{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-288701",
  "citation": "Res. 00078-2020 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Impuesto de patente a expendedoras de gasolina y prescripción de tributos municipales",
  "title_en": "Business license tax on gasoline stations and statute of limitations for municipal taxes",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección V, resolvió una demanda de nulidad presentada por una empresa expendedora de gasolina contra la Municipalidad de San José. La empresa cuestionó tres puntos: la obligación de contar con licencia municipal pese a ser un servicio público, la prescripción de períodos fiscales del impuesto de patentes, y la base imponible del tributo. Sobre el primer punto, el Tribunal rechazó la pretensión al no existir exoneración legal expresa; la actividad, aunque servicio público, es lucrativa y está sujeta al impuesto. En cuanto a la prescripción, declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda: aplicó el plazo de 5 años del artículo 82 del Código Municipal (no los 10 años del Código Tributario) y, considerando el inicio de la fiscalización en agosto 2011, declaró prescritos los cuatro trimestres de 2005 y los dos primeros de 2006. El resto de períodos no prescribieron. Respecto a la base imponible, rechazó la pretensión por falta de prueba y cambio de jurisprudencia constitucional que respaldaba a la Municipalidad. El fallo es una decisión mixta: nulidad parcial del acto que denegó la prescripción, manteniendo la validez de los demás aspectos del cobro.",
  "summary_en": "The Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section V, ruled on a nullity claim filed by a gas station company against the Municipality of San José. The company challenged three issues: the requirement to hold a municipal business license despite being a public service, the statute of limitations for certain tax periods of the patent tax, and the tax base. On the first point, the Tribunal rejected the claim as no express legal exemption existed; the activity, though a public service, is profit-oriented and therefore taxable. Regarding the statute of limitations, it partially upheld the claim: applying the five-year term of Article 82 of the Municipal Code (not the ten-year term of the Tax Code) and considering the start of the audit procedure in August 2011, it declared the four quarters of 2005 and the first two quarters of 2006 time-barred. The remaining periods were not time-barred. On the tax base, the claim was rejected due to lack of evidence and a shift in constitutional precedent that supported the Municipality. The ruling is a mixed decision: partial nullity of the act denying the statute of limitations, while upholding the validity of the other aspects of the tax assessment.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V",
  "date": "2020",
  "year": "2020",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "impuesto de patentes",
    "prescripción",
    "Código Municipal",
    "LGAP",
    "hecho generador",
    "principio de legalidad tributaria",
    "nulidad parcial"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 1",
      "law": "Ley 5694"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 7",
      "law": "Ley 5694"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 10",
      "law": "Ley 5694"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 82",
      "law": "Código Municipal"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 158",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 166",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 167",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "impuesto de patentes",
    "prescripción tributaria",
    "Código Municipal",
    "licencia municipal",
    "hidrocarburos",
    "exoneración tributaria",
    "legalidad tributaria"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "business license tax",
    "statute of limitations",
    "municipal code",
    "municipal license",
    "hydrocarbons",
    "tax exemption",
    "tax legality"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "De ese modo, bajo esa contextualidad, lo que opera es el plazo de los 5 años para la prescripción de los Tributos Municipales. ... es desde el primer día del mes siguiente a la fecha en que cada pago debió haber sido realizado, que corre el plazo de prescripción de cinco años que fija el numeral 82 del Código Municipal ... si la fiscalización dio su inicio el 1 de agosto del 2011, para los períodos 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 y 2010, se encontrarían prescritos los 4 trimestres del año 2005, así como el primero y segundo trimestre del año 2006. El resto de los períodos, acorde con la norma prescriptiva aplicada y la forma de llevar a cabo el cómputo no estarían prescritos. Por lo expuesto debe ser declarada parcialmente con lugar la demanda en este punto.",
  "excerpt_en": "Thus, in this context, the applicable term is five years for the statute of limitations on Municipal Taxes. ... it is from the first day of the month following the date on which each payment should have been made, that the five-year prescriptive term set by Article 82 of the Municipal Code runs ... if the audit procedure began on August 1, 2011, for the periods 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, the four quarters of 2005 and the first and second quarters of 2006 would be time-barred. The remaining periods, according to the prescriptive rule applied and the method of calculation, would not be time-barred. Therefore, the claim must be partially upheld on this point.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Partially granted",
    "label_es": "Parcialmente con lugar",
    "summary_en": "The claim is partially upheld: the administrative act denying the statute of limitations is partially annulled, declaring the tax periods of 2005 and the first and second quarters of 2006 time-barred; the claims regarding the municipal license obligation and the tax base are rejected.",
    "summary_es": "Se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda: se anula parcialmente el acto administrativo que rechazó la prescripción, declarando prescritos los períodos fiscales 2005 y primer y segundo trimestre de 2006; se rechazan las pretensiones relativas a la obligación de licencia municipal y la base imponible."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando a)",
      "quote_en": "In accordance with the principle of tax legality, any tax exemption or waiver must be established by law.",
      "quote_es": "Acorde con el principio de legalidad tributaria, cualquier exoneración o dispensa de un impuesto, debe estar dispuesto por ley."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando b)",
      "quote_en": "it is from the first day of the month following the date on which each payment should have been made, that the five-year prescriptive term set by Article 82 of the Municipal Code runs",
      "quote_es": "es desde el primer día del mes siguiente a la fecha en que cada pago debió haber sido realizado, que corre el plazo de prescripción de cinco años que fija el numeral 82 del Código Municipal"
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando c)",
      "quote_en": "Since the claimant has limited itself to making affirmations and hypothetical examples, which cannot be considered as material evidence.",
      "quote_es": "Dado que la parte accionante se ha limitado a realizar afirmaciones así como ejemplos hipotéticos, que no pueden ser considerados como prueba material."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-288701",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-40197",
      "norm_num": "7794",
      "norm_name": "Código Municipal",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "30/04/1998"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-6530",
      "norm_num": "4755",
      "norm_name": "Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "03/05/1971"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-86595",
      "norm_num": "9542",
      "norm_name": "Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Policía Municipal",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "23/04/2018"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "\"V.-Sobre el caso concreto. El proceso de nulidad que ocupa a esta jurisdicción resulta ser muy concreto, pues la pretensión se dirige a una actuación específica por parte de la Administración Tributaria de la Municipalidad. En realidad, lo que se cuestionan son tres actos administrativos debidamente identificados. Por otro lado, los cuestionamientos que hace la parte accionante, también resultan muy concisos. Dadas esta características de este proceso, se resolverá cada punto cuestionado. a) Sobre la improcedente obligación de contar con una licencia municipal para operar la comercialización de hidrocarburos [...]\n\nCriterio del Despacho: Previo a resolver este primer aspecto jurídico alegado por la sociedad accionante, es menester indicar, con vista del objeto de este proceso, así como la competencia material del Tribunal, que emana del canon 49 de la Constitución Política, mediante el cual le otorga la competencia al Poder Judicial, garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado o sus instituciones y de toda otra entidad de derecho público, al tratarse de un proceso en el que se pide la declaratoria de nulidad de una conducta administrativa, las reglas para determinar la validez o invalidez de ese acto, son las que contiene la Ley General de la Administración Pública, a partir del Título Sexto, desde el capítulo primero al sexto, en los que se hace referencia no sólo a los elementos de validez de los actos administrativos, sino a los que producen su nulidad. De conformidad con el canon 158 del cuerpo normativo indicado, es motivo de nulidad, la falta o defecto de algún requisito del acto administrativo, expresa o implícitamente exigido por el ordenamiento jurídico, por lo que se constituirá un vicio de éste. Igualmente, será inválido el acto sustancialmente disconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico. A la vez, las causas de invalidez podrán ser cualesquiera infracciones sustanciales del ordenamiento, incluso las de normas no escritas. Por tal razón, se entenderán incorporadas al ordenamiento, para este efecto, las reglas técnicas y científicas de sentido unívoco y aplicación exacta, en las circunstancias del caso. Finalmente, dicho numeral dispone que las infracciones insustanciales no invalidarán el acto pero podrán dar lugar a responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor agente. Por otro lado, en lo que respecta a las clases de nulidad, el numeral 166 de la LGAP, establece que habrá nulidad absoluta del acto cuando falten totalmente uno o varios de sus elementos constitutivos, real o jurídicamente. Por otra parte, en lo que respecta a la nulidad relativa, el siguiente artículo, con el número 167, establece que se producirá esta nulidad en el acto, cuando sea imperfecto uno de sus elementos constitutivos, salvo que la imperfección impida la realización del fin, en cuyo caso la nulidad será absoluta. Lo anterior, se indica, pues la parte actora, en lo concerniente a este punto que se resuelve, en los planteamientos de su demanda, no ha hecho referencia sobre cuál de los elementos del acto se han visto afectados por la invalidez, sean los formales o materiales, ni el tipo patología o invalidez que padece el acto en cuestión. Este primer punto debatido por el actor, resulta bastante confuso y desapegado a la técnica jurídica, pues no indica directa y claramente en qué consiste la patología que afecta la conducta administrativa, sin indicar su ubicación específica, si en los elementos formales o materiales del acto administrativo. Por el contrario, en este punto lo que pide es que el Tribunal “haga una interpretación” favorable a la teoría del caso que viene a plantear, lo que resulta desapegado a la técnica. En tal sentido, lo que hace la parte accionante es una serie de citas de normas legales y reglamentarias, que refieren a la naturaleza de la prestación del servicio que desarrolla la sociedad dicha, que sin duda alguna definen la actividad como la de un servicio público. Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, si bien hace referencia a que nos encontramos frente a un servicio de naturaleza pública, en ninguna de ellas existe una exoneración o dispensa expresa al pago del tributo del caso bajo examen. Acorde con el principio de legalidad tributaria, cualquier exoneración o dispensa de un impuesto, debe estar dispuesto por ley. En el caso bajo examen, en lo que a este aparte respecta, lo que la sociedad actora pretende es que el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo \"interprete\" de las normas que cita, la no sujeción al tributo por parte de las empresas expendedoras de gasolina, por el hecho de ser un servicio público. El artículo primero del cuerpo normativo que crea el impuesto de patente de la Municipalidad de San José, dispone lo siguiente: \"ARTICULO 1º.- Todas las personas físicas o jurídicas que se dediquen al ejercicio de cualquier tipo de actividad lucrativa, en el Cantón Central de San José y hayan obtenido la respectiva licencia, pagarán a la Municipalidad de San José el Impuesto de patente que las faculte para llevar a cabo estas actividades. Cuando la actividad lucrativa principal se desarrolle fuera del cantón Central de San José, pero el contribuyente realice también actividades lucrativas en este cantón, por medio de sucursales, agencias o similares a juicio de la Municipalidad, las personas físicas o jurídicas que operen en ese nivel, deberán pagar a la Municipalidad de San José, el impuesto que se determine, porcentualmente, entre las municipalidades involucradas, de conformidad con lo declarado en un informe porcentual aclaratorio por parte del patentado, donde se demuestre lo percibido por concepto de ingresos en cada Municipalidad; los datos serán verificados por la Municipalidad de San José, en las otras municipalidades.\" Por su parte el ordinal segundo dispone lo siguiente: \"ARTICULO 2º.- El impuesto de patente será fijado para la Municipalidad de San José, de acuerdo con lo establecido en los artículo 14, 15, 16 y 17 de esta ley y con el reglamento que al efecto dicte la Municipalidad.\" Finalmente, el canon tercero indica: \"ARTICULO 3º.- El impuesto de patente se pagará durante todo el tiempo que se tenga el establecimiento abierto, o se ejerza el comercio en forma ambulante y durante el tiempo en que se haya poseído licencia, aunque la actividad no se hubiese realizado.\" De conformidad con estas normas y de una revisión del texto normativo bajo estudio, no aparece dispuesto de forma expresa que para el caso de la actividad que desarrolla la sociedad accionante no se encuentre sujeta al tributo en cuestión [...]\n\nb) Sobre la prescripción del impuesto de patente [...]\n\nCriterio del Despacho: En el caso bajo examen, se discute la prescripción de los períodos fiscales 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 y 2010 del impuesto de patentes de San José. De acuerdo con la actuaciones que obran en los autos, ante la gestión formulada en sede administrativa, el ente autónomo denegó, al considerar que por tratarse de relaciones fiscales en las cuales se había omitido el deber de declarar, resultaba aplicable la regla de prescripción ampliada de diez años que regula el ordinal 51 del CNPT. Resulta importante indicar que la Ley n.° 5694 , Ley de Impuestos Municipales de San José, regula lo relacionado al impuesto de patente por el ejercicio de actividad lucrativa en el Cantón Central de San José. De ese modo, el numeral 1 de dicho cuerpo normativo, establece el hecho generador del tributo. Al no existir una norma que regule de forma expresa el tema de la prescripción de este impuesto específico de la Municipalidad de San José, se debe hacer la integración con el canon 82 del Código Municipal, cuya numeración fue corrida, por el artículo 1° de la ley N° 9542 \"Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Policía Municipal\" del 23 de abril del 2018, que lo traspasó del antiguo artículo 73 al 82). Dicho ordinal, en lo que interesa dispone: \"Artículo 82. - Los tributos municipales prescribirán en cinco años y los funcionarios que los dejen prescribir responderán por su pago personalmente\". Conforme a lo anterior, procede la aplicación del artículo 82 citado, dado que el impuesto de patentes es un tributo municipal. En los casos de tributos por destino, como es el caso del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, aplicaría la prescripción del Código de normas y Procedimiento tributarios, pero como se reitera, para el caso que nos ocupa es el canon 82, del Código Municipal, antes citado. De ese modo, bajo esa contextualidad, lo que opera es el plazo de los 5 años para la prescripción de los Tributos Municipales. Aclarada la norma aplicable, y dado que es otro punto que se discute en esta sede, debe tenerse claridad sobre el momento a partir del cual surge la obligación tributaria, de la cual se parte para realizar el cómputo de los cinco años. En lo que interesa, dicho artículo 7 de la Ley n.° 5694 dispone lo siguiente: \"...ARTICULO 7º.- Cada año, a más tardar el 15 de enero, las personas a que se refiere el artículo primero de esta ley presentarán, ante la Municipalidad de San José, una declaración jurada que indique el monto de las ventas o los ingresos brutos y el impuesto trimestral que deba pagar por concepto de patente, conforme al artículo 14 de esta ley (...)\" Por su parte, el artículo 10 del mismo cuerpo normativo, dispone que si se produce una omisión en la declaración del patentado, se aplicará la calificación del año anterior, salvo que se establezca la necesidad de recalificar la patente respectiva. Igualmente, el artículo mencionado, confiere autorización al ente local para verificar ante la Dirección General de Tributación, la exactitud de los datos suministrados, de modo que, si se determina alteración de éstos por el patentado, y con ello, una categorización incorrecta, la Municipalidad se encuentra facultada para realizar la recalificación correspondiente. Lo anterior se explica en la circunstancia de que la tarifa del impuesto se impone con sustento en la categorización que regula el precepto 17 de esa ley, y sobre la base de los criterios o factores que para la imposición señala el numeral 5 de esa norma. Por su parte, esa disposición aclara que el impuesto debe pagarse de manera trimestral, acorde a la tasación realizada con sustento en la información aportada para cada período. Lo anterior implica que la Municipalidad en tanto gestora del impuesto bajo examen, se constituye en una Administración Tributaria. Conforme a lo expuesto y regulado, si bien las declaraciones deben ser presentadas a más tardar el 15 de enero de cada año, lo cierto del caso es que el pago del tributo es trimestral. Así, es desde el primer día del mes siguiente a la fecha en que cada pago debió haber sido realizado, que corre el plazo de prescripción de cinco años que fija el numeral 82 del Código Municipal, sea, el plazo de prescripción de cinco años, para realizar determinaciones fiscales por ese concepto. Planteadas así las cosas, teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, si la fiscalización dio su inicio el 1 de agosto del 2011, para los períodos 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 y 2010, se encontrarían prescritos los 4 trimestres del año 2005, así como el primero y segundo trimestre del año 2006. El resto de los períodos, acorde con la norma prescriptiva aplicada y la forma de llevar a cabo el cómputo no estarían prescritos. Por lo expuesto debe ser declarada parcialmente con lugar la demanda en este punto, entendiendo prescritos -únicamente- los períodos correspondientes a los 4 trimestres del año 2005, así como el primero y segundo trimestre del año 2006. Por lo que debe ser decretada la nulidad parcial del acto de la Municipalidad de San José, que dispuso el rechazo de prescripción de esos períodos\n\nc) Sobre base imponible del impuesto de patente municipal [...]\n\nCriterio del Despacho: El accionante considera que por su situación particular, la forma en la que la Municipalidad de San José calcula el impuesto, no sólo lo perjudica, sino que transgrede los principios de realidad económica y el de igualdad tributaria. Para dar sustento a su teoría del caso, se fundamenta en dos sentencias de la Sala Constitucional, la n.° 8857-2000 y la n.° 0094-2001. Para contrarrestar el tema de la jurisprudencia constitucional, la Municipalidad accionada, aporta 3 sentencias más recientes de la Sala Constitucional en la que señala el cambio de la línea jurisprudencial del Tribunal Constitucional, contenidas en los votos de ese mismo Tribunal n.° 11.902-2002, n.° 555-2004 y n.° 14.084-2005, así como un criterio de la Procuraduría General de la República con el número C-462-2007. Dado que la discusión de este punto está basado en lo que la Sala Constitucional ha dicho en el transcurso de los años, sobre este tema en particular, pues la parte accionante no aporta prueba material de su dicho, que demuestra el perjuicio alegado, así como el desequilibrio, será analizado bajo esa línea argumental. Del análisis de las sentencias a la que hace mención el accionante, resulta importante destacar, que ha sido bastante polémico a nivel de la misma Sala Constitucional, pues el primero de los votos que menciona la accionante, derivado de un recurso de amparo, con el número 8857-2000, fue acogido por mayoría. Desde ese momento, el tema resultaba discutible [...] en esta sede tiene sustento únicamente en lo que el Tribunal Constitucional ha resuelto y, dado que ha variado en el tiempo, con una posición distinta a la que se alega en esta sede, deben ser rechazadas sus argumentaciones como fundamento para acoger su demanda. En todo caso, como se reitera, si bien la entidad accionante refiere la existencia de un perjuicio, así como un desequilibrio, no ha aportado la prueba pertinente, como le corresponde, de acuerdo con el principio de carga probatoria, que permita al Tribunal tener por acreditada esta situación de desbalance en su ecuación económico-tributaria. Tampoco ha aportado la prueba pertinente que permita acreditar que no ha sido reconocido dentro de su estructura de costos un monto porcentual para el pago de patente municipal. El caso que nos ocupa no ha trascendido más allá de la argumentación jurídica y la especulación hipotética, basada en criterios de la Sala Constitucional que han cambiado con el transcurso del tiempo y mantienen una línea contraria a lo que afirma en esta sede. Dado que la parte accionante se ha limitado a realizar afirmaciones así como ejemplos hipotéticos, que no pueden ser considerados como prueba material. Falta la prueba técnica que acredite el desequilibrio alegado. Finalmente, y como ya se mencionó el punto tras anterior, de la normativa que cita en su defensa, la empresa demandante, no se desprende la existencia de una exoneración o dispensa, derivada de una Ley, como corresponden en esta materia, que ampare su caso. Por lo expuesto, no se encuentra motivo alguno para decretar la invalidez de la conducta que se cuestiona\".",
  "body_en_text": "**V.-On the specific case.** The nullity proceeding before this jurisdiction is very specific, since the claim is directed at a specific action by the Tax Administration of the Municipality. In reality, what is being challenged are three duly identified administrative acts. On the other hand, the challenges raised by the plaintiff are also very concise. Given these characteristics of this proceeding, each challenged point will be resolved. **a) Regarding the improper obligation to have a municipal license to operate the marketing of hydrocarbons [...]**\n\n**Opinion of the Court:** Before resolving this first legal aspect alleged by the plaintiff company, it is necessary to indicate, in view of the object of this proceeding, as well as the material competence of the Court, which emanates from canon 49 of the Political Constitution, through which it grants competence to the Judicial Branch to guarantee the legality of the administrative function of the State or its institutions and of any other public law entity, since this is a proceeding in which the declaration of nullity of an administrative conduct is requested, the rules for determining the validity or invalidity of that act are those contained in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), from Title Six, from the first chapter to the sixth, in which reference is made not only to the elements of validity of administrative acts, but also to those that produce their nullity. In accordance with canon 158 of the indicated normative body, grounds for nullity include the lack or defect of any requirement of the administrative act, expressly or implicitly required by the legal system, which will therefore constitute a defect (vicio) thereof. Likewise, an act substantially inconsistent with the legal system shall be invalid. At the same time, the causes of invalidity may be any substantial infractions of the legal system, even those of unwritten rules. For this purpose, technical and scientific rules of unequivocal meaning and exact application, under the circumstances of the case, shall be understood as incorporated into the legal system. Finally, said article provides that insubstantial infractions shall not invalidate the act but may give rise to disciplinary liability of the acting public servant. On the other hand, regarding the types of nullity, article 166 of the LGAP establishes that there shall be absolute nullity of the act when one or several of its constituent elements are totally lacking, in reality or legally. Moreover, regarding relative nullity, the following article, number 167, establishes that this nullity shall occur in the act when one of its constituent elements is imperfect, unless the imperfection prevents the fulfillment of its purpose, in which case the nullity shall be absolute. The foregoing is indicated because the plaintiff, concerning this point being resolved, in the arguments of its complaint, has not made reference to which of the elements of the act have been affected by invalidity, whether formal or material, nor the type of pathology or invalidity suffered by the act in question. This first point debated by the plaintiff is quite confusing and detached from legal technique, as it does not directly and clearly indicate what the pathology affecting the administrative conduct consists of, without indicating its specific location, whether in the formal or material elements of the administrative act. On the contrary, on this point, what it requests is that the Court \"make an interpretation\" favorable to the theory of the case it presents, which is detached from legal technique. In this sense, what the plaintiff does is present a series of citations of legal and regulatory norms that refer to the nature of the service provided by said company, which undoubtedly define the activity as that of a public service. Notwithstanding the foregoing, although it refers to the fact that we are faced with a service of a public nature, in none of them is there an express exemption or waiver from the payment of the tax of the case under examination. In accordance with the principle of tax legality, any exemption or waiver from a tax must be provided by law. In the case under examination, regarding this section, what the plaintiff company intends is for the Contentious-Administrative Court to \"interpret\" from the norms it cites, the non-subjection to the tax by gasoline retail companies, due to it being a public service. The first article of the normative body that creates the business license tax (impuesto de patente) of the Municipality of San José provides the following: \"ARTICLE 1.- All natural or legal persons engaged in any type of for-profit activity (actividad lucrativa) in the Central Canton of San José and who have obtained the respective license shall pay to the Municipality of San José the business license tax that authorizes them to carry out these activities. When the main for-profit activity is carried out outside the Central Canton of San José, but the taxpayer also carries out for-profit activities in this canton, through branches, agencies or similar at the discretion of the Municipality, the natural or legal persons operating at that level must pay to the Municipality of San José the tax determined, proportionally, among the municipalities involved, in accordance with what is declared in a clarifying proportional report by the licensee, demonstrating the income received in each Municipality; the data shall be verified by the Municipality of San José, with the other municipalities.\" For its part, the second article provides the following: \"ARTICLE 2.- The business license tax shall be set for the Municipality of San José, in accordance with the provisions of articles 14, 15, 16 and 17 of this law and with the regulations issued for that purpose by the Municipality.\" Finally, the third canon indicates: \"ARTICLE 3.- The business license tax shall be paid during the entire time the establishment is open, or commerce is carried out on an itinerant basis, and during the time a license has been held, even if the activity has not been carried out.\" In accordance with these norms and upon a review of the normative text under study, it does not appear expressly provided that the activity carried out by the plaintiff company is not subject to the tax in question [...]\n\n**b) Regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the business license tax [...]**\n\n**Opinion of the Court:** In the case under examination, the statute of limitations for fiscal periods 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 of the business license tax of San José is discussed. According to the actions in the record, in response to the request made at the administrative level, the autonomous entity denied it, considering that since these were fiscal relationships in which the duty to declare had been omitted, the extended ten-year statute of limitations rule regulated by article 51 of the CNPT was applicable. It is important to indicate that Law No. 5694, Law of Municipal Taxes of San José (Ley de Impuestos Municipales de San José), regulates matters related to the business license tax for the exercise of for-profit activity in the Central Canton of San José. Thus, article 1 of said normative body establishes the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax. As there is no rule that expressly regulates the statute of limitations for this specific tax of the Municipality of San José, integration must be made with canon 82 of the Municipal Code, whose numbering was shifted by Article 1 of Law No. 9542, \"Law for the Strengthening of the Municipal Police\" (Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Policía Municipal) of April 23, 2018, which moved it from former Article 73 to 82). Said article, in what is relevant, provides: \"Article 82. - Municipal taxes shall prescribe in five years and the officials who allow them to prescribe shall be personally liable for their payment.\" In accordance with the foregoing, the application of the cited Article 82 is appropriate, given that the business license tax is a municipal tax. In cases of destination-based taxes, such as the real estate tax, the statute of limitations of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) would apply, but as reiterated, for the case at hand, it is canon 82 of the Municipal Code, cited above. Thus, under this context, what applies is the 5-year period for the statute of limitations for Municipal Taxes. Having clarified the applicable rule, and given that this is another point discussed in this venue, clarity must be had regarding the moment from which the tax obligation arises, from which the five-year calculation is made. In what is relevant, said Article 7 of Law No. 5694 provides the following: \"...ARTICLE 7.- Each year, no later than January 15, the persons referred to in the first article of this law shall file with the Municipality of San José a sworn statement (declaración jurada) indicating the amount of gross sales or income and the quarterly tax to be paid for the business license, in accordance with Article 14 of this law (...)\" For its part, Article 10 of the same normative body provides that if an omission occurs in the licensee's declaration, the classification from the previous year shall apply, unless the need to reclassify the respective license is established. Likewise, the mentioned article grants authorization to the local entity to verify with the General Directorate of Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación) the accuracy of the data provided, so that if an alteration of these by the licensee is determined, and with it, an incorrect categorization, the Municipality is empowered to carry out the corresponding reclassification. The foregoing is explained by the circumstance that the tax rate is imposed based on the categorization regulated by precept 17 of that law, and on the basis of the criteria or factors that article 5 of that rule indicates for the imposition. For its part, that provision clarifies that the tax must be paid quarterly, according to the assessment made based on the information provided for each period. The foregoing implies that the Municipality, as the administrator of the tax under examination, constitutes a Tax Administration. In accordance with the foregoing and as regulated, although the declarations must be filed no later than January 15 of each year, the truth of the matter is that the tax payment is quarterly. Thus, it is from the first day of the month following the date on which each payment should have been made that the five-year statute of limitations period established by article 82 of the Municipal Code begins to run, that is, the five-year statute of limitations period for making tax determinations for that concept. Matters thus presented, taking the foregoing into account, if the audit (fiscalización) began on August 1, 2011, for the periods 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, the 4 quarters of the year 2005, as well as the first and second quarters of the year 2006, would be time-barred. The rest of the periods, in accordance with the applicable prescriptive rule and the manner of carrying out the calculation, would not be time-barred. Based on the foregoing, the complaint must be partially granted on this point, understanding as time-barred -only- the periods corresponding to the 4 quarters of the year 2005, as well as the first and second quarters of the year 2006. Therefore, the partial nullity of the act of the Municipality of San José that ordered the rejection of the statute of limitations for those periods must be decreed.\n\n**c) Regarding the tax base (base imponible) of the municipal business license tax [...]**\n\n**Opinion of the Court:** The plaintiff considers that due to its particular situation, the way in which the Municipality of San José calculates the tax not only harms it, but also violates the principles of economic reality and tax equality. To support its theory of the case, it relies on two rulings of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), No. 8857-2000 and No. 0094-2001. To counter the issue of constitutional jurisprudence, the defendant Municipality provides 3 more recent rulings of the Constitutional Chamber, indicating a change in the jurisprudential line of the Constitutional Court, contained in votes (votos) of that same Court No. 11.902-2002, No. 555-2004 and No. 14.084-2005, as well as an opinion of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) with number C-462-2007. Since the discussion of this point is based on what the Constitutional Chamber has said over the years on this particular topic, as the plaintiff does not provide material proof of its claim demonstrating the alleged harm and imbalance, it will be analyzed under that argumentative line. From the analysis of the rulings mentioned by the plaintiff, it is important to highlight that it has been quite controversial even within the Constitutional Chamber itself, since the first of the votes mentioned by the plaintiff, derived from an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo), number 8857-2000, was adopted by a majority. From that moment, the issue was debatable [...] in this venue is sustained solely on what the Constitutional Court has resolved, and given that it has varied over time, with a position different from the one alleged in this venue, its arguments must be rejected as grounds to grant its complaint. In any case, as reiterated, although the plaintiff entity refers to the existence of a harm and an imbalance, it has not provided the pertinent evidence, as corresponds to it, in accordance with the principle of the burden of proof, which allows the Court to consider this situation of imbalance in its economic-tax equation as proven. Nor has it provided the pertinent evidence to prove that a percentage amount for the payment of the municipal business license has not been recognized within its cost structure. The case at hand has not transcended beyond legal argumentation and hypothetical speculation, based on criteria of the Constitutional Chamber that have changed over time and maintain a line contrary to what is asserted in this venue. Given that the plaintiff has limited itself to making statements and hypothetical examples, which cannot be considered as material evidence, the technical evidence to prove the alleged imbalance is missing. Finally, and as already mentioned two points prior, from the regulations cited in its defense by the plaintiff company, the existence of an exemption or waiver, derived from a Law, as required in this matter, that covers its case does not emerge. Based on the foregoing, no reason is found to decree the invalidity of the conduct being challenged.\n\nFor this reason, it shall be understood that the unequivocal and precisely applicable technical and scientific rules, in the circumstances of the case, are incorporated into the regulatory framework for this purpose. Finally, said article provides that insubstantial infractions shall not invalidate the act but may give rise to disciplinary liability of the acting official. On the other hand, regarding the classes of nullity, Article 166 of the LGAP establishes that there shall be absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of the act when one or several of its constituent elements are completely absent, in fact or in law. Moreover, regarding relative nullity (nulidad relativa), the following article, numbered 167, establishes that such nullity shall occur in the act when one of its constituent elements is imperfect, unless the imperfection prevents the achievement of the purpose, in which case the nullity shall be absolute. The foregoing is noted because the plaintiff, with respect to this point being decided, in the pleadings of its complaint, has not made reference to which of the elements of the act have been affected by the invalidity, whether formal or substantive, nor the type of pathology or invalidity from which the act in question suffers. This first point debated by the plaintiff is quite confusing and detached from proper legal technique, as it does not directly and clearly indicate what the pathology affecting the administrative conduct consists of, without indicating its specific location, whether in the formal or substantive elements of the administrative act. On the contrary, on this point what it requests is that the Court \"make an interpretation\" favorable to the theory of the case it is putting forward, which is detached from proper technique. In this sense, what the plaintiff does is a series of citations of legal and regulatory provisions, which refer to the nature of the service provision carried out by said company, which undoubtedly define the activity as that of a public service (servicio público). Notwithstanding the foregoing, while it does refer to the fact that we are dealing with a service of a public nature, in none of them is there an express exoneration (exoneración) or dispensation (dispensa) from payment of the tax under examination. In accordance with the principle of tax legality, any exoneration or dispensation from a tax must be established by law. In the case under examination, with respect to this section, what the plaintiff company seeks is for the Administrative Litigation Court to \"interpret\" from the cited provisions, the non-subjection (no sujeción) to the tax on the part of gasoline retailing companies, by virtue of being a public service.\n\n</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;\">The first article of the regulatory body that creates the business license tax (impuesto de patente) of the Municipality of San José, provides as follows: \"</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;\">ARTICLE 1º.- All natural or legal persons engaged in the exercise of any type of for-profit activity (actividad lucrativa), in the Central Canton of San José and who have obtained the respective license, shall pay to the Municipality of San José the license tax (Impuesto de patente) that authorizes them to carry out these activities. When the main for-profit activity is carried out outside the central canton of San José, but the taxpayer also carries out for-profit activities in this canton, through branches, agencies or similar in the judgment of the Municipality, the natural or legal persons operating at that level, must pay to the Municipality of San José, the tax that is determined, percentage-wise, among the municipalities involved, in accordance with what is declared in a clarifying percentage report by the licensee, where the income received in each Municipality is demonstrated; the data shall be verified by the Municipality of San José, in the other municipalities.</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;\">\" For its part, the second ordinal provides as follows: \"</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;\">ARTICLE 2º.- The license tax shall be fixed for the Municipality of San José, in accordance with the provisions of articles 14, 15, 16 and 17 of this law and with the regulations issued for that purpose by the Municipality.</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;\">\" </span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;\">Finally, the third canon indicates: \"</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;\">ARTICLE 3º.- The license tax shall be paid during the entire time the establishment is kept open, or trade is carried out in an itinerant manner and during the time the license has been held, even though the activity has not been carried out.</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;\">\" In accordance with these norms and from a review of the regulatory text under study, it is not expressly provided that in the case of the activity carried out by the plaintiff company, it is not subject to the tax in question [...]</span>\n\n**b) On the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the license tax [...]**\n\n**Desk's Criterion**: In the case under examination, the statute of limitations for the fiscal periods 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 of the San José license tax (impuesto de patentes) is under discussion. According to the actions on record, before the request filed in administrative proceedings, the autonomous entity denied it, considering that since these were tax relationships in which the duty to declare had been omitted, the extended statute of limitations rule of ten years regulated by ordinal 51 of the CNPT was applicable. It is important to indicate that Law No. 5694, Municipal Tax Law of San José, regulates matters related to the license tax for the exercise of for-profit activity in the Central Canton of San José. In this way, numeral 1 of said regulatory body establishes the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax. As there is no norm that expressly regulates the matter of the statute of limitations for this specific tax of the Municipality of San José, the integration must be made with canon 82 of the Municipal Code, whose numbering was moved, by article 1° of law No. 9542 \"Law for the Strengthening of the Municipal Police\" of April 23, 2018, which transferred it from the old article 73 to 82. Said ordinal, as relevant, provides: \"<span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;\">Article 82. - Municipal taxes shall prescribe in five years and the officials who allow them to prescribe shall be personally responsible for their payment</span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;\">.</span>\" <span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;\">Pursuant to the foregoing, the application of the cited article 82 proceeds, given that the license tax is a municipal tax. In cases of taxes by destination, as is the case of the real estate tax, the statute of limitations of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedure would apply, but as is reiterated, for the case at hand it is canon 82 of the Municipal Code, cited above. </span><span style=\"font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;\"> Thus, under that context, what applies is the 5-year term for the statute of limitations of Municipal Taxes.</span>\n\nHaving clarified the applicable law, and given that this is another point discussed in this venue, clarity must be had regarding the moment from which the tax obligation arises, from which the calculation of the five years begins. For what is relevant, said Article 7 of Law No. 5694 provides as follows: \"*...ARTICLE 7.- Each year, no later than January 15th, the persons referred to in article one of this law shall submit, before the Municipality of San José, a sworn declaration indicating the amount of sales or gross income and the quarterly tax that must be paid for the business license (patente), in accordance with article 14 of this law (...)*\" For its part, Article 10 of the same regulatory body provides that if an omission occurs in the declaration of the licensee, the classification of the previous year shall be applied, unless the need to reclassify the respective business license is established. Likewise, the aforementioned article grants authorization to the local entity to verify before the Dirección General de Tributación, the accuracy of the data provided, so that, if an alteration of these by the licensee is determined, and with it, an incorrect categorization, the Municipality is empowered to carry out the corresponding reclassification. The foregoing is explained by the circumstance that the tax rate is imposed based on the categorization regulated by precept 17 of that law, and on the basis of the criteria or factors for the imposition indicated by numeral 5 of that norm. For its part, that provision clarifies that the tax must be paid quarterly, according to the assessment carried out based on the information provided for each period. The foregoing implies that the Municipality, as manager of the tax under examination, constitutes a Tax Administration. According to the foregoing, as set forth and regulated, although the declarations must be submitted no later than January 15th of each year, the truth of the matter is that the payment of the tax is quarterly. Thus, it is from the first day of the month following the date on which each payment should have been made, that the five-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period fixed by numeral 82 of the Municipal Code runs, that is, the five-year statute of limitations period to make tax determinations for that concept. This being the case, taking the foregoing into account, if the audit began on August 1, 2011, for the periods 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, the 4 quarters of the year 2005 would be time-barred, as well as the first and second quarter of the year 2006. The rest of the periods, in accordance with the prescriptive norm applied and the manner of carrying out the calculation, would not be time-barred. Based on the foregoing, the lawsuit on this point must be partially granted, it being understood that—only—the periods corresponding to the 4 quarters of the year 2005, as well as the first and second quarter of the year 2006, are time-barred. Therefore, the partial annulment of the act of the Municipality of San José, which ordered the rejection of the statute of limitations for those periods, must be decreed.\n\n**c) *On the taxable base of the municipal business license tax [...]***\n\n**Opinion of the Court:** The plaintiff considers that due to his particular situation, the way in which the Municipality of San José calculates the tax not only harms him, but also violates the principles of economic reality and tax equality. To support his theory of the case, he bases it on two judgments of the Constitutional Chamber, No. 8857-2000 and No. 0094-2001. To counteract the issue of constitutional jurisprudence, the defendant Municipality provides 3 more recent judgments of the Constitutional Chamber in which the change in the jurisprudential line of the Constitutional Court is indicated, contained in votes of that same Court No. 11.902-2002, No. 555-2004, and No. 14.084-2005, as well as an opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República with number C-462-2007. Given that the discussion of this point is based on what the Constitutional Chamber has said over the years on this particular topic, since the plaintiff does not provide material proof of his statement demonstrating the alleged harm, as well as the imbalance, it will be analyzed under that argumentative line. From the analysis of the judgments mentioned by the plaintiff, it is important to highlight that it has been quite controversial at the level of the Constitutional Chamber itself, because the first of the votes mentioned by the plaintiff, derived from an amparo appeal, with number 8857-2000, was granted by a majority. From that moment on, the topic was debatable [...] in this venue, its support is based solely on what the Constitutional Court has resolved and, given that it has varied over time, with a different position from the one alleged in this venue, his arguments as grounds for granting his lawsuit must be rejected.\n\nIn any event, as reiterated, although the plaintiff entity refers to the existence of harm, as well as an imbalance, it has not provided the pertinent evidence, as is its responsibility according to the principle of burden of proof (principio de carga probatoria), that would allow the Tribunal to consider this situation of imbalance in its economic-tax equation as proven. Nor has it provided the pertinent evidence to demonstrate that a percentage amount for the payment of the municipal patent (patente municipal) has not been recognized within its cost structure. The case before us has not transcended beyond legal argumentation and hypothetical speculation, based on criteria of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) that have changed over time and maintain a line contrary to what it asserts in this venue. Given that the plaintiff has limited itself to making assertions as well as hypothetical examples, these cannot be considered material evidence. There is a lack of technical evidence to prove the alleged imbalance. Finally, and as mentioned in the point prior to the previous one, from the regulations cited in its defense by the plaintiff company, the existence of an exoneration (exoneración) or dispensation (dispensa), derived from a Law, as is appropriate in this matter, that covers its case, does not emerge. For the foregoing reasons, no grounds whatsoever are found to decree the invalidity of the conduct being challenged.\"\n\nOn the other hand, regarding the types of nullity, Article 166 of the LGAP establishes that there shall be absolute nullity of the act when one or several of its constitutive elements are totally lacking, in fact or in law. Moreover, with respect to relative nullity, the following article, numbered 167, establishes that this nullity shall occur in the act when one of its constitutive elements is imperfect, unless the imperfection prevents the fulfillment of the purpose, in which case the nullity shall be absolute. The foregoing is noted because the plaintiff, with regard to this point being resolved, in the pleadings of its complaint, has made no reference to which of the elements of the act have been affected by invalidity, whether formal or material, nor the type of pathology or invalidity suffered by the act in question. This first point argued by the plaintiff is quite confusing and detached from legal technicality, as it does not directly and clearly indicate what the pathology affecting the administrative conduct consists of, without indicating its specific location, whether in the formal or material elements of the administrative act. On the contrary, on this point what it requests is that the Court “make an interpretation” favorable to the theory of the case it comes to pose, which is detached from technicality. In this sense, what the plaintiff does is a series of citations of legal and regulatory norms, which refer to the nature of the provision of the service developed by said company, which undoubtedly define the activity as that of a public service. Notwithstanding the foregoing, while it does refer to the fact that we are facing a service of a public nature, in none of them is there an express exemption (exoneración) or dispensation (dispensa) from payment of the tax in the case under examination. In accordance with the principle of tax legality, any exemption or dispensation from a tax must be provided for by law. In the case under examination, insofar as this section is concerned, what the plaintiff company intends is that the Administrative Litigation Court \"interpret\" from the cited norms, the non-subjection to the tax on the part of gasoline retail companies, due to the fact of being a public service. Article one of the regulatory body creating the patent tax of the Municipality of San José provides as follows: \"ARTICLE 1º.- All natural or legal persons engaged in the exercise of any type of lucrative activity in the Central Canton of San José and who have obtained the respective license, shall pay to the Municipality of San José the patent tax that empowers them to carry out these activities. When the main lucrative activity is developed outside the central canton of San José, but the taxpayer also carries out lucrative activities in this canton, through branches, agencies or similar at the discretion of the Municipality, the natural or legal persons operating at that level must pay to the Municipality of San José the tax that is determined, percentage-wise, among the municipalities involved, in accordance with what is declared in a clarifying percentage report by the patent holder, demonstrating what was received in terms of income in each Municipality; the data shall be verified by the Municipality of San José in the other municipalities.\" For its part, Article two provides as follows: \"ARTICLE 2º.- The patent tax shall be fixed for the Municipality of San José, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 17 of this law and with the regulation issued for that purpose by the Municipality.\" Finally, Article three indicates: \"ARTICLE 3º.- The patent tax shall be paid for the entire time the establishment is kept open, or commerce is exercised in an ambulatory manner and during the time the license has been held, even if the activity has not been carried out.\" In accordance with these norms and a review of the regulatory text under study, it is not expressly provided that the activity developed by the plaintiff company is not subject to the tax in question [...]\n\nb) On the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the patent tax [...]\n\nOpinion of the Office: In the case under examination, the statute of limitations of fiscal periods 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 of the San José patent tax is disputed.\n\nIn accordance with the actions contained in the case file, regarding the request made at the administrative level, the autonomous entity denied it, considering that since these are fiscal relationships in which the duty to declare had been omitted, the extended ten-year statute of limitations (prescripción) rule regulated by section 51 of the CNPT was applicable. It is important to note that Law No. 5694, the Municipal Tax Law of San José (Ley de Impuestos Municipales de San José), regulates matters related to the business license tax (impuesto de patente) for the exercise of for-profit activities in the Central Canton of San José. In this way, section 1 of that normative body establishes the taxable event (hecho generador del tributo). In the absence of a rule expressly regulating the matter of the statute of limitations for this specific tax of the Municipality of San José (Municipalidad de San José), integration must be made with canon 82 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), whose numbering was moved by Article 1° of Law No. 9542 \"Law for the Strengthening of the Municipal Police\" (\"Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Policía Municipal\") of April 23, 2018, which transferred it from former Article 73 to 82). Said section, as relevant, provides: \"Article 82. - Municipal taxes (tributos municipales) shall prescribe in five years, and the officials who allow them to prescribe shall be personally liable for their payment.\" In accordance with the foregoing, the application of the cited Article 82 is appropriate, given that the business license tax is a municipal tax. In cases of destination-based taxes (tributos por destino), as is the case with the real estate tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), the statute of limitations of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimiento Tributarios) would apply, but as reiterated, for the case at hand it is canon 82 of the Municipal Code, cited above.\n\nThus, under this context, the applicable period is the 5-year term for the statute of limitations of Municipal Taxes. Having clarified the applicable rule, and since this is another point under discussion in this venue, clarity must be established regarding the moment from which the tax obligation arises, from which the calculation of the five years is made. As relevant, Article 7 of Law No. 5694 provides the following: \"...ARTICLE 7º.- Each year, no later than January 15, the persons referred to in Article one of this law shall present, before the Municipality of San José, a sworn statement (declaración jurada) indicating the amount of gross sales or income and the quarterly tax they must pay for the business license, in accordance with Article 14 of this law (...)\". For its part, Article 10 of the same normative body provides that if there is an omission in the licensee’s (patentado) declaration, the previous year's classification shall be applied, unless the need to reclassify the respective business license is established. Likewise, the mentioned article grants authorization to the local entity to verify, with the Directorate General of Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación), the accuracy of the data provided, so that if an alteration of these by the licensee is determined, and with it an incorrect categorization, the Municipality is empowered to carry out the corresponding reclassification. The foregoing is explained by the circumstance that the tax rate is imposed based on the categorization regulated by precept 17 of that law, and on the basis of the criteria or factors indicated by section 5 of that rule for the imposition. For its part, that provision clarifies that the tax must be paid quarterly, according to the assessment (tasación) made based on the information provided for each period. The foregoing implies that the Municipality, as the administrator of the tax under examination, constitutes a Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria). In accordance with the above stated and regulated, although the declarations must be filed no later than January 15 of each year, the truth is that the tax payment is quarterly. Thus, it is from the first day of the month following the date on which each payment should have been made that the five-year statute of limitations period established by section 82 of the Municipal Code runs, i.e., the five-year statute of limitations period to make fiscal determinations for that concept. With matters thus presented, and taking the foregoing into account, if the audit (fiscalización) began on August 1, 2011, for the periods 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, the 4 quarters of the year 2005 would be time-barred (prescritos), as well as the first and second quarters of the year 2006. The rest of the periods, according to the applied prescriptive rule and the method of carrying out the calculation, would not be time-barred.\n\nFor the reasons stated, the claim on this point must be declared partially granted, understanding as time-barred—only—the periods corresponding to the 4 quarters of 2005, as well as the first and second quarter of 2006. The partial annulment (nulidad parcial) of the decision by the Municipality of San José that ordered the rejection of the statute of limitations for those periods must therefore be decreed.\n\nc) On the taxable base (base imponible) of the municipal patent tax (impuesto de patente municipal) [...]\n\nOpinion of the Court: The plaintiff considers that, due to his particular situation, the method by which the Municipality of San José calculates the tax not only harms him but also violates the principles of economic reality and tax equality. To support his theory of the case, he bases his argument on two judgments of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), No. 8857-2000 and No. 0094-2001. To counter the issue of constitutional jurisprudence, the respondent Municipality provides 3 more recent judgments from the Constitutional Chamber, which indicate a change in the jurisprudential line of the Constitutional Court, contained in votes by that same Court No. 11.902-2002, No. 555-2004, and No. 14.084-2005, as well as an opinion from the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) with number C-462-2007. Given that the discussion of this point is based on what the Constitutional Chamber has said over the years on this particular topic, since the plaintiff does not provide material evidence of his statement demonstrating the alleged harm, nor the imbalance, it will be analyzed under that line of argument. From the analysis of the judgments mentioned by the plaintiff, it is important to highlight that the issue has been quite controversial within the Constitutional Chamber itself, as the first of the votes mentioned by the plaintiff, derived from an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo), number 8857-2000, was upheld by a majority. From that moment, the issue was debatable [...] in this venue is based solely on what the Constitutional Court has decided and, given that it has varied over time, with a position different from that alleged in this venue, its arguments must be rejected as grounds for upholding its claim. In any event, as reiterated, although the plaintiff entity refers to the existence of harm, as well as an imbalance, it has not provided the relevant proof, as is its responsibility, in accordance with the principle of burden of proof, that allows the Court to consider this situation of imbalance in its economic-tax equation as proven. Nor has it provided the relevant proof to demonstrate that a percentage amount for the payment of the municipal patent tax was not recognized within its cost structure. The case at hand has gone no further than legal argumentation and hypothetical speculation, based on criteria of the Constitutional Chamber that have changed over time and maintain a line contrary to what it asserts in this venue. Given that the plaintiff has limited itself to making statements and hypothetical examples, which cannot be considered as material evidence, the technical proof to demonstrate the alleged imbalance is lacking. Finally, and as mentioned in the penultimate point, the regulations cited in its defense by the plaintiff company do not reveal the existence of an exoneration (exoneración) or dispensation (dispensa), derived from a Law, as corresponds in this matter, that covers its case. For the reasons stated, no grounds are found to decree the invalidity of the conduct being challenged."
}