{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-65433",
  "citation": "Res. 00493-2004 Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Casación rechazada: responsabilidad objetiva civil por contaminación de ríos con agroquímicos",
  "title_en": "Cassation denied: strict civil liability for river pollution from agrochemicals",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José, en voto 00493-2004, declara sin lugar un recurso de casación interpuesto por la demandada civil Inversiones Sábalo S.A., condenada al pago de daños y perjuicios en el marco de un proceso penal por contaminación ambiental con agroquímicos (Endosulfán y Hinosán) aplicados por fumigación aérea sobre un arrozal en La Virgen de Golfito. La sentencia de juicio había absuelto al imputado (un agrónomo) por falta de prueba sobre su responsabilidad penal, pero condenó civilmente a la empresa en aplicación de la responsabilidad objetiva. El tribunal de casación rechaza los nueve motivos del recurso. Ratifica que, aunque el tribunal de instancia citó erróneamente el artículo 1045 del Código Civil (propio de la responsabilidad subjetiva), la condena civil se fundamenta correctamente en la responsabilidad objetiva derivada de los artículos 41, 46 y 50 de la Constitución Política y de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (Ley 7554), que consagran el principio de que el daño debe ser reparado con independencia de la culpa. El fallo enfatiza que la responsabilidad objetiva no exige probar dolo o culpa, sino la creación de un riesgo y la producción de un daño, e invierte la carga de la prueba en favor de la víctima. Rechaza los argumentos sobre violación de la cadena de custodia y necropsia de peces, considerando que la sentencia de instancia valoró suficiente y razonadamente los indicios de contaminación.",
  "summary_en": "The Criminal Cassation Court of San José, in decision 00493-2004, rejects the cassation appeal filed by the civil defendant Inversiones Sábalo S.A., which had been ordered to pay civil damages in a criminal proceeding concerning environmental pollution from agrochemicals (Endosulfan and Hinosan) applied by aerial spraying over a rice field in La Virgen de Golfito. The trial court had acquitted the accused (an agronomist) due to insufficient evidence of criminal liability, but civilly condemned the company based on strict liability. The cassation court rejects all nine grounds of appeal. It confirms that, although the trial court erroneously cited article 1045 of the Civil Code (which governs fault-based liability), the civil conviction is correctly grounded on strict liability under articles 41, 46, and 50 of the Political Constitution and the Environmental Law (Law 7554), which embody the principle that damage must be compensated regardless of fault. The ruling stresses that strict liability requires proof of the creation of a risk and the occurrence of harm, but not of intent or negligence, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. It dismisses objections concerning the chain of custody and lack of a fish necropsy, finding that the trial court adequately assessed the circumstantial evidence of pollution.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José",
  "date": "20/05/2004",
  "year": "2004",
  "topic_ids": [
    "environmental-law-7554"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "environmental-law-7554",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "responsabilidad civil objetiva",
    "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
    "el que contamina paga",
    "carga de la prueba invertida",
    "acción civil resarcitoria",
    "fumigación aérea",
    "daño ambiental"
  ],
  "article_citations": [
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política",
      "article": "41",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política 0",
      "article": "41",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política",
      "article": "46",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política 0",
      "article": "46",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política",
      "article": "50",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Constitución Política 0",
      "article": "50",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Código Civil",
      "article": "1045",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 63",
      "article": "1045",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Código Civil",
      "article": "1048",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 63",
      "article": "1048",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "article": "2",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 7554",
      "article": "2",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "article": "59",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 7554",
      "article": "59",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "article": "66",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 7554",
      "article": "66",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "article": "101",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 7554",
      "article": "101",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Código Procesal Penal",
      "article": "148",
      "doc_id": "norm-41297",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 7594",
      "article": "148",
      "doc_id": "norm-41297",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Código Procesal Penal",
      "article": "433",
      "doc_id": "norm-41297",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 7594",
      "article": "433",
      "doc_id": "norm-41297",
      "source": "metadata"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "responsabilidad civil objetiva",
    "contaminación de aguas",
    "fumigación aérea",
    "Endosulfán",
    "Hinosán",
    "acción civil resarcitoria",
    "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
    "principio el que contamina paga",
    "inversión carga de la prueba",
    "daño ambiental",
    "arrozal Golfito",
    "río Coto",
    "río Sábalo"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "strict liability",
    "objective civil liability",
    "water pollution",
    "aerial spraying",
    "Endosulfan",
    "Hinosan",
    "civil compensation in criminal proceedings",
    "Environmental Organic Law",
    "polluter pays principle",
    "shifting burden of proof",
    "environmental damage",
    "Golfito rice plantation",
    "Coto River",
    "Sábalo River"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "De la normativa citada se desprende claramente que nuestro legislador ha receptado y materializado el principio tradicional en materia ambiental, conforme al cual “el que contamina paga” con independencia de la existencia de un vínculo subjetivo. Estamos frente a un cambio de paradigma, ya que no siempre la responsabilidad se encuentra fundada únicamente en la teoría de la culpa, sino que el aumento de causas de dañosidad producidas por el desarrollo industrial, comercial y agrícola exponen al ser humano a mayores riesgos. (...) Desde la óptica práctica, la responsabilidad objetiva se resume en una ventaja a favor del lesionado que significa una inversión de la carga de la prueba, en el sentido de que éste queda exonerado de la carga de probar la culpa o dolo del causante del daño y tampoco requiere probar su falta de culpa, a diferencia de los casos de responsabilidad subjetiva.",
  "excerpt_en": "From the cited norms it clearly follows that our legislator has adopted and given effect to the traditional principle in environmental matters: 'the polluter pays', regardless of any subjective element. We are witnessing a paradigm shift, for liability is no longer solely founded on fault; rather, the proliferation of harmful activities from industrial, commercial and agricultural development exposes people to greater risks. (...) In practical terms, strict liability amounts to an advantage for the injured party: it shifts the burden of proof, so that the victim is relieved from proving the tortfeasor's intent or negligence, and need not even prove his own lack of fault, unlike in fault-based liability.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The civil defendant's cassation appeal is denied, upholding the conviction for strict civil liability for river pollution from agrochemicals applied by aerial spraying.",
    "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación de la demandada civil, confirmándose la condena por responsabilidad civil objetiva por contaminación de ríos con agroquímicos aplicados por fumigación aérea."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando II",
      "quote_en": "From the cited norms it clearly follows that our legislator has adopted and given effect to the traditional principle in environmental matters: 'the polluter pays', regardless of any subjective element.",
      "quote_es": "De la normativa citada se desprende claramente que nuestro legislador ha receptado y materializado el principio tradicional en materia ambiental, conforme al cual “el que contamina paga” con independencia de la existencia de un vínculo subjetivo."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando II",
      "quote_en": "The basis for reparation lies not in fault or intent, but rather in the occurrence of harm.",
      "quote_es": "El fundamento de la reparación no estriba en la culpa o el dolo, sino más bien en la producción de un daño."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando II",
      "quote_en": "Strict liability amounts to an advantage for the injured party: it shifts the burden of proof, so that the victim is relieved from proving the tortfeasor's intent or negligence.",
      "quote_es": "La responsabilidad objetiva se resume en una ventaja a favor del lesionado que significa una inversión de la carga de la prueba, en el sentido de que éste queda exonerado de la carga de probar la culpa o dolo del causante del daño."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando II",
      "quote_en": "Those enterprises, which create danger for the community and benefit for their owner, are the means through which harm is caused to the victim. Therefore, as the cause of the injury, they are obliged to repair it.",
      "quote_es": "Esas empresas, generadoras de peligro para la comunidad y de beneficio para su dueño, constituyen un medio a través del cual se produce el daño a la víctima. De manera que como causante del perjuicio, se encuentran obligados a repararlo."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [
    {
      "id": "norm-871",
      "citation": "Constitución Política 0 (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 07/11/1949)",
      "title_en": "Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment — Article 50 of the Political Constitution",
      "title_es": "Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado — Artículo 50 de la Constitución Política",
      "doc_type": "constitution",
      "date": "07/11/1949",
      "year": "1949"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-27738",
      "citation": "Ley 7554",
      "title_en": "Organic Environmental Law",
      "title_es": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "04/10/1995",
      "year": "1995"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-41297",
      "citation": "Ley 7594",
      "title_en": "Criminal Procedure Code — Criminal Action in Environmental Crimes",
      "title_es": "Código Procesal Penal — Acción penal en delitos ambientales",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "10/04/1996",
      "year": "1996"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-15437",
      "citation": "",
      "title_en": "Civil Code of Costa Rica",
      "title_es": "Código Civil de Costa Rica",
      "doc_type": null,
      "date": "01/01/1888",
      "year": "1888"
    }
  ],
  "cited_by": [
    {
      "id": "norm-15437",
      "citation": "",
      "title_en": "Civil Code of Costa Rica",
      "title_es": "Código Civil de Costa Rica",
      "doc_type": null,
      "date": "01/01/1888",
      "year": "1888"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-27738",
      "citation": "Ley 7554",
      "title_en": "Organic Environmental Law",
      "title_es": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "04/10/1995",
      "year": "1995"
    },
    {
      "id": "norm-41297",
      "citation": "Ley 7594",
      "title_en": "Criminal Procedure Code — Criminal Action in Environmental Crimes",
      "title_es": "Código Procesal Penal — Acción penal en delitos ambientales",
      "doc_type": "law",
      "date": "10/04/1996",
      "year": "1996"
    }
  ],
  "references": {
    "internal": [
      {
        "target_id": "norm-871",
        "kind": "cited_norm",
        "label": "Constitución Política"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-27738",
        "kind": "cited_norm",
        "label": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente"
      },
      {
        "target_id": "norm-41297",
        "kind": "cited_norm",
        "label": "Código Procesal Penal"
      }
    ],
    "external": [
      {
        "ref_id": "norm-15437",
        "url": "https://pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_norma.aspx?param1=NRM&nValor1=1&nValor2=15437&strTipM=FN",
        "kind": "cited_norm",
        "label": "Código Civil",
        "norm_id": "15437"
      },
      {
        "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-133032",
        "url": "",
        "kind": "related_voto",
        "label": "",
        "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-133032"
      },
      {
        "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-150918",
        "url": "",
        "kind": "related_voto",
        "label": "",
        "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-150918"
      },
      {
        "ref_id": "nexus-sen-1-0034-248214",
        "url": "",
        "kind": "related_voto",
        "label": "",
        "nexus_id": "sen-1-0034-248214"
      }
    ]
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-65433",
  "tier": 2,
  "is_environmental": true,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [
    {
      "art_num": "41",
      "art_scij": "4889",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "norm_fecha": "07 Nov 1949",
      "norm_name": "Constitución Política",
      "norm_num": "0",
      "norm_ver": "935",
      "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "46",
      "art_scij": "4894",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "norm_fecha": "07 Nov 1949",
      "norm_name": "Constitución Política",
      "norm_num": "0",
      "norm_ver": "935",
      "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "50",
      "art_scij": "4898",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-871",
      "norm_fecha": "07 Nov 1949",
      "norm_name": "Constitución Política",
      "norm_num": "0",
      "norm_ver": "935",
      "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "1045",
      "art_scij": "89940",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "norm_fecha": "28 Sep 1887",
      "norm_name": "Código Civil",
      "norm_num": "63",
      "norm_ver": "16547",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "1048",
      "art_scij": "89943",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "norm_fecha": "28 Sep 1887",
      "norm_name": "Código Civil",
      "norm_num": "63",
      "norm_ver": "16547",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "2",
      "art_scij": "132378",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "norm_detalle": "Inciso b",
      "norm_fecha": "04 Oct 1995",
      "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "norm_num": "7554",
      "norm_ver": "29343",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "59",
      "art_scij": "132435",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "norm_fecha": "04 Oct 1995",
      "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "norm_num": "7554",
      "norm_ver": "29343",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "66",
      "art_scij": "132442",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "norm_fecha": "04 Oct 1995",
      "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "norm_num": "7554",
      "norm_ver": "29343",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "101",
      "art_scij": "132477",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "norm_fecha": "04 Oct 1995",
      "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "norm_num": "7554",
      "norm_ver": "29343",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "148",
      "art_scij": "180407",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-41297",
      "norm_fecha": "10 Abr 1996",
      "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal",
      "norm_num": "7594",
      "norm_ver": "43528",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    },
    {
      "art_num": "433",
      "art_scij": "180692",
      "art_subnum": "0",
      "doc_id": "norm-41297",
      "norm_fecha": "10 Abr 1996",
      "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal",
      "norm_num": "7594",
      "norm_ver": "43528",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley"
    }
  ],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "norm_num": "",
      "norm_name": "Código Civil de Costa Rica",
      "tipo_norma": "",
      "norm_fecha": "01/01/1888"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-27738",
      "norm_num": "7554",
      "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "04/10/1995"
    },
    {
      "doc_id": "norm-41297",
      "norm_num": "7594",
      "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal — Acción penal en delitos ambientales",
      "tipo_norma": "Ley",
      "norm_fecha": "10/04/1996"
    }
  ],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [
    "sen-1-0034-133032",
    "sen-1-0034-150918",
    "sen-1-0034-248214"
  ],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 2,
          "nombre": "Fundamento de la reparación no estriba en la culpa o dolo sino en la producción del daño"
        },
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Contaminación de aguas"
        }
      ],
      "id": 2,
      "nombre": "Acción civil resarcitoria"
    },
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 2,
          "nombre": "Fundamento de la reparación no estriba en la culpa o dolo sino en la producción del daño"
        },
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Contaminación de aguas"
        }
      ],
      "id": 5,
      "nombre": "Responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible"
    },
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Fundamento de la reparación no estriba en la culpa o dolo sino en la producción del daño"
        }
      ],
      "id": 3,
      "nombre": "Daños y perjuicios derivados de hecho punible"
    },
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Concepto de contaminación del ambiente"
        },
        {
          "id": 2,
          "nombre": "Fundamento de la reparación no estriba en la culpa o dolo sino en la producción del daño"
        }
      ],
      "id": 1,
      "nombre": "Contaminación de aguas o terrenos"
    },
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 2,
          "nombre": "Fundamento de la reparación no estriba en la culpa o dolo sino en la producción del daño"
        },
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Contaminación de aguas"
        }
      ],
      "id": 4,
      "nombre": "Responsabilidad civil objetiva"
    }
  ],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "\"II. [...] Aunque el recurso se plantea a través de nueve motivos, todos ellos versan sobre aspectos de fundamentación, razón por la cual se resuelven de manera conjunta. De acuerdo con el considerando primero de la sentencia impugnada, se tuvo por acreditado que el encartado [Nombre1], en su condición de agrónomo trabajaba para la empresa Inversiones Sábalo S.A. y era el encargado de la asesoría técnica para la aplicación de químicos en la plantación de arroz ubicada en La Virgen de Golfito. Los días 13, 14 y 16 de noviembre de dos mil, el encartado confeccionó las recetas para la aplicación de productos agroquímicos escogiendo, entre otros productos el Endosulfán que es tóxico para los peces y únicamente se puede aplicar por vía terrestre y el Hinosofán que también es tóxico para los peces. Posterior al 14 de noviembre y siempre dentro del mismo mes, se realizó la fumigación aérea aplicando Hinosofán y Endosulfán, siendo que dichos químicos llegaron hasta las aguas de los ríos Coto y Sábalo, las que contaminaron y ocasionaron la muerte de gran cantidad de fauna nativa. El tribunal de juicio absuelve al encartado en aplicación del principio in dubio pro reo, pero condena a la demandada civil en aplicación de la responsabilidad objetiva y con fundamento en el artículo 1045 del Código Civil. De manera que lo único que se discute en el presente recurso son los aspectos civiles y no los penales. Lo anterior hace que resulte cuestionable la discusión y aplicación de los requisitos de la “Cadena de Custodia”, que es un instituto netamente penal para determinar la legitimidad de la prueba a un tema estrictamente civil, donde operan otros principios y fundamentos. En efecto, como todos sabemos, la responsabilidad civil surge de dos grandes vertientes. Por un lado la responsabilidad contractual, que no es del caso analizar, y por otro la responsabilidad extracontractual. Esta última se compone de la responsabilidad subjetiva y la objetiva. La responsabilidad subjetiva es aquella que surge como consecuencia de un comportamiento doloso o culposo en virtud del cual se produce un daño. Precisamente esta responsabilidad se encuentra expresamente contemplada en el artículo 1045 del Código Civil, el cual señala “Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencias o imprudencia causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios”. De donde se colige que resulta indispensable demostrar tanto la existencia del daño como la relación de causalidad entre ese daño y la conducta dolosa o culposa. Lo anteriormente expuesto, nos permite establecer que el juzgador un error material al sustentar la responsabilidad objetiva en el citado artículo 1045 del Código Civil, cuando precisamente esa norma se refiere a la subjetiva, yerro que, conforme a lo dispuesto por los artículos 146 y 433 del Código Procesal Penal debe ser corregido en la forma que se dirá seguidamente. En el presente caso surge la responsabilidad objetiva, cuyo punto de partida no es la acción del sujeto sino más bien el desarrollo de actividades industriales, comerciales, agrícolas que aunque lícitas, son causas generadoras de riesgo y fuente potencial de daños. Su fundamento no es subjetivo, sino más bien objetivo en la medida que el interés central no es sancionar o castigar, sino reparar. Progresivamente, el nuevo derecho de daños, con criterios solidaristas, se orienta hacia la objetivación de la responsabilidad y toma en cuenta otros criterios basados en valoraciones económicas, sociales, etc, que impone que el daño sufrido no sea asumido exclusivamente por la víctima y pueda ser trasladado económicamente a un tercero. La idea se centra no ya en sancionar o castigar al autor de la conducta antijurídica, sino en la necesidad de que el daño sea reparado. (Cfr: [Nombre2]. Teoría General de la Reparación de daños. Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1997, p 143 y 144.) Según dispone el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política de Costa Rica, “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales…” De acuerdo con dicha normativa, el fundamento de la reparación no estriba en la culpa o el dolo, sino más bien en la producción de un daño. Norma que se complementa con los artículos 46 y 50 de la misma Constitución. Al respecto el ordinal 46, párrafo final dispone que “…los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos; a recibir información adecuada y veraz; a la libertad de elección y a un trato equitativo…”, mientras que el 50 establece: “El Estado procurará el mayor bienestar a todos los habitantes del país organizando y estimulando la producción y el más adecuado reparto de la riqueza. Toda persona tiene derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Por ello está legitimada para denunciar los actos que infrinjan ese derecho y para reclamar la reparación del daño causado. El Estado garantizará, defenderá y preservará ese derecho. La ley determinará las responsabilidades y las sanciones correspondientes” (El subrayado es nuestro). Por su parte, la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, desarrollando el postulado constitucional, en su artículo 2 inciso d) dispone un principio general a cuyo tenor: “Quien contamine el ambiente o le ocasiones un daño será responsable, conforme lo establezcan las leyes de la República y las Convenciones internacionales vigentes.” Mientras tanto el numeral 59 del mismo cuerpo normativo define la contaminación del ambiente como “toda alteración o modificación del ambiente que pueda perjudicar a la salud humana, atentar contra los recursos naturales o afectar el ambiente en general de la Nación. La descarga y la emisión de contaminantes, se ajustará, obligatoriamente a las regulaciones técnicas que se emitan. El Estado adoptará las medidas que sean necesarias para prevenir o corregir la contaminación ambiental.” Respecto al vertido de material contaminante, que es precisamente lo que estamos discutiendo, artículo 66 de la ley en comentario establece que “ …la responsabilidad de tratamiento de vertidos corresponderá a quien produzca la contaminación…”. Finalmente, el 101 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente dispone que “Sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades de otra naturaleza que les puedan resultar como partícipes en cualquiera de sus formas, los causantes de las infracciones a la presente ley o las que regulan la protección del ambiente y la diversidad biológica, sean personas físicas o jurídicas, serán civil y solidariamente responsables por los daños y perjuicios causados…” De la normativa citada se desprende claramente que nuestro legislador ha receptado y materializado el principio tradicional en materia ambiental, conforme al cual “el que contamina paga” con independencia de la existencia de un vínculo subjetivo. Estamos frente aun cambio de paradigma, ya que no siempre la responsabilidad se encuentra fundada únicamente en la teoría de la culpa, sino que el aumento de causas de dañosidad producidas por el desarrollo industrial, comercial y agrícola exponen al ser humano a mayores riesgos. En relación con esta temática y analizando el párrafo quinto del Código Civil, [Nombre3] señala que \" en nuestra jurisprudencia… se ha aclarado que los párrafos 4 y 5 del artículo 1048 del Código Civil no se basan en la responsabilidad por culpa directa o indirecta, sino en la responsabilidad objetiva- es decir sin culpa-, que recae sobre los empresarios de establecimientos peligrosos y los que se dedican a la explotación de los medios de transporte; estos dos reglas son reflejo de la teoría del riesgo. En realidad, con esto, la ley ha tomado en cuenta dos cosas: de un lado, excitar el cuidado de los dueños y empresarios de actividades peligrosas, en el sentido de impedir accidentes y, de otro lado, garantizar mejor el pago de la respectiva indemnización, poniéndolo directamente a cargo de los individuos solventes. Como puede observarse, a diferencia de los casos de \"responsabilidad por culpa\", la responsabilidad objetiva reside en el hecho de que aquél para su propio provecho crea una fuente de probables daños y expone a las personas y los bienes ajenos a peligros y queda obligado si el daño se verifica…\" (Pérez [Nombre4]. Derecho Privado. San José, Publitex, 1998, p. 416). Desde la óptica práctica, la responsabilidad objetiva se resume en una ventaja a favor del lesionado que significa una inversión de la carga de la prueba, en el sentido de que éste queda exonerado de la carga de probar la culpa o dolo del causante del daño y tampoco requiere probar su falta de culpa, a diferencia de los casos de responsabilidad subjetiva. El fundamento de este tipo de responsabilidad es el reconocimiento social de que ciertas actividades, aún siendo lícitas (por lo que no es requisito el ser antijurídicas) y necesarias dentro del desarrollo social y tecnológico actual, que no puede ni debe ser obstruido, pero que, concomitantemente generan un riesgo -como entidades productoras de eventuales daños- el cual desde luego no debe ser asumido por la víctima o sus allegados, sino más bien por aquel que se beneficia de la actividad riesgosa o de la tenencia de una fuente productora de peligro. Esas empresas, generadoras de peligro para la comunidad y de beneficio para su dueño, constituyen un medio a través del cual se produce el daño a la víctima. De manera que como causante del perjuicio, se encuentran obligados a repararlo. (Sobre la responsabilidad civil objetiva, crf: Voto 085-F-99 del 10 de marzo de 1999, Tribunal Superior de Casación Penal. Voto No: 1262-97 de las 11:30 horas del 14 de noviembre de 1997. Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Voto No: 525-F- 2001 del 31 de mayo del 2001, Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Igualmente Sala Segunda Civil de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No: 304 de las 15:10 horas del 4 de octubre de 1973 y 481 de las 10:05 horas de 20 de julio de 1992, del Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, Sección Segunda). Así las cosas, el argumento central del recurrente en cuanto a que se violó la cadena de custodia en relación con la recolección de muestras no resulta atendible. Tales principios son válidos para establecer la responsabilidad penal, no así para la responsabilidad civil donde aplican otros criterios. Debemos recordar que las muestras de agua no fueron tomadas por miembros del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, ni por oficiales de dicha dependencia. Fueron más bien los miembros de la estación de Guarda costas de Golfito y personeros del Ministerio de Salud quienes se encargaron de dichas diligencias. En todo caso, en relación a los reparos sobre la recolección de agua y sus resultados, la sentencia se pronuncia de manera motivada. Sobre el particular expresa que “…el análisis de las muestras recolectadas por el biólogo marino, policía de guardacostas de la zona y testigo en esta causa, [Nombre5]. Tal deponente es claro cuando refiere la forma como se tomaron las muestras y ante cada uno de los cuestionamientos de la defensa acerca de la cadena de custodia de dichas muestras hasta llevarlas al Ministerio de salud para su análisis y el cuidado que se tuvo con ellas, pudo sin cavilación dar respuesta a todas las inquietudes, de forma clara y contundente, sin dejar laguna de tipo alguno acerca de cómo se llevaron las muestras, cómo se recolectaron, cómo se guardaron, dónde se mantuvieron y finalmente a quien se le hizo llegar hasta su análisis” (folio 277). Igual ocurre con el informe rendido por el experto de la defensa, señor [Nombre6]. La sentencia de manera razonable descarta su tesis. Al respecto se indica “Declara dicho deponente que él no puede emitir un juicio acerca de la veracidad de tales resultados, eso es así porque él no aplicó las pruebas, agregaríamos acá. Pero acto seguido entra en contradicción con tales afirmaciones e indica que existen dos metodologías para hacerlo y las describe, refiere que una es con la que se realizaron los análisis y otra es la que él preferiría. Sin embargo nunca pasa de meras especulaciones respecto a los estándares que debieron o pudieron aplicarse en el análisis de las muestras. Se insiste en la necesidad de realizar una necropsia de los peces hallados, para tener certeza desde su punto de vista acerca de la causa de muerte de los peces. No obstante, considera este tribunal que los indicios referidos son más que claros y permite determinar cuál ha sido la causa de la muerte de dichos animales. Incluso el testigo [Nombre7] fue claro cuando indicó que olía a fungicida en los canales…”(folio 278). De acuerdo con lo anterior, a pesar de que no se contó con una necropsia de los peces, fue posible establecer la existencia de la contaminación a través del análisis conjunto y armoniosos de los distintos indicios que se evacuaron en el debate. De allí que contrario a lo sostenido en el recurso, el fallo si se refiere a la cadena de custodia y al informe del experto ofrecido por la defensa. Ahora bien, en cuanto a la responsabilidad civil, el juzgador sustenta su decisión en la responsabilidad objetiva. Aunque la sentencia por un error material cita el artículo 1045 del Código Civil, el que no resulta aplicable al caso, lo cierto es que conforme a la Constitución Política y la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, efectivamente opera una responsabilidad civil objetiva. Aparte de lo anterior, la sentencia se encuentra debidamente fundamentada en cuanto a la creación del riesgo por parte de la demandada y la producción de un daño en el ambiente. Es un hecho no controvertido, que la demandada civil es propietaria de una finca ubicada en la Virgen de Golfito, de aproximadamente mil hectáreas y dedicada a la producción de arroz. Tampoco está en discusión que en el mes de noviembre de dos mil, se procedió a fumigar, vía aérea, aproximadamente quinientas hectáreas con los químicos Hinosán y Endosulfan. Luego de la fumigación cae una fuerte lluvia y posteriormente aparece una mortandad de peces y otros animales que se encontraban en la desembocadura del Río Coto. A lo anterior hay que agregar, conforme lo sustenta el juez en la sentencia, que a raíz del suceso, un biólogo marino en compañía de otras autoridades del Ministerio de Salud realizan un recorrido por la zona, empezando por la desembocadura del río y avanzando río arriba, siguiendo el rastro de animales muertos, llegan hasta la finca de la demandada Inversiones Sábalo S.A. donde precisamente se origina el siniestro. Si además los vecinos informan a esos personeros que recientemente había ocurrido una fumigación área en dicha finca, es válido establecer la vinculación entre la fumigación y la contaminación. Vinculación que puede efectuarse aún suprimiendo la muestra de agua y sus resultados. Como bien lo señala el juzgador “los vecinos refieren que desde el punto de vista temporal el suceso que explica la contaminación del agua es la actividad de la fumigación en dicha finca; que la mencionada finca prácticamente rodea a los canales citados; que como admitió el propio [Nombre8] fumigaron en época de lluvia y el día que hicieron las aplicaciones también llovió bastante, lo que por boca del defensor repite el testigo [Nombre6]; existiendo una cercanía temporal, geográfica, utilizando productos tóxicos para los peces…encontrándose muestras de agua con residuos tóxicos, tanto en dichos canales, como en el propio arrozal, es posible concluir sin lugar a duda que la causa de es daño es la actividad de explotación agrícola…”(folio 276). Así las cosas, la sentencia se encuentra debidamente suficientemente motivada en cuanto a la responsabilidad civil de la demandada. Finalmente, el reclamo del recurrente en cuanto a que el juez consideró que la defensa de la demandada civil se allanó a las pretensiones de la actora, carece de interés. Ciertamente el juzgador comete un error al indicar que “De hecho en cuanto a la pretensión resarcitoria estatal el representante de la sociedad demandada no hizo manifestación alguna por lo que incluso es dable concluir que se allana a las mismas” (cfr. Folio 283). Independientemente de que el demandado hiciera o no referencia a la acción civil (afirmación que combate el impugnante), ello no puede interpretarse como un allanamiento a las pretensiones de la parte contraria, pues para que ello suceda debe ocurrir una expresa manifestación de voluntad. Sin embargo, lo cierto y relevante es que el juez entra a conocer las razones de fondo y determina la existencia de una responsabilidad objetiva. Conclusión que como se ha visto, es compartida por esta Cámara. En atención a lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación formulado por la demandada civil.\"",
  "body_en_text": "\"II. [...] Although the appeal is filed through nine grounds, all of them deal with aspects of legal reasoning, which is why they are resolved jointly. According to the first recital (considerando) of the contested judgment, it was deemed proven that the defendant [Name1], in his capacity as an agronomist, worked for the company Inversiones Sábalo S.A. and was in charge of technical advisory services for the application of chemicals on the rice plantation located in La Virgen de Golfito. On November 13, 14, and 16, two thousand, the defendant drafted the prescriptions for the application of agrochemical products, choosing, among other products, Endosulfán, which is toxic to fish and can only be applied by ground, and Hinosofán, which is also toxic to fish. After November 14 and still within the same month, aerial fumigation was carried out, applying Hinosofán and Endosulfán, and these chemicals reached the waters of the Coto and Sábalo rivers, contaminating them and causing the death of a large quantity of native fauna. The trial court acquits the defendant in application of the in dubio pro reo principle but condemns the civil defendant in application of objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva) based on Article 1045 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the only issues discussed in this appeal are the civil aspects and not the criminal ones. The foregoing makes the discussion and application of the \"Chain of Custody\" (Cadena de Custodia) requirements questionable, as this is a purely criminal legal concept for determining the legitimacy of evidence, to a strictly civil matter, where other principles and foundations operate. Indeed, as we all know, civil liability (responsabilidad civil) arises from two main sources. On one hand, contractual liability (responsabilidad contractual), which is not relevant for this analysis, and on the other, extracontractual liability (responsabilidad extracontractual). The latter comprises subjective liability (responsabilidad subjetiva) and objective liability. Subjective liability (responsabilidad subjetiva) is that which arises as a consequence of intentional or negligent conduct (comportamiento doloso o culposo) by virtue of which harm is caused. Precisely this liability is expressly contemplated in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which states: \"Anyone who, through intent, fault, negligence, or imprudence causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it together with the damages.\" From which it is inferred that it is indispensable to demonstrate both the existence of the harm and the causal link (relación de causalidad) between that harm and the intentional or negligent conduct. The foregoing allows us to establish that the judge committed a material error by basing objective liability on the cited Article 1045 of the Civil Code, when that provision precisely refers to subjective liability, an error which, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 146 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), must be corrected as will be stated forthwith. In the present case, objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva) arises, whose starting point is not the action of the subject but rather the development of industrial, commercial, and agricultural activities that, although lawful, are risk-generating causes (causas generadoras de riesgo) and potential sources of harm. Its foundation is not subjective but rather objective insofar as the central interest is not to sanction or punish but to repair. Progressively, the new law of damages, with solidarity-based criteria, is oriented towards the objectification of liability and takes into account other criteria based on economic and social assessments, etc., which requires that the harm suffered not be assumed exclusively by the victim and can be economically transferred to a third party. The idea is centered no longer on sanctioning or punishing the perpetrator of the unlawful act but on the need for the harm to be repaired. (Cf.: [Name2]. General Theory of Damage Reparation. Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1997, pp. 143 and 144.) According to the provisions of Article 41 of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, \"Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests…\" In accordance with this normative, the foundation of reparation does not lie in fault (culpa) or intent (dolo) but rather in the production of harm. A provision that is complemented by Articles 46 and 50 of the same Constitution. Regarding this, Article 46, final paragraph, provides that \"...consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, security, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice and to equitable treatment...\", while Article 50 establishes: \"The State shall procure the greatest well-being for all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Therefore, they are legally entitled to denounce acts that infringe upon this right and to claim reparation for the damage caused. The State shall guarantee, defend, and preserve that right. The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions\" (Our underlining). For its part, the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), developing the constitutional postulate, in its Article 2, subsection d), provides a general principle according to which: \"Whoever contaminates the environment or causes it damage shall be responsible, as established by the laws of the Republic and the international conventions in force.\" Meanwhile, Article 59 of the same regulatory body defines environmental contamination (contaminación del ambiente) as \"any alteration or modification of the environment that may harm human health, threaten natural resources, or affect the environment in general of the Nation. The discharge and emission of pollutants shall be obligatorily adjusted to the technical regulations issued. The State shall adopt the measures necessary to prevent or correct environmental contamination.\" Regarding the discharge of contaminating material, which is precisely what we are discussing, Article 66 of the law under comment establishes that \"...the responsibility for the treatment of discharges shall correspond to whoever produces the contamination...\". Finally, Article 101 of the Organic Law of the Environment provides that \"Without prejudice to the responsibilities of another nature that they may incur as participants in any of their forms, those causing the infractions to this law or those regulating the protection of the environment and biological diversity, whether natural or legal persons (personas físicas o jurídicas), shall be civilly and jointly and severally liable (civil y solidariamente responsables) for the damages and losses caused...\" From the cited normative, it is clearly evident that our legislator has received and materialized the traditional principle in environmental matters, according to which \"the polluter pays\" (el que contamina paga), independently of the existence of a subjective link. We are facing a paradigm shift, since liability is not always founded solely on the theory of fault, but rather the increase in causes of harmfulness produced by industrial, commercial, and agricultural development exposes human beings to greater risks. In relation to this topic and analyzing the fifth paragraph of the Civil Code, [Name3] points out that \"in our jurisprudence... it has been clarified that paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 1048 of the Civil Code are not based on liability for direct or indirect fault but on objective liability—that is to say, without fault—which falls on the owners of dangerous establishments and those dedicated to the operation of means of transport; these two rules are a reflection of the theory of risk. In reality, with this, the law has taken two things into account: on one hand, to excite the care of owners and operators of dangerous activities, in the sense of preventing accidents, and, on the other hand, to better guarantee the payment of the respective indemnification, placing it directly in charge of solvent individuals. As can be observed, unlike cases of 'liability for fault', objective liability resides in the fact that someone, for their own benefit, creates a source of probable damages and exposes people and the property of others to dangers and becomes obligated if the damage occurs...\" (Pérez [Name4]. Private Law. San José, Publitex, 1998, p. 416). From a practical perspective, objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva) is summarized as an advantage in favor of the injured party that signifies a reversal of the burden of proof (inversión de la carga de la prueba), in the sense that the latter is exonerated from the burden of proving the fault (culpa) or intent (dolo) of the one causing the harm and is also not required to prove their own lack of fault, unlike cases of subjective liability. The foundation of this type of liability is the social recognition that certain activities, even though lawful (so being unlawful is not a requirement) and necessary within the current social and technological development, which cannot and must not be obstructed, but which concomitantly generate a risk—as producers of eventual damages—which of course should not be assumed by the victim or their next of kin but rather by the one who benefits from the risky activity or from the possession of a source that produces danger. These enterprises, generators of danger for the community and of benefit for their owner, constitute a means through which the damage to the victim is produced. Therefore, as the cause of the harm, they are obliged to repair it. (On objective civil liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva), cf.: Voto 085-F-99 of March 10, 1999, Superior Criminal Cassation Court (Tribunal Superior de Casación Penal). Voto No: 1262-97 of 11:30 a.m. on November 14, 1997, Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Voto No: 525-F-2001 of May 31, 2001, Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Likewise, Second Civil Chamber (Sala Segunda Civil) of the Supreme Court of Justice, No: 304 of 3:10 p.m. on October 4, 1973, and 481 of 10:05 a.m. on July 20, 1992, of the Second Superior Civil Court (Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil), Second Section). Thus, the central argument of the appellant that the chain of custody was violated in relation to the collection of samples is not admissible. Such principles are valid for establishing criminal liability, but not for civil liability where other criteria apply. We must remember that the water samples were not taken by members of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), nor by officers of said department. Rather, it was the members of the Golfito Coast Guard Station (estación de Guardacostas de Golfito) and officials of the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) who were in charge of said proceedings. In any case, regarding the objections to the water collection and its results, the judgment provides a reasoned pronouncement. On this matter, it states that \"...the analysis of the samples collected by the marine biologist, zone coast guard police officer, and witness in this case, [Name5]. This deponent is clear when he refers to the way in which the samples were taken, and to each of the defense's questions about the chain of custody of those samples until they were taken to the Ministry of Health for their analysis and the care taken with them, he was able, without hesitation, to answer all the concerns clearly and forcefully, without leaving any gap whatsoever about how the samples were transported, how they were collected, how they were stored, where they were kept, and finally to whom they were delivered until their analysis\" (folio 277). The same occurs with the report rendered by the defense expert, Mr. [Name6]. The judgment reasonably dismisses his thesis. In this regard, it is indicated: \"This deponent states that he cannot issue a judgment about the veracity of such results; that is so because he did not apply the tests, we would add here. But then he contradicts such statements and indicates that there are two methodologies to do so and describes them, stating that one is the one with which the analyses were carried out and the other is the one he would prefer. However, he never goes beyond mere speculation regarding the standards that should have or could have been applied in the analysis of the samples. He insists on the need to perform a necropsy of the fish found, to have certainty, from his point of view, about the cause of death of the fish. Notwithstanding, this court considers that the referred indicia are more than clear and allow determining what the cause of death of said animals was. Even the witness [Name7] was clear when he indicated that it smelled like fungicide in the canals...\" (folio 278). According to the foregoing, despite not having a necropsy of the fish, it was possible to establish the existence of contamination through the joint and harmonious analysis of the different pieces of circumstantial evidence (indicios) that were presented during the trial. Hence, contrary to what is asserted in the appeal, the ruling does refer to the chain of custody (cadena de custodia) and to the expert's report offered by the defense. Now, regarding civil liability (responsabilidad civil), the judge bases his decision on objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Although the judgment, due to a material error, cites Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which is not applicable to the case, the truth is that, according to the Political Constitution and the Organic Law of the Environment, objective civil liability effectively operates. Apart from the foregoing, the judgment is duly reasoned regarding the creation of risk by the defendant and the production of damage to the environment. It is an uncontested fact that the civil defendant is the owner of a farm located in La Virgen de Golfito, of approximately one thousand hectares and dedicated to the production of rice. It is also not disputed that in November of two thousand, aerial fumigation was carried out on approximately five hundred hectares with the chemicals Hinosán and Endosulfán. After the fumigation, a strong rain fell, and subsequently, a die-off of fish and other animals found at the mouth of the Río Coto appeared. To the foregoing, it must be added, as the judge supports in the judgment, that as a result of the event, a marine biologist, accompanied by other authorities from the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud), conducted a tour of the area, starting from the mouth of the river and advancing upstream, following the trail of dead animals, arriving at the farm of the defendant Inversiones Sábalo S.A., where precisely the incident originated. If, in addition, the neighbors inform these officials that an aerial fumigation had recently occurred on said farm, it is valid to establish the linkage between the fumigation and the contamination. A linkage that can be made even if the water sample and its results are suppressed. As the judge rightly points out, \"the neighbors state that from a temporal point of view, the event that explains the water contamination is the fumigation activity on said farm; that the mentioned farm practically surrounds the cited canals; that, as [Name8] himself admitted, they fumigated during the rainy season, and on the day they made the applications, it also rained heavily, which the witness [Name6] repeats through the defense; given the temporal and geographic proximity, using products toxic to fish... finding water samples with toxic residues both in said canals and in the rice field itself, it is possible to conclude beyond any doubt that the cause of this damage is the agricultural exploitation activity...\" (folio 276). Thus, the judgment is duly and sufficiently reasoned regarding the civil liability of the defendant. Finally, the appellant's complaint that the judge considered that the civil defendant's defense acquiesced to the plaintiff's claims lacks merit. Certainly, the judge makes an error in indicating that \"In fact, regarding the state claim for damages, the representative of the defendant company made no statement, which even makes it possible to conclude that it acquiesces to them\" (cf. Folio 283). Regardless of whether or not the defendant referred to the civil action (a statement contested by the appellant), this cannot be interpreted as an acquiescence (allanamiento) to the opposing party's claims, because for that to occur, there must be an express declaration of will. However, what is true and relevant is that the judge proceeds to examine the substantive reasons and determines the existence of objective liability. A conclusion that, as has been seen, is shared by this Chamber. In view of the foregoing, the appeal for cassation (recurso de casación) filed by the civil defendant is declared without merit.\"\n\nThird Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Vote No: 525-F-2001 of May 31, 2001, Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Likewise, Second Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No: 304 of 3:10 p.m. on October 4, 1973, and 481 of 10:05 a.m. on July 20, 1992, of the Second Civil Superior Court, Second Section). Thus, the appellant's central argument regarding the violation of the chain of custody in relation to the sample collection is not meritorious. Such principles are valid for establishing criminal responsibility, but not for civil liability where other criteria apply. We must recall that the water samples were not taken by members of the Judicial Investigation Organization, nor by officers of that agency. Rather, it was members of the Golfito Coast Guard station and officials of the Ministry of Health who were responsible for those proceedings. In any case, regarding the objections to the water collection and its results, the judgment provides a reasoned ruling. On this point, it states that \"...*the analysis of the samples collected by the marine biologist, a coast guard officer from the area and a witness in this case, [Name5]. Said witness is clear when he describes the manner in which the samples were taken and, in response to each of the defense's questions about the chain of custody of said samples until they were taken to the Ministry of Health for analysis and the care taken with them, he was able, without hesitation, to answer all concerns clearly and forcefully, leaving no gap whatsoever about how the samples were transported, how they were collected, how they were stored, where they were kept, and finally to whom they were delivered for analysis*\" (folio 277). The same occurs with the report issued by the defense expert, Mr. [Name6]. The judgment reasonably dismisses his thesis. In this regard, it indicates \"*Said witness states that he cannot render a judgment about the veracity of such results; this is so because he did not apply the tests, we might add here. But immediately thereafter he contradicts such statements and indicates that there are two methodologies for doing so and describes them, stating that one is what was used for the analyses and the other is the one he would prefer. However, he never goes beyond mere speculation regarding the standards that should or could have been applied in the analysis of the samples. He insists on the need to perform a necropsy on the fish found, to be certain from his point of view about the cause of the fish's death. Nevertheless, this tribunal considers that the referred indicia are more than clear and allow determination of what has been the cause of death of said animals. Even the witness [Name7] was clear when he indicated that it smelled of fungicide in the channels*...\" (folio 278). In accordance with the foregoing, despite not having a necropsy of the fish, it was possible to establish the existence of the pollution through the joint and harmonious analysis of the various pieces of evidence presented at the hearing. Hence, contrary to what is held in the appeal, the ruling does address the chain of custody and the defense expert's report.\n\nNow, regarding the civil liability, the adjudicator bases his decision on strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Although the judgment, due to a material error, cites Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which is not applicable to the case, the truth is that, pursuant to the Political Constitution and the Organic Environmental Law, strict civil liability indeed applies. Aside from the above, the judgment is duly substantiated regarding the creation of risk by the defendant and the production of environmental damage. It is an undisputed fact that the civil defendant is the owner of a property located in La Virgen de Golfito, of approximately one thousand hectares and dedicated to rice production. It is also not in dispute that in November of the year two thousand, approximately five hundred hectares were fumigated, via aerial application, with the chemicals Hinosan and Endosulfan. After the fumigation, a heavy rain fell, and subsequently, a die-off of fish and other animals located at the mouth of the Río Coto appeared. To the above must be added, as supported by the judge in the ruling, that as a result of the event, a marine biologist, accompanied by other authorities from the Ministry of Health, conducted a tour of the area, starting at the river mouth and moving upstream, following the trail of dead animals, arriving at the property of the defendant Inversiones Sábalo S.A., where precisely the incident originated. If, in addition, neighbors informed those officials that an aerial fumigation had recently occurred on said property, it is valid to establish the link between the fumigation and the pollution. A link that can be established even suppressing the water sample and its results. As the adjudicator correctly points out, \"*the neighbors state that from a temporal point of view, the event explaining the water pollution is the fumigation activity on said property; that the mentioned property practically surrounds the cited channels; that as [Name8] himself admitted, they fumigated during the rainy season and on the day they made the applications it also rained quite heavily, which, by the mouth of the defender, the witness [Name6] repeats; there being temporal and geographical proximity, using products toxic to fish... water samples with toxic residues being found, both in said channels and in the paddy field itself, it is possible to conclude without a doubt that the cause of this damage is the agricultural exploitation activity*...\" (folio 276). Thus, the judgment is sufficiently reasoned regarding the civil liability of the defendant.\n\nFinally, the appellant's claim that the judge considered that the civil defendant's defense acquiesced to the plaintiff's claims lacks interest. Certainly, the adjudicator makes an error by indicating that \"*In fact, regarding the state's claim for damages, the representative of the defendant company made no statement whatsoever, therefore it is even plausible to conclude that he acquiesces to them*\" (cf. Folio 283). Regardless of whether the defendant did or did not refer to the civil action (an assertion that the appellant contests), this cannot be interpreted as acquiescence to the opposing party's claims, because for that to occur, an express declaration of will must exist. However, what is certain and relevant is that the judge proceeds to examine the substantive reasons and determines the existence of a strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). A conclusion that, as has been seen, is shared by this Chamber. In view of the foregoing, the appeal filed by the civil defendant is declared without merit.\"\n\nThus, the appellant's central argument that the chain of custody was violated in relation to the collection of samples is unavailing. Those principles are valid for establishing criminal liability, but not for civil liability where other criteria apply. We must recall that the water samples were not taken by members of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, nor by officers of that agency. Rather, it was the members of the Golfito Coast Guard station and officials of the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) who were in charge of those proceedings. In any event, regarding the objections to the water collection and its results, the judgment addresses them in a reasoned manner. On this point, it states that “…the analysis of the samples collected by the marine biologist, coast guard police officer of the area, and witness in this case, [Name5]. This deponent is clear when recounting the manner in which the samples were taken, and when faced with each of the defense's questions about the chain of custody of said samples until they were taken to the Ministry of Health for analysis and the care that was taken with them, he was able, without hesitation, to answer all concerns, clearly and forcefully, leaving no gap whatsoever about how the samples were transported, how they were collected, how they were stored, where they were kept, and finally to whom they were delivered for analysis” (folio 277). The same applies to the report rendered by the defense expert, Mr. [Name6]. The judgment reasonably dismisses his thesis. In this regard, it is indicated: “The deponent states that he cannot issue an opinion about the veracity of such results; that is so, we would add here, because he did not perform the tests. But immediately thereafter he contradicts such affirmations and indicates that there are two methodologies for doing so and describes them; he states that one is the one with which the analyses were performed and the other is the one he would prefer. However, he never goes beyond mere speculation regarding the standards that should or could have been applied in the analysis of the samples. He insists on the need to perform a necropsy of the fish found, in order to be certain, from his point of view, about the cause of death of the fish. Nevertheless, this court considers that the cited circumstantial evidence is more than clear and allows for determining what the cause of death of said animals was. Even witness [Name7] was clear when he indicated that it smelled like fungicide in the channels…” (folio 278). In accordance with the foregoing, despite not having a necropsy of the fish, it was possible to establish the existence of the contamination through the joint and harmonious analysis of the various pieces of circumstantial evidence that were introduced at trial. Hence, contrary to what is argued in the appeal, the ruling does address the chain of custody and the report of the expert offered by the defense.\n\nNow, regarding civil liability, the trial judge bases his decision on strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Although the judgment, due to a material error, cites Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which is not applicable to the case, the fact is that, in accordance with the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), a strict liability regime indeed applies. Apart from the foregoing, the judgment is duly substantiated regarding the creation of risk by the defendant and the production of environmental damage. It is an undisputed fact that the civil defendant is the owner of a property located in La Virgen de Golfito, of approximately one thousand hectares, dedicated to rice production. It is also not under discussion that in November two thousand, approximately five hundred hectares were fumigated aerially with the chemicals Hinosán and Endosulfan. After the fumigation, a heavy rain fell, and subsequently a die-off of fish and other animals located at the mouth of the Río Coto appeared. To the above, it must be added, as the judge supports in the judgment, that as a result of the event, a marine biologist, accompanied by other authorities from the Ministry of Health, conducted a survey of the area, starting from the river mouth and advancing upstream, following the trail of dead animals, until they reached the property of the defendant Inversiones Sábalo S.A., where the incident precisely originated. If, furthermore, the neighbors informed those officials that an aerial fumigation had recently occurred on said property, it is valid to establish the link between the fumigation and the contamination. A link that can be made even by disregarding the water sample and its results. As the trial judge rightly points out: “...the neighbors state that, from a temporal standpoint, the event explaining the water contamination is the fumigation activity on said property; that the aforementioned property practically surrounds the cited channels; that, as [Name8] himself admitted, they fumigated during the rainy season and on the day they made the applications, it also rained heavily, which the witness [Name6] repeats through the defense’s own mouth; given a temporal and geographic proximity, using products toxic to fish... with water samples found containing toxic residues, both in said channels and in the rice field itself, it is possible to conclude without a doubt that the cause of that damage is the agricultural exploitation activity...” (folio 276). Thus, the judgment is sufficiently and duly reasoned regarding the civil liability of the defendant.\n\nFinally, the appellant's claim that the judge considered that the defense of the civil defendant acquiesced (se allanó) to the plaintiff's claims lacks merit. The trial judge indeed committed an error by indicating that “In fact, regarding the State’s claim for damages, the representative of the defendant company made no statement whatsoever, so it is even reasonable to conclude that it acquiesces to them” (cf. Folio 283). Regardless of whether the defendant did or did not refer to the civil action (an assertion the challenger contests), this cannot be interpreted as acquiescence to the opposing party’s claims, because for that to occur, an express manifestation of will is required. However, what is true and relevant is that the judge proceeds to examine the substantive reasons and determines the existence of strict liability. A conclusion which, as has been seen, is shared by this Chamber. In light of the foregoing, the cassation appeal filed by the civil defendant is declared without merit."
}