{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-247981", "citation": "Res. 00708-2018 Sala Tercera de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Desestimación en caso de Magistrados de la Sala Tercera que declaran inadmisible recurso de casación", "title_en": "Dismissal in Case of Criminal Chamber Magistrates Declaring Cassation Appeal Inadmissible", "summary_es": "La Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia resuelve una solicitud de desestimación presentada por la Fiscalía General contra cinco Magistrados denunciados por el delito de prevaricato. En primer lugar, determina su competencia para conocer del procedimiento especial de juzgamiento de miembros de los Supremos Poderes respecto de dos Magistrados que aún ejercían el cargo al momento de la denuncia, mientras que declina competencia sobre otros tres que ya habían cesado en sus funciones, ordenando remitir testimonio de piezas al Ministerio Público para el trámite ordinario. En cuanto al fondo, acoge la solicitud de desestimación al concluir que la resolución que declaró inadmisible un recurso de casación —basada en el artículo 467 del Código Procesal Penal— se encuentra dentro de los márgenes de interpretación razonable de la ley, por lo que la conducta no se adecua a los elementos objetivos del tipo penal de prevaricato. La Sala subraya que la mera disconformidad de la parte con la interpretación jurídica realizada por los juzgadores no es suficiente para configurar el delito, que exige dolo y una resolución manifiestamente contraria a la ley o basada en hechos falsos.", "summary_en": "The Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice resolves a request for dismissal filed by the Attorney General's Office against five Magistrates accused of the crime of prevarication. First, it determines its jurisdiction to hear the special procedure for judging members of the Supreme Powers with respect to two Magistrates who were still in office at the time of the complaint, while declining jurisdiction over three others who had already left office, ordering the referral of the case file to the Public Prosecutor's Office for ordinary proceedings. On the merits, it upholds the request for dismissal after concluding that the ruling declaring a cassation appeal inadmissible —based on Article 467 of the Criminal Procedure Code— falls within the margins of reasonable interpretation of the law, and therefore the conduct does not fit the objective elements of the crime of prevarication. The Chamber emphasizes that mere disagreement by a party with the legal interpretation carried out by the judges is not sufficient to constitute the offense, which requires intent and a ruling manifestly contrary to the law or based on false facts.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Tercera de la Corte", "date": "2018", "year": "2018", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "prevaricato de derecho", "prevaricato de hecho", "desestimación", "recurso de casación", "ad quem", "a quo", "Supremos Poderes", "Ministerio Público" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 357", "law": "Código Penal" }, { "article": "Art. 391", "law": "Código Procesal Penal" }, { "article": "Art. 467", "law": "Código Procesal Penal" }, { "article": "Art. 56", "law": "Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial" }, { "article": "Art. 156", "law": "Constitución Política" } ], "keywords_es": [ "prevaricato", "desestimación", "recurso de casación", "inadmisibilidad", "artículo 467", "Sala Tercera", "Supremos Poderes", "competencia", "Ministerio Público", "Magistrados" ], "keywords_en": [ "prevarication", "dismissal", "cassation appeal", "inadmissibility", "Article 467", "Criminal Chamber", "Supreme Powers", "jurisdiction", "Public Prosecutor's Office", "Magistrates" ], "excerpt_es": "De la lectura de los argumentos planteados, se desprende que los hechos atribuidos a los denunciados, no se adecuan al delito de prevaricato y por ende, la causa debe ser desestimada. [...] En el caso concreto, aún cuando la conducta fue realizada por un funcionario judicial conforme lo requiere la normativa sustantiva, lo cierto es que la resolución dictada por Jesús Ramírez Quirós y María Elena Gómez Cortés, se encuentra dentro de los márgenes de interpretación de la ley. [...] Por esta razón, la solicitud de desestimación planteada por la Fiscala General Emilia Navas Aparicio debe ser acogida y en consecuencia, se debe ordenar la desestimación de la causa.", "excerpt_en": "From a reading of the arguments put forward, it is clear that the facts attributed to the accused do not fit the crime of prevarication, and therefore the case must be dismissed. [...] In the present case, even though the conduct was carried out by a judicial officer as required by the substantive law, the truth is that the ruling issued by Jesús Ramírez Quirós and María Elena Gómez Cortés falls within the margins of interpretation of the law. [...] For this reason, the request for dismissal filed by Attorney General Emilia Navas Aparicio must be upheld, and consequently, the dismissal of the case must be ordered.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Dismissal granted", "label_es": "Desestimación acogida", "summary_en": "The Criminal Chamber dismisses the case for the crime of prevarication after finding that the challenged judicial ruling was in accordance with a reasonable interpretation of the law.", "summary_es": "La Sala Tercera desestima la causa por el delito de prevaricato al considerar que la resolución judicial impugnada se ajustaba a una interpretación razonable de la ley." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Sección III, conclusión", "quote_en": "the conduct does not fit the objective elements of the crime, and therefore the reported facts are not criminal.", "quote_es": "la conducta no se adecua a los elementos objetivos del tipo penal, por lo que los hechos denunciados resultan atípicos." }, { "context": "Sección III, análisis de fondo", "quote_en": "the ruling issued ... falls within the margins of interpretation of the law.", "quote_es": "la resolución dictada ... se encuentra dentro de los márgenes de interpretación de la ley." }, { "context": "Sección III, citando jurisprudencia antigua", "quote_en": "anything that falls within the limits of the 'interpretation of law' is outside the scope of the crime of prevarication.", "quote_es": "todo aquello que caiga dentro de los límites de la 'interpretación de la ley', está fuera de la figura del prevaricato." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-247981", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-33635", "norm_num": "", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial", "tipo_norma": "", "norm_fecha": "" }, { "doc_id": "norm-41297", "norm_num": "7594", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal — Acción penal en delitos ambientales", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "10/04/1996" }, { "doc_id": "norm-5027", "norm_num": "4573", "norm_name": "Código Penal — Ley 4573", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "04/05/1970" }, { "doc_id": "norm-871", "norm_num": "0", "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "\"II. Sobre la competencia de la Sala Tercera para conocer de la solicitud de desestimación. De la lectura de los hechos objeto de la solicitud de desestimación, se concluye que la Cámara de Casación se encuentra facultada para conocer de la solicitud de desestimación presentada a favor de Jesús Ramírez Quirós, Magistrado propietario de la Sala Tercera y María Elena Gómez Cortés, Magistrada Suplente de la Sala Tercera, sin embargo, se carece de competencia para pronunciarse en relación con los denunciados Carlos Chinchilla Sandí, Doris Arias Madrigal y Celso Gamboa Sánchez, quienes no forman parte de los miembros de los supremos poderes y por ende, la solicitud en relación con dichos imputados debe ser ventilada en la vía ordinaria. En este orden de ideas, el artículo 391 del Código Procesal Penal establece un procedimiento especial para el juzgamiento de los miembros de los Supremos Poderes, al señalar: “El juzgamiento de los miembros de los Supremos Poderes y de los funcionarios respecto de quienes la Constitución Política exige que la Asamblea Legislativa autorice su juzgamiento para que puedan ser sometidos a proceso penal, se regirá por las disposiciones comunes, salvo las que se establecen en este Capítulo”. Dicho procedimiento especial, debe ser conocido por la Cámara de Casación Penal, quien conforme al inciso 2) del artículo 56 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, es competente para juzgar a los Miembros de los Supremos Poderes. Desde esta óptica, la norma citada indica: “La Sala Tercera conocerá (…) De las causas penales contra los miembros de los Supremos Poderes y otros funcionarios equiparados”. Por otra parte, los Magistrados de la Sala de Casación Penal integran la Corte Suprema de Justicia, órgano que conforme al artículo 156 de la Constitución Política, es el tribunal superior del Poder Judicial y por esta razón, se debe concluir que los Magistrados de las distintas Salas que la integran, forman parte de los miembros de los Supremos Poderes. Sobre el particular, la doctrina ha indicado: “En el caso de los Supremos Poderes, restaría indicar que en cuanto al Poder Judicial, son sujeto del proceso especial los magistrados de las respectivas Salas que integran la Corte Suprema de Justicia” (Garay, Noberto. El procedimiento especial para juzgar a los miembros de los Supremos Poderes: un análisis desde el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. Tendencias actuales del derecho penal desde una perspectiva jurisprudencial, Tomo I, primera edición, San José, C.R., 2014, pag. 333). Debe notarse que el procedimiento especial conocido por la Sala de Casación Penal, resulta aplicable mientras el imputado se encuentre en el ejercicio del cargo y con ello, se protege la continuidad de la función, sin embargo, si durante el transcurso del procedimiento se pierde la condición de miembro de los Supremos Poderes o de un sujeto equiparado a éstos, el procedimiento especial deja de ser aplicable. En este sentido, la jurisprudencia de la Cámara de Casación Penal ha justificado la no aplicación del procedimiento especial señalando: “tal y como en otras ocasiones lo ha indicado esta Sala, dicho procedimiento especial se justifica por razones de interés público, ya que con su regulación se pretende garantizar el eficaz desempeño del cargo público que ostenta el miembro de uno de los Supremos Poderes de la República, que es objeto de una investigación de carácter penal, siendo que tal prerrogativa cesa, cuando en la persona no concurre o finaliza tal investidura” (voto 2009-1793 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 9:20 horas, del 18 de diciembre de 2009, subrayado no corresponde al original). En el caso concreto, se observa que los señores Carlos Chinchilla Sandí, Doris Arias Madrigal y Celso Gamboa Sánchez ya no forman parte de los miembros de los supremos poderes, al haber cesado en sus funciones como Magistrados de esta Sala, hecho que es público y notorio, por lo que se ordena el testimonio de piezas y se remite al Ministerio Público, para que proceda conforme a derecho.\n\n III. Se acoge la solicitud de desestimación a favor de Jesús Ramírez Quirós y María Elena Gómez Cortés. De la lectura de los argumentos planteados, se desprende que los hechos atribuidos a los denunciados, no se adecuan al delito de prevaricato y por ende, la causa debe ser desestimada. En este sentido, el delito de prevaricato se encuentra previsto en el artículo 357 del Código Penal, donde se dispone: “Se impondrá prisión de dos a seis años al funcionario judicial o administrativo que dictare resoluciones contrarias a la ley o las fundare en hechos falsos. Si se tratare de una sentencia condenatoria en causa criminal, la pena será de tres a quince años de prisión. Lo dispuesto en el párrafo primero de este artículo será aplicable en su caso, a los árbitros y arbitradores”. Del análisis de los elementos objetivos del tipo penal base, se desprende que el sujeto activo es especial, porque el hecho solo puede ser cometido por un funcionario judicial o administrativo. Asimismo, la acción realizada por el sujeto activo es el dictado de una resolución, sobre el particular la Sala Tercera ha indicado: “…La acción típica consiste en dictar resoluciones contrarias a la ley o fundadas en hechos falsos; el bien jurídico tutelado es el deber de probidad en la función pública y la conducta típica recae directamente sobre la legalidad y veracidad de las resoluciones, sentencias, autos, providencias y decisiones finales que afecten derechos e intereses de los administrados…” (Voto N° 2013-000881, de las 09:54 horas, del 12 de julio del 2013). Por otra parte, la resolución dictada debe tener al menos una de las siguientes características: debe ser contraria a la ley (prevaricato de derecho), o bien, debe estar basada en hechos falsos (prevaricato de hecho). En relación con el prevaricato de derecho, debe tenerse en cuenta que la conducta no se adecuaría a dicho elemento objetivo, cuando la resolución esté dentro de los márgenes de interpretación razonables, tal y como lo ha reconocido la Jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia al indicar: “Asimismo, resulta relevante acotar que los alcances y la interpretación de normas no están contemplados como elementos objetivos de este tipo penal, es decir no son punibles. Así lo ha establecido esta Sala de Casación Penal, desde vieja data, al señalar: “...la doctrina y la jurisprudencia son acordes en cuanto a que todo aquello que caiga dentro de los límites de la \"interpretación de la ley\", está fuera de la figura del prevaricato, excluyéndose así la posibilidad de prevaricación sobre la base de algún precepto insospechado de derecho (...), es decir, que: «cuando la ley no es clara, cuando ella permite interpretaciones –salvo el caso evidente de malicia-, el juez no prevaricaría al aplicarla» (Sala Segunda Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, resolución de las 10:30 horas del 10 de diciembre de 1948) (...) El delito de prevaricato exigiría que en la presente resolución existiera una absoluta oposición y contrariedad entre lo que se resuelve y lo que la ley declara, o bien que la resolución se fundamentara sobre hechos falsos, como serían aquellos que no existen o no aparecen constando en autos, lo cual no sucede aquí...” (Resolución número V-183-F, de las 11:20 horas, del 24 de marzo de 1995). Mientras que en doctrina algunos autores han apuntado que: “…encuadra en el delito de prevaricación aquella resolución que está guiada por un criterio abiertamente contrario a cualquiera de las posibles interpretaciones del derecho aplicable. Por lo tanto, ninguna decisión judicial que sea conforme a alguna de las interpretaciones del derecho positivo podrá integrar el delito de prevaricación judicial…” (DONNA, EDGARDO ALBERTO. Delitos contra la Administración Pública. Rubinzal-Culzoni editores. Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2000, pp. 417). C) En el caso concreto: […] Tal y como se ha indicado en las líneas precedentes, esta ilicitud es de carácter dolosa, por lo tanto, para que una conducta encuadre en esta figura penal debe quedar demostrada una clara intención de causar algún perjuicio a los intereses de la denunciante y de vulnerar el bien jurídico tutelado de los deberes de la función pública, circunstancias que no ocurren en el caso en particular […] Recordemos, el delito de prevaricato conforme lo establece el artículo 357 del Código Penal afecta el deber de probidad en la función pública, solo en dos supuestos: (i) cuando el juzgador basa una resolución en hechos falsos y a partir de ese fraudulento cuadro fáctico aplica una norma (afectando la veracidad del fallo); o, (ii) cuando dice fundamentarse en una normativa que en realidad inobserva, desatiende, no aplica (quebrantando su legalidad). En el sub examine, se pudo verificar que el juzgador no se basó en hechos falsos, pero tampoco su decisión fue contraria a la ley invocada en el pronunciamiento. Si la normativa utilizada en la resolución era la correcta o no, ese es un tema que ocuparía el procedimiento ordinario respectivo y, en ese sentido, es un hecho notorio que cotidianamente se formulan en nuestro país y el mundo entero, impugnaciones en todo tipo de procesos (civiles, penales, agrarios, etc.) donde las partes protestan muchas veces, precisamente, de la normativa aplicada por los juzgadores (en su corrección, interpretación, aplicación en el tiempo y espacio, etc.) y no por ello, dichas autoridades jurisdiccionales (aún declarándose luego con lugar los reclamos de las partes) son acusados y sentenciados por la comisión de un delito de prevaricato. La razón es sencilla, una cosa es la inconformidad de la parte con lo resuelto (en cuanto a los hechos probados o la ley aplicada) y otra muy distinta, es cuando esa persona juzgadora introduce dolosamente (con conocimiento y voluntad) hechos falsos o, pese a invocar una legislación, al resolver el asunto la desatiende y eso resulta evidente en el fallo; en esos últimos supuestos el legislador estimó se afectaba el deber de probidad en la función pública y decidió tipificarlo como delito. De ahí que en este caso, por parte de los denunciantes se evidencia una simple disconformidad con lo resuelto en sede disciplinaria, concretamente con respecto a la interpretación y aplicación del Derecho, lo cual comprende la labor jurisdiccional y no implica per se el supuesto de una resolución contraria a la ley, en los términos descritos en el artículo 357 del Código Penal, para el delito de prevaricato. […].” (voto 2017-00240 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 10:48 horas, del 22 de marzo de 2017). En el caso concreto, aún cuando la conducta fue realizada por un funcionario judicial conforme lo requiere la normativa sustantiva, lo cierto es que la resolución dictada por Jesús Ramírez Quirós y María Elena Gómez Cortés, se encuentra dentro de los márgenes de interpretación de la ley. En este sentido, es necesario considerar que mediante resolución 2007-0012 del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, de las 10:20 horas, del 12 de enero de 2017, se declaró parcialmente con lugar los recurso de apelación presentados y en consecuencia, se anuló la sentencia, ordenando el reenvío para una nueva sustanciación (f. 56). Contra dicha resolución, el denunciante interpuso recurso de casación, el cual fue declarado inadmisible mediante el voto 2007-00148 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 11:35 horas, del 27 de febrero de 2017 (f. 33-35), resolución que el denunciante considera subsumible en el tipo penal de prevaricato. En el fundamento de la resolución, se establece que el recurso de casación es inadmisible, porque con base en el artículo 467 de la normativa procesal penal, lo resuelto por el ad quem era inimpugnable desde el punto de vista objetivo, toda vez que no confirmó total o parcialmente, ni resolvió de forma definitiva la sentencia dictada por el a quo. Desde esta perspectiva, considerando que conforme al artículo 467 del Código Procesal Penal “El recurso de casación procederá contra las resoluciones dictadas por los tribunales de apelación de sentencia, que confirmen total o parcialmente, o bien resuelvan en definitiva, la sentencia dictada por el tribunal de juicio”, la aplicación del método literal-gramatical permite concluir que la resolución de la Cámara de Casación que da motivo a la denuncia, se encuentra de los márgenes de interpretación. En el mismo sentido, la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ya se había pronunciado acerca de la inadmisibilidad del recurso de casación, cuando el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal hubiese ordenado el reenvío de la causa, señalado: “Sin embargo, el artículo 467 del Código Procesal Penal, es claro en determinar que el recurso de casación procede únicamente “(…) contra las resoluciones dictadas por los tribunales de apelación de sentencia, que confirmen total o parcialmente, o bien resuelvan en manera definitiva, la sentencia dictada por el tribunal de juicio”. Contrario a los exigido por la norma, el cuadro fáctico expuesto por el Defensor Público no se adecua a los requisitos de impugnabilidad objetiva, ya que la sentencia del Tribunal de Apelaciones, no confirma ni total ni parcialmente, ni tampoco resuelve de manera definitiva, la sentencia dictada por el Tribunal de Juicio, sino que ordena el reenvío para juicio la causa contra V.B. Este criterio de inadmisibilidad, ya ha sido expuesto por esta Cámara en recurso de casación interpuesto en contra de la sentencia del ad quem que ordena el reenvío, […] (Resolución 2014-346 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 9:29 horas del 7 de marzo de 2014)\" ( 2015-00436 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 10:30 horas, del 11 de marzo de 2015). Por estas razones, al encontrarse la interpretación de la resolución objeto de la denuncia tanto desde una interpretación literal del artículo 467 del Código Procesal Penal y conforme con la jurisprudencia que la Cámara de Casación ha sostenido con anterioridad, se concluye que la conducta no se adecua a los elementos objetivos del tipo penal, por lo que los hechos denunciados resultan atípicos. Adicionalmente, de los autos no se desprende que la resolución dictada por los Magistrados, se haya basado en un hecho falso, por lo que tampoco es posible subsumir la conducta en el delito de prevaricato, en su modalidad de prevaricato de hecho. Por esta razón, la solicitud de desestimación planteada por la Fiscala General Emilia Navas Aparicio debe ser acogida y en consecuencia, se debe ordenar la desestimación de la causa.\"", "body_en_text": "II. On the competence of the Sala Tercera to hear the request for dismissal. From a reading of the facts subject to the request for dismissal (solicitud de desestimación), it is concluded that the Cámara de Casación is empowered to hear the request for dismissal filed in favor of Jesús Ramírez Quirós, tenured Magistrate of the Sala Tercera, and María Elena Gómez Cortés, Substitute Magistrate of the Sala Tercera; however, it lacks competence to rule with respect to the accused Carlos Chinchilla Sandí, Doris Arias Madrigal, and Celso Gamboa Sánchez, who are not part of the members of the supreme powers (miembros de los supremos poderes) and, therefore, the request in relation to said defendants must be heard in the ordinary channel. In this vein, Article 391 of the Código Procesal Penal establishes a special procedure for the prosecution of the members of the Supreme Powers, stating: “The prosecution of the members of the Supreme Powers and of the officials for whom the Constitución Política requires that the Asamblea Legislativa authorize their prosecution so that they may be subjected to criminal proceedings, shall be governed by the common provisions, except as established in this Chapter.” This special procedure must be heard by the Cámara de Casación Penal, which, pursuant to subsection 2) of Article 56 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, is competent to prosecute the Members of the Supreme Powers. From this perspective, the cited rule indicates: “The Sala Tercera shall hear (…) Criminal cases against the members of the Supreme Powers and other equivalent officials.” Furthermore, the Magistrates of the Sala de Casación Penal make up the Corte Suprema de Justicia, an organ which, pursuant to Article 156 of the Constitución Política, is the superior court of the Poder Judicial, and for this reason, it must be concluded that the Magistrates of the various Chambers that comprise it form part of the members of the Supreme Powers. On this particular, legal doctrine has indicated: “In the case of the Supreme Powers, it would remain to be stated that with regard to the Poder Judicial, the subjects of the special process are the magistrates of the respective Chambers that make up the Corte Suprema de Justicia” (Garay, Noberto. El procedimiento especial para juzgar a los miembros de los Supremos Poderes: un análisis desde el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. Tendencias actuales del derecho penal desde una perspectiva jurisprudencial, Tomo I, primera edición, San José, C.R., 2014, pag. 333). It should be noted that the special procedure heard by the Sala de Casación Penal is applicable while the defendant is in the exercise of their office, thereby protecting the continuity of the function; however, if during the course of the proceeding the status of member of the Supreme Powers or of a subject equivalent to them is lost, the special procedure ceases to be applicable. In this sense, the case law of the Cámara de Casación Penal has justified the non-application of the special procedure, stating: “as this Chamber has indicated on other occasions, said special procedure is justified for reasons of public interest, since its regulation is intended to guarantee the effective performance of the public office held by the member of one of the Supreme Powers of the Republic, who is the subject of a criminal investigation, such that this prerogative ceases when such investiture no longer exists in the person or concludes” (voto 2009-1793 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 9:20 horas, del 18 de diciembre de 2009, underlining does not correspond to the original). In the specific case, it is observed that Messrs. Carlos Chinchilla Sandí, Doris Arias Madrigal, and Celso Gamboa Sánchez are no longer part of the members of the supreme powers, having ceased their functions as Magistrates of this Chamber, a fact that is public and notorious; therefore, the certification of documents (testimonio de piezas) is ordered and sent to the Ministerio Público, so that it may proceed according to law.\n\nIII. The request for dismissal in favor of Jesús Ramírez Quirós and María Elena Gómez Cortés is granted. From a reading of the arguments put forth, it is clear that the facts attributed to the accused do not fit the crime of prevarication (prevaricato) and therefore, the cause must be dismissed. In this sense, the crime of prevarication is set forth in Article 357 of the Código Penal, which provides: \"Imprisonment of two to six years shall be imposed on the judicial or administrative official who issues rulings (resoluciones) contrary to the law or bases them on false facts. If it concerns a guilty verdict in a criminal cause, the penalty shall be three to fifteen years of imprisonment. The provisions in the first paragraph of this article shall be applicable, where appropriate, to arbitrators and arbitrators-at-law (arbitradores).\" From the analysis of the objective elements of the base criminal type, it is clear that the active subject is special, because the act can only be committed by a judicial or administrative official. Likewise, the action performed by the active subject is the issuance of a ruling, on which matter the Sala Tercera has indicated: “…The typical action consists of issuing rulings contrary to the law or based on false facts; the protected legal interest is the duty of probity in public office, and the typical conduct falls directly upon the legality and veracity of the rulings, judgments, decrees (autos), orders (providencias), and final decisions that affect the rights and interests of the governed…” (Voto N° 2013-000881, de las 09:54 horas, del 12 de julio del 2013). On the other hand, the ruling issued must have at least one of the following characteristics: it must be contrary to the law (prevarication of law, prevaricato de derecho), or it must be based on false facts (prevarication of fact, prevaricato de hecho). In relation to prevarication of law, it must be taken into account that the conduct would not fit said objective element when the ruling is within the margins of reasonable interpretation, as recognized by the Jurisprudence of the Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia when indicating: “Likewise, it is relevant to note that the scope and interpretation of norms are not contemplated as objective elements of this criminal type, that is, they are not punishable. This has been established by this Sala de Casación Penal for a long time, stating: ‘...doctrine and jurisprudence are in agreement that everything that falls within the limits of “interpretation of the law” is outside the figure of prevarication, thus excluding the possibility of prevarication based on some unsuspected legal precept (...); that is: ‘when the law is not clear, when it allows interpretations –except in the evident case of malice–, the judge would not prevaricate by applying it’ (Sala Segunda Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, resolution of 10:30 hours on December 10, 1948) (...) The crime of prevarication would require that in the present ruling there exists an absolute opposition and contradiction between what is resolved and what the law declares, or that the ruling be based on false facts, such as those that do not exist or do not appear on the record, which is not the case here...’ (Resolución número V-183-F, de las 11:20 horas, del 24 de marzo de 1995). Meanwhile, in doctrine, some authors have pointed out that: ‘…that ruling fits the crime of prevarication which is guided by a criterion openly contrary to any of the possible interpretations of the applicable law. Therefore, no judicial decision that conforms to any of the interpretations of positive law can constitute the crime of judicial prevarication…’ (DONNA, EDGARDO ALBERTO. Delitos contra la Administración Pública. Rubinzal-Culzoni editores. Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2000, pp. 417). C) In the specific case: […] As indicated in the preceding lines, this illegality is of a fraudulent nature (dolosa); therefore, for conduct to fit this criminal figure, a clear intention to cause harm to the interests of the complainant and to violate the protected legal interest of the duties of public office must be demonstrated, circumstances that do not occur in the particular case […] Let us remember, the crime of prevarication, as established by Article 357 of the Código Penal, affects the duty of probity in public office only in two situations: (i) when the judge bases a ruling on false facts and, from that fraudulent factual framework, applies a norm (affecting the veracity of the decision); or, (ii) when the judge claims to base the decision on a rule that is actually disregarded, ignored, or not applied (breaking its legality). In the sub examine, it could be verified that the judge did not rely on false facts, nor was his decision contrary to the law invoked in the pronouncement. Whether the rule used in the ruling was correct or not is a matter that would occupy the respective ordinary proceeding and, in that sense, it is a notorious fact that appeals are routinely filed in our country and throughout the world in all types of proceedings (civil, criminal, agrarian, etc.) where the parties often protest, precisely, the rule applied by the judges (in its correctness, interpretation, application in time and space, etc.) and not for that reason are said jurisdictional authorities (even if the parties' claims are later upheld) accused and sentenced for the commission of a crime of prevarication. The reason is simple: it is one thing for the party to disagree with what was resolved (regarding the proven facts or the applied law) and something very different when that judging person fraudulently (with knowledge and will) introduces false facts or, despite invoking legislation, when resolving the matter disregards it and that is evident in the decision; in these latter situations, the legislator deemed that the duty of probity in public office was affected and decided to classify it as a crime. Hence, in this case, the complainants evidence a simple disagreement with what was resolved in the disciplinary venue, specifically regarding the interpretation and application of the Law, which comprises the jurisdictional work and does not per se imply the situation of a ruling contrary to the law, in the terms described in Article 357 of the Código Penal, for the crime of prevarication. […].” (voto 2017-00240 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 10:48 horas, del 22 de marzo de 2017). In the specific case, even though the conduct was performed by a judicial official as required by the substantive law, the truth is that the ruling issued by Jesús Ramírez Quirós and María Elena Gómez Cortés falls within the margins of interpretation of the law. In this sense, it is necessary to consider that through resolution 2007-0012 of the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, at 10:20 hours on January 12, 2017, the appeals filed were partially granted and, consequently, the sentence was annulled, ordering a remand for a new proceeding (f. 56). Against said ruling, the complainant filed a cassation appeal (recurso de casación), which was declared inadmissible by vote 2007-00148 of the Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, at 11:35 hours on February 27, 2017 (f. 33-35), a ruling that the complainant considers subsumable under the criminal type of prevarication. In the grounds of the ruling, it is established that the cassation appeal is inadmissible because, based on Article 467 of the criminal procedural law, what was resolved by the ad quem was unchallengeable from an objective point of view, since it did not confirm, in whole or in part, nor definitively resolve the sentence issued by the a quo. From this perspective, considering that pursuant to Article 467 of the Código Procesal Penal “The cassation appeal shall proceed against rulings issued by the sentence appeals courts that confirm, in whole or in part, or definitively resolve, the sentence issued by the trial court,” the application of the literal-grammatical method allows concluding that the ruling of the Cámara de Casación that gives rise to the complaint falls within the margins of interpretation. In the same vein, the Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia had already ruled on the inadmissibility of the cassation appeal when the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal had ordered the remand of the case, stating: “However, Article 467 of the Código Procesal Penal is clear in determining that the cassation appeal proceeds only ‘(…) against rulings issued by the sentence appeals courts that confirm, in whole or in part, or definitively resolve, the sentence issued by the trial court.’ Contrary to the requirements of the rule, the factual framework set forth by the Public Defender (Defensor Público) does not fit the requirements of objective challengeability, since the sentence of the Appeals Court neither confirms, in whole or in part, nor definitively resolves the sentence issued by the Trial Court, but rather orders the remand for trial of the case against V.B. This criterion of inadmissibility has already been set forth by this Cámara in cassation appeals filed against the sentence of the ad quem that orders the remand, […] (Resolución 2014-346 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 9:29 horas del 7 de marzo de 2014)\" (2015-00436 de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 10:30 horas, del 11 de marzo de 2015). For these reasons, finding that the interpretation of the ruling subject to the complaint conforms both to a literal interpretation of Article 467 of the Código Procesal Penal and to the case law that the Cámara de Casación has previously sustained, it is concluded that the conduct does not fit the objective elements of the criminal type, such that the reported facts are atypical. Additionally, it does not emerge from the record that the ruling issued by the Magistrates was based on a false fact, and therefore it is also not possible to subsume the conduct under the crime of prevarication, in its modality of prevarication of fact. For this reason, the request for dismissal filed by the Attorney General (Fiscala General) Emilia Navas Aparicio must be granted, and consequently, the dismissal of the cause must be ordered.\n\nII. On the competence of the Third Chamber to hear the dismissal request. From reading the facts subject to the dismissal request, it is concluded that the Criminal Cassation Chamber is empowered to hear the dismissal request filed in favor of Jesús Ramírez Quirós, Proprietary Magistrate of the Third Chamber, and María Elena Gómez Cortés, Substitute Magistrate of the Third Chamber; however, it lacks competence to rule with respect to the accused Carlos Chinchilla Sandí, Doris Arias Madrigal, and Celso Gamboa Sánchez, who are not among the members of the supreme branches of government and, therefore, the request in relation to said accused must be heard in ordinary proceedings. In this vein, Article 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes a special procedure for the prosecution of members of the Supreme Branches of Government, stating: “The prosecution of members of the Supreme Branches of Government and of officials for whom the Political Constitution requires the Legislative Assembly to authorize their prosecution so that they may be subjected to criminal proceedings, shall be governed by the common provisions, except for those established in this Chapter.” This special procedure must be heard by the Criminal Cassation Chamber, which, in accordance with subsection 2) of Article 56 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, is competent to prosecute Members of the Supreme Branches of Government. From this viewpoint, the cited norm indicates: “The Third Chamber shall hear (…) Criminal cases against members of the Supreme Branches of Government and other equivalent officials.” Moreover, the Magistrates of the Criminal Cassation Chamber make up the Supreme Court of Justice, a body that, pursuant to Article 156 of the Political Constitution, is the superior court of the Judicial Branch and, for this reason, it must be concluded that the Magistrates of the different Chambers composing it form part of the members of the Supreme Branches of Government. On this matter, the doctrine has indicated: “In the case of the Supreme Branches of Government, it would remain to be indicated that regarding the Judicial Branch, the subjects of the special procedure are the magistrates of the respective Chambers that make up the Supreme Court of Justice” (Garay, Noberto. The special procedure for prosecuting members of the Supreme Branches of Government: an analysis from the perspective of international human rights law. Current trends in criminal law from a jurisprudential perspective, Volume I, first edition, San José, C.R., 2014, pag. 333). It should be noted that the special procedure heard by the Criminal Cassation Chamber is applicable while the accused is in the exercise of the position, and thereby, the continuity of the function is protected; however, if during the course of the procedure the condition of member of the Supreme Branches of Government or of an equivalent subject is lost, the special procedure ceases to be applicable. In this sense, the jurisprudence of the Criminal Cassation Chamber has justified the non-application of the special procedure, pointing out: “as this Chamber has indicated on other occasions, said special procedure is justified for reasons of public interest, since its regulation seeks to guarantee the effective performance of the public office held by the member of one of the Supreme Branches of Government of the Republic, who is the subject of a criminal investigation, and such prerogative ceases when such investiture no longer applies to or ends for the person” (ruling 2009-1793 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 9:20 a.m., on December 18, 2009, underlining not in the original). In the specific case, it is observed that Messrs. Carlos Chinchilla Sandí, Doris Arias Madrigal, and Celso Gamboa Sánchez are no longer members of the supreme branches of government, having ceased in their functions as Magistrates of this Chamber, a fact that is public and notorious; therefore, the certification of records is ordered and remitted to the Public Prosecutor's Office, so that it may proceed in accordance with the law.\n\nIII. The dismissal request in favor of Jesús Ramírez Quirós and María Elena Gómez Cortés is granted. From reading the arguments presented, it is inferred that the acts attributed to the accused do not fit the crime of malfeasance (prevaricato) and, therefore, the case must be dismissed. In this sense, the crime of malfeasance is provided for in Article 357 of the Penal Code, which states: “A prison term of two to six years shall be imposed on the judicial or administrative official who issues resolutions contrary to the law or bases them on false facts. If it concerns a conviction in a criminal case, the penalty shall be three to fifteen years of imprisonment. The provisions in the first paragraph of this article shall be applicable, where appropriate, to arbitrators and mediators.” From the analysis of the objective elements of the base criminal offense, it is inferred that the active subject is special, because the act can only be committed by a judicial or administrative official. Likewise, the action carried out by the active subject is the issuance of a resolution; on this matter, the Third Chamber has indicated: “…The typical action consists of issuing resolutions contrary to the law or based on false facts; the legally protected interest is the duty of probity in public service, and the typical conduct directly falls upon the legality and veracity of resolutions, rulings, orders, decrees, and final decisions that affect the rights and interests of the administered parties…” (Voto N° 2013-000881, at 09:54 a.m., on July 12, 2013). Furthermore, the resolution issued must have at least one of the following characteristics: it must be contrary to the law (malfeasance by law), or it must be based on false facts (malfeasance by fact). In relation to malfeasance by law, it must be taken into account that the conduct would not fit said objective element when the resolution falls within the margins of reasonable interpretation, as recognized by the Jurisprudence of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice when indicating: “Likewise, it is relevant to note that the scope and interpretation of norms are not contemplated as objective elements of this criminal offense, that is, they are not punishable. This has been established by this Criminal Cassation Chamber for a long time, pointing out: ‘...the doctrine and jurisprudence agree that anything falling within the limits of the “interpretation of the law” is outside the scope of malfeasance, thus excluding the possibility of malfeasance based on some unsuspected precept of law (...), that is, that: «when the law is not clear, when it allows interpretations – except in the evident case of malice – the judge would not commit malfeasance by applying it» (Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, resolution at 10:30 a.m. on December 10, 1948) (...) The crime of malfeasance would require that in the present resolution there exists an absolute opposition and contradiction between what is decided and what the law declares, or that the resolution was based on false facts, such as those that do not exist or do not appear recorded in the case file, which does not occur here...’ (Resolution number V-183-F, at 11:20 a.m., on March 24, 1995). Meanwhile, in doctrine, some authors have noted that: ‘…a resolution fits within the crime of malfeasance when it is guided by a criterion openly contrary to any of the possible interpretations of the applicable law. Therefore, no judicial decision that conforms to any of the interpretations of positive law can constitute the crime of judicial malfeasance…’ (DONNA, EDGARDO ALBERTO. Crimes against Public Administration. Rubinzal-Culzoni editores. Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2000, pp. 417). C) In the specific case: […] As indicated in the preceding lines, this illegality is of a willful nature; therefore, for conduct to fit within this criminal figure, a clear intention to cause some harm to the interests of the complainant and to violate the legally protected interest of public service duties must be demonstrated, circumstances that do not occur in this particular case […] Let us remember, the crime of malfeasance, as established in Article 357 of the Penal Code, affects the duty of probity in public service only in two scenarios: (i) when the judge bases a resolution on false facts and, based on that fraudulent factual picture, applies a norm (affecting the veracity of the decision); or, (ii) when they claim to base their decision on a norm that they actually ignore, disregard, or fail to apply (breaching its legality). In the sub examine, it was possible to verify that the judge did not base their decision on false facts, nor was their decision contrary to the law invoked in the pronouncement. Whether the norm used in the resolution was correct or not is an issue that would be addressed in the respective ordinary procedure and, in that sense, it is a notorious fact that challenges are daily formulated in our country and throughout the world, in all types of processes (civil, criminal, agrarian, etc.) where the parties often protest, precisely, the norm applied by the judges (its correctness, interpretation, application in time and space, etc.) and not, for that reason, are said jurisdictional authorities (even if the parties' claims are later upheld) accused and sentenced for the commission of a crime of malfeasance. The reason is simple: one thing is the party's dissatisfaction with what was decided (regarding the proven facts or the law applied), and a very different thing is when the judging person willfully introduces (with knowledge and intent) false facts or, despite invoking legislation, when deciding the matter disregards it and this is evident in the decision; in these latter scenarios, the legislator deemed the duty of probity in public service to be affected and decided to criminalize it. Hence, in this case, what is evident on the part of the complainants is a simple disagreement with what was decided in the disciplinary venue, specifically regarding the interpretation and application of the Law, which is part of jurisdictional work and does not, per se, imply the scenario of a resolution contrary to law, in the terms described in Article 357 of the Penal Code, for the crime of malfeasance. […].” (ruling 2017-00240 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 10:48 a.m., on March 22, 2017). In the specific case, even though the conduct was carried out by a judicial official as required by the substantive regulations, the truth is that the resolution issued by Jesús Ramírez Quirós and María Elena Gómez Cortés falls within the margins of interpretation of the law. In this regard, it is necessary to consider that by resolution 2007-0012 of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal for the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at 10:20 a.m., on January 12, 2017, the appeals filed were partially granted and, consequently, the sentence was annulled, ordering the remand for a new proceeding (f. 56). Against said resolution, the complainant filed a cassation appeal, which was declared inadmissible by ruling 2007-00148 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 11:35 a.m., on February 27, 2017 (f. 33-35), a resolution that the complainant deems subsumable under the criminal offense of malfeasance. The basis of the resolution establishes that the cassation appeal is inadmissible, because based on Article 467 of the criminal procedural regulations, what was decided by the ad quem was unchallengeable from an objective standpoint, since it did not confirm, totally or partially, nor did it definitively resolve the sentence issued by the a quo. From this perspective, considering that pursuant to Article 467 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “The cassation appeal shall proceed against resolutions issued by the sentence appeals tribunals, which totally or partially confirm, or definitively resolve, the sentence issued by the trial court,” the application of the literal-grammatical method allows the conclusion that the resolution of the Cassation Chamber giving rise to the complaint falls within the margins of interpretation. In the same vein, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice had already ruled on the inadmissibility of the cassation appeal when the Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal had ordered the case remanded, stating: “However, Article 467 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clear in determining that the cassation appeal proceeds only ‘(…) against resolutions issued by the sentence appeals tribunals, which totally or partially confirm, or definitively resolve, the sentence issued by the trial court.’ Contrary to what the norm requires, the factual picture presented by the Public Defender does not fit the requirements of objective challengeability, since the sentence of the Appeals Tribunal neither confirms totally nor partially, nor does it definitively resolve, the sentence issued by the Trial Court, but rather orders the remand for trial of the case against V.B. This criterion of inadmissibility has already been set forth by this Chamber in cassation appeals filed against the sentence of the ad quem that orders remand, […] (Resolution 2014-346 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 9:29 a.m. on March 7, 2014)” (2015-00436 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 10:30 a.m., on March 11, 2015). For these reasons, as the interpretation of the resolution subject to the complaint is found both from a literal interpretation of Article 467 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in accordance with the jurisprudence that the Cassation Chamber has previously sustained, it is concluded that the conduct does not fit the objective elements of the criminal offense, and therefore the reported facts are atypical. Additionally, it does not appear from the case file that the resolution issued by the Magistrates was based on a false fact, and therefore it is also not possible to subsume the conduct under the crime of malfeasance in its modality of malfeasance by fact. For this reason, the dismissal request filed by the Attorney General Emilia Navas Aparicio must be granted and, consequently, the dismissal of the case must be ordered.\"" }