prueba) corresponds to the Tax Administration regarding the constitutive facts of the material tax obligation, while it corresponds to the taxpayer regarding the impeding, modifying, or extinguishing facts of the tax obligation. In that sense, it shall be the responsibility of the latter, as the case may be, to demonstrate the facts or acts that constitute its costs, expenses, liabilities, tax credits, exemptions, non-subjections (no sujeciones), deductions and, in general, the tax benefits it alleges exist in its favor.\"\n\nIt is precisely in consideration of the content and implications of the principle of the burden of proof (carga de la prueba) in the tax field, that the plaintiff's argument is incorrect. Note that it was in the exercise of the oversight authority (potestad fiscalizadora) that assists the Tax Administration, that it determined that in the fiscal periods two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six, the plaintiff had omitted the declaration and payment of the tax on income that is indeed taxed. It was therefore the plaintiff's responsibility to prove the causes for exemption, in accordance with the regulations governing the matter - subsections b) and ch) of Article 3 of the Income Tax Law, as explained above -, in this case, that said income, in its entirety, had been destined for the maintenance of worship or for social assistance services on a non-profit basis -subsection b)- or that it was an association declared of public interest by the Executive Branch, whose assets in their entirety had been destined for public or charitable purposes and that no distribution, directly or indirectly, had been made among its members -subsection ch)-, none of which was proven, it is repeated, neither in the administrative venue nor in the jurisdictional one - unproven facts 1.) and 2.)-.\n\nSixth: Finally, the plaintiff alluded in its defense that it is a non-profit association, according to its internal bylaws, whereby it does not distribute dividends among its members; for which reason it is not possible to tax any of its activities that contribute to the achievement of its essential purpose. In this regard, it should be noted that the mere reference to the Bylaws of the plaintiff association is not sufficient, given that not only was it not provided to the case file - it is repeated, neither in the administrative venue nor in this jurisdictional instance -, its alleged transcription of some of its articles in some of the briefs in the administrative venue not being enough; but also because even if the purpose of the plaintiff association is the promotion and dissemination of the gospel and in principle it does not distribute dividends or profits among its members, the fact is that according to the legal form it adopted, the for-profit purpose is not excluded in this type of social organization, under the terms permitted in Article One of the Associations Law, insofar as it empowers that this type of subjects can have any lawful purpose, such as, for example, scientific, artistic, sports, charitable, recreational, and \"... that do not have profit and gain as their sole and exclusive purpose\" (the highlighting is not from the original). So, according to the legal mandate, profit is not prohibited in social organizations formed under the legal form of associations, only that it is clarified that this purpose - profit and gain - cannot be the sole one, nor the principal one. From the foregoing, it is clearly deduced that the plaintiff can indeed carry out for-profit activities, as the Tax Administration indeed accredited in its oversight and procedures.\n\nOnce again, it must be stated that the plaintiff did not prove the destination of those revenues, in accordance with the referenced legal mandate —explained above— the only way to consider her as not obliged to pay the tax in question.\n\nSeventh: Finally, the allegations made by the plaintiff association regarding the infringement and violation of the freedom of worship, if its \"non-subjection\" to the income tax is not recognized because it is a religious institution, are misguided. In this regard, two clarifications must be made:\n\ni.- This Contentious-Administrative Tribunal conducts a legality review (control de legalidad) of the administrative action submitted for its consideration, in accordance with the mandate of Article 49 of the Political Constitution and as developed in the first article of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. This proceeding requests the review of various acts of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), by which, first, adjustments were determined to the income tax returns filed by the plaintiff here in the fiscal periods two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six; and then, the corresponding tax penalties were imposed for those adjustments. This is a review that uses the body of legality or legal order of the Administrative legal system as a parameter, whose hierarchical scale begins with the Political Constitution (norms and principles emanating from it), and then follows, in strict order, international treaties, laws, and regulatory provisions, in the manner provided in Article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); and which is also nourished by unwritten norms, these being jurisprudence, principles, and custom (Article 7 of the same General Law), and completing this order are the rules of science and technique (Article 16.1 in relation to 158.4 Ibid.). Thus, the review that has been verified on this occasion and the conclusions reached (that the plaintiff is obliged to pay the income tax in relation to the lucrative activities it carries out, in the periods referring to the challenged tax actions, and which refer to teaching and the sale of bookstore items), are purely of legality, based on the regulations applicable to the case. In any case, it does not follow that the concepts of \"non-subjection\" (no sujeción) and \"tax exemption\" (exención tributaria) form part of the essential content of the freedom of worship of religious institutions, as is evident at first glance from the development that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has made of this public freedom in its jurisprudence. Thus, by way of example, it suffices to cite what was stated in judgment number 3173-93, at fourteen hours and fifty-seven minutes on the sixth of July, nineteen ninety-three:\n\n\"VII. Religious freedom encompasses, in its generic concept, a complex bundle of faculties. In this sense, it first refers to the individual plane, that is, freedom of conscience, which must be considered as an individual subjective public right, wielded against the State, to demand abstention and protection from attacks by other persons or entities. It consists of the legally guaranteed possibility of the subject accommodating their religious conduct and way of life to what their own conviction prescribes, without being forced to do anything contrary to it. Secondly, it refers to the social plane, the freedom of worship, which translates into the right to externally practice the belief one has made one's own. It is also comprised of the freedom of proselytism or propaganda, the freedom of congregation or foundation, the freedom of teaching, the right of assembly and association, and the rights of religious communities, etc.\n\nVIII. Freedom of worship, as the external manifestation of religious freedom, includes the right to maintain places of worship and to practice it, both inside premises and outdoors, always within the limitations established by the legal order, whether by constitutional norm or legal norm. In this sense, it is the constitutional text itself that permits the free exercise in the Republic of other faiths —other than the Catholic religion—, provided 'they do not oppose universal morality or good customs' (Article 75).\"\n\nii.- Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the plaintiff has doubts as to whether the legal regulations that have been applied in the sub judice are contrary to the freedom of worship contained in Article 75 of the Fundamental Charter, this is a matter that this Judicial Authority cannot resolve. The interested party must, if it sees fit, appeal to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), as that instance has reserved and concentrated the review of constitutionality according to the constitutional mandate of Article 10, and as developed in Articles 1, 2 subsection b), and 73 et seq. of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). On this aspect, Judge Hess Araya adds a separate note.\n\nX.- It is based on the foregoing considerations and reasons that this Chamber of Judges dismisses the first subsidiary claim, finding no error in the interpretation that the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) made of Article 3, subsection b) of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta).\n\nXI.- ON THE TAXATION OF PRIVATE TEACHING ACTIVITY UNDER THE INCOME TAX.- We proceed with the analysis of the second subsidiary claim, regarding whether or not the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) made an adequate interpretation and application of subsection h) of Article 2 of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta), which literally provides, regarding what is relevant to this matter:\n\n\"Article 2.- Taxpayers (Contribuyentes).\n\nRegardless of nationality, domicile, and the place of incorporation of legal entities or the holding of their board meetings or the execution of contracts, all public or private companies that carry out lucrative activities or businesses in the country are taxpayers:\n\n...\n\nh) Entities engaged in the private provision of university education services, regardless of the legal form adopted; for this purpose they must file the respective return. Excepted from the provision of this rule is the entity created by Law No. 7044 of September 29, 1986.\"\n(As amended by subsection a) of Article 21 of the Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency (Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria), number 8114, of July four, two thousand one.)\n\nTo address this point, the references already made regarding the substantial elements of the tax in question are also useful, that is, the taxable event (hecho generador) (\"perception of income in money or in kind, continuous or occasional, from any Costa Rican source,\" according to the second paragraph of Article 1 of Law number 7092) and the taxable person (sujeto pasivo) (whoever carries out a lucrative activity or business, as stated in Article 2). Also useful is what was explained regarding the concept and legal regime of tax exonerations (exoneraciones tributarias), that is, that they are reserved to law —formal and material— (subsection b) of Article 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios)), and that their determination must be clear, precise, and specific in all their elements and conditions (Article 62 of the Tax Code (Código Tributario)). Based on the foregoing, it is not possible for this Judicial Authority to understand the logic of the reasoning proposed by the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica, of deriving a tax exoneration for private educational instruction at the preschool, primary, and secondary levels, because their taxation under this tax is not expressly contained in subsection h) of Article 2 of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta). As with the point regarding the burden of proof in tax matters, the plaintiff inverts the sense of logic and understanding of the legal concepts involved, in this case, of the way in which taxes —and with them their constituent elements— are determined, and tax exonerations. In this case, the taxable event (hecho generador) of the income tax is clear, and it is not necessary to list each of the activities and businesses that generate income or profit from a Costa Rican source. On the contrary, this delimitation and precision is necessary when dealing with tax exonerations. Thus, there is no doubt that teaching activity at all levels at which it is provided in the country is subject to the payment of income tax, without exception. Having reached this point, we must specify the background of the tax situation of foundations, as the provision under comment refers to them. Thus, pursuant to the provisions of Article 10 of the Foundations Law (Ley de Fundaciones), number 5338, of August twenty-eight, nineteen seventy-three, a practically total exoneration had been established for these legal entities, as follows:\n\n\"Foundations shall be exempt from the payment of registration fees and national and municipal taxes, except for customs duties, which may only be exonerated in each case by the Ministry of Finance, according to the type of goods involved and their destination.\"\n\nHowever, by mandate of Article 1 of the Law Regulating Existing Exonerations and Exceptions (Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes y Excepciones), number 7293, of March thirty-one, nineteen ninety-two, effective as of the following April third, the repeal was ordered of\n\n\"... all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and legal norms referring, among other taxes, to customs duties, sales, income, consumption, territorial, and vehicle property taxes, with the exceptions indicated in this Law. By virtue of the provision, only the tax exemptions mentioned in the following article shall remain in force.\"\n\nThus, specifically, in Article 2 of the aforementioned Law number 7293, the following cases exclusively were excepted from the previous repeal concerning foundations:\n\n\"d) Granted in favor of institutions, foundations, and associations without lucrative activities, which are dedicated to the comprehensive care of minors in a state of abandonment, homelessness, or social risk and which are duly registered in the Public Registry (Registro Público)\";\n\nand\n\n\"e) Granted in favor of institutions, public and private companies, foundations, and associations without lucrative activities that are dedicated to the collection and treatment of garbage and the conservation of natural resources and the environment, as well as any other basic activity in the control of environmental hygiene and public health.\"\n\nPursuant to these provisions, the scope of exonerations for foundations was restricted to the indicated cases, understanding that in all other respects, they were subject to the taxing power of the State and the municipalities. However, in this same regulation, the legislator modified some tax precepts, and specifically, through Article 15, modified Article 3 of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta), including in this reform the provision of subsection ch) previously commented on, so that it established the non-obligation to pay income tax in the case of foundations, it is reiterated, \"... declared of public utility by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), provided that the income they obtain, as well as their patrimony, is destined in its entirety, exclusively for public or charitable purposes and that, in no case, is distributed directly or indirectly among its members,\" which is the same provision already commented on for associations. Now, it is on the occasion of the addition of subsection h) of Article 2 of Law number 7092, which occurred with the enactment of the Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency (Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria), number 8114, of July four, two thousand one, that all private institutions \"... that are engaged in the private provision of university education services, regardless of the legal form adopted; ...\" were expressly taxed. From this provision it is clear that it is not possible to derive from the text of this subsection h) the exoneration that the plaintiff defends —for teaching activity at the preschool, primary, and secondary levels— because it does not conform to the form and requirements that the law demands for its establishment. Additionally, contrary to what was expressed by the plaintiff, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in its judgment number 6509-2002, at fourteen hours and fifty-three minutes on July three, two thousand two, did not indicate or recognize the existence of an exoneration from income tax for private education at the preschool, first, and second cycle levels. The reading proposed by the plaintiff is biased and arbitrary, as it refers to a citation made by the Constitutional Court of its own precedent, and which refers to a facultative legislative consultation of constitutionality, precisely on the draft Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency (Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias); that is, it did not involve the analysis of the regulations in force at the time of the situation. Note also that on the occasion of the indicated reform, that is, the one given by Law 8114, no exoneration from income tax was established for subjects engaged in preschool, first, and second cycle activities. In accordance with the above, the second subsidiary claim filed by the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica must be dismissed, as its reading and proposal of Article 2, subsection h) of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta) is not in accordance with law, and the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) is correct in its criterion expressed in the acts challenged in this proceeding.\"\n\nThus, the criteria for being subject to tax can be <b><i>personal</i></b> or <b><i>real</i></b>; where the <i>former</i> (personal) refer to situations in which there is a link related to the very nature of the individual or taxpayer, such that subjection to the tax laws of a given State is defined by the status of national or tax resident of the passive subject; and the <i>latter</i> (real) centers on the criterion <b>of the source of the income</b>, that is, the link to the tax laws arises as a consequence of the generation of income. From the content of the first clause of the referenced Law 7092, it is possible to conclude that the criterion adopted by the legislature was the real one, as its literal text provides:\n\n\"<b><i>Article 1.- Tax covered by this law, taxable event (hecho generador), and taxable matter</i></b><i>. A tax is established <b>on the profits of companies and of individuals who carry out profit-making activities (actividades lucrativas)</b>.</i> (Thus added and expanded by Article 102 of Budget Law number 7097, of the first of September, nineteen eighty-eight.)\n\n<i>The taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax on the profits referred to in the preceding paragraph <b>is the receipt of income in money or in kind, continuous or occasional, <u>coming from any Costa Rican source</u></b></i>. (Thus amended by Article 102 of Budget Law No. 7097, of the first of September, nineteen eighty-eight.)\n\n<i>This tax also levies continuous or eventual income <b>from a Costa Rican source, received or accrued by individuals or legal entities domiciled in the country; as well as any other income or benefit from a Costa Rican source not exempted by law</b>, including income received by beneficiaries of export contracts through tax credit certificates. The condition of being domiciled in the country shall be determined in accordance with the regulations. The provisions of this law shall not apply to the environmental promotion and compensation mechanisms established in the Ley Forestal, No. 7575, of February 13, 1996.</i> (Thus amended this third paragraph by Article 1 of Law number 7838, of October fifth, nineteen ninety-eight.)\n\n<i>For the purposes of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, income or benefits from a Costa Rican source shall be understood to be those coming from services rendered, goods situated, or capital used in the national territory, which are obtained during the fiscal period in accordance with the provisions of this law.</i>\" (The underlining is not from the original).\n\nThus, the decisive factor in this tax is the <b>production of income from a Costa Rican source</b>, not who generates it. The legislature defined or grounded the tax on the concept of <b>source-based income (renta producto)</b>, which refers to wealth that comes solely from the productive factors (land, labor, and capital) available to the taxpayer and that the taxpayer, through their economic activity, has put into operation; and by exception, it incorporates some elements of the income-type system when it taxes, for example, certain cases of capital gains and gratuitous income in the tax on remittances abroad. This principle of subjection to source-based income (renta producto) in our tax system on profits has been confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in its precedents, as for example in judgment number 728-F-S1-2014, of eight hours fifty minutes on June fifth, two thousand fourteen, with the following considerations:\n\n<i>\"(...) As this Chamber has already indicated, the national tax scheme follows, for the definition of the material element of the tax (taxable event (hecho generador)), the concept of 'source-based income' (renta-producto), as can be observed in judgment 1334-F-S1-2011 of 10 hours 5 minutes on October 20, 2011. Article 1 of the LISR is clear in this regard. It defines the taxable event (hecho generador) as 'the receipt of income in money or in kind, continuous or occasional, coming from any Costa Rican source,' as well as 'continuous or eventual income from a Costa Rican source, received or accrued by individuals or legal entities domiciled in the country; as well as any other income or benefit from a Costa Rican source not exempted by law,' and it clarifies what should be understood by income or benefits, incorporating into that last legal definition the source-based income (renta producto) scheme, by stating that these are those 'coming from services rendered, goods situated or capital used in the national territory, which are obtained during the fiscal period in accordance with the provisions of this law.' Note that the terms services, goods, and capital essentially correspond to the factors of production (labor, land, and capital) linked to the source-based income (renta producto) scheme. (...)\"</i>.\n\nOn the basis of this criterion of subjection—profit-making activity (actividad lucrativa) from a Costa Rican source—the law determines the rest of the essential elements of the tax, which, for a better understanding of the situation, are detailed here, and which are of interest for the analysis of the question raised:\n\n<b>i.- Subjective element of the tax:</b> It is <b>Article 2</b> of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta that establishes who the taxpayers of the income tax are, its defining feature, according to the general statement for all cases, being that \"... <i>they carry out profit-making activities or businesses (actividades lucrativas) in the country</i>,\" hereby reiterating the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax. It then proceeds to list various subjects, based on different parameters, such as, <u>according to the form of organization in the case of legal entities</u>—the \"<i>legally constituted legal entities, de facto partnerships (sociedades de hecho), professional activity partnerships, state enterprises, and joint ventures (cuentas en participación) existing in the country</i>\" (subsection a)—; <u>legal entities for the administration of property</u>—the \"<i>trusts (fideicomisos) and fiduciary assignments (encargos de confianza) constituted in accordance with Costa Rican legislation</i>\" (subsection c) and the \"<i>estates, as long as they remain undivided</i>\" (subsection ch)—; <u>that carry out their activity or are domiciled in the national territory</u>: —the \"<i>branches, agencies, and other permanent establishments operating in Costa Rica, of persons not domiciled in the country, that exist herein</i>\" (subsection b); the \"<i>limited liability individual enterprises and individual enterprises that act in the country</i>\" (subsection d); the \"<i>individuals domiciled in Costa Rica, regardless of nationality and the place of execution of contracts</i>\" (subsection e)—; <u>by the type of activity they carry out</u>: —the \"<i>professionals who render their services independently</i>\" (subsection f); \"<i>(A)ll those individuals or legal entities that are not expressly included in the preceding subsections, but who develop profit-making activities (actividades lucrativas) in the country</i>\" (subsection g) and finally, with an addition made under subsection a) of Article 21 of the Law on Tax Simplification and Efficiency, number 8114, of July fourth, two thousand one, and effective as of the following July ninth, the case of subsection h) was added to this rule, to expressly include in this tax the <i>\"</i> <i>entities engaged in the private provision of university education services, regardless of the legal form adopted.</i>\"\n\n<b>ii.- Determination of the objective element of the Costa Rican source:</b> For its part, <b>Article 54</b> of the same law establishes what must be understood as income from a Costa Rican source, which is levied by the profit or income tax. It thus makes the following list: income from immovable property situated in the national territory (subsection a); income produced by the use of capital, goods, or rights invested or used in the country (subsection b); income originating in civil, commercial, banking, industrial, agricultural, forestry, fishing, mining activities or the exploitation of any natural deposit, income from public services, from the exercise of professional services developed or managed within the territory of the Republic when the remuneration is a salary, stipend, fees, gratuities, royalties, advantages, commissions, or any form of payment originating in an employment relationship, as well as pensions, retirement benefits, and the like (subsection c); Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) (subsection ch); payments or credits made for the use of patents, supply of formulas, trademarks, privileges, franchises, royalties, refinancing, and insurance premiums of any kind (subsection d). This determination is completed by the cases in <b>clause 55</b>, which lists special cases that are also considered as income from a Costa Rican source.\n\n<b>Third:</b> In light of the foregoing considerations, there is no alternative but to consider that, even though clause 3 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta is titled as cases of non-subjection to this tax (understanding by such, that the taxable event (hecho generador) does not occur, as explained supra), we are not faced with such a case. Note that the rule sets out a series of situations in which it is understood that the obligation to pay the tax in question is not generated, but that consequence is by express statement of the law, in each of the cases listed, regarding which, despite there being income or profit, the obligation to pay the tax is not generated; which more closely resembles the legal institute of tax exemption (exención fiscal) (according to the definition given previously). And indeed, as is relevant to this matter, regarding subsection b) of Article 3 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta (transcribed supra), it is noted that expressly, clearly, and concretely it is indicated that in the case of religious institutions, \"<i>whatever their creed may be</i>,\" and using rigorous and correct legal-tax terminology, they are not taxed with the income tax, \"<b><i>the income they obtain for the maintenance of worship and for the social assistance services they provide without profit motive.</i></b>\" The exclusion from this tax does not respond to the subjective element or particular condition of the taxpayer, as the plaintiff association argues, in this case, that of being a religious institution, so as to encompass, as the plaintiff intends, all activities carried out by it, even when they generate profit. On the contrary, the criterion defined by the legislator is of an objective nature, in this case defined by the destination of the income, but very concrete and precise ones—it is reiterated—only those used for the maintenance of worship and/or for social assistance services, without profit motive. Under the foregoing, any activity that generates a profit or gain for a religious institution—whatever its creed may be—that has a purpose different from the two sole cases indicated, is understood to be taxed with the income tax, according to the definition of the taxable event (hecho generador), in the terms of the transcribed clause 1 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta. This being the case, the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica is not correct in its claim, in considering that by its sole condition of being a religious institution—insofar as it carries out worship activities in various centers in the country—it is not obliged to pay income tax, regarding profit-making activities (actividades lucrativas), which in this case are educational activities and the sale of bookstore items. In accordance with the regulations governing this tax, only the income it allocates to the maintenance of worship—which was recognized in the challenged tax actions—and that allocated to social assistance services without profit motive—which was not accredited, either in the tax administrative procedures followed against the plaintiff or in this venue, regarding the fiscal periods two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six, <b>unproven fact 1.)</b>—is the income that is not taxed by the income tax.\n\n<b>Fourth:</b> Likewise, this Chamber of Judges rules on the situation of the plaintiff in relation to the provisions of Article 3, subsection ch) of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta. In line with what was stated in the preceding section, the same consideration must be made of the provisions of this precept. That is, again, we are not faced with a case of non-subjection to the tax, but rather an exemption, because the taxable event (hecho generador) occurs, but under the content of the rule, the obligation to pay it is not generated in the regulated case. And neither are we faced with an exclusion of the tax obligation due to the particular condition of the passive subject, that is, the condition of being legal entities organized as associations—understood, in accordance with the Law on Associations, number 218, of August eighth, nineteen thirty-eight, and its reforms—upon which a declaration of public interest by the Executive Branch weighs; rather, the precept expressly and clearly defines that the profit-making activity (actividad lucrativa) for which these subjects receive income that is excluded from the tax obligation is so only by reason of the destination of that activity, that is, \"<i>when the income they obtain, as well as their patrimony, is allocated in its entirety, exclusively for public or charitable purposes (fines públicos o de beneficiencia) and that, in no case, is it distributed directly or indirectly among its members.</i>\" Under the foregoing, it was not possible for the Tax Administration to recognize the exclusion from the tax in question for the plaintiff, insofar as it is organized as an association, in the terms of the cited Law; for two specific reasons, first, for not having that declaration of public utility—emanating from the Executive Branch—and second, for also not having accredited that in the indicated fiscal periods—two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six—it allocated the entirety of its patrimony and income, exclusively to public or charitable purposes (fines públicos o de beneficiencia), and that in no way did it distribute, directly or indirectly, that income among its members—<b>unproven fact 2.)</b>-.\n\n<b>Fifth:</b> Having reached this point, and by reason of the claims made by the plaintiff association regarding the burden of proof, we must say the following. Indeed, the allegation of the maxim <i>in dubio pro fisco</i> is now a thing of the past, which in its classical view led to the conclusion that in tax matters, the burden of proof fell, in all cases, solely and exclusively on the taxpayer. It is clear that such a position finds no support in the rules governing this matter. In this sense, as provided in clause 19 of the General Regulation for Tax Management, Oversight, and Collection, Decreto Ejecutivo number 29264-H, of January twenty-fourth, two thousand one, effective from February seventh, two thousand one, to April first, two thousand fourteen (inasmuch as on April second, two thousand fourteen, the Regulation on Tax Procedures came into effect, Decreto Ejecutivo number 28277-H, of March seventh, two thousand fourteen, which expressly repealed the prior regulatory regulation), it indicated that the evidentiary burden falls on the Tax Authority with respect to the facts constitutive of the material tax obligation and on the passive subject with respect to the facts that impede, modify, or extinguish that tax duty. This treatment was subsequently incorporated and recognized in the Law, through the reform carried out by the Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management, number 9069, of September tenth, two thousand twelve (effective as of the following September twenty-eighth), so that now the second paragraph of clause 140 of the Tax Code literally states:\n\n\"<i>The burden of proof falls on the Tax Administration with respect to the facts constitutive of the material tax obligation, while it falls on the taxpayer with respect to the facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the tax obligation. In this regard, it shall correspond to the latter, as the case may be, to demonstrate the facts or acts that constitute their costs, expenses, liabilities, tax credits, exemptions, non-subjections, deductions, and, in general, the tax benefits that they claim exist in their favor.</i>\"\n\nIt is precisely in attention to the content and implications of the principle of the burden of proof in the tax domain that the plaintiff is not correct in their claim. Note that it was in exercise of the oversight power that assists the Tax Administration, that it determined that in the fiscal periods two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six, the plaintiff had omitted the declaration and payment of the tax on income that is indeed taxed. It then fell to the plaintiff to accredit the causes for exemption, in accordance with the regulations governing the matter—subsections b) and ch) of Article 3 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, as explained above—, in this case, that that income, in its entirety, had been destined for the maintenance of worship or for social assistance services without profit motive—subsection b)—or that it was an association declared of public interest by the Executive Branch, whose entire patrimony was destined to public or charitable purposes (fines públicos o de beneficiencia) and no distribution, neither direct nor indirect, had been made among its members—subsection ch)—, none of which was proven, it is repeated, neither in the administrative venue nor in the jurisdictional one—<b>unproven facts 1.)</b> and <b>2.)</b>-.\n\n<b>Sixth:</b> Finally, the plaintiff alleged in its defense that it is a non-profit association, according to its internal bylaws, under which it does not distribute dividends among its members; a reason for which it is not possible to tax any of its activities that contribute to the attainment of its essential purpose. In this regard, it is appropriate to indicate that the simple reference to the Bylaws of the plaintiff association is not sufficient in this sense, insofar as not only were they not provided to the case file—it is repeated, neither in the administrative venue nor in this jurisdictional instance—, with their supposed transcription of some of its articles in one of the writings in the administrative venue not being enough; but also because even though the purpose of the plaintiff association is the promotion and dissemination of the gospel and in principle it does not distribute dividends or profits among its members, the truth is that, according to the legal form it adopted, the profit motive is not excluded in this type of social organizations, in the terms permitted in Article one of the Law on Associations, insofar as it empowers that this type of subjects may have any lawful purpose, such as, for example, scientific, artistic, sports, charitable, recreational purposes, and \"... <i>that <b>do not have as their sole and exclusive purpose profit and gain (el lucro y la ganancia)</b></i>\" (the highlighting is not from the original.) So that, under the legal mandate, profit is not prohibited in social organizations formed under the legal form of associations; it is only clarified that this purpose—that of profit and gain—cannot be the only one, nor the principal one. From the foregoing, it is clearly deduced that the plaintiff can indeed carry out profit-making activities (actividades lucrativas), as the Tax Administration accredited in its oversight and procedures. Once more it must be said that the plaintiff did not prove the destination of that income, in accordance with the referenced legal mandate—explained supra—the only way to consider it as not obligated to pay the tax in question.\n\n<b>Seventh:</b> Finally, the allegations made by the plaintiff association regarding the infringement and violation of freedom of worship, if its \"non-subjection\" to the income tax for being a religious institution is not recognized, are misguided. In this regard, two clarifications must be made:\n\n<b>i.- </b>This Administrative Litigation Court carries out a legality review of the administrative action submitted for its knowledge, pursuant to the mandate of Article 49 of the Constitución Política, and develops clause one of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. This proceeding seeks the review of various acts of the Tax Administration, by which, first, adjustments were determined for it in the income tax declarations filed by the plaintiff here in the fiscal periods two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six; and then, the corresponding tax sanctions for those adjustments were imposed on it. This is a review that uses as a parameter the block of legality (bloque de juridicidad) of the Administrative legal order, whose hierarchical scale begins with the Constitución Política (rules and principles emanating from it), and then there are, in strict order, international treaties, laws, and regulatory provisions, in the manner provided for in clause 6 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; and which is also nourished by unwritten norms, these being jurisprudence, principles, and custom (Article 7 of the same Ley General) and this order is completed by the rules of science and technique (Articles 16.1 in relation to 158.4 Ibidem.) Thus, the review that has been verified on this occasion and the conclusions reached (that the plaintiff is obligated to pay the income tax, in relation to the profit-making activities (actividades lucrativas) it carries out, in the periods that refer to the challenged tax actions, and that refer to teaching and the sale of bookstore items), are based purely on legality, on the basis of the regulations applicable to the case. In any case, it does not follow that the concepts of \"<i>non-subjection</i>\" and \"<i>tax exemption</i>\" form part of the essential content of the freedom of worship of religious institutions, as is evident at a glance from the development that the Constitutional Chamber has made of this public freedom in its jurisprudence. Thus, by way of example, it suffices to cite what is indicated in judgment number 3173-93, of fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on July sixth, nineteen ninety-three:\n\n\"<b><i>VII</i></b><b><i>. </i></b><i>Religious freedom encompasses, in its generic concept, a complex bundle of faculties. In this sense, in the first place, it refers to the individual plane, that is, <b>freedom of conscience</b>, which must be considered as a subjective individual public right, invoked against the State, to demand abstention and protection from attacks by other persons or entities. It consists of the possibility, legally guaranteed, of the subject to adjust their religious conduct and their way of life to what their own convictions prescribe, without being compelled to do anything contrary thereto. In the second place, it refers to the social plane, <b>freedom of worship</b>, which translates into the right to externally practice the belief made one's own.</i>\"\n\nIt also encompasses the freedom of proselytism or propaganda, the freedom of congregation or founding, the freedom of teaching, the right of assembly and association, and the rights of religious communities, etc.\n\n**VIII.** *Freedom of worship, as an external manifestation of religious freedom, includes the right to maintain places of worship and to practice it, both indoors and outdoors, always within the limitations established by the legal system, whether by constitutional or legal norm. In this sense, it is the constitutional text itself that permits the free exercise in the Republic of other faiths—from the Catholic religion—as long as they \"do not oppose universal morality nor good customs\" (Article 75).*\"\n\n**ii.-** Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the plaintiff has doubts as to whether the legal regulations that have been applied to the *sub judice* matter are contrary to the freedom of worship, contained in numeral 75 of the Constitution, this is an issue that this Jurisdictional Authority cannot resolve, and the interested party must, if she sees fit, appeal to the Constitutional Chamber, as that instance has reserved and concentrated constitutional control pursuant to the constitutional mandate of Article 10, and as developed by Articles first, 2 subsection b), and 73 and following of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. On this aspect, Judge Hess Araya adds an additional note.\n\n**X.-** It is on the basis of the foregoing considerations and reasons that this Chamber of Judges dismisses the first subsidiary claim, finding no error in the interpretation that the Tax Administration made of Article 3 subsection b) of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta.\n\n**XI.- TAXATION OF PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITY UNDER THE INCOME TAX.-** We proceed with the analysis of the second subsidiary claim, concerning whether or not the Tax Administration made an adequate interpretation and application of subsection h) of Article 2 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, which literally provides, as relevant to this matter:\n\n\"***Article 2.- Taxpayers.** *\n\n*Regardless of nationality, domicile, the place of incorporation of legal entities, or the meeting of their boards of directors or the execution of contracts, taxpayers are all public or private enterprises that carry out activities or businesses of a for-profit nature in the country:*\n\n*...*\n\n***h)** Entities dedicated to the private provision of university education services, regardless of the legal form adopted; for this purpose, they must file the respective declaration. From the provisions of this norm, the entity created by Law No. 7044, of September 29, 1986, is exempted.*\" *(Thus added by subsection a) of Article 21 of the Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria, number 8114, of July fourth, two thousand one.)*\n\nTo address this point, the references already made regarding the substantial elements of the tax in question are also useful, that is, the taxable event (*\"perception of income in cash or in kind, continuous or occasional, coming from any Costa Rican source\"*, according to the second paragraph of Article one of Law number 7092) and the passive subject (whoever carries out a for-profit activity or business, statement of numeral 2.) What was explained regarding the concept and legal regime of tax exemptions is also useful, that is, that they are reserved to the law—formal and material—(subsection b) of Article 5 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), and that their determination must be clear, precise, and concrete in all their elements and conditions (Article 62 of the Código Tributario.) Based on the foregoing, for this Jurisdictional Authority it is not possible to understand the logic of the reasoning proposed by the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica, of deriving a tax exemption for private educational teaching at the preschool, primary, and secondary levels, since their taxation under this tax is not expressly contained in subsection h) of canon 2 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta. As with the point regarding the burden of proof in tax matters, the plaintiff inverts the sense of logic and the understanding of the legal concepts involved, in this case, regarding how taxes are determined—and with them their constituent elements—and tax exemptions. In this case, the taxable event of the income tax is clear, and it is not necessary to list each and every one of the activities and businesses that generate income or profit, of Costa Rican source. On the contrary, this delimitation and precision is necessary when dealing with tax exemptions. Thus, there is no doubt that educational activity at all levels taught in the country is subject to the payment of income tax, without exception. Having reached this point, we must specify the background of the tax situation of foundations, as the provision under discussion refers to them. Thus, pursuant to the provisions of Article 10 of the Ley de Fundaciones, number 5338, of August twenty-eighth, nineteen seventy-three, a practically total exemption had been provided for these legal entities, as follows:\n\n\"*Foundations shall be exempt from the payment of registration fees and national and municipal taxes, except for customs duties, which may only be exempted in each case by the Ministry of Finance, according to the class of goods involved and their destination.*\"\n\nHowever, by mandate of Article 1 of the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes y Excepciones number 7293, of March thirty-first, nineteen ninety-two, effective as of the following April third, the repeal was ordered of\n\n\"*... all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and legal norms referring, among other taxes, to customs duties, sales, income, consumption, territorial, vehicle property taxes, with the exceptions indicated by this Law. By virtue of the foregoing, only the tax exemptions mentioned in the following article shall remain in force.*\"\n\nThus, in a concrete manner, Article 2 of the cited Law number 7293 exempted from the previous repeal, and in the case of foundations, only the following instances:\n\n\"***d)** Granted in favor of institutions, foundations, and associations without for-profit activities, which are dedicated to the comprehensive care of minors in a state of abandonment, homelessness, or social risk and which are duly registered in the Public Registry*\";\n\nand\n\n\"***e)** Granted in favor of institutions, public and private enterprises, foundations, and associations without for-profit activities that are dedicated to the collection and treatment of garbage and to the conservation of natural resources and the environment, as well as any other basic activity in the control of environmental hygiene and public health.*\"\n\nPursuant to these provisions, the scope of exemptions for foundations was restricted to the indicated instances, understanding that in all other matters, they were subject to the taxing power of the State and the municipalities. However, in this same regulation, the legislator modified some tax precepts, and specifically, through its numeral 15, modified Article 3 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, including in this reform the provision of subsection ch) previously discussed, so that it established the non-obligatoriness of the payment of income tax, in the case of foundations, it is reiterated, \"*... declared of public utility by the Executive Branch, provided that the income they obtain, as well as their equity, is allocated in its entirety, exclusively for public or charitable purposes and that, in no case, is it distributed directly or indirectly among its members*\", which is the same provision already discussed for associations. Now, it is by reason of the addition of subsection h) of Article 2 of Law number 7092, which occurred with the enactment of the Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributaria, number 8114, of July fourth, two thousand one, that all private institutions were expressly taxed \"*... that are dedicated to the private provision of university education services, regardless of the legal form adopted*; ...\" From this provision, it is clear that it is not possible to derive from the text of this subsection h) the exemption that the claimant defends—for educational activity at the preschool, primary, and secondary levels—as it does not conform to the form and requirements that the law demands for its establishment. Additionally, contrary to what the plaintiff expressed, the Constitutional Chamber, in its judgment number 6509-2002, of fourteen hours fifty-three minutes of July third, two thousand two, did not indicate or recognize the existence of an exemption from income tax for private education at the preschool, first, and second cycle levels. The reading proposed by the plaintiff is biased and capricious, as it refers to a citation made by the Constitutional Court of its own precedent, and which refers to an optional legislative consultation of constitutionality, precisely on the draft of the Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, that is, it did not imply the analysis of the regulations in force at the time of the situation. Note also that by reason of the indicated reform, that is, the one given by Law 8114, no exemption from income tax was established for subjects dedicated to preschool, first, and second cycle activities.\n\nIn accordance with the foregoing, the second subsidiary claim filed by the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica must be dismissed, as the reading and proposal it makes of subsection 2(h) of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta is not in accordance with the law, and the Tax Administration is correct in its criterion expressed in the actions challenged in this proceeding.”</span><o:p></o:p></p>\n\n<p class=MsoNormal style='text-align:justify;line-height:150%'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>\n\n<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>\n\n</div>\n\n</body>\n\n</html>\n\nmust specify the conditions and the requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it covers, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end of or during said period the goods may be released or whether the taxes must be settled, or whether the transfer to third parties may be authorized and under what conditions.\" This means that, regarding exemptions, it is not possible to create situations of exemption by analogy, as stated in the second paragraph of section 6 of the Code of reference, and \"Although there may be an express provision of tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation,\" in accordance with section 63 of the same Code. Thus, these are situations exhaustively established in the law (principle of strict definition (taxatividad) of exemptions), whose definition in all its elements must be clearly and completely defined in the law. In this regard, the First Chamber, in judgment 1118-F-S1-2015, established what this Chamber considers relevant for this pronouncement:\n\n\"...In short, [exemptions] can only be created by legal means, their source of origin must meet the conditions indicated in section 62 of the cited Code, and they only take effect if the event that has been pre-established for their occurrence happens. Therefore, just as taxes are subject to a principle of legal reserve, so too are exemptions and benefits, in whose creation source the basic elements that delimit it must be set forth. Thus, the judge must analyze in each case, with rigorous care, whether the factual situation proposed by the taxpayer fits and coincides with the exempt event provided by the rule that establishes the benefit, within its material content.\" [...]\n\nSecond: It is now of interest to refer to the connection criteria governing the income tax in our country, as regulated in Law 7092, of March twenty-fourth, nineteen eighty-eight, effective as of May nineteenth of the same year, and its amendments. This is because, in exercising the taxing power held by the State, it has full authority to establish taxes within its jurisdiction, which obviously includes the determination of the connection criteria for their imposition, that is, the elements that determine which income or which subject is subject to the State's taxing power. Thus, the connection criteria can be personal or real (reales); where the former (personal) refer to situations in which there is a link related to the very nature of the individual or taxpayer, such that subjection to the tax laws of a given State is defined by the condition of national or tax resident of the taxpayer; and the latter (real) focus on the criterion of the source of income, that is, the link to tax laws arises as a consequence of the generation of income. From the content of section one of the referenced Law 7092, it is possible to conclude that the criterion adopted by the legislator was the real one, as it literally states:\n\n\"Article 1.- Tax covered by the law, taxable event (hecho generador) and taxable matter. A tax is established on the profits of companies and individuals who engage in for-profit activities. (Thus added and expanded by article 102 of Budget Law number 7097, of September first, nineteen eighty-eight.)\n\nThe taxable event of the tax on the profits referred to in the preceding paragraph is the receipt of income in cash or in kind, continuous or occasional, from any Costa Rican source. (Thus reformed by article 102 of Budget Law No. 7097, of September first, nineteen eighty-eight.)\n\nThis tax also applies to continuous or eventual income, from a Costa Rican source, received or accrued by individuals or legal entities domiciled in the country; as well as any other income or benefit from a Costa Rican source not exempted by law, including income received by beneficiaries of export contracts for tax credit certificates. The condition of being domiciled in the country shall be determined in accordance with the regulations. The provisions of this law shall not be applicable to the environmental promotion and compensation mechanisms established in the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), No. 7575, of February 13, 1996. (Thus modified this third paragraph by article 1 of Law number 7838, of October fifth, nineteen ninety-eight.)\n\nFor the purposes of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, income, revenue, or benefits from a Costa Rican source shall be understood as those coming from services rendered, goods located, or capital used in the national territory, obtained during the fiscal period in accordance with the provisions of this law.\" (Underlining not in original).\n\nThus, the decisive factor in this tax is the production of income from a Costa Rican source, not who generates it. The legislator defined or based the tax on the concept of income-product (renta producto), which refers to the wealth that comes solely from productive factors (land, labor, and capital) available to the taxpayer and which the taxpayer, through their economic activity, has put into operation; and by exception, it incorporates some elements of the income-inflow system when it taxes, for example, certain cases of capital gains and gratuitous income in the tax on remittances abroad. This principle of connection to income-product in our profit tax system has been confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in its precedents, as for example in judgment number 728-F-S1-2014, at eight hours and fifty minutes on June fifth, two thousand fourteen, with the following considerations:\n\n\"(...) As this Chamber has already indicated, the national tax system follows, for the definition of the material element of the tax (taxable event), the concept of 'income-product,' as can be observed in judgment 1334-F-S1-2011 at 10 hours 5 minutes on October 20, 2011. Article 1 of the LISR is clear in this regard. It defines the taxable event as 'the receipt of income in cash or in kind, continuous or occasional, from any Costa Rican source,' as well as 'continuous or eventual income, from a Costa Rican source, received or accrued by individuals or legal entities domiciled in the country; as well as any other income or benefit from a Costa Rican source not exempted by law,' and clarifies what should be understood by income, revenue, or benefits, incorporating into that last legal definition the income-product scheme, by stating that these are those 'coming from services rendered, goods located, or capital used in the national territory, obtained during the fiscal period in accordance with the provisions of this law.' Note that the terms services, goods, and capital correspond essentially to the factors of production (labor, land, and capital) linked to the income-product scheme. (...)\".\n\nOn the basis of this connection criterion -for-profit activity from a Costa Rican source- the law determines the rest of the essential elements of the tax, which for a better understanding of the situation are detailed below, and which are of interest for the analysis of the issue raised:\n\ni.- Subjective element of the tax: It is article 2 of the Income Tax Law that establishes who the income taxpayers are, with its defining feature, according to the general statement for all cases, being that \"...they carry out for-profit activities or businesses in the country,\" thereby reiterating the taxable event of the tax. It then lists various subjects, based on different parameters, such as, according to the form of organization in the case of legal entities - \"legally constituted legal entities, de facto partnerships (sociedades de hecho), professional activity partnerships (sociedades de actividades profesionales), State enterprises, and joint venture accounts (cuentas en participación) existing in the country\" (subsection a)-; legal entities for the administration of assets - \"trusts (fideicomisos) and trust assignments (encargos de confianza) constituted in accordance with Costa Rican legislation\" (subsection c) and \"estates (sucesiones), as long as they remain undivided\" (subsection ch)-; that carry out their activity or are domiciled in the national territory: - \"branches, agencies, and other permanent establishments operating in Costa Rica, of persons not domiciled in the country that exist therein\" (subsection b); \"individual limited liability companies (empresas individuales de responsabilidad limitada) and individual companies operating in the country\" (subsection d); \"individuals domiciled in Costa Rica, regardless of nationality and the place where contracts are concluded\" subsection e)-; by the type of activity they carry out: - \"professionals who provide their services in a liberal manner\" (subsection f); \"(A)ll those individuals or legal entities not expressly included in the preceding subsections, but who develop for-profit activities in the country\" (subsection g) and finally, with an addition made under subsection a) of article 21 of the Law for Tax Simplification and Efficiency, number 8114, of July fourth, two thousand one, effective as of July ninth of the same year, the situation of subsection h) was added to this rule, to expressly include within this tax the \"entities engaged in the private provision of university education services, regardless of the legal form adopted.\"\n\nii.- Determination of the objective element of the Costa Rican source: For its part, article 54 of the same law establishes what should be understood as income from a Costa Rican source, which is subject to the profits or income tax. It makes the following list: income from real estate located in the national territory (subsection a); income produced by the use of capital, assets, or rights invested or used in the country (subsection b); income originating from civil, commercial, banking, industrial, agricultural, forestry, fishing, mining activities or the exploitation of any natural deposit, income from public services, from the exercise of professional services developed or managed within the territory of the Republic when the remuneration is a salary, per diem (dieta), fees, gratuities, royalties, advantages, commissions, or any form of payment originating from an employment relationship, as well as pensions, retirement benefits, and the like (subsection c); year-end bonus (aguinaldo) (subsection ch); payments or credits made for the use of patents, supply of formulas, trademarks, privileges, franchises, royalties, refinancing, and insurance premiums of any kind (subsection d). This determination is completed by the situations in section 55, which lists special cases also considered as income from a Costa Rican source.\n\nThird: In light of the foregoing considerations, one must conclude that, even though section 3 of the Income Tax Law is titled as situations of non-subjection (no sujeción) to this tax (understood as meaning that the taxable event does not occur, as explained above), we are not facing such a situation. Note that the rule lists a series of situations in which it is understood that the obligation to pay the tax in question is not generated, but this consequence arises from the express statement of the law, in each of the stated situations, regarding which, despite there being income or profit, the obligation to pay the tax is not generated; which rather resembles the legal institution of the tax exemption (according to the definition given previously). And indeed, with respect to what is relevant to this matter, regarding subsection b) of article 3 of the Income Tax Law (transcribed above), it is noted that it is expressly, clearly, and specifically indicated that, in the case of religious institutions, \"whatever their creed may be,\" and using rigorous and correct legal-tax terminology, they are not subject to income tax on \"the income they obtain for the maintenance of worship and for the social assistance services they provide without profitmaking purposes.\" The exclusion from this tax does not depend on the subjective element or particular condition of the taxpayer, as the plaintiff association argues, in this case, that of being a religious institution, to encompass, as the plaintiff intends, all activities carried out by it, even when they generate profit. On the contrary, the criterion defined by the legislator is of an objective type, in this case defined by the destination of the income, but very specific and precise -it is reiterated-, only that used for the maintenance of worship and/or for social assistance services, without profit-making purposes. According to the foregoing, any activity that generates a profit or gain for a religious institution -whatever its creed- that has a purpose different from the two sole indicated situations is understood to be subject to income tax, according to the definition of the taxable event, in the terms of the transcribed section 1 of the Income Tax Law. Consequently, the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica is not correct in its claim when it estimates that, by its sole condition of being a religious institution -as long as it carries out worship activities in various centers in the country-, it is not obliged to pay income tax, with respect to for-profit activities, which in this case are educational activities and the sale of bookstore items. According to the regulations governing this tax, only the income used for the maintenance of worship -which was recognized in the challenged tax actions- and that used for social assistance services without profit-making purposes -which was not accredited, either in the tax administrative procedures followed against the plaintiff or in this venue, for the fiscal periods two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six, unproven fact 1.)-, is the income not subject to income tax.\n\nFourth: Likewise, this Chamber of Judges rules on the situation of the plaintiff in relation to the provisions of article 3, subsection ch) of the Income Tax Law. In line with what was stated in the previous section, the same consideration must be made regarding what is regulated in this precept. That is, this is also not a case of non-subjection to the tax, but of exemption, because the taxable event occurs, but according to the content of the rule, the obligation to pay is not generated in the regulated situation. Nor is it a case of exclusion from the tax obligation due to the particular condition of the taxpayer, i.e., being legal entities organized as associations -understood to mean, in accordance with the Law of Associations, number 218, of August eighth, nineteen thirty-eight and its amendments-, upon which a declaration of public interest by the Executive Branch is incumbent; rather, the precept expressly and clearly defines that the for-profit activity through which these subjects receive income and which is excluded from the tax obligation, is so solely by reason of the destination of that activity, namely, \"when the income they obtain, as well as their assets, are destined in their entirety, exclusively for public or charitable purposes and that, in no case, are distributed directly or indirectly among their members.\" According to the foregoing, it was not possible for the Tax Administration to recognize the exclusion from the tax in question for the plaintiff, insofar as it is organized as an association, under the terms of the cited Law; for two specific reasons, first, for not having that declaration of public utility -issued by the Executive Branch-, and second, for not having accredited either that in the indicated fiscal periods -two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six- it had used all of its assets and income exclusively for public or charitable purposes, and that it had in no way distributed, directly or indirectly, that income among its members -unproven fact 2.)-.\n\nFifth: Having reached this point, and on account of the claims made by the plaintiff association regarding the burden of proof, we must state the following. Indeed, the argument of the maxim in dubio pro fisco is now obsolete, which in its classical view led to the conclusion that in tax matters, the burden of proof fell, in all cases, solely and exclusively on the taxpayer. It is clear that such a position finds no support in the norms that regulate this matter. In this sense, as provided in section 19 of the General Regulation for Tax Management, Auditing, and Collection, Executive Decree number 29264-H, of January twenty-fourth, two thousand one, effective from February seventh, two thousand one to April first, two thousand fourteen (since on April second, two thousand fourteen, the Regulation of Tax Procedures, Executive Decree number 28277-H, of March seventh, two thousand fourteen, came into effect, which expressly repealed the previous regulatory regulation), it indicated that the burden of proof falls on the Tax Authority regarding the constitutive facts of the material tax obligation and on the taxpayer regarding the facts that impede, modify, or extinguish that tax duty. This treatment was subsequently incorporated and recognized in the Law, through the reform carried out by the Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management, number 9069, of September tenth, two thousand twelve (effective as of September twenty-eighth of the same year), so that now the second paragraph of section 140 of the Tax Code literally states:\n\n\"The burden of proof falls on the Tax Administration regarding the constitutive facts of the material tax obligation, while it falls on the taxpayer regarding the facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the tax obligation. In that sense, it shall correspond to the latter, as the case may be, to demonstrate the facts or acts that constitute its costs, expenses, liabilities, tax credits, exemptions, non-subjections, deductions, and, in general, the tax benefits it claims exist in its favor.\"\n\nIt is precisely in consideration of the content and implications of the principle of the burden of proof in the tax field, that the plaintiff's argument is unfounded. Note that it was in the exercise of the auditing power vested in the Tax Administration, that it determined that in the fiscal periods two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six, the plaintiff had omitted the declaration and payment of the tax on income that is indeed taxed. It was therefore incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the grounds for exemption, in accordance with the regulations governing the matter -subsections b) and ch) of article 3 of the Income Tax Law, as explained above-, in this case, that said income, in its entirety, had been destined for the maintenance of worship or for social assistance services without profit-making purposes -subsection b)- or that it was an association declared of public interest by the Executive Branch, whose assets in their entirety had been destined for public or charitable purposes and no distribution, whether direct or indirect, had been made among its members -subsection ch)-, none of which was proven, it is repeated, neither in the administrative venue nor in the jurisdictional one -unproven facts 1.) and 2.)-.\n\nSixth: Finally, the plaintiff alluded in its defense that it is a non-profit association, according to its internal bylaws, according to which, it does not distribute dividends among its members; a reason for which it is not possible to tax any of its activities that contribute to achieving its essential purpose. In this regard, it is worth noting that a simple reference to the Bylaws of the plaintiff association is not sufficient, since not only were they not provided to the case file -it is repeated, neither in the administrative venue nor in this jurisdictional instance-, and the supposed transcription of some of its articles in one of the administrative briefs is insufficient; but also because even though the purpose of the plaintiff association is the promotion and dissemination of the gospel and in principle it does not distribute dividends or profits among its members, the truth is that according to the legal form it adopted, the profit-making purpose is not excluded in this type of social organizations, in the terms permitted in article one of the Associations Law, as it empowers that this type of subject may have any lawful purpose, such as scientific, artistic, sports, charitable, recreational, and \"...that do not have profit and gain as their sole and exclusive object\" (the highlighting is not original). Therefore, according to the legal mandate, profit is not prohibited in social organizations formed under the legal form of associations, it is only clarified that this purpose -that of profit and gain- cannot be the only one, nor the main one. From the foregoing, it is clearly deduced that the plaintiff can indeed carry out for-profit activities, as was indeed accredited by the Tax Administration in its audit and procedures. Once again it must be stated that the plaintiff did not prove the destination of that income, in accordance with the referenced legal mandate -explained above- the only way to consider it not obligated to pay the tax in question.\n\nSeventh: Finally, the claims made by the plaintiff association regarding the infraction and violation of freedom of worship, if its \"non-subjection\" to income tax is not recognized because it is a religious institution, are misguided. In this regard, two clarifications must be made:\n\ni.- This Contentious-Administrative Tribunal carries out a legality review of the administrative action submitted to its knowledge, in accordance with the mandate of article 49 of the Political Constitution and as developed by section one of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code.\n\nThis process seeks review of various acts by the Tax Administration, through which, first, adjustments were determined to the income tax returns filed by the plaintiff herein for the fiscal periods two thousand four, two thousand five, and two thousand six; and subsequently, tax sanctions were imposed corresponding to those adjustments. This is a review using as a parameter the block of legality (bloque de juridicidad) or legality of the Administrative legal system, whose hierarchical scale begins with the Political Constitution (norms and principles emanating from it), followed, in strict order, by international treaties, laws, and regulatory provisions, in the manner provided in numeral 6 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); and which is also nourished by unwritten norms, namely jurisprudence, principles, and custom (article 7 of the same General Law), and completing this order, the rules of science and technique (articles 16.1 in relation to 158.4 Ibid.). Thus, the review conducted on this occasion and the conclusions reached (that the plaintiff is obligated to pay income tax, in relation to the for-profit activities it carries out, in the periods referring to the contested tax actions, and which refer to teaching and sale of bookstore articles), are of mere legality, based on the regulations applicable to the case. In any event, it does not follow that the concepts of \"non-subjection (no sujeción)\" and \"tax exemption (exención tributaria)\" form part of the essential content of the freedom of worship of religious institutions, as is apparent at a glance from the development that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has made regarding this public freedom in its jurisprudence. Thus, by way of example, it suffices to cite what was stated in judgment number 3173-93, of fourteen hours and fifty-seven minutes of July six, nineteen ninety-three:\n\n\"**VII.** Religious freedom encompasses, in its generic concept, a complex bundle of faculties. In this sense, it refers firstly to the individual sphere, that is, **freedom of conscience**, which must be considered an individual subjective public right, asserted against the State, to demand abstention and protection from attacks by other persons or entities. It consists of the legally guaranteed possibility for the subject to accommodate their religious conduct and way of life to what their own conviction prescribes, without being forced to do anything contrary to it. Secondly, it refers to the social sphere, **freedom of worship**, which translates into the right to externally practice the belief one has adopted. It also includes the freedom of proselytism or propaganda, the freedom of congregation or foundation, the freedom of teaching, the right of assembly and association, and the rights of religious communities, etc.\n\n**VIII.** Freedom of worship, as an external manifestation of religious freedom, comprises the right to maintain places of worship and to practice it, both within premises and outside, always within the limitations established by the legal system, whether by constitutional or legal norm. In this sense, it is the constitutional text itself that allows the free exercise in the Republic of other cults – of the Catholic religion – provided that \"they do not oppose universal morality nor good customs\" (article 75).\"\n\n**ii.-** Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the plaintiff has doubts regarding whether the legal regulations applied to the subjudice are contrary to the freedom of worship contained in numeral 75 of the Fundamental Charter, this is a matter that this Jurisdictional Authority cannot resolve, and the interested party must, if it sees fit, appeal to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), as that instance has reserved and concentrated review of constitutionality pursuant to the constitutional mandate of article 10, and as developed by articles 1, 2 subsection b), and 73 et seq. of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Concerning this aspect, Judge Hess Araya adds a separate note.\n\n**X.-** Based on the foregoing considerations and reasons, this Chamber of Judges dismisses the first subsidiary claim, finding no error in the interpretation that the Tax Administration made of article 3 subsection b) of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta).\n\n**XI.- TAXATION OF PRIVATE TEACHING ACTIVITY UNDER THE INCOME TAX.-** We proceed to the analysis of the second subsidiary claim, concerning whether the Tax Administration made an appropriate interpretation and application of subsection h) of article 2 of the Income Tax Law, which literally provides, as relevant to this matter:\n\n\"**Article 2.- Taxpayers.** Regardless of nationality, domicile, and the place of incorporation of legal entities or the holding of their board meetings or the execution of contracts, all public or private enterprises that carry out for-profit activities or businesses in the country are taxpayers:\n\n...\n\n**h)** Entities engaged in the private provision of university education services, regardless of the legal form adopted; for this purpose, they must file the respective return. Excepted from the provisions of this norm is the entity created by Law No. 7044, of September 29, 1986.\" (Thus added subsection a) of article 21 of the Law on Tax Simplification and Efficiency, number 8114, of July four, two thousand one.)\n\nTo address this point, the references already made regarding the substantial elements of the tax in question are also useful, that is, the taxable event (\"perception of income in money or in kind, continuous or occasional, from any Costa Rican source\", according to the second paragraph of article 1 of Law number 7092) and the taxpayer (whoever carries out a for-profit activity or business, as stated in numeral 2). Also useful is what was explained regarding the concept and legal regime of tax exemptions (exoneraciones tributarias), that is, that they are reserved to law – formal and material – (subsection b) of article 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures), and that their determination must be clear, precise, and concrete in all their elements and conditions (article 62 of the Tax Code). Based on the foregoing, for this Jurisdictional Authority it is not possible to understand the logic of the reasoning proposed by the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica, of deriving a tax exemption for private education at the preschool, primary, and secondary levels, since their taxation under this tax is not expressly contained in subsection h) of canon 2 of the Income Tax Law. As with the point regarding the burden of proof in tax matters, the plaintiff reverses the logical sense and understanding of the legal concepts involved, in this case, of how taxes are determined – and with them their constituent elements – and tax exemptions. In this case, the taxable event of the income tax is clear, and it is not necessary to list each of the activities and businesses that generate income or profit from Costa Rican sources. On the contrary, this delimitation and precision is necessary in the case of tax exemptions. Thus, there is no doubt that teaching activity at all levels at which it is provided in the country is subject to income tax payment, without exception. Having reached this point, we must specify the antecedents of the tax situation of foundations, as the provision under comment refers to them. Thus, pursuant to the provisions of article 10 of the Law of Foundations, number 5338, of August twenty-eight, nineteen seventy-three, a practically total exemption had been established for these legal entities, in the following manner:\n\n\"Foundations shall be exempt from payment of registration fees and national and municipal taxes, except for customs duties, which the Ministry of Finance may only exempt on a case-by-case basis, according to the type of goods involved and their destination.\"\n\nHowever, by mandate of article 1 of the Law Regulating Existing Exemptions and Exceptions number 7293, of March thirty-one, nineteen ninety-two, effective as of April third of that same year, the derogation was ordered of\n\n\"... all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and legal norms referring, among other taxes, to customs duties, sales, income, consumption, territorial, property of vehicles, with the exceptions indicated by this Law. By virtue of what is provided, only the tax exemptions mentioned in the following article shall remain in force.\"\n\nThus, in a concrete manner, article 2 of the cited Law number 7293 exempted from the prior derogation, and in the case of foundations, only the following scenarios:\n\n\"**d)** They are granted in favor of institutions, foundations, and associations without for-profit activities, which are dedicated to the comprehensive care of minors in a state of abandonment, street situation, or at social risk and which are duly registered in the Public Registry\";\n\nand\n\n\"**e)** They are granted in favor of institutions, public and private enterprises, foundations, and associations without for-profit activities that are dedicated to the collection and treatment of garbage and to the conservation of natural resources and the environment, as well as any other basic activity in the control of environmental hygiene and public health.\"\n\nPursuant to these provisions, the scope of exemptions for foundations was restricted to the indicated scenarios, understanding that in all other respects, they were subject to the taxing power of the State and the municipalities. However, in this same regulation, the legislator modified some tax precepts, and specifically, by its numeral 15, modified article 3 of the Income Tax Law, including in this reform, the budgetary provision of subsection ch) previously commented on, such that it established the non-obligation to pay income tax, in the case of foundations, it is reiterated, \"... declared of public utility by the Executive Branch, provided that the income they obtain, as well as their assets, are allocated entirely, exclusively for public or charitable purposes and that, in no case, are distributed directly or indirectly among their members\", which is the same budgetary provision already commented on for associations. Now, it was upon the addition of subsection h) of article 2 of Law number 7092, which occurred with the enactment of the Law on Tax Simplification and Efficiency, number 8114, of July four, two thousand one, that all private institutions were expressly taxed \"... that are engaged in the private provision of university education services, regardless of the legal form adopted; ...\" From this provision it is clear that it is not possible to derive from the text of this subsection h) the exemption that the plaintiff defends – of teaching activity at the preschool, primary, and secondary levels – as it does not conform to the form and requirements that the law demands for its establishment. Additionally, contrary to what was stated by the plaintiff, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its judgment number 6509-2002, of fourteen hours fifty-three minutes of July three, year two thousand two, did not indicate or recognize the existence of an exemption from income tax for private education at the preschool, first and second cycle levels. The reading proposed by the plaintiff is partial and capricious, as it refers to a citation the Constitutional Court made of its own precedent, which refers to a non-binding legislative consultation on constitutionality, precisely regarding the bill for the Law on Tax Simplification and Efficiency, that is, it did not imply an analysis of the regulations in force at the time of the situation. Note also that upon the indicated reform, that is, the one given by Law 8114, no exemption from income tax was established for subjects engaged in preschool, first, and second cycle activity. In line with what has been indicated, the second subsidiary claim formulated by the Asociación Iglesia Evangélica Metodista de Costa Rica must be dismissed, because the reading and proposal it makes of numeral 2 subsection h) of the Income Tax Law are not in accordance with law, the Tax Administration being correct in its opinion expressed in the actions challenged in this process.\""
}