{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-250622",
  "citation": "Res. 01743-2018 Sala Segunda de la Corte",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Sobresueldos por recargo no son derecho adquirido en reubicación por salud",
  "title_en": "Surcharge payments are not vested rights upon health-related reassignment",
  "summary_es": "La Sala Segunda de la Corte analiza, mediante voto salvado de la magistrada Julia Varela Araya, si una docente reubicada en funciones administrativas por recomendación médica —sin estar formalmente incapacitada— conserva el derecho al pago de un sobresueldo por recargo de 8 lecciones interinas. La magistrada disidente concluye que tal sobresueldo es de carácter temporal y no constituye un derecho adquirido. Sostiene que el principio de legalidad (artículos 11 constitucional y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) impide pagar un plus salarial cuando no se presta efectivamente la función que lo origina. Analiza los artículos 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente, que configuran los recargos como temporales y condicionados. Además, invoca el artículo 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, que solo obliga a incluir los sobresueldos en el subsidio cuando el servidor se incapacita por enfermedad o goza de licencia por maternidad, supuesto no concurrente en el caso. La supresión del pago tras la reubicación se considera ajustada a derecho, pues lo contrario lesionaría los principios de razonabilidad, igualdad salarial y primacía de la realidad.",
  "summary_en": "The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court, through a dissenting vote by Justice Julia Varela Araya, examines whether a teacher reassigned to administrative duties on medical advice—without being formally on sick leave—retains the right to receive a surcharge for 8 interim teaching hours. The dissenting justice concludes that such surcharge is temporary and does not constitute a vested right. She holds that the principle of legality (Art. 11 of the Constitution and Arts. 11 and 13 of the General Public Administration Act) bars paying a salary bonus when the underlying function is no longer performed. She analyzes Art. 118 of the Education Code and Art. 13 of the Teaching Personnel Administration Procedures Manual, which define surcharges as temporary and conditional. She also invokes Art. 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which requires including surcharges in the subsidy only when the employee is on sick leave or maternity leave—a scenario not present here. The cessation of the payment upon reassignment is held to be lawful, as the opposite would violate the principles of reasonableness, equal pay, and the primacy of reality.",
  "court_or_agency": "Sala Segunda de la Corte",
  "date": "2018",
  "year": "2018",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "sobresueldo",
    "recargo de funciones",
    "derecho adquirido",
    "reubicación administrativa",
    "voto salvado",
    "primacía de la realidad",
    "Estatuto de Servicio Civil"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 11",
      "law": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 11",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 13",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 118",
      "law": "Código de Educación"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 174",
      "law": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 22 bis",
      "law": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "sobresueldo",
    "recargo de funciones",
    "derecho adquirido",
    "reubicación administrativa",
    "Sala Segunda",
    "voto salvado",
    "legalidad",
    "Estatuto de Servicio Civil",
    "Código de Educación",
    "igualdad salarial"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "surcharge",
    "function surcharge",
    "vested right",
    "administrative reassignment",
    "Second Chamber",
    "dissenting vote",
    "legality",
    "Civil Service Statute",
    "Education Code",
    "equal pay"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "IX.- VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA JULIA VARELA ARAYA: La suscrita se aparta del criterio de mayoría en cuanto reconoce a la actora el pago del sobresueldo por recargo de 8 lecciones interinas a partir del momento en que fue reubicada en labores administrativas y mientras se mantenga en esa condición. [...] Conforme a lo expuesto, resulta evidente que las sumas recibidas por recargos constituyen sobresueldos temporales, anexos a la estructura salarial, que si bien forman parte de la remuneración final que percibe la persona funcionaria, no son un componente sustancial permanente, sino adicional, cuyo reconocimiento depende de que aquella se encuentre en los presupuestos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para su concesión y de las necesidades que surjan en cada periodo lectivo. Cabe destacar que el pago de estos recargos procede en razón del puesto y de las funciones que realiza la persona servidora, por lo que puede denegarse cuando las condiciones originarias de su otorgamiento desaparezcan. Con base en las normas traídas a colación, la jurisprudencia citada y los principios de primacía de la realidad, razonabilidad e igualdad salarial, considero que la representación del Estado lleva razón cuando manifiesta que no es factible mantener el pago de retribuciones cuando no se da la prestación real del servicio, por motivos como el de autos (persona reubicada en un puesto administrativo), pues no existe sustento fáctico ni jurídico para retribuir un servicio que no se está prestando.",
  "excerpt_en": "IX.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUSTICE JULIA VARELA ARAYA: The undersigned departs from the majority opinion insofar as it awards the plaintiff the surcharge payment for 8 interim hours from the moment she was reassigned to administrative duties and as long as she remains in that condition. [...] Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received as surcharges constitute temporary salary supplements, attached to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration received by the employee, are not a permanent substantive component but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on the employee meeting the legal prerequisites for its grant and on the needs that arise in each academic term. It is worth stressing that the payment of these surcharges is tied to the position and the functions performed by the employee, and therefore may be denied when the original conditions for its grant disappear. On the basis of the cited regulations, case law, and the principles of primacy of reality, reasonableness and equal pay, I consider that the State is correct in asserting that it is not feasible to continue paying compensation when the actual service is not being rendered, for reasons such as those in the present case (employee reassigned to an administrative position), since there is no factual or legal basis to pay for a service that is not being provided.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Dissenting vote",
    "label_es": "Voto salvado",
    "summary_en": "Justice Julia Varela Araya dissents from the majority and concludes that ceasing the surcharge payment to a teacher reassigned to administrative duties for health reasons is lawful, as it is not a vested right.",
    "summary_es": "La magistrada Julia Varela Araya disiente del criterio mayoritario y concluye que la supresión del sobresueldo por recargo a una docente reubicada en funciones administrativas por salud es ajustada a derecho, al no tratarse de un derecho adquirido."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando único del voto salvado",
      "quote_en": "Articles 118 of the Education Code and 13 of the Teaching Personnel Administration Procedures Manual provide for the possibility of assigning certain surcharges, which do not constitute a vested right and, consequently, their payment must be suspended when the employee, in the performance of their regular duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition.",
      "quote_es": "Los ordinales 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente estipulan la posibilidad de asignar ciertos recargos, los cuales no constituyen un derecho adquirido y, por consiguiente, el pago de estos debe suspenderse cuando la persona funcionaria, en el ejercicio de sus labores habituales, deja de cumplir los requisitos exigidos para su reconocimiento."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando único del voto salvado",
      "quote_en": "In other words, the granting of these surcharges depends on the circumstances warranting it and therefore they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each academic year, according to the start and end dates set forth in article 176 of the Civil Service Statute; otherwise, the temporary service would be distorted and become a permanent one.",
      "quote_es": "Dicho de otro modo, el otorgamiento de estos sobresueldos depende de que las circunstancias así lo ameriten y por ello se asignan con carácter temporal, para cada curso lectivo, según las fechas de inicio y fin normadas en el ordinal 176 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; de lo contrario, se desnaturalizaría el servicio eventual y se convertiría en uno ordinario."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando único del voto salvado",
      "quote_en": "It is evident that the sums received as surcharges constitute temporary salary supplements, attached to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration received by the employee, are not a permanent substantive component but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on the employee meeting the legal prerequisites for its grant and on the needs that arise in each academic term.",
      "quote_es": "Resulta evidente que las sumas recibidas por recargos constituyen sobresueldos temporales, anexos a la estructura salarial, que si bien forman parte de la remuneración final que percibe la persona funcionaria, no son un componente sustancial permanente, sino adicional, cuyo reconocimiento depende de que aquella se encuentre en los presupuestos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para su concesión y de las necesidades que surjan en cada periodo lectivo."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-250622",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
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  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-31486",
      "norm_num": "",
      "norm_name": "Código de Educación",
      "tipo_norma": "",
      "norm_fecha": ""
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-32708",
      "norm_num": "1581",
      "norm_name": "Estatuto de Servicio Civil",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "30/05/1953"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-3672",
      "norm_num": "2166",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "09/10/1957"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-8975",
      "norm_num": "",
      "norm_name": "Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil",
      "tipo_norma": "",
      "norm_fecha": ""
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "\"IX.- VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA JULIA VARELA ARAYA: La suscrita se aparta del criterio de mayoría en cuanto reconoce a la actora el pago del sobresueldo por recargo de 8 lecciones interinas a partir del momento en que fue reubicada en labores administrativas y mientras se mantenga en esa condición. Ha quedado debidamente acreditado que, en el año 2011, la demandante devengaba aquel recargo y que, debido a problemas de salud, fue reubicada en funciones administrativas a partir del 1° de setiembre de 2011; razón por la cual aquel sobresueldo se le dejó de pagar (hechos probados 2 y 3 de la sentencia de primera instancia, ratificados por el Tribunal). Asimismo, según se desprende de los oficios números DRH-PPRH-UL-262-2014 y DRH-PRH-UL-279-2015, visibles a imágenes 34-37 y 43-46 de la vista completa del expediente electrónico del Juzgado, respectivamente, está claro que la reubicación se acordó ante una recomendación médica, basada en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. No estamos ante una incapacidad propiamente dicha. Ante la Sala se sostiene que la Administración Pública está sujeta al principio de legalidad, por lo que solo puede proceder conforme a lo que esté debidamente autorizado en el ordenamiento jurídico (numerales 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), y que la servidora no se encuentra dentro de los presupuestos de hecho previstos en el artículo 22 bis inciso a) del Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil, pues no se encuentra incapacitada por enfermedad como se estableció, que la hagan acreedora a lo pretendido. Luego de un replanteamiento del análisis sobre los alcances de la normativa aplicable al caso concreto, concluyo que lleva razón quien recurre. Los ordinales 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente estipulan la posibilidad de asignar ciertos recargos, los cuales no constituyen un derecho adquirido y, por consiguiente, el pago de estos debe suspenderse cuando la persona funcionaria, en el ejercicio de sus labores habituales, deja de cumplir los requisitos exigidos para su reconocimiento. Por otro lado, el artículo 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, establece que: “a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por \"horario alterno\", o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando. /b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes. (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la Ley No.5659 de 17 de diciembre de 1974). /c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder. / (Así adicionado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1º de la Ley No. 6110 de 9 de noviembre de 1977)” (el resaltado es agregado). Del texto antes trascrito se colige, en forma clara y expresa, que la persona servidora que se encuentre incapacitada por enfermedad, o la funcionaria en licencia por maternidad, que viniere devengando salario adicional por sobresueldos, tiene derecho a que estos se contemplen al momento de fijar el importe del subsidio a pagarle. En el caso que nos ocupa, la promovente fue reubicada en funciones administrativas y no está incapacitada ni disfrutando de aquella licencia, por lo que su situación no se subsume en el presupuesto de hecho de la norma. Además, hay que tener presente que al tenor de lo dispuesto en los numerales 118, inciso j), del Código de Educación y 13 del Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 12915-E-P, antes citados, estos pluses se conceden cuando la persona servidora lleva a cabo funciones adicionales a las que realiza ordinariamente en su puesto, de manera temporal, y cuya asignación se encuentra debidamente justificada, ya sea por necesidades de los centros educativos, por razones de oportunidad y conveniencia, o para la satisfacción efectiva y eficiente del servicio brindado. Dicho de otro modo, el otorgamiento de estos sobresueldos depende de que las circunstancias así lo ameriten y por ello se asignan con carácter temporal, para cada curso lectivo, según las fechas de inicio y fin normadas en el ordinal 176 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; de lo contrario, se desnaturalizaría el servicio eventual y se convertiría en uno ordinario. En consonancia con lo anterior, el artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública prescribe que “el exceso se mantendrá como un recargo, por ende, de carácter temporal”. Consecuentemente, aquellos recargos que dependan de alguna condición particular para ser concedidos no se configuran como un derecho adquirido, que se incorpora irremediablemente al salario total de la persona trabajadora, en forma permanente y con independencia del servicio que preste, como se pretende en este caso. Existe vasta jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en el sentido de que los recargos de funciones (en este caso por horario alterno) no pueden considerarse como un derecho adquirido de la persona servidora. Así, en la sentencia n.° 3681, de las 15:45 horas del 22 de marzo de 2011, se externó: “Debe recordarse que esta Sala ha señalado que el desempeño del trabajador que pueda ser catalogado como un recargo de funciones, no constituye un derecho adquirido para el trabajador al que se le asigna y que obligue a la Administración a mantenerle en esa condición. Generalmente la asignación de tales recargos -por obedecer a la necesidad de prestación del servicio en un momento determinado-, tiene un carácter temporal y se paga por una cantidad de labores específicas, siendo que, lógicamente, su valor deberá ser determinado por la autoridad recurrida con fundamento en criterios técnicos y objetivos que son propiamente de su interés y de su competencia (ver en ese sentido sentencia número 2003-09533 de las doce horas veintiocho minutos del cinco de septiembre del dos mil tres y 2006-7717 de las dieciséis horas cuarenta y siete minutos del treinta de mayo del dos mil seis, entre otras). Por tal razón, el recargo constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial que depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo u horario alterno\" (énfasis suplido; véanse también las resoluciones números 6390 de las 15:14 horas del 18 de mayo de 2011 y 868 de las 9:05 horas del 18 de enero de 2013). De igual manera, en el voto n.° 3306, de las 12:48 horas del 9 de marzo de 2007, se acotó: “…si los supuestos por los cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó (sentencia N° 2006-010959 de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006)”. En este mismo fallo se hizo referencia a la sentencia n.° 296, de las 11:54 horas del 13 de enero de 1995, en el cual expresamente se indicó: “De igual forma cabe pronunciarse en lo que toca a la diferencia salarial que dice el recurrente que deja de percibir con ocasión del acto cuestionado, toda vez que la retribución por el recargo citado constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial, el cual depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado, para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo señalado, de manera que el recurso, en cuanto a este último reparo es también improcedente…”. Por último, en la resolución n.° 10959, de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006, se apuntó: “Esta Sala, en múltiples oportunidades, ha establecido que los sobresueldos que dependan de alguna condición para ser otorgados no constituyen un derecho adquirido que se incorpore como tal al salario propiamente dicho, toda vez que su otorgamiento depende de las condiciones objetivas por las cuales fue reconocido. En otras palabras, si las condiciones bajo las cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó”. Conforme a lo expuesto, resulta evidente que las sumas recibidas por recargos constituyen sobresueldos temporales, anexos a la estructura salarial, que si bien forman parte de la remuneración final que percibe la persona funcionaria, no son un componente sustancial permanente, sino adicional, cuyo reconocimiento depende de que aquella se encuentre en los presupuestos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para su concesión y de las necesidades que surjan en cada periodo lectivo. Cabe destacar que el pago de estos recargos procede en razón del puesto y de las funciones que realiza la persona servidora, por lo que puede denegarse cuando las condiciones originarias de su otorgamiento desaparezcan. Con base en las normas traídas a colación, la jurisprudencia citada y los principios de primacía de la realidad, razonabilidad e igualdad salarial, considero que la representación del Estado lleva razón cuando manifiesta que no es factible mantener el pago de retribuciones cuando no se da la prestación real del servicio, por motivos como el de autos (persona reubicada en un puesto administrativo), pues no existe sustento fáctico ni jurídico para retribuir un servicio que no se está prestando. Además, obligar al Estado a cancelar una remuneración por una contraprestación que no se está brindando resulta irrazonable y contrario a la equidad. Aunado a ello, se estaría dando una ventaja indebida a las personas reubicadas, con respecto a quienes se encuentran nombradas en una plaza de docente y ejerciendo las funciones por recargo de algún tipo, pues no se hallan en igualdad de condiciones y ganan igual. Amén de que el Estado estaría pagando doble (a dos funcionarios) por un mismo recargo, cuando haya sido necesario que lo asuma la persona que sustituye a quien ha sido reubicada por razones de salud. Como se dijo antes, el recargo de 8 lecciones interinas, como ocurre en el caso de estudio, no constituye un derecho adquirido, amén de que, por lo excepcional del tema, no pueden ser reputados como un derecho que se incorpora de ordinario (fijo) a los contratos de trabajo de las personas docentes. Finalmente, téngase presente que para poder exigir el pago del recargo se requiere necesariamente que una norma así lo autorice (principio de legalidad que rige en el sector público) y cumplir con las condiciones y presupuestos por ella estatuidos; lo que no se da en la especie. En virtud de lo anterior, la supresión del sobresueldo en cuestión, al pasar la actora de la condición de docente a cumplir funciones administrativas por reubicación, está ajustada a derecho.\"",
  "body_en_text": "IX.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE JULIA VARELA ARAYA: The undersigned departs from the majority criterion insofar as it grants the plaintiff payment of the additional salary (sobresueldo) for the overload (recargo) of 8 interim lessons (lecciones interinas) from the moment she was reassigned to administrative duties and for as long as she remains in that condition. It has been duly proven that, in 2011, the claimant was earning that overload (recargo) and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative functions as of September 1, 2011; which is why that additional salary (sobresueldo) ceased to be paid to her (proven facts 2 and 3 of the first-instance judgment, ratified by the Tribunal). Likewise, as is evident from official communications numbers DRH-PPRH-UL-262-2014 and DRH-PRH-UL-279-2015, visible at images 34-37 and 43-46 of the complete view of the electronic case file of the Juzgado, respectively, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon following a medical recommendation, based on article 254 of the Código de Trabajo. We are not dealing with a proper incapacity (incapacidad). Before the Sala, it is argued that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and therefore may only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (articles 11 of the Constitución Política and 11 and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), and that the employee is not within the factual circumstances provided for in article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil, since she is not incapacitated (incapacitada) by illness, as was established, that would make her entitled to the claim. After reconsidering the analysis of the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, I conclude that the appellant is correct. Articles 118 of the Código de Educación and 13 of the Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente stipulate the possibility of assigning certain overloads (recargos), which do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) and, consequently, payment thereof must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements for their recognition. On the other hand, article 174 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil establishes that: “a) If the employee, at the time of being incapacitated (incapacitarse) due to illness or maternity, were earning additional salary for zoning (zonaje), for \"alternate schedule\" (horario alterno), or any additional salary (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that moment. /b) Sick leave, regardless of its duration, shall not interrupt the right of employees to receive the corresponding salary increases. (Thus amended by article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall be, consequently, the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may correspond. / (Thus added the preceding subsection by article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (emphasis added). From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that the employee who is incapacitated (incapacitada) by illness, or the female employee on maternity leave, who was earning additional salary for additional salaries (sobresueldos), has the right to have these considered when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid to them. In the case before us, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative functions and is neither incapacitated (incapacitada) nor enjoying that leave, so her situation does not fall within the factual circumstances of the rule. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that according to the provisions of articles 118, subsection j), of the Código de Educación and 13 of Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 12915-E-P, cited above, these pluses (pluses) are granted when the employee performs functions additional to those ordinarily performed in their position, temporarily, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether due to the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these additional salaries (sobresueldos) depends on the circumstances warranting it, and for this reason they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each school year, according to the start and end dates regulated in article 176 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil; otherwise, the temporary service would be distorted and would become an ordinary one. In line with the foregoing, article 15 of the Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública prescribes that “the excess shall be maintained as an overload (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature.” Consequently, those overloads (recargos) that depend on some particular condition to be granted are not configured as a vested right (derecho adquirido), which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and regardless of the service rendered, as is claimed in this case. There is extensive jurisprudence from the Sala Constitucional to the effect that function overloads (recargos de funciones) (in this case for alternate schedule [horario alterno]) cannot be considered a vested right (derecho adquirido) of the employee. Thus, in judgment n.° 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It must be remembered that this Sala has indicated that the worker's performance that can be classified as a function overload (recargo de funciones) does not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) for the worker to whom it is assigned and that obliges the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such overloads (recargos) - because it responds to the need for service provision at a given moment -, is temporary in nature and is paid for a quantity of specific tasks, it being logical that its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly of its interest and competence (see in this regard judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve hours twenty-eight minutes on September fifth, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 of sixteen hours forty-seven minutes on May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the overload (recargo) constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit that depends on the fact that the functions are or are not exercised, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party so that such amount continues to be paid to them, or so that the overload (recargo) or alternate schedule (horario alterno) is maintained for them” (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 of 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 of 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Likewise, in vote n.° 3306, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the assumptions for which an additional salary (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not fulfilled (judgment N° 2006-010959 of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006).” In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment n.° 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly indicated: “In the same way, it is appropriate to rule regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to stop receiving on the occasion of the questioned act, since the remuneration for the cited overload (recargo) constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit, which depends on the fact that the functions are or are not exercised, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, so that such amount continues to be paid to them, or so that the indicated overload (recargo) is maintained for them, so that the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also inadmissible…”. Finally, in resolution n.° 10959, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: “This Sala, on multiple occasions, has established that additional salaries (sobresueldos) that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) that is incorporated as such into the salary itself, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which it was recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which an additional salary (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not fulfilled.” In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for overloads (recargos) constitute temporary additional salaries (sobresueldos), annexed to the salary structure, which although they form part of the final remuneration received by the employee, are not a permanent substantial component, but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on the employee being in the circumstances established in the legal system for their concession and on the needs that arise in each school period. It should be noted that the payment of these overloads (recargos) is based on the position and the functions performed by the employee, and therefore can be denied when the originating conditions for their granting disappear. Based on the norms brought up, the cited jurisprudence, and the principles of primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, I consider that the State's representation is correct when it states that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of remuneration when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as the one in this case (a person reassigned to an administrative position), as there is no factual or legal basis to remunerate a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, obliging the State to pay a remuneration for a consideration that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. In addition to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, with respect to those who are appointed to a teaching position and exercising the functions for an overload (recargo) of some kind, since they are not under equal conditions and earn the same. Besides the fact that the State would be paying double (to two officials) for the same overload (recargo), when it has been necessary for the person substituting the one who has been reassigned for health reasons to assume it. As stated before, the overload (recargo) of 8 interim lessons (lecciones interinas), as occurs in the case under study, does not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be deemed a right that is ordinarily (fixed) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it must be kept in mind that to be able to demand payment of the overload (recargo), it is necessarily required that a norm so authorizes it (principle of legality that governs the public sector) and to comply with the conditions and circumstances established by it; which does not occur in this instance. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the additional salary (sobresueldo) in question, when the plaintiff went from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law.\n\nIX.- DISSENTING OPINION OF MAGISTRATE JULIA VARELA ARAYA: The undersigned departs from the majority opinion insofar as it grants the plaintiff the payment of the additional pay (sobresueldo) for the surcharge (recargo) of 8 interim lessons from the moment she was reassigned to administrative duties and for as long as she remains in that condition. It has been duly proven that, in 2011, the plaintiff was earning that surcharge (recargo) and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative duties as of September 1, 2011; for which reason that additional pay (sobresueldo) ceased to be paid to her (proven facts 2 and 3 of the first-instance judgment, ratified by the Tribunal). Likewise, as can be deduced from official letters numbers DRH-PPRH-UL-262-2014 and DRH-PRH-UL-279-2015, visible at images 34-37 and 43-46 of the complete view of the Court's electronic case file, respectively, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, grounded in Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not dealing with a disability leave (incapacidad) as such. Before the Chamber, it is argued that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, so it can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (Articles 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), and that the employee is not within the factual circumstances provided for in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil), since she is not on a disability leave due to illness as was established, which would make her entitled to what she claims. After a reconsideration of the analysis regarding the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, I conclude that the appellant is correct. Articles 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Managing Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain surcharges (recargos), which do not constitute an acquired right (derecho adquirido) and, consequently, their payment must be suspended when the public servant, in the exercise of their regular duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) establishes that: “a) If the servant, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for location allowance (zonaje), for \\\"alternate schedule\\\" (horario alterno), or any additional pay (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. / b) Sick leaves, regardless of their duration, shall not interrupt the right of the servants to receive the corresponding salary increases. (As reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). / c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may correspond. / (The previous subsection was thus added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (highlighting added). From the text transcribed above, it is deduced, clearly and expressly, that the public servant who is on a disability leave (incapacitada) due to illness, or the female official on maternity leave, who was earning additional salary from additional pay (sobresueldos), has the right for these to be considered when establishing the amount of the subsidy to be paid to them. In the case at hand, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative duties and is neither on a disability leave (incapacitada) nor enjoying that leave, so her situation does not fall under the factual premise of the rule. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that pursuant to the provisions of Articles 118, subsection j), of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 12915-E-P, cited above, these additional amounts (pluses) are granted when the public servant performs additional functions to those ordinarily carried out in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether due to the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these additional pays (sobresueldos) depends on the circumstances so warranting, and therefore they are assigned temporarily, for each school year, according to the start and end dates regulated in Article 176 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); otherwise, the eventual service would be distorted and become an ordinary one. In line with the above, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) prescribes that “the excess shall be maintained as a surcharge (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature.” Consequently, those surcharges (recargos) that depend on a particular condition to be granted are not configured as an acquired right (derecho adquirido), which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and independently of the service provided, as is intended in this case. There is vast jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in the sense that functional surcharges (recargos de funciones) (in this case for alternate schedule) cannot be considered an acquired right (derecho adquirido) of the public servant. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, at 15:45 hours on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It must be remembered that this Chamber has indicated that the worker's performance that can be classified as a functional surcharge (recargo de funciones) does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned and that obliges the Administration to keep them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such surcharges (recargos) - because it responds to the need for service provision at a given moment - has a temporary character and is paid for a specific set of tasks, and, logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly of its interest and competence (see in this sense judgment number 2003-09533 at twelve hours and twenty-eight minutes on September 5, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 at sixteen hours and forty-seven minutes on May 30, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the surcharge (recargo) constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit that depends on whether or not the functions are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party for them to continue being paid that item, or for them to maintain the surcharge (recargo) or alternate schedule\" (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 at 15:14 hours on May 18, 2011, and 868 at 9:05 hours on January 18, 2013). Similarly, in vote No. 3306, at 12:48 hours on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the assumptions under which an additional pay (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person no longer finds themselves in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not fulfilled (Judgment No. 2006-010959 at 17:51 hours on July 26, 2006).” This same ruling referred to judgment No. 296, at 11:54 hours on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly indicated: “A similar pronouncement must be made regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to no longer receive on the occasion of the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited surcharge (recargo) constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit, which depends on whether or not the functions are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, for them to continue being paid that item, or for them to maintain the indicated surcharge (recargo), so that the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also inadmissible…”. Finally, in resolution No. 10959, at 17:51 hours on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: “This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that additional pays (sobresueldos) that depend on a condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary proper, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which they were recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which an additional pay (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person no longer finds themselves in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not fulfilled.” According to the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for surcharges (recargos) constitute temporary additional pays (sobresueldos), annexed to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration that the public servant receives, are not a permanent substantial component, but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on whether that person meets the requirements established in the legal system for its concession and on the needs that arise in each school period. It should be highlighted that the payment of these surcharges (recargos) proceeds depending on the position and the functions performed by the public servant, so it can be denied when the original conditions for its granting disappear. Based on the rules brought to the discussion, the cited jurisprudence, and the principles of primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, I consider that the State's representation is correct when it states that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of remunerations when the real provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as the one in this case (a person reassigned to an administrative position), since there is no factual or legal basis to remunerate a service that is not being provided. Moreover, obliging the State to pay a remuneration for a consideration that is not being rendered is unreasonable and contrary to equity. In addition to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, with respect to those who are appointed to a teaching position and performing the duties for a surcharge (recargo) of some kind, since they are not in equal conditions yet earn the same. Moreover, the State would be paying double (to two officials) for the same surcharge (recargo), when it has been necessary for the person replacing the one who has been reassigned for health reasons to assume it. As stated before, the surcharge (recargo) of 8 interim lessons, as in the case under study, does not constitute an acquired right (derecho adquirido), and besides, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be deemed a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it should be borne in mind that in order to demand the payment of the surcharge (recargo), it is necessary that a legal provision specifically authorizes it (principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and to comply with the conditions and assumptions established by it; which does not occur in this case. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the additional pay (sobresueldo) in question, when the plaintiff moved from the status of teacher to performing administrative duties due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law.\""
}