{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-386355",
  "citation": "Res. 01164-2025 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela San Ramón",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Exención de costas por razón plausible para litigar en acción civil de proceso penal",
  "title_en": "Cost exemption for plausible reason to litigate in civil action within criminal proceedings",
  "summary_es": "La presente resolución del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, San Ramón, confirma la decisión del tribunal de juicio de eximir a la parte querellante y actora civil del pago de las costas personales y procesales, tras la absolución de la imputada por duda razonable en un caso de falsedad instrumental. El tribunal analiza el concepto de razón plausible para litigar, concluyendo que la acusación no fue temeraria, infundada ni arbitraria, ya que el proceso superó la etapa intermedia con una probabilidad de ocurrencia de los hechos y la absolución solo fue posible después del contradictorio. Se enfatiza que la existencia de una duda razonable no implica mala fe de los acusadores, y se aplica el artículo 73.2 del Código Procesal Civil para justificar la exoneración en costas, descartando pretensiones exageradas, mala fe o uso irracional del sistema procesal. La resolución establece límites a la condena en costas cuando la acusación se basa en una causa probable que justifica el debate plenario.",
  "summary_en": "This ruling by the Criminal Appeals Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón, upholds the trial court's decision to exempt the complaining party and civil plaintiff from paying personal and procedural costs, following the acquittal of the defendant on reasonable doubt in a case of document falsification. The court analyzes the concept of a plausible reason to litigate, finding that the accusation was not reckless, unfounded, or arbitrary, since the case passed the intermediate stage with a probability of occurrence and the acquittal was only possible after trial. It emphasizes that the existence of reasonable doubt does not imply bad faith on the part of the accusers, and applies Article 73.2 of the Civil Procedure Code to justify the cost exemption, ruling out exaggerated claims, bad faith, or irrational use of the procedural system. The decision sets limits on cost awards when the accusation is based on probable cause that justifies a full trial.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal III Circuito Judicial de Alajuela San Ramón",
  "date": "27/11/2025",
  "year": "2025",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "razón plausible para litigar",
    "exención en costas",
    "acción civil resarcitoria",
    "falsedad instrumental",
    "duda razonable",
    "buena fe procesal",
    "querellante",
    "Ministerio Público"
  ],
  "article_citations": [
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política",
      "article": "41",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política 0",
      "article": "41",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Código Civil",
      "article": "1045",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 30",
      "article": "1045",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Código de Comercio",
      "article": "152",
      "doc_id": "norm-6239",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 3284",
      "article": "152",
      "doc_id": "norm-6239",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José)",
      "article": "8",
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      "law": "Ley 4534",
      "article": "8",
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    {
      "law": "Código Procesal Civil",
      "article": "73",
      "doc_id": "norm-81360",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 9342",
      "article": "73",
      "doc_id": "norm-81360",
      "source": "metadata"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "costas procesales",
    "exención en costas",
    "razón plausible para litigar",
    "acción civil resarcitoria",
    "absolución por duda razonable",
    "falsedad instrumental",
    "buena fe procesal",
    "querellante",
    "actor civil",
    "imputada",
    "apelación penal",
    "Código Procesal Civil",
    "artículo 73.2"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "procedural costs",
    "cost exemption",
    "plausible reason to litigate",
    "civil action for damages",
    "acquittal on reasonable doubt",
    "instrumental falsity",
    "procedural good faith",
    "complaining party",
    "civil plaintiff",
    "defendant",
    "criminal appeal",
    "Civil Procedure Code",
    "article 73.2"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "De lo expuesto, se comparte el argumento de la Cámara de Juicio sobre la existencia de una razón plausible para litigar, pues la conclusión absolutoria únicamente era factible arribarla tras la celebración del contradictorio, lo cual incluso quedó avalado con el auto de apertura a juicio dispuesto por la Jueza de la etapa intermedia, siendo evidente como la sumaria arribó a la fase plenaria con una probabilidad de ocurrencia de los hechos, descartando que el proceder los acusadores (Ministerio Público y querellante en este caso), hubiese sido temerario, infundado o arbitrario, de ahí que se respalde la decisión tomada por el a quo de eximir en el pago de las costas personales y procesales a la parte querellante y actora civil de este asunto. […] la acusación formulada por la querellante no contiene elementos los cuales permitan sustentar que ésta haya sido producto de un ejercicio irresponsable, temerario, arbitrario o infundado en contra de la señora [Nombre 001], antes bien, deviene del ejercicio propio de derechos y garantías procesales reconocidas para toda persona en nuestra legislación e instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos.",
  "excerpt_en": "From the foregoing, the argument of the Trial Chamber is shared regarding the existence of a plausible reason to litigate, since the acquittal conclusion was only attainable after the adversarial hearing, which was even endorsed by the trial opening order issued by the Intermediate Stage Judge, making it evident that the summary proceedings reached the trial phase with a probability of occurrence of the facts, ruling out that the conduct of the accusers (the Public Prosecutor's Office and the complaining party in this case) was reckless, unfounded, or arbitrary, hence the decision taken by the a quo to exempt the complaining party and civil plaintiff in this matter from paying personal and procedural costs is upheld. […] the accusation filed by the complaining party contains no elements to support that it resulted from an irresponsible, reckless, arbitrary, or unfounded exercise against Mrs. [Name 001]; rather, it stems from the exercise of procedural rights and guarantees recognized for all persons in our legislation and international human rights instruments.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The Appeals Court denied the appeal and upheld the cost exemption for the complaining party and civil plaintiff, finding that there was a plausible reason to litigate and the accusation was neither reckless nor in bad faith.",
    "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Apelación rechazó el recurso y confirmó la exención de costas a la parte querellante y actora civil, al considerar que existió una razón plausible para litigar y que la acusación no fue temeraria ni de mala fe."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "The grievance thus raised cannot succeed.",
      "quote_es": "El agravio así planteado no puede prosperar."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "The acquittal conclusion was only attainable after the adversarial hearing, which was even endorsed by the trial opening order issued by the Intermediate Stage Judge, making it evident that the summary proceedings reached the trial phase with a probability of occurrence of the facts.",
      "quote_es": "La conclusión absolutoria únicamente era factible arribarla tras la celebración del contradictorio, lo cual incluso quedó avalado con el auto de apertura a juicio dispuesto por la Jueza de la etapa intermedia, siendo evidente como la sumaria arribó a la fase plenaria con una probabilidad de ocurrencia de los hechos."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "The accusation filed by the complaining party contains no elements to support that it resulted from an irresponsible, reckless, arbitrary, or unfounded exercise against Mrs. [Name 001]; rather, it stems from the exercise of procedural rights and guarantees recognized for all persons in our legislation and international human rights instruments.",
      "quote_es": "La acusación formulada por la querellante no contiene elementos los cuales permitan sustentar que ésta haya sido producto de un ejercicio irresponsable, temerario, arbitrario o infundado en contra de la señora [Nombre 001], antes bien, deviene del ejercicio propio de derechos y garantías procesales reconocidas para toda persona en nuestra legislación e instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "The argument of the Trial Chamber is shared regarding the existence of a plausible reason to litigate... ruling out that the conduct of the accusers (the Public Prosecutor's Office and the complaining party in this case) was reckless, unfounded, or arbitrary.",
      "quote_es": "Se comparte el argumento de la Cámara de Juicio sobre la existencia de una razón plausible para litigar... descartando que el proceder los acusadores (Ministerio Público y querellante en este caso), hubiese sido temerario, infundado o arbitrario."
    }
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      "title_en": "Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment — Article 50 of the Political Constitution",
      "title_es": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política",
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  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Alcances sobre la razón plausible para litigar, actuación de buena fe y casos de exención de condena en costas"
        }
      ],
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      "nombre": "Acción civil resarcitoria"
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          "nombre": "Alcances sobre la razón plausible para litigar, actuación de buena fe y casos de exención de condena en costas"
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  "body_es_text": "\"IV.[...] El agravio así planteado no puede prosperar.[...] Nótese cómo, sí quedó probado el otorgamiento de la escritura de hipoteca, así como se analizó en el acápite intelectivo del fallo que parte de la cadena de actos que conllevó a la configuración de tal gravamen abarcaron un documento falso (la protocolización realizada por parte de la señora [Nombre 001] en su calidad de Notaria Pública), todo lo cual condujo a la Cámara de Juicio a acoger la declaratoria de falsedad instrumental requerida en conclusiones por el representante del Ministerio Público y la parte querellante, no obstante, no se condenó en lo penal ni en lo civil a [Nombre 001] al prevalecer una duda razonable respecto de que ésta estuviese de común acuerdo con el resto de coimputados (a quienes se les resolvió la causa por aparte) para defraudar a la sociedad ofendida, no pudiéndose configurar a plenitud el dolo en su proceder, tal cual lo fundamentó así el fallo impugnado. De lo expuesto, se comparte el argumento de la Cámara de Juicio sobre la existencia de una razón plausible para litigar, pues la conclusión absolutoria únicamente era factible arribarla tras la celebración del contradictorio, lo cual incluso quedó avalado con el auto de apertura a juicio dispuesto por la Jueza de la etapa intermedia, siendo evidente como la sumaria arribó a la fase plenaria con una probabilidad de ocurrencia de los hechos, descartando que el proceder los acusadores (Ministerio Público y querellante en este caso), hubiese sido temerario, infundado o arbitrario, de ahí que se respalde la decisión tomada por el a quo de eximir en el pago de las costas personales y procesales a la parte querellante y actora civil de este asunto, tal cual lo razonó la sentencia en el siguiente pasaje:[...] A mayor abundamiento, y en relación con el artículo 73.2 del Código Procesal Civil, los supuestos ahí previstos para la exoneración en costas por una razón plausible para litigar de acuerdo con la realidad procesal de este asunto también acuerpan la decisión tomada por el a quo. Al respecto tal ordinal indica lo siguiente: “73.2 Exención. Se podrá eximir, total o parcialmente, de forma razonada, cuando: 1. La demanda o contrademanda comprenda pretensiones exageradas. 2. El fallo admita defensas de importancia invocadas por el vencido, que modifiquen sustancialmente lo pretendido. 3. Haya vencimiento recíproco trascendente sobre pretensiones, defensas o excepciones. 4. La parte haya ajustado su conducta a la buena fe, la lealtad, la probidad y al uso racional del sistema procesal.” En este caso, nótese cómo la pretensión final en conclusiones de la acción civil no fue de doscientos millones de colones como inicialmente se estimó en tal libelo, siendo que la liquidación de pretensiones en juicio no se tiene como exagerada; en segundo término el fallo rechazó las excepciones planteadas por la defensa técnica; y finalmente, no se advierte un uso irracional del sistema respecto de la parte querellante y actora civil, en los términos antes expuestos, descartándose que éstos se condujeran litigando de mala fe. De lo expuesto, se concluye que la resolución sin especial condenatoria en costas en este asunto al amparo de una razón plausible para litigar quedó más demostrada, por lo cual se avala el razonamiento así expuesto en sentencia al haberse absuelto a la imputada por la existencia de una duda razonable y en donde, siempre quedó probada la falsedad del documento hecho por ésta en su condición de notaria, más allá de la no demostración del dolo en su caso, todo lo cual condujo a la declaratoria de falsedad instrumental. Además, resultaron infundadas las afirmaciones atinentes a que la parte querellante y actora civil litigaron de mala fe al amparo por el ocultamiento de información y datos a la Cámara de Juicio; y finalmente, la acusación formulada por la querellante no contiene elementos los cuales permitan sustentar que ésta haya sido producto de un ejercicio irresponsable, temerario, arbitrario o infundado en contra de la señora [Nombre 001], antes bien, deviene del ejercicio propio de derechos y garantías procesales reconocidas para toda persona en nuestra legislación e instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos.[...]\"",
  "body_en_text": "IV.[...] The grievance thus raised cannot succeed.[...] Note how the granting of the mortgage deed was indeed proven, as was analyzed in the intellectual section of the judgment, that part of the chain of acts that led to the configuration of such encumbrance involved a false document (the protocolization carried out by Mrs. [Nombre 001] in her capacity as a Notary Public), all of which led the Trial Chamber to grant the declaration of instrumental falsity (falsedad instrumental) requested in closing arguments by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the complainant (parte querellante); however, [Nombre 001] was not convicted in criminal or civil matters because a reasonable doubt prevailed as to whether she was in collusion with the rest of the co-defendants (whose case was resolved separately) to defraud the aggrieved company, as the intent (dolo) in her actions could not be fully established, just as the contested judgment so reasoned. From the foregoing, the Trial Chamber's argument regarding the existence of a plausible reason to litigate (razón plausible para litigar) is shared, since the acquittal conclusion was only possible to reach after the adversarial proceedings had been held, which was even endorsed by the order to open trial (auto de apertura a juicio) issued by the Judge of the intermediate stage, it being evident how the preliminary proceedings (sumaria) reached the plenary phase with a probability of occurrence of the facts, ruling out that the conduct of the accusers (Public Prosecutor's Office and complainant in this case) had been reckless, unfounded, or arbitrary; hence, the decision taken by the lower court (a quo) to exempt the complainant and civil plaintiff (actora civil) in this matter from paying personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) is upheld, just as the judgment reasoned in the following passage:[...] Furthermore, and in relation to Article 73.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), the scenarios provided therein for exoneration from costs (costas) due to a plausible reason to litigate, in accordance with the procedural reality of this matter, also support the decision taken by the lower court (a quo). In this regard, the said article states the following: “73.2 Exemption. Total or partial exemption may be granted, with reasoned justification, when: 1. The lawsuit or counterclaim includes exaggerated claims. 2. The ruling admits important defenses invoked by the losing party that substantially modify what was sought. 3. There is a significant reciprocal defeat on claims, defenses, or exceptions. 4. The party has adjusted their conduct to good faith, loyalty, probity, and the rational use of the procedural system.” In this case, note how the final claim in the conclusions of the civil action was not for two hundred million colones, as initially estimated in the said pleading, meaning that the liquidation of claims at trial is not considered exaggerated; secondly, the ruling rejected the exceptions raised by the technical defense; and finally, no irrational use of the system is observed regarding the complainant and civil plaintiff, in the terms set forth above, ruling out that they conducted themselves in bad faith. From the foregoing, it is concluded that the resolution without a special award of costs (condenatoria en costas) in this matter, under the protection of a plausible reason to litigate, was more than demonstrated, which is why the reasoning thus set forth in the judgment is endorsed, given that the defendant was acquitted due to the existence of a reasonable doubt, and where the falsity of the document made by her in her capacity as a notary was always proven, beyond the non-demonstration of intent (dolo) in her case, all of which led to the declaration of instrumental falsity. Furthermore, the statements concerning the complainant and civil plaintiff having litigated in bad faith under the guise of concealing information and data from the Trial Chamber were unfounded; and finally, the accusation filed by the complainant does not contain elements that would allow it to be sustained that it was the product of an irresponsible, reckless, arbitrary, or unfounded exercise against Mrs. [Nombre 001]; rather, it stems from the very exercise of rights and procedural guarantees recognized for every person in our legislation and international human rights instruments.[...]\n\nA total or partial exemption may be granted, with reasons stated, when: 1. The claim or counterclaim includes exaggerated demands. 2. The judgment admits important defenses invoked by the losing party, which substantially modify what was sought. 3. There is a significant mutual defeat regarding claims, defenses, or exceptions. 4. The party has conducted itself in accordance with good faith, loyalty, probity, and the rational use of the procedural system.” In this case, note how the final claim in the conclusions of the civil action was not for two hundred million colones as initially estimated in that pleading, since the quantification of claims at trial is not considered exaggerated; second, the judgment rejected the exceptions raised by the defense counsel; and finally, no irrational use of the system is observed with respect to the complainant and civil plaintiff, in the terms set forth above, and it is ruled out that they acted by litigating in bad faith. From the foregoing, it is concluded that the decision without a special award of costs in this matter, based on a plausible reason for litigating, was more than demonstrated, and therefore the reasoning set forth in the judgment is endorsed, given that the accused was acquitted due to the existence of a reasonable doubt and where, in any case, the falsity of the document made by her in her capacity as a notary public was proven, beyond the non-demonstration of intent (dolo) in her case, all of which led to the declaration of instrumental falsehood. Furthermore, the statements concerning the complainant and civil plaintiff having litigated in bad faith by allegedly concealing information and data from the Trial Chamber were unfounded; and finally, the accusation made by the complainant does not contain elements that would support it being the product of an irresponsible, reckless, arbitrary, or unfounded action against Mrs. [Name 001], but rather arises from the exercise of rights and procedural guarantees recognized for all persons in our legislation and international human rights instruments.[...]"
}