{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-292678",
  "citation": "Res. 01859-2020 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal II Circuito Judicial de San José",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Aplicación de los artículos 71 inciso g) y 72 del Código Penal a mujeres transgénero",
  "title_en": "Application of Articles 71(g) and 72 of the Criminal Code to transgender women",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José conoció de un recurso contra la sentencia que denegó a dos mujeres trans la aplicación de la atenuante prevista en los artículos 71 inciso g) y 72 del Código Penal, destinada a mujeres en estado de vulnerabilidad. El tribunal de instancia argumentó que dicha protección se dirige a la mujer desde el punto de vista del sexo biológico y no del género, excluyendo por ello a las imputadas. La Sala revocó parcialmente, declarando que la interpretación restrictiva basada en el sexo biológico resulta discriminatoria y contraria al principio de legalidad, al control de convencionalidad y al derecho a la identidad de género. Sostuvo que el concepto “mujer” en la norma debe interpretarse conforme a la identidad de género autodeterminada y no a la biología. Ordenó un reenvío para que el tribunal determine si las encartadas, en su condición de mujeres trans en situación de vulnerabilidad, cumplen los demás requisitos legales para la posible reducción de la pena.",
  "summary_en": "The Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José reviewed a decision that denied two transgender women the benefit of Articles 71(g) and 72 of the Criminal Code, a mitigating factor for women in vulnerable circumstances. The trial court held that the provision protects women from a biological-sex perspective only, thus excluding the defendants. The appellate chamber partially reversed, finding the restrictive biological interpretation discriminatory and contrary to the principle of legality, conventionality control, and the right to gender identity. It ruled that the term “woman” in the statute must be interpreted according to self-determined gender identity, not biology. The matter was remanded for the trial court to assess whether the defendants—as transgender women in a vulnerable state—meet the other legal requirements for a possible sentence reduction.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal II Circuito Judicial de San José",
  "date": "16/11/2020",
  "year": "2020",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "identidad de género",
    "mujer trans",
    "control de convencionalidad",
    "acción afirmativa",
    "principio de no reforma en perjuicio",
    "juicio de reenvío"
  ],
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  "keywords_es": [
    "mujeres trans",
    "identidad de género",
    "artículo 71 inciso g Código Penal",
    "artículo 72 Código Penal",
    "discriminación por razón de sexo",
    "vulnerabilidad",
    "control de convencionalidad",
    "Opinión Consultiva OC-24/17",
    "CEDAW",
    "Reglas de Bangkok",
    "acción afirmativa"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "trans women",
    "gender identity",
    "Article 71(g) Criminal Code",
    "Article 72 Criminal Code",
    "sex-based discrimination",
    "vulnerability",
    "conventionality control",
    "Advisory Opinion OC-24/17",
    "CEDAW",
    "Bangkok Rules",
    "affirmative action"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Como se puede colegir, la decisión del a quo, de no aplicar el artículo 71 inciso g) y 72 del Código Penal, para fijar y motivar la sanción penal de las encartadas, se basó en criterios que lesionan los Derechos Humanos, en tanto su género -mujeres trans- no era un obstáculo para interpretar que podían ser destinatarias de la norma, a partir de que debe considerárseles, conforme a su identidad de género, como mujeres.\n\nAsí queda claro, que al sostener la defensa pública que sus representadas eran mujeres y que estaban en estado de vulnerabilidad, debió ineludiblemente el tribunal de instancia entrar a ponderar fáctica y jurídicamente tales aspectos, para poder determinar si se cumplía, o no, con los restantes requerimientos normativos para ponderar la aplicación de una posible disminución de la sanción penal.\n\nEn este sentido, se decreta la ineficacia parcial de la sentencia, únicamente en cuanto a la determinación e imposición de la sanción penal y se dispone el juicio de reenvío (conforme a las reglas de cesura que se dispuso para el sub examine) ante el mismo tribunal, para que con una integración diferente proceda a resolver tal extremo del fallo, conforme a Derecho y al principio de no reforma en perjuicio.",
  "excerpt_en": "As can be inferred, the trial court's decision not to apply Article 71(g) and 72 of the Criminal Code to determine and justify the defendants' sentence was based on criteria that violate Human Rights, since their gender—trans women—was not an obstacle to interpreting that they could be recipients of the rule, given that they must be considered, according to their gender identity, as women.\n\nThus it is clear that when the public defender asserted that her clients were women in a vulnerable state, the trial court should have inevitably weighed these factual and legal aspects to determine whether the remaining regulatory requirements for a possible sentence reduction were met.\n\nAccordingly, the partial nullity of the judgment is decreed, only regarding the determination and imposition of the criminal sanction, and a retrial is ordered (pursuant to the severance rules set for the sub examine) before the same court, with a different composition, to resolve this part of the judgment in accordance with the law and the principle of non-reformation in peius.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Partially granted",
    "label_es": "Parcialmente con lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Court declared the partial nullity of the judgment regarding sentencing and ordered a retrial for the lower court to weigh the possible application of Articles 71(g) and 72 of the Criminal Code to the defendants, as trans women in a vulnerable state.",
    "summary_es": "El Tribunal declaró la ineficacia parcial de la sentencia en cuanto a la determinación de la pena y ordenó un juicio de reenvío para que se pondere la posible aplicación de los artículos 71 inciso g) y 72 del Código Penal a las imputadas, en su condición de mujeres trans en estado de vulnerabilidad."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando III",
      "quote_en": "the expression 'woman in a vulnerable state' does not refer to a woman from a sex perspective [...] but from gender, which is a social construct",
      "quote_es": "la expresión “mujer en estado de vulnerabilidad” no hace referencia a la mujer desde la perspectiva de su sexo […] sino desde el género, que resulta ser una construcción social"
    },
    {
      "context": "Sentencia de instancia citada",
      "quote_en": "the recognition of vulnerability due to a female gender identity does not make her a woman from a biological point of view",
      "quote_es": "el reconocimiento de la condición de vulnerabilidad por una identidad de género femenina no la convierte en una mujer desde el punto de vista biológico"
    },
    {
      "context": "Opinión Consultiva OC-24/17",
      "quote_en": "preeminence must be given to psychosocial sex over morphological sex, in order to fully respect the rights of sexual and gender identity",
      "quote_es": "debe darse un carácter preeminente al sexo psicosocial frente al morfológico, a fin de respetar plenamente los derechos de identidad sexual y de género"
    },
    {
      "context": "Por tanto",
      "quote_en": "the partial nullity of the judgment is decreed, solely regarding the determination and imposition of the criminal sanction, and a retrial is ordered",
      "quote_es": "se decreta la ineficacia parcial de la sentencia, únicamente en cuanto a la determinación e imposición de la sanción penal y se dispone el juicio de reenvío"
    }
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      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "184",
      "art_scij": "180443",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-41297",
      "norm_fecha": "10 Abr 1996",
      "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal",
      "norm_num": "7594",
      "norm_ver": "119814",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "465",
      "art_scij": "180709",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-41297",
      "norm_fecha": "10 Abr 1996",
      "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal",
      "norm_num": "7594",
      "norm_ver": "119814",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    }
  ],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-41297",
      "norm_num": "7594",
      "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal — Acción penal en delitos ambientales",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "10/04/1996"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-5027",
      "norm_num": "4573",
      "norm_name": "Código Penal — Ley 4573",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "04/05/1970"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "norm_num": "0",
      "norm_name": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política",
      "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política",
      "norm_fecha": "07/11/1949"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [
    "sen-1-0006-921950",
    "sen-1-0007-81561",
    "sen-1-0007-618040"
  ],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Discriminatorio y lesivo a la dignidad humana de imputadas transexuales argumentar que la protección de los artículos 71 inciso g y 72 del Código Penal está destinada a la mujer desde un punto de vista del sexo biológico y no de género"
        }
      ],
      "id": 4,
      "nombre": "Prohibición de discriminación por sexo"
    },
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Discriminatorio y lesivo a la dignidad humana de imputadas transexuales argumentar que la protección de los artículos 71 inciso g y 72 del Código Penal está destinada a la mujer desde un punto de vista del sexo biológico y no de género"
        }
      ],
      "id": 1,
      "nombre": "Fijación de la pena"
    },
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Discriminatorio y lesivo a la dignidad humana de imputadas transexuales argumentar que la protección de los artículos 71 inciso g y 72 del Código Penal está destinada a la mujer desde un punto de vista del sexo biológico y no de género"
        }
      ],
      "id": 2,
      "nombre": "Mujer imputada en el proceso penal"
    },
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Discriminatorio y lesivo a la dignidad humana de imputadas transexuales argumentar que la protección de los artículos 71 inciso g y 72 del Código Penal está destinada a la mujer desde un punto de vista del sexo biológico y no de género"
        }
      ],
      "id": 3,
      "nombre": "Derecho de preferencia sexual"
    },
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Discriminatorio y lesivo a la dignidad humana de imputadas transexuales argumentar que la protección de los artículos 71 inciso g y 72 del Código Penal está destinada a la mujer desde un punto de vista del sexo biológico y no de género"
        }
      ],
      "id": 5,
      "nombre": "Derecho a la dignidad humana"
    },
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Discriminatorio y lesivo a la dignidad humana de imputadas transexuales argumentar que la protección de los artículos 71 inciso g y 72 del Código Penal está destinada a la mujer desde un punto de vista del sexo biológico y no de género"
        }
      ],
      "id": 6,
      "nombre": "Control de convencionalidad"
    }
  ],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "\"III. [...] La petición de la defensa pública, de que se aplicara a las sindicadas lo dispuesto en el artículo 71 inciso g) y 72 del Código Penal, fue rechazada por el tribunal de instancia bajo el siguiente argumento: “Se nota que, tanto esta normativa internacional, como la reforma penal mencionada, está encaminada a dar una protección especial a las mujeres con dicha condición [vulnerabilidad], desde un punto de vista del sexo, y no del género. El Tribunal tiene claro que tanto la señora [Nombre [Nombre1]] como [Nombre [Nombre2]], son personas que se identifican como mujeres -trans- género, es decir, que a pesar de haber nacido con una biología del sexo masculino no se identifican como tal, lo anterior partiendo de sus datos de identificación así como la misma condición que ellas han admitido y esto, efectivamente es un derecho reconocido, entre otras disposiciones los Principios de Yogyakarta de noviembre del año 2006, \"Todas las personas tienen derecho al disfrute de todos los derechos humanos, sin discriminación por motivos de orientación sexual o identidad de género. Todas las personas tienen derecho a ser iguales ante la ley y tienen derecho a igual protección por parte de la ley, sin ninguna de las discriminaciones mencionadas, ya sea que el disfrute de otro derecho humano también esté afectado o no. La ley prohibirá toda discriminación de esta clase y garantizará a todas las personas protección igual y efectiva contra cualquier forma de discriminación de esta clase. La discriminación por motivos de orientación sexual o identidad de género incluye toda distinción, exclusión, restricción o preferencia basada en la orientación sexual o la identidad de género que tenga por objeto o por resultado la anulación o el menoscabo de la igualdad ante la ley o de la igual protección por parte de la ley, o del reconocimiento, o goce o ejercicio, en igualdad de condiciones, de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales. La discriminación por motivos de orientación sexual o identidad de género puede verse y por lo común se ve agravada por la discriminación basada en otras causales, incluyendo género, raza, edad, religión, discapacidad, estado de salud y condición económica.” Estos principios como se ve, les reconocen una serie de derechos propios e inherentes a la dignidad de la persona humana, entre ellos el derecho a la vida, al trabajo, a la salud, derechos sobre los cuales tienen los Estados la obligación de tomar medidas para asegurarlos. Incluso nuestro país fue más allá y, formuló una consulta a la Corte Interamericana de Derechos humanos , respecto de la población LGTBI, resultando de ello la Opinión Consultiva número OC-24-2017, relativa a la identidad de género, igualdad y no discriminación a parejas del mismo sexo, dentro de los considerandos de la Opinión Consultiva, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, es clara en indicar que constituyen poblaciones vulnerables los adultos mayores, las personas con diversas orientaciones sexuales e identidades de género, y también incluidas las mujeres. Resulta claro entonces que el reconocimiento de la condición de vulnerabilidad por una identidad de género femenina no la convierte en una mujer desde el punto de vista biológico, y que estas últimas han sido precisamente por su condición de mujer discriminadas de manera sistemática. Se tiene entonces que ambas son poblaciones vulnerables que requieren protecciones especiales, pero no son el mismo tipo de población vulnerable, por ello en cuanto a la reforma del artículo 71 y 72, esta protección está destinada a las mujeres desde un punto de vista del sexo biológico y no a las mujeres transexuales, las cuales este Tribunal tiene clarísimo que también deben ser sujeto de protecciones especiales, debido a toda la discriminación y vulnerabilidad que sufren, pero ello, no es resorte de este Tribunal, quien debe resolver en apego al principio de legalidad. Sobre el mismo tema la Sala III de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ha puntualizado: \"Ya que si bien en el ordenamiento jurídico se adicionó una de las causales de modo de fijación de la pena, al disponerse como un elemento de consideración la valoración de la condición de vulnerabilidad que haya influido en la comisión del hecho punible y que la persona sentenciada sea mujer, delimitó la eventual atenuación de la pena a un requisito sine que non estipulando en el ordinal 72 del Código Penal\" (Resolución 2019-00624 de las once horas y tres minutos del diecisiete de mayo del dos mil diecinueve, el resaltado no es del texto original). Así las cosas y del análisis jurídico realizado, el Tribunal considera que la reforma del artículo 71 y 72, del Código Penal, no resulta aplicable al caso concreto que se está resolviendo” (cfr. folios 215 a 217. El énfasis es suplido). Como se aprecia, el tribunal de mérito tomó su decisión a partir de varias premisas erradas que, no cabe duda, tornan el rechazo de la petición de la defensa como infundada y contrarias a las normas internacionales e internas que protegen los Derechos Humanos. Una de estas premisas es concluir que los artículos 71 g) y 72 del Código Penal, contienen una “protección [que] está destinada a las mujeres desde un punto de vista del sexo biológico” (sic). Esta conclusión resulta contraria al principio de legalidad y a una correcta hermenéutica jurídica. Así, partiendo de la literalidad de las normas, se describe en el numeral 71 que: “El Juez, en sentencia motivada, fijará la duración de la pena que debe imponerse de acuerdo con los límites señalados para cada delito, atendiendo a la gravedad del hecho y a la personalidad del partícipe. // Para apreciarlos se tomará en cuenta: […] g) Que la persona sentenciada sea una mujer que se encuentre en estado de vulnerabilidad, por pobreza, por tener bajo su responsabilidad el cuido y manutención de familiares dependientes, por discapacidad o por ser víctima de violencia de género, cuando ese estado haya influido en la comisión del hecho” (El resaltado es propio). Por su parte, el artículo 72 dispone: “Cuando concurran circunstancias agravantes y atenuantes en el mismo hecho punible, el juez las apreciará por su número e importancia, de acuerdo con el artículo anterior. // Cuando concurran alguna de las circunstancias previstas en el inciso g) del artículo anterior, y la mujer sentenciada no tenga antecedentes penales, el tribunal de juicio podrá disminuir la sanción, incluso por debajo del monto mínimo previsto en el tipo penal”. Como se evidencia, el legislador hace referencia a “ una mujer”, sin que se haga diferencia entre si esta debe ser reconocida como tal a partir de su sexo (“1. m. Condición orgánica, masculina o femenina, de los animales y las plantas”. REAL ACADEMIA ESPAÑOLA: Diccionario de la lengua española, 23.ª ed., [versión 23.3 en línea]. https://dle.rae.es/sexo?m=form , 04 de noviembre de 2020) o de su género (“ 3. m. Grupo al que pertenecen los seres humanos de cada sexo, entendido este desde un punto de vista sociocultural en lugar de exclusivamente biológico” Ibídem, https://dle.rae.es/género?m=form ). Sin embargo, al verificarse que la disposición legal no está dispuesta para todas las mujeres, sino solo para aquellas “en estado de vulnerabilidad” y que esa condición se definiría “por pobreza, por tener bajo su responsabilidad el cuido y manutención de familiares dependientes, por discapacidad o por ser víctima de violencia de género”, es notorio que tales disposiciones estaban dispuestas como una acción afirmativa (discriminación positiva) que tomó el Estado costarricense para erradicar las prácticas discriminatorias que enfrentan las mujeres, como personas sometidas a conductas abusivas y violentas en sociedades estructuradas a partir del ejercicio del dominio patriarcal (artículo 1, 3 y 4.1 de la Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer, adoptada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, en su resolución 34/180, de 18 de diciembre de 1979). Esto en razón de que este tipo de discriminación es un tipo de violencia contra la mujer, entendida como “…cualquier acción o conducta, basada en su género, que cause muerte, daño o sufrimiento físico, sexual o psicológico a la mujer, tanto en el ámbito público como en el privado” (artículo 1 de la Convención interamericana para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer, Convención De Belem Do Pará aprobada el 06 de setiembre de 1994). De este modo, desde la literalidad de las normas descritas, la expresión “mujer en estado de vulnerabilidad” no hace referencia a la mujer desde la perspectiva de su sexo [En un sentido estricto, el término “sexo” se refiere “ a las diferencias biológicas entre el hombre y la mujer”, a sus características fisiológicas, a la “ suma de las características biológicas que define el espectro de los humanos personas como mujeres y hombres”, o a la “construcción biológica que se refiere a las características genéticas, hormonales, anatómicas y fisiológicas sobre cuya base es clasificada como macho o hembra al nacer” (cfr. Consejo Permanente de la Organización de Estados Americanos, Comisión de asunto jurídicos y políticos, Orientación sexual, identidad de género y expresión de género: algunos términos y estándares relevantes)], sino desde el género, que resulta ser una construcción social que se refiere “…a las identidades, las funciones y los atributos construidos socialmente de la mujer y el hombre y al significado social y cultural que se atribuye a esas diferencias biológicas” ( Ibídem). Esta interpretación no es ajena a la exposición de motivos del proyecto de ley N° 20300, que permitió la modificación de los artículos 71 inciso g) y 72 del Código Penal, ya que en este se cita: “El presente proyecto de ley pretende paliar los embates de la exclusión social en contra de las mujeres en conflicto con la ley penal. Se trata de ampliar las posibilidades disponibles para los jueces a la hora de juzgar a mujeres en situaciones de vulnerabilidad, tales como pobreza, dependencia o violencia de género. Esto se enmarca dentro de las vertientes más modernas de la criminología, que admiten el olvido tradicional de una visión de género en el tratamiento científico del problema criminógeno en las mujeres. // La igualdad sustantiva entre mujeres y hombres es una aspiración que, como sociedad, debe definir las líneas hacia dónde se debe avanzar. Las relaciones entre las personas en sociedades estructuradas a partir del ejercicio del poder de dominio, se desenvuelven en un contexto que genera desigualdad, en el cual muchas mujeres (como resultado de mandatos estructurales sobre cómo deben ser y respecto a lo que deben hacer) se encuentran en desventaja con respecto a los hombres en todos los ámbitos de la vida. Es por ello que resulta indispensable que el Estado costarricense desarrolle las acciones requeridas para superar las brechas de género y erradicar las prácticas discriminatorias que enfrenta constantemente […] Por lo anterior, resulta fundamental incorporar el análisis del enfoque de igualdad entre mujeres y hombres, como una herramienta clave para interpretar la realidad, en este caso, valorar las particularidades de las mujeres sentenciadas en sede penal desde un abordaje integral. En ese sentido, es importante conocer a profundidad las aristas particulares que tiene la expresión de la vulnerabilidad que enfrentan las mujeres por su condición de género, ya que históricamente han estado en desventaja en torno a la toma de decisiones, el acceso a los recursos materiales, culturales y simbólicos. Se entiende en situación de vulnerabilidad a las mujeres que entran en contacto con el sistema penal, quienes, en razón de los condicionamientos culturales y sociales, tienen bajo su responsabilidad directa a personas con enfermedades, menores de edad, adultas mayores, entre otras, de manera que su detención genera un impacto personal hacia ellas, sus dependientes y, por ende, hacia la sociedad”. Como se puede colegir, las diferencias biológicas entre hombre y mujer no fue lo que primó para realizar la modificaciones a los artículos mencionados, como equívocamente lo sostuvo el a quo , sino las desventajas y discriminación que enfrentan las mujeres al tener que cumplir las funciones, roles o atributos construidos por una sociedad patriarcal, que las coloca en vulnerabilidad frente al Sistema de Justicia Penal y puede influir en ella para la comisión de un hecho criminal. Por otro lado, tampoco es válido señalar, como se afirma en el fallo de estudio, que la Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer -CEDAW- y Las Reglas de Bangkok, como instrumentos internacionales que informan la modificación de los artículos 71 inciso g) y 72 del Código Penal, dan protección a las mujeres “…desde un punto de vista del sexo, y no del género” (sic), como lo sostuvo el a quo . En cuanto a las Reglas de Bangkok, basta con realizar su revisión para verificar lo contrario, ya que aunque las reglas mínimas para el tratamiento de los reclusos se aplican a todos ellos sin discriminación, al haber aumentado la población penal femenina en todo el mundo, adquirió importancia y urgencia la necesidad de aportar más claridad a las consideraciones que deben aplicarse al tratamiento de las reclusas. Esto precisamente fue lo que se reconoció en la invitación que se hizo en la resolución 10/2 del Consejo de Derechos Humanos, de 25 de marzo de 2009, dirigida a los gobiernos, los órganos internacionales y regionales competentes, las instituciones nacionales de Derechos Humanos y las organizaciones no gubernamentales, para que “…dediquen mayor atención a la cuestión de las mujeres y niñas que se encuentran en prisión, incluidas cuestiones relativas a los hijos de las reclusas, con miras a identificar los aspectos y desafíos del problema en función del género y ocuparse de ellos” (el énfasis es suplido). También se estableció que dichas reglas se inspiran en los principios contenidos en diversos tratados y declaraciones de las Naciones Unidas, y por ello “…son compatibles con las disposiciones del derecho internacional en vigor”. Destacando dentro de estas disposiciones las contendidas en la resolución 61/143, de 19 de diciembre de 2006, titulada “Intensificación de los esfuerzos para eliminar todas las formas de violencia contra la mujer”, en donde la Asamblea General instó a los Estados a que “…examinaran, y según procediera, revisaran, modificaran o derogaran todas las leyes, normas, políticas, prácticas y usos que discriminaran a la mujer o que tuvieran efectos discriminatorios en su contra, y garantizaran que las disposiciones de múltiples sistemas jurídicos, cuando existieran, se ajustaran a las obligaciones, los compromisos y los principios internacionales de derechos humanos, en particular el principio de no discriminación; tomaran medidas positivas para hacer frente a las causas estructurales de la violencia contra la mujer y fortalecer las labores de prevención con miras a acabar con las prácticas y normas sociales discriminatorias, en particular respecto de las mujeres que necesitaban atención especial, como las mujeres recluidas en instituciones o detenidas; e impartieran capacitación sobre la igualdad entre los géneros y los derechos de la mujer al personal encargado de velar por el cumplimiento de la ley y los jueces y fomentaran su capacidad”. De modo que, soslayar que dichas reglas se basan, entre otros aspectos, en la diferencia de género de las mujeres, es contradecir la literalidad y contenido de su texto, y la naturaleza jurídica de protección de los Derechos Humanos de su génesis, lo que resulta contrario a la reglas de interpretación normativa. Por su parte, si bien en la Convención CEDAW es usual encontrar referencias al sexo para diferenciar a las mujeres de los hombres, o exponer los fenómenos de discriminación, ello debe entenderse en el contexto social y cultural en que fue redactada (1979), sin que se impida interpretarla, en la actualidad, conforme a los criterios de Derechos Humanos imperantes. Nótese que, incluso, tal normativa así lo permite, al señalar: “ Nada de lo dispuesto en la presente Convención afectará a disposición alguna que sea más conducente al logro de la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres y que pueda formar parte de: a) La legislación de un Estado Parte; o b) Cualquier otra convención, tratado o acuerdo internacional vigente en ese Estado” (artículo 23, CEDAW). Esta interpretación ha sido sostenida también por el Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer de las Naciones Unidas, como encargado de vigilancia de los procesos de aplicación de la mencionada convención, al explicar: “[s]i bien en la Convención solo se menciona la discriminación por motivos de sexo, al interpretar el articulo 1 junto con el párrafo f) del artículo 2 y el párrafo a) del artículo 5 se pone de manifiesto que la Convención abarca la discriminación contra la mujer por motivos de género” (cfr. Recomendación general N° 28, CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 de diciembre de 2010). Esto resulta comprensible, debido a que históricamente las categorías sexo y género han sido utilizadas de forma intercambiable, y es en la actualidad cuando, desde el ámbito social y doctrinal, se ha establecido una diferenciación entre uno y otro. Corolario, en el caso de los tratados internacionales y demás cuerpos normativos nacionales que al momento de su redacción no contemplaban la categoría “género”, es correcto interpretarlos de manera evolutiva (cfr. artículo 29 de la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos, Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados y Opinión Consultiva OC-16/99, párr. 114; Caso de la Masacre de Mapiripán vs. Colombia, párr. 106, y Caso [Nombre3] y niñas vs. Chile. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, párr. 83), entendiendo que la categoría “sexo” comprende también la de “género”, ya que solo así se podría dar contendido al objeto útil de la protección jurídica integral de los Derechos Humanos. Aunado a que, este ejercicio de control de convencionalidad resulta de acatamiento obligatorio para las personas juzgadoras de la República, ya que en todos los casos sometidos a su conocimientos deben realizar un contraste entre las normas internas y los parámetros de convencionalidad, conformado por las convenciones y declaraciones regionales en materia de Derechos Humanos, y la jurisprudencia de la Corte IDH (incluidas las opiniones consultivas). Así lo resolvió la Corte IDH al señalar: “58. La Corte estima necesario, además, recordar que, conforme al derecho internacional, cuando un Estado es parte de un tratado internacional, como la Convención Americana, dicho tratado obliga a todos sus órganos incluidos los poderes judiciales y legislativo, por lo que la violación por parte de alguno de dichos órganos, genera responsabilidad internacional para aquél. Es por tal razón que estima necesario que los diversos órganos del Estado realicen el correspondiente control de convencionalidad, también sobre de la base de lo que señale en ejercicio de su competencia no contenciosa, o consultiva, la que innegablemente comparte con su competencia contenciosa, el propósito del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos, cual es “la protección de los derechos humanos de los seres humanos” (Corte IDH Opinión Consultiva OC-25/18 del 30 de mayo del año 2018. En similar sentido, Sala Constitucional resolución N° 2313-95 de las 16:18 horas del 9 de mayo de 1995 y N° 2014-012703 de las 11:51 horas del 01 de agosto de 2014). Como puede colegirse, los argumentos utilizados por el tribunal de instancia para denegar a las encartadas la aplicación de la norma sustantiva, no encuentran amparo ni en el principio de legalidad ni en la interpretación de los instrumentos internacionales que cita en sus justificaciones, ya que dichas normas no se amparan sobre una discriminación positiva con base en el sexo de la persona, sino en su género. Este mismo criterio, el sexo de las encartadas (masculino), sirvió de base para establecer que no eran destinatarias de las normas cuestionadas (71 inciso g) y 72 del Código Penal), debido a que eran personas transgénero y no mujeres. No cabe duda que este razonamiento resulta discriminatorio y lesivo de la dignidad de las justiciables, protegida por el artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Corte IDH) dejó establecido que: “…la orientación sexual y la identidad de género, así como la expresión de género son categorías protegidas por la Convención. Por ello está proscrita por la Convención cualquier norma, acto o práctica discriminatoria basada en la orientación sexual, identidad de género o expresión de género de la persona. En consecuencia, ninguna norma, decisión o práctica de derecho interno, sea por parte de autoridades estatales o por particulares, pueden disminuir o restringir, de modo alguno, los derechos de una persona a partir de su orientación sexual, su identidad de género y/o su expresión de género” (cfr. CIDH. Opinión Consultiva OC-24/17 del 24 de noviembre de 2017, párrafo 78). En este sentido, como lo define la Corte IDH en la mencionada consulta, citando a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas, un “transgénero o persona trans ” puede definirse “[c]uando la identidad o la expresión de género de una persona es diferente de aquella que típicamente se encuentran asociadas con el sexo asignado al nacer. Las personas trans construyen su identidad independientemente de un tratamiento médico o intervenciones quirúrgicas. El término trans, es un término sombrilla utilizado para describir las diferentes variantes de la identidad de género, cuyo común denominador es la no conformidad entre el sexo asignado al nacer de la persona y la identidad de género que ha sido tradicionalmente asignada a éste. Una persona transgénero o trans puede identificarse con los conceptos de hombre, mujer, hombre trans, mujer trans y persona no binaria, o bien con otros términos como hijra, tercer género, biespiritual, travesti, fa’afafine, queer, transpinoy, muxé, waria y meti. La identidad de género es un concepto diferente de la orientación sexual” (Ibídem, párrafo 32 h). Precisamente, el órgano jurisdiccional reconoce esta identidad de género en las encartadas [[Nombre4] ] y [Nombre [Nombre1]], al señalar en la sentencia: “…son personas que se identifican como mujeres -trans- género, es decir, que a pesar de haber nacido con una biología del sexo masculino no se identifican como tal, lo anterior partiendo de sus datos de identificación así como la misma condición que ellas han admitido y esto, efectivamente es un derecho reconocido” (cfr. folio 216). Es decir, para el a quo ambas sindicadas, por su identidad y expresión de género, eran mujeres, pero, consideró que las normas cuestionadas no se aplicaban en su caso, debido a que: “…el reconocimiento de la condición de vulnerabilidad por una identidad de género femenina no la (sic) convierte en una mujer desde el punto de vista biológico” (cfr. folios 216 y 217). Así, resulta evidente que las personas juzgadoras, en forma contradictoria, primero reconocen la existencia de un derecho humano de las endilgadas a que se les trate dentro del proceso en apego a su identidad y expresión de género (para lo cual incluso aplican los Principios de Yogyakarta, al tratar a las imputadas con sus nombres femeninos), sin embargo, cuando se trata de aplicar una norma que proyecta una posible disminución de la pena en torno a su condición de mujer, es decir, que daría contenido real al derecho al reconocimiento de su identidad de género, recurre a la biología para restarles tal condición, lo cual resulta notoriamente violatorio de los artículos 1.1., 3, 7, 11.2 y 18 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, que consideran como parte integrante de la dignidad humana el garantizar el libre desarrollo de la personalidad, el derecho a la privacidad y el reconocimiento de la personalidad jurídica de las personas. En este mismo sentido, la Corte IDH ha resuelto: “94. En este punto, corresponde recordar que la identidad de género ha sido definida en esta opinión como la vivencia interna e individual del género tal como cada persona la siente, la cual podría corresponder o no con el sexo asignado al momento del nacimiento. Lo anterior, conlleva también a la vivencia personal del cuerpo y otras expresiones de género, como lo son la vestimenta, el modo de hablar y los modales (supra párr. 32.f). En esa línea, para esta Corte, el reconocimiento de la identidad de género se encuentra ligada necesariamente con la idea según la cual el sexo y el género deben ser percibidos como parte de una construcción identitaria que es resultado de la decisión libre y autónoma de cada persona, sin que deba estar sujeta a su genitalidad. 95. De esa forma, el sexo, así como las identidades, las funciones y los atributos construidos socialmente que se atribuye a las diferencias biológicas en torno al sexo asignado al nacer, lejos de constituirse en componentes objetivos e inmutables del estado civil que individualiza a la persona, por ser un hecho de la naturaleza física o biológica, terminan siendo rasgos que dependen de la apreciación subjetiva de quien lo detenta y descansan en una construcción de la identidad de género auto-percibida relacionada con el libre desarrollo de la personalidad, la autodeterminación sexual y el derecho a la vida privada. Por ende, quien decide asumirla, es titular de intereses jurídicamente protegidos, que bajo ningún punto de vista pueden ser objeto de restricciones por el simple hecho de que el conglomerado social no comparte específicos y singulares estilos de vida, a raíz de miedos, estereotipos, prejuicios sociales y morales carentes de fundamentos razonables. Es así que, ante los factores que definen la identidad sexual y de género de una persona, se presenta en la realidad una prelación del factor subjetivo sobre sus caracteres físicos o morfológicos (factor objetivo). En ese sentido, partiendo de la compleja naturaleza humana que lleva a cada persona a desarrollar su propia personalidad con base en la visión particular que respecto de sí mismo tenga, debe darse un carácter preeminente al sexo psicosocial frente al morfológico, a fin de respetar plenamente los derechos de identidad sexual y de género, al ser aspectos que, en mayor medida, definen tanto la visión que la persona tiene frente a sí misma como su proyección ante la sociedad” (cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-24/17 del 24 de noviembre de 2017. El resaltado es suplido). Como se puede colegir, la decisión del a quo, de no aplicar el artículo 71 inciso g) y 72 del Código Penal, para fijar y motivar la sanción penal de las encartadas, se basó en criterios que lesionan los Derechos Humanos, en tanto su género -mujeres trans - no era un obstáculo para interpretar que podían ser destinatarias de la norma, a partir de que debe considerárseles, conforme a su identidad de género, como mujeres. Así queda claro, que al sostener la defensa pública que sus representadas eran mujeres y que estaban en estado de vulnerabilidad, debió ineludiblemente el tribunal de instancia entrar a ponderar fáctica y jurídicamente tales aspectos, para poder determinar si se cumplía, o no, con los restantes requerimientos normativos para ponderar la aplicación de una posible disminución de la sanción penal. Corolario, al no efectuarse ello, se dio un quebranto el principio fundamental de tutela judicial efectiva (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), que solo puede ser subsanado declarando la ineficacia de la imposición de la sanción penal y ordenando la realización de un juicio de reenvío para que se conozca tal extremo del fallo, como así se dispondrá infra. Como anteriormente se explicó, la norma del inciso g del artículo 70 del Código Penal, es una acción afirmativa desde la perspectiva de género, empleado como una medida para acelerar el proceso de igualdad de facto entre hombre y mujer, ya que se reconoce que muchas mujeres, sujetas a mandatos sociales y culturalmente estructurados del cómo deben ser y lo que deben hacer, se encuentran en una condición de disparidad, incluso cuando se someten al Sistema de Justicia Penal. De modo que, siendo que dicha acción positiva no está dispuesta para todas las mujeres, sino solo para aquellas que en razón de su género se encuentra en ese “estado de vulnerabilidad”, tampoco lo sería para una mujer trans por el solo hecho de ser transgénero, como pareciera entenderlo la defensora pública. No cabe duda que las personas trans pueden resultar vulnerables, tanto por la transfobia que existe, como por la violencia de género al que están sometidas a raíz de que no se ajustan, en una sociedad machista, al binario hombre/mujer, desde una perspectiva biológica. De ahí que, para resultar destinataria de la norma, la persona transgénero debe encontrarse en ese estado de vulnerabilidad por la identidad de género femenina con la que se autodetermina y expresa (como un reconocimiento a su personalidad jurídica), por cuanto solo así la acción afirmativa descrita en los artículos 71 inciso g) y 72 del Código Penal, en concordancia con el artículo 4.1 de la CEDAW, tendría el sentido jurídico que se le otorgó como un medio para alcanzar la igualdad real. Aunado a que, para aplicarse las normas de cita y ser considerada una disminución de la sanción penal, no basta con que esta vulnerabilidad de la mujer (incluida la mujer trans) por encontrarse en pobreza, por tener bajo su responsabilidad el cuido y la manutención de familiares dependientes, por discapacidad o por ser víctimas de violencia de género, se acredite, sino que se requiere también demostrar que ese estado de vulnerabilidad “…haya influido en la comisión del hecho punible”. Esta disposición ratifica que dicha acción positiva no está dispuesta para todas las mujeres (sea esta definida por su sexo o identidad de género autodeterminada), como supra se expuso, por lo que será en cada caso concreto donde se deberá acreditar si se presenta o no tal vulnerabilidad y si esta influyó o no en la comisión del hecho criminal. Como acertadamente lo afirma la defensa pública, estos tópicos no fueron tratados en el fallo de estudio, el cual se dedicó a desechar la petición de la defensa realizando una discriminación por sexo que no se infiere de la norma y que, sin duda alguna, resultó contraria a los principios que informan los Derechos Humanos. Así las cosas, no es posible que esta cámara de apelación aplique la norma omitida (artículo 465 del Código Procesal Penal), como requiere la quejosa se haga, sin haberse abordado estos aspectos en el contradictorio y tenerse por acreditados luego de un ejercicio de ponderación de la prueba. En este sentido, se decreta la ineficacia parcial de la sentencia, únicamente en cuanto a la determinación e imposición de la sanción penal y se dispone el juicio de reenvío (conforme a las reglas de cesura que se dispuso para el sub examine) ante el mismo tribunal, para que con una integración diferente proceda a resolver tal extremo del fallo, conforme a Derecho y al principio de no reforma en perjuicio.\"",
  "body_en_text": "III. [...] The request by the public defense that the provisions of Article 71(g) and 72 of the Penal Code be applied to the defendants was rejected by the trial court based on the following reasoning: \"It is noted that both this international regulation and the aforementioned criminal law reform are aimed at providing special protection to women with said condition [vulnerability], from a perspective of sex, and not of gender. The Court is clear that both Ms. [Name [Name1]] and [Name [Name2]] are persons who identify as women -trans- gender, that is, despite having been born with a male biological sex, they do not identify as such, based on their identification data as well as the same condition they have admitted, and this is indeed a recognized right, among other provisions, by the Yogyakarta Principles of November 2006, 'All persons have the right to the enjoyment of all human rights, without discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. All persons have the right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection by the law, without any of the aforementioned discriminations, whether or not the enjoyment of another human right is also affected. The law shall prohibit any such discrimination and shall guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any form of such discrimination. Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity includes any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on sexual orientation or gender identity that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality before the law or equal protection by the law, or the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal basis, of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity may be, and commonly is, compounded by discrimination based on other grounds, including gender, race, age, religion, disability, health status, and economic condition.' These principles, as seen, recognize a series of rights inherent to the dignity of the human person, among them the right to life, to work, to health, rights upon which States have the obligation to take measures to ensure. Our country even went further and formulated a query to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding the LGBTI population, resulting in Advisory Opinion number OC-24-2017, relating to gender identity, equality, and non-discrimination for same-sex couples; within the recitals of the Advisory Opinion, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is clear in indicating that elderly adults, persons with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, and also women, constitute vulnerable populations. It is thus clear that the recognition of the condition of vulnerability due to a female gender identity does not convert her into a woman from a biological point of view, and that the latter have been systematically discriminated against precisely because of their condition as women. It is therefore understood that both are vulnerable populations requiring special protections, but they are not the same type of vulnerable population; therefore, regarding the reform of Articles 71 and 72, this protection is aimed at women from a biological sex perspective and not at transsexual women, whom this Court is very clear must also be subjects of special protections, due to all the discrimination and vulnerability they suffer, but this is not within the purview of this Court, which must resolve in adherence to the principle of legality. On the same subject, Chamber III of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: 'Since although a ground for determining the penalty was added to the legal system, by providing the assessment of the condition of vulnerability that influenced the commission of the punishable act and that the sentenced person be a woman as an element of consideration, it delimited the possible mitigation of the penalty to a sine qua non requirement stipulated in article 72 of the Penal Code' (Resolution 2019-00624 of eleven hours and three minutes of May 17, two thousand nineteen, highlighting is not from the original text). Thus, based on the legal analysis conducted, the Court considers that the reform of Articles 71 and 72 of the Penal Code is not applicable to the specific case being resolved\" (cf. folios 215 to 217. Emphasis supplied).\n\nAs can be seen, the trial court made its decision based on several erroneous premises that, undoubtedly, render the rejection of the defense's request unfounded and contrary to the international and domestic norms protecting Human Rights. One of these premises is concluding that Articles 71(g) and 72 of the Penal Code contain a \"protection [that] is aimed at women from a biological sex perspective\" (sic). This conclusion is contrary to the principle of legality and to correct legal hermeneutics. Thus, based on the literal wording of the norms, numeral 71 describes that: \"The Judge, in a reasoned judgment, shall set the duration of the penalty to be imposed in accordance with the limits indicated for each crime, considering the seriousness of the act and the personality of the participant. // To assess these, the following shall be taken into account: [...] g) That the sentenced person is a woman who is in a state of vulnerability, due to poverty, due to having under her responsibility the care and support of dependent family members, due to disability, or due to being a victim of gender-based violence, when this state has influenced the commission of the act\" (Highlighting is ours). For its part, Article 72 provides: \"When aggravating and mitigating circumstances concur in the same punishable act, the judge shall weigh them by their number and importance, in accordance with the preceding article. // When any of the circumstances provided in subsection g) of the preceding article apply, and the sentenced woman has no criminal record, the trial court may reduce the sanction, even below the minimum amount provided in the criminal definition.\" As is evident, the legislator refers to \"a woman,\" without making a distinction between whether she should be recognized as such based on her sex (\"1. m. Organic condition, male or female, of animals and plants.\" REAL ACADEMIA ESPAÑOLA: Diccionario de la lengua española, 23rd ed., [version 23.3 online]. https://dle.rae.es/sexo?m=form , November 4, 2020) or her gender (\"3. m. Group to which human beings of each sex belong, understood from a sociocultural point of view instead of exclusively biological\" Ibidem, https://dle.rae.es/género?m=form ). However, upon verifying that the legal provision is not established for all women, but only for those \"in a state of vulnerability\" and that this condition would be defined \"by poverty, by having under her responsibility the care and support of dependent family members, by disability, or by being a victim of gender-based violence,\" it is notable that such provisions were established as an affirmative action (positive discrimination) taken by the Costa Rican State to eradicate the discriminatory practices faced by women, as persons subjected to abusive and violent conduct in societies structured around the exercise of patriarchal domination (Articles 1, 3, and 4.1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, in its resolution 34/180, of December 18, 1979). This is because this type of discrimination is a form of violence against women, understood as \"...any action or conduct, based on her gender, that causes death, harm, or physical, sexual, or psychological suffering to women, whether in the public or private sphere\" (Article 1 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, Convention of Belém do Pará approved on September 6, 1994). In this way, from the literal wording of the described norms, the expression \"woman in a state of vulnerability\" does not refer to the woman from the perspective of her sex [In a strict sense, the term \"sex\" refers \"to the biological differences between man and woman,\" to their physiological characteristics, to the \"sum of the biological characteristics that defines the spectrum of humans as women and men,\" or to the \"biological construction that refers to the genetic, hormonal, anatomical, and physiological characteristics on whose basis a person is classified as male or female at birth\" (cf. Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Gender Expression: some relevant terms and standards)], but rather from gender, which turns out to be a social construction that refers \"...to the identities, functions, and attributes socially constructed of woman and man and to the social and cultural meaning attributed to these biological differences\" (Ibidem). This interpretation is not alien to the preamble of bill N° 20300, which allowed the modification of Articles 71 subsection g) and 72 of the Penal Code, as it cites: \"This bill aims to mitigate the effects of social exclusion against women in conflict with the criminal law. It is about expanding the possibilities available to judges when judging women in situations of vulnerability, such as poverty, dependency, or gender-based violence. This is framed within the most modern aspects of criminology, which admit the traditional neglect of a gender perspective in the scientific treatment of the criminogenic problem in women. // Substantive equality between women and men is an aspiration that, as a society, must define the lines towards which to advance. Relationships between people in societies structured around the exercise of power and domination develop in a context that generates inequality, in which many women (as a result of structural mandates on how they should be and what they should do) are at a disadvantage compared to men in all areas of life. It is therefore essential that the Costa Rican State develop the actions required to overcome gender gaps and eradicate the discriminatory practices that it constantly faces [...] Therefore, it is fundamental to incorporate the analysis of the equality approach between women and men, as a key tool for interpreting reality, in this case, assessing the particularities of women sentenced in criminal courts from a comprehensive approach. In that sense, it is important to know in depth the unique aspects of the expression of vulnerability that women face due to their gender condition, since they have historically been at a disadvantage regarding decision-making, access to material, cultural, and symbolic resources. Women who come into contact with the penal system are understood to be in a situation of vulnerability, who, due to cultural and social conditioning, have under their direct responsibility persons with illnesses, minors, elderly adults, among others, such that their detention generates a personal impact on them, their dependents, and, consequently, on society.\" As can be inferred, the biological differences between men and women were not what prevailed in making the modifications to the mentioned articles, as the lower court erroneously maintained, but rather the disadvantages and discrimination faced by women in having to fulfill the functions, roles, or attributes constructed by a patriarchal society, which places them in vulnerability before the Criminal Justice System and may influence them to commit a criminal act. On the other hand, it is also not valid to state, as is affirmed in the ruling under review, that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women -CEDAW- and the Bangkok Rules, as international instruments informing the modification of Articles 71 subsection g) and 72 of the Penal Code, provide protection to women \"...from a perspective of sex, and not of gender\" (sic), as the lower court maintained. Regarding the Bangkok Rules, it suffices to review them to verify the contrary, since although the minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners apply to all of them without discrimination, with the increase in the female prison population worldwide, the need to provide greater clarity on considerations that should apply to the treatment of female prisoners gained importance and urgency. This was precisely what was recognized in the invitation made in Human Rights Council resolution 10/2, of March 25, 2009, addressed to governments, competent international and regional bodies, national Human Rights institutions, and non-governmental organizations, so that they \"...devote greater attention to the issue of women and girls in prison, including issues relating to the children of female prisoners, with a view to identifying the key problems and challenges from a gender perspective and addressing them\" (emphasis supplied). It was also established that these rules are inspired by the principles contained in various United Nations treaties and declarations, and therefore \"...are compatible with the provisions of current international law.\" Highlighting among these provisions those contained in resolution 61/143, of December 19, 2006, titled \"Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women,\" in which the General Assembly urged States to \"...examine, and where appropriate, review, modify, or repeal all laws, regulations, policies, practices, and customs that discriminated against women or had discriminatory effects against them, and ensure that the provisions of multiple legal systems, where they exist, comply with international human rights obligations, commitments, and principles, in particular the principle of non-discrimination; take positive measures to address the structural causes of violence against women and strengthen prevention efforts aimed at ending discriminatory social practices and norms, in particular regarding women who needed special attention, such as women institutionalized or detained; and provide training on gender equality and women's rights to law enforcement personnel and judges and build their capacity.\" Thus, to ignore that these rules are based, among other aspects, on the gender difference of women, contradicts the literal wording and content of its text, and the legal nature of protecting Human Rights in its genesis, which is contrary to the rules of normative interpretation.\n\nFor its part, although in the CEDAW Convention it is usual to find references to sex to differentiate women from men, or to expose phenomena of discrimination, this must be understood in the social and cultural context in which it was drafted (1979), without preventing it from being interpreted, currently, in accordance with prevailing Human Rights criteria. Note that, even, such normative framework allows for this, stating: \"Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provision that is more conducive to the achievement of equality between men and women and that may form part of: a) The legislation of a State Party; or b) Any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force in that State\" (Article 23, CEDAW). This interpretation has also been upheld by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, as the body responsible for monitoring the implementation processes of the aforementioned convention, explaining: \"[a]lthough the Convention only mentions sex-based discrimination, interpreting Article 1 together with Article 2(f) and Article 5(a) reveals that the Convention covers discrimination against women on grounds of gender\" (cf. General Recommendation N° 28, CEDAW/C/GC/28, December 16, 2010). This is understandable, due to the fact that historically the categories sex and gender have been used interchangeably, and it is currently when, from the social and doctrinal field, a differentiation has been established between one and the other. Consequently, in the case of international treaties and other national normative bodies that at the time of their drafting did not contemplate the category \"gender,\" it is correct to interpret them in an evolutionary manner (cf. Article 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, para. 114; Case of the Mapiripán Massacre vs. Colombia, para. 106, and Case of [Name3] and girls vs. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs, para. 83), understanding that the category \"sex\" also encompasses \"gender,\" since only in this way could the useful purpose of comprehensive legal protection of Human Rights be given substance. In addition to this, this exercise of conventionality control is mandatory for the judicial authorities of the Republic, since in all cases submitted to their knowledge they must conduct a contrast between domestic norms and the parameters of conventionality, composed of regional conventions and declarations on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR Court) (including advisory opinions). This was resolved by the IACHR Court stating: \"58. The Court deems it necessary, moreover, to recall that, under international law, when a State is a party to an international treaty, such as the American Convention, said treaty binds all its organs, including the judiciary and legislative branches, so that a violation by any of said organs generates international responsibility for the former. It is for this reason that it deems it necessary for the various State organs to carry out the corresponding conventionality control, also based on what it indicates in the exercise of its non-contentious or advisory jurisdiction, which undeniably shares with its contentious jurisdiction, the purpose of the inter-American system of human rights, which is 'the protection of the human rights of human beings'\" (IACHR Court Advisory Opinion OC-25/18 of May 30, 2018. In a similar sense, Constitutional Chamber resolution N° 2313-95 of 16:18 hours of May 9, 1995 and N° 2014-012703 of 11:51 hours of August 1, 2014).\n\nAs can be gathered, the arguments used by the trial court to deny the defendants the application of the substantive norm find no support either in the principle of legality or in the interpretation of the international instruments cited in its justifications, since these norms are not based on positive discrimination based on the person's sex, but rather on their gender. This same criterion, the sex of the defendants (male), served as the basis for establishing that they were not recipients of the questioned norms (Article 71(g) and 72 of the Penal Code), because they were transgender persons and not women. There is no doubt that this reasoning is discriminatory and injurious to the dignity of the individuals subject to justice, protected by Article 1.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR Court) established that: \"...sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as gender expression, are categories protected by the Convention. Therefore, any discriminatory norm, act, or practice based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression of the person is proscribed by the Convention. Consequently, no domestic norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or private individuals, can diminish or restrict, in any way, the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation, gender identity and/or gender expression\" (cf. IACHR. Advisory Opinion OC-24/17 of November 24, 2017, paragraph 78). In this sense, as defined by the IACHR Court in the mentioned advisory opinion, citing the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, a \"transgender or trans person\" can be defined \"[w]hen a person's gender identity or gender expression is different from that typically associated with the sex assigned at birth. Trans persons construct their identity independently of medical treatment or surgical interventions. The term trans is an umbrella term used to describe the different variants of gender identity, whose common denominator is the non-conformity between the sex assigned at birth to the person and the gender identity that has been traditionally assigned to it. A transgender or trans person may identify with the concepts of man, woman, trans man, trans woman, and non-binary person, or with other terms such as hijra, third gender, two-spirit, travesti, fa'afafine, queer, transpinay, muxé, waria and meti. Gender identity is a different concept from sexual orientation\" (Ibidem, paragraph 32.h). Precisely, the jurisdictional body recognizes this gender identity in the defendants [[Name4]] and [Name [Name1]], when stating in the judgment: \"...are persons who identify as women -trans- gender, that is, despite having been born with a male biological sex, they do not identify as such, based on their identification data as well as the same condition they have admitted, and this is indeed a recognized right\" (cf. folio 216). That is, for the lower court both defendants, due to their gender identity and expression, were women, but it considered that the questioned norms did not apply in their case, because: \"...the recognition of the condition of vulnerability due to a female gender identity does not convert her into a woman from a biological point of view\" (cf. folios 216 and 217). Thus, it is evident that the judges, in a contradictory manner, first recognize the existence of a human right of the accused to be treated within the process in accordance with their gender identity and expression (for which they even apply the Yogyakarta Principles, by addressing the defendants by their female names), however, when it comes to applying a norm that projects a possible reduction of the penalty based on their condition as women, that is, that would give real content to the right to recognition of their gender identity, they resort to biology to diminish this condition, which is notoriously violative of Articles 1.1., 3, 7, 11.2, and 18 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which consider guaranteeing the free development of personality, the right to privacy, and the recognition of the legal personality of individuals as an integral part of human dignity.\n\nIn this same vein, the IACHR Court has resolved: \"94. At this point, it should be recalled that gender identity has been defined in this opinion as the internal and individual experience of gender as each person feels it, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at the time of birth. The foregoing also entails the personal experience of the body and other gender expressions, such as clothing, speech, and mannerisms (supra para. 32.f). Along these lines, for this Court, the recognition of gender identity is necessarily linked to the idea that sex and gender must be perceived as part of an identity construction resulting from the free and autonomous decision of each person, without having to be subject to their genitalia. 95. In this way, sex, as well as the socially constructed identities, functions, and attributes attributed to the biological differences regarding the sex assigned at birth, far from constituting objective and immutable components of the civil status that individualizes the person, as a fact of physical or biological nature, end up being traits that depend on the subjective appreciation of the holder and rest on a construction of self-perceived gender identity related to the free development of personality, sexual self-determination, and the right to private life. Therefore, whoever decides to assume it holds legally protected interests, which under no point of view can be subject to restrictions simply because the social conglomerate does not share specific and singular lifestyles, due to fears, stereotypes, social and moral prejudices lacking reasonable grounds. It is thus that, given the factors defining a person's sexual and gender identity, a prioritization of the subjective factor over their physical or morphological characteristics (objective factor) occurs in reality. In that sense, based on the complex human nature that leads each person to develop their own personality based on the particular vision they have of themselves, a preeminent character must be given to psychosocial sex over morphological sex, in order to fully respect the rights to sexual and gender identity, as these are aspects that, to a greater extent, define both the vision the person has of themselves and their projection before society\" (cf. Advisory Opinion OC-24/17 of November 24, 2017. Highlighting is supplied).\n\nAs can be inferred, the decision of the lower court not to apply Article 71(g) and 72 of the Penal Code to set and reason the criminal sanction of the defendants was based on criteria that violate Human Rights, insofar as their gender -trans women- was not an obstacle to interpreting that they could be recipients of the norm, based on the fact that they must be considered, according to their gender identity, as women. It is thus clear that when the public defense argued that its clients were women and were in a state of vulnerability, the trial court should have inevitably proceeded to weigh these aspects factually and legally, to determine whether or not the remaining normative requirements for considering the application of a possible reduction of the criminal sanction were met. Consequently, by not doing so, the fundamental principle of effective judicial protection (Article 41 of the Political Constitution) was violated, which can only be remedied by declaring the imposition of the criminal sanction ineffective and ordering the holding of a new trial so that this part of the judgment can be heard, as will be ordered below.\n\nAs explained previously, the norm of subsection g of Article 70 of the Penal Code is an affirmative action from a gender perspective, used as a measure to accelerate the process of de facto equality between men and women, since it is recognized that many women, subject to socially and culturally structured mandates about how they should be and what they should do, find themselves in a condition of disparity, even when subjected to the Criminal Justice System. Thus, since said positive action is not established for all women, but only for those who, by reason of their gender, find themselves in that \"state of vulnerability,\" it would also not apply to a trans woman merely for being transgender, as the public defender seems to understand it. There is no doubt that trans persons can be vulnerable, both because of the transphobia that exists, and because of the gender-based violence to which they are subjected as a result of not conforming, in a sexist society, to the male/female binary, from a biological perspective.\n\nTherefore, in order to be a recipient of the rule, the transgender person must find herself in that state of vulnerability due to the female gender identity with which she self-determines and expresses herself (as a recognition of her legal personality), since only in this way would the affirmative action described in articles 71(g) and 72 of the Penal Code (Código Penal), in accordance with article 4.1 of the CEDAW, have the legal meaning granted to it as a means to achieve real equality. Added to this is that, for the cited rules to be applied and to be considered a reduction of the criminal penalty, it is not enough that this vulnerability of the woman (including the trans woman) due to being in poverty, having under her responsibility the care and maintenance of dependent family members, disability, or being a victim of gender-based violence, be accredited, but it is also required to demonstrate that this state of vulnerability “…influenced the commission of the punishable act (hecho punible)”. This provision ratifies that said positive action is not provided for all women (whether defined by their sex or self-determined gender identity), as stated above, so it will be in each specific case where it must be accredited whether or not such vulnerability exists and whether or not it influenced the commission of the criminal act. As the public defense correctly states, these topics were not addressed in the judgment under review, which focused on rejecting the defense's petition by carrying out discrimination based on sex that is not inferred from the rule and that, without a doubt, was contrary to the principles that inform Human Rights. This being the case, it is not possible for this appellate chamber (cámara de apelación) to apply the omitted rule (article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Código Procesal Penal), as the complainant requests be done, without these aspects having been addressed in the adversarial proceedings and taken as accredited after an exercise of weighing the evidence. In this regard, the partial ineffectiveness of the sentence is decreed, only with respect to the determination and imposition of the criminal penalty, and a retrial (juicio de reenvío) is ordered (in accordance with the severance rules that were ordered for the sub examine) before the same court, so that with a different panel it may proceed to resolve this aspect of the judgment, in accordance with the Law and the principle of no reformation in detriment (principio de no reforma en perjuicio).\n\n\"III. [...] The public defense's petition, that the provisions of article 71(g) and 72 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) be applied to the accused, was rejected by the trial court under the following argument: “It is noted that both this international regulation, as well as the aforementioned criminal reform, is aimed at providing special protection to women with said condition [vulnerability], from a point of view of sex, and not of gender. The Court is clear that both Ms. [Name [Name1]] and [Name [Name2]], are persons who identify as women —trans— gender, that is, that despite having been born with a male sex biology they do not identify as such, the foregoing based on their identification data as well as the very condition they have admitted and this is, effectively, a recognized right, among other provisions, the Yogyakarta Principles of November 2006, 'All persons have the right to the enjoyment of all human rights, without discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. All persons have the right to be equal before the law and have the right to equal protection by the law, without any of the mentioned discriminations, whether the enjoyment of another human right is also affected or not. The law shall prohibit all such discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any form of such discrimination. Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity includes any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on sexual orientation or gender identity that has the purpose or result of nullifying or impairing equality before the law or equal protection by the law, or the recognition, or enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity may be and is commonly aggravated by discrimination based on other grounds, including gender, race, age, religion, disability, health status, and economic condition.' These principles, as can be seen, recognize a series of rights inherent to the dignity of the human person, among them the right to life, to work, to health, rights over which States have the obligation to take measures to ensure them. Our country even went further and formulated a query to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, regarding the LGBTI population, resulting in Advisory Opinion number OC-24-2017, relating to gender identity, equality, and non-discrimination for same-sex couples, within the consideranda of the Advisory Opinion, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is clear in indicating that older adults, persons with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, and also women included, constitute vulnerable populations. It is clear then that the recognition of the condition of vulnerability due to a female gender identity does not convert her into a woman from the biological point of view, and that the latter have been, precisely because of their condition as women, systematically discriminated against. It follows then that both are vulnerable populations that require special protections, but they are not the same type of vulnerable population, therefore, regarding the reform of article 71 and 72, this protection is intended for women from a biological sex point of view and not for transsexual women, for whom this Court is very clear that they must also be subject to special protections, due to all the discrimination and vulnerability they suffer, but that is not within the purview of this Court, which must resolve in adherence to the principle of legality. On the same topic, the Third Chamber (Sala III) of the Supreme Court of Justice has clarified: 'Since, although a cause for the mode of setting the penalty was added to the legal system, by providing as an element of consideration the assessment of the condition of vulnerability that has influenced the commission of the punishable act (hecho punible) and that the sentenced person be a woman, it delimited the possible attenuation of the penalty to a sine qua non requirement stipulating in ordinal 72 of the Penal Code (Código Penal)' (Resolution 2019-00624 of eleven hours and three minutes of May seventeenth, two thousand nineteen, the highlighting is not from the original text). Thus, based on the legal analysis carried out, the Court considers that the reform of articles 71 and 72 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) is not applicable to the specific case being resolved” (cf. folios 215 to 217. The emphasis is supplied). As can be seen, the trial court made its decision based on several erroneous premises that, undoubtedly, render the rejection of the defense's petition unfounded and contrary to international and domestic rules that protect Human Rights. One of these premises is to conclude that articles 71(g) and 72 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) contain a 'protection [that] is intended for women from a biological sex point of view' (sic). This conclusion is contrary to the principle of legality and to a correct legal hermeneutics. Thus, starting from the literal wording of the rules, numeral 71 describes that: 'The Judge, in a reasoned judgment, shall determine the duration of the penalty to be imposed in accordance with the limits indicated for each crime, taking into account the seriousness of the act and the personality of the participant. // To assess them, the following shall be taken into account: […] g) That the sentenced person be a woman who finds herself in a state of vulnerability, due to poverty, having under her responsibility the care and maintenance of dependent family members, disability, or being a victim of gender-based violence, when that state has influenced the commission of the act' (The highlighting is our own). Meanwhile, article 72 provides: 'When aggravating and mitigating circumstances concur in the same punishable act (hecho punible), the judge shall assess them by their number and importance, in accordance with the preceding article. // When any of the circumstances provided in subsection g) of the preceding article concur, and the sentenced woman has no criminal record, the trial court may reduce the penalty, even below the minimum amount provided in the criminal type (tipo penal)'. As is evident, the legislator refers to 'a woman', without making a distinction as to whether she must be recognized as such based on her sex ('1. m. Organic condition, male or female, of animals and plants'. REAL ACADEMIA ESPAÑOLA: Diccionario de la lengua española, 23rd ed., [version 23.3 online]. https://dle.rae.es/sexo?m=form , November 4, 2020) or her gender ('3. m. Group to which human beings of each sex belong, understood from a sociocultural point of view instead of exclusively biological' Ibídem, https://dle.rae.es/género?m=form ). However, upon verifying that the legal provision is not provided for all women, but only for those 'in a state of vulnerability' and that this condition would be defined 'by poverty, having under her responsibility the care and maintenance of dependent family members, disability, or being a victim of gender-based violence', it is notorious that such provisions were arranged as an affirmative action (positive discrimination) that the Costa Rican State undertook to eradicate discriminatory practices faced by women, as persons subjected to abusive and violent conduct in societies structured based on the exercise of patriarchal domination (articles 1, 3, and 4.1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 34/180, of December 18, 1979). This is because this type of discrimination is a type of violence against women, understood as '…any action or conduct, based on her gender, that causes death, harm, or physical, sexual, or psychological suffering to women, whether in the public or private sphere' (article 1 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, Convention of Belem Do Pará approved on September 6, 1994). Thus, from the literal wording of the described rules, the expression 'woman in a state of vulnerability' does not refer to the woman from the perspective of her sex [In a strict sense, the term 'sex' refers 'to the biological differences between man and woman', to their physiological characteristics, to the 'sum of the biological characteristics that defines the spectrum of humans as women and men', or to the 'biological construction that refers to the genetic, hormonal, anatomical, and physiological characteristics on the basis of which one is classified as male or female at birth' (cf. Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Gender Expression: some relevant terms and standards)], but rather from gender, which turns out to be a social construction that refers '…to the socially constructed identities, functions, and attributes of woman and man and to the social and cultural meaning attributed to those biological differences' (Ibídem). This interpretation is not foreign to the explanatory statement (exposición de motivos) of bill N° 20300, which allowed the modification of articles 71(g) and 72 of the Penal Code (Código Penal), since it cites: 'This bill aims to alleviate the impacts of social exclusion against women in conflict with the criminal law. It seeks to expand the possibilities available to judges when judging women in situations of vulnerability, such as poverty, dependency, or gender-based violence. This falls within the most modern strands of criminology, which admit the traditional neglect of a gender perspective in the scientific treatment of the criminogenic problem in women. // Substantive equality between women and men is an aspiration that, as a society, must define the lines along which to advance. Relations between people in societies structured based on the exercise of power and domination unfold in a context that generates inequality, in which many women (as a result of structural mandates on how they should be and what they should do) find themselves at a disadvantage compared to men in all areas of life. It is therefore essential that the Costa Rican State develop the required actions to overcome gender gaps and eradicate the discriminatory practices it constantly faces […] Therefore, it is fundamental to incorporate the analysis of the equality approach between women and men as a key tool to interpret reality, in this case, to assess the particularities of women sentenced in criminal courts from a comprehensive approach. In this sense, it is important to know in depth the particular edges that the expression of vulnerability faced by women due to their gender condition has, since historically they have been at a disadvantage regarding decision-making, access to material, cultural, and symbolic resources. Women are understood to be in a situation of vulnerability who come into contact with the penal system, who, due to cultural and social conditioning, have under their direct responsibility persons with illnesses, minors, older adults, among others, such that their detention generates a personal impact on them, their dependents, and, consequently, on society'. As can be inferred, the biological differences between man and woman were not what prevailed in making the modifications to the mentioned articles, as the a quo erroneously maintained, but rather the disadvantages and discrimination faced by women in having to fulfill the functions, roles, or attributes constructed by a patriarchal society, which places them in vulnerability before the Criminal Justice System and can influence them in the commission of a criminal act. On the other hand, it is not valid to point out, as stated in the judgment under review, that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women -CEDAW- and the Bangkok Rules, as international instruments that inform the modification of articles 71(g) and 72 of the Penal Code (Código Penal), give protection to women '…from a point of view of sex, and not of gender' (sic), as the a quo maintained. Regarding the Bangkok Rules, a simple review is enough to verify the opposite, because although the minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners apply to all of them without discrimination, the increase in the female prison population worldwide made the need to provide more clarity on the considerations that should apply to the treatment of female prisoners important and urgent. This was precisely what was recognized in the invitation made in resolution 10/2 of the Human Rights Council, of March 25, 2009, addressed to governments, competent international and regional bodies, national Human Rights institutions, and non-governmental organizations, to '…devote greater attention to the issue of women and girls in prison, including issues relating to the children of female prisoners, with a view to identifying the aspects and challenges of the problem based on gender and addressing them' (the emphasis is supplied). It was also established that these rules are inspired by the principles contained in various United Nations treaties and declarations, and therefore '…are compatible with the provisions of international law in force'. Highlighting among these provisions those contained in resolution 61/143, of December 19, 2006, entitled 'Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women', in which the General Assembly urged States to '…examine, and where appropriate, review, modify, or repeal all laws, regulations, policies, practices, and customs that discriminate against women or have discriminatory effects against them, and ensure that the provisions of multiple legal systems, where they exist, comply with international human rights obligations, commitments, and principles, particularly the principle of non-discrimination; take positive measures to address the structural causes of violence against women and strengthen prevention efforts with a view to ending discriminatory social practices and norms, particularly regarding women who need special attention, such as women confined in institutions or detained; and provide training on gender equality and women's rights to law enforcement personnel and judges and strengthen their capacity'. Therefore, ignoring that these rules are based, among other aspects, on the gender difference of women, is to contradict the literal wording and content of their text, and the legal nature of the Human Rights protection of their genesis, which is contrary to the rules of normative interpretation. For its part, although in the CEDAW Convention it is usual to find references to sex to differentiate women from men, or to expose phenomena of discrimination, this must be understood in the social and cultural context in which it was drafted (1979), without preventing its interpretation, currently, in accordance with prevailing Human Rights criteria. Note that, even, such regulation allows this, by stating: 'Nothing in this Convention shall affect any provision that is more conducive to the achievement of equality between men and women and which may form part of: a) The legislation of a State Party; or b) Any other international convention, treaty, or agreement in force in that State' (article 23, CEDAW). This interpretation has also been sustained by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in charge of monitoring the application processes of the mentioned convention, when explaining: '[w]hile the Convention only mentions sex-based discrimination, interpreting article 1 together with paragraph (f) of article 2 and paragraph (a) of article 5 reveals that the Convention covers gender-based discrimination against women' (cf. General Recommendation No. 28, CEDAW/C/GC/28, December 16, 2010). This is understandable, because historically the categories sex and gender have been used interchangeably, and it is currently when, from the social and doctrinal scope, a differentiation between one and the other has been established. Corollary, in the case of international treaties and other national normative bodies that at the time of their drafting did not contemplate the category 'gender', it is correct to interpret them in an evolutive manner (cf. article 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, para. 114; Case of the Mapiripán Massacre vs. Colombia, para. 106, and Case [Name3] and girls vs. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs, para. 83), understanding that the category 'sex' also comprises that of 'gender', since only in this way could the useful objective of the comprehensive legal protection of Human Rights be given content. In addition to this, this exercise of conventionality control is of mandatory compliance for the adjudicators of the Republic, since in all cases submitted to their knowledge they must carry out a contrast between domestic rules and conventionality parameters, composed of regional conventions and declarations on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) (including advisory opinions). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) resolved this by stating: '58. The Court also deems it necessary to recall that, under international law, when a State is a party to an international treaty, such as the American Convention, said treaty obligates all its organs, including the judicial and legislative branches, so that a violation by any of said organs generates international responsibility for that State. It is for this reason that it deems it necessary for the various State organs to carry out the corresponding conventionality control, also based on what it indicates in the exercise of its non-contencious, or advisory, jurisdiction, which undeniably shares with its contentious jurisdiction the purpose of the Inter-American human rights system, which is 'the protection of the human rights of human beings'' (Corte IDH Advisory Opinion OC-25/18 of May 30, 2018. In a similar sense, Constitutional Chamber resolution N° 2313-95 of 16:18 hours of May 9, 1995 and N° 2014-012703 of 11:51 hours of August 1, 2014). As can be inferred, the arguments used by the trial court to deny the defendants the application of the substantive rule find no support either in the principle of legality or in the interpretation of the international instruments cited in its justifications, since said rules are not based on a positive discrimination based on the sex of the person, but on their gender. This same criterion, the sex of the defendants (male), served as the basis for establishing that they were not recipients of the questioned rules (71(g) and 72 of the Penal Code, Código Penal), because they were transgender persons and not women. There is no doubt that this reasoning is discriminatory and harmful to the dignity of the defendants, protected by article 1.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) established that: '…sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as gender expression, are categories protected by the Convention. Therefore, any discriminatory rule, act, or practice based on the sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression of the person is proscribed by the Convention.'\n\nConsequently, no norm, decision, or practice of domestic law, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, may in any way diminish or restrict the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation, gender identity, and/or gender expression\" (cf. IACHR. Advisory Opinion OC-24/17 of November 24, 2017, paragraph 78). In this regard, as defined by the I/A Court H.R. in the aforementioned advisory opinion, citing the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner, a \"transgender or trans person\" can be defined \"[w]hen a person's gender identity or expression is different from that typically associated with the sex assigned at birth. Trans people construct their identity independently of medical treatment or surgical interventions. The term trans is an umbrella term used to describe the different variants of gender identity, whose common denominator is the non-conformity between the sex assigned at birth of the person and the gender identity that has been traditionally assigned to it. A transgender or trans person may identify with the concepts of man, woman, trans man, trans woman and non-binary person, or with other terms such as hijra, third gender, two-spirit, travesti, fa’afafine, queer, transpinoy, muxé, waria and meti. Gender identity is a different concept from sexual orientation\" (Ibidem, paragraph 32 h). Precisely, the lower court (órgano jurisdiccional) recognizes this gender identity in the accused [\\[Name4\\]  ] and [Name [Name1]], by stating in the judgment: \"…they are persons who identify as women -trans- gender, that is, that despite having been born with a male biological sex they do not identify as such, the foregoing based on their identification data as well as the same condition they have admitted and this, indeed, is a recognized right\" (cf. folio 216). That is, for the lower court (a quo) both defendants, by their gender identity and expression, were women, but it considered that the challenged norms did not apply in their case, because: \"…the recognition of the condition of vulnerability due to a female gender identity does not (sic) convert her into a woman from a biological point of view\" (cf. folios 216 and 217). Thus, it is evident that the judging persons, in a contradictory manner, first recognize the existence of a human right of the accused to be treated within the process in adherence to their gender identity and expression (for which they even apply the Yogyakarta Principles, by treating the accused with their feminine names), however, when it comes to applying a norm that projects a possible reduction of the penalty based on their condition as women, that is, that would give real content to the right to recognition of their gender identity, they resort to biology to subtract such condition, which is notoriously violative of Articles 1.1, 3, 7, 11.2, and 18 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which consider as an integral part of human dignity the guarantee of the free development of personality, the right to privacy, and the recognition of the legal personality of persons. In this same vein, the I/A Court H.R. has resolved: \"94. At this point, it is worth recalling that gender identity has been defined in this opinion as the internal and individual experience of gender as each person feels it, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth. The foregoing also entails the personal experience of the body and other expressions of gender, such as dress, speech, and mannerisms (supra para. 32.f). In this line, for this Court, the recognition of gender identity is necessarily linked to the idea according to which sex and gender must be perceived as part of an identity construction that is the result of the free and autonomous decision of each person, without it having to be subject to their genitalia. 95. In this way, sex, as well as the socially constructed identities, functions, and attributes that are attributed to biological differences around sex assigned at birth, far from constituting objective and immutable components of the civil status that individualizes the person, for being a fact of physical or biological nature, end up being traits that depend on the subjective appreciation of the person who holds it and rest on a construction of self-perceived gender identity related to the free development of personality, sexual self-determination, and the right to private life. Therefore, whoever decides to assume it, is the holder of legally protected interests, which under no point of view can be subject to restrictions by the simple fact that the social conglomerate does not share specific and singular lifestyles, as a result of fears, stereotypes, social and moral prejudices lacking reasonable foundations. It is so that, before the factors that define the sexual and gender identity of a person, a prelation of the subjective factor over its physical or morphological characteristics (objective factor) occurs in reality. In that sense, based on the complex human nature that leads each person to develop their own personality based on the particular vision they have of themselves, a preeminent character must be given to the psychosocial sex over the morphological sex, in order to fully respect the rights of sexual identity and gender, as these are aspects that, to a greater extent, define both the vision that the person has of themselves and their projection before society\" (cf. Advisory Opinion OC-24/17 of November 24, 2017. The highlighting is supplied). As can be inferred, the decision of the lower court (a quo), not to apply Article 71 subparagraph g) and 72 of the Penal Code, to set and state the reasons for the penal sanction of the accused, was based on criteria that injure Human Rights, insofar as their gender -trans women- was not an obstacle to interpreting that they could be recipients of the norm, starting from the point that they must be considered, according to their gender identity, as women. Thus, it is clear that, when the public defender maintained that her clients were women and were in a state of vulnerability (estado de vulnerabilidad), the trial court should have inevitably weighed such aspects factually and legally, in order to determine whether or not the remaining normative requirements were met to consider the application of a possible reduction of the penal sanction. Corollary, by not doing so, a breach of the fundamental principle of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) occurred (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), which can only be remedied by declaring the ineffectiveness of the imposition of the penal sanction and ordering a remand hearing (juicio de reenvío) so that this part of the ruling is heard, as will be ordered infra. As previously explained, the norm of subparagraph g of Article 70 of the Penal Code is an affirmative action from a gender perspective, used as a measure to accelerate the process of de facto equality between men and women, since it is recognized that many women, subject to socially and culturally structured mandates of how they should be and what they should do, find themselves in a condition of disparity, even when they are subject to the Criminal Justice System. So, given that said positive action is not provided for all women, but only for those who, by reason of their gender, find themselves in that \"state of vulnerability\", it would not be so either for a trans woman just for the mere fact of being transgender, as the public defender seemed to understand it. There is no doubt that trans persons can be vulnerable, both because of the transphobia that exists, and because of the gender-based violence to which they are subjected as a result of not conforming, in a machista society, to the man/woman binary, from a biological perspective. Hence, in order to be a recipient of the norm, the transgender person must find herself in that state of vulnerability by the female gender identity with which she self-identifies and expresses (as a recognition of her legal personality), because only in this way would the affirmative action described in Articles 71 subparagraph g) and 72 of the Penal Code, in accordance with Article 4.1 of the CEDAW,  have the legal sense that was granted to it as a means to achieve real equality. In addition to the fact that, for the cited norms to apply and a reduction of the penal sanction to be considered, it is not enough for this vulnerability of the woman (including the trans woman) due to being in poverty, for having under her responsibility the care and maintenance of dependent family members, for disability, or for being a victim of gender violence, to be accredited, but it is also required to demonstrate that this state of vulnerability \"…influenced the commission of the punishable act.\" This provision ratifies that said positive action is not provided for all women (whether defined by their sex or self-determined gender identity), as was stated supra, so it will be in each specific case where it must be proven whether or not such vulnerability is present and whether or not it influenced the commission of the criminal act. As the public defender correctly states, these topics were not addressed in the ruling under study, which focused on dismissing the defense's request by carrying out discrimination based on sex that is not inferred from the norm and which, without a doubt, was contrary to the principles that inform Human Rights. This being so, it is not possible for this appellate chamber to apply the omitted norm (Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code), as the complainant requires it to do, without these aspects having been addressed in the adversarial proceeding and taken as accredited after an exercise of weighing the evidence. In this sense, the partial ineffectiveness of the judgment is decreed, solely regarding the determination and imposition of the penal sanction, and a remand hearing is ordered (in accordance with the rules of bifurcation (cesura) that were provided for the sub examine) before the same court, so that with a different integration it may proceed to resolve this part of the ruling, in accordance with Law and the principle of non-reformation in detriment.\"\n\nIt is clear then that <span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">the recognition of the condition of vulnerability due to a female gender identity does not make her a woman from a biological point of view, and that the latter have been systematically discriminated against precisely because of their condition as women.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> It follows that both are vulnerable populations requiring special protections, but they are not the same type of vulnerable population, </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">therefore, regarding the reform of Article 71 and 72, this protection is intended for women from the point of view of biological sex and not for transsexual women, whom this Court is very clear must also be subjects of special protections, due to all the discrimination and vulnerability they suffer, but that is not within the purview of this Court, which must rule in accordance with the principle of legality</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">. On the same subject, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: \"Since, although one of the grounds for determining the manner of fixing the penalty was added to the legal system, by establishing as an element of consideration the assessment of the condition of vulnerability that influenced the commission of the punishable act and that the sentenced person is a woman, it delimited the potential mitigation of the penalty to a sine qua non requirement stipulated in Article 72 of the Penal Code\" (Resolution 2019-00624 of eleven hours and three minutes of May seventeenth, two thousand nineteen, the highlighting is not from the original text). Thus, from the legal analysis carried out, the Court considers that the reform of Article 71 and 72 of the Penal Code is not applicable to the specific case being resolved</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” (cf. folios 215 to 217. Emphasis supplied). As can be seen, the trial court made its decision based on several erroneous premises that, without a doubt, render the rejection of the defense's request unfounded and contrary to the international and domestic norms that protect Human Rights. One of these premises is concluding that Articles 71 g) and 72 of the Penal Code contain a “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">protection</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> [that] </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">is intended for women from the point of view of biological sex</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” (sic). This conclusion is contrary to the principle of legality and to a correct legal hermeneutics. Thus, starting from the literal wording of the norms, numeral 71 describes that: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">The Judge, in a reasoned judgment, shall fix the duration of the penalty to be imposed in accordance with the limits set for each crime, taking into account the gravity of the act and the personality of the participant. // To assess them, the following shall be taken into account: […] g) That the sentenced person is </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">a woman</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> who is in a state of vulnerability, due to poverty, having under her responsibility the care and maintenance of dependent family members, disability, or being a victim of gender-based violence, when that state has influenced the commission of the act</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” (Highlighting is ours). For its part, Article 72 states: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">When aggravating and mitigating circumstances concur in the same punishable act, the judge shall assess them by their number and importance, in accordance with the previous article. // When any of the circumstances provided for in subsection g) of the previous article concur, and the sentenced woman has no prior criminal record, the trial court may reduce the sanction, even below the minimum amount provided for in the criminal type</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">”. As is evident, the legislator refers to “ </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">a woman</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">”, without making a distinction as to whether she should be recognized as such based on her sex (“</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">1. m. Organic condition, masculine or feminine, of animals and plants</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">”. REAL ACADEMIA ESPAÑOLA:</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> Diccionario de la lengua española</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, 23rd ed., [version 23.3 online].</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><a href=\"https://dle.rae.es/sexo?m=form\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; background-color:#ffffff\">https://dle.rae.es/sexo?m=form</span></a><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, November 4, 2020) or her gender (“ </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">3. m. Group to which human beings of each sex belong, understood from a sociocultural rather than an exclusively biological point of view</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Ibidem</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, </span><a href=\"https://dle.rae.es/género?m=form\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; background-color:#ffffff\">https://dle.rae.es/género?m=form</span></a><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">). However, upon verifying that the legal provision is not established for all women, but only for those “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">in a state of vulnerability” </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">and that this condition is defined </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“by poverty, having under their responsibility the care and maintenance of dependent family members, disability, or being a victim of gender-based violence</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">”, it is notorious that such provisions were established as an affirmative action (positive discrimination) taken by the Costa Rican State to eradicate the discriminatory practices faced by women, as persons subjected to abusive and violent conduct in societies structured around the exercise of patriarchal dominance (Articles 1, 3, and 4.1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 34/180, of December 18, 1979). This is because this type of discrimination is a type of violence against women, understood as “…</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">any action or conduct, based on her gender, that causes death, harm, or physical, sexual, or psychological suffering to the woman, whether in the public or private sphere</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” (Article 1 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, Convention </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">of Belém do Pará</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> approved on September 6, 1994). Thus, from the literal wording of the described norms, the expression “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">woman in a state of vulnerability</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” does not refer to woman from the perspective of her sex [In a strict sense, the term “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">sex</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” refers “ </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">to the biological differences between man and woman</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">”, to their physiological characteristics, to the “ </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">sum of the biological characteristics that defines the spectrum of human persons as women and men</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">”, or to the “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">biological construction that refers to the genetic, hormonal, anatomical, and physiological characteristics on the basis of which a person is classified as male or female at birth</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” (cf. Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Gender Expression: Some Relevant Terms and Standards)], but rather from gender, which is a social construction that refers </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“…to the socially constructed identities, functions, and attributes of woman and man and to the social and cultural meaning attributed to these biological differences</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” ( </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Ibidem</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">). This interpretation is not alien to the explanatory memorandum of Bill No. 20300, which allowed the modification of Articles 71 subsection g) and 72 of the Penal Code, as it states: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">This bill aims to alleviate the onslaughts of social exclusion against women in conflict with the criminal law. It seeks to expand the possibilities available to judges when judging women in situations of vulnerability, such as poverty, dependency, or gender-based violence.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> This is framed within the most modern trends in criminology, which admit the traditional neglect of a gender perspective in the scientific treatment of the criminogenic problem in women. // Substantive equality between women and men is an aspiration that, as a society, must define the lines along which we must advance.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> Relations between people in societies structured around the exercise of power of dominance unfold in a context that generates inequality, in which many women (as a result of structural mandates on how they should be and what they should do) find themselves at a disadvantage compared to men in all spheres of life. That is why it is essential that the Costa Rican State develop the required actions to overcome gender gaps and eradicate the discriminatory practices it constantly faces […] Therefore, it is fundamental to incorporate the analysis of the equality approach between women and men as a key tool to interpret reality, in this case, to assess the particularities of women sentenced in criminal courts from a comprehensive approach. In this sense, it is important to know in depth the particular aspects of the expression of vulnerability faced by women due to their gender condition, since historically they have been at a disadvantage regarding decision-making, access to material, cultural, and symbolic resources. Women who come into contact with the penal system are understood to be in a situation of vulnerability when, due to cultural and social conditioning, they have under their direct responsibility persons with illnesses, minors, older adults, among others, such that their detention generates a personal impact on them, their dependents, and, therefore, on society</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">”. As can be deduced, the biological differences between man and woman were not what prevailed in making the modifications to the mentioned articles, as erroneously held by the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">a quo</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> court, but rather the disadvantages and discrimination faced by women when having to fulfill the functions, roles, or attributes constructed by a patriarchal society, which places them in vulnerability before the Criminal Justice System and may influence them in the commission of a criminal act. On the other hand, it is also not valid to state, as affirmed in the judgment under study, that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women -CEDAW- and the Bangkok Rules, as international instruments informing the modification of Articles 71 subsection g) and 72 of the Penal Code, provide protection to women </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“…from the point of view of sex, and not of gender”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> (sic), as held by the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">a quo</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> court. Regarding the Bangkok Rules, it suffices to review them to verify the opposite, because although the minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners apply to all of them without discrimination, with the increase in the female prison population worldwide, the need to provide more clarity to the considerations that must be applied to the treatment of female prisoners gained importance and urgency. This was precisely what was recognized in the invitation made in Human Rights Council resolution 10/2 of March 25, 2009, addressed to governments, relevant international and regional bodies, national Human Rights institutions, and non-governmental organizations, so that they </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“…pay greater attention to the issue of women and girls in prison, including issues relating to the children of female prisoners, with a view to identifying the aspects and challenges of the problem </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">based on gender</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> and addressing them</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” (emphasis supplied). It was also established that these rules are inspired by the principles contained in various United Nations treaties and declarations, and therefore </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“…are compatible with the provisions of current international law</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">”. Noteworthy among these provisions are those contained in resolution 61/143 of December 19, 2006, entitled “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">”, in which the General Assembly urged States to </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“…examine, and, as appropriate, review, amend or repeal all laws, regulations, policies, practices and customs that discriminated against women or had a discriminatory effect against them, and ensure that the provisions of multiple legal systems, where they existed, complied with international human rights obligations, commitments and principles, in particular the principle of non-discrimination; take positive measures to address the structural causes of violence against women and strengthen prevention efforts with a view to ending discriminatory social practices and norms, in particular with regard to women who needed special attention, such as women in institutions or in detention; and provide training on gender equality and women's rights to law enforcement personnel and judges and build their capacity”.</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Therefore, to overlook that these rules are based, among other aspects, on the gender difference of women, contradicts the literal wording and content of their text, and the juridical nature of the protection of Human Rights of their genesis, which is contrary to the rules of normative interpretation. For its part, although in the CEDAW Convention it is common to find references to sex to differentiate women from men, or to expose phenomena of discrimination, this must be understood in the social and cultural context in which it was drafted (1979), without preventing its interpretation, at present, in accordance with the prevailing Human Rights criteria. Note that, even, such regulation allows this when stating: “ </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provision that is more conducive to the achievement of equality between men and women and which may be contained in: (a) The legislation of a State Party; or (b) Any other convention, treaty or international agreement in force in that State</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” (Article 23, CEDAW). This interpretation has also been sustained by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, as the body responsible for monitoring the application processes of the mentioned convention, explaining: “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">[a]lthough the Convention only mentions discrimination on the basis of sex, interpreting Article 1 together with paragraph f) of Article 2 and paragraph a) of Article 5 reveals that the Convention covers discrimination against women on the grounds of gender</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">” (cf. General Recommendation No. 28, CEDAW/C/GC/28, December 16, 2010). This is understandable, because historically the categories sex and gender have been used interchangeably, and it is currently when, from the social and doctrinal sphere, a differentiation has been established between them. Corollary, in the case of international treaties and other national normative bodies that at the time of their drafting did not contemplate the category “gender”, it is correct to interpret them in an </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">evolutionary manner</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> (cf. Article 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, para. 114; Case of the Mapiripán Massacre vs. Colombia, para. 106, and Case [Name3]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">  </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">and girls vs. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs, para. 83), understanding that the category “sex” also comprises that of “gender”, since only thus can content be given to the useful purpose of the comprehensive juridical protection of Human Rights. In addition to the fact that this conventionality control exercise is mandatory for the judges of the Republic, given that in all cases submitted to their knowledge, they must contrast domestic norms with the parameters of conventionality, consisting of regional conventions and declarations on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence of the IACHR Court (including advisory opinions). This was resolved by the IACHR Court, stating: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“58. The Court deems it necessary, moreover, to recall that, under international law, when a State is a party to an international treaty, such as the American Convention, that treaty is binding on all its organs, including the judicial and legislative branches, so that a violation by any of these organs generates international responsibility for that State.</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> </span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">It is for this reason that it considers it necessary for the various State organs to carry out the corresponding conventionality control, also on the basis of what is indicated in the exercise of its non-contentious or advisory competence,</span><span style=\"font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">which undeniably shares with its contentious competence the purpose of the inter-American human rights system, which is “the protection of the human rights of human beings”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> (IACHR Court Advisory Opinion OC-25/18 of May 30, 2018. In a similar vein, Constitutional Chamber Resolution No. 2313-95 at 16:18 hours on May 9, 1995, and No. 2014-012703 at 11:51 hours on August 1, 2014). As can be deduced, the arguments used by the trial court to deny the defendants the application of the substantive norm find no support either in the principle of legality or in the interpretation of the international instruments it cites in its justifications, because these norms are not based on positive discrimination based on the person's sex, but on their gender. This same criterion, the sex of the defendants (male), served as the basis to establish that they were not beneficiaries of the norms in question (71 subsection g) and 72 of the Penal Code), because they were transgender persons and not women. There is no doubt that this reasoning is discriminatory and injurious to the dignity of the defendants, protected by Article 1.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR Court) established that: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“…sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as gender expression, are categories protected by the Convention. Therefore, any norm, act, or discriminatory practice based on a person's sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression is proscribed by the Convention. Consequently, no norm, decision, or practice of domestic law, whether by state authorities or by individuals, may diminish or restrict, in any way, the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation, gender identity, and/or gender expression”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> (cf. IACHR. Advisory Opinion OC-24/17 of November 24, 2017, paragraph 78). In this sense, as defined by the IACHR Court in the mentioned advisory opinion, citing the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, a “</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">transgender or trans person</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> ” can be defined </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“[w]hen a person's gender identity or expression is different from that typically associated with the sex assigned at birth. Trans persons construct their identity independently of medical treatment or surgical interventions. The term trans is an umbrella term used to describe the different variants of gender identity, whose common denominator is the non-conformity between the sex assigned at birth of the person and the gender identity that has been traditionally assigned to it. A transgender or trans person may identify with the concepts of man, woman, trans man, trans woman, and non-binary person, or with other terms such as hijra, third gender, two-spirit, travesti, fa’afafine, queer, transpinoy, muxé, waria, and meti. Gender identity is a concept different from sexual orientation” </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial\\\">(Ibidem, paragraph 32 h). Precisely, the jurisdictional organ recognizes this gender identity in the defendants [[Name4]</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\\\">  </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial\\\">] and [Name [Name1]], when stating in the judgment: </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\\\">“…they are persons who identify as women -trans- gender, that is, although born with a male biological sex they do not identify as such, the foregoing based on their identification data as well as the very condition they have admitted and this, indeed, is a recognized right</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial\\\">” (cf. folio 216). That is, for the </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\\\">a quo</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial\\\"> court, both defendants, due to their gender identity and expression, </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\\\">were women</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial\\\">, but it considered that the norms in question did not apply in their case, because: “</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\\\">…the recognition of the condition of vulnerability due to a female gender identity does not [sic] make her a woman from a biological point of view</span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial\\\">” (cf. folios 216 and 217). Thus, it is evident that the judging persons, in a contradictory manner, first recognize the existence of a human right of the accused to be treated within the process in accordance with their gender identity and expression (for which they even apply the Yogyakarta Principles, treating the defendants by their female names), yet, when it comes to applying a norm that projects a possible reduction of the penalty regarding their condition as women, that is, one that would give real content to the right to the recognition of their gender identity, they resort to biology to take away such condition, which is notoriously violative of Articles 1.1., 3, 7, 11.2, and 18 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which consider guaranteeing the free development of personality, the right to privacy, and the recognition of the legal personality of persons as an integral part of human dignity. In this same sense, the IACHR Court has resolved: </span><span style=\\\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\\\">“94. At this point, it is pertinent to recall that gender identity has been defined in this opinion as the internal and individual experience of gender as each person feels it, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth. The foregoing also entails the personal experience of the body and other expressions of gender, such as dress, speech, and mannerisms (supra para. 32.f). In this line, for this Court, the recognition of gender identity is necessarily linked to the idea that sex and gender must be perceived as part of an identity construction that is the result of the free and autonomous decision of each person, without having to be subject to their genitalia. 95. In this way, sex, as well as the identities, functions, and socially constructed attributes attributed to biological differences around the sex assigned at birth, far from constituting objective and immutable components of the civil status that individualizes a person, for being a fact of physical or biological nature, end up being traits that depend on the subjective appreciation of the person who holds them and rest on a construction of self-perceived gender identity related to the free development of personality, sexual self-determination, and the right to private life. Therefore, whoever decides to assume it, is the holder of legally protected interests, which under no point of view can be subject to restrictions for the simple fact that the social conglomerate does not share specific and singular lifestyles, because of fears, stereotypes, social and moral prejudices lacking reasonable foundations. Thus, in the face of the factors that define a person's sexual and gender identity, a prevalence of the subjective factor over their physical or morphological characters (objective factor) occurs in reality.</span>\n\nIn that sense, starting from the complex human nature that leads each person to develop their own personality based on the particular vision they have of themselves, a preeminent character must be given to psychosocial sex over morphological sex, in order to fully respect the rights of sexual and gender identity, as these are aspects that, to a greater extent, define both the vision the person has of themselves and their projection before society (cfr. Advisory Opinion OC-24/17 of November 24, 2017. The highlighting is supplied). As can be inferred, the decision of the a quo, not to apply Article 71 subsection g) and Article 72 of the Criminal Code, to set and justify the criminal sanction of the accused, was based on criteria that harm Human Rights, since their gender—trans women—was not an obstacle to interpreting that they could be recipients of the norm, given that they must be considered, according to their gender identity, as women. Thus, it is clear that, when the public defender maintained that her clients were women and were in a state of vulnerability, the trial court unavoidably had to weigh such aspects factually and legally, in order to determine whether or not the remaining normative requirements were met to assess the application of a possible reduction of the criminal sanction. As a corollary, by not doing so, a breach of the fundamental principle of effective judicial protection (Article 41 of the Political Constitution) occurred, which can only be remedied by declaring the ineffectiveness of the imposition of the criminal sanction and ordering a remittal hearing so that this aspect of the ruling is addressed, as will be ordered infra.\n\nAs previously explained, the norm of subsection g of Article 70 of the Criminal Code is an affirmative action from a gender perspective, used as a measure to accelerate the process of de facto equality between men and women, since it is recognized that many women, subject to socially and culturally structured mandates of how they should be and what they should do, find themselves in a condition of disparity, even when they are subject to the Criminal Justice System. Therefore, given that said positive action is not provided for all women, but only for those who, by reason of their gender, find themselves in that \"state of vulnerability,\" it would also not apply to a trans woman merely because she is transgender, as the public defender seemed to understand it. There is no doubt that trans people can be vulnerable, both because of the transphobia that exists, and because of the gender violence they are subjected to as a result of not conforming, in a machista society, to the man/woman binary from a biological perspective. Hence, to be a recipient of the norm, the transgender person must find herself in that state of vulnerability due to the female gender identity with which she self-determines and expresses herself (as a recognition of her legal personality), because only then would the affirmative action described in Article 71 subsection g) and Article 72 of the Criminal Code, in conjunction with Article 4.1 of the CEDAW, have the legal meaning given to it as a means to achieve real equality.\n\nCoupled with the fact that, for the cited norms to be applied and a reduction of the criminal sanction to be considered, it is not enough for this vulnerability of the woman (including the trans woman) due to being in poverty, having under her responsibility the care and maintenance of dependent family members, disability, or being a victim of gender violence, to be proven; it is also required to demonstrate that this state of vulnerability \"…influenced the commission of the punishable act.\" This provision ratifies that said positive action is not provided for all women (whether defined by their sex or self-determined gender identity), as was stated supra, so it will be in each specific case where it must be proven whether or not such vulnerability exists and whether or not it influenced the commission of the criminal act. As the public defense correctly asserts, these topics were not addressed in the ruling under study, which focused on dismissing the defense's request by engaging in discrimination based on sex that is not inferred from the norm and that, without a doubt, was contrary to the principles that inform Human Rights.\n\nThus, as things stand, it is not possible for this appellate chamber to apply the omitted norm (Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code), as the complainant requires be done, without these aspects having been addressed in the adversarial proceeding and being taken as proven following an exercise of weighing the evidence. In this regard, the partial ineffectiveness of the sentence is decreed, solely regarding the determination and imposition of the criminal sanction, and a remittal hearing is ordered (in accordance with the severance rules established for the sub examine) before the same court, so that with a different composition it proceeds to resolve that aspect of the ruling, in accordance with Law and the principle of non-reform in prejudice."
}