“VII.- On the content of the easement in the specific case. Typology. Scope. As is evident from the case file, in 1990, the IDA consolidated a total of 9 properties from the Alcoa settlement to assign, via segregation (fraccionamiento), a series of parcels, among which, folio [Valor 038] (corresponding to lot 4-2) was assigned to José Blanco Valverde and Mrs. Juana Navarro Vargas, who at that time was his wife. Subsequently, it is noted that from that property, the plaintiff segregated in his own name a series of lots, among which the folio [Valor 038] is of interest to this proceeding. The plaintiff seeks compensation for the de facto imposition of the easement affecting the aforementioned properties, as well as for the construction of the tower site. In this sense, he indicates that within the property [Valor 038] is tower site number T-122. In turn, he seeks reparation for damage to the remainder. Regarding this mention, the following should be noted. As established by Article 70 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, No. 2825, in force at the time of the Río Macho-San Isidro project, the ITCO, later IDA, was empowered to provide lands for works of public interest. In that sense, the regulation indicated: \"The Institute, the Ministries of Public Works, Health and Education preferentially, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, Municipalities and other related Autonomous Institutions, are empowered to complete land grants with the construction of works for roads, irrigation, sanitation, medical assistance, hospital centers, housing, education and other common services.\" This regulation enabled rights of use to be configured within these lands for the execution of public service works. Now, as part of the Río Macho-San Isidro Electric Line project, through appraisal No. 521-82 of the ICE, dated November 3, 1982, issued for the Río Macho-San Isidro Transmission Line construction, the value assigned for easement purposes was appraised on the properties owned by the IDA, numbers 129321-208058, registered in volumes 1465-2084, folios 390-339, entries 6-2, with an area of 40 hectares 1973.25 square meters and 20 hectares 2867.19 square meters, respectively. Regarding the easement right, it was indicated that it was imposed on the IDA's property, on a strip 20 meters wide, along a length of 745 meters, for a total affected area of 1 hectare 4900 square meters, heading north to south. Considering the placement of three tower sites, the total value of the easement determined at that time was ¢7,460.00 (seven thousand four hundred sixty colones). (Folios 197-199 of the main file). Then, Through appraisal No. 30-86 approved by the ICE on April 15, 1986, an appraisal of the easement to be imposed on the IDA's property was carried out for the purposes of the Río Macho San Isidro transmission line project. In the general property details section, it is indicated that it was owned by Alcoa de Costa Rica S.A., which sold to the State and the latter ceded to the IDA, being at that date divided into parcels, leased to different persons. That appraisal established an area to be affected of 20 meters wide by 745 meters long, for a total area of 1 hectare 4900 square meters. In the transmission line section, it detailed that it affected parcels 1, 2, 3, and 4 of block 4-A of Alcoa. A total value of the easement right of ¢29,820.00 (twenty-nine thousand eight hundred twenty colones) was assigned. In that instrument, it was noted that three tower positions would be located within the easement, namely: T121, T122, and T123. That appraisal was approved by the Board of Directors of the ICE in resolution 2502, session 3773 of April 15, 1986, Article 9, subsection 8). In that agreement, it was indicated that the easement was for the passage of the electrical grid, with a width of 10 meters on each side of the center line, that is, 20 meters in total, with a length of 745 meters, for a total easement area of 1 hectare 4900 square meters. (Images 496-510 of the main file) Similarly, it is noted that on September 24, 1987, the ICE issued a payment order in favor of the IDA, for an amount of ¢29,820.00 (twenty-nine thousand eight hundred twenty colones), with the following detail: “To pay the value of the easement right over the property in San José, located in Pérez Zeledón, as a consequence of the passage of the Transmission Line Río Macho-San Isidro. See appraisal No. 30-86, approved by the Board of Directors in session No. 3373 of 4/15/86. HAND OVER CHECK TO THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT.” (Image 505 of the main file) As has been detailed, both properties regarding which the cited appraisal was issued (folios 129321 and 208058), formed part of the 9 properties that were consolidated by the IDA in the public deed executed on August 18, 1990, through which a series of parcels were segregated within the Alcoa project. Specifically, regarding what is relevant to the present cause, this Court has established within the list of proven facts that through public deed number 18, executed before notaries public Marta Eugenia Solano Arias and Julio Sánchez Carvajal, acting under the protocol of the former, dated August 18, 1990, the then representative of the IDA, Mr. Carlos Prendas Lépiz, consolidated a series of properties, among which are folios of the Partido de San José 78649-000, 86127-000, 123458-000, 123460-000, 129321-000, 180282-000, 208058-000, 216143-000, 220772-000 and 111976-000. Similarly, in clause four of that public deed, lots were segregated for the project called Alcoa cuatro, within which, lot four-two, land for agriculture, located in the third district of canton 19 of the Province of San José, with an area of 12 hectares 3,069 square meters 57 square decimeters, in equal parts to Mr. José Blanco Valverde and Mrs. Juana Navarro Vargas. In that public deed, it was established that all acquirers accepted the sale of each segregated parcel and understood that these were made accepting limitations, within which, the clause identified with the letter “CH)” provided: “CH) That the State shall have the right at any time to take up to twelve percent of the alienated areas to exercise therein the easements of way necessary for the construction and surveillance of all kinds of communication routes and the use of hydroelectric forces, as well as the construction and surveillance of telegraph and telephone lines; the use of the indispensable land for the construction of bridges and docks; the extraction of materials for those same works, the use of water courses that are necessary for the supply of populations, watering places for cattle, irrigation or any other uses of general interest. For the areas it takes for the indicated purposes, the State shall pay the original purchase price and the value of the necessary and useful improvements.” (Images 105-108, 520-609 of the main file) In this sense, in the same deed of assignment of that property, notice was given of the possibility of imposing easements, an aspect that coincided grammatically with Article 70 of Law No. 2825, in force at that time, and which sets the same conditions of administrative limitations reflected in the signed agreement. Ergo, from the acquisition of that parcel in 1990, being that the Río Macho-San Isidro project existed, the acquirers were aware of that eventuality.”
\nThat reference is necessary because it highlights the situation that characterized the parent property and that, by derivation, is transferred to the properties that were segregated in favor of the petitioner. From that standpoint, it is clear that, on the acquisition date, the disposition by the ICE regarding the use of the space for the high-voltage power line was already materially evident and notorious. However, unlike what the defendant entity's representation states, this circumstance alone does not eliminate the relevance or admissibility of the claims made in this dispute.
\nIX.- Now, the plaintiff himself points out that, at the time of acquiring the properties in the Partido de San José, Real Property Folios [Valor 030] (cadastral map [Valor 031]) and [Valor 028] (map No. [Valor 029]), said properties were subject to the transferred easement (servidumbre trasladada) registered under the registry citations [Valor 041]
\n, an easement of way on foot, on horseback, and with a cart until reaching the street, in favor of property registration number 1-86127, established on July 2, 1940. Similarly, a transferred easement (servidumbre trasladada) under citations 0382-00007487-01-0817-002, and a transferred easement under citations 0382-00007487-01-0818-001. However, after the analysis of the case file and a review of the various positions issued regarding proceedings in which, like the present one, civil reparation has been sought for what has been considered a de facto easement, this Court reiterates its position held in the aforementioned judgment No. 141-2018-VI, in the sense that, from the analysis of those registry citations, although they impose a transferred easement, their content does not allow concluding that it refers to the power line easement that was the subject of consideration in appraisal 30-86 raised in its opportunity by the ICE for the Río Macho-San Isidro Transmission Line construction [...]
\nFrom that standpoint, that registry detail does not allow it to be considered a proven fact that the registration of parcel 4-2, assigned to Mr. Blanco Valverde, from which the property [Valor 038] originated, and which subsequently led to the segregation of the folios acquired by the petitioner, implied the registry entry of an easement imposition related to the electrical transmission line of the cited Río Macho-San Isidro project, since the one registered under citations [Valor 041] refers to the terms already indicated. Now, from the objective analysis of the case file, it is evident that there has been no express acceptance of the easement subject to complaint, from the party who, at the relevant historical moment, was the legitimate owner of the property on which that limitation was imposed, specifically the IDA, in accordance with the permissibility granted to it by Article 70 of Law No. 2825. From the analysis of administrative appraisal 30-86 already referred to above, it is evident that the ICE, in its opportunity, carried out an analysis of the implications of the imposition of that easement on the lands that would occupy tower sites T-121, T-122, and T-123, ergo, concerning the plaintiff's estate, which corresponds, as he himself indicates, to tower site 122. The appraisals provided by the defendant entity are from November 1982 and April 1986, the most recent and specifically the latter, 30-86, in which a detail of the area over which the easement is constituted is made, which allows for the geographical coincidence with the strip of land whose reparation is now sought. Both refer to the property from which the estate owned by the petitioner emerged, obtained in 1990, a date on which the IDA had already granted the easement in favor of the ICE.
\nOn this aspect, it should be noted that on August 18, 1990, when the IDA chose to manage the consolidation of properties and segregation of parcels, among which the plaintiff's is found, the existence of that easement was already physically evident, given the apparent nature of that encumbrance. Since the property under Real Property Folio 623027-000 was segregated from the property [Valor 038], and later, from this estate emerged the folios [Valor 030] (cadastral map [Valor 031]) and [Valor 028] (map No. [Valor 029]), that particularity of prior knowledge of the material existence of the easement and of the Proyecto de Línea de Transmisión Río Macho San Isidro was equally present. However, it is clear that the mere evidence of an easement does not speak to the legitimacy of its existence, as the express consent of the owner of the servient tenement would be necessary, as well as any timely indemnifications arising from those voluntary limitations, an aspect that is analyzed below.
\nX.- Now, this factual account shows that in its due time, the ICE constituted the easement for the passage of the aerial line, from which it is clear that from that historical moment, the right of way for the electric line over the referred area arose, which to that extent became the servient tenement of the easement of way in favor of the ICE. That easement, insofar as it involves the placement of electrical wiring towers, implies the possibility for the ICE to enter the affected area to carry out the necessary maintenance of that infrastructure. However, although at the time the plaintiff acquired his properties via segregation in August 2009 and February 2016, clause CH) of the segregation deed warned the acquirer of the possibility of affecting the property with that type of projects or works, the reality is that the assessment of the evidence provided in this case does not allow establishing that this instrument manifested the direct intention to impose an easement in favor of the ICE regarding the cited project, and that this limitation was transferred to the parcels that were segregated. Unlike other cases resolved by this Administrative Litigation Court, Sixth Section, in which the registry existence of that type of easement was established, in this case, documents issued by the administrative registry office have been provided, in which it is recorded that the easement registered under citations [Valor 041] does not coincide with the type of encumbrance that the ICE claims was constituted in that registry entry. Those items, on the contrary, show that this easement involves a permissibility of passage on foot, horseback, or cart but bears no relation whatsoever to one concerning an electrical power line. From this angle of examination, from the registry standpoint, there is no element that would have given the acquirer an objective possibility of knowing about the existence of that administrative limitation. It is, of course, clear that since on the date of acquisition (2009 and 2016), the project in question was already under construction (as it began in 1984), being an easement for electrical transmission lines, it is an apparent easement, whereby, from the physical-visual perspective, the plaintiff was in a position to know of the existence of that limitation, especially considering that the Río Macho-San Isidro project dates from 1983. However, that mere material existence does not speak to the inadmissibility of the compensation claims made. Indeed, in light of what has been set forth above, the implementation of that type of easements requires either the registry entry of its existence at the time the acquisition of ownership of the affected property is constituted, or, in the case of apparent ones, to prove with the due force that they have been compensated to the original owner. For such purposes, the ICE provides as support for its position, both in the denial of the claim and in the justification of the counterclaim it raises (as well as the cause consolidated in this file), details of the administrative appraisals carried out in their time to compensate the then IDA for the encumbrances subject to controversy. In this dimension,through appraisal No. 30-86 approved by the ICE on April 15, 1986, an appraisal of the easement to be imposed on the IDA's property was carried out for the purposes of the Río Macho San Isidro transmission line project. In the general property details section, it is indicated that it was owned by ALCOA de Costa Rica S.A., which sold to the State and the latter ceded to the IDA, being at that date divided into parcels, leased to different persons [...]
\nHowever, there is not a single piece of evidence in this process that allows conjecturing that the imposition of that easement was accepted and paid to the person owning the servient properties, an aspect that is decisive in the analysis of the object of this process, to the extent that the claimed compensation is directly conditioned on the definition of whether that easement was effectively paid to whom, at the time, accepted or granted it. Only with that basic prerequisite could the enforceability and duty of acceptance of the easement be justified for someone who subsequently acquires an estate on which that type of public interest encumbrance weighs. However, the aforementioned evidence shows the existence of an economic appraisal to make a civil reparation for the commented easement, carried out in 1986. Note that official letter FSA-0183-2019 of March 6, 2019, issued by the INDER, does not refer to the ICE having paid for that easement at the time, but is limited to expressing its own criteria on the reasons why such payment to the current owners is inappropriate. From that standpoint, it does not have the virtue of refuting the mentioned criterion regarding the due payment of the imposed easement. That official letter asserts, without the necessary detail, that, in its opportunity, the IDA accepted the constitution of the cited easement, yet it does not offer or indicate the specific detail of the act or document in which that entity may have shown such consent. In this way, the successive tract postulated by that official letter cannot be considered established, because, as has been said, the already mentioned registry citations do not allow deducing the existence of that encumbrance, under the terms claimed by the ICE and indicated by said official letter [...]
\nAlthough it can be inferred that the consent for passage by the IDA, as has been indicated, there is no evidence that allows sustaining a registry annotation of that easement, such that the subsequent acquirers would have to bear the actions of the ICE regarding the operation and maintenance of the works of the Río Macho-San Isidro transmission line project, given that the registry citations on which the ICE claims that condition, it has already been considered proven, through certificates issued by the National Registry itself, that they do not refer to that easement, but to a very different one that is not related, in any way, to that project. In this manner, attending to the evidentiary duties that operate within a process of this nature, it is the ICE that must credibly prove the concurrence of those assumptions on which it seeks to deny the right to compensation claimed by the plaintiff, which it ultimately fails to establish with the evidence provided, nor with its arguments. Even the filing and subsequent withdrawal of the expropriation proceedings referred to above shows a series of deficiencies in the information and documentation records of that public entity regarding the project in question.
\n\nThis Chamber does not in any way doubt the public relevance of that project, but that does not imply that the material and legal effects of an easement (servidumbre) that has not been demonstrated to have been constituted legitimately and in accordance with legality can be imposed on a purchaser [...]\nThus, following the analysis set forth above, this Tribunal considers that to the extent that there is no registry annotation of the constitution of the easement in favor of ICE, and at the same time payment for that encumbrance is not evident, the procedure imposed by Law No. 6313 for the imposition of that type of encumbrance cannot be considered satisfied, and in that manner, despite the apparent nature of the easement, due to the physical notoriety of its existence, its enforceability against third-party purchasers cannot be inferred and, based on that, the indemnities sought cannot be denied. Indeed, from the analysis of the case file, ICE has not been able to credibly demonstrate with the required forcefulness the constitution of an easement of the nature and condition that materially encumbers the plaintiff's property, and moreover, its registry backing has also not been established, which in itself reveals substantial inaccuracies in the configuration and operation of this type of encumbrance. The foregoing by virtue of the fact that, since an easement constitutes, as has been set forth above, a limitation imposed on a property, which prevents the owner of the domain from carrying out a set of actions related to their estate, it is necessary, as a prerequisite for its legitimacy, that it has been accepted by the owner of the servient tenement, and that it has been constituted in accordance with the legal norms governing that aspect. Hence, in order to ensure the legality of the procedures, to the extent that under the terms of Article 2 of Law 6313 there is a declaration of public interest regarding all works of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad pertaining to the fulfillment of its legal purposes, the imposition of an easement such as the one analyzed required the carrying out of the corresponding appraisal (Article 2 of the aforementioned Law number 6313), and communication of that act to the owner of that property (Article 7 of the same Law, and 140 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). Those actions were carried out with respect to the estate now under debate, however, the plaintiff did not accept the appraisal performed by the public entity.
\nFrom the analysis of the evidence provided to this proceeding, it is established that ICE filed an expropriation proceeding against Mr. José Blanco Valverde, a proceeding processed under case file No. 12-000483-1028-CA before the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, for the purpose of imposing an easement on the farm registered under Folio Real 1-623027-000, as well as indemnifying the remnant damage and the tower site to be located as part of the Río Macho-San Isidro Transmission Line project. However, in a brief dated November 4, 2013, within the expropriation process 12-000483-1028-CA, ICE's legal representative withdrew from the cited proceeding, indicating for those purposes: “Based on the technical studies, as well as the background studies conducted by my represented entity, it was established that said lands have already been indemnified and that no change or expansion is being made regarding the easement that was constituted with the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) through administrative appraisal number 30-1986 and which appears as a charge on the adjudication of the lands of said institution in 1990. (…)”. By order issued at 14 hours 42 minutes on November 4, 2013, the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo deemed the expropriation proceedings, case file 12-000483-1028-CA, withdrawn. In response, on November 21, 2013, ICE petitioned to continue with the proceedings. In a brief dated April 8, 2015, it requested that the object of the expropriation proceedings be modified, considering that it was not appropriate to indemnify the easement or the tower site, but only the access road to maintain the tower, since that easement had been constituted by the original owner in 1980, that is, the then ITCO, a petition that was rejected by the order issued at 09:00 hours on May 27, 2015. In a brief dated August 14, 2015, ICE indicated that based on the arguments set forth in the brief received on April 8, 2015, it requested the withdrawal of the expropriation process, without a costs order. By order issued at 11 hours 26 minutes on August 19, 2015, the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo deemed the expropriation withdrawn and noted that regarding the administrative appraisal, any arrangement between the parties had to be made through the channel they considered most appropriate. The foregoing demonstrates that although ICE initiated the procedures imposed by law for the imposition of the easement on the petitioner, it later decided to withdraw from that process, under the position that this right had already been indemnified, an aspect that, as has been set forth, could not be established. Therefore, the aforementioned expropriation procedure cannot be considered satisfied, and since the registry constitution of the easement in question could not be verified, nor the effective payment in its time to the IDA, it is necessary to declare the duty of ICE (and the corresponding right of the plaintiff) to institute the due expropriation actions in order to compensate the owner of that farm for the limitations that materially encumber their estate, considering for those purposes the material and legal implications of the easement. From that standpoint, in accordance with the analysis presented in this judgment, ICE must be ordered, within a maximum period of two months calculated from the finality of this judgment, to institute the due legal procedures in order to carry out the economic assessments through the respective appraisals, and procedures that allow the indemnification of the just price and eventual expropriation to the plaintiff for the encumbrance that the Río Macho-San Isidro Electric Line project produces on the real property they own. In that order, it is necessary to consider, within the determination of that just price, the existence of the easement and the limitations imposed on those lands, and any other aspect that, in accordance with Law No. 6313, must strictly be included within the determination of the corresponding just price. On the other hand, it should be noted that said appraisal must be carried out considering the encumbrance on the farm located in the San José district, registered under Folio Real [Value 026], cadastral map [Value 027], with an area of seven hundred and fifty square meters, given that it has been established that this estate arose from the segregation of 50% of property [Value 028] and its respective combination with farm [Value 030] [...]
\nXVI.- On the other hand, payment of subjective moral damages is claimed in the following terms: “ SUBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGE. It consists of the pain, anguish, suffering, anxiety, the arrogance of ICE in entering and leaving my property to maintain the electrical line without asking permission, making it seem as if the strip of land used as an easement belonged to ICE, which produced, together with my family, great emotional instability. Prudential estimation, five million colones, for the purposes of Article 58 subsection E of the CPCA.” The scope of coverage of the norms and principles that constitute the tort liability of the Public Administration transcends the reparation of eminently material damages, to include within its area of protection damages of a non-economic nature, which arises as a natural consequence of a type of liability rooted in damage and risk. The foregoing finds its basis in the doctrine of constitutional canon 41, by establishing the principle of full reparation of damage, which is conferred as a right to individuals in their personal sphere, property, or moral interests. It concerns the due protection against infringements on the legal situation of the person, which includes their patrimonial assets, but also their internal sphere. This is indeed inferred from numeral 197 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, a norm that provides: “There shall be liability for damage to purely moral assets, as well as for the moral suffering and physical pain caused by death or by the injury inflicted, respectively.” Thus, it is evident that moral damage occurs when the sphere of an individual's non-economic interest is injured. However, keeping in mind that its violation can generate economic consequences, it can certainly be quantified. Therefore, a distinction must be made between subjective moral damage and objective moral damage. On this subject, national jurisprudence is abundant. One may see, among many, judgment 316-f-2006 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which explains that: “VIII.- Moral damage (also called in doctrine non-pecuniary, non-economic, sentimental, etc.) occurs when the sphere of an individual's non-economic interest is injured, however, as its violation can generate economic consequences, a distinction can be drawn between subjective 'pure' moral damage, or sentimental damage, and objective or 'objectified' moral damage. Subjective moral damage occurs when a non-economic right has been injured, without impacting the patrimony, normally implying an unjust disturbance of the individual's mental conditions (displeasure, discouragement, despair, loss of satisfaction in living, etc., e.g., injury to honor, dignity, privacy, the so-called loss of enjoyment of life, affliction due to the death of a family member or loved one, etc.). (…) In short, moral damage consists of physical, psychological, sentimental, or moral pain or suffering inflicted through a wrongful act. Normally, the fertile field of moral damage is that of personality rights when they are violated.” Regarding its quantification and proof, by its very nature, it does not require direct evidence, meaning its assessment is equitable, made by the judge. This is because it is an effect that occurs within the internal realm of the person. In this regard, the previously mentioned First Chamber, in judgment no. 537 of 10 hours 40 minutes on September 3, 2003, stated: “…It is deduced through presumptions inferred from indicia, since the wrongful generating event reveals the moral damage, for when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc. are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage; for this reason it is said that the proof of moral damage exists ‘in re ipsa’. Nor should its value be proven because it does not have a concrete value. It is assessed prudentially. It is not a matter, then, of quantifying the suffering, because it is invaluable, but of setting monetary compensation for its injury, the only mechanism to which the law can resort, in order to repair, at least in part, its offense.”. Even so, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that although its granting is not conditioned or subject to evidentiary factors, the same does not apply when it comes to establishing the causal link that allows it to be requested. That is to say, the causal relationship that would allow the subjective moral damage to be deemed to have occurred must be proven, at least, by linking a public action or inaction as the source causing the internal injury. On the other hand, despite this aforementioned evidentiary dispensation, its determination is subject to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. Hence, in each case, the jurisdictional authority must weigh the particularities and scope of the conflict so that its granting and quantification conform to said guiding criteria and do not result in excessive indemnities leading to unjustified benefits. Therefore, its determination must maintain a fair balance derived from the specific factual framework. Well, in the instant case, it has been established that ICE did not finalize the imposition of the easement on the plaintiff's property through the proper registry formalization, nor the prior reparation that would have allowed the enforceability of that limitation against the plaintiff without any right of reparation. Regarding the assessment parameters for subjective moral damage, in ruling No. 080-2019-VI of 14 hours 20 minutes on June 28, 2019, it established a series of guidelines that impose aspects of necessary consideration to rationalize the definitions regarding this type of injury. A fundamental element is the necessary establishment and clarity of the background circumstances that constitute or are considered the adequate cause of the claimed damage. In that sense, the plaintiff indicates that the source of the suffering was \"…the arrogance of ICE in entering and leaving my property to maintain the electrical line without asking permission, making it seem like the strip of land used as an easement belonged to ICE, which produced, together with my family, great emotional instability…”. Regardless of the recognition of the plaintiff's right to obtain retribution for the de facto easement that encumbers their property, the truth of the matter is that the claimant associates that moral damage with a circumstance that has not been duly proven in this proceeding, consisting of the disturbance derived from conduct they term \"arrogant\" on the part of ICE personnel when entering and leaving their property. This issue is one that has not been proven nor addressed in any way by the claimant, and while it can be anticipated that within a logical context, it is feasible that, given the type of civil work that crosses the plaintiff's property, the electrical line must be maintained, and that this would lead, as a matter of principle, to the need to enter the servient property, the truth is that the lawsuit is entirely devoid of indications or elements of conviction that would allow some type of consideration to be established regarding the existence or not of those reproaches on which the damage under study is based. Note that, in the context of the lawsuit, the cause to which that injury is attributed is precisely those supposed conducts and not other circumstances. Therefore, according to the principle of procedural congruence, regulated in ordinal 119 of the CPCA, this Tribunal cannot base the analysis of this claim on considerations that were not expressly formulated by the proposing party, much less speculate on causal relationships not set forth. Thus, the rejection of the damage under examination is ordered [...]\".
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