{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-279667", "citation": "Res. 00025-2020 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Cómputo del plazo mensual de prescripción disciplinaria para despido", "title_en": "Calculation of the one-month statute of limitations for disciplinary dismissal", "summary_es": "La sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo, Sección VI, resuelve un caso en el que un exfuncionario de la Universidad Técnica Nacional impugna su despido por haber sido notificado fuera del plazo de prescripción de un mes previsto en el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo. El demandante alegaba que el acto debía contarse por días (33 días), excediendo el mes, y que por tanto era nulo. El tribunal, por mayoría, desestima la demanda. Establece que el plazo de “un mes” del artículo 603 se computa por meses según el calendario (de fecha a fecha), y no por días, aplicando supletoriamente el artículo 146 del Código Procesal Civil. Al vencer el plazo en un día inhábil (domingo 14 de agosto de 2016), se prorroga al día hábil siguiente conforme al artículo 147 del Código Procesal Civil y 148 del Código de Trabajo. Por tanto, la notificación realizada el martes 16 de agosto de 2016 fue oportuna y el acto de despido es válido.", "summary_en": "This ruling by the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section VI, addresses a case where a former employee of the National Technical University challenged his dismissal on the grounds that the notification fell outside the one-month statute of limitations under Article 603 of the Labor Code. The claimant argued that the deadline should be counted in days (33 days), exceeding the month, and thus the act was null and void. The majority of the court rejects the claim. It holds that the “one-month” period in Article 603 is computed on a calendar-month basis (from date to date), not by days, following the supplementary application of Article 146 of the Civil Procedure Code. Since the deadline expired on a non-business day (Sunday, August 14, 2016), it was extended to the next business day under Article 147 of the Civil Procedure Code and Article 148 of the Labor Code. Accordingly, the notification made on Tuesday, August 16, 2016, was timely and the dismissal act is valid.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "date": "2020", "year": "2020", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "prescripción", "caducidad", "preclusión", "días inhábiles", "integración normativa", "plazo mensual" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 603", "law": "Código de Trabajo" }, { "article": "Art. 146", "law": "Código Procesal Civil" }, { "article": "Art. 147", "law": "Código Procesal Civil" }, { "article": "Art. 256", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 71", "law": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República" } ], "keywords_es": [ "prescripción disciplinaria", "plazo de un mes", "despido", "cómputo de plazos", "preclusión de competencia", "días inhábiles", "Art. 603 Código de Trabajo", "integración normativa", "derecho administrativo sancionador", "empleo público" ], "keywords_en": [ "disciplinary statute of limitations", "one-month period", "dismissal", "time computation", "loss of competence", "non-business days", "Art. 603 Labor Code", "normative integration", "administrative sanctioning law", "public employment" ], "excerpt_es": "Así las cosas, deriva este Tribunal entonces, que el plazo prescriptivo mensual, en efecto, debe contabilizarse de fecha a fecha según el calendario y no por equivalencia en una determinada cantidad de días naturales, tal y como lo aduce la representación del actor; por consiguiente, en el caso concreto, el día final del plazo correspondería al día domingo 14 de agosto de 2016, sin embargo, en atención a lo dispuesto en los numerales 147 CPC (Ley N° 7130) y 147 y 148 CdeT, al corresponder no sólo ese día, sino también el siguiente, a días inhábiles, el plazo debe entenderse ampliado al siguiente día hábil, por lo que el punto en el tiempo en el cual cesaba la posibilidad de ejercer legítimamente la potestad disciplinaria, correspondería -para la mayoría del Colegio de Jueces- al martes 16 de agosto de 2016 y, tal y como se tuvo por demostrado (hecho probado n° 10), ese día, justamente, coincide con el instante en que se notificó el acto impugnado a los medios aportados por el señor Hernández Castro al expediente administrativo, de tal manera que la Administración sí ejerció en tiempo su poder de disciplina.", "excerpt_en": "Thus, this Tribunal finds that the monthly prescription period must indeed be counted from date to date according to the calendar, and not by an equivalent number of calendar days, as the claimant’s representative argues. Therefore, in the specific case, the final day of the period would be Sunday, August 14, 2016. However, pursuant to Articles 147 of the Civil Procedure Code (Law No. 7130) and 147 and 148 of the Labor Code, since not only that day but also the following one are non-business days, the period must be understood as extended to the next business day. Hence, the point in time at which the possibility of legitimately exercising disciplinary power ceased would be —for the majority of this Panel of Judges— Tuesday, August 16, 2016. As demonstrated (proven fact No. 10), that day precisely coincides with the moment the challenged act was notified to the means provided by Mr. Hernández Castro in the administrative file, so the Administration did exercise its disciplinary power on time.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The Court dismisses the claim for annulment of the dismissal, finding that the act was notified within the one-month period counted from date to date, extended due to non-business days.", "summary_es": "El Tribunal declara sin lugar la demanda de nulidad del despido, al considerar que la notificación del acto se realizó dentro del plazo de un mes contado de fecha a fecha, prorrogado por días inhábiles." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Artículo 146 del Código Procesal Civil (citado)", "quote_en": "Periods of years or months shall be counted according to the calendar, that is, from date to date.", "quote_es": "Los plazos por años o meses se contarán según el calendario, o sea, de fecha a fecha." }, { "context": "Artículo 147 del Código Procesal Civil (citado)", "quote_en": "If the final day of a period is a non-business day, it shall be considered extended to the following business day.", "quote_es": "Si el día final de un plazo fuere inhábil, se tendrá por prorrogado hasta el día hábil siguiente." }, { "context": "Considerando IX, ratio decidendi", "quote_en": "The monthly statute of limitations period must indeed be counted from date to date according to the calendar and not by an equivalent number of calendar days.", "quote_es": "El plazo prescriptivo mensual, en efecto, debe contabilizarse de fecha a fecha según el calendario y no por equivalencia en una determinada cantidad de días naturales." }, { "context": "Artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (citado)", "quote_en": "The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act that orders the commencement of the administrative proceeding.", "quote_es": "La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-279667", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-21629", "norm_num": "7428", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "07/09/1994" }, { "doc_id": "norm-6530", "norm_num": "4755", "norm_name": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "03/05/1971" }, { "doc_id": "norm-80985", "norm_num": "9343", "norm_name": "Reforma Procesal Laboral", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "25/01/2016" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "\"V.- SOBRE EL ELEMENTO TEMPORAL EN EL EJERCICIO DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA.- En las relaciones funcionariales, el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria del jerarca (102 LGAP) se encuentra sujeto a un factor de temporalidad, luego del cual, tal ejercicio no podrá ser emprendido. Este límite temporal varía según las reglas jurídicas que al respecto disponga cada régimen jurídico de empleo público, no obstante lo cual, se mantienen algunas regulaciones generales como veremos más adelante. Este rasgo temporal es un aspecto que diferencia ésta de otras potestades públicas que, per se, se consideran imprescriptibles -v.gr., tutela de bienes demaniales-, quizás precisamente por constituir una de las manifestaciones del poder sancionador de la Administración (ius puniendi). Esta variedad en el marco normativo, se debe a que la determinación jurídica de esta limitación temporal de la potestad disciplinaria, es un asunto librado a la discrecionalidad del legislador, quien ha establecido en cada régimen jurídico reglas particulares, sea sujetando ésta a un régimen de prescripción o uno de caducidad. Sin embargo y desde ese plano, el fenecimiento por el paso del tiempo en cualquiera de estos dos supuestos, supone la concurrencia de varios factores fundamentales, a saber: a) inercia del titular de un derecho en su ejercicio y b) transcurso del tiempo fijado por el ordenamiento jurídico en esa inercia del titular y; en el caso particular de la prescripción, además: c) alegación o excepción del sujeto pasivo de la relación jurídica, y d) la concurrencia o no de hipótesis de suspensión o interrupción del plazo. Con todo, el principal instrumento por el cual se ha decantado nuestra legislación en materia de empleo público ha sido el de la prescripción negativa, que de esta manera bien puede ser alegada como causal de nulidad del acto final sancionatorio, porque impide el ejercicio de la competencia en el caso concreto. Asimismo, tratándose de actuaciones de la Administración Pública en procedimientos administrativos sancionatorios, resulta fundamental lo estatuido por el ordinal 329.3 de la LGAP que señala: “…3. El acto final recaído fuera del plazo será válido para todo efecto legal, salvo disposición en contrario de la ley…”, de suerte que cuando una disposición legal fije la pérdida o preclusión del ejercicio de la competencia por el paso del tiempo, hace que el acto que hubiese dictado extemporáneamente, no pueda ser tenido como válido por la desaparición de ese elemento constitutivo. De esta manera, con la pérdida del presupuesto temporal como requisito para el ejercicio de la competencia disciplinaria, el órgano público estaría impedido para actuar en el caso concreto y por ende, el acto sancionatorio así emitido carecería fundamentalmente de legitimación y de competencia.- \n\nVI.- CONTINÚA.- Ahora bien, tratándose de la potestad disciplinaria en materia de empleo público, el Derecho costarricense ha dispuesto que la extinción o fenecimiento del presupuesto temporal de ésta puede acontecer según diversos momentos o etapas del procedimiento. En ese sentido, de conformidad con los numerales 9 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y por ende, a falta de norma administrativa que regule de manera general la prescripción en las relaciones de empleo público, se debe recurrir -sin perjuicio de norma especial- a las disposiciones que en ese sentido se establecen en el Código de Trabajo, primero en el artículo 603 y posteriormente, a partir de la reforma operada por Ley N° 9343, en los artículos 414 y 415. Concretamente, se ha establecido que el decurso del tiempo puede afectar, por prescripción o por caducidad -según la regulación específica-, el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria en cuatro estadios diferentes del procedimiento: 1) Para iniciar el poder de disciplina; 2) Para la adopción de la sanción por parte del órgano decisor; 3) Para la ejecución de la sanción impuesta; y 4) Para el trámite del procedimiento. Estas divisiones, han sido sostenidas por esta Sección a través de diversas sentencias, de las cuales valga citar algunas, tales como las n° 25-2019-VI de las 10:20 horas del 28 de febrero de 2019, n° 075-2018-VI de las 14:05 horas del 22 de junio del 2018, entre otras. Comenzaremos el análisis, según el orden antes señalado. 1) Para iniciar la potestad disciplinaria: Esta fase acontece cuando aún no se ha ejercitado la autotutela administrativa encaminada a determinar si han ocurrido o no los hechos que configuran las sanciones administrativas disciplinarias, como derivación de lo establecido en los ordinales 214, 221, 297, 308 LGAP. Esta potestad para verificar los hechos se entiende comprendida para efectos del cómputo de la prescripción, como parte de la potestad disciplinaria y su ejercicio, y consecuentemente, está sujeta a un plazo legal, el cual a su vez dependerá en su definición de las regulaciones especiales o generales aplicables al caso concreto. Así, en éste último plano, el Código de Trabajo (CdeT), antes o después de la reforma operada por la Ley N° 9343, en consistencia con la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR), Ley N° 7428 del 7 de setiembre de 1994, en tanto marcos prescriptivos comunes para la materia administrativa, son consistentes en identificar que ese momento acaece cuando el Jerarca se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad, situación que en la realidad dependerá del carácter notorio o evidente de los hechos constitutivos de la infracción, esto es, según amerite o no el desarrollo de una investigación preliminar y del conocimiento de sus resultados. Así, es posible aseverar que el plazo podría iniciarse con el “acaecimiento del hecho” (Art 71.a LOCGR) o “desde que se dio la causa para la separación o sanción” (Art. 414 CdeT -anterior 603-), cuando el hecho a sancionar es notorio o evidente; o en una segunda hipótesis, cuando dada la complejidad de las circunstancias, se torna indispensable realizar previamente una investigación preliminar, en cuyo caso el conteo de la prescripción iniciaría “desde que fueran conocidos los hechos causales” (Art. 414 CdeT), o “a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo” (Art 71.b LOCGR). En tal escenario, el plazo señalado se computa desde el momento de la recepción o comunicación efectiva al jerarca de dicho informe, pues es hasta ese momento que ese titular puede válidamente adoptar las decisiones respecto de la apertura o no de disposiciones disciplinarias. Con todo, debe discriminarse en cada caso la necesidad o no de esa fase (investigación preliminar), pues de otro modo, podría utilizarse como estrategia para evadir la prescripción, siendo que no en todos los escenarios, esa investigación sería necesaria, sino solo aquellos en que por las particularidades del caso, esa fase sea indispensable para determinar la pertinencia o no de la apertura del procedimiento sancionatorio, o bien, para recabar indicios que propendan a clarificar su necesidad o no.-\n\nVII.- CONT.- 2) Término para la adopción y comunicación de la sanción por parte del órgano decisor: Corresponde al límite máximo temporal que puede discurrir entre el momento en que el órgano director concluye con su labor instructora, mediante la puesta en conocimiento del expediente administrativo al órgano decisor o titular de la competencia, sea o no por medio de informe o dictamen conclusivo (contenga o no recomendaciones), y la adopción y comunicación de la respectiva decisión, esto es, de la declaración de la voluntad administrativa a través del dictado del acto final del procedimiento y su respectiva notificación, necesaria a fin de que esa voluntad pueda desplegar su eficacia conforme lo estipula el artículo 140 LGAP. Este término, conforme las regulaciones generales contenidas en el anterior ordinal 603 del Código de Trabajo, sería de un mes, vencido el cual ocurría indefectiblemente la prescripción de esa potestad y, por ende, el acto final adoptado más allá de este límite, sería nulo por lesión al elemento competencial, condicionado en ese caso por factores de preclusión. Valga decir que en la reforma procesal laboral contenida en la Ley N° 9342, concretamente, en el párrafo segundo del ordinal 414, esta hipótesis fue precisada adecuadamente de la siguiente manera: “…el mes comenzará a correr de nuevo en el momento en que la persona empleadora o el órgano competente, en su caso, esté en posibilidad de resolver…”. Al tratarse de un umbral máximo, se debe entender entonces que los plazos regulados en los numerales 261 y 319 LGAP, serían de carácter ordenatorio, además de que regulan situaciones de distinto tipo, que no alteran el plazo prescriptivo al que hacemos referencia.- 3) Para la ejecución de la sanción impuesta: Se refiere al plazo con que cuenta el jerarca administrativo para disponer la aplicación de la sanción dictada, es decir, para la ejecución material del acto que dispone como contenido una sanción disciplinaria. Al respecto y ante la carencia de norma administrativa, esta Cámara considera que se debe acudir por integración, a lo preceptuado en el Código de Trabajo a manera de marco normativo de aplicación supletoria. Valga decir que en esa legislación, de previo a la entrada en vigencia de la reforma procesal laboral, Ley N° 9343 de 25 de enero de 2016, esta hipótesis se regulaba mediante prescripción, sin embargo, a partir de ésta se impuso en el artículo 415 un término de caducidad de un año: “…Cuando sea necesario seguir un procedimiento y consignar las sanciones disciplinarias en un acto escrito, la ejecución de las así impuestas caduca, para todo efecto, en un año desde la firmeza del acto…” (Resaltado no es del original). Recordemos que en ese sentido, pese a que la norma hace contar el plazo a partir de la firmeza, la ejecución de un acto desfavorable -como lo es precisamente una sanción disciplinaria-, está supeditada necesariamente a la comunicación previa a su destinatario, a tenor de la doctrina de los artículos 140, 141, 150.1, 239, 240, 256.3, entre otros, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. 4) Para el trámite del procedimiento: Como límite, este umbral esta referido al plazo máximo que puede durar un procedimiento administrativo instaurado para establecer los hechos que permitan adoptar la decisión final del titular de la potestad represiva pública. Este tema encuentra una regulación general en lo dispuesto en el artículo 261, en relación con el 319 y el 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, Ley N°6227; valga señalar que que éste último numeral somete esta fase a un supuesto de caducidad como forma de terminación anormal, sin embargo, previas circunstancias concretas que deben presentarse en cada caso particular, entre ellas, la inercia de la Administración, el reclamo respectivo del afectado, un término especial de seis meses, entre otros aspectos. De este modo, a excepción del supuesto del artículo 340 LGAP u otras disposiciones especiales que resulten aplicables (por ejemplo, el ordinal 211 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), en esta etapa se carece entonces de regulaciones expresas respecto de algún límite temporal para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria y por lo tanto, el plazo bimensual que se dispone en el numeral 261 de la LGAP, corresponde de este modo a uno de naturaleza ordenatoria, no perentoria. Ahora bien, considera esta Cámara que es necesario dejar en claro, que en modo alguno de esta circunstancia se puede colegir que resultan jurídicamente validos y aceptables, procedimientos con dilaciones injustificadas, arbitrarias y desproporcionadas, precisamente porque con ello se conculcan los derechos fundamentales de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida y a la buena y eficiente prestación de los servicios públicos, así como a los principios generales del Derecho Público de eficacia, eficiencia, celeridad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, los cuales también comparten raigambre constitucional y legal (Arts. 4, 7 y 8 LGAP) . Así, en tesis de inicio, el exceso de dos meses, si bien no conduce per se a la nulidad del procedimiento por preclusión de la competencia, será necesario analizar en cada caso concreto si su duración atenta o no contra la celeridad, eficacia y la eficiencia que desde el plano racional y proporcional deben imperar en estas lides. En este sentido, puede verse el fallo No. 199-2011-VI de esta Sección VI, de las las 16: 20 horas del 12 de septiembre del 2011.- \n\nVIII.- CONT.- Sobre la interrupción y suspensión de los plazos de prescripción.- Como hemos visto hasta ahora, las regulaciones sobre el presupuesto temporal que incide en el ejercicio de la competencia, se desarrollan a través de las figuras de la caducidad o de la prescripción. Igualmente, determinamos que el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria se limita en el tiempo de diferente manera conforme el estadio o etapa del procedimiento de la que se trate, por lo que en la fase inicial y en la de adopción del acto se regula según el instituto de la prescripción, mientras que en la de ejecución (posterior a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley N° 9343) por la de caducidad. En la de instrucción, se regula según la figura del caducidad del procedimiento o bien, por el principio constitucional de justicia pronta y cumplida. De esta manera, es en los escenarios regulados por la prescripción que es posible someter el plazo a causales de suspensión o interrupción. La distinción fundamental entre ambas radica en que, en los supuestos de interrupción, el decurso del tiempo anterior al hecho que da lugar a tales supuestos deviene en inexistente, es decir, se genera una ficción jurídica por la cual el tiempo transcurrido deja de existir para todo efecto legal, de modo que nuevamente comienza a correr el plazo prescriptivo. El artículo 878 del Código Civil dice: “…El efecto de la interrupción es inutilizar para la prescripción todo el tiempo corrido anteriormente…”. Por otra parte, en las causales de suspensión, el acaecimiento del hecho lo que hace es inhibir momentáneamente el transcurso del tiempo, por lo que una vez desaparecido, se reanuda el cómputo del plazo justo en el mismo punto en el que fue paralizado. La Sala Primera ha señalado: “…En primer término, precisa recordar que la prescripción está sujeta a causas de suspensión y de interrupción. Sobre el tema, esta Sala ha indicado que, en virtud de la primera, cuando se produce alguna de las que tengan este efecto, el plazo deja de correr y cuando cesa el motivo de su paralización, corre de nuevo desde el punto en que se suspendió. En la interrupción, por el contrario, sobrevenida la causal, el plazo corre nuevamente, es decir, el curso del tiempo transcurrido a favor de la prescriptibilidad deja de existir; y comienza a computarse otro a partir del hecho o circunstancia que indujo esta situación. En consecuencia, no puede contarse el que ya había transcurrido…” (Sentencia n° 348-F-2007 de las 10:25 horas del 11 de mayo de 2007). De estas categorías, la que interesa para efectos de la prescripción disciplinaria es la de la interrupción, toda vez que es ésta, la que expresamente se ha regulado en los diversos marcos normativos a los que hemos hecho referencia en este fallo: el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, o bien en el artículo 603 o 414 del Código de Trabajo, según se aplique o no la reforma procesal laboral operada por la Ley N° 9343. La primera de estas normas supone una hipótesis de interrupción para el estadio inicial del procedimiento (1): la comunicación inicial del procedimiento disciplinario o traslado de cargos: “…La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo…” (Art. 71 LOCGR). Así, la notificación de la apertura del procedimiento genera un efecto continuado de interrupción de ese margen de temporalidad, de manera que inhibe por un lado, el tiempo transcurrido anteriormente y por otro, mantiene paralizado el decurso de éste hasta tanto el asunto llegue a conocimiento del jerarca. Por su parte, la regla general del Código de Trabajo, antes o después de la reforma procesal laboral, abarcaba tanto la hipótesis del estado inicial (1), como del supuesto del período para adopción del acto final (2), sin embargo, es en la versión actual, en concreto, en el párrafo segundo del numeral 414, donde hace una distinción un poco más precisa: “… En caso de que la parte empleadora deba cumplir un procedimiento sancionador, la intención de sanción debe notificarse al empleado dentro de ese plazo [...el término de un mes...] y, a partir de ese momento, el mes comenzará a correr de nuevo en el momento en que la persona empleadora o el órgano competente, en su caso, esté en posibilidad de resolver, salvo que el procedimiento se paralice o detenga por culpa atribuible exclusivamente a la parte empleadora, situación en la cual la prescripción es aplicable, si la paralización o suspensión alcanza a cubrir ese plazo…” (Resaltado no es del original). La redacción de esta norma (junto con el párrafo primero), confirma la presencia de dos plazos prescriptivos de un mes: uno para el inicio del procedimiento, que se interrumpe con la notificación al trabajador de la “intención de sanción” y que cede frente a los supuestos regulados en normas especiales, y otro, previsto para la adopción del acto final, que se interrumpirá justamente con la debida comunicación del acto sancionatorio, en atención a que los artículos 140, 142, 239 y 240 LGAP establecen que la eficacia prospectiva (ex nunc) del acto -incluyendo el efecto interruptor de la prescripción- surge con la notificación de éste.-\n\nIX.- CASO CONCRETO.- La parte actora sostiene la nulidad del acto de despido dictado en su contra sobre un único alegato, en concreto, estima que el mismo le fue comunicado fuera del plazo previsto en el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo, norma vigente al momento de los hechos. En ese sentido y conforme se ha tenido por probado, el Órgano Director del procedimiento disciplinario emitió sus conclusiones mediante resolución n° OD-03-2016 de las 08:00 horas del 13 de julio de 2016, la cual -junto con el expediente administrativo- fue recibida en la Rectoría de la UTN al día siguiente, esto es, en fecha 14 de julio de 2016, tal y como se puede apreciar en el siguiente extracto digital:------- [...] Posteriormente, y mediante resolución administrativa sin fecha aunque con número de oficio R-070-2016, el funcionario y aquí demandado, señor Marcelo Prieto Jiménez, en su condición de Rector de la Universidad Técnica Nacional dispuso acoger la recomendación del órgano director y proceder con el despido sin responsabilidad patronal del aquí actor “…tanto en su nombramiento como Coordinador de Trabajo Comunal Universitario y en la Dirección de la Carrera de Tecnologías de la Información por estar ligados en los plazos en que se encontraba incapacitado…”. No obstante, este acto le fue comunicado al actor hasta el día 16 de agosto de 2016, a los dos medios de notificación que tenía señalados en el expediente administrativo. Es así como la representación de la parte actora formula aquí el vicio de invalidez de la conducta administrativa impugnada, pues en su teoría del caso, la Administración contaba con un plazo prescriptivo de un mes -a tenor del artículo 603 CdeT-, para llevar a cabo el dictado y notificación del acto sancionatorio, termino que dice venció el domingo 14 de agosto de 2016, de modo que la Rectoría de la UTN se excedió por dos días, deviniendo el acto impugnado en absolutamente nulo. Al respecto, una vez analizado mesuradamente el caso, este Tribunal, por mayoría, considera que el argumento no resulta de recibo y por tanto, la demanda debe ser rechazada por improcedente. La norma del Código de Trabajo con base en la que apoya su acción la parte, decía expresamente: \"...Artículo 603.- Los derechos y acciones de los patronos para despedir justificadamente a los trabajadores o para disciplinar sus faltas prescriben en un mes, que comenzará a correr desde que se dio causa para la separación o, en su caso, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria...\" (Resaltado no es del original) Tal y como explicamos en el Considerando anterior, la prescripción regulada allí refería a dos límites temporales al ejercicio de la potestad sancionadora disciplinaria de la Administración en sus relaciones de empleo público, concretamente, para iniciar el procedimiento (1) y para adoptar el acto final (2). Ahora bien, examinado el reclamo de la parte demandante, se detalla que el mismo radica concretamente en la manera en que se debe efectuar el conteo del plazo, por cuanto en su criterio, la Rectoría de la UTN se excedió de ese mes, disponiendo su despido treinta y tres días después de que le fuera puesto en conocimiento la recomendación del órgano director. Sin embargo, para la mayoría de esta Cámara, esta interpretación es incorrecta, por cuanto la norma legal en cuestión establece de manera diáfana que el plazo es de \"un mes\", esto es, un plazo por meses y no por días, tal y como lo sostiene el actor, de modo que no resulta aplicable la regla jurídica contenida en el artículo 256 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que estipula en su inciso primero que \"...Los plazos por días, para la Administración, incluyen los inhábiles...\" (Resaltado no es del original). Nada en ese artículo, o en el resto de la Ley General, estipula algo en relación a los plazos por meses, tampoco el Código de Trabajo, cuerpo normativo del que -a falta de norma administrativa- se extrae la prescripción analizada. Ahora bien, conforme los artículos 6, 7, 9, 13 y en particular, el 229.2 LGAP, que dice: \"...2. En ausencia de disposición expresa de su texto, se aplicarán supletoriamente, en lo que fueren compatibles, los demás Libros de esta ley, el Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, las demás normas, escritas y no escritas, con rango legal o reglamentario, del ordenamiento administrativo y, en último término, el Código de Procedimiento Civiles, la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el resto del Derecho común...\". Por tanto, acorde con el principio de autointegración del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, se observa que si bien la Ley N° 8508 (CPCA) no establece regulación alguna sobre la manera en que se debe contar los plazos por meses, en aplicación supletoria de otra norma procedimental de orden público, esto es, el Código Procesal Civil, se colige finalmente una regla general para el cómputo de los plazos por meses, que en la versión vigente para el momento en que ocurrieron los hechos, esto es, la Ley N° 7130 de 16 de agosto de 1989, disponía lo siguiente: \"...Artículo 146.- Plazos por horas, días, meses y años.- Cuando este Código fije un plazo de veinticuatro horas, se entiende reducido a las que fueren de despacho el día en que comienza a correr. / Los plazos por días se entiende que han de ser hábiles. / Los plazos por años o meses se contarán según el calendario, o sea, de fecha a fecha. Cuando el ordinal del día de partida no exista en el mes de vencimiento, el plazo concluirá el último día de éste. Artículo 147.- Día final de un plazo.- Si el día final de un plazo fuere inhábil, se tendrá por prorrogado hasta el día hábil siguiente. La misma regla se aplicará cuando se declare de asueto parte de ese día final. / En todo plazo, el día de vencimiento se tendrá por concluido en el instante en que, según la ley, deba cerrarse el despacho ordinario del órgano jurisdiccional en donde haya de hacerse la gestión o practicarse la diligencia, pero serán admisibles y válidas las gestiones presentadas y las diligencias iniciadas en la hora exacta en que se cierran las oficinas judiciales...\" (Resaltado no es del original). Estas disposiciones se mantuvieron incólumes en la versión actualmente vigente, a saber el numeral 30.5 del Código Procesal Civil, operada por Ley N° 9342 del 03 de febrero de 2016. Así las cosas, deriva este Tribunal entonces, que el plazo prescriptivo mensual, en efecto, debe contabilizarse de fecha a fecha según el calendario y no por equivalencia en una determinada cantidad de días naturales, tal y como lo aduce la representación del actor; por consiguiente, en el caso concreto, el día final del plazo correspondería al día domingo 14 de agosto de 2016, sin embargo, en atención a lo dispuesto en el numerales 147 CPC (Ley N° 7130) y 147 y 148 CdeT, al corresponder no sólo ese día, sino también el siguiente, a días inhábiles, el plazo debe entenderse ampliado al siguiente día hábil, por lo que el punto en el tiempo en el cual cesaba la posibilidad de ejercer legítimamente la potestad disciplinaria, correspondería -para mayoría la del Colegio de Jueces- al martes 16 de agosto de 2016 y, tal y como se tuvo por demostrado (hecho probado n° 10), ese día, justamente, coincide con el instante en que se notificó el acto impugnado a los medios aportados por el señor Hernández Castro al expediente administrativo, de tal manera que la Administración sí ejerció en tiempo su poder de disciplina. En aras de reforzar la labor de integración normativa que ha llevado adelante esta Cámara, podemos apreciar la existencia de otros cuerpos legales en materia administrativa que, de idéntica manera, regulan el cómputo de los plazos mensuales. Así, el artículo 10 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, Ley N° 4755 de 03 de mayo de 1971, establece también esta regla: \"...Artículo 10.- Cómputo de los plazos. Los plazos legales y reglamentarios se deben contar de la siguiente manera: a) Los plazos por años o meses son continuos y terminan el día equivalente del año o mes respectivo; [...] c) En todos los casos, los términos y plazos que venzan en día inhábil para la Administración Tributaria, se extienden hasta el primer día hábil siguiente....\" (Resaltado no es del original). En consecuencia y siendo que éste es el único alegato en el que se funda la nulidad aducida con la demanda planteada, lo procedente entonces es desestimar el reclamo en cuestión, como en efecto se ordena.-\"", "body_en_text": "V.- ON THE TEMPORAL ELEMENT IN THE EXERCISE OF DISCIPLINARY POWER.- In employment relationships, the exercise of the disciplinary power of the hierarchical superior (102 LGAP) is subject to a factor of temporality, after which such exercise may not be undertaken. This time limit varies according to the legal rules provided in each legal regime of public employment, notwithstanding which some general regulations remain, as we shall see below. This temporal feature is an aspect that differentiates this power from other public powers that, per se, are considered imprescriptible—e.g., protection of public domain assets (bienes demaniales)—perhaps precisely because it constitutes one of the manifestations of the Administration’s sanctioning power (ius puniendi). This variety in the normative framework is due to the fact that the legal determination of this temporal limitation of the disciplinary power is a matter left to the discretion of the legislator, who has established particular rules in each legal regime, whether subjecting it to a statute of limitations (prescripción) regime or a lapse (caducidad) regime. However, and from that standpoint, the extinguishment by the passage of time in either of these two scenarios presupposes the concurrence of several fundamental factors, namely: a) inaction of the holder of a right in its exercise and b) lapse of the time fixed by the legal order during that inaction of the holder; and, in the particular case of the statute of limitations, additionally: c) the assertion or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, and d) the occurrence or not of hypotheses of suspension or interruption of the term. All in all, the main instrument by which our legislation in public employment matters has opted has been that of negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa), which thus may well be asserted as a ground for nullity of the final sanctioning act, because it prevents the exercise of the competence in the specific case. Likewise, in the case of actions by the Public Administration in sanctioning administrative procedures, the provision of article 329.3 of the LGAP is fundamental, which states: “…3. The final act rendered outside the term shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless provided otherwise by law…”, so that when a legal provision fixes the loss or preclusion of the exercise of competence by the passage of time, it renders the act that was issued untimely incapable of being considered valid due to the disappearance of that constitutive element. Thus, with the loss of the temporal prerequisite as a requirement for the exercise of disciplinary competence, the public body would be prevented from acting in the specific case and therefore, the sanctioning act thus issued would fundamentally lack legitimacy and competence.-\n\nVI.- CONTINUES.- Now, in the case of disciplinary power in public employment matters, Costa Rican law has provided that the extinction or extinguishment of its temporal prerequisite can occur at various moments or stages of the procedure. In that sense, in accordance with articles 9 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) and therefore, in the absence of an administrative rule that generally regulates the statute of limitations in public employment relationships, one must resort—without prejudice to any special rule—to the provisions established in that respect in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), first in article 603 and later, as of the reform effected by Ley N° 9343, in articles 414 and 415. Specifically, it has been established that the passage of time can affect, by statute of limitations or by lapse—depending on the specific regulation—the exercise of disciplinary power at four different procedural stages: 1) To initiate the disciplinary power; 2) For the adoption of the sanction by the deciding body (órgano decisor); 3) For the execution of the imposed sanction; and 4) For the processing of the procedure. These divisions have been sustained by this Section through various judgments, among which it is worth citing some, such as No. 25-2019-VI of 10:20 a.m. on February 28, 2019, No. 075-2018-VI of 2:05 p.m. on June 22, 2018, among others. We will begin the analysis, in the order indicated above. 1) To initiate the disciplinary power: This phase occurs when administrative self-protection (autotutela administrativa) aimed at determining whether or not the facts that constitute administrative disciplinary sanctions have occurred has not yet been exercised, as a derivation of the provisions in articles 214, 221, 297, 308 LGAP. This power to verify the facts is understood to be included, for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations, as part of the disciplinary power and its exercise, and consequently, is subject to a legal term, which in turn will depend in its definition on the special or general regulations applicable to the specific case. Thus, in this latter context, the Labor Code (CdeT), before and after the reform effected by Ley N° 9343, consistent with the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, LOCGR), Ley N° 7428 of September 7, 1994, as common prescriptive frameworks for administrative matters, are consistent in identifying that this moment occurs when the hierarchical superior is in an objective position to know of the fault and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of his power, a situation that in reality will depend on the notoriety or obviousness of the facts constituting the infraction, that is, whether or not it merits the development of a preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) and knowledge of its results. Thus, it is possible to assert that the term could begin with the “occurrence of the event” (Art. 71.a LOCGR) or “from when the cause for separation or sanction arose” (Art. 414 CdeT—former 603—), when the fact to be sanctioned is notorious or obvious; or in a second hypothesis, when, given the complexity of the circumstances, it becomes indispensable to first conduct a preliminary investigation, in which case the limitation period would begin “from when the causal facts were known” (Art. 414 CdeT), or “from the date on which the respective investigation or audit report is made known to the hierarchical superior or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure” (Art. 71.b LOCGR). In such a scenario, the stated term is computed from the moment of receipt or effective communication to the hierarchical superior of said report, since it is only at that moment that the holder can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. All in all, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be discerned in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, since not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only those in which, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the relevance or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or, to gather indicia tending to clarify its necessity or not.-\n\nVII.- CONT.- 2) Term for the adoption and communication of the sanction by the deciding body: This corresponds to the maximum time limit that may elapse between the moment in which the directing body (órgano director) concludes its investigatory work, by making the administrative file known to the deciding body or holder of competence, whether or not by means of a conclusive report or opinion (dictamen conclusivo) (whether or not it contains recommendations), and the adoption and communication of the respective decision, that is, of the declaration of administrative will through the issuance of the final act of the procedure and its respective notification, necessary so that said will may produce its effects as stipulated in article 140 LGAP. This term, according to the general regulations contained in former article 603 of the Labor Code, would be one month, upon the expiration of which the statute of limitations for that power would unfailingly occur and, therefore, the final act adopted beyond this limit would be null due to injury to the jurisdictional element, conditioned in that case by preclusion factors. It is worth noting that in the labor procedural reform contained in Ley N° 9342, specifically, in the second paragraph of article 414, this hypothesis was appropriately specified as follows: “…the month shall begin to run anew at the moment in which the employer or the competent body, as the case may be, is in a position to resolve…”. As this is a maximum threshold, it must then be understood that the terms regulated in articles 261 and 319 LGAP would be of a directory nature, in addition to regulating situations of a different type, which do not alter the prescriptive term to which we refer.- 3) For the execution of the imposed sanction: This refers to the period available to the administrative hierarchical superior to order the application of the dictated sanction, that is, for the material execution of the act that provides a disciplinary sanction as its content. In this regard and given the lack of an administrative rule, this Chamber considers that one must resort, by integration, to the provisions of the Labor Code as a supplementary normative framework. It should be noted that in that legislation, before the entry into force of the labor procedural reform, Ley N° 9343 of January 25, 2016, this hypothesis was regulated through the statute of limitations; however, as of that reform, a one-year lapse term was imposed in article 415: “…When it is necessary to follow a procedure and record the disciplinary sanctions in a written act, the execution of those thus imposed lapses (caduca), for all purposes, one year from the finality of the act…” (Highlighting not in original). Recall that in this sense, despite the rule counting the term from finality, the execution of an unfavorable act—as is precisely a disciplinary sanction—is necessarily subject to prior communication to its recipient, in accordance with the doctrine of articles 140, 141, 150.1, 239, 240, 256.3, among others, of the General Law of Public Administration. 4) For the processing of the procedure: As a limit, this threshold is referred to the maximum period that an administrative procedure instituted to establish the facts that allow the adoption of the final decision by the holder of the public repressive power can last. This matter finds general regulation in the provisions of article 261, in relation to 319 and 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, Ley N° 6227; it is worth noting that this latter article subjects this phase to a hypothesis of lapse (caducidad) as a form of abnormal termination; however, prior specific circumstances must be present in each particular case, among them, the inaction of the Administration, the respective claim by the affected party, a special six-month term, among other aspects. Thus, with the exception of the hypothesis of article 340 LGAP or other special provisions that may be applicable (for example, article 211 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch), at this stage there is then a lack of express regulations regarding any time limit for the exercise of the disciplinary power and therefore, the two-month term provided in article 261 of the LGAP corresponds thus to one of a directory nature, not peremptory. Now, this Chamber considers it necessary to make clear that in no way can it be inferred from this circumstance that procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays are legally valid and acceptable, precisely because this would violate the fundamental rights to prompt and complete administrative justice and to the good and efficient provision of public services, as well as the general principles of Public Law of effectiveness, efficiency, celerity, reasonableness, and proportionality, which also share constitutional and legal roots (Arts. 4, 7, and 8 LGAP). Thus, as a starting thesis, exceeding two months, while not per se leading to the nullity of the procedure due to preclusion of competence, it will be necessary to analyze in each specific case whether its duration violates or not the celerity, effectiveness, and efficiency that, from a rational and proportional standpoint, must prevail in these matters. In this sense, see judgment No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, of 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011.-\n\nVIII.- CONT.- On the interruption and suspension of limitation periods.- As we have seen so far, the regulations on the temporal prerequisite that affects the exercise of competence are developed through the figures of lapse (caducidad) or statute of limitations (prescripción). Likewise, we determined that the exercise of disciplinary power is limited in time in different ways depending on the procedural stage in question, so that in the initial phase and the act adoption phase it is regulated under the institute of statute of limitations, while in the execution phase (after the entry into force of Ley N° 9343) by lapse. In the investigatory/instructory phase, it is regulated under the figure of lapse of the procedure or, alternatively, by the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice. Thus, it is in the scenarios regulated by the statute of limitations that it is possible to subject the term to grounds for suspension or interruption. The fundamental distinction between the two lies in the fact that, in cases of interruption, the passage of time prior to the event giving rise to such scenarios becomes non-existent, that is, a legal fiction is generated whereby the time elapsed ceases to exist for all legal purposes, so that the prescriptive term begins to run anew. Article 878 of the Civil Code states: “…The effect of interruption is to render useless for the statute of limitations all the time previously elapsed…”. On the other hand, in grounds for suspension, the occurrence of the event momentarily inhibits the passage of time, so that once it disappears, the computation of the term resumes at the exact point at which it was paralyzed. The First Chamber (Sala Primera) has stated: “…First of all, it is necessary to recall that the statute of limitations is subject to grounds for suspension and interruption. On this subject, this Chamber has indicated that, by virtue of the former, when one of those having this effect occurs, the term stops running and when the reason for its paralysis ceases, it runs again from the point at which it was suspended. In interruption, on the contrary, once the ground has occurred, the term runs anew, that is, the course of time elapsed in favor of prescriptibility ceases to exist; and another period begins to be computed from the event or circumstance that induced this situation. Consequently, the time that had already elapsed cannot be counted…” (Judgment No. 348-F-2007 of 10:25 a.m. on May 11, 2007). Of these categories, the one of interest for purposes of disciplinary statute of limitations is interruption, since it is this that has been expressly regulated in the various normative frameworks to which we have referred in this judgment: article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, or in article 603 or 414 of the Labor Code, depending on whether or not the labor procedural reform effected by Ley N° 9343 applies. The first of these rules provides a hypothesis of interruption for the initial stage of the procedure (1): the initial communication of the disciplinary procedure or notice of charges (traslado de cargos): “…The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible person of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure…” (Art. 71 LOCGR). Thus, the notification of the opening of the procedure generates a continuous effect of interruption of that margin of temporality, so that it inhibits, on the one hand, the time previously elapsed and, on the other, keeps the passage thereof paralyzed until the matter comes to the knowledge of the hierarchical superior. For its part, the general rule of the Labor Code, before or after the labor procedural reform, covered both the hypothesis of the initial stage (1) and the scenario of the period for adoption of the final act (2); however, it is in the current version, specifically, in the second paragraph of article 414, where a slightly more precise distinction is made: “… In the event that the employer must fulfill a sanctioning procedure, the intention to sanction must be notified to the employee within that period [...the one-month term...] and, as of that moment, the month shall begin to run anew at the moment in which the employer or the competent body, as the case may be, is in a position to resolve, unless the procedure is paralyzed or stopped for reasons attributable exclusively to the employer, a situation in which the statute of limitations is applicable, if the paralysis or suspension reaches to cover that term…” (Highlighting not in original). The wording of this rule (together with the first paragraph) confirms the presence of two one-month prescriptive terms: one for the initiation of the procedure, which is interrupted by the notification to the worker of the “intention to sanction” and which yields to the scenarios regulated in special rules, and another, provided for the adoption of the final act, which will be interrupted precisely with the proper communication of the sanctioning act, considering that articles 140, 142, 239, and 240 LGAP establish that the prospective efficacy (ex nunc) of the act—including the interruptive effect on the statute of limitations—arises with its notification.-\n\nIX.- SPECIFIC CASE.- The plaintiff maintains the nullity of the dismissal act issued against him on a single argument, specifically, he considers that it was communicated to him outside the term provided in article 603 of the Labor Code, the rule in force at the time of the facts. In that sense and as has been proven, the Directing Body (Órgano Director) of the disciplinary procedure issued its conclusions by resolution No. OD-03-2016 of 8:00 a.m. on July 13, 2016, which—together with the administrative file—was received by the Rectory of the UTN on the following day, that is, on July 14, 2016, as can be seen in the following digital excerpt:------- Subsequently, and by means of an undated administrative resolution although with official letter number R-070-2016, the official and defendant herein, Mr. Marcelo Prieto Jiménez, in his capacity as Rector of the Universidad Técnica Nacional, ordered to accept the recommendation of the directing body and proceed with the dismissal without employer liability of the plaintiff herein “…both in his appointment as Coordinator of University Community Work and in the Direction of the Information Technologies Career because they are linked in the periods in which he was on sick leave…”. However, this act was communicated to the plaintiff until August 16, 2016, to the two means of notification he had indicated in the administrative file. That is how the representation of the plaintiff formulates here the defect of invalidity of the challenged administrative conduct, since in his theory of the case, the Administration had a one-month prescriptive term—pursuant to article 603 CdeT—to carry out the issuance and notification of the sanctioning act, a term that he says expired on Sunday, August 14, 2016, such that the Rectory of the UTN exceeded it by two days, rendering the challenged act absolutely null. In this regard, after a measured analysis of the case, this Court, by majority, considers that the argument is not acceptable and therefore, the claim must be rejected as unfounded. The rule of the Labor Code on which the party bases its action expressly stated: “…Article 603.- The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe (prescriben) in one month, which shall begin to run from when the cause for separation arose or, as the case may be, from when the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known…” (Highlighting not in original) As we explained in the preceding Whereas Clause, the statute of limitations regulated there referred to two time limits on the exercise of the Administration’s disciplinary sanctioning power in its public employment relationships, specifically, to initiate the procedure (1) and to adopt the final act (2). Now, upon examining the plaintiff’s claim, it is detailed that it lies specifically in the manner in which the term must be counted, since in his opinion, the Rectory of the UTN exceeded that one-month period, ordering his dismissal thirty-three days after the directing body’s recommendation was brought to its knowledge. However, for the majority of this Chamber, this interpretation is incorrect, because the legal rule in question clearly establishes that the term is “one month”, that is, a term counted by months and not by days, as the plaintiff maintains, so that the legal rule contained in article 256 of the General Law of Public Administration, which stipulates in its first subsection that “…Terms by days, for the Administration, include non-business days…” (Highlighting not in original) is not applicable. Nothing in that article, or in the rest of the General Law, stipulates anything in relation to terms by months, nor does the Labor Code, the normative body from which—in the absence of an administrative rule—the analyzed statute of limitations is drawn. Now, according to articles 6, 7, 9, 13 and, in particular, 229.2 LGAP, which states: “…2. In the absence of an express provision in its text, the other Books of this law, the Administrative-Contentious Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), the other written and unwritten norms, with legal or regulatory rank, of the administrative order and, in the last resort, the Code of Civil Procedure (Código de Procedimiento Civiles), the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), and the rest of Common Law shall be applied supplementarily, insofar as they are compatible…”. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of self-integration of the administrative legal order, it is observed that although Ley N° 8508 (CPCA) does not establish any regulation on the manner in which terms by months should be counted, in supplementary application of another procedural rule of public order, that is, the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), a general rule for the computation of terms by months is ultimately gathered, which in the version in force at the time the events occurred, that is, Ley N° 7130 of August 16, 1989, provided the following: “…Article 146.- Terms by hours, days, months, and years.- When this Code fixes a twenty-four hour term, it is understood to be reduced to the office hours of the day on which it begins to run. / Terms by days are understood to be business days. / Terms by years or months shall be counted according to the calendar, that is, from date to date. When the ordinal day of departure does not exist in the month of expiration, the term shall conclude on the last day of that month. Article 147.- Final day of a term.- If the final day of a term is a non-business day, it shall be deemed extended to the next business day. The same rule shall apply when a part of that final day is declared a holiday. / In every term, the day of expiration shall be deemed concluded at the moment in which, according to the law, the ordinary office of the jurisdictional body where the proceeding is to be done or the diligence practiced must close, but proceedings submitted and diligences initiated at the exact hour when the judicial offices close shall be admissible and valid…” (Highlighting not in original). These provisions remained unchanged in the currently effective version, namely article 30.5 of the Civil Procedure Code, enacted by Ley N° 9342 of February 3, 2016. Matters being thus, this Tribunal therefore derives that the monthly prescriptive term, indeed, must be accounted from date to date according to the calendar and not by equivalence in a certain number of calendar days, as the plaintiff’s representative argues; consequently, in the specific case, the final day of the term would correspond to Sunday, August 14, 2016; however, in consideration of the provisions in articles 147 CPC (Ley N° 7130) and 147 and 148 CdeT, since not only that day, but also the following one, correspond to non-business days, the term must be understood to be extended to the next business day, so that the point in time at which the possibility of legitimately exercising the disciplinary power ceased, would correspond—for the majority of the Panel of Judges—to Tuesday, August 16, 2016 and, as was demonstrated (proven fact No. 10), that day precisely coincides with the moment in which the challenged act was notified to the means provided by Mr. Hernández Castro in the administrative file, such that the Administration did exercise its disciplinary power in time. In order to reinforce the normative integration work carried out by this Chamber, we can appreciate the existence of other legal bodies in administrative matters that, in an identical manner, regulate the computation of monthly terms. Thus, article 10 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), Ley N° 4755 of May 3, 1971, also establishes this rule: “…Article 10.- Computation of terms. Legal and regulatory terms must be counted as follows: a) Terms by years or months are continuous and end on the equivalent day of the respective year or month; [...] c) In all cases, terms and periods that expire on a non-business day for the Tax Administration are extended to the first following business day….” (Highlighting not in original). Consequently, and since this is the sole argument on which the nullity alleged in the filed claim is based, the appropriate course is to dismiss the claim in question, as is hereby ordered.-\"\n\nThis variety in the regulatory framework is due to the fact that the legal determination of this temporal limitation on disciplinary power is a matter left to the discretion of the legislator, who has established particular rules in each legal regime, whether subjecting it to a statute of limitations (prescripción) or a statute of repose (caducidad). However, from that perspective, the extinguishment by the passage of time in either of these two scenarios implies the concurrence of several fundamental factors, namely: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise, and b) lapse of the time set by the legal system during that inertia of the holder; and, in the particular case of the statute of limitations (prescripción), additionally: c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship, and d) the concurrence or not of hypotheses of suspension or interruption of the term. Nevertheless, the main instrument by which our legislation on public employment has opted is that of negative prescription, which in this way may well be alleged as a ground for nullity of the final punishing act, because it prevents the exercise of the competence in the specific case. Likewise, in the case of actions by the Public Administration in punitive administrative procedures, what is established by article 329.3 of the LGAP is fundamental, which states: “…3. The final act rendered outside the time limit shall be valid for all legal effects, unless a provision of law provides otherwise…”, so that when a legal provision establishes the loss or preclusion of the exercise of competence due to the passage of time, it means that an act rendered untimely cannot be considered valid due to the disappearance of that constitutive element. Thus, with the loss of the temporal predicate as a requirement for the exercise of disciplinary competence, the public body would be impeded from acting in the specific case and, therefore, the punishing act thus issued would fundamentally lack legitimacy and competence.-\n\nVI.- CONTINUES.- Now, in the case of disciplinary power in matters of public employment, Costa Rican law has provided that the extinction or extinguishment of the temporal predicate of said power may occur at various moments or stages of the procedure. In that sense, in accordance with articles 9 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration and, therefore, in the absence of an administrative norm that generally regulates the statute of limitations (prescripción) in public employment relationships, it is necessary to resort -without prejudice to any special norm- to the provisions established in that sense in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), first in Article 603 and subsequently, from the reform brought about by Law No. 9343, in Articles 414 and 415. Specifically, it has been established that the passage of time can affect, through the statute of limitations (prescripción) or the statute of repose (caducidad) -according to the specific regulation-, the exercise of disciplinary power at four different stages of the procedure: 1) To initiate the power of discipline; 2) For the adoption of the sanction by the deciding body; 3) For the execution of the imposed sanction; and 4) For the processing of the procedure. These divisions have been upheld by this Section through various rulings, of which it is worth citing some, such as those No. 25-2019-VI of 10:20 a.m. on February 28, 2019, No. 075-2018-VI of 2:05 p.m. on June 22, 2018, among others. We will begin the analysis, according to the order indicated above. 1) To initiate disciplinary power: This phase occurs when the administrative self-protection aimed at determining whether or not the facts constituting the disciplinary administrative sanctions have occurred has not yet been exercised, as derived from the provisions of articles 214, 221, 297, 308 LGAP. This power to verify the facts is understood, for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations (prescripción), as part of the disciplinary power and its exercise, and consequently, it is subject to a legal time limit, which in turn will depend in its definition on the special or general regulations applicable to the specific case. Thus, in this latter aspect, the Labor Code (CdeT), before or after the reform brought about by Law No. 9343, consistent with the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (LOCGR), Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994, as common prescriptive frameworks for administrative matters, are consistent in identifying that this moment occurs when the Head of the entity is in an objective position to know the fault and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of his power, a situation that in reality will depend on the notorious or evident nature of the facts constituting the infraction, that is, according to whether or not the development of a preliminary investigation and knowledge of its results is required. Thus, it is possible to assert that the time limit could begin with the \"occurrence of the fact\" (Art 71.a LOCGR) or \"from the time the cause for separation or sanction arose\" (Art. 414 CdeT -former 603-), when the fact to be sanctioned is notorious or evident; or in a second hypothesis, when given the complexity of the circumstances, it becomes essential to first carry out a preliminary investigation, in which case the calculation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) would begin \"from the time the causal facts were known\" (Art. 414 CdeT), or \"from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the head of the entity or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure\" (Art 71.b LOCGR). In such a scenario, the indicated time limit is calculated from the moment of reception or effective communication of said report to the Head of the entity, since it is only at that moment that said holder can validly make decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, the need or not for that phase (preliminary investigation) must be determined in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations (prescripción), given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the relevance or not of opening the punitive procedure, or to gather indications that tend to clarify its need or not.-\n\nVII.- CONT.- 2) Time limit for the adoption and communication of the sanction by the deciding body: This corresponds to the maximum temporal limit that can elapse between the moment the directing body concludes its investigative work, by bringing the administrative file to the attention of the deciding body or holder of the competence, whether or not by means of a concluding report or opinion (containing recommendations or not), and the adoption and communication of the respective decision, that is, the declaration of the administrative will through the issuance of the final act of the procedure and its respective notification, necessary so that said will can deploy its effectiveness as stipulated in Article 140 LGAP. This term, according to the general regulations contained in former article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), was one month, after which the statute of limitations (prescripción) of that power inevitably occurred and, therefore, the final act adopted beyond this limit would be null due to harm to the competence element, conditioned in that case by factors of preclusion.\n\nIt is worth noting that in the labor procedural reform contained in Law No. 9342, specifically, in the second paragraph of Article 414, this hypothesis was adequately specified in the following manner: *“…the month shall begin to run anew from the moment in which the employer or the competent body, as applicable, is in a position to resolve…”*. Since it concerns a maximum threshold, it must therefore be understood that the time limits regulated in Articles 261 and 319 LGAP would be of a directory nature, in addition to the fact that they regulate situations of a different type, which do not alter the prescriptive time limit to which we refer.-\n\n**3) For the execution of the imposed sanction:** This refers to the time limit available to the administrative superior to order the application of the issued sanction, that is, for the material execution of the act that provides a disciplinary sanction as its content. In this regard, and given the lack of an administrative norm, this Chamber considers that it must resort, by integration, to the provisions of the Labor Code as a normative framework for supplementary application. It is worth noting that in that legislation, prior to the entry into force of the labor procedural reform, Law No. 9343 of January 25, 2016, this hypothesis was regulated through prescription; however, thereafter, it imposed a one-year expiration (caducidad) term in Article 415: *“…When it is necessary to follow a procedure and record disciplinary sanctions in a written act, the execution of those so imposed shall expire, for all purposes, in one year from the finality of the act…”* (Highlighting is not from the original). Let us remember that in that sense, despite the fact that the norm sets the time limit to run from finality, the execution of an unfavorable act - -as a disciplinary sanction precisely is- -, is necessarily contingent upon prior notification to its addressee, according to the doctrine of Articles 140, 141, 150.1, 239, 240, 256.3, among others, of the General Law of Public Administration.\n\n**4) For the processing of the procedure:** As a limit, this threshold refers to the maximum time that an administrative procedure initiated to establish the facts that allow the holder of the public repressive power to adopt the final decision may last. This matter finds general regulation in the provisions of Article 261, in relation to Articles 319 and 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, Law No. 6227; it is worth noting that this latter Article subjects this phase to a scenario of expiration (caducidad) as a form of abnormal termination; however, prior concrete circumstances must occur in each particular case, among them, the inertia of the Administration, the respective claim of the affected party, a special term of six months, among other aspects. Thus, with the exception of the scenario under Article 340 LGAP or other special provisions that may be applicable (for example, Article 211 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch), at this stage there are therefore no express regulations regarding any temporal limit for the exercise of disciplinary power, and consequently, the two-month time limit provided in Article 261 of the LGAP corresponds in this way to one of a directory nature, not a peremptory one. Now, this Chamber considers it necessary to clarify that in no way can it be inferred from this circumstance that procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays are legally valid and acceptable, precisely because this violates the fundamental rights to prompt and complete administrative justice and to the good and efficient provision of public services, as well as the general principles of Public Law of effectiveness, efficiency, speed, reasonableness, and proportionality, which also share constitutional and legal roots (Arts. 4, 7 and 8 LGAP). Thus, as an initial thesis, the excess of two months, although it does not *per se* lead to the nullity of the procedure for preclusion of competence, it will be necessary to analyze in each specific case whether its duration undermines or not the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency that should prevail in these matters from a rational and proportional standpoint. In this sense, one can see ruling No.\n\n199-2011-VI of this Section VI, of the 16:20 hours of September 12, 2011.-

\n

VIII.- CONT.- On the interruption and suspension of statute of limitations (prescripción) periods.- As we have seen so far, the regulations on the temporal budget affecting the exercise of competence are developed through the figures of expiry (caducidad) or statute of limitations (prescripción). Likewise, we determined that the exercise of disciplinary power is limited in time differently according to the stage or phase of the procedure in question, so that in the initial phase and in the adoption of the act it is regulated according to the institution of statute of limitations (prescripción), while in the execution phase (after the entry into force of Law No. 9343) by that of expiry (caducidad). In the investigation phase, it is regulated according to the figure of expiry of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento) or, alternatively, by the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice. Thus, it is in the scenarios regulated by the statute of limitations (prescripción) that it is possible to subject the period to grounds for suspension or interruption. The fundamental distinction between the two lies in the fact that, in cases of interruption, the course of time prior to the event giving rise to such cases becomes non-existent, that is, a legal fiction is generated whereby the time elapsed ceases to exist for all legal effects, so that the prescriptive period begins to run anew. Article 878 of the Civil Code states: \"…The effect of interruption is to render useless for the statute of limitations all time previously elapsed…\". On the other hand, in grounds for suspension, the occurrence of the event momentarily inhibits the passage of time, so that once it disappears, the calculation of the period resumes exactly at the point where it was halted. The First Chamber has indicated: \"…First, it is necessary to recall that the statute of limitations is subject to causes of suspension and interruption. On this subject, this Chamber has indicated that, by virtue of the former, when any of those having this effect occurs, the period ceases to run and when the reason for its halting ceases, it runs again from the point at which it was suspended. In interruption, on the contrary, once the cause has occurred, the period runs anew, that is, the course of time elapsed in favor of prescriptibility ceases to exist; and another begins to be computed from the event or circumstance that induced this situation. Consequently, the time that had already elapsed cannot be counted…\" (Judgment No. 348-F-2007 of 10:25 hours of May 11, 2007). Of these categories, the one that is of interest for purposes of the disciplinary statute of limitations (prescripción) is that of interruption, given that it is this which has been expressly regulated in the various regulatory frameworks to which we have referred in this ruling: Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, or else in Article 603 or 414 of the Labor Code, depending on whether or not the labor procedural reform implemented by Law No. 9343 applies. The first of these norms entails a hypothesis of interruption for the initial stage of the procedure (1): the initial communication of the disciplinary procedure or notification of charges (traslado de cargos): \"…The prescriptive period shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible person of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding…\" (Art. 71 LOCGR). Thus, the notification of the opening of the proceeding generates a continuing effect of interruption of that time margin, so that it inhibits on the one hand, the time previously elapsed and on the other, keeps the course of this paralyzed until the matter comes to the knowledge of the hierarchical superior (jerarca). For its part, the general rule of the Labor Code, before or after the labor procedural reform, encompassed both the hypothesis of the initial stage (1), and the scenario of the period for adoption of the final act (2), however, it is in the current version, specifically, in the second paragraph of Article 414, where it makes a slightly more precise distinction: \"… In the event that the employer must complete a sanctioning procedure, the intention to sanction must be notified to the employee within that period [...the period of one month...] and, from that moment, the month shall begin to run anew at the time when the employer or the competent body, as the case may be, is in a position to resolve, unless the procedure is paralyzed or halted due to fault attributable exclusively to the employer, a situation in which the statute of limitations is applicable, if the halting or suspension reaches to cover that period…\" (Highlighting is not from the original).\n\nThe wording of this provision (together with the first paragraph) confirms the existence of two one-month statute-of-limitations periods (plazos prescriptivos): one for the initiation of the proceeding, which is interrupted by the notification to the worker of the \"intention to sanction\" and which yields in the cases regulated in special norms, and another, provided for the adoption of the final act, which shall be interrupted precisely by the due communication of the sanctioning act, given that Articles 140, 142, 239, and 240 LGAP establish that the prospective effectiveness (ex nunc) of the act—including the interrupting effect of the statute of limitations—arises with the notification thereof.-\n\n**IX.- SPECIFIC CASE.-** The plaintiff maintains the nullity of the dismissal act issued against him based on a single argument, specifically, he considers that it was communicated to him outside the time limit provided for in numeral 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), the provision in force at the time of the facts. In that sense, and as has been deemed proven, the Directing Body (Órgano Director) of the disciplinary proceeding issued its conclusions through resolution no. OD-03-2016 of 08:00 hours on July 13, 2016, which—together with the administrative file—was received by the Rector's Office (Rectoría) of the UTN the following day, that is, on July 14, 2016, as can be seen in the following digital excerpt:------- [...] Subsequently, and by means of an undated administrative resolution bearing official number R-070-2016, the official and defendant herein, Mr. Marcelo Prieto Jiménez, in his capacity as Rector of the Universidad Técnica Nacional, ordered that the recommendation of the directing body be accepted and proceeded with the dismissal without employer liability of the plaintiff herein *“… tanto en su nombramiento como Coordinador de Trabajo Comunal Universitario y en la Dirección de la Carrera de Tecnologías de la Información por estar ligados en los plazos en que se encontraba incapacitado…”*. However, this act was communicated to the plaintiff only on August 16, 2016, to the two means of notification he had indicated in the administrative file. Thus, the plaintiff's representation raises here the defect of invalidity of the challenged administrative conduct, since in its theory of the case, the Administration had a one-month statute-of-limitations period (plazo prescriptivo)—pursuant to Article 603 CdeT—to carry out the issuance and notification of the sanctioning act, a period that it says expired on Sunday, August 14, 2016, such that the Rector's Office of the UTN exceeded it by two days, rendering the challenged act absolutely null. In this regard, after carefully analyzing the case, this Tribunal, by majority, considers that the argument is not acceptable and therefore, the claim must be dismissed as unfounded. The provision of the Labor Code on which the plaintiff bases its action expressly stated: *\"...Artículo 603.- Los derechos y acciones de los patronos para despedir justificadamente a los trabajadores o para disciplinar sus faltas **prescriben en un mes**, que comenzará a correr desde que se dio causa para la separación o, en su caso, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria...\"* (Highlighting not in the original). As we explained in the preceding Considering, the statute of limitations (prescripción) regulated there referred to two temporal limits on the exercise of the Administration's disciplinary sanctioning power in its public employment relations, specifically, to initiate the proceeding (1) and to adopt the final act (2). Now, upon examining the plaintiff's claim, it is detailed that it lies specifically in the manner in which the counting of the time limit must be carried out, since in its view, the Rector's Office of the UTN exceeded that month, ordering his dismissal thirty-three days after the recommendation of the directing body was made known to it. However, for the majority of this Chamber, this interpretation is incorrect, because the legal provision in question clearly establishes that the time limit is \"one month\" (*un mes*), that is, a time limit by months and not by days, as the plaintiff maintains, so that the legal rule contained in Article 256 of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) is not applicable, which stipulates in its first subsection that *\"...Los plazos por **días**, para la Administración, incluyen los inhábiles...\"* (Highlighting not in the original). Nothing in that article, or in the rest of the General Law, stipulates anything regarding time limits by months, nor does the Labor Code, the normative body from which—in the absence of an administrative provision—the analyzed statute of limitations is extracted. Now, pursuant to Articles 6, 7, 9, 13, and particularly 229.2 LGAP, which states: *\"...2. En ausencia de disposición expresa de su texto, se aplicarán supletoriamente, en lo que fueren compatibles, los demás Libros de esta ley, el Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, las demás normas, escritas y no escritas, con rango legal o reglamentario, del ordenamiento administrativo y, en último término, el Código de Procedimiento Civiles, la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el resto del Derecho común...\"*. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of self-integration of the administrative legal system, it is observed that although Law No. 8508 (CPCA) does not establish any regulation on the manner in which time limits by months must be counted, in supplementary application of another procedural norm of public order, that is, the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), a general rule for the computation of time limits by months is finally deduced, which in the version in force at the time the facts occurred, that is, Law No. 7130 of August 16, 1989, provided the following: *\"...Artículo 146.- Plazos por horas, días, meses y años.- Cuando este Código fije un plazo de veinticuatro horas, se entiende reducido a las que fueren de despacho el día en que comienza a correr. / Los plazos por días se entiende que han de ser hábiles. / **Los plazos por años o meses se contarán según el calendario, o sea, de fecha a fecha**. Cuando el ordinal del día de partida no exista en el mes de vencimiento, el plazo concluirá el último día de éste. Artículo 147.- Día final de un plazo.- **Si el día final de un plazo fuere inhábil, se tendrá por prorrogado hasta el día hábil siguiente**. La misma regla se aplicará cuando se declare de asueto parte de ese día final. / En todo plazo, el día de vencimiento se tendrá por concluido en el instante en que, según la ley, deba cerrarse el despacho ordinario del órgano jurisdiccional en donde haya de hacerse la gestión o practicarse la diligencia, pero serán admisibles y válidas las gestiones presentadas y las diligencias iniciadas en la hora exacta en que se cierran las oficinas judiciales...\"* (Highlighting not in the original). These provisions remained unchanged in the version currently in force, namely numeral 30.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, enacted through Law No. 9342 of February 3, 2016. Thus, this Tribunal derives, then, that the monthly statute-of-limitations period, in effect, must be counted from date to date according to the calendar and not by equivalence in a certain number of calendar days, as the plaintiff's representation alleges; consequently, in the specific case, the final day of the time limit would correspond to Sunday, August 14, 2016, however, in light of the provisions in numerals 147 CPC (Law No. 7130) and 147 and 148 CdeT, as not only that day, but also the following one, corresponded to non-business days, the time limit must be understood as extended to the next business day, so that the point in time at which the possibility of legitimately exercising the disciplinary power ceased would correspond—for the majority of the Panel of Judges—to Tuesday, August 16, 2016, and, as was demonstrated (proven fact no. 10), that day precisely coincides with the moment at which the challenged act was notified to the means provided by Mr. Hernández Castro to the administrative file, such that the Administration did exercise its disciplinary power in time. In order to reinforce the task of normative integration that this Chamber has carried out, we can appreciate the existence of other legal bodies in administrative matters that, in an identical manner, regulate the computation of monthly time limits. Thus, Article 10 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), Law No. 4755 of May 3, 1971, also establishes this rule: *\"...Artículo 10.- Cómputo de los plazos. Los plazos legales y reglamentarios se deben contar de la siguiente manera: a) Los plazos por años o **meses son continuos y terminan el día equivalente** del año o **mes** respectivo; [...] c) En todos los casos, **los términos y plazos que venzan en día inhábil para la Administración Tributaria, se extienden hasta el primer día hábil siguiente**....\"* (Highlighting not in the original).\n\nConsequently, and given that this is the sole argument upon which the nullity alleged in the filed claim is based, the appropriate course of action is to dismiss the claim in question, as is hereby ordered.-\"\n\n**V.- ON THE TEMPORAL ELEMENT IN THE EXERCISE OF DISCIPLINARY POWER.-** In employment relationships, the exercise of the hierarchical superior's disciplinary power (102 LGAP) is subject to a temporality factor, after which such exercise may not be undertaken. This temporal limit varies according to the legal rules that each public employment legal regime provides in this regard, notwithstanding which, some general regulations remain, as we will see below. This temporal feature is an aspect that differentiates this from other public powers that, *per se*, are considered imprescriptible —e.g., protection of public domain assets (tutela de bienes demaniales)—, perhaps precisely because it constitutes one of the manifestations of the Administration's punitive power (*ius puniendi*). This variety in the regulatory framework is due to the fact that the legal determination of this temporal limitation on disciplinary power is a matter left to the discretion of the legislator, who has established particular rules in each legal regime, either subjecting it to a statute of limitations (prescripción) or to a statute of repose/caducity (caducidad). However, and from that perspective, the extinguishment by the passage of time in either of these two scenarios presupposes the concurrence of several fundamental factors, namely: **a)** inaction by the holder of a right in its exercise, and **b)** passage of the time period set by the legal system during that inaction by the holder; and in the specific case of the statute of limitations (prescripción), additionally: **c)** assertion or exception raised by the passive subject of the legal relationship, and **d)** the concurrence or not of hypotheses of suspension or interruption of the period. All in all, the primary instrument through which our legislation on public employment matters has been shaped is that of negative prescription (prescripción negativa), which may thus rightly be alleged as a ground for nullity of the final sanctioning act, because it prevents the exercise of the competence in the specific case. Likewise, regarding actions by the Public Administration in administrative sanctioning procedures, the provisions of Article 329.3 of the LGAP are fundamental, stating: “…*3. The final act issued outside the time limit shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless otherwise provided by law…*”, so that when a legal provision establishes the loss or preclusion of the exercise of competence due to the passage of time, it renders the act that was issued untimely incapable of being considered valid due to the disappearance of that constitutive element. In this way, with the loss of the temporal prerequisite as a requirement for the exercise of disciplinary competence, the public body would be barred from acting in the specific case, and therefore, the sanctioning act thus issued would fundamentally lack legitimacy and competence.-\n\n**VI.- CONTINUES.-** Now then, regarding disciplinary power in matters of public employment, Costa Rican law has established that the extinction or expiration of its temporal prerequisite can occur according to various moments or stages of the procedure.\n\nIn that sense, in accordance with numerals 9 and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP) and therefore, in the absence of an administrative rule that generally regulates statutes of limitations (prescripción) in public employment relations, one must resort—without prejudice to any special rule—to the provisions established in that regard in the Código de Trabajo, first in Article 603 and subsequently, as of the reform implemented by Ley N° 9343, in Articles 414 and 415. Specifically, it has been established that the passage of time can affect, through statute of limitations (prescripción) or expiration (caducidad)—depending on the specific regulation—the exercise of disciplinary authority in four different stages of the procedure: 1) To initiate the disciplinary power; 2) For the adoption of the sanction by the decision-making body; 3) For the execution of the sanction imposed; and 4) For the processing of the procedure. These divisions have been upheld by this Section through various judgments, among which it is worth citing some, such as No. 25-2019-VI of 10:20 a.m. on February 28, 2019, No. 075-2018-VI of 2:05 p.m. on June 22, 2018, among others. We will begin the analysis, in the order indicated above. 1) To initiate the disciplinary authority: This phase occurs when the administrative self-protection (autotutela administrativa) aimed at determining whether or not the facts that constitute administrative disciplinary sanctions have occurred has not yet been exercised, as derived from the provisions in ordinals 214, 221, 297, 308 LGAP. This authority to verify the facts is understood to be included, for the purposes of calculating the statute of limitations (prescripción), as part of the disciplinary authority and its exercise, and consequently, it is subject to a legal term, which in turn will depend in its definition on the special or general regulations applicable to the specific case. Thus, on this latter plane, the Código de Trabajo (CdeT), before or after the reform implemented by Ley N° 9343, consistent with the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR), Ley N° 7428 of September 7, 1994, as common prescriptive frameworks for administrative matters, are consistent in identifying that this moment occurs when the Head (Jerarca) is in an objective position to know of the fault and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of their authority, a situation that in reality will depend on the notorious or evident nature of the facts constituting the infraction, that is, whether or not it requires the development of a preliminary investigation and knowledge of its results. Thus, it is possible to assert that the term could begin with the “occurrence of the event (acaecimiento del hecho)” (Art. 71.a LOCGR) or “from when the cause for the separation or sanction arose (desde que se dio la causa para la separación o sanción)” (Art. 414 CdeT – former 603-), when the fact to be sanctioned is notorious or evident; or in a second hypothesis, when given the complexity of the circumstances, it becomes indispensable to first conduct a preliminary investigation, in which case the calculation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) would begin “from when the causal facts were known (desde que fueran conocidos los hechos causales)” (Art. 414 CdeT), or “from the date on which the report of the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the head or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure (a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo)” (Art. 71.b LOCGR). In such a scenario, the term indicated is calculated from the moment of receipt or effective communication of said report to the head, since it is only at that time that said titleholder can validly make decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. However, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be discriminated in each case, because otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations (prescripción), given that this investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the relevance or not of the opening of the sanctioning procedure, or to gather evidence tending to clarify its necessity or not.\n\nVII.- CONT.- 2) Term for the adoption and communication of the sanction by the decision-making body: This corresponds to the maximum time limit that may elapse between the moment the directing body concludes its investigative work, by bringing the administrative case file (expediente administrativo) to the attention of the decision-making body or holder of the competence, whether or not by means of a concluding report or opinion (containing recommendations or not), and the adoption and communication of the respective decision, that is, the declaration of administrative will through the issuance of the final act of the procedure and its respective notification, necessary so that said will can deploy its effectiveness as stipulated in Article 140 LGAP. This term, according to the general regulations contained in the former ordinal 603 of the Código de Trabajo, would be one month, after the expiration of which the statute of limitations (prescripción) of that authority inevitably occurred and, therefore, the final act adopted beyond this limit would be null due to harm to the element of competence, conditioned in that case by factors of preclusion. It is worth mentioning that in the labor procedural reform contained in Ley N° 9342, specifically, in the second paragraph of ordinal 414, this hypothesis was adequately specified in the following manner: “…the month shall begin to run again at the time the employer or the competent body, as the case may be, is in a position to resolve…”. As it concerns a maximum threshold, it must therefore be understood that the terms regulated in numerals 261 and 319 LGAP would be of an ordering nature, in addition to regulating situations of a different type that do not alter the prescriptive term to which we refer.- 3) For the execution of the sanction imposed: This refers to the term available to the administrative head to order the application of the sanction issued, that is, for the material execution of the act that provides as content a disciplinary sanction. In this regard and given the lack of an administrative rule, this Chamber considers that one must resort by integration to the provisions of the Código de Trabajo as a supplementary regulatory framework.\n\nIt is worth noting that in that legislation, prior to the entry into force of the labor procedural reform, Ley N° 9343 of January 25, 2016, this scenario was regulated by way of prescription (prescripción); however, subsequent to it, a one-year statute of limitations (caducidad) term was imposed in Article 415: “…When it is necessary to follow a procedure and record the disciplinary sanctions in a written act, the execution of those thus imposed expires (caduca), for all purposes, one year from the finality of the act…” (emphasis is not in the original). Let us recall that in this regard, despite the rule making the term count from finality, the execution of an unfavorable act – as a disciplinary sanction precisely is – is necessarily subject to prior communication to its addressee, according to the doctrine of Articles 140, 141, 150.1, 239, 240, 256.3, among others, of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública). 4) For the processing of the procedure: As a limit, this threshold refers to the maximum time that an administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo) established to determine the facts that allow the holder of the public repressive power to adopt the final decision may last. This matter finds general regulation in the provisions of Article 261, in relation to 319 and 340 of the General Public Administration Law, Ley N°6227; it is worth noting that this latter numeral subjects this phase to a scenario of expiration (caducidad) as a form of abnormal termination, however, subject to specific circumstances that must arise in each particular case, among them, the Administration's inertia, the respective claim by the affected party, a special six-month term, among other aspects. Thus, with the exception of the scenario in Article 340 LGAP or other special provisions that may be applicable (for example, ordinal 211 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), at this stage there are therefore no express regulations regarding any time limit for the exercise of the disciplinary power, and consequently, the bimonthly term provided in numeral 261 of the LGAP is accordingly of an ordering, non-peremptory nature. Now, this Chamber considers it necessary to make clear that in no way can it be inferred from this circumstance that procedures with unjustified, arbitrary, and disproportionate delays are legally valid and acceptable, precisely because this would violate the fundamental rights to prompt and complete administrative justice and to the good and efficient provision of public services, as well as the general principles of Public Law of effectiveness, efficiency, speed, reasonableness, and proportionality, which also share constitutional and legal roots (Arts. 4, 7, and 8 LGAP). Thus, as a starting thesis, while exceeding two months does not per se lead to the nullity of the procedure due to preclusion of competence, it will be necessary to analyze in each specific case whether its duration offends or not the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency that, from a rational and proportional standpoint, must prevail in these matters. In this regard, see ruling No. 199-2011-VI of this Section VI, at 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011.-\n\nVIII.- CONT.- On the interruption and suspension of prescription (prescripción) terms.- As we have seen so far, the regulations on the temporal budget that affects the exercise of competence are developed through the figures of expiration (caducidad) or prescription (prescripción). Likewise, we determined that the exercise of the disciplinary power is limited in time in different ways depending on the stage or phase of the procedure in question, so that in the initial phase and in the adoption of the act, it is regulated by the institute of prescription (prescripción), while in the execution phase (subsequent to the entry into force of Ley N° 9343) by that of expiration (caducidad). In the investigation phase, it is regulated by the figure of expiration (caducidad) of the procedure or, alternatively, by the constitutional principle of prompt and complete justice. In this way, it is in the scenarios regulated by prescription (prescripción) that it is possible to subject the term to grounds for suspension or interruption. The fundamental distinction between the two lies in the fact that, in cases of interruption, the passage of time prior to the event giving rise to such grounds becomes non-existent, that is, a legal fiction is generated whereby the elapsed time ceases to exist for all legal purposes, so that the prescriptive term begins to run anew. Article 878 of the Civil Code states: “…The effect of interruption is to render all previously elapsed time useless for the prescription (prescripción)…”. On the other hand, in grounds for suspension, the occurrence of the event momentarily inhibits the passage of time, so that once it disappears, the computation of the term resumes exactly at the point where it was paralyzed. The First Chamber has indicated: “…First, it is necessary to recall that prescription (prescripción) is subject to causes of suspension and interruption. On the subject, this Chamber has indicated that, by virtue of the former, when one of those having this effect occurs, the term stops running and when the reason for its paralysis ceases, it runs again from the point at which it was suspended. In interruption, on the contrary, once the ground has occurred, the term runs again, that is, the course of time elapsed in favor of prescriptibility ceases to exist; and another begins to be computed from the fact or circumstance that induced this situation. Consequently, what had already elapsed cannot be counted…” (Judgment n° 348-F-2007 of 10:25 a.m. on May 11, 2007).\n\nOf these categories, the one of interest for the purposes of disciplinary prescription (prescripción disciplinaria) is interruption, since it is this that has been expressly regulated in the various normative frameworks we have referenced in this ruling: Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, or in Article 603 or 414 of the Código de Trabajo, depending on whether the labor procedural reform enacted by Ley N° 9343 applies or not. The first of these norms entails a hypothesis of interruption for the initial stage of the procedure (1): the initial communication of the disciplinary procedure or notice of charges: “…The prescription shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notice to the presumed responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding…” (Art. 71 LOCGR). Thus, the notification of the opening of the proceeding generates a continuous interrupting effect on that temporal margin, such that it nullifies, on the one hand, the time previously elapsed and, on the other hand, keeps its course paralyzed until the matter comes before the head of the entity. For its part, the general rule of the Código de Trabajo, before or after the labor procedural reform, encompassed both the hypothesis of the initial stage (1) and the scenario of the period for adopting the final act (2); however, it is in the current version, specifically in the second paragraph of numeral 414, where it makes a somewhat more precise distinction: “…In the event that the employer must comply with a disciplinary procedure, the intention to impose a sanction must be notified to the employee within that period [...the one-month term...] and, from that moment, the month shall begin to run anew from the moment that the employer or the competent body, as appropriate, is in a position to resolve, unless the procedure is paralyzed or halted for reasons attributable exclusively to the employer, a situation in which the prescription is applicable if the paralysis or suspension spans that entire period…” (Emphasis not in original). The wording of this norm (together with the first paragraph) confirms the presence of two prescriptive periods of one month: one for the initiation of the proceeding, which is interrupted by the notice to the employee of the \"intention to impose a sanction\" and which yields to the scenarios regulated in special norms, and another, prescribed for the adoption of the final act, which shall be interrupted precisely by the due communication of the disciplinary act, considering that Articles 140, 142, 239, and 240 LGAP establish that the prospective efficacy (ex nunc) of the act—including the interrupting effect of the prescription—arises with the notification thereof.-\n\nIX.- SPECIFIC CASE.- The plaintiff argues the nullity of the dismissal act issued against them on a single allegation, specifically, they consider that it was communicated to them beyond the period provided for in numeral 603 of the Código de Trabajo, the norm in force at the time of the facts. In that sense and as has been held as proven, the Directing Body (Órgano Director) of the disciplinary proceeding issued its conclusions through resolution no. OD-03-2016 of 08:00 hours on July 13, 2016, which—together with the administrative file—was received by the Rector's Office (Rectoría) of the UTN the following day, that is, on July 14, 2016, as can be seen in the following digital excerpt:------- [...] Subsequently, and by means of an undated administrative resolution though bearing official number R-070-2016, the official and defendant here, Mr. Marcelo Prieto Jiménez, in his capacity as Rector of the Universidad Técnica Nacional, decided to accept the recommendation of the directing body and proceed with the dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal) of the plaintiff here “…both in their appointment as Coordinator of University Community Work and in the Directorship of the Information Technologies Career because these were linked to the periods in which they were on medical leave…”. However, this act was communicated to the plaintiff only on August 16, 2016, through the two means of notification designated for them in the administrative file. It is thus that the plaintiff's representation formulates here the defect of invalidity of the challenged administrative conduct, since in their theory of the case, the Administration had a prescriptive period of one month—pursuant to Article 603 CdeT—to carry out the issuance and notification of the disciplinary act, a term that they say expired on Sunday, August 14, 2016, such that the Rector's Office of the UTN exceeded it by two days, resulting in the challenged act being absolutely null.\n\nIn that regard, having carefully analyzed the case, this Tribunal, by majority, considers that the argument is not receivable and therefore, the claim must be dismissed as unfounded. The norm of the Labor Code on which the party bases its action expressly stated:\n\n\"...Article 603.- The rights and actions of employers to justifiedly dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from the moment the cause for separation arose or, as applicable, from the moment the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known...\" (Highlighting is not from the original)\n\nAs we explained in the previous Considering, the statute of limitations (prescripción) regulated therein referred to two temporal limits on the exercise of the Administration's disciplinary sanctioning power in its public employment relations, specifically, to initiate the procedure (1) and to adopt the final act (2). Now, examining the claim of the plaintiff, it is detailed that it lies specifically in the manner in which the counting of the time limit should be conducted, since in their view, the Rector's Office of the UTN exceeded that month, ordering their dismissal thirty-three days after the recommendation of the directing body was made known to them. However, for the majority of this Chamber, this interpretation is incorrect, since the legal norm in question clearly establishes that the time limit is \"one month,\" that is, a time limit by months and not by days, as claimed by the plaintiff, so the legal rule contained in Article 256 of the General Law on Public Administration is not applicable, which stipulates in its first subsection that \"...Time limits by days, for the Administration, include non-business days...\" (Highlighting is not from the original). Nothing in that article, or in the rest of the General Law, stipulates anything in relation to time limits by months, nor does the Labor Code, the normative body from which - in the absence of an administrative norm - the analyzed statute of limitations (prescripción) is extracted. Now, in accordance with Articles 6, 7, 9, 13 and in particular, 229.2 of the General Law on Public Administration (LGAP), which states: \"...2. In the absence of an express provision in its text, the other Books of this law, the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, the other written and unwritten norms, with legal or regulatory rank, of the administrative legal order and, ultimately, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the rest of common law shall apply supplementarily, to the extent they are compatible...\".\n\nTherefore, in accordance with the principle of self-integration of the administrative legal order, it is observed that although Law No. 8508 (Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, CPCA) does not establish any regulation on the manner in which time limits by months should be counted, in supplementary application of another procedural norm of public order, that is, the Code of Civil Procedure, a general rule for the computation of time limits by months is finally inferred, which in the version in force at the time the events occurred, that is, Law No. 7130 of August 16, 1989, provided the following: \"...Article 146.- Time limits by hours, days, months and years.- When this Code sets a time limit of twenty-four hours, it is understood as reduced to those of official business on the day it begins to run. / Time limits by days are understood to be business days. / Time limits by years or months shall be counted according to the calendar, that is, from date to date. When the ordinal of the starting day does not exist in the month of expiration, the time limit shall end on the last day of that month. Article 147.- Final day of a time limit.- If the final day of a time limit is a non-business day, it shall be deemed extended until the next business day. The same rule shall apply when part of that final day is declared a holiday. / In any time limit, the day of expiration shall be deemed concluded at the moment when, according to the law, the ordinary office of the jurisdictional body where the action is to be taken or the proceeding carried out must close, but actions submitted and proceedings initiated at the exact time when the judicial offices close shall be admissible and valid...\" (Highlighting is not from the original). These provisions remained unchanged in the currently in-force version, namely numeral 30.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, enacted by Law No. 9342 of February 3, 2016. Thus, this Tribunal then derives that the monthly prescriptive time limit, in effect, must be counted from date to date according to the calendar and not by equivalence to a certain number of calendar days, as alleged by the plaintiff's representation; consequently, in the specific case, the final day of the time limit would correspond to Sunday, August 14, 2016, however, in consideration of the provisions in numerals 147 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Law No. 7130) and 147 and 148 of the Labor Code, as not only that day, but also the following one, correspond to non-business days, the time limit must be understood as extended to the next business day, so that the point in time at which the possibility of legitimately exercising the disciplinary power ceased would correspond - for the majority of the Panel of Judges - to Tuesday, August 16, 2016 and, as it was demonstrated (proven fact No. 10), that day precisely coincides with the moment in which the challenged act was notified to the means provided by Mr. Hernández Castro to the administrative case file, such that the Administration did exercise its disciplinary power in time. In order to reinforce the normative integration work carried out by this Chamber, we can appreciate the existence of other legal bodies in administrative matters that, identically, regulate the computation of monthly time limits. Thus, Article 10 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, Law No. 4755 of May 3, 1971, also establishes this rule: \"...Article 10.- Computation of time limits. Legal and regulatory time limits must be counted in the following manner: a) Time limits by years or months are continuous and end on the equivalent day of the respective year or month; [...] c) In all cases, the terms and time limits that expire on a non-business day for the Tax Administration are extended until the first following business day....\" (Highlighting is not from the original). Consequently, and since this is the sole argument on which the annulment alleged in the filed claim is based, the appropriate course is to dismiss the claim in question, as is hereby ordered.-\"" }