{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-280331", "citation": "Res. 00014-2020 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Prescripción de cinco años aplica a infracciones al deber de probidad bajo Ley 8422", "title_en": "Five-year statute of limitations applies to probity violations under Law 8422", "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo resuelve un recurso contra el despido de un funcionario del MAG, alegando prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria. El actor argumentó que había transcurrido más de un mes desde los hechos imputados (participación en junta directiva de LAICA durante jornada laboral, uso de vehículos oficiales, etc.), por lo que la acción disciplinaria estaba prescrita según el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Trabajo. El Tribunal rechaza este argumento, determinando que las conductas imputadas encuadran en violaciones al deber de probidad regulado en la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito (Ley No. 8422) y la Ley General de Control Interno (Ley No. 8292). En consecuencia, aplica el plazo de prescripción de cinco años previsto en los artículos 44 de la Ley No. 8422 y 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, por encima del plazo general de un mes del Código de Trabajo. La sentencia enfatiza que la Ley No. 8422 es una normativa especial que prevalece sobre el régimen laboral general, y que la prescripción de cinco años es aplicable a todas las faltas vinculadas con la corrupción, el enriquecimiento ilícito y la gestión indebida de fondos públicos.", "summary_en": "The Contentious-Administrative Tribunal resolves an appeal against the dismissal of a public official from the Ministry of Agriculture. The plaintiff argued that the disciplinary action was time-barred because more than one month had elapsed since the alleged misconduct (participation in LAICA board meetings during working hours, misuse of official vehicles, etc.), invoking the one-month prescription period under the Civil Service Statute and Labor Code. The Tribunal rejects this argument, finding that the imputed conduct constitutes violations of the duty of probity under the Anti-Corruption and Illicit Enrichment Law (Law No. 8422) and the General Internal Control Law (Law No. 8292). Consequently, the special five-year prescription period established in Articles 44 of Law No. 8422 and 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General prevails over the general one-month labor prescription. The decision emphasizes that Law No. 8422 is special legislation that overrides the general labor regime, and that the five-year term applies to all offenses related to corruption, illicit enrichment, and improper management of public funds.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI", "date": "2020", "year": "2020", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "deber de probidad", "prescripción", "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito (Ley 8422)", "Ley General de Control Interno (Ley 8292)", "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "Código de Trabajo", "potestad disciplinaria", "incompatibilidad", "dietas", "LAICA" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 3", "law": "Ley 8422" }, { "article": "Art. 4", "law": "Ley 8422" }, { "article": "Art. 17", "law": "Ley 8422" }, { "article": "Art. 44", "law": "Ley 8422" }, { "article": "Art. 71", "law": "Ley 7428" }, { "article": "Art. 43", "law": "Ley 8292" }, { "article": "Art. 414", "law": "Código de Trabajo" }, { "article": "Art. 214", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" } ], "keywords_es": [ "prescripción", "deber de probidad", "Ley 8422", "Ley 8292", "Estatuto de Servicio Civil", "Código de Trabajo", "potestad disciplinaria", "corrupción", "función pública", "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo", "Costa Rica" ], "keywords_en": [ "statute of limitations", "duty of probity", "Law 8422", "Law 8292", "Civil Service Statute", "Labor Code", "disciplinary power", "corruption", "public function", "Contentious-Administrative Tribunal", "Costa Rica" ], "excerpt_es": "Ahora bien, en virtud de lo alegado, es menester abordar el tema de las funciones que le son propias al órgano director y al órgano decisor del procedimiento. La competencia para emitir el acto final dentro de un procedimiento corresponde al órgano decisor, sea, a quien se ha otorgado la competencia legal para emitir el acto que causa estado. Empero, en aras de la eficiencia administrativa, las competencias de instrucción son delegables en un órgano encargado de llevar a cabo la instrucción del procedimiento, el que se ha tendido en denominar \"órgano director o instructor\".", "excerpt_en": "It is necessary to address the roles of the directing body and the deciding body within the procedure. The competence to issue the final act in a procedure corresponds to the deciding body, that is, the entity legally empowered to issue the act that exhausts administrative remedies. However, for the sake of administrative efficiency, investigatory powers may be delegated to a body charged with conducting the investigation, commonly called the 'directing or investigating body'.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The Court denied the appeal, confirming that the disciplinary power had not prescribed because the special five-year term under the probity and internal control legislation applied.", "summary_es": "El Tribunal declara sin lugar el recurso, confirmando que la potestad disciplinaria no había prescrito al aplicarse el plazo especial de cinco años previsto en la legislación de probidad y control interno." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Sobre el deber de probidad. Alcances.", "quote_en": "The duty of probity regulated in article three of Law No. 8422 requires every public servant to perform their duties in accordance with the principle of impartiality regarding personal, family, economic, or other interests, and thus must demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law.", "quote_es": "El deber de probidad regulado en el artículo tercero de la Ley No.8422 obliga a todo servidor público a ejercer su cargo con apego al principio de imparcialidad frente a intereses personales o familiares, económicos, y de otra naturaleza, por lo que en su desempeño debe demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley." }, { "context": "VII.- Análisis de la prescripción en el caso concreto.", "quote_en": "In this regard, the temporal margin for exercising disciplinary power applicable in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its article 44, which refers to the five-year prescription rule established in article 71 of Law No. 7428. This is a special regulation that prevails over the provisions of article 51 of the Civil Service Statute, which refer to the Labor Code, the latter setting a one-month prescription period for exercising disciplinary power.", "quote_es": "En ese sentido, el margen de temporalidad para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria que aplica en este caso, es el que impone la Ley No. 8422 en su numeral 44, que remite a la norma quinquenal de prescripción que estatuye el mandato 71 de la Ley No. 7428. Se trata de una regulación especial que prevalece sobre las ordenanzas del artículo 51 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, que remiten al Código de Trabajo, normativa esta última que fija un plazo de prescripción de un mes para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [ { "target_id": "norm-53738", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 8422 Art. 3" }, { "target_id": "norm-21629", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 7428 Art. 71" }, { "target_id": "norm-49185", "kind": "concept_anchor", "label": "Ley 8292 Art. 43" } ], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-280331", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-21629", "norm_num": "7428", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "07/09/1994" }, { "doc_id": "norm-49185", "norm_num": "8292", "norm_name": "Ley General de Control Interno", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "31/07/2002" }, { "doc_id": "norm-53738", "norm_num": "8422", "norm_name": "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "06/10/2004" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "\"III.- Generalidades sobre el procedimiento administrativo. El procedimiento administrativo constituye un importante elemento formal de la conducta pública. Cumple una doble finalidad. Por un lado, establece el camino que ha de seguir la Administración para adoptar una determinada decisión, orientando su proceder. Por otro, se impone como un marco de referencia que permite al administrado, establecer un cotejo del proceder público, a fin de fijar un control de que sus actuaciones se hayan manifestado acorde a las normas que orientan ese proceder. Busca, por ende, constituirse en un mecanismo de tutela de derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos frente a poder público, así como garantizar la legalidad, oportunidad y conveniencia de la decisión administrativa y correcto funcionamiento de la función pública. Conforme lo señala el canon 214 de la Ley No. 6227, su objeto es establecer la verdad real de los hechos que sirven de motivo al caso final. Este elemento formal resulta imperativo para lograr un equilibrio entre el mejor cumplimiento de los fines de la Administración y la tutela de los derechos del particular, tal y como se expresa en el artículo 225.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. De ahí que el canon 216.1 ibídem, exija a la Administración adoptar sus decisiones dentro del procedimiento con estricto apego al ordenamiento jurídico. En su curso, el procedimiento pretende establecer las formalidades básicas que permitan al administrado el ejercicio pleno del derecho de defensa y el contradictorio, para llegar a establecer la referida verdad real de los hechos (dentro de las cuales pueden verse las estatuidas en los cánones 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, entre otros, todos de la citada Ley General). Ello adquiere aún mayor relevancia en los denominados procedimientos de control o sancionatorios, siendo que, en esos casos, la decisión final puede imponer un marco represivo en la esfera jurídica de una persona. El mismo plexo normativo dispone la sustancialidad de estas garantías mínimas, considerando inválido el procedimiento que no satisfaga esas cuestiones mínimas. Así se desprende del mandato 223 de la Ley de referencia, en cuanto señala que la omisión de formalidades sustanciales causará nulidad del procedimiento. Desde este plano, este Tribunal ya ha señalado que el control de la función administrativa que confiere a esta jurisdicción el canon 49 de la Carta Magna, supone un cotejo de que la Administración en el curso de esos procedimientos (de corte sancionatorio para este caso), satisfacen las garantías mínimas fijadas por la normativa aplicable, y que, en lo medular, se ha tutelado el debido proceso que ha de ser infranqueable en ese proceder. Ahora bien, en virtud de lo alegado, es menester abordar el tema de las funciones que le son propias al órgano director y al órgano decisor del procedimiento. La competencia para emitir el acto final dentro de un procedimiento corresponde al órgano decisor, sea, a quien se ha otorgado la competencia legal para emitir el acto que causa estado. Empero, en aras de la eficiencia administrativa, las competencias de instrucción son delegables en un órgano encargado de llevar a cabo la instrucción del procedimiento, el que se ha tendido en denominar \"órgano director o instructor\". En tesis de principio, la designación de este último corresponde al órgano decisor, para lo cual, su validez se encuentra sujeta a que recaiga en un funcionario adscrito, designado regularmente y en posesión del cargo. Sin embargo, es factible que, en determinados supuestos, la misma ley establezca la unidad administrativa que se constituye en órgano director del trámite. De manera excepcional, se ha tolerado que se constituya como órgano director del procedimiento a personas que no son funcionarios regulares, sin embargo, en esa función específica, debe entenderse que cumplen una función pública, con las obligaciones inherentes. En cuanto a sus competencias, la representación de la administración instructora dentro del procedimiento corresponde a ese órgano director, según se desprende con toda claridad del ordinal 282 inciso 3 de la Ley No. 6227/78. Se trata de una instancia con potestades de instrucción y ordenación del procedimiento (art. 227 LGAP), encargada de llevar todas las etapas preparatorias para luego, remitir los autos al órgano decisor, en ocasiones, según corresponda, junto con un dictamen no vinculante -salvo norma en contrario- (art. 330 LGAP). Si bien puede, eventualmente, rendir recomendaciones, ciertamente no serían vinculantes, por lo que sus determinaciones de cara a la adopción de una decisión final se consideran actos de trámite. Por ende, le corresponde dictar el acto de apertura, dar impulso procesal, toda la labor de instrucción del procedimiento, dirigir la comparecencia, resolver cuestiones previas, resolver el recurso de revocatoria que se interponga contra los actos de trámite, rendir un informe al órgano decisor al momento de remitir el expediente para el dictado del acto final. Dentro de sus competencias pueden verse los artículos 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, todos de la Ley General de referencia. Por su parte, el órgano decisor es el jerarca competente que reúne las condiciones necesarias para dictar el acto final que resuelve el procedimiento [...]\n\nSobre ese particular y considerando las alegaciones del Estado, arriba resumidas, cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone. Sobre el deber de probidad. Alcances. El numeral 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública define al funcionario público como la persona que presta servicios a la Administración o a nombre y por cuenta de ésta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia de su carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva. Por su parte, el canon 113 ejusdem, establece con claridad que el marco funcional del agente público ha de realizarse de manera que satisfaga primordialmente el interés público, entendido como el interés coincidente de los administrados. Para tal efecto, el servidor público se encuentra de manera impostergable, afecto al principio de legalidad, tanto en su visión negativa como positiva, según se colige, a nivel legal, de los ordinales 11, 12, 13, 59 y 66 de la citada Ley General y del artículo 11 de la Carta Magna. Como parte de esta orientación, el desempeño del funcionario se encuentra orientado y delimitado por normas de transparencia y probidad, cuyo sustento legal se encuentra expreso en el numeral 3 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública (LCCEIFP), No. 8422. Dicha norma señala:\n\n\"Deber de probidad. El funcionario público estará obligado a orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público. Este deber se manifestará, fundamentalmente, al identificar y atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias, de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igualdad para los habitantes de la República; asimismo, al demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley; asegurarse de que las decisiones que adopte en cumplimiento de sus atribuciones se ajustan a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución en la que se desempeña y, finalmente, al administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente.\" \n\nDesde esta arista, como complemento de la orientación finalista del funcionario público que le exige potenciar la satisfacción de los intereses públicos por encima de los personales, incluso de los intereses de la Administración (113.2 ibídem), lo que es propio de la naturaleza servicial de sus competencias, el deber de probidad pretende aportar aspectos de mayor concreción, que de alguna manera, orientan las acciones del funcionario público (o son líneas que deben hacerlo), a fin de que su conducta responda a esa dimensión teleológica, ya no solo a nivel de resultado, sino mediante la incorporación de deberes morales y éticos que garantizan transparencia y objetividad en su proceder. Es decir, esa moral pública exige que, en caso de conflictos de intereses, deba separarse del conocimiento del asunto, a efecto de no \"polucionar\" o poner en riesgo la objetividad que ha de ser propia de la conducta, pero, además, en sus acciones, ha de propender a la satisfacción de aquel interés mayor. Más simple, el deber de probidad regulado en el artículo tercero de la Ley No.8422 obliga a todo servidor público a ejercer su cargo con apego al principio de imparcialidad frente a intereses personales o familiares, económicos, y de otra naturaleza, por lo que en su desempeño debe demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley. Así en efecto se desprende del canon primero del Reglamento a la citada Ley No. 8422, que sobre el citado deber de probidad manifiesta se expresa, entre otras acciones, en “abstenerse de conocer y resolver un asunto cuando existan las mismas causas de impedimento y recusación que se establecen en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, en el Código Procesal y Civil y en otras leyes”. Por tanto, es claro que la condición de agente público supone la sujeción y el debido cumplimiento de deberes de orientación moral y ética que el mismo ordenamiento jurídico consagra e impone, que le exigen conducirse en su gestión con rectitud y solidez. Para el resguardo de ese cometido, las normas que impregnan las actividades de los funcionarios públicos imponen un régimen de impedimentos, que fijan causas en las cuales se imposibilita al servidor, sea de oficio o a gestión de parte, el conocimiento de un determinado asunto en el cual, por la concurrencia de determinadas situaciones, pueda ver lesionada, o amenazada su objetividad en el desarrollo de sus funciones y con ello, el consustancial riesgo en la ponderación debida del interés público. Es este el caso de las causas impuestas por el canon 230 de la Ley General de previa referencia, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y los motivos referenciados en los cánones 12 y siguientes del Código Procesal Civil, así como las impuestas por la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, todas las cuales buscan evitar un posible conflicto de intereses. Es claro en este punto, que, a nivel preventivo, esas condiciones de impedimento buscan mantener la objetividad y transparencia en el proceder del funcionario público, evitando que el correcto cumplimiento de los cometidos que son propios de su investidura y, en consecuencia, la satisfacción del interés público como norte de su comportamiento, se vea amenazado o sea relegado por intereses personales. De ahí que la infracción al mencionado deber de probidad no se encuentra inmune al marco de responsabilidad disciplinaria del agente público. El precepto 4 de la mencionada Ley No. 8422 establece: \n\n\"Sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades civiles y penales que procedan, la infracción del deber de probidad, debidamente comprobada y previa defensa, constituirá justa causa para la separación del cargo público sin responsabilidad patronal.\" \n\nTal efecto condicionado encuentra sentido, en el contexto que se analiza, para actos en los que se le endilga incorrecciones por ejercicio concurrente de cargos bajo remuneración, en jornada laboral, así como la utilización de bienes y recursos públicos para fines ajenos al cargo. Desde luego que la aplicación e interpretación de esa norma ha de transitar por las sendas de la racionalidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, parámetros que deben ser valorados en cada caso concreto. Para ello, el mandato 38 de la citada legislación (Ley No. 8422) establece causales de responsabilidad administrativa, que luego, encuentran sus correlativas sanciones posibles en la letra de la norma 39 ius ibíd., la que en ese tanto, sería aplicable ante las infracciones al deber de probidad en los términos ya desarrollados. La sinergia de estas disposiciones incorpora un sistema flexible que permite hacer surgir la responsabilidad de un funcionario ante la emisión de conductas transgresoras de las normas de la ética. Con todo, la aplicación correcta de este sistema, implica la necesaria instrucción de un procedimiento administrativo, como paso previo e infranqueable para aplicar una sanción por las lesiones a ese marco de obligaciones funcionariales, con respeto pleno e íntegro de las garantías de defensa y el debido proceso, lo que viene a ser fundamental para eludir actuaciones arbitrarias e ilegales. En el caso de los agentes públicos regulados por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil, la gestión de despido debe atender al procedimiento y ordenanzas previstas en el capítulo IX de ese Estatuto (a partir del numeral 43 al 47) y preceptos del 88 al 96 del Reglamento al citado Estatuto, el que fija la autorización del Tribunal de Servicio Civil al titular de la respectiva cartera ministerial, para dicta el acto de despido del respectivo servidor público. De esa manera, la validez de ese tipo de actuaciones se encuentra condicionada a la satisfacción de las garantías procedimentales que ese régimen jurídico impone. Lo anterior sin perjuicio de las potestades que la LOCGR, No. 7428, confiere a ese órgano contralor para la recomendación vinculante de aplicación de sanciones y responsabilidades por infracciones al régimen superior de fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública, se insiste, integrado por las leyes 7428, 7494 (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), 8131 (Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos), 8292 (LCI) y 8422 (LCCEIFP), caso en el cual, ha de instaurarse las acciones pertinentes para atender esa recomendación, con respeto de los derechos e intereses del funcionario. \n\n VII.- Análisis de la prescripción en el caso concreto. Dicho esto, si bien el deber de probidad impone un marco de comportamiento acorde a los deberes funcionariales, así como a las reglas que modulan las conductas del agente público, esa regulación se orienta a prevenir, detectar y sancionar la corrupción en el ejercicio de la función pública, según se desprende del ordinal 1 de la citada Ley No. 8422, de manera que la comprensión del concepto de probidad, ha de realizarse precisamente en el contexto de esa finalidad legal, sea, cuando la falta del servidor suponga un aspecto vinculable (directamente) a la corrupción, el enriquecimiento ilegítimo y la inadecuada gestión de fondos públicos o la hacienda pública. De otro modo, si se entendiera infringido el deber de probidad por cualquier acción u omisión del agente público que suponga una desatención o incumplimiento a reglas deontológicas de comportamiento, que le son propias o inherentes a su ejercicio competencial, y en general a su investidura, en sentido amplio y extremo, sin realizar ese juicio de asociación a los fines de la citada ley, toda falta funcionarial cabría dentro del ámbito de lesión al deber de probidad. Lo anterior llevaría a imponer un régimen general de prescriptibilidad de las faltas de cinco años, en todos los casos, lo que, a juicio de esta Cámara Sentenciadora, no es la finalidad o ratio de la ley de referencia. Por ende, es necesario que en cada procedimiento de corte disciplinario, se analice el contenido de las conductas intimadas, de cara a establecer si el régimen jurídico que precisa el plazo para el ejercicio de la prescripción de la potestad correctiva interna, es el común de un mes que impone la doctrina del actual ordinal 414 del Código de Trabajo, anterior 603 de esa misma fuente, mismo plazo fijado por remisión del precepto 51 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, o si por el contrario, por estar frente a los supuestos que busca tutelar la Ley No. 8422, o bien la No. 8292, el citado plazo se ensancha por la aplicación de la regla prevista en el mandato 71 de la Ley No. 7428. En ese contexto, los hechos que le fueron imputados al accionante fueron precisados en el traslado inicial de cargos, en el cual se le atribuyó: \n\n\"...1. Transgredir el régimen de incompatibilidad de los funcionarios públicos al participar dentro de la jornada laboral a sesiones de la Junta Directiva de LAICA, en su carácter personal, lo que provocó el pago de su salario y adicionalmente de las dietas de ese Órgano Colegiado con una evidente contraposición horaria y el recibo de doble salario y violación al artículo 17 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. 2. Por violentar el beneficio de dedicación exclusiva de que goza dicho funcionario, ya que no puede desempeñar otro cargo fuera de la jornada laboral, ya que se le pago dedicación exclusiva. 3. Por abandonar su trabajo, pues, sin autorización del MAG, se ausentó de sus labores para asistir en carácter personal a sesiones de la Junta Directiva de LAICA en forma consecutiva. 4. Por incumplir el régimen de incapacidades de la CCSS, ya que estando en esa condición, asistió en carácter personal a sesiones de la Junta Directiva de LAICA. 5. Por utilizar vehículos oficiales para beneficio personal. 6. Por cobrar viáticos para asistir a actividades personales y no propias del cargo.”\n\nComo se observa, desde la misma relación de hechos atribuidos, el acto de traslado inicial es claro y contundente en señalare que el procedimiento se instruye por la posible violación a las reglas previstas en el canon 17 de la Ley No. 8422, por la participación en sesiones de la Junta Directiva de LAICA, en horario de jornada laboral del MAG. Ciertamente el detalle de esas conductas no refiere de manera directa la gestión directa de recursos o bienes públicos asignados por las competencias propias del cargo, empero, como se ha señalado, el régimen de probidad se encuentra regulado por un conjunto de normas de carácter sectorial (fiscalización superior de la Hacienda Pública) que imponen pautas de comportamiento al agente público y dentro de las cuales, la LCCEIFP, guarda especial relevancia, en la medida en que impone el DEBER DE PROBIDAD como pauta rectora de la función pública. En ese sentido, el ordinal 3 de la citada legislación desarrolla el concepto de probidad, según ya fue señalado en el aparte previo. Como proyección de ese deber, el ordinal 4 ejusdem señala la posibilidad del despido sin responsabilidad patronal por las infracciones graves a dicho régimen. Para tales efectos, el Capítulo II de esa fuente legal regula lo relativo al régimen preventivo, a partir del ordinal 14, capítulo en el cual, detalla una serie de conductas que configuran prohibiciones expresas (tipicidad) y que se entienden como infracciones al deber de probidad. En ese orden alude a la prohibición de ejercer profesiones liberales y la correspondiente retribución económica por esa restricción (arts. 14 y 15), prohibición de percibir compensaciones salariales (art. 16), restricción de desempeño simultáneo de cargos públicos (art. 17), a la vez que fija un régimen de incompatibilidades y los supuestos del levantamiento de estas (arts. 18 y 19), así como lo relacionado al régimen de donaciones y obsequios (art. 20). Del análisis de traslado de cargos observa este Tribunal que los hechos intimados encajan a plenitud en la calificación legal dada por la Dirección General de Servicio Civil, en la medida en que se cita como norma infringida el mandato 17 de la Ley No. 8422, norma que en sus párrafos cuarto y quinto precisa: \n\n\"Artículo 17.- Desempeño simultáneo de cargos públicos. (...) Asimismo, quienes desempeñen un cargo dentro de la función pública, no podrán devengar dieta alguna como miembros de juntas directivas o de otros órganos colegiados pertenecientes a órganos, entes y empresas de la Administración Pública, salvo si no existe superposición horaria entre la jornada laboral y las sesiones de tales órganos. (Así reformado el párrafo anterior por el inciso a) del artículo 1° de la ley N° 8445 del 10 de mayo del 2005)\n\nQuienes, sin ser funcionarios públicos integren, simultáneamente, hasta tres juntas directivas u otros órganos colegiados adscritos a órganos, entes y empresas de la Administración Pública, podrán recibir las dietas correspondientes a cada cargo, siempre y cuando no exista superposición horaria. Cuando, por razones de interés público, se requiera que la persona integre más de tres juntas directivas u otros órganos colegiados adscritos a órganos, entes y empresas de la Administración Pública, deberá recabarse la autorización de la Contraloría General de la República. (Así adicionado el párrafo anterior por el inciso b) del artículo 1° de la ley N° 8445 del 10 de mayo del 2005) ...\"\n\nResulta notorio que, al imputarse como parte del objeto del procedimiento, haber percibido dietas por la participación en la Junta Directiva de LAICA, en tiempo de jornada laboral del MAG, esa norma resultaba atinente al caso. Este solo elemento es determinante para fijar el régimen jurídico aplicable, en cuanto a las reglas de temporalidad que definen la eventual responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor público. A juicio de esta Cámara, el contenido sustancial de las conductas intimadas y objeto del procedimiento constituyen manifestaciones que encajan dentro de la previsión normativa y que, por ende, se estiman antagónicas del deber de probidad que se impone en el ejercicio de la función pública. Desde este plano, no debe generar confusión la responsabilidad de quienes administran Hacienda Pública de manera directa, denominados superiores jerárquicos o titulares subordinados, con la responsabilidad que resulta propia, por su sola condición, a quienes ejercen cargos públicos, y que, por tanto, se encuentran sujetos a las regulaciones del deber de probidad. En ese sentido, el margen de temporalidad para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria que aplica en este caso, es el que impone la Ley No. 8422 en su numeral 44, que remite a la norma quinquenal de prescripción que estatuye el mandato 71 de la Ley No. 7428. Se trata de una regulación especial que prevalece sobre las ordenanzas del artículo 51 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, que remiten al Código de Trabajo, normativa esta última que fija un plazo de prescripción de un mes para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria, según se desprende del actual ordinal 414, dada la reforma realizada por la Ley No. 9343 y que, de previo a esa modificación, correspondía al precepto 603. En efecto, en la dinámica del ejercicio disciplinario convergen diversas fases que cuentan con regulaciones especiales en cuanto al elemento temporal, a saber: a) Plazo para la instrucción del procedimiento direccionado a establecer la concurrencia de los elementos de sustento justificativo de la falta, b) Plazo para tramitar el procedimiento, c) Plazo para la emisión del acto final dentro del procedimiento y d) Término para la ejecución del acto disciplinario. En la especie las alegaciones de las partes se asocian al primer espacio referido, siendo inocuo referirse al detalle de las diversas etapas aludidas. En concreto, el plazo de prescripción (o caducidad -en los casos que resulte aplicable este instituto-) del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria, entendida como plazo que fija el ordenamiento jurídico para que el titular de la potestad correctiva interna adopte las medidas procedimentales del caso que le permitan emitir la decisión final. En este plano, se trata del plazo máximo incoado por el ordenamiento jurídico para que el jerarca administrativo disponga la apertura del procedimiento pertinente, direccionado a establecer la pertinencia o no de la imposición de una sanción. En este caso, es claro que la notificación de la apertura del procedimiento que busca el establecimiento de los hechos (verdad real) que sirven de base al motivo del acto, genera un efecto interruptor de ese margen de temporalidad, en la medida en que consiste un acto expreso y una medida que directamente propende al ejercicio de esa potestad. No podría considerarse que el citado plazo del ejercicio de la potestad se interrumpe con el dictado del acto final pues como derivación del principio del debido proceso, es menester que la Administración disponga la apertura de una causa administrativa, se insiste, para establecer si corresponde la sanción, como derivación de lo establecido en los ordinales 214, 221, 297, 308 de la LGAP. En esta hipótesis analizada, la potestad disciplinaria del jerarca administrativo se encuentra sujeta a plazo prescriptivo (cuyo tratamiento en la praxis es en realidad muy próximo a la figura de la caducidad en la medida en que en determinados supuestos se estila declarar ese aspecto ex officio), genéricamente regulado por el mandato 414 del Código de Trabajo, norma que fija un plazo de un mes para el ejercicio de esa potestad represiva, el que se insiste, se interrumpe con la comunicación del traslado de cargos. Lo anterior sin perjuicio de las faltas que se encuentren reguladas por las normas especiales, tales como las expresadas por el régimen de control interno, probidad en la función pública y gestión de la hacienda pública, en los cuales, acorde a lo regulado por la Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292 (art. 43), Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública, No. 8422 (art. 44) y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, opera un plazo especial de cinco años (según los supuestos y desde los momentos en que esas normas disponen). En tales casos, se impone el plazo especial y no el mensual estatuido por el Código de Trabajo, se insiste, al ser una normativa especial y posterior que prevalece sobre el régimen general laboral. De ahí que, en este caso, el plazo aplicable para la instrucción del procedimiento ha de ser el previsto por el citado ordinal 44 de la Ley No. 8422, sea, de cinco años. \n\n VIII.- En ese ámbito, el accionante reprocha que por virtud del mandato 99 del Reglamento al Estatuto de Servicio Civil, el plazo con que cuenta el Ministro para iniciar la gestión de despido es de un mes a partir de la causa para la sanción. Ciertamente, ese precepto indica en su inciso c), que prescribirá en un mes: \"c) Las acciones de los Ministros para iniciar la gestión de despido de los servidores regulares por causa justificada y para imponer las correcciones disciplinarias que autoricen la ley y los reglamentos interiores de trabajo, a partir del día en que se dio causa para la sanción, o en su caso, desde que fueren conocidos los hechos o faltas correspondientes.\" Frente a esa referencia, es menester indicar que, al igual que se ha señalado, esa norma es de carácter general y, por ende, cede ante la especialidad y mayor jerarquía de las regulaciones legales a las que ya se ha hecho referencia, propias del régimen de probidad en la función pública. Por un lado, se reitera, la Ley No. 8422 es un ordenamiento especial que prevalece frente a las regulaciones de orden genérico y por otro, ostenta mayor resistencia y potencia que la norma reglamentaria a la que hace referencia el accionante. De ese modo, esa disposición no podría imponerse frente a los plazos quinquenales previstos en el artículo 44 de la Ley No. 8422 y el canon 71 de la Ley No. 7428. Aunado a lo expuesto, en los casos cubiertos por el ámbito de aplicación de la LCI y la LCCEIFP, la remisión que se hace al numeral 71 de la LOCGR, implica que el cómputo de la citada prescripción se configure a partir de las reglas que ese mandato regula, el que en su tenor literal expresa: \n\n\"Artículo 71.-Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas:\n\na) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho.\n\nb) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio -entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo.\n\nLa prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo.\n\nCuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo.\n\nSe reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa justificada.\n\n(Así reformado por el inciso a) del artículo 45 de la Ley de Control Interno, N° 8292 de 31 de julio del 2002)\"\n\nEn cuanto al punto de partida de la prescripción (dies a quo), la norma señala que el inicio de los plazos es el conocimiento de los hechos que configuran la falta sancionable, a efectos de lo cual, es menester discriminar si los hechos constituyen una falta notoria o si, por el contrario, requiere de acciones internas de orden complementario para determinar o inferir la irregularidad. En este sentido, ese plazo se ha de computar desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad correctiva se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la falta y, por ende, emprender el ejercicio de su potestad. Por ende, cuando las particularidades del caso exijan la realización de una etapa previa de investigación preliminar, supuesto cubierto por el inciso b) de la norma recién aludida, el plazo en cuestión corre desde el momento en que se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca los resultados de ese ejercicio. Es el caso, además, de faltas que sean evidenciadas en informes de Auditoría Interna, pero cuya prosecución para efectos de sancionar, deban ser sometidas al jerarca respectivo. En tal escenario, el plazo señalado se computa desde el momento de la recepción o comunicación efectiva al jerarca de dicho informe, pues es hasta ese momento que ese titular puede válidamente adoptar las decisiones respecto de la apertura o no de disposiciones disciplinarias. Con todo, debe discriminarse en cada caso la necesidad o no de esa fase (investigación preliminar), pues de otro modo, podría utilizarse como estrategia para evadir la prescripción, siendo que no en todos los escenarios, esa investigación sería necesaria, sino solo aquellos en que por las particularidades del caso, esa fase sea indispensable para determinar la pertinencia o no de la apertura del procedimiento sancionatorio, o bien, para recabar indicios que propendan a clarificar su necesidad o no\".", "body_en_text": "III.- Generalities on the administrative procedure. The administrative procedure constitutes a significant formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it establishes the path the Administration must follow to adopt a particular decision, guiding its actions. On the other, it imposes itself as a frame of reference that allows the administered party to compare public conduct, in order to establish a control ensuring that its actions have manifested in accordance with the rules guiding that conduct. It seeks, therefore, to constitute a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated by canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its object is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP). Hence, canon 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure in strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial principle, in order to establish the aforementioned real truth of the facts (within which can be seen those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law). This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning procedures, where the final decision may impose a repressive framework on a person's legal sphere. The same normative plexus provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid the procedure that does not satisfy those minimum issues. This follows from mandate 223 of the referenced Law, insofar as it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities will cause nullity of the procedure. From this perspective, this Tribunal has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred upon this jurisdiction by canon 49 of the Magna Carta, involves a verification that the Administration, in the course of those procedures (of a sanctioning nature in this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, in essence, the due process, which must be insurmountable in that conduct, has been protected. Now, by virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions proper to the directing body (órgano director) and the decision-making body (órgano decisor) of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the decision-making body, that is, to whomever has been granted the legal competence to issue the act that is final (causa estado). However, in the interest of administrative efficiency, the instructional competences are delegable to a body charged with carrying out the instruction of the procedure, which has tended to be called the \"directing or instructing body\". In principle, the designation of the latter corresponds to the decision-making body, for which its validity is subject to it falling upon an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. However, it is feasible that, in certain cases, the law itself establishes the administrative unit that constitutes the directing body of the proceeding. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated that persons who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure, nevertheless, in that specific function, it must be understood that they perform a public function, with the inherent obligations. Regarding its competences, the representation of the instructing administration within the procedure corresponds to that directing body, as is clearly inferred from ordinal 282, subsection 3 of Law No. 6227/78. It is an instance with powers of instruction and ordering of the procedure (art. 227 LGAP), charged with carrying out all the preparatory stages to then forward the case file to the decision-making body, on occasions, as appropriate, together with a non-binding opinion -unless a rule states otherwise- (art. 330 LGAP). While it may, eventually, render recommendations, they would certainly not be binding, such that its determinations regarding the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts (actos de trámite). Therefore, it is responsible for issuing the opening act, providing procedural impetus, all the instructional work of the procedure, directing the appearance, resolving preliminary issues, resolving the appeal for revocation filed against procedural acts, and rendering a report to the decision-making body at the time of forwarding the case file for the issuance of the final act. Within its competences can be seen Articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the referenced General Law. For its part, the decision-making body is the competent superior (jerarca) who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act that resolves the procedure [...]\n\nRegarding this particular matter and considering the allegations of the State, summarized above, it is pertinent to note what is set forth below. On the duty of probity (deber de probidad). Scope. Numeral 111 of the General Public Administration Law defines the public official as the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf of and for the account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence of its imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. For its part, canon 113 ejusdem, clearly establishes that the functional framework of the public agent must be carried out in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, understood as the coinciding interest of the administered persons. For this purpose, the public servant is unavoidably subject to the principle of legality, both in its negative and positive aspects, as is inferred, at the legal level, from ordinals 11, 12, 13, 59 and 66 of the cited General Law and from Article 11 of the Magna Carta. As part of this orientation, the performance of the official is oriented and delimited by norms of transparency and probity, whose legal support is expressly found in numeral 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, LCCEIFP), No. 8422. Said norm states:\n\n\"Duty of probity. The public official shall be obliged to orient their management towards the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest, fundamentally, in identifying and addressing priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, in demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions adopted in compliance with their attributions conform to impartiality and the institution's own objectives in which they perform; and, finally, in administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, efficacy, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily.\"\n\nFrom this angle, as a complement to the finalist orientation of the public official that demands prioritizing the satisfaction of public interests over personal ones, even over the interests of the Administration (113.2 ibidem), which is proper to the service-oriented nature of their competences, the duty of probity aims to provide aspects of greater concreteness, which in some way, guide the actions of the public official (or are lines that should do so), so that their conduct responds to that teleological dimension, no longer only at the level of result, but through the incorporation of moral and ethical duties that guarantee transparency and objectivity in their actions. That is to say, that public morality demands that, in cases of conflicts of interest, they must recuse themselves from hearing the matter, in order not to \"pollute\" or jeopardize the objectivity that must be characteristic of the conduct, but, furthermore, in their actions, they must tend towards the satisfaction of that greater interest. More simply, the duty of probity regulated in Article Three of Law No. 8422 obligates every public servant to exercise their position in adherence to the principle of impartiality regarding personal or familial, economic, and other interests, such that in their performance they must demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law. Thus, in effect, it follows from canon one of the Regulations to the cited Law No. 8422, which regarding the cited duty of probity states it is expressed, among other actions, in \"abstaining from hearing and resolving a matter when the same grounds for impediment and recusal exist as are established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, in the Procedural and Civil Code, and in other laws\". Therefore, it is clear that the condition of a public agent entails subjection to and due compliance with duties of moral and ethical orientation that the legal system itself enshrines and imposes, which demand they conduct themselves in their management with rectitude and solidity. For the safeguarding of this objective, the norms that permeate the activities of public officials impose a regime of impediments (impedimentos), which establish causes in which the servant is prevented, whether ex officio or at the request of a party, from hearing a specific matter in which, due to the concurrence of certain situations, their objectivity in the performance of their functions may be harmed or threatened, and with it, the inherent risk to the due weighing of the public interest. This is the case of the causes imposed by canon 230 of the previously referenced General Law, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and the grounds referenced in canons 12 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, as well as those imposed by the Law on Administrative Contracting (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa), all of which seek to avoid a possible conflict of interest. It is clear on this point that, at a preventive level, those conditions of impediment seek to maintain objectivity and transparency in the conduct of the public official, preventing the correct fulfillment of the objectives inherent to their office, and consequently, the satisfaction of the public interest as the north of their behavior, from being threatened or relegated by personal interests. Hence, the infringement of the mentioned duty of probity is not immune to the disciplinary liability framework of the public agent. Precept 4 of the mentioned Law No. 8422 establishes:\n\n\"Without prejudice to the civil and criminal liabilities that may apply, the infringement of the duty of probity, duly proven and after prior defense, shall constitute just cause for dismissal from the public position without employer liability.\"\n\nSuch a conditioned effect finds meaning, in the context under analysis, for acts in which incorrect actions are attributed for the concurrent holding of remunerated positions, during working hours, as well as the use of public goods and resources for purposes unrelated to the position. Of course, the application and interpretation of that norm must travel the paths of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, parameters that must be assessed in each specific case. For this purpose, mandate 38 of the cited legislation (Law No. 8422) establishes grounds for administrative liability, which then find their correlative possible sanctions in the text of norm 39 ius ibid., which in that respect, would be applicable to infringements of the duty of probity under the terms already developed. The synergy of these provisions incorporates a flexible system that allows the liability of an official to arise upon the commission of conducts that violate ethical norms. Nonetheless, the correct application of this system implies the necessary instruction of an administrative procedure, as a prior and insurmountable step to apply a sanction for the injuries to that framework of official obligations, with full and complete respect for guarantees of defense and due process, which is fundamental to avoid arbitrary and illegal actions. In the case of public agents regulated by the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), the dismissal proceeding must adhere to the procedure and ordinances provided in chapter IX of that Statute (from numeral 43 to 47) and precepts from 88 to 96 of the Regulations to the cited Statute, which establishes the authorization of the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal de Servicio Civil) to the head of the respective ministerial portfolio, to issue the act of dismissal of the respective public servant. In this way, the validity of that type of action is conditioned upon the satisfaction of the procedural guarantees imposed by that legal regime. The foregoing is without prejudice to the powers that the LOCGR, No. 7428, confers upon that controlling body for the binding recommendation of the application of sanctions and liabilities for infringements of the superior regime of oversight of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), it is insisted, comprised of Laws 7428, 7494 (Law on Administrative Contracting), 8131 (Law on Financial Administration and Public Budgets), 8292 (LCI) and 8422 (LCCEIFP), in which case, the pertinent actions must be instituted to attend to that recommendation, respecting the rights and interests of the official.\n\nVII.- Analysis of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in the specific case. That said, although the duty of probity imposes a behavioral framework in accordance with official duties, as well as the rules that modulate the conduct of the public agent, that regulation is oriented towards preventing, detecting, and sanctioning corruption in the exercise of the public function, as inferred from ordinal 1 of the cited Law No. 8422, such that the understanding of the concept of probity must be carried out precisely in the context of that legal purpose, that is, when the servant's fault involves an aspect linkable (directly) to corruption, illicit enrichment, and the inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury. Otherwise, if the duty of probity were understood to be infringed by any action or omission of the public agent that represents a disregard or breach of deontological rules of conduct, which are proper or inherent to their exercise of competences, and in general to their office, in a broad and extreme sense, without making that judgment of association to the purposes of the cited law, every official fault would fall within the scope of injury to the duty of probity. The foregoing would lead to imposing a general statute of limitations regime for faults of five years, in all cases, which, in the judgment of this Sentencing Chamber, is not the purpose or ratio of the referenced law. Therefore, it is necessary that in each disciplinary proceeding, the content of the charged conduct is analyzed, in order to establish whether the legal regime that specifies the term for exercising the statute of limitations on the internal corrective power is the common one of one month imposed by the doctrine of current ordinal 414 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), formerly 603 of that same source, the same term established by remission of precept 51 of the Civil Service Statute, or if, on the contrary, as the case involves situations sought to be protected by Law No. 8422, or indeed No. 8292, the cited term is extended by the application of the rule provided in mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. In that context, the acts (hechos) imputed to the plaintiff were specified in the initial notice of charges (traslado inicial de cargos), in which they were attributed:\n\n\"...1. Violating the incompatibility regime for public officials by participating, during working hours, in sessions of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of LAICA, in their personal capacity, which resulted in the payment of their salary and additionally the fees (dietas) of that Collegiate Body with an evident scheduling overlap and the receipt of a double salary and violation of Article 17 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function. 2. For violating the exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva) benefit enjoyed by said official, as they cannot hold another position outside of working hours, given that exclusive dedication was paid to them. 3. For abandoning their work, since, without authorization from the MAG, they were absent from their duties to attend, in a personal capacity, sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA on a consecutive basis. 4. For violating the CCSS disability regime, since, while in that condition, they attended, in a personal capacity, sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA. 5. For using official vehicles for personal benefit. 6. For collecting per diems (viáticos) to attend personal activities and not those proper to the position.\"\n\nAs observed, from the very statement of attributed acts, the initial notice act is clear and emphatic in indicating that the procedure is initiated for the possible violation of the rules provided in canon 17 of Law No. 8422, for participation in sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA, during the MAG working hours. Certainly, the detail of those conducts does not refer directly to the direct management of public resources or goods assigned by the competences of the position, however, as has been indicated, the probity regime is regulated by a set of sectoral norms (superior oversight of the Public Treasury) that impose behavioral guidelines on the public agent and within which, the LCCEIFP is of special relevance, insofar as it imposes the DUTY OF PROBITY as a guiding principle of the public function. In that sense, ordinal 3 of the cited legislation develops the concept of probity, as already indicated in the previous section. As a projection of that duty, ordinal 4 ejusdem indicates the possibility of dismissal without employer liability for serious infringements of said regime. For such purposes, Chapter II of that legal source regulates matters related to the preventive regime, starting from ordinal 14, a chapter in which it details a series of conducts that constitute express prohibitions (typicity) and are understood as infringements of the duty of probity. In that vein, it alludes to the prohibition of practicing liberal professions and the corresponding economic compensation for that restriction (arts. 14 and 15), the prohibition of receiving salary compensations (art. 16), the restriction on the simultaneous holding of public positions (art. 17), while also establishing a regime of incompatibilities and the events for lifting these (arts. 18 and 19), as well as matters related to the regime of donations and gifts (art. 20). From the analysis of the notice of charges, this Tribunal observes that the charged acts fully fit the legal qualification given by the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, insofar as mandate 17 of Law No. 8422 is cited as the infringed norm, a norm which in its fourth and fifth paragraphs specifies:\n\n\"Article 17.- Simultaneous holding of public positions. (...) Likewise, those who hold a position within the public function may not receive any fee as members of boards of directors or other collegial bodies belonging to organs, entities, and companies of the Public Administration, except if there is no scheduling overlap between the working day and the sessions of such bodies. (Thus amended the previous paragraph by subsection a) of Article 1° of Law N° 8445 of May 10, 2005)\n\nThose who, without being public officials, simultaneously serve on up to three boards of directors or other collegial bodies attached to organs, entities, and companies of the Public Administration, may receive the fees corresponding to each position, provided there is no scheduling overlap. When, for reasons of public interest, it is required that the person serve on more than three boards of directors or other collegial bodies attached to organs, entities, and companies of the Public Administration, the authorization of the Contraloría General de la República must be obtained. (Thus added the previous paragraph by subsection b) of Article 1° of Law N° 8445 of May 10, 2005) ...\"\n\nIt is notorious that, when having received fees for participation in the Board of Directors of LAICA, during MAG working hours, is imputed as part of the object of the procedure, that norm was pertinent to the case. This single element is determinative for establishing the applicable legal regime, regarding the time limitation rules that define the potential disciplinary liability of the public servant. In this Chamber's judgment, the substantial content of the charged conducts and the object of the procedure constitute manifestations that fit within the normative provision and that, therefore, are considered antagonistic to the duty of probity imposed in the exercise of public function. From this perspective, no confusion should arise between the responsibility of those who directly administer Public Treasury, termed hierarchical superiors or subordinate managers, and the responsibility that is proper, by their mere condition, to those who hold public positions, and who, therefore, are subject to the regulations of the duty of probity. In this sense, the time limitation margin for the exercise of the disciplinary power applicable in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its numeral 44, which remits to the five-year statute of limitations rule established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. It is a special regulation that prevails over the ordinances of Article 51 of the Civil Service Statute, which remit to the Labor Code, this latter regulation sets a statute of limitations term of one month for the exercise of the disciplinary power, as inferred from current ordinal 414, given the amendment made by Law No. 9343 and which, prior to that amendment, corresponded to precept 603. Indeed, in the dynamics of disciplinary exercise, various phases converge that have special regulations regarding the time element, namely: a) Term for the instruction of the procedure aimed at establishing the concurrence of the elements substantiating the fault, b) Term for processing the procedure, c) Term for the issuance of the final act within the procedure, and d) Term for the execution of the disciplinary act. In the present case, the parties' allegations are associated with the first space referenced, it being unnecessary to refer to the detail of the various stages alluded to. Specifically, the statute of limitations term (or expiration (caducidad) -in cases where this legal concept is applicable-) for the exercise of the disciplinary power, understood as the term set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures of the case that allow them to issue the final decision. At this level, it is the maximum period established by the legal system for the administrative superior to order the opening of the pertinent procedure, aimed at establishing the relevance or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure seeking the establishment of the facts (real truth) that serve as the basis for the grounds of the act, generates an interrupting effect on that time limitation margin, insofar as it consists of an express act and a measure that directly tends towards the exercise of that power. It could not be considered that the cited term for the exercise of the power is interrupted by the issuance of the final act because, as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative cause, it is insisted, to establish whether the sanction is applicable, as a derivation of what is established in ordinals 214, 221, 297, 308 of the LGAP. In this analyzed hypothesis, the disciplinary power of the administrative superior is subject to a statutory limitation period (whose treatment in practice is actually very close to the concept of expiration insofar as in certain situations it is customary to declare that aspect ex officio), generically regulated by mandate 414 of the Labor Code, a norm that sets a one-month term for the exercise of that repressive power, which, it is insisted, is interrupted by the communication of the notice of charges. The foregoing is without prejudice to faults that are regulated by special norms, such as those expressed by the internal control regime, probity in the public function, and management of the public treasury, in which, according to what is regulated by the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), No. 8292 (art. 43), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, No. 8422 (art. 44), and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, a special five-year term operates (according to the situations and from the moments that those norms provide). In such cases, the special term is imposed and not the monthly one established by the Labor Code, it is insisted, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime. Hence, in this case, the applicable term for the instruction of the procedure must be that provided by the cited ordinal 44 of Law No. 8422, that is, five years.\n\nVIII.- In that context, the plaintiff reproaches that by virtue of mandate 99 of the Regulations to the Civil Service Statute, the term available to the Minister to initiate the dismissal proceeding is one month from the cause for the sanction. Certainly, that precept indicates in its subsection c), that the following will prescribe in one month: \"c) The actions of the Ministers to initiate dismissal proceedings against regular servants for justified cause and to impose the disciplinary corrections authorized by the law and internal work regulations, from the day the cause for the sanction arose, or, where appropriate, from when the corresponding facts or faults were known.\" In light of that reference, it is necessary to indicate that, as has been pointed out, that norm is of a general nature and, therefore, yields to the specialty and higher hierarchy of the legal regulations already referenced, proper to the probity in the public function regime. On one hand, it is reiterated, Law No. 8422 is a special legal system that prevails over regulations of a generic order, and on the other, it possesses greater resistance and potency than the regulatory norm referenced by the plaintiff. Thus, that provision could not be imposed over the five-year terms provided in Article 44 of Law No. 8422 and canon 71 of Law No. 7428. In addition to what has been stated, in cases covered by the scope of application of the LCI and the LCCEIFP, the referral made to numeral 71 of the LOCGR implies that the computation of the cited statute of limitations is configured based on the rules that that mandate regulates, which literally states:\n\n\"Article 71.-Statute of limitations on disciplinary liability.\n\nThe administrative liability of a public official for the infractions set forth in this Law and in the superior control and oversight legal framework shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules:\n\na) In cases where the irregular event is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the event.\n\nb) In cases where the irregular event is not notorious—understood as an event that requires an investigation or an audit study to report possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is brought to the attention of the superior (jerarca) or the official competent to initiate the respective proceeding.\n\nPrescription shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding.\n\nWhen the author of the offense is the superior (jerarca), the time period shall begin to run from the date on which said superior ends his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body.\n\nIt shall be considered a serious offense of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning proceeding not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the liability of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause.\n\n(Thus amended by section a) of Article 45 of the Internal Control Law, Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002)\n\nRegarding the starting point of the prescription (dies a quo), the rule states that the commencement of the time periods is the knowledge of the events that constitute the sanctionable offense, for which purpose it is necessary to distinguish whether the events constitute a notorious offense or, on the contrary, require internal, supplementary actions to determine or infer the irregularity. In this sense, said time period must be calculated from the moment when the holder of the corrective power is in a position to objectively know of the offense and, therefore, to undertake the exercise of his power. Thus, when the particularities of the case require the performance of a previous preliminary investigation stage, a scenario covered by section b) of the recently mentioned rule, the time period in question runs from the moment when the results of that exercise are brought to the attention of the superior (jerarca). This is also the case for offenses that are evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose prosecution for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective superior (jerarca). In such a scenario, the indicated time period is calculated from the moment of receipt or effective communication of said report to the superior (jerarca), since it is only at that moment that said titleholder can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or non-opening of disciplinary measures. Nevertheless, a determination must be made in each case as to the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation), since otherwise it could be used as a strategy to evade prescription, given that not in all scenarios would such investigation be necessary, but only those in which, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the relevance or not of the opening of the sanctioning proceeding, or else, to gather indications that tend to clarify its necessity or not.\"\n\nIII.- Generalities on the administrative procedure. The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its actions. On the other, it imposes itself as a frame of reference that allows the administered party to establish a comparison of public conduct, in order to set a control ensuring that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the rules that guide such conduct. It seeks, therefore, to constitute a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated by canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its object is to establish the real truth of the events that serve as the basis for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the rights of the individual, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Hence, canon 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal framework. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial process, in order to arrive at establishing the referenced real truth of the events (among which can be seen those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law). This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning procedures, given that, in those cases, the final decision may impose a repressive framework on the legal sphere of a person. The same normative body provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering a procedure that does not satisfy those minimum matters to be invalid. This can be inferred from mandate 223 of the referenced Law, insofar as it states that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the proceeding. From this standpoint, this Court has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred on this jurisdiction by canon 49 of the Magna Carta entails a verification that the Administration, in the course of those procedures (of a sanctioning nature in this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, at its core, the due process that must be inviolable in such actions has been safeguarded. Now, by virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions inherent to the directing body (órgano director) and the deciding body (órgano decisor) of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the deciding body (órgano decisor), that is, to whomever has been granted the legal competence to issue the act that becomes final. However, in the interest of administrative efficiency, the powers of instruction are delegable to a body responsible for carrying out the instruction of the procedure, which has tended to be called the \"directing or instructing body (órgano director o instructor).\" In principle, the designation of this latter body corresponds to the deciding body (órgano decisor), for which its validity is subject to the condition that it falls upon an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. However, it is possible that, in certain scenarios, the same law establishes the administrative unit that becomes the directing body of the proceeding. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated that persons who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure, however, in that specific function, it must be understood that they fulfill a public function, with the inherent obligations. As for its competences, the representation of the instructing administration within the procedure corresponds to that directing body (órgano director), as can be inferred with all clarity from ordinal 282 subsection 3 of Law No. 6227/78. It is an instance with powers of instruction and ordering of the procedure (Article 227 LGAP), responsible for carrying out all the preparatory stages and then, forwarding the case record to the deciding body (órgano decisor), on occasion, as appropriate, together with a non-binding opinion—unless a rule provides otherwise—(Article 330 LGAP). Although it may, eventually, issue recommendations, they certainly would not be binding, so its determinations regarding the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts (actos de trámite).\n\nTherefore, it is incumbent upon the investigating body (órgano director) to issue the opening act, provide procedural momentum, conduct all the investigatory work of the proceeding, direct the hearing, resolve preliminary issues, resolve the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed against procedural acts, and render a report to the deciding body (órgano decisor) when remitting the case file (expediente) for the issuance of the final act. Its competencies can be seen in Articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the referenced General Law. For its part, the deciding body (órgano decisor) is the competent superior authority who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act resolving the proceeding [...]\n\nOn this matter and considering the State's allegations, summarized above, the following must be noted. **Regarding the duty of probity. Scope.** Section 111 of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) defines a public official (funcionario público) as the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and on account of the latter, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence from its imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. For its part, canon 113 of the same body of law clearly establishes that the functional framework of the public agent must be carried out in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest (interés público), understood as the coinciding interest of the governed. To that end, the public servant is, in an inescapable manner, bound by the principle of legality, both in its negative and positive aspects, as deduced, at the legal level, from sections 11, 12, 13, 59, and 66 of the cited General Law and from Article 11 of the Constitution (Carta Magna). As part of this orientation, the performance of the official is guided and delimited by norms of transparency and probity, whose legal basis is expressly found in section 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, LCCEIFP), No. 8422. Said norm states:\n\n\"**Duty of probity.** The public official (funcionario público) shall be obligated to orient his or her management toward the satisfaction of the public interest (interés público). This duty shall be manifested, fundamentally, in identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner, and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, in demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; in ensuring that the decisions adopted in fulfillment of his or her attributions conform to impartiality and the objectives of the institution in which he or she serves; and, finally, in administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, efficacy, economy, and efficiency, rendering satisfactory accounts.\"\n\nFrom this perspective, as a complement to the finalistic orientation of the public official that requires him or her to prioritize the satisfaction of public interests over personal ones, even over the interests of the Administration itself (113.2 ibidem), which is characteristic of the service-oriented nature of his or her competencies, the duty of probity (deber de probidad) seeks to provide aspects of greater specificity, which in some way guide the actions of the public official (or are lines that must do so), so that his or her conduct responds to that teleological dimension, not only at the level of results, but through the incorporation of moral and ethical duties that guarantee transparency and objectivity in his or her behavior. That is, that public morality requires that, in cases of conflicts of interest, the official must recuse himself or herself from the knowledge of the matter, so as not to \"pollute\" or jeopardize the objectivity that must be inherent to the conduct, but, furthermore, in his or her actions, the official must tend toward the satisfaction of that greater interest. More simply, the duty of probity regulated in Article three of Law No. 8422 obligates every public servant to exercise his or her position in adherence to the principle of impartiality against personal or familial, economic, and other interests, for which reason in his or her performance the official must demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law. This is indeed derived from canon one of the Regulation to the cited Law No.\n\n8422, which, regarding the aforementioned duty of probity, is expressed, among other actions, in “abstaining from hearing and resolving a matter when the same grounds for disqualification and recusal established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, in the Civil Procedure Code, and in other laws exist.” Therefore, it is clear that the status of public agent entails subjection to and due fulfillment of duties of moral and ethical orientation that the legal system itself enshrines and imposes, which require the agent to conduct themselves with rectitude and soundness in their management. To safeguard that purpose, the rules that permeate the activities of public officials impose a regime of disqualifications, which set forth grounds on which the public servant is barred, either ex officio or at the request of a party, from hearing a specific matter in which, due to the concurrence of certain situations, their objectivity in the performance of their duties may be impaired or threatened, and with it, the inherent risk in the proper weighing of the public interest. Such is the case of the grounds imposed by canon 230 of the previously referenced General Law, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and the grounds referenced in canons 12 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, as well as those imposed by the Law on Administrative Procurement, all of which seek to avoid a possible conflict of interest. It is clear at this point that, at a preventive level, these conditions of disqualification seek to maintain objectivity and transparency in the public official’s conduct, preventing the proper fulfillment of the tasks that are inherent to their office and, consequently, the satisfaction of the public interest as the guiding principle of their behavior, from being threatened or relegated by personal interests. Hence, a violation of the aforementioned duty of probity is not immune from the disciplinary liability framework of the public agent. Precept 4 of the aforementioned Law No. 8422 establishes:\n\n\"Without prejudice to any applicable civil and criminal liabilities, a violation of the duty of probity, duly proven and after a defense has been afforded, shall constitute just cause for separation from public office without employer liability.\"\n\nSuch conditioned effect finds meaning, in the context under analysis, for acts in which the agent is accused of improprieties for concurrently holding remunerated positions during working hours, as well as the use of public assets and resources for purposes unrelated to the office. Naturally, the application and interpretation of that rule must follow the paths of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, parameters that must be assessed in each specific case. To that end, mandate 38 of the cited legislation (Law No. 8422) establishes grounds for administrative liability, which then find their correlative possible sanctions in the text of rule 39 ibid., which, to that extent, would be applicable to violations of the duty of probity under the terms already developed. The synergy of these provisions incorporates a flexible system that allows for a public official’s liability to arise from the issuance of conduct that transgresses ethical norms. Nevertheless, the correct application of this system implies the necessary initiation of an administrative procedure, as a prior and unavoidable step to apply a sanction for injuries to that framework of official obligations, with full and complete respect for the guarantees of defense and due process, which becomes fundamental to avoid arbitrary and illegal actions. In the case of public agents regulated by the Civil Service Statute, the dismissal process must adhere to the procedure and ordinances set forth in chapter IX of that Statute (from numeral 43 to 47) and precepts 88 to 96 of the Regulation to the cited Statute, which establishes the authorization by the Civil Service Tribunal to the head of the respective ministerial portfolio to issue the act of dismissal of the respective public servant. In this way, the validity of such actions is conditioned upon the satisfaction of the procedural guarantees that that legal regime imposes. The foregoing is without prejudice to the powers that the LOCGR, No. 7428, confers upon that oversight body for the binding recommendation of the application of sanctions and liabilities for violations of the superior oversight regime for the Public Treasury, it is reiterated, composed of laws 7428, 7494 (Law on Administrative Procurement), 8131 (Law on Financial Administration and Public Budgets), 8292 (LCI), and 8422 (LCCEIFP), in which case, the pertinent actions must be initiated to comply with that recommendation, with respect for the rights and interests of the official. \n\n**VII.- Analysis of the statute of limitations in the specific case.** That said, although the duty of probity imposes a framework of behavior in accordance with official duties, as well as the rules that modulate the conduct of the public agent, that regulation is aimed at preventing, detecting, and sanctioning corruption in the exercise of the public function, as can be inferred from numeral 1 of the cited Law No.\n\n8422, so that the understanding of the concept of probity (probidad) must be carried out precisely within the context of that legal purpose, that is, when the public servant's fault involves an aspect directly linkable to corruption, unlawful enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito), and inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury (hacienda pública). Otherwise, if the duty of probity were understood to be infringed by any action or omission of the public agent that constitutes a disregard for or breach of deontological rules of conduct, which are proper to or inherent in the exercise of their competencies, and in general to their investiture, in a broad and extreme sense, without making that judgment of association with the purposes of the cited law, every official fault would fall within the scope of injury to the duty of probity. The foregoing would lead to imposing a general statute of limitations (prescriptibilidad) of five years for faults in all cases, which, in the judgment of this Sentencing Chamber (Cámara Sentenciadora), is not the purpose or ratio of the reference law. Therefore, it is necessary in each disciplinary procedure to analyze the content of the alleged conduct, in order to establish whether the legal regime that specifies the time limit for exercising the internal corrective power is the common one-month period imposed by the doctrine of current Article 414 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), former Article 603 of that same source, the same period set by referral from precept 51 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), or if, on the contrary, because we are facing the situations that Law No. 8422, or Law No. 8292, seeks to protect, the cited period is extended by the application of the rule provided in mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. In that context, the facts that were attributed to the plaintiff (accionante) were specified in the initial notice of charges (traslado inicial de cargos), in which the following was attributed to him:\n\n\"*...1. Violating the incompatibility regime of public officials by participating during working hours in sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA, in a personal capacity, which caused the payment of his salary and additionally the per diem fees of that Collegiate Body with an evident time conflict and receipt of double salary and violation of Article 17 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública). 2. For violating the benefit of exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva) enjoyed by said official, since he cannot perform another position outside working hours, as he was paid exclusive dedication. 3. For abandoning his work, since, without authorization from the MAG, he was absent from his duties to attend sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA in a personal capacity consecutively. 4. For failing to comply with the CCSS disability regime, since, while in that condition, he attended sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA in a personal capacity. 5. For using official vehicles for personal benefit. 6. For collecting travel allowances (viáticos) to attend personal activities and not those proper to the position.*”\n\nAs observed, from the very account of attributed facts, the initial notice act is clear and forceful in indicating that the procedure is instructed for the possible violation of the rules provided in canon 17 of Law No. 8422, for participating in sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA, during MAG working hours. Certainly, the detail of those conducts does not directly refer to the direct management of public resources or assets assigned by the competencies proper to the position, however, as indicated, the probity regime is regulated by a set of sectoral rules (higher oversight of the Public Treasury) that impose behavioral guidelines on the public agent and within which, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (LCCEIFP) holds special relevance, to the extent that it imposes the DUTY OF PROBITY as a guiding principle of the public function. In that sense, Article 3 of the cited legislation develops the concept of probity (probidad), as already pointed out in the previous section. As a projection of that duty, Article 4 ejusdem indicates the possibility of dismissal without employer liability for serious infractions of said regime. For such effects, Chapter II of that legal source regulates matters related to the preventive regime, starting from Article 14, a chapter in which it details a series of conducts that constitute express prohibitions (typicity) and that are understood as infractions of the duty of probity. In that order, it refers to the prohibition on practicing liberal professions and the corresponding economic compensation for that restriction (arts. 14 and 15), prohibition on receiving salary compensation (art. 16), restriction on the simultaneous performance of public positions (art. 17), while establishing a regime of incompatibilities and the scenarios for lifting these (arts. 18 and 19), as well as matters related to the regime of donations and gifts (art. 20).\n\nFrom the analysis of the formal statement of charges, this Tribunal observes that the alleged facts fully fit the legal classification given by the Dirección General de Servicio Civil, insofar as the provision cited as infringed is mandate 17 of Law No. 8422, a provision which in its fourth and fifth paragraphs states:\n\n\"**Artículo 17.- Simultaneous performance of public offices.** (...) Likewise, those who hold a position within the public function may not earn any per diem (dieta) as members of boards of directors or other collegiate bodies belonging to organs, entities, and companies of the Public Administration, except if there is no time overlap between the workday and the sessions of such bodies. (Thus amended the preceding paragraph by subsection a) of article 1° of law N° 8445 of May 10, 2005)\n\nThose who, without being public officials, simultaneously serve on up to three boards of directors or other collegiate bodies attached to organs, entities, and companies of the Public Administration, may receive the per diems (dietas) corresponding to each position, provided there is no time overlap. When, for reasons of public interest, the person is required to serve on more than three boards of directors or other collegiate bodies attached to organs, entities, and companies of the Public Administration, the authorization of the Contraloría General de la República must be obtained. (Thus added the preceding paragraph by subsection b) of article 1° of law N° 8445 of May 10, 2005) ...\"\n\nIt is notorious that, by imputing as part of the object of the procedure the receipt of per diems (dietas) for participation in the Board of Directors of LAICA, during the workday of the MAG, that provision was pertinent to the case. This single element is decisive for establishing the applicable legal regime, regarding the timeliness rules that define the eventual disciplinary liability of the public servant. In the judgment of this Chamber, the substantial content of the alleged conducts and object of the procedure constitute manifestations that fit within the normative provision and that, therefore, are deemed antagonistic to the duty of probity imposed in the exercise of the public function. From this standpoint, no confusion should be generated by the responsibility of those who administer Public Treasury directly, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate heads, with the responsibility that is inherent, by their condition alone, to those who hold public office, and who are, therefore, subject to the regulations of the duty of probity. In that sense, the timeliness margin for the exercise of disciplinary power that applies in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its numeral 44, which refers to the five-year statute of limitations (prescripción) established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. This is a special regulation that prevails over the ordinances of article 51 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil, which refer to the Código de Trabajo, the latter regulation establishing a statute of limitations (prescripción) period of one month for the exercise of disciplinary power, as inferred from the current ordinal 414, given the reform made by Law No. 9343 and which, prior to that amendment, corresponded to precept 603. Indeed, in the dynamics of the disciplinary exercise, various phases converge that have special regulations regarding the temporal element, namely: a) Period for the investigation (instrucción) of the procedure aimed at establishing the concurrence of the elements substantiating the fault, b) Period for processing the procedure, c) Period for the issuance of the final act within the procedure and d) Term for the execution of the disciplinary act. In the present case, the parties' allegations are associated with the first mentioned stage, making it irrelevant to refer to the detail of the various stages alluded to.\n\nSpecifically, the statute of limitations period (or expiration period – in cases where this legal mechanism is applicable) for the exercise of the disciplinary power, understood as the period established by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures necessary to issue the final decision. In this context, it concerns the maximum period established by the legal system for the administrative superior to order the opening of the pertinent proceeding, aimed at determining the appropriateness or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the proceeding that seeks to establish the facts (material truth) which serve as the basis for the act, generates an interrupting effect on that timeframe, insofar as it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power. It could not be considered that the cited period for the exercise of the power is interrupted by the issuance of the final act, because as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative case, it is insisted, to establish whether a sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of the provisions in articles 214, 221, 297, 308 of the LGAP. In this analyzed hypothesis, the disciplinary power of the administrative superior is subject to a prescriptive period (whose treatment in practice is actually very close to the figure of expiration insofar as in certain cases, it is customary to declare that aspect ex officio), generically regulated by the mandate 414 of the Código de Trabajo, a rule that sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power, which, it is insisted, is interrupted with the communication of the statement of charges. The foregoing is without prejudice to faults that are regulated by special laws, such as those expressed by the internal control regime, probity in the public function (probidad en la función pública), and management of public finances (gestión de la hacienda pública), in which, according to what is regulated by the Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292 (art. 43), Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la función pública, No. 8422 (art. 44) and article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, a special period of five years applies (according to the cases and from the moments those laws stipulate). In such cases, the special period prevails and not the monthly one established by the Código de Trabajo, it is insisted, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime. Hence, in this case, the applicable period for the instruction of the proceeding must be that provided for by the cited article 44 of Ley No. 8422, that is, five years.\n\nVIII.- In that sphere, the plaintiff objects that by virtue of mandate 99 of the Reglamento al Estatuto de Servicio Civil, the deadline available to the Minister to initiate the dismissal process is one month from the cause for the sanction. Certainly, that precept indicates in its subsection c), that it will prescribe in one month: \"c) The actions of the Ministers to initiate the dismissal process for regular employees for just cause and to impose the disciplinary corrections authorized by law and internal work regulations, starting from the day the cause for the sanction arose, or in its case, from when the corresponding facts or faults were known.\" Regarding that reference, it is necessary to indicate that, as has been noted, that rule is of a general nature and, therefore, yields to the specialty and higher hierarchy of the legal regulations already referred to, which are characteristic of the probity in the public function (probidad en la función pública) regime. On the one hand, it is reiterated, Ley No. 8422 is a special law that prevails over generic regulations, and on the other, it holds greater resistance and force than the regulatory provision cited by the plaintiff. In this way, that provision could not be imposed against the five-year periods set forth in article 44 of Ley No. 8422 and canon 71 of Ley No. 7428.\n\nIn addition to the foregoing, in cases covered by the scope of application of the LCI and the LCCEIFP, the referral made to article 71 of the LOCGR implies that the computation of the cited statute of limitations (prescripción) is configured based on the rules that mandate regulates, which in its literal wording expresses:\n\n\"**Article 71.-Statute of limitations for disciplinary liability (Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria).** The administrative liability of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight regulations shall prescribe (prescribirá) in accordance with the following rules:\n\na) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act.\n\nb) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious —understood as an act that requires an investigation (indagación) or an audit study to report its possible irregularity— liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is brought to the attention of the head of the entity (jerarca) or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure.\n\nThe statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the alleged offender of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure.\n\nWhen the perpetrator of the offense is the head of the entity, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body.\n\nIt shall be considered a serious offense for the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure to fail to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the offender's liability to prescribe, without justified cause.\n\n(Thus amended by subsection a) of article 45 of the Internal Control Law, No. 8292 of July 31, 2002)\"\n\nRegarding the starting point of the statute of limitations (dies a quo), the rule indicates that the beginning of the periods is the knowledge of the facts that constitute the sanctionable offense, for which purpose it is necessary to distinguish whether the facts constitute a notorious offense or whether, on the contrary, they require complementary internal actions to determine or infer the irregularity. In this sense, this period must be computed from the moment in which the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility of knowing the offense and, therefore, undertaking the exercise of his power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require the carrying out of a prior stage of preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar), a scenario covered by subsection b) of the rule just mentioned, the period in question runs from the moment in which the results of that exercise are brought to the attention of the head of the entity. It is also the case, moreover, of offenses that are evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose pursuit for sanctioning purposes must be submitted to the respective head of the entity. In such a scenario, the indicated period is computed from the moment of the effective receipt or communication of said report to the head of the entity, since it is only at that moment that this holder can validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, the need or not for that phase (preliminary investigation) must be distinguished in each case, since otherwise, it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that not in all scenarios would that investigation be necessary, but only those in which, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable to determine the pertinence or not of opening the sanctioning procedure, or else, to gather evidence that tends to clarify its need or not.\"\n\nOn one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a particular decision, guiding its conduct. On the other, it is imposed as a frame of reference that allows the administered party to establish a comparison of public conduct, in order to set a control that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the norms that guide that conduct. It seeks, therefore, to constitute itself as a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and advisability of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated by canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its object is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in article 225.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Hence, canon 216.1 of the same law requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal order. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial process, in order to arrive at establishing the referred real truth of the facts (among which can be seen those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law). This acquires even greater relevance in the so-called control or sanctioning procedures (procedimientos de control o sancionatorios), given that, in those cases, the final decision may impose a repressive framework on a person's legal sphere. The same normative plexus provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid any procedure that does not satisfy these minimum issues. This is inferred from mandate 223 of the Law of reference, insofar as it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities shall cause annulment of the procedure. From this perspective, this Court has already indicated that the control of the administrative function that canon 49 of the Magna Carta confers upon this jurisdiction involves a comparison that the Administration, during the course of those procedures (of a sanctioning nature for this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, in its core, the due process that must be insurmountable in that conduct has been protected. However, by virtue of the allegations made, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions proper to the directing body (órgano director) and the deciding body (órgano decisor) of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure belongs to the deciding body, that is, to whomever has been granted the legal competence to issue the act that creates a definitive legal status. However, in the interest of administrative efficiency, the powers of investigation are delegable to a body entrusted with carrying out the investigation of the procedure, which has tended to be called the \"directing or investigating body (órgano director o instructor)\". In principle, the designation of this latter body corresponds to the deciding body, for which its validity is subject to it falling upon an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. Nevertheless, it is feasible that, in certain cases, the law itself establishes the administrative unit that constitutes the directing body of the proceeding. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated that persons who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure; however, in that specific function, it must be understood that they perform a public function, with the inherent obligations. As for its competencies, the representation of the investigating administration within the procedure corresponds to that directing body, as clearly inferred from ordinal 282 subsection 3 of Law No. 6227/78. It is an instance with powers of investigation and ordering of the procedure (art. 227 LGAP), entrusted with carrying out all the preparatory stages, to then send the case file to the deciding body, on occasions, as applicable, together with a non-binding opinion (dictamen no vinculante) -unless a rule states otherwise- (art. 330 LGAP). Even though it may, eventually, render recommendations, they would certainly not be binding, and therefore its determinations with a view to the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts. Consequently, it is responsible for issuing the initiating act, providing procedural momentum, all the labor of investigating the procedure, directing the hearing, resolving preliminary issues, resolving the appeal for revocation filed against procedural acts, rendering a report to the deciding body at the time of sending the case file for the issuance of the final act. Its competencies can be seen in articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the General Law of reference. For its part, the deciding body is the competent hierarch who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act that resolves the procedure [...]\n\nRegarding this particular matter and considering the State's allegations, summarized above, it is worth noting what is set forth below. **On the duty of probity. Scope.**\n\nSection 111 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) defines a public official (funcionario público) as the person who provides services to the Administration or on behalf and on account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence of its imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character of the respective activity. For its part, canon 113 of the same law clearly establishes that the functional framework of the public agent must be carried out in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, understood as the coinciding interest of the administered persons. To that end, the public servant is, in an unavoidable manner, bound by the principle of legality, both in its negative and positive aspects, as inferred, at the legal level, from articles 11, 12, 13, 59, and 66 of the cited General Law and Article 11 of the Constitution (Carta Magna). As part of this orientation, the official's performance is guided and delimited by norms of transparency and probity, whose legal basis is expressly found in section 3 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, LCCEIFP), No. 8422. Said norm states:\n\n\"**Duty of probity (Deber de probidad)**. The public official shall be obliged to orient his or her management toward satisfying the public interest. This duty shall be manifested, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; by ensuring that the decisions adopted in the fulfillment of his or her attributions conform to impartiality and the proper objectives of the institution in which he or she serves and, finally, by administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily.\"\n\nFrom this perspective, as a complement to the purposive orientation of the public official that requires him or her to prioritize the satisfaction of public interests over personal ones, even over the interests of the Administration (113.2 ibidem), which is inherent in the service-oriented nature of his or her competencies, the duty of probity seeks to provide aspects of greater specificity, which in some way guide the actions of the public official (or are lines that must guide them), so that his or her conduct responds to that teleological dimension, not just at the level of results, but through the incorporation of moral and ethical duties that guarantee transparency and objectivity in his or her conduct. That is to say, that public morality requires that, in cases of conflicts of interest, he or she must recuse him or herself from hearing the matter, in order not to \"pollute\" or jeopardize the objectivity that must be proper to the conduct, but, furthermore, in his or her actions, must tend toward the satisfaction of that greater interest. More simply, the duty of probity regulated in Article 3 of Law No. 8422 obliges every public servant to exercise his or her position in adherence to the principle of impartiality in the face of personal or family, economic, and other interests, such that in his or her performance he or she must demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law. This is indeed drawn from the first canon of the Regulation to the cited Law No. 8422, which states that the aforementioned duty of probity is expressed, among other actions, in *\"refraining from hearing and resolving a matter when the same grounds for disqualification (impedimento) and recusal (recusación) exist as are established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), in the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), and in other laws\"*. Therefore, it is clear that the condition of public agent entails the subjection and due fulfillment of moral and ethical guiding duties that the legal system itself enshrines and imposes, which demand he or she conduct his or her management with rectitude and solidity. To safeguard that purpose, the norms that permeate the activities of public officials impose a system of grounds for disqualification, which establish causes in which the servant is precluded, whether sua sponte or upon petition of a party, from hearing a specific matter in which, due to the concurrence of certain situations, his or her objectivity in the performance of duties may be impaired or threatened and, with it, the inherent risk in the due weighing of the public interest.\n\nThis is the case of the grounds imposed by canon 230 of the aforementioned General Law, the Organic Law of the Judiciary, and the reasons referenced in canons 12 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, as well as those imposed by the Law on Administrative Procurement, all of which seek to avoid a possible conflict of interest. It is clear at this point that, at a preventive level, those conditions of disqualification seek to maintain objectivity and transparency in the conduct of the public official, preventing the correct fulfillment of the duties inherent to their office and, consequently, the satisfaction of the public interest as the guiding principle of their behavior, from being threatened or relegated by personal interests. Hence, the violation of the aforementioned duty of probity is not immune to the framework of disciplinary liability of the public agent. Precept 4 of the aforementioned Law No. 8422 establishes:\n\n\"Without prejudice to the civil and criminal liabilities that may apply, the violation of the duty of probity, duly proven and after a defense, shall constitute just cause for the separation from public office without employer liability.\"\n\nThis conditioned effect makes sense, in the context under analysis, for acts in which improprieties are attributed for the concurrent exercise of remunerated positions, during working hours, as well as the use of public goods and resources for purposes unrelated to the office. Of course, the application and interpretation of that norm must proceed along the paths of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, parameters that must be assessed in each specific case. To that end, mandate 38 of the cited legislation (Law No. 8422) establishes grounds for administrative liability, which then find their correlative possible sanctions in the text of norm 39 ibid., which, in that respect, would be applicable to violations of the duty of probity in the terms already developed. The synergy of these provisions incorporates a flexible system that allows for the liability of an official to arise before the issuance of conduct that transgresses ethical norms. Nevertheless, the correct application of this system implies the necessary initiation of an administrative procedure, as a prior and insurmountable step to apply a sanction for injuries to that framework of official obligations, with full and complete respect for the guarantees of defense and due process, which is fundamental to avoid arbitrary and illegal actions. In the case of public agents regulated by the Civil Service Statute, the dismissal process must adhere to the procedure and ordinances provided in Chapter IX of that Statute (from numeral 43 through 47) and precepts 88 through 96 of the Regulations to the cited Statute, which establishes the authorization of the Civil Service Tribunal to the head of the respective ministerial portfolio, to issue the act of dismissal of the respective public servant. In that way, the validity of that type of action is conditioned upon the satisfaction of the procedural guarantees that this legal regime imposes. The foregoing is without prejudice to the powers that the LOCGR, No. 7428, confers upon that oversight body for the binding recommendation of the application of sanctions and liabilities for violations of the superior regime for the oversight of the Public Treasury, which, it is reiterated, is composed of Laws 7428, 7494 (Law on Administrative Procurement), 8131 (Law on Financial Administration and Public Budgets), 8292 (LCI), and 8422 (LCCEIFP), in which case, the pertinent actions must be initiated to address that recommendation, with respect for the rights and interests of the official.\n\n**VII.- Analysis of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in the specific case.** Having said this, although the duty of probity imposes a framework of behavior in accordance with official duties, as well as the rules that modulate the conduct of the public agent, that regulation is oriented towards preventing, detecting, and sanctioning corruption in the exercise of the public function, according to what is inferred from ordinal 1 of the cited Law No. 8422, so that the understanding of the concept of probity must be carried out precisely in the context of that legal purpose, that is, when the servant's fault implies an aspect linkable (directly) to corruption, illicit enrichment, and the inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury. Otherwise, if the duty of probity were understood to be violated by any action or omission of the public agent that implies a disregard for or non-compliance with deontological rules of behavior that are proper to or inherent in their exercise of competence, and generally in their office, in a broad and extreme sense, without carrying out that judgment of association with the purposes of the cited law, every official fault would fall within the scope of injury to the duty of probity. The above would lead to imposing a general regime for the statute of limitations on faults of five years, in all cases, which, in the judgment of this Sentencing Chamber, is not the purpose or ratio of the referenced law.\n\nTherefore, it is necessary that in each disciplinary dismissal procedure, the content of the alleged conduct be analyzed in order to establish whether the legal regime that specifies the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the exercise of internal corrective authority is the common one-month period imposed by the doctrine of current article 414 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), formerly 603 of the same source, the same period established by referral of precept 51 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), or whether, on the contrary, because the matter involves situations that Law No. 8422 or Law No. 8292 seek to protect, the cited period is extended by the application of the rule provided for in provision 71 of Law No. 7428.\n\nIn that context, the facts attributed to the claimant were specified in the initial statement of charges (traslado inicial de cargos), in which the following was attributed to him:\n\n\"...1. Violating the public officials' incompatibility regime (régimen de incompatibilidad) by participating, during working hours, in sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA, in a personal capacity, which resulted in the payment of his salary and additionally the attendance fees (dietas) of that Collegiate Body with an evident time conflict and the receipt of double salary and violation of article 17 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública). 2. For violating the exclusive dedication (dedicación exclusiva) benefit enjoyed by said official, since he cannot hold another position outside of working hours, as he was paid exclusive dedication. 3. For abandoning his work, since, without authorization from MAG, he absented himself from his duties to attend, in a personal capacity, sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA consecutively. 4. For failing to comply with the CCSS disability regime (régimen de incapacidades), since while in that condition, he attended, in a personal capacity, sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA. 5. For using official vehicles for personal benefit. 6. For charging travel expenses (viáticos) to attend personal activities not pertaining to the position.\"\n\nAs can be observed, from the very account of the attributed facts, the initial transfer act is clear and forceful in stating that the proceeding is conducted for the possible violation of the rules provided in article 17 of Law No. 8422, due to participation in sessions of the Board of Directors of LAICA, during MAG's working hours. Certainly, the detail of these conducts does not directly refer to the direct management of public resources or assets assigned by the specific competencies of the position; however, as has been indicated, the probity regime (régimen de probidad) is regulated by a set of sectoral norms (superior oversight of the Public Treasury, fiscalización superior de la Hacienda Pública) that impose behavioral guidelines on the public agent, and among which, the LCCEIFP holds special relevance, insofar as it imposes the DUTY OF PROBITY (DEBER DE PROBIDAD) as a guiding principle of the public function. In that sense, article 3 of the cited legislation develops the concept of probity, as already noted in the previous section. As a projection of that duty, article 4 ejusdem indicates the possibility of dismissal without employer liability for serious infractions of said regime. For such purposes, Chapter II of that legal source regulates matters related to the preventive regime, starting from article 14, a chapter in which it details a series of conducts that constitute express prohibitions (tipicidad) and that are understood as infractions of the duty of probity. In that order, it refers to the prohibition of practicing liberal professions and the corresponding economic compensation for that restriction (arts. 14 and 15), the prohibition of receiving salary compensations (art. 16), the restriction of simultaneously holding public positions (art. 17), while also establishing an incompatibilities regime and the cases for lifting them (arts. 18 and 19), as well as matters related to the regime of donations and gifts (art. 20). From the analysis of the statement of charges, this Tribunal observes that the alleged facts fully fit the legal classification given by the Civil Service Directorate General (Dirección General de Servicio Civil), insofar as article 17 of Law No. 8422 is cited as the violated norm, a norm which in its fourth and fifth paragraphs specifies:\n\n(...) Likewise, those who hold a position within the public function may not earn any per diem (dieta) as members of boards of directors or other collegiate bodies belonging to organs, entities, and companies of the Public Administration, unless there is no time overlap between the workday and the sessions of such bodies. (Thus amended the preceding paragraph by subsection a) of Article 1° of Law No. 8445 of May 10, 2005)\n\nThose who, without being public officials, simultaneously serve on up to three boards of directors or other collegiate bodies attached to organs, entities, and companies of the Public Administration, may receive the per diem (dietas) corresponding to each position, provided there is no time overlap. When, for reasons of public interest, the person is required to serve on more than three boards of directors or other collegiate bodies attached to organs, entities, and companies of the Public Administration, the authorization of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) must be obtained. (Thus added the preceding paragraph by subsection b) of Article 1° of Law No. 8445 of May 10, 2005) ...\"\n\nIt is notorious that, since the object of the procedure included having received per diem (dietas) for participation in the Board of Directors of LAICA, during the working hours of MAG, that rule was relevant to the case. This single element is decisive for establishing the applicable legal regime, regarding the temporality rules that define the potential disciplinary liability of the public servant. In the judgment of this Chamber, the substantial content of the alleged conducts that are the object of the procedure constitute manifestations that fit within the normative provision and that, therefore, are considered antagonistic to the duty of probity imposed in the exercise of the public function. From this standpoint, the liability of those who directly administer Public Funds, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate heads, should not be confused with the liability that is inherent, by their mere condition, to those who hold public office, and who, therefore, are subject to the regulations of the duty of probity. In that sense, the margin of temporality for the exercise of the disciplinary power that applies in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its article 44, which refers to the five-year statute of limitations (prescripción) rule established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. It is a special regulation that prevails over the ordinances of Article 51 of the Civil Service Statute, which refer to the Labor Code, the latter regulation setting a statute of limitations (prescripción) period of one month for the exercise of the disciplinary power, as can be inferred from the current article 414, given the reform carried out by Law No. 9343 and which, prior to that modification, corresponded to precept 603. Indeed, in the dynamic of the disciplinary exercise, various phases converge that have special regulations regarding the temporal element, namely: a) Term for the initiation of the procedure aimed at establishing the concurrence of the supporting elements justifying the fault, b) Term for processing the procedure, c) Term for the issuance of the final act within the procedure, and d) Term for the execution of the disciplinary act. In the specific case, the parties' allegations are associated with the first referred space, making it innocuous to refer to the detail of the various stages mentioned. Specifically, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period (or expiration (caducidad) -in cases where this institute is applicable-) for the exercise of the disciplinary power, understood as the period set by the legal system for the holder of the internal corrective power to adopt the procedural measures of the case that allow issuing the final decision. On this plane, it concerns the maximum period established by the legal system for the administrative head to order the opening of the pertinent procedure, aimed at establishing the appropriateness or not of imposing a sanction. In this case, it is clear that the notification of the opening of the procedure that seeks to establish the facts (real truth) that serve as the basis for the grounds of the act, generates an interrupting effect on that margin of temporality, insofar as it constitutes an express act and a measure that directly tends toward the exercise of that power.\n\nIt could not be considered that the cited time limit for exercising the power is interrupted by the issuance of the final act, because as a derivation of the principle of due process, it is necessary for the Administration to order the opening of an administrative proceeding, it is reiterated, to determine whether the sanction is appropriate, as a derivation of the provisions in ordinals 214, 221, 297, 308 of the LGAP. In this analyzed hypothesis, the disciplinary power of the administrative superior is subject to a prescriptive period (whose treatment in praxis is actually very close to the figure of expiration (caducidad) insofar as, in certain scenarios, it is customary to declare that aspect ex officio), generically regulated by mandate 414 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), a rule that sets a one-month period for the exercise of that repressive power, which, it is reiterated, is interrupted with the communication of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos). The foregoing is without prejudice to offenses that are regulated by special rules, such as those expressed by the internal control, public probity, and public treasury management regimes, in which, according to what is regulated by the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 (Art. 43), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422 (Art. 44), and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, a special five-year period operates (according to the scenarios and from the moments those rules provide for). In such cases, the special period applies and not the monthly one established by the Labor Code, it is reiterated, as it is a special and later regulation that prevails over the general labor regime. Hence, in this case, the applicable period for the conduct of the proceeding must be that provided for by the cited ordinal 44 of Law No. 8422, that is, five years.\n\nVIII.- In that area, the complainant reproaches that by virtue of mandate 99 of the Regulation to the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento al Estatuto de Servicio Civil), the period available to the Minister to initiate dismissal proceedings is one month from the cause for the sanction. Certainly, that precept indicates in its subsection c), that it will prescribe in one month: \"c) The actions of the Ministers to initiate dismissal proceedings for regular employees for justified cause and to impose the disciplinary corrections authorized by the law and internal work regulations, from the day the cause for the sanction arose, or in its case, from when the corresponding facts or offenses became known.\" In light of that reference, it is necessary to indicate that, as already noted, that rule is of a general nature and, therefore, yields to the speciality and higher hierarchy of the legal regulations already referred to, pertaining to the public probity regime. On one hand, it is reiterated, Law No. 8422 is a special ordinance that prevails over regulations of a generic nature and, on the other, it holds greater resistance and potency than the regulatory rule to which the complainant refers. In this way, that provision could not impose itself against the five-year (quinquenales) periods provided for in Article 44 of Law No. 8422 and canon 71 of Law No. 7428.\n\nIn addition to the foregoing, in the cases covered by the scope of application of the LCI and the LCCEIFP, the reference made to article 71 of the LOCGR implies that the computation of the cited statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be configured based on the rules that said mandate regulates, which in its literal text states:\n\n\"**Article 71.-Statute of limitations for disciplinary liability.** The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight regulations shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules:\n\na) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act.\n\nb) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as an act that requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is made known to the senior official (jerarca) or the official competent to initiate the respective proceeding.\n\nThe statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the alleged offender of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding.\n\nWhen the perpetrator of the fault is the senior official, the period shall begin to run from the date on which that official ends his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body.\n\nFailure by the official competent to initiate the sanctioning proceeding to initiate it in a timely manner, or allowing the offender's liability to prescribe without justified cause, shall be deemed a serious fault.\n\n(Thus amended by subparagraph a) of article 45 of the Law on Internal Control, No. 8292 of July 31, 2002)\"\n\nRegarding the starting point of the statute of limitations (dies a quo), the rule indicates that the beginning of the periods is the knowledge of the facts that constitute the sanctionable fault, for which purpose it is necessary to distinguish whether the facts constitute a notorious fault or whether, on the contrary, it requires internal actions of a supplementary nature to determine or infer the irregularity. In this sense, this period must be computed from the moment at which the holder of the corrective power is in an objective possibility of knowing the fault and, consequently, of undertaking the exercise of his power. Therefore, when the particularities of the case require the carrying out of a prior preliminary investigation stage—a scenario covered by subparagraph b) of the rule just mentioned—the period in question runs from the moment the results of that exercise are made known to the senior official. This is also the case of faults that are evidenced in Internal Audit reports, but whose furtherance, for sanctioning purposes, must be submitted to the respective senior official. In such a scenario, the indicated period is computed from the moment of effective receipt or communication of said report to the senior official, since only at that moment can that titleholder validly adopt decisions regarding the opening or not of disciplinary measures. Nevertheless, the necessity or not of that phase (preliminary investigation) must be distinguished in each case, since otherwise it could be used as a strategy to evade the statute of limitations, given that such an investigation would not be necessary in all scenarios, but only in those where, due to the particularities of the case, that phase is indispensable for determining the pertinence or not of the opening of the sanctioning proceeding, or for gathering evidence aimed at clarifying its necessity or not.\"" }