{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-163943", "citation": "Res. 00910-2017 Sala Primera de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Incompetencia de Coprocom para conocer y sancionar prácticas monopolísticas tras la entrada en funciones de la SUTEL", "title_en": "Lack of Jurisdiction of Coprocom to Investigate and Sanction Monopolistic Practices Once SUTEL Enters into Operation", "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte conoce un recurso de casación interpuesto por la Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia (ESPH) contra una sentencia que confirmó una sanción impuesta por la Comisión para Promover la Competencia (Coprocom). El meollo del caso es determinar qué órgano era competente para conocer la denuncia por prácticas monopolísticas presentada por Cable Visión, relativa a la negativa de la ESPH de alquilar su postería. La Sala analiza la entrada en vigencia de la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones (Ley 8642) y la posterior creación y puesta en funcionamiento de la Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones (SUTEL). Determina que, si bien Coprocom era competente al momento de la denuncia (junio 2008), el procedimiento administrativo no inició formalmente sino hasta enero de 2010, cuando la SUTEL ya estaba en funciones. La sala concluye que, en virtud del régimen de competencia sectorial, Coprocom debió declararse incompetente y remitir el expediente a la SUTEL, por lo que anula la sanción impuesta.", "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court hears an appeal filed by the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia (ESPH) against a judgment that confirmed a sanction imposed by the Commission for the Promotion of Competition (Coprocom). The core issue is determining which body had jurisdiction over Cable Visión's complaint of monopolistic practices concerning ESPH's refusal to lease its utility poles. The Chamber examines the entry into force of the General Telecommunications Law (Law 8642) and the subsequent creation and commencement of operations of the Superintendency of Telecommunications (SUTEL). It finds that, although Coprocom had jurisdiction when the complaint was filed (June 2008), the administrative proceeding did not formally begin until January 2010, when SUTEL was already operational. The Chamber concludes that, under the sectoral competition regime, Coprocom should have declared its lack of jurisdiction and transferred the file to SUTEL, thus annulling the sanction.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte", "date": "2017", "year": "2017", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "competencia exclusiva", "prácticas monopolísticas", "régimen sectorial", "SUTEL", "Coprocom", "LGAP", "nulidad absoluta" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 52", "law": "Ley 8642" }, { "article": "Art. 55", "law": "Ley 8642" }, { "article": "Transitorio I", "law": "Ley 8642" }, { "article": "Art. 1", "law": "Ley 8660" }, { "article": "Art. 59", "law": "Ley 8660" }, { "article": "Art. 12", "law": "Ley 7472" }, { "article": "Art. 129", "law": "Ley 6227" }, { "article": "Art. 132", "law": "Ley 6227" } ], "keywords_es": [ "competencia administrativa", "prácticas monopolísticas", "SUTEL", "Coprocom", "telecomunicaciones", "sancionatorio", "postería", "Cable Visión", "ESPH" ], "keywords_en": [ "administrative jurisdiction", "monopolistic practices", "SUTEL", "Coprocom", "telecommunications", "sanction", "utility poles", "Cable Visión", "ESPH" ], "excerpt_es": "El inicio del procedimiento administrativo en contra de la ESPH, acorde a lo señalado en el hecho probado número 21 de esa parte del elenco de hechos demostrados, tuvo lugar cuando el órgano director del procedimiento, mediante resolución de las 10 horas del 28 de enero de 2010, notificada ese mismo día, citó a las partes a la comparecencia oral y privada. Ahí fue cuando se les puso en conocimiento el expediente administrativo, indicándoseles cuál era la información que contenía -el público y los confidenciales-. Para ese momento, no solo las leyes indicadas se encontraban ya vigentes; sino también, la SUTEL ya había iniciado sus funciones. (...) Al no hacerse así, de conformidad a lo preceptuado en el numeral 129 de la LGAP, se vició de nulidad absoluta el acto cuestionado, no. 01-2011 de las 19 horas 45 minutos del 25 de enero de 2011, mediante el cual acogió la denuncia y declaró a la ESPH responsable del quebranto del precepto 12 inciso g) de la Ley no. 7472; ordenándole otorgar a CVCR acceso a la postería en condiciones no discriminatorias; imponiéndole una multa de 410 veces el salario mínimo, equivalente a la suma de ₡90.341.642,70.", "excerpt_en": "The commencement of the administrative proceeding against ESPH, according to proven fact number 21, took place when the Directing Body of the proceeding, by resolution at 10:00 a.m. on January 28, 2010, notified on the same day, summoned the parties to an oral and private hearing. It was then that the administrative file was brought to their attention, indicating which information it contained—the public and confidential ones. By that time, not only were the aforementioned laws already in force, but SUTEL had also already commenced its operations. (...) By not doing so, in accordance with the provisions of article 129 of the LGAP, the challenged act—no. 01-2011 of 7:45 p.m. on January 25, 2011—was vitiated by absolute nullity; an act by which the complaint was upheld, ESPH was declared responsible for violating section 12(g) of Law no. 7472, ordered to grant CVCR non-discriminatory access to the utility poles, and fined 410 times the minimum wage, equivalent to ₡90,341,642.70.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Appeal Granted", "label_es": "Con lugar el recurso", "summary_en": "The Chamber granted the appeal on grounds of Coprocom’s lack of jurisdiction and annulled the sanction imposed on ESPH for violating Article 12(g) of Law 7472, ordering the closure of the proceeding.", "summary_es": "La Sala declaró con lugar el recurso de casación por incompetencia de Coprocom y anuló la sanción impuesta a la ESPH por violar el artículo 12.g de la Ley 7472, ordenando el archivo del procedimiento." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando VII", "quote_en": "The commencement of the administrative proceeding does not occur with the appointment of the investigating body—because that is an internal act with no effect on the legal sphere of the parties—but rather when the designated body decrees it by summoning the parties to an oral and private hearing...", "quote_es": "El inicio del procedimiento administrativo se produce, no con la designación del órgano instructor, porque éste es un acto interno sin efectos en la esfera de los administrados, sino cuando el órgano designado así lo decreta, convocando a las partes a una comparecencia oral y privada..." }, { "context": "Considerando IV (cita del Tribunal)", "quote_en": "A body that has not yet come into legal existence cannot be competent to hear an administrative proceeding.", "quote_es": "No puede ser competente para conocer de un procedimiento administrativo un órgano que aún no había nacido a la vida jurídica." }, { "context": "Considerando IX", "quote_en": "By not doing so, in accordance with the provision of Article 129 of the LGAP, the challenged act was vitiated by absolute nullity...", "quote_es": "Al no hacerse así, de conformidad a lo preceptuado en el numeral 129 de la LGAP, se vició de nulidad absoluta el acto cuestionado..." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-63431", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 8642 Art. 52" }, { "target_id": "norm-63786", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 8660 Art. 1" }, { "target_id": "norm-26481", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7472 Art. 12" }, { "target_id": "norm-13231", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 6227 Art. 129" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-163943", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-26314", "norm_num": "7593", "norm_name": "Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "09/08/1996" }, { "doc_id": "norm-63431", "norm_num": "8642", "norm_name": "Ley General de Telecomunicaciones", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "04/06/2008" }, { "doc_id": "norm-63786", "norm_num": "8660", "norm_name": "Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "08/08/2008" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "“IV. En un primer aspecto, claramente definido en el\r\npresente motivo de disconformidad, el casacionista\r\nalega la incompetencia de la Coprocom para conocer la\r\ndenuncia interpuesta por CVCR y, sobre todo, emitir\r\nel acto sancionatorio cuestionado; motivo por el\r\ncual, afirma, es nulo por vicio en el elemento sujeto. En su criterio, el\r\nórgano competente es la SUTEL, pues, al momento de\r\niniciarse el procedimiento ya estaba vigente la LGT,\r\nno. 8642 del 4 de junio de 2008, la cual estableció un régimen sectorial,\r\nconfiriéndole a dicho órgano competencia exclusiva y excluyente para conocer\r\n–de oficio o por denuncia-, las prácticas monopolísticas cometidas por los\r\noperadores o proveedores que tengan por objeto o efecto: limitar, disminuir o eliminar\r\nla competencia en el mercado de las telecomunicaciones. Al respecto, es\r\nmenester, pese a su extensión, reproducir lo considerado por las personas\r\njuzgadoras en el apartado IX de la sentencia\r\ncuestionada, en torno al órgano competente para conocer la denuncia interpuesta\r\npor CVCR: “[…] Expuestos los argumentos de las\r\npartes, considera el Tribunal que la COPROCOM es el\r\nórgano competente para conocer de la denuncia, así como de la instauración del\r\nprocedimiento administrativo llevado a cabo, por las siguientes razones: al\r\nmomento de ocurrencia de los hechos, sea en julio del año 2006 y en marzo de\r\n2008, el único órgano competente para conocer de los mismos era la COPROCOM, ante quien en efecto acude Cable Visión a\r\ninterponer la denuncia el once de junio de dos mil ocho. En ese momento, aún\r\n[sic] cuando formalmente no había iniciado el procedimiento en contra de la\r\nactora, la Comisión se arroga la competencia y emite los actos necesarios para\r\ndeterminar el inicio del procedimiento, así como el inicio del mismo, según los\r\nestablecido en los artículos 30 y 31 del Decreto Ejecutivo N°\r\n25234-MEIC, vigente en ese momento. La posterior\r\nentrada en vigencia de la LGT no tiene la virtud de\r\nquitar la competencia del órgano, pues era competente para hacerlo y lo que faltaba\r\nera una condición de eficacia, no de validez, en el acto de inicio, en el que\r\nse comunica a la ESPH la instauración de un\r\nprocedimiento en su contra. Admitir lo contrario crearía una situación de incerteza e inseguridad jurídica en contra del denunciante,\r\npor lo que entendido en forma armónica el ordenamiento jurídico, la competencia\r\nqueda en el órgano que conoció la denuncia y dictó el inicio del procedimiento,\r\npara una mejor satisfacción del interés público y del derecho de ambas partes,\r\nque son los fines que persigue el derecho administrativo, pues el acto había\r\nsido dictado y lo que faltaba, se reitera era su comunicación para que fuera\r\neficaz. Sin embargo, hay un aspecto más determinante, que es el señalado por la\r\nSUTEL y es que aún con la entrada en vigencia de la LGT, la SUTEL no existía más que\r\nen el papel. Como antecedente histórico, debe recordarse que esa LGT y la Ley 8660, Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización\r\nde las Entidades Públicas del Sector de Telecomunicaciones, fueron discutidas y\r\naprobadas luego del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos,\r\nCentroamérica y República Dominicana, con el cual se dio la apertura del\r\nmercado de las telecomunicaciones. Son leyes paralelas. No obstante, existe una\r\ndiferencia, de escasos dos meses entre la LGT y la\r\nLey 8660. Si bien en la primera se otorga competencias a la SUTEL\r\npara que conozca del régimen de derecho de la competencia sectorial, es en la\r\nsegunda en donde se crea el Sector de Telecomunicaciones (artículo 38) y se\r\nreforma en el artículo 41 la Ley 7593 de la Autoridad Reguladora de los\r\nServicios Públicos, para crear la SUTEL, como órgano\r\nde desconcentración máxima adscrito a la ARESEP,\r\nsegún se desprende los artículos 45, 59, 60, 61 y 62 de la Ley de la Autoridad\r\nReguladora. Es decir, que aún [sic] cuando con la LGT\r\nse otorgaron competencias específicas a la SUTEL,\r\nésta no existía. Por ello, y a riesgo de que suene como verdad de perogrullo, no puede ser competente para conocer de un\r\nprocedimiento administrativo un órgano que aún había nacido a la vida jurídica.\r\nDeclarar la incompetencia en aplicación estricta de la LGT\r\nhubiera implicado que la denuncia hubiera quedado a la espera de la aprobación,\r\nen ese momento incierta, de una Ley, máxime en el caso concreto, en que el acto\r\nde inicio ya había sido dictado y lo único que faltaba era su comunicación para\r\nque fuera eficaz. Por lo anterior, se rechaza ese motivo de nulidad respecto de\r\nlos votos 01-2011 y 09-2011, ambos de la COPROCOM,\r\nasí como la resolución RCS-396-2009 de la SUTEL. En cuanto a la exclusión que hace el artículo 9 de\r\nlos agentes prestadores de los servicios públicos, el Tribunal coincide con los\r\ncodemandados, en cuanto a que el alquiler de la postería\r\nno es un servicio público, sino un contrato, en el que confluyen dos voluntades\r\ny que la negativa del dueño, podría configurar una práctica anticompetitiva,\r\nsegún se detalló en el considerando anterior, por lo que corresponde por\r\nmateria a la COPROCOM el conocimiento de la denuncia,\r\ny no a la ARESEP. Por las razones expuestas, se\r\nrechazan en su totalidad los vicios de incompetencia alegados y se entra a\r\nconocer el fondo de la resolución atacada.” Esta Cámara, con base en las\r\nrazones que de seguido se exponen, no comparte lo expuesto por el Tribunal.\n\r\n\r\n\nV. Según se tuvo por demostrado, la LGT, no. 8642, entró en vigencia el 30 de junio de 2008. A la luz de lo\r\npreceptuado en su canon 52, la operación de redes y la prestación de servicios\r\nde telecomunicaciones están sujetas a un régimen sectorial de competencia, el\r\ncual se rige por lo previsto en esa Ley y, supletoriamente, por los criterios\r\nestablecidos en el capítulo III de la Ley no. 7472. En\r\nesta línea de pensamiento, en dicha disposición, le fueron otorgadas a la SUTEL las siguientes competencias: “a) \r\nPromover los principios de competencia en el mercado nacional de\r\ntelecomunicaciones. / b) Analizar el grado de\r\ncompetencia efectiva en los mercados. / c) \r\nDeterminar cuándo las operaciones o los actos que se ejecuten o celebren fuera\r\ndel país, por parte de los operadores o proveedores, pueden afectar la\r\ncompetencia efectiva en el mercado nacional. / d) \r\nGarantizar el acceso de los operadores y proveedores al mercado de\r\ntelecomunicaciones en condiciones razonables y no discriminatorias. / e) \r\nGarantizar el acceso a las instalaciones esenciales en condiciones equitativas\r\ny no discriminatorias. / f) Evitar los abusos y las\r\nprácticas monopolísticas por parte de operadores o proveedores en el mercado,\r\nestos últimos no podrán asignar a un solo operador sus sistemas y tecnologías\r\ncon fines monopolísticos. Si se llega a determinar que un proveedor ha\r\ncreado o utilizado otras personas jurídicas con estos fines monopolísticos, la Sutel deberá garantizar que dicha práctica cese\r\ninmediatamente, sin detrimento de las responsabilidades que esta conducta\r\nderive. / La Sutel tendrá la competencia\r\nexclusiva para conocer de oficio o por denuncia, así como para corregir y\r\nsancionar, cuando proceda, las prácticas monopolísticas cometidas por\r\noperadores o proveedores que tengan por objeto o efecto limitar, disminuir o\r\neliminar la competencia en el mercado de las telecomunicaciones. / Se\r\nautoriza a la Sutel para que realice convenios e\r\nintercambio de información con las autoridades reguladoras de telecomunicaciones\r\nde otras jurisdicciones. Los deberes de confidencialidad definidos para\r\nla Sutel serán extendidos a las personas que,\r\nproducto de este intercambio de información, tengan conocimiento de la\r\ninformación generada.” Lo subrayado es suplido. Por su parte, el ordinal 55\r\níbid, indica: “ARTÍCULO 55.- Criterio\r\ntécnico de la Comisión para Promover la Competencia / Las\r\nprácticas monopolísticas serán sancionadas por la Sutel,\r\nde conformidad con esta Ley. Previo a resolver sobre la procedencia o\r\nno del procedimiento y antes de dictar la resolución final, la Sutel solicitará a la Comisión para Promover la Competencia\r\nlos criterios técnicos correspondientes. Dichos criterios se rendirán en\r\nun plazo de quince días hábiles, contado a partir del recibo de la solicitud de\r\nla Sutel. / Los criterios de la Comisión\r\npara Promover la Competencia no serán vinculantes para la Sutel. \r\nNo obstante, para apartarse de ellos, la resolución correspondiente deberá ser\r\ndebidamente motivada y se requerirá mayoría calificada para su adopción.” Asimismo,\r\nel numeral 58 ejúsdem le confirió competencia a la SUTEL para establecer medidas correctivas de la siguiente\r\nmanera: “Sin perjuicio de la sanción que corresponda, la Sutel\r\npodrá imponer a los operadores y proveedores las siguientes medidas\r\ncorrectivas, cuando realicen prácticas monopolísticas o concentraciones no\r\nautorizadas en esta Ley: / a) La suspensión, la corrección o la\r\nsupresión de la práctica de que se trate. / b) La\r\ndesconcentración, parcial o total, de lo que se haya concentrado indebidamente.”\r\nPor su parte, mediante la Ley no. 8660 del 8 de agosto de 2008, Ley de\r\nFortalecimiento y Modernización, la cual entró en vigencia el día 13 de ese mes\r\ny año, se creó la SUTEL. En este sentido, el\r\nartículo primero -en su redacción original-, dispone: “Créase, por medio de\r\nla presente Ley, el Sector Telecomunicaciones y se desarrollan las competencias\r\ny atribuciones que corresponden al ministro rector del Sector del Ministerio de\r\nAmbiente y Energía, en adelante denominado Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y\r\nTelecomunicaciones (Minaet). Además se modernizan y\r\nfortalecen el instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) y sus empresas;\r\ntambién se modifica la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios\r\nPúblicos. N° 7593, de 9 de agosto de 1996, para crear\r\nla Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones, en adelante denominada Sutel, que será e! órgano\r\nencargado de regular, aplicar, vigilar y controlar e! ordenamiento jurídico de\r\nlas telecomunicaciones. [este párrafo fue reformado mediante el canon 10 de\r\nla Ley no. 9046 del 25 de junio de 2012, denominada “Ley de Traslado del Sector\r\nTelecomunicaciones del Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones al\r\nMinisterio de Ciencia y Tecnología”, para que, en lo de interés, se lea: “Créase,\r\npor medio de la presente ley, el sector telecomunicaciones y se desarrollan las\r\ncompetencias y atribuciones que corresponden al Ministerio de Ciencia,\r\nTecnología y Telecomunicaciones (Micitt), que por\r\nmedio de su jerarca ejercerá la rectoría de dicho sector. …”] /\r\nQuedan sometidos al ámbito de aplicación de esta Ley toda la Administración\r\nPública, tanto la centralizada como la descentralizada incluyendo a aquellas\r\nque pertenezcan al régimen municipal, las instituciones autónomas las semiautónomas y las empresas públicas y privadas, que\r\ndesarrollen funciones o actividades relacionadas con las telecomunicaciones, infocomunicaciones, productos y servicios de información,\r\ninterconexión y demás servicios en convergencia del Sector Telecomunicaciones.”\r\nDe igual manera, en el numeral 41 se modificó la Ley de la ARESEP,\r\nno. 7593. En su inciso j), adicionó un nuevo capítulo, el XI,\r\nmediante el cual se creó la SUTEL. En el nuevo\r\nartículo 59 de la Ley de la ARESEP, se indica: “Superintendencia\r\nde Telecomunicaciones / Corresponde a la Superintendencia de\r\nTelecomunicaciones (Sutel) regular, aplicar, vigilar\r\ny controlar el ordenamiento jurídico de las telecomunicaciones; para ello, se\r\nregirá por lo dispuesto en esta Ley y en las demás disposiciones legales y\r\nreglamentarias que resulten aplicables. / La Sutel\r\nes un órgano de desconcentración máxima adscrito a la Autoridad Reguladora de\r\nlos Servicios Públicos; tendrá personalidad jurídica instrumental propia, para\r\nadministrar el Fondo Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, realizar la actividad\r\ncontractual, administrar sus recursos y su presupuesto, así como para suscribir\r\nlos contratos y convenios que requiera para el cumplimiento de sus funciones. /\r\nLa Sutel será independiente de todo operador de redes\r\ny proveedor de servicios de telecomunicaciones y estará sujeta al Plan nacional\r\nde desarrollo de las telecomunicaciones y a las políticas sectoriales\r\ncorrespondientes.” Lo subrayado no es del original. Por su parte, agregado\r\ncanon 60 establece: “Son obligaciones fundamentales de la Sutel: / a) Aplicar el ordenamiento jurídico de las\r\ntelecomunicaciones, para lo cual actuará en concordancia con las políticas del\r\nSector, lo establecido en el Plan nacional de desarrollo de las\r\ntelecomunicaciones, la Ley general de telecomunicaciones, las disposiciones\r\nestablecidas en esta Ley y las demás disposiciones legales y reglamentarias que\r\nresulten aplicables. / b) Administrar el Fondo Nacional de\r\nTelecomunicaciones y garantizar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de acceso y\r\nservicio universal que se impongan a los operadores de redes y proveedores de\r\nservicios de telecomunicaciones. / c) Promover la diversidad de los\r\nservicios de telecomunicaciones y la introducción de nuevas tecnologías. / d)\r\nGarantizar y proteger los derechos de los usuarios de las\r\ntelecomunicaciones. / e) Velar por el cumplimiento de los deberes y\r\nderechos de los operadores de redes y proveedores de servicios de\r\ntelecomunicaciones. / f) Asegurar, en forma objetiva,\r\nproporcional, oportuna, transparente, eficiente y no discriminatoria, el acceso\r\na los recursos escasos asociados con la operación de redes y la \r\nprestación de servicios de telecomunicaciones. / g) Controlar y\r\ncomprobar el uso eficiente del espectro radioeléctrico, \r\nlas emisiones radioeléctricas, así \r\ncomo la inspección, detección, \r\nidentificación y eliminación de las\r\ninterferencias perjudiciales y los recursos de \r\nnumeración, conforme a los planes respectivos. / h) Asegurar el\r\ncumplimiento de las obligaciones de acceso e interconexión que se impongan a\r\nlos operadores de redes de telecomunicaciones, así como la interoperabilidad de\r\ndichas redes. / i) Establecer y garantizar estándares de calidad de las\r\nredes y de los servicios de telecomunicaciones para hacerlos más eficientes y\r\nproductivos. / j) Velar por la sostenibilidad\r\nambiental en la explotación de las \r\nredes y la \r\nprestación de los \r\nservicios de ü telecomunicaciones. / k)\r\nConocer y sancionar las infracciones administrativas en que incurran los\r\noperadores de redes y los proveedores de servicios de telecomunicaciones; así\r\ncomo establecer la responsabilidad civil de sus funcionarios.” La norma\r\ntransitoria V señala que: “ A partir de la\r\nfecha de entrada en vigencia de esta Ley, se iniciará el proceso de\r\nconformación e integración de la Sutel: para ello, se\r\ndispondrá de un plazo máximo de seis (6) meses.” Esta legislación, como se\r\ntuvo por probado, entró en vigencia el 13 de agosto de 2008; por su parte,\r\nacorde a lo previsto en dicha disposición transitoria, la SUTEL\r\ninició funciones el 20 de febrero de 2009, según lo ratificaron sus apoderados\r\nespeciales judiciales –ver considerando VI de la\r\nsentencia cuestionada-. \n\r\n\r\n\nVI. Tocante al tema de la vigencia de las leyes, esta\r\nSala, en la resolución no. 71-C-S1-2014, de las 12 horas 10 minutos del 16 de\r\nenero de 2014, en lo de interés, señaló: “II.-\r\nDe conformidad con el numeral 129 de la Constitución Política las\r\nleyes son obligatorias y surten efectos a partir del día que en ellas se\r\ndisponga. Una vez derogada cesan sus efectos. Empero es frecuente que el\r\nlegislador disponga medidas transitorias que permiten ajustar y dimensionar la\r\nentrada en vigencia del nuevo marco jurídico, para lo cual, se ponderan\r\naspectos de conveniencia, así como protección de situaciones consolidadas al amparo\r\ndel régimen derogado, o bien, el resguardo de derechos adquiridos. Producto de\r\nlo cual se presentan supuestos en los que opera una ultra-actividad (sobrevivencia) de la norma derogada, que se aplican de\r\nmanera excepcional y en los casos expresamente previstos, con la sana finalidad\r\nde no producir distorsiones o afectaciones a esas situaciones que eran\r\nreguladas en un marco jurídico distinto. […]”. En igual sentido, puede\r\nconsultarse, mutatis mutandis,\r\nla sentencia no. 654 de las 9 horas 5 minutos del 9 de junio de 2011. En esta\r\nlínea de pensamiento, la norma transitoria I de la LGT,\r\ndispone: “Los procedimientos en curso, a la entrada en vigencia de esta\r\nLey, continuarán tramitándose de acuerdo con el ordenamiento vigente aplicable.\r\n/ De la misma manera, se mantendrán en vigencia las disposiciones\r\nreglamentarias y administrativas, en tanto sean conformes con lo previsto en la\r\npresente Ley.” Lo subrayado es suplido. Acorde a lo expuesto en esta\r\ndisposición, para la solución del agravio en análisis, resulta indispensable\r\ndeterminar si, al momento de iniciarse el procedimiento administrativo en\r\ncontra de la ESPH ya estaba vigente la LGT.\n\r\n\r\n\nVII. En este sentido, tal y\r\ncomo lo señaló el casacionista, esta Sala, en\r\nsentencia no. 398 de las 15 horas 10 minutos del 16 de mayo de 2002, en lo de\r\ninterés, indicó: “X.- También invoca […] una nulidad\r\ndel procedimiento administrativo por violación al derecho de defensa. El\r\npropósito de esta instrucción, es conciliar el cumplimiento de los fines de la\r\nAdministración y el respeto a los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos del\r\nadministrado, siendo su objeto más importante verificar la verdad real de los\r\nhechos que servirán de motivo al acto final, de ahí que las partes tengan\r\ngarantizado su derecho de defensa, pudiendo para ese efecto, conocer el\r\nexpediente y alegar todo cuanto estimen pertinente a sus intereses y aportar la\r\nprueba correspondiente (artículos 214 y siguientes de la Ley General de la\r\nAdministración Pública). El inicio del procedimiento administrativo se produce,\r\nno con la designación del órgano instructor, porque éste es un acto interno sin\r\nefectos en la esfera de los administrados, sino cuando el órgano designado así\r\nlo decreta, convocando a las partes a una comparecencia oral y privada\r\nenumerando brevemente y poniendo a disposición la documentación que obre\r\nen su poder, previniéndoles que aporten toda su prueba antes o durante la\r\ncomparecencia. Allí la parte tiene, además, derecho a que ésta se admita,\r\naclare, amplíe o a reformar su defensa, proponer alternativas probatorias y\r\nformular conclusiones acerca de ellas y de los resultados de la diligencia. Concluida\r\nesa fase, queda el asunto listo para el dictado del acto final (artículos 308 y\r\nsiguientes de la ley en mención). Antes de esa convocatoria, la Administración\r\ntiene la potestad de realizar una investigación previa para determinar, entre\r\notros, si es pertinente la apertura del procedimiento, y justificar su\r\nmotivación, etapas en las cuales, no está obligada a darle participación al\r\nadministrado, sin perjuicio desde luego de poner a su disposición la prueba\r\nrecabada en la forma en que se ha expuesto (Sala Constitucional, voto N° 598, de las 17 horas 12 minutos del 1° de febrero de\r\n1995). […]” Lo subrayado es suplido. En igual sentido, pueden consultarse, mutatis mutandis, las sentencias\r\nde este órgano decisor números 206 de las 16 horas 20\r\nminutos del 26 de febrero de 2009 y 950 de las 9 horas 50 minutos del 12 de\r\nagosto de 2010. Tesis que comparte la actual integración de esta Cámara. \n\r\n\r\n\nVIII. Según se indicó en el\r\nconsiderando I de este fallo, las personas juzgadoras, en lo de interés,\r\nacreditaron lo siguiente: “1) Que por oficio UEN EE y AP-709-2006, de fecha veintiocho de julio de dos\r\nmil seis, el […] de la ESPH, respondió\r\na […], Presidente de Cable Visión con respecto a la solicitud de la\r\núltima de alquilar la postería para ofrecer el\r\nservicio de televisión por cable: \"En consulta con la Gerencia se ha\r\ndeterminado que por el momento no es conveniente la utilización de nuestra postería por otra empresa de cable ya que podemos\r\nsobrecargar nuestras redes. Adicionalmente la Empresa esta (sic) a la espera de\r\nlos cambios Nacionales (sic) que se avecinan en el campo de las\r\ntelecomunicaciones para optar por las mejores alternativas para nuestra\r\nEmpresa.\" (ver folio 15 del tomo I del expediente\r\nadministrativo de la COPROCOM). 2) Que en el\r\noficio GG-1852-2006, del veintidós de diciembre de\r\ndos mil seis, […] Gerente General de la ESPH,\r\nindicó a […], Presidente de Cable Visión: \"La Empresa de Servicios\r\nPúblicos de Heredia S.A., tiene razones técnicas y comerciales que impiden la\r\nautorización o permiso para utilizar las redes, para que opere una nueva\r\nEmpresa de Cable. Estas razones son sustentadas en nuestros propios planes de\r\ndesarrollo y en recomendaciones técnicas de operación que sustentan nuestras\r\ndisposiciones. Por lo tanto, lamentamos no poder atender su solicitud.\" (ver folio 16 del tomo I del expediente administrativo de la COPROCOM). 3) Que por nota recibida el veintitrés de\r\nenero de dos mil ocho, Cable Visión solicitó de nuevo a la ESPH\r\nun contrato de alquiler de la postería de su\r\npropiedad (ver folio 17 del tomo I del expediente administrativo de la COPROCOM). 4) Que por oficio GG-401-2008 […] Gerente General de la ESPH contestó a Cable Visión, respecto de la nota anterior:\r\n“[…] Así las cosas me permito informarle que, hasta tanto no contemos\r\ncon dicho dictamen técnico no podemos concluir el proceso de análisis de los\r\ndistintos factores que intervienen en esta decisión, y por ende no podemos dar\r\nrespuesta a su solicitud, siendo que, esperamos que el dictamen sea rendido\r\ndentro de un plazo razonable (considerando su complejidad, pues requiere el\r\nanálisis de toda la infraestructura en postería) sin\r\nafectar sus derechos y dentro del rol usual de labores que mantiene dicha\r\nDirección.\" (ver folio 19 del tomo I del\r\nexpediente administrativo de la COPROCOM). 5) Que\r\nen junio de dos mil ocho, la empresa Cable Visión de Costa Rica CVCR, S.A., presentó ante la Comisión para Promover la\r\nCompetencia (COPROCOM) una denuncia por presuntas\r\nprácticas monopolísticas relativas, en contra de la Empresa de Servicios\r\nPúblicos de Heredia, por impedirle el acceso a la instalación de la red en los\r\npostes propiedad de ESPH, así como para que se le\r\nordenara a la compañía eléctrica dicho acceso (ver folios 1 a 14 del tomo I del\r\nexpediente administrativo de la COPROCOM). 6) Que\r\npor artículo Cuarto de la Sesión Ordinaria 20-2008, del diecisiete de junio de\r\ndos mil ocho, la COPROCOM ordenó la apertura de un\r\nprocedimiento administrativo ordinario en contra de la ESPH.\r\nDicha resolución es notificada a esa empresa el ocho de julio de dos mil ocho\r\n(ver folios 36 a\r\n39 y 43 del tomo I del expediente administrativo de la COPROCOM).\r\n[…] 21) Que por resolución del Órgano Director de las diez\r\nhoras del veintiocho de enero de dos mil diez, se citó a las partes a la\r\ncomparecencia oral y privada a realizarse los días 24 y 25 de febrero de dos\r\nmil diez, se puso en conocimiento de las partes el expediente administrativo\r\ncon indicación de la información que contenía el expediente público y los\r\nexpedientes confidenciales. Dicha resolución fue notificada a la parte actora\r\nel veintiocho de enero de dos mil diez (ver folios 464 a 470 del tomo III del expediente administrativo de la COPROCOM).\r\n[…] 27) Que a las diecinueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos\r\ndel veinticinco de enero de dos mil once, la COPROCOM\r\ndictó el acto final, en la cual se hizo la siguiente relación de hechos\r\nprobados y no probados: […] La parte resolutiva acoge la denuncia,\r\ndeclara a la ESPH responsable de la violación al\r\nartículo 12.g) de la Ley 7472, le ordena otorgar a Cable Visión acceso a la postería de su propiedad en condiciones no\r\ndiscriminatorias, a la vez que se le impone una multa de 410 veces el salario\r\nmínimo, equivalente a la suma de noventa millones trescientos cuarenta y un mil\r\nseiscientos cuarenta y dos colones con setenta céntimos, conforme con el\r\nDecreto Ejecutivo N° 36292-MTSS,\r\npublicado el ocho de diciembre de dos mil diez, que fijó el salario mínimo en\r\nla suma de doscientos veinte mil trescientos cuarenta y cinco colones con\r\ncuarenta y siete céntimos. También indica que contra la resolución se puede\r\ninterponer recurso de reposición y se hace la primera intimación de pago. Dicha\r\nresolución es notificada a la actora el día catorce de abril de dos mil once\r\n(ver folios 713 a\r\n758 del tomo IV expediente administrativo de la COPROCOM).” \n\r\n\r\n\nIX. A la luz de lo\r\nanteriormente expuesto, y diferente a lo señalado tanto por el representante\r\njudicial de la SUTEL en su escrito de folios 927 a 931, como la señora\r\nProcuradora en su memorial de folios 948 a 952, esta Sala determina que, si bien,\r\npara cuando ocurrieron los hechos denunciados por CVCR\r\n–julio del año 2006 y enero del año 2008-, y al momento de interponerse la\r\ndenuncia ante la Coprocom –junio de 2008-, no se\r\nencontraban vigentes las leyes números 8642 y 8660; motivo por el cual, el\r\núnico órgano competente para conocerla lo era dicha Comisión –precepto 27\r\ninciso c) de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia-; también lo es que, acorde\r\na lo indicado por esta Sala, y distinto a lo señalado por el Tribunal, el\r\nprocedimiento administrativo no inició con la orden de apertura emitida por la Coprocom en el artículo cuarto de la Sesión Ordinaria no.\r\n20-2008 del 17 de junio de 2008 –hecho probado 6 del apartado “A. PROCEDIMIENTO\r\nANTE LA COPROCOM”, del considerando I de la sentencia\r\ncuestionada “SOBRE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS”. Tal acto configura una decisión\r\ninterna sin efecto en la esfera del administrado; es decir, es la decisión u\r\norden de iniciarlo. El inicio del procedimiento administrativo en contra de la ESPH, acorde a lo señalado en el hecho probado número 21 de\r\nesa parte del elenco de hechos demostrados, tuvo lugar cuando el órgano\r\ndirector del procedimiento, mediante resolución de las 10 horas del 28 de enero\r\nde 2010, notificada ese mismo día, citó a las partes a la comparecencia oral y\r\nprivada. Ahí fue cuando se les puso en conocimiento el expediente\r\nadministrativo, indicándoseles cuál era la información que contenía -el público\r\ny los confidenciales-. Para ese momento, no solo las leyes indicadas se\r\nencontraban ya vigentes; sino también, la SUTEL ya\r\nhabía iniciado sus funciones. Esto también se colige de los dispuesto en el\r\nDecreto Ejecutivo no. 25234-MEIC, publicado en el\r\ndiario oficial La Gaceta no. 124 del 1 de julio de 1996 y vigente hasta el 30\r\nde setiembre de 2010, cuando fue derogado por el\r\nartículo 187 del Reglamento a la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa\r\nEfectiva del Consumidor, no. 36234. El canon 35 de ese cuerpo normativo,\r\nvigente cuando el órgano director del procedimiento emitió su resolución de las\r\n10 horas del 28 de enero de 2010 (las normas reglamentarias citadas por el\r\nTribunal, preceptos 30 y 31, son producto de la reforma introducida a ese\r\ncuerpo normativo mediante Decreto Ejecutivo no. 35998 del 9 de abril de 2010;\r\nes decir, son posteriores, incluso, de la susodicha resolución del órgano\r\ndirector, por lo que no son aplicables a esta lite), dispone: “Inicio del\r\nprocedimiento / Con base en el informe preliminar presentado\r\npor la Unidad Técnica, la CPC, si estimare que hay\r\nmérito suficiente y cuando la resolución final pueda resultar en la imposición\r\nde alguna de las sanciones previstas en el artículo 25 de la Ley, acordará el\r\ninicio formal del procedimiento administrativo. / Si no se diese alguna de las\r\ncircunstancias indicadas en el párrafo anterior, la CPC\r\nacordará el rechazo de la denuncia y el archivo del expediente o, en su caso,\r\nla remisión del asunto a la vía que corresponda.” Como se colige con\r\nclaridad, esta norma señala que, luego de la investigación preliminar efectuada\r\npor la Unidad Técnica, y si la Coprocom estima la\r\nexistencia de mérito suficiente, y si la resolución final puede imponer alguna\r\nde las sanciones previstas en el numeral 25 de la Ley no. 7472 (hoy 28), acuerda\r\nordenar el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. Es decir, se trata de una\r\nresolución interna, sin efecto o incidencia en la esfera jurídica de las\r\npersonas administradas, en donde emite la decisión u orden de iniciar el\r\nprocedimiento, tal y como sucedió en esta lite, mediante el artículo cuatro de\r\nla Sesión Ordinaria no. 20-2008 del 17 de junio de 2008 –hecho probado seis-. Mas,\r\ncomo ya se indicó, su inicio, propiamente tal, se produjo cuando se notificó,\r\nel 28 de enero de 2010, la resolución del órgano director del procedimiento de\r\nlas 10 horas de ese mismo día, mediante la cual se citó a las partes a la\r\ncomparecencia oral y privada –hecho probado 21-; pues es en ese momento en que\r\nadquirió eficacia –canon 140 de la LGAP-. Por\r\nconsiguiente, acorde a lo previsto en la norma transitoria I de la LGT, entendida a contrario sensu,\r\nla iniciar el procedimiento administrativo en contra de la ESPH\r\nluego de su entrada en vigencia y de que la SUTEL\r\niniciara funciones, la Coprocom debió\r\ndeclararse incompetente para seguir conociendo el procedimiento administrativo\r\ny remitir el expediente al órgano competente para conocerlo –la SUTEL-; a su vez, este órgano debía asumir esa competencia.\r\nAl no hacerse así, de conformidad a lo preceptuado en el numeral 129 de la LGAP, se vició de nulidad absoluta el acto cuestionado, no.\r\n01-2011 de las 19 horas 45 minutos del 25 de enero de 2011, mediante el cual\r\nacogió la denuncia y declaró a la ESPH responsable\r\ndel quebranto del precepto 12 inciso g) de la Ley no. 7472; ordenándole otorgar\r\na CVCR acceso a la postería\r\nen condiciones no discriminatorias; imponiéndole una multa de 410 veces el\r\nsalario mínimo, equivalente a la suma de ₡90.341.642,70. Por otro lado,\r\ncuando la SUTEL emitió la resolución RCS-396-2009 de las 15 horas 45 minutos del 2 de octubre de\r\n2009, tanto la LGT, como la de Fortalecimiento y\r\nModernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones, se\r\nencontraban vigentes. Además, evidentemente, también había iniciado sus\r\nfunciones. En consecuencia, era el competente para conocer la denuncia\r\ninterpuesta por CVCR en contra de la ESPH por supuesta práctica monopolística relativa. Ergo,\r\ndicha resolución, mediante la cual acogió la excepción de incompetencia\r\ninterpuesta por CVCR, ordenando el archivo del expediente\r\nSUTEL-OT-17-2009, también\r\nresulta viciada de nulidad, pues su contenido resulta ilícito –artículo 132 de\r\nla LGAP-.”", "body_en_text": "“IV. In a first aspect, clearly defined in the present ground of disagreement, the appellant alleges the incompetence of Coprocom to hear the complaint filed by CVCR and, above all, to issue the challenged sanctioning act; for which reason, he claims, it is null due to a defect in the subject element. In his opinion, the competent body is SUTEL, since, at the time the proceeding was initiated, the LGT, no. 8642 of June 4, 2008, was already in force, which established a sectorial regime, conferring upon said body exclusive and preclusive competence to hear –ex officio or by complaint– monopolistic practices committed by operators or providers whose purpose or effect is: to limit, reduce, or eliminate competition in the telecommunications market. In this regard, it is necessary, despite its length, to reproduce what was considered by the judges in section IX of the questioned judgment, regarding the competent body to hear the complaint filed by CVCR: “[…] Having set forth the arguments of the parties, the Court considers that COPROCOM is the competent body to hear the complaint, as well as the institution of the administrative proceeding carried out, for the following reasons: at the time of occurrence of the events, i.e., in July 2006 and March 2008, the only body competent to hear them was COPROCOM, before which Cable Visión indeed appeared to file the complaint on June eleven, two thousand eight. At that moment, even [sic] though the proceeding against the plaintiff had not formally begun, the Commission arrogates competence and issues the necessary acts to determine the initiation of the proceeding, as well as the initiation thereof, according to the provisions of Articles 30 and 31 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 25234-MEIC, in force at that time. The subsequent entry into force of the LGT does not have the power to remove the body's competence, since it was competent to do so and what was lacking was a condition of efficacy, not of validity, in the act of initiation, in which ESPH is notified of the institution of a proceeding against it. Admitting the contrary would create a situation of uncertainty and legal insecurity against the complainant, such that, understood harmoniously with the legal system, competence remains with the body that heard the complaint and ordered the initiation of the proceeding, for better satisfaction of the public interest and the right of both parties, which are the aims pursued by administrative law, since the act had been issued and what was lacking, it is reiterated, was its communication for it to be effective. However, there is a more decisive aspect, which is that pointed out by SUTEL, namely that even with the entry into force of the LGT, SUTEL existed only on paper. As a historical background, it must be remembered that this LGT and Ley 8660, Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector de Telecomunicaciones, were discussed and approved following the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, which opened the telecommunications market. They are parallel laws. However, there is a difference of barely two months between the LGT and Ley 8660. Although the former grants SUTEL competence to hear the sectorial competition law regime, it is in the latter where the Telecommunications Sector is created (Article 38) and Article 41 reforms Ley 7593 of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, to create SUTEL, as a body of maximum deconcentration attached to ARESEP, as follows from Articles 45, 59, 60, 61, and 62 of the Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora. That is to say, that even [sic] when the LGT granted specific competences to SUTEL, it did not exist. Therefore, and at the risk of sounding like a truism, a body that had not yet been born to legal life cannot be competent to hear an administrative proceeding. Declaring incompetence in strict application of the LGT would have meant that the complaint would have been left awaiting the approval, at that time uncertain, of a Law, especially in the specific case, where the act of initiation had already been issued and the only thing lacking was its communication for it to be effective. For the foregoing reasons, this ground of nullity is rejected with respect to votes 01-2011 and 09-2011, both of COPROCOM, as well as resolution RCS-396-2009 of SUTEL. Regarding the exclusion that Article 9 makes of agents providing public services, the Court agrees with the co-defendants, in that the rental of the utility pole network (postería) is not a public service, but a contract, in which two wills converge and the owner's refusal could constitute an anticompetitive practice, as detailed in the preceding recital, so that it corresponds by subject matter to COPROCOM to hear the complaint, and not to ARESEP. For the reasons set forth, the alleged defects of incompetence are rejected in their entirety, and the merits of the challenged resolution are examined.” This Chamber, based on the reasons set forth below, does not share what was set forth by the Court.\n\nV. As was held as proven, the LGT, no. 8642, entered into force on June 30, 2008. In light of the provisions of its canon 52, the operation of networks and the provision of telecommunications services are subject to a sectorial competition regime, which is governed by the provisions of that Law and, supplementarily, by the criteria established in Chapter III of Ley no. 7472. In this line of thought, in said provision, the following competences were granted to SUTEL: “a) Promote the principles of competition in the national telecommunications market. / b) Analyze the degree of effective competition in the markets. / c) Determine when operations or acts executed or entered into outside the country, by operators or providers, may affect effective competition in the national market. / d) Guarantee the access of operators and providers to the telecommunications market under reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions. / e) Guarantee access to essential facilities under equitable and non-discriminatory conditions. / f) Prevent abuses and monopolistic practices by operators or providers in the market; the latter may not assign their systems and technologies to a single operator for monopolistic purposes. If it is determined that a provider has created or used other legal persons for these monopolistic purposes, the Sutel must ensure that such practice ceases immediately, without prejudice to the liabilities derived from this conduct. / The Sutel shall have exclusive competence to hear ex officio or by complaint, as well as to correct and sanction, when appropriate, monopolistic practices committed by operators or providers whose purpose or effect is to limit, reduce, or eliminate competition in the telecommunications market. / The Sutel is authorized to enter into agreements and exchange information with telecommunications regulatory authorities of other jurisdictions. The duties of confidentiality defined for the Sutel shall be extended to persons who, as a result of this exchange of information, become aware of the generated information.” The underlining is supplied. For its part, ordinal 55 ibid. states: “ARTÍCULO 55.- Technical criterion of the Comisión para Promover la Competencia / Monopolistic practices shall be sanctioned by the Sutel, in accordance with this Law. Prior to resolving on the appropriateness or not of the proceeding and before issuing the final resolution, the Sutel shall request the corresponding technical criteria from the Comisión para Promover la Competencia. Said criteria shall be rendered within a period of fifteen business days, counted from the receipt of the request from the Sutel. / The criteria of the Comisión para Promover la Competencia shall not be binding on the Sutel. However, to depart from them, the corresponding resolution must be duly reasoned and a qualified majority shall be required for its adoption.” Likewise, numeral 58 ibidem conferred competence upon SUTEL to establish corrective measures in the following manner: “Without prejudice to the corresponding sanction, the Sutel may impose the following corrective measures on operators and providers when they engage in monopolistic practices or concentrations not authorized in this Law: / a) The suspension, correction, or suppression of the practice in question. / b) The deconcentration, partial or total, of what has been improperly concentrated.” For its part, through Ley no. 8660 of August 8, 2008, Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización, which entered into force on the 13th day of that month and year, SUTEL was created. In this sense, the first article –in its original drafting– provides: “Created, by means of this Law, is the Telecommunications Sector and the competences and powers corresponding to the governing minister of the Sector of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, hereinafter referred to as Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones (Minaet), are developed. In addition, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) and its companies are modernized and strengthened; also, the Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, N° 7593, of August 9, 1996, is amended to create the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones, hereinafter referred to as Sutel, which shall be the body responsible for regulating, applying, monitoring, and controlling the legal framework of telecommunications. [this paragraph was reformed by canon 10 of Ley no. 9046 of June 25, 2012, called “Ley de Traslado del Sector Telecomunicaciones del Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones al Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología”, so that, in what is of interest, it reads: “Created, by means of this law, is the telecommunications sector and the competences and powers corresponding to the Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología y Telecomunicaciones (Micitt), which through its head shall exercise the stewardship of said sector, are developed. …”] / The entire Public Administration, both centralized and decentralized, including those belonging to the municipal regime, autonomous institutions, semi-autonomous institutions, and public and private companies, that perform functions or activities related to telecommunications, infocommunications, information products and services, interconnection, and other convergent services of the Telecommunications Sector, are subject to the scope of application of this Law.” Likewise, in numeral 41, the Law of ARESEP, no. 7593, was amended. In its subsection j), it added a new chapter, XI, through which SUTEL was created. In the new Article 59 of the ARESEP Law, it is stated: “Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones / It corresponds to the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones (Sutel) to regulate, apply, monitor, and control the legal framework of telecommunications; for this purpose, it shall be governed by the provisions of this Law and other applicable legal and regulatory provisions. / The Sutel is a body of maximum deconcentration attached to the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos; it shall have its own instrumental legal personality, to administer the Fondo Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, carry out contractual activity, administer its resources and its budget, as well as to sign the contracts and agreements required for the fulfillment of its functions. / The Sutel shall be independent of all network operators and telecommunications service providers and shall be subject to the Plan nacional de desarrollo de las telecomunicaciones and the corresponding sectorial policies.” The underlining is not from the original. For its part, the added canon 60 establishes: “The fundamental obligations of the Sutel are: / a) Apply the legal framework of telecommunications, for which it shall act in accordance with the Sector's policies, the provisions of the Plan nacional de desarrollo de las telecomunicaciones, the Ley general de telecomunicaciones, the provisions established in this Law, and other applicable legal and regulatory provisions. / b) Administer the Fondo Nacional de Telecomunicaciones and guarantee compliance with the universal access and service obligations imposed on network operators and telecommunications service providers. / c) Promote the diversity of telecommunications services and the introduction of new technologies. / d) Guarantee and protect the rights of telecommunications users. / e) Ensure compliance with the duties and rights of network operators and telecommunications service providers. / f) Ensure, in an objective, proportional, timely, transparent, efficient, and non-discriminatory manner, access to scarce resources associated with the operation of networks and the provision of telecommunications services. / g) Control and verify the efficient use of the radio spectrum, radio emissions, as well as the inspection, detection, identification, and elimination of harmful interference and numbering resources, in accordance with the respective plans. / h) Ensure compliance with the access and interconnection obligations imposed on telecommunications network operators, as well as the interoperability of said networks. / i) Establish and guarantee quality standards for networks and telecommunications services to make them more efficient and productive. / j) Ensure environmental sustainability in the exploitation of networks and the provision of telecommunications services. / k) Hear and sanction administrative infractions incurred by network operators and telecommunications service providers; as well as establish the civil liability of their officials.” Transitional provision V states that: “As of the date of entry into force of this Law, the process of formation and integration of the Sutel shall begin: for this purpose, a maximum period of six (6) months shall be available.” This legislation, as was held as proven, entered into force on August 13, 2008; for its part, in accordance with the provisions of said transitional provision, SUTEL began functions on February 20, 2009, as ratified by its special judicial representatives –see recital VI of the questioned judgment–.\n\nVI. Regarding the topic of the validity of laws, this Chamber, in resolution no. 71-C-S1-2014, of 12 hours 10 minutes on January 16, 2014, in what is of interest, stated: “II.- In accordance with numeral 129 of the Constitución Política, laws are obligatory and take effect from the day they provide. Once repealed, their effects cease. However, it is common for the legislator to provide transitional measures that allow adjusting and dimensioning the entry into force of the new legal framework, for which aspects of convenience are weighed, as well as the protection of situations consolidated under the repealed regime, or the safeguarding of acquired rights. As a result, scenarios arise in which an ultra-activity (survival) of the repealed norm operates, which are applied exceptionally and in expressly provided cases, with the healthy purpose of not producing distortions or effects on those situations that were regulated in a different legal framework. […]”. In the same sense, see, mutatis mutandis, judgment no. 654 of 9 hours 5 minutes on June 9, 2011. In this line of thought, transitional provision I of the LGT provides: “Proceedings in progress, upon the entry into force of this Law, shall continue to be processed in accordance with the applicable legal system in force. / In the same manner, regulatory and administrative provisions shall remain in force, insofar as they are consistent with the provisions of this Law.” The underlining is supplied. According to what was stated in this provision, for the resolution of the grievance under analysis, it is essential to determine whether, at the time the administrative proceeding was initiated against ESPH, the LGT was already in force.\n\nVII. In this sense, as pointed out by the appellant, this Chamber, in judgment no. 398 of 15 hours 10 minutes on May 16, 2002, in what is of interest, indicated: “X.- [The appellant] also invokes […] a nullity of the administrative proceeding for violation of the right of defense. The purpose of this instruction is to reconcile the fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party, its most important object being to verify the real truth of the facts that will serve as grounds for the final act, hence the parties have their right of defense guaranteed, being able, for that purpose, to examine the case file and allege everything they deem pertinent to their interests and provide the corresponding evidence (Articles 214 et seq. of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). The initiation of the administrative proceeding occurs, not with the appointment of the instructing body, because this is an internal act without effects on the sphere of the administered parties, but when the designated body so decrees, summoning the parties to an oral and private hearing, briefly enumerating and making available the documentation in its possession, warning them to provide all their evidence before or during the hearing. There the party also has the right to have it admitted, clarified, expanded, or to reform its defense, propose evidentiary alternatives, and formulate conclusions about them and the results of the proceeding. Once that phase is concluded, the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act (Articles 308 et seq. of the aforementioned law). Before that summons, the Administration has the power to conduct a prior investigation to determine, among others, whether the opening of the proceeding is pertinent, and to justify its reasoning, stages in which it is not obliged to give participation to the administered party, without prejudice, of course, to making available the evidence gathered in the manner set forth (Sala Constitucional, vote N° 598, of 17 hours 12 minutes on February 1st, 1995). […]” The underlining is supplied. In the same sense, see, mutatis mutandis, judgments of this deciding body numbers 206 of 16 hours 20 minutes on February 26, 2009, and 950 of 9 hours 50 minutes on August 12, 2010. A thesis shared by the current composition of this Chamber.\n\nVIII. As indicated in recital I of this ruling, the judges, in what is of interest, accredited the following: “1) That by official communication UEN EE y AP-709-2006, dated July twenty-eighth, two thousand six, the […] of ESPH, responded to […], President of Cable Visión regarding the latter's request to rent the utility pole network (postería) to offer cable television service: \"In consultation with Management, it has been determined that at the moment the use of our utility pole network (postería) by another cable company is not convenient as we could overload our networks. Additionally, the Company is awaiting the National changes that are approaching in the field of telecommunications to opt for the best alternatives for our Company.\" (see folio 15 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). 2) That in official communication GG-1852-2006, of December twenty-second, two thousand six, […] General Manager of ESPH, indicated to […], President of Cable Visión: \"La Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia S.A., has technical and commercial reasons that prevent the authorization or permission to use the networks, for a new Cable Company to operate. These reasons are supported by our own development plans and technical operating recommendations that support our provisions. Therefore, we regret we cannot address your request.\" (see folio 16 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). 3) That by note received on January twenty-third, two thousand eight, Cable Visión again requested from ESPH a rental contract for the utility pole network (postería) owned by it (see folio 17 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). 4) That by official communication GG-401-2008 […] General Manager of ESPH replied to Cable Visión, regarding the previous note: “[…] Such being the case, I inform you that, until we have said technical report, we cannot conclude the analysis process of the different factors involved in this decision, and therefore we cannot respond to your request, as we expect the report to be rendered within a reasonable period (considering its complexity, since it requires the analysis of the entire infrastructure in utility pole network (postería)) without affecting your rights and within the usual workload of said Directorate.\" (see folio 19 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). 5) That in June of two thousand eight, the company Cable Visión de Costa Rica CVCR, S.A., filed before the Comisión para Promover la Competencia (COPROCOM) a complaint for alleged relative monopolistic practices, against the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, for preventing its access to the installation of the network on the poles owned by ESPH, as well as for said electrical company to be ordered to grant said access (see folios 1 to 14 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). 6) That by Article Four of Ordinary Session 20-2008, of June seventeenth, two thousand eight, COPROCOM ordered the opening of an ordinary administrative proceeding against ESPH. Said resolution is notified to that company on July eighth, two thousand eight (see folios 36 to 39 and 43 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). […] 21) That by resolution of the Directing Body at ten hours on January twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, the parties were summoned to the oral and private hearing to be held on February 24 and 25, two thousand ten, the administrative file was made known to the parties with an indication of the information contained in the public file and the confidential files. Said resolution was notified to the plaintiff on January twenty-eighth, two thousand ten (see folios 464 to 470 of volume III of the administrative file of COPROCOM). […] 27) That at nineteen hours forty-five minutes on January twenty-fifth, two thousand eleven, COPROCOM issued the final act, in which the following relation of proven and unproven facts was made: […] The operative part upholds the complaint, declares ESPH responsible for the violation of Article 12.g) of Ley 7472, orders it to grant Cable Visión access to its utility pole network (postería) under non-discriminatory conditions, while imposing a fine of 410 times the minimum wage, equivalent to the sum of ninety million three hundred forty-one thousand six hundred forty-two colones with seventy céntimos, in accordance with Decreto Ejecutivo N° 36292-MTSS, published on December eight, two thousand ten, which set the minimum wage at the sum of two hundred twenty thousand three hundred forty-five colones with forty-seven céntimos. It also indicates that an appeal for reconsideration may be filed against the resolution and the first payment demand is made. Said resolution is notified to the plaintiff on April fourteenth, two thousand eleven (see folios 713 to 758 of volume IV of the administrative file of COPROCOM).”\n\nIX. In light of the foregoing, and different from what was stated by both the judicial representative of SUTEL in its brief at folios 927 to 931, and the Procuradora in her memorial at folios 948 to 952, this Chamber determines that, although at the time the events reported by CVCR occurred –July 2006 and January 2008–, and at the time of filing the complaint before Coprocom –June 2008–, laws numbers 8642 and 8660 were not in force; for which reason, the only body competent to hear it was said Commission –precept 27 subsection c) of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia–; it is also true that, in accordance with what was indicated by this Chamber, and differently from what was stated by the Court, the administrative proceeding did not begin with the opening order issued by Coprocom in Article four of Ordinary Session no. 20-2008 of June 17, 2008 –proven fact 6 of section “A. PROCEDIMIENTO ANTE LA COPROCOM”, of recital I of the questioned judgment “SOBRE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS”. Such an act constitutes an internal decision without effect on the sphere of the administered party; that is, it is the decision or order to initiate it. The initiation of the administrative proceeding against ESPH, in accordance with what was stated in proven fact number 21 of that part of the list of proven facts, took place when the directing body of the proceeding, by resolution at 10 hours on January 28, 2010, notified that same day, summoned the parties to the oral and private hearing. It was then that the administrative file was made known to them, indicating what information it contained –the public and the confidential ones–. At that moment, not only were the indicated laws already in force; but also, SUTEL had already begun its functions. This is also inferred from the provisions of Decreto Ejecutivo no. 25234-MEIC, published in the official gazette La Gaceta no. 124 of July 1, 1996, and in force until September 30, 2010, when it was repealed by Article 187 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, no. 36234. Canon 35 of that regulatory body, in force when the directing body of the proceeding issued its resolution at 10 hours on January 28, 2010 (the regulatory norms cited by the Court, precepts 30 and 31, are the product of the reform introduced to that regulatory body by Decreto Ejecutivo no. 35998 of April 9, 2010; that is, they are subsequent to, even, the aforementioned resolution of the directing body, and therefore are not applicable to this lite), provides: “Initiation of the proceeding / Based on the preliminary report presented by the Technical Unit, the CPC, if it deems that there is sufficient merit and when the final resolution may result in the imposition of any of the sanctions provided for in Article 25 of the Law, shall agree on the formal initiation of the administrative proceeding. / If none of the circumstances indicated in the preceding paragraph occurs, the CPC shall agree on the rejection of the complaint and the archiving of the file or, as the case may be, the referral of the matter to the appropriate channel.” As is clearly inferred, this norm states that, following the preliminary investigation carried out by the Technical Unit, and if Coprocom deems the existence of sufficient merit, and if the final resolution may impose any of the sanctions provided for in numeral 25 of Ley no. 7472 (today 28), it agrees to order the initiation of the administrative proceeding. That is, it is an internal resolution, without effect or impact on the legal sphere of the administered persons, where it issues the decision or order to initiate the proceeding, just as happened in this lite, through Article four of Ordinary Session no. 20-2008 of June 17, 2008 –proven fact six–.\n\nHowever, as already indicated, its actual commencement occurred when, on January 28, 2010, the resolution of the directing body of the proceeding, issued at 10:00 a.m. that same day, was notified, by which the parties were summoned to the oral and private hearing –proven fact 21-; for it is at that moment that it became effective –canon 140 of the LGAP-. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Transitory Provision I of the LGT, understood a contrario sensu, upon initiating the administrative proceeding against ESPH after its entry into force and after SUTEL began operations, Coprocom should have declared itself incompetent to continue hearing the administrative proceeding and should have referred the case file (expediente) to the competent body to hear it –SUTEL-; in turn, that body should have assumed that competence. By not doing so, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 129 of the LGAP, the challenged act, no. 01-2011 of 19:45 on January 25, 2011, by which it upheld the complaint and declared ESPH responsible for the violation of precept 12 subsection g) of Law no. 7472; ordering it to grant CVCR access to the utility poles (postería) under non-discriminatory conditions; imposing a fine of 410 times the minimum wage, equivalent to the sum of ₡90,341,642.70, is vitiated by absolute nullity. On the other hand, when SUTEL issued resolution RCS-396-2009 at 15:45 on October 2, 2009, both the LGT and the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector were in force. Furthermore, it had evidently also begun operations. Consequently, it was the competent body to hear the complaint filed by CVCR against ESPH for an alleged relative monopolistic practice. Ergo, said resolution, by which it upheld the plea of lack of competence (incompetencia) filed by CVCR, ordering the archiving of case file SUTEL-OT-17-2009, is also vitiated by nullity, as its content is unlawful –article 132 of the LGAP-.”\n\nVIII. As indicated in Considerando I of this judgment, the judges, in what is relevant, established the following: “1) That by official communication UEN EE y AP-709-2006, dated July twenty-eighth, two thousand six, the […] of the ESPH, responded to […], President of Cable Visión regarding the latter’s request to lease the pole infrastructure (postería) to offer cable television service: ‘In consultation with Management, it has been determined that at this time the use of our pole infrastructure (postería) by another cable company is not advisable, as we could overload our networks. Additionally, the Company is awaiting the National changes that are forthcoming in the field of telecommunications in order to choose the best alternatives for our Company.’ (see folio 15 of volume I of the COPROCOM administrative file). 2) That in official communication GG-1852-2006, of December twenty-second, two thousand six, […] General Manager of the ESPH, indicated to […], President of Cable Visión: ‘The Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia S.A. has technical and commercial reasons that prevent the authorization or permission to use the networks for a new Cable Company to operate. These reasons are supported by our own development plans and by technical operating recommendations that support our provisions. Therefore, we regret being unable to accommodate your request.’ (see folio 16 of volume I of the COPROCOM administrative file). 3) That by note received on January twenty-third, two thousand eight, Cable Visión again requested from the ESPH a lease contract for the pole infrastructure (postería) owned by the latter (see folio 17 of volume I of the COPROCOM administrative file). 4) That by official communication GG-401-2008 […] General Manager of the ESPH replied to Cable Visión, regarding the previous note: “[…] Thus, I must inform you that, until we have said technical opinion, we cannot conclude the process of analyzing the different factors involved in this decision, and therefore we cannot respond to your request, it being that we expect the opinion to be rendered within a reasonable timeframe (considering its complexity, as it requires the analysis of the entire pole infrastructure [postería]) without affecting your rights and within the usual workload of said Directorate.” (see folio 19 of volume I of the COPROCOM administrative file). 5) That in June two thousand eight, the company Cable Visión de Costa Rica CVCR, S.A., filed a complaint before the Commission for the Promotion of Competition (COPROCOM) for alleged relative monopolistic practices against the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, for preventing it from accessing the network installation on the poles owned by ESPH, as well as to order the electric company to grant said access (see folios 1 to 14 of volume I of the COPROCOM administrative file). 6) That by Article Four of Ordinary Session 20-2008, of June seventeenth, two thousand eight, the COPROCOM ordered the opening of an ordinary administrative proceeding against the ESPH. Said resolution is notified to that company on July eighth, two thousand eight (see folios 36 to 39 and 43 of volume I of the COPROCOM administrative file). […] 21) That by resolution of the Directing Body at ten o’clock on January twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, the parties were summoned to the oral and private hearing to be held on February 24 and 25, two thousand ten, and the administrative file was made known to the parties, indicating the information contained in the public file and the confidential files. Said resolution was notified to the claimant on January twenty-eighth, two thousand ten (see folios 464 to 470 of volume III of the COPROCOM administrative file). […] 27) That at nineteen forty-five hours on January twenty-fifth, two thousand eleven, the COPROCOM issued the final act, in which the following relation of proven and unproven facts was made: […] The operative part upholds the complaint, declares the ESPH responsible for the violation of Article 12.g) of Law 7472, orders it to grant Cable Visión access to the pole infrastructure (postería) owned by it under non-discriminatory conditions, while imposing a fine of 410 times the minimum wage, equivalent to the sum of ninety million three hundred forty-one thousand six hundred forty-two colones and seventy cents, in accordance with Executive Decree N° 36292-MTSS, published on December eighth, two thousand ten, which set the minimum wage at the sum of two hundred twenty thousand three hundred forty-five colones and forty-seven cents. It also indicates that a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) may be filed against the resolution and makes the first demand for payment. Said resolution is notified to the claimant on April fourteenth, two thousand eleven (see folios 713 to 758 of volume IV of the COPROCOM administrative file).”\n\nIX. In light of the foregoing, and contrary to what was indicated both by the judicial representative of the SUTEL in their brief on folios 927 to 931, and by the Procuradora in her submission on folios 948 to 952, this Chamber determines that, while it is true that when the acts reported by CVCR occurred –July 2006 and January 2008–, and at the time the complaint was filed before the Coprocom –June 2008–, Laws No. 8642 and 8660 were not yet in force; reason for which the sole body competent to hear it was said Commission –Article 27 subsection c) of the Law for the Promotion of Competition–; it is also true that, in accordance with what this Chamber has indicated, and contrary to what the Court stated, the administrative proceeding did not begin with the order to open issued by the Coprocom in Article Four of Ordinary Session No. 20-2008 of June 17, 2008 –proven fact 6 of section “A. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COPROCOM”, of Considerando I of the contested judgment “REGARDING THE PROVEN FACTS”. Such act constitutes an internal decision without effect on the sphere of the administered party; that is, it is the decision or order to initiate it. The start of the administrative proceeding against the ESPH, in accordance with what was stated in the proven fact number 21 of that part of the list of demonstrated facts, took place when the directing body of the proceeding, by resolution of 10 o’clock on January 28, 2010, notified that same day, summoned the parties to the oral and private hearing. It was then that the administrative file was made known to them, indicating what information it contained –the public file and the confidential ones–. By that time, not only were the cited laws already in force; but also, the SUTEL had already initiated its functions. This is also deduced from the provisions of Executive Decree No. 25234-MEIC, published in the official gazette La Gaceta No. 124 of July 1, 1996 and in force until September 30, 2010, when it was repealed by Article 187 of the Regulation to the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, No. 36234. Canon 35 of that regulatory body, in force when the directing body of the proceeding issued its resolution of 10 o’clock on January 28, 2010 (the regulatory norms cited by the Court, Articles 30 and 31, are the product of the reform introduced to that regulatory body by Executive Decree No. 35998 of April 9, 2010; that is, they are subsequent even to the aforementioned resolution of the directing body, and therefore are not applicable to this lite), provides: “Initiation of the proceeding / Based on the preliminary report presented by the Technical Unit, the CPC, if it considers there is sufficient merit and when the final resolution may result in the imposition of any of the sanctions provided in Article 25 of the Law, shall agree to the formal initiation of the administrative proceeding. / If none of the circumstances indicated in the preceding paragraph occur, the CPC shall agree to the rejection of the complaint and the archiving of the file or, where appropriate, the referral of the matter to the appropriate channel.” As is clearly deduced, this norm states that, after the preliminary investigation carried out by the Technical Unit, and if the Coprocom considers there is sufficient merit, and if the final resolution may impose any of the sanctions provided in numeral 25 of Law No. 7472 (now 28), it agrees to order the initiation of the administrative proceeding. That is, it involves an internal resolution, without effect or impact on the legal sphere of the administered persons, where it issues the decision or order to initiate the proceeding, just as happened in this lite, through Article Four of Ordinary Session No. 20-2008 of June 17, 2008 –proven fact six–. But, as already indicated, its actual initiation occurred when the resolution of the directing body of the proceeding of 10 o’clock that same day, by which the parties were summoned to the oral and private hearing, was notified on January 28, 2010 –proven fact 21–; for it is at that moment that it became effective –canon 140 of the LGAP–. Consequently, in accordance with what is provided in transitory norm I of the LGT, understood a contrario sensu, upon initiating the administrative proceeding against the ESPH after its entry into force and after the SUTEL began functions, the Coprocom should have declared itself incompetent to continue hearing the administrative proceeding and remitted the file to the competent body to hear it –the SUTEL–; in turn, this body should have assumed that competence. By not doing so, in accordance with what is prescribed in numeral 129 of the LGAP, the challenged act, No. 01-2011 of 19 hours 45 minutes on January 25, 2011, by which it upheld the complaint and declared the ESPH responsible for the breach of Article 12 subsection g) of Law No. 7472; ordering it to grant CVCR access to the pole infrastructure (postería) under non-discriminatory conditions; imposing a fine of 410 times the minimum wage, equivalent to the sum of ₡90,341,642.70, was vitiated by absolute nullity. On the other hand, when the SUTEL issued resolution RCS-396-2009 of 15 hours 45 minutes on October 2, 2009, both the LGT and the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector were in force. Furthermore, it evidently had also begun its functions. Consequently, it was the competent body to hear the complaint filed by CVCR against the ESPH for alleged relative monopolistic practice. Ergo, said resolution, by which it upheld the objection of lack of competence (excepción de incompetencia) filed by CVCR, ordering the archiving of file SUTEL-OT-17-2009, is also vitiated by nullity, since its content is unlawful –Article 132 of the LGAP–.”\n\nTo admit the contrary would create a situation of uncertainty (incerteza) and legal insecurity against the complainant, therefore, understanding the legal system harmoniously, competence remains with the body that heard the complaint and ordered the start of the procedure, for a better satisfaction of the public interest and the rights of both parties, which are the purposes pursued by administrative law, since the act had been issued and what was lacking, it is reiterated, was its notification for it to be effective. However, there is a more decisive aspect, which is the one pointed out by SUTEL, and that is that even with the entry into force of the LGT, SUTEL existed only on paper. As a historical background, it must be remembered that this LGT and Law 8660, the Law for Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, were discussed and approved following the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, which opened the telecommunications market. They are parallel laws. However, there is a difference of barely two months between the LGT and Law 8660. Although the former grants SUTEL the authority to hear matters of the sectorial competition law regime, it is the latter that creates the Telecommunications Sector (Article 38) and reforms, in Article 41, Law 7593 of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, to create SUTEL, as an organ of maximum deconcentration attached to ARESEP, as is evident from Articles 45, 59, 60, 61, and 62 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority. That is to say, that even [sic] though the LGT granted specific powers to SUTEL, it did not yet exist. For this reason, and at the risk of sounding like a truism (verdad de perogrullo), an organ that had not yet come into legal existence cannot be competent to hear an administrative procedure. Declaring a lack of competence in strict application of the LGT would have meant that the complaint would have been left waiting for the approval, at that time uncertain, of a Law, especially in the specific case, where the initiation act had already been issued and the only thing missing was its notification for it to be effective. Therefore, this ground for nullity is rejected with respect to votes 01-2011 and 09-2011, both of COPROCOM, as well as resolution RCS-396-2009 of SUTEL. Regarding the exclusion made by Article 9 of agents providing public services, the Court agrees with the co-defendants, in that the leasing of the pole infrastructure (postería) is not a public service, but rather a contract, in which two wills converge and the owner's refusal could constitute an anticompetitive practice, as detailed in the previous recital, which is why the hearing of the complaint corresponds by subject matter to COPROCOM, and not to ARESEP. For the reasons stated, the alleged defects of incompetence are rejected in their entirety and the merits of the challenged resolution are examined.” This Chamber, based on the reasons set forth below, does not share what was stated by the Court.\n\nV. As was proven, the LGT, no. 8642, entered into force on June 30, 2008. In light of the provisions of its canon 52, the operation of networks and the provision of telecommunications services are subject to a sectorial competition regime, which is governed by the provisions of said Law and, supplementarily, by the criteria established in Chapter III of Law no. 7472. In this line of thought, in said provision, the following powers were granted to SUTEL: “a) Promote the principles of competition in the national telecommunications market. / b) Analyze the degree of effective competition in the markets. / c) Determine when operations or acts executed or concluded outside the country, by operators or providers, may affect effective competition in the national market. / d) Guarantee the access of operators and providers to the telecommunications market under reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions. / e) Guarantee access to essential facilities under equitable and non-discriminatory conditions. / f) Prevent abuses and monopolistic practices by operators or providers in the market; the latter may not assign their systems and technologies to a single operator for monopolistic purposes. If it is determined that a provider has created or used other legal entities for these monopolistic purposes, SUTEL must guarantee that said practice ceases immediately, without prejudice to the liabilities that this conduct may entail. / SUTEL shall have exclusive competence to hear, ex officio or by complaint, as well as to correct and sanction, when appropriate, monopolistic practices committed by operators or providers that have the purpose or effect of limiting, diminishing, or eliminating competition in the telecommunications market. / SUTEL is authorized to enter into agreements and exchange information with the telecommunications regulatory authorities of other jurisdictions. The duties of confidentiality defined for SUTEL shall be extended to the persons who, as a result of this exchange of information, become aware of the information generated.” The underlining is supplied. For its part, ordinal 55 ibid, states: “ARTICLE 55.- Technical criterion of the Commission for the Promotion of Competition / Monopolistic practices shall be sanctioned by SUTEL, in accordance with this Law. Prior to deciding on the admissibility or not of the procedure and before issuing the final resolution, SUTEL shall request the corresponding technical criteria from the Commission for the Promotion of Competition. Said criteria shall be rendered within a period of fifteen business days, counted from the receipt of SUTEL's request. / The criteria of the Commission for the Promotion of Competition shall not be binding on SUTEL. However, to depart from them, the corresponding resolution must be duly reasoned and a qualified majority shall be required for its adoption.” Likewise, numeral 58 ejusdem conferred competence upon SUTEL to establish corrective measures in the following manner: “Without prejudice to the corresponding sanction, SUTEL may impose the following corrective measures on operators and providers, when they engage in monopolistic practices or concentrations not authorized in this Law: / a) The suspension, correction, or suppression of the practice in question. / b) The deconcentration, partial or total, of what has been improperly concentrated. / c) Order the cessation of the abusive practices found.” For its part, through Law no. 8660 of August 8, 2008, the Law for Strengthening and Modernization, which entered into force on the 13th of that month and year, SUTEL was created. In this sense, article one -in its original wording-, provides: “Through this Law, the Telecommunications Sector is created, and the powers and attributions corresponding to the rector minister of the Sector of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, hereinafter referred to as the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET), are developed. In addition, the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (ICE) and its companies are modernized and strengthened; Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, No. 7593, of August 9, 1996, is also amended to create the Superintendency of Telecommunications, hereinafter referred to as SUTEL, which shall be the organ responsible for regulating, applying, monitoring, and controlling the legal framework of telecommunications. [this paragraph was amended via canon 10 of Law no. 9046 of June 25, 2012, called “Law for the Transfer of the Telecommunications Sector from the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications to the Ministry of Science and Technology”, so that, for the relevant part, it reads: “Through this law, the telecommunications sector is created, and the powers and attributions corresponding to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Telecommunications (MICITT) are developed, which through its head shall exercise the stewardship of said sector. …”] / The entire Public Administration, both centralized and decentralized, including those belonging to the municipal regime, autonomous institutions, semi-autonomous ones, and public and private companies, that carry out functions or activities related to telecommunications, infocommunications, information products and services, interconnection, and other converged services of the Telecommunications Sector, are subject to the scope of application of this Law.” Similarly, in numeral 41, the Law of ARESEP, no. 7593, was amended. In its subsection j), it added a new chapter, XI, through which SUTEL was created. In the new article 59 of the Law of ARESEP, it is stated: “Superintendency of Telecommunications / It is the responsibility of the Superintendency of Telecommunications (SUTEL) to regulate, apply, monitor, and control the legal framework of telecommunications; for this purpose, it shall be governed by the provisions of this Law and by the other applicable legal and regulatory provisions. / SUTEL is an organ of maximum deconcentration attached to the Regulatory Authority of Public Services; it shall have its own instrumental legal personality, to administer the National Telecommunications Fund, carry out contractual activity, administer its resources and its budget, as well as to sign the contracts and agreements it requires for the fulfillment of its functions. / SUTEL shall be independent of all network operators and telecommunications service providers and shall be subject to the National Telecommunications Development Plan and the corresponding sectoral policies.” The underlining is not from the original. For its part, the added canon 60 establishes: “The fundamental obligations of SUTEL are: / a) Apply the legal framework of telecommunications, for which it shall act in accordance with the policies of the Sector, the provisions of the National Telecommunications Development Plan, the General Telecommunications Law, the provisions established in this Law, and the other applicable legal and regulatory provisions. / b) Administer the National Telecommunications Fund and guarantee compliance with the universal access and service obligations imposed on network operators and telecommunications service providers. / c) Promote the diversity of telecommunications services and the introduction of new technologies. / d) Guarantee and protect the rights of telecommunications users. / e) Ensure compliance with the duties and rights of network operators and telecommunications service providers. / f) Ensure, in an objective, proportional, timely, transparent, efficient, and non-discriminatory manner, access to scarce resources associated with the operation of networks and the provision of telecommunications services. / g) Control and verify the efficient use of the radio spectrum, radio emissions, as well as the inspection, detection, identification, and elimination of harmful interference and numbering resources, in accordance with the respective plans. / h) Ensure compliance with the access and interconnection obligations imposed on telecommunications network operators, as well as the interoperability of said networks. / i) Establish and guarantee quality standards for networks and telecommunications services to make them more efficient and productive. / j) Ensure environmental sustainability (sostenibilidad) in the operation of telecommunications networks and the provision of telecommunications services. / k) Hear and sanction the administrative infractions incurred by network operators and telecommunications service providers; as well as establish the civil liability of their officials.” Transitory norm V states: “As of the date of entry into force of this Law, the process of forming and integrating SUTEL shall begin: for this, a maximum period of six (6) months shall be available.” This legislation, as was proven, entered into force on August 13, 2008; for its part, in accordance with the provisions of said transitory provision, SUTEL began operations on February 20, 2009, as ratified by its special judicial representatives –see recital VI of the challenged judgment-.\n\nVI. Regarding the issue of the entry into force of laws, this Chamber, in resolution no. 71-C-S1-2014, at 12 hours and 10 minutes of January 16, 2014, for the relevant part, stated: “II.- In accordance with numeral 129 of the Political Constitution, laws are obligatory and take effect from the day stipulated therein. Once repealed, their effects cease. However, it is common for the legislator to provide transitory measures that allow adjusting and dimensioning the entry into force of the new legal framework, for which purpose, aspects of convenience are weighed, as well as the protection of situations consolidated under the repealed regime, or the safeguarding of acquired rights. As a result, scenarios arise where an ultra-activity (sobrevivencia) of the repealed norm operates, which is applied exceptionally and in expressly provided cases, with the sound purpose of not producing distortions or impairments to those situations that were regulated in a different legal framework. […]”. In the same vein, mutatis mutandis, judgment no. 654 at 9 hours and 5 minutes of June 9, 2011, may be consulted. In this line of thought, transitory norm I of the LGT provides: “Procedures in progress, upon the entry into force of this Law, shall continue being processed in accordance with the applicable legal system in force. / In the same manner, regulatory and administrative provisions shall remain in force, as long as they are consistent with the provisions of this Law.” The underlining is supplied. In accordance with the foregoing provision, to resolve the grievance under analysis, it is essential to determine if, at the time the administrative procedure was initiated against ESPH, the LGT was already in force.\n\nVII. In this sense, as indicated by the appellant (casacionista), this Chamber, in judgment no. 398 at 15 hours and 10 minutes of May 16, 2002, for the relevant part, stated: “X.- It also invokes […] a nullity of the administrative procedure for violation of the right of defense. The purpose of this instruction is to reconcile the fulfillment of the Administration's goals with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party, its most important object being to verify the real truth of the facts that will serve as grounds for the final act; hence, the parties have their right of defense guaranteed, being able for that purpose to examine the case file and argue everything they deem pertinent to their interests and provide the corresponding evidence (articles 214 and following of the General Law of Public Administration). The initiation of the administrative procedure occurs, not with the appointment of the investigative body, because this is an internal act without effects on the sphere of the administered parties, but when the designated body so decrees, summoning the parties to an oral and private hearing, briefly enumerating and making available the documentation in its possession, warning them to provide all their evidence before or during the hearing. There, the party also has the right for it to be admitted, clarified, expanded, or to reform its defense, propose evidentiary alternatives, and formulate conclusions about them and the results of the proceeding. Once that phase is concluded, the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act (articles 308 and following of the law in question). Before that summons, the Administration has the power to conduct a prior investigation to determine, among others, if the opening of the procedure is pertinent, and to justify its reasoning, stages in which it is not obliged to give participation to the administered party, without prejudice, of course, to making the evidence gathered available to it in the manner that has been set forth (Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 598, at 17 hours and 12 minutes of February 1st, 1995). […]” The underlining is supplied. In the same vein, mutatis mutandis, judgments of this decision-making body (órgano decisor) numbers 206 at 16 hours and 20 minutes of February 26, 2009, and 950 at 9 hours and 50 minutes of August 12, 2010, may be consulted. A thesis shared by the current composition of this Chamber.\n\nVIII. As indicated in recital I of this ruling, the judges, for the relevant part, certified the following: “1) That by official letter UEN EE y AP-709-2006, dated July twenty-eighth, two thousand six, the [...] of ESPH, responded to [...], President of Cable Visión regarding the latter's request to lease the pole infrastructure (postería) to offer cable television service: \"In consultation with Management, it has been determined that at the moment, the use of our pole infrastructure (postería) by another cable company is not advisable as we could overload our networks. Additionally, the Company is awaiting the National changes that are forthcoming in the field of telecommunications to opt for the best alternatives for our Company.\" (see folio 15 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). 2) That in official letter GG-1852-2006, of December twenty-second, two thousand six, [...] General Manager of ESPH, indicated to [...], President of Cable Visión: \"The Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia S.A., has technical and commercial reasons that prevent the authorization or permit to use the networks, for a new Cable Company to operate. These reasons are supported by our own development plans and by technical operating recommendations that support our provisions. Therefore, we regret not being able to attend to your request.\" (see folio 16 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). 3) That by note received on January twenty-third, two thousand eight, Cable Visión again requested from ESPH a lease contract for the pole infrastructure (postería) of its property (see folio 17 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). 4) That by official letter GG-401-2008 [...] General Manager of ESPH replied to Cable Visión, regarding the previous note: “[…] Therefore, I must inform you that, until we have said technical opinion, we cannot conclude the process of analyzing the different factors involved in this decision, and thus we cannot respond to your request, with the expectation that the opinion will be rendered within a reasonable timeframe (considering its complexity, as it requires the analysis of the entire pole infrastructure (postería)) without affecting your rights and within the usual workload of said Directorate.” (see folio 19 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). 5) That in June two thousand eight, the company Cable Visión de Costa Rica CVCR, S.A., filed a complaint with the Commission for the Promotion of Competition (COPROCOM) for alleged relative monopolistic practices, against the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, for preventing its access to the installation of the network on the poles owned by ESPH, as well as for ordering said access from the electric company (see folios 1 to 14 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). 6) That by Article Four of Ordinary Session 20-2008, of June seventeenth, two thousand eight, COPROCOM ordered the opening of an ordinary administrative procedure against ESPH. Said resolution is notified to that company on July eighth, two thousand eight (see folios 36 to 39 and 43 of volume I of the administrative file of COPROCOM). […] 21) That by resolution of the Investigating Body at ten hours of January twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, the parties were summoned to the oral and private hearing to be held on February 24 and 25, two thousand ten, the administrative file was made available to the parties with an indication of the information contained in the public file and the confidential files. Said resolution was notified to the plaintiff on January twenty-eighth, two thousand ten (see folios 464 to 470 of volume III of the administrative file of COPROCOM). […] 27) That at nineteen hours forty-five minutes of January twenty-fifth, two thousand eleven, COPROCOM issued the final act, which contained the following statement of proven and unproven facts: […] The operative part upholds the complaint, declares ESPH responsible for the violation of article 12.g) of Law 7472, orders it to grant Cable Visión access to the pole infrastructure (postería) of its property under non-discriminatory conditions, while also imposing a fine of 410 times the minimum wage, equivalent to the sum of ninety million three hundred forty-one thousand six hundred forty-two colones with seventy céntimos, in accordance with Executive Decree No. 36292-MTSS, published on December eighth, two thousand ten, which set the minimum wage at the sum of two hundred twenty thousand three hundred forty-five colones with forty-seven céntimos. It also indicates that a motion for reconsideration can be filed against the resolution and makes the first demand for payment. Said resolution is notified to the plaintiff on the fourteenth of April, two thousand eleven (see folios 713 to 758 of volume IV administrative file of COPROCOM).”\n\nIX. In light of the foregoing, and unlike what was indicated by both the judicial representative of SUTEL in their brief at folios 927 to 931, and the Attorney General in her brief at folios 948 to 952, this Chamber determines that, although it is true that when the events denounced by CVCR occurred –July 2006 and January 2008–, and at the time the complaint was filed before COPROCOM –June 2008–, laws numbers 8642 and 8660 were not yet in force; reason for which, the only body competent to hear it was said Commission –precept 27 subsection c) of the Law for the Promotion of Competition–; it is also true that, in accordance with what was indicated by this Chamber, and unlike what was stated by the Court, the administrative procedure did not begin with the opening order issued by COPROCOM in Article Four of Ordinary Session no. 20-2008 of June 17, 2008 –proven fact 6 of section “A. PROCEDURE BEFORE COPROCOM”, of recital I of the challenged judgment “ON THE PROVEN FACTS”. Such an act constitutes an internal decision without effect on the sphere of the administered party; that is to say, it is the decision or order to initiate it. The initiation of the administrative procedure against ESPH, in accordance with what was stated in proven fact number 21 of that part of the list of demonstrated facts, took place when the investigative body of the procedure, through a resolution at 10 hours of January 28, 2010, notified on that same day, summoned the parties to the oral and private hearing.\n\nIt was then that the administrative file was disclosed to them, indicating what information it contained—the public and the confidential ones. At that time, not only were the aforementioned laws already in force, but SUTEL had also already begun its functions. This is also inferred from the provisions of Decreto Ejecutivo no. 25234-MEIC, published in the official gazette La Gaceta no. 124 of July 1, 1996, and in force until September 30, 2010, when it was repealed by article 187 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, no. 36234. Canon 35 of that regulatory body, in force when the directing body of the proceeding issued its resolution at 10:00 a.m. on January 28, 2010 (the regulatory provisions cited by the Tribunal, precepts 30 and 31, are the product of the reform introduced to that regulatory body by Decreto Ejecutivo no. 35998 of April 9, 2010; that is, they are subsequent even to the aforementioned resolution of the directing body, and therefore are not applicable to this dispute), provides: “Initiation of the proceeding / Based on the preliminary report presented by the Technical Unit, the CPC, if it deems there is sufficient merit and when the final resolution may result in the imposition of any of the penalties provided for in article 25 of the Law, shall order the formal initiation of the administrative proceeding. / If none of the circumstances indicated in the preceding paragraph arise, the CPC shall order the rejection of the complaint and the archiving of the file, or, as applicable, the referral of the matter to the appropriate channel.” As is clearly inferred, this provision states that, following the preliminary investigation carried out by the Technical Unit, and if the Coprocom deems that sufficient merit exists, and if the final resolution could impose any of the penalties provided for in numeral 25 of Law no. 7472 (now 28), it agrees to order the initiation of the administrative proceeding. That is, it is an internal resolution, with no effect or incidence on the legal sphere of the administered persons, in which it issues the decision or order to initiate the proceeding, just as happened in this dispute, through article four of Sesión Ordinaria no. 20-2008 of June 17, 2008—proven fact six. But, as already indicated, its initiation, properly speaking, occurred when the resolution of the directing body of the proceeding, issued at 10:00 a.m. on that same day, January 28, 2010, was notified, by which the parties were summoned to the oral and private hearing—proven fact 21—; since it is at that moment that it acquired effectiveness—canon 140 of the LGAP—. Consequently, in accordance with the provisions of transitory provision I of the LGT, understood a contrario sensu, by initiating the administrative proceeding against ESPH after its entry into force and after SUTEL began its functions, the Coprocom should have declared itself incompetent to continue hearing the administrative proceeding and remitted the file to the competent body to hear it—SUTEL—; in turn, that body should have assumed that jurisdiction. By not doing so, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 129 of the LGAP, the challenged act, no. 01-2011 of 7:45 p.m. on January 25, 2011, by which it upheld the complaint and declared ESPH responsible for the breach of precept 12, subsection g) of Law no. 7472; ordering it to grant CVCR access to the utility poles (postería) under non-discriminatory conditions; imposing a fine of 410 times the minimum wage, equivalent to the sum of ₡90,341,642.70, was vitiated by absolute nullity. Furthermore, when SUTEL issued resolution RCS-396-2009 at 3:45 p.m. on October 2, 2009, both the LGT and the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector were in force. Moreover, it evidently had also begun its functions. Consequently, it was the competent body to hear the complaint filed by CVCR against ESPH for an alleged relative monopolistic practice. Ergo, said resolution, by which it upheld the exception of lack of jurisdiction (incompetencia) raised by CVCR, ordering the archiving of file SUTEL-OT-17-2009, is also vitiated by nullity, since its content is unlawful—article 132 of the LGAP—.”" }