{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-7014",
  "citation": "Res. 00195-2001 Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Efectos de la prescripción penal sobre la acción civil resarcitoria",
  "title_en": "Effects of criminal statute of limitations on civil damages action",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José analiza si la declaratoria de prescripción de la acción penal impide continuar con la pretensión civil resarcitoria. Examina dos posturas doctrinales y jurisprudenciales: una, basada en el artículo 871 del Código Civil, sostiene que la acción civil prescribe junto con la penal; otra, fundada en el artículo 96 párrafo segundo del Código Penal (norma posterior y especial), defiende que la extinción de la acción penal no afecta la obligación de reparar el daño. El Tribunal acoge esta segunda tesis al considerar que el artículo 96 párrafo segundo del Código Penal deroga implícitamente al 871 del Código Civil, por ser ley posterior y especial. Además, señala que si ninguna de las partes alegó la prescripción de la acción civil, el tribunal de instancia incurrió en un vicio de incongruencia extra petita al declararla de oficio. En consecuencia, declara con lugar el recurso de la actora civil, anula la declaratoria de prescripción de la acción civil y remite a la vía civil para que se reclame la indemnización correspondiente.",
  "summary_en": "The San José Criminal Cassation Court examines whether the declaration of the statute of limitations for criminal proceedings prevents the continuation of the civil claim for damages. It analyzes two doctrinal and jurisprudential positions: one, based on Article 871 of the Civil Code, holding that the civil action is extinguished along with the criminal action; the other, grounded in Article 96, second paragraph, of the Criminal Code (a later and special norm), maintaining that the extinguishment of criminal proceedings does not affect the obligation to repair the harm. The Court adopts the second view, finding that Article 96, second paragraph, of the Criminal Code implicitly repeals Article 871 of the Civil Code as a later, special law. It further holds that since neither party raised the statute of limitations on the civil claim, the lower court’s sua sponte declaration constitutes an extra petita defect. Consequently, it grants the appeal of the civil plaintiff, reverses the declaration that the civil action is time-barred, and refers the matter to the civil jurisdiction for the corresponding damages claim.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José",
  "date": "02/03/2001",
  "year": "2001",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "acción civil resarcitoria",
    "prescripción de la acción penal",
    "Art. 871 Código Civil",
    "Art. 96 párrafo segundo Código Penal",
    "extra petita",
    "sobreseimiento",
    "derogación implícita",
    "principio de especialidad"
  ],
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      "article": "82",
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      "source": "metadata"
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      "law": "Ley 4573",
      "article": "82",
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      "law": "Código Penal",
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      "article": "96",
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    {
      "law": "Código de Procedimientos Penales",
      "article": "11",
      "doc_id": "norm-1061",
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    {
      "law": "Ley 5377",
      "article": "11",
      "doc_id": "norm-1061",
      "source": "metadata"
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    {
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública",
      "article": "207",
      "doc_id": "norm-13231",
      "source": "metadata"
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    {
      "law": "Ley 6227",
      "article": "207",
      "doc_id": "norm-13231",
      "source": "metadata"
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    {
      "law": "Código Civil",
      "article": "868",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 63",
      "article": "868",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
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    {
      "law": "Código Civil",
      "article": "869",
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      "source": "metadata"
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      "law": "Ley 63",
      "article": "869",
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      "article": "870",
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      "article": "871",
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      "article": "871",
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      "article": "13",
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      "law": "Ley 7135",
      "article": "13",
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  "keywords_es": [
    "acción civil resarcitoria",
    "prescripción penal",
    "Art. 871 Código Civil",
    "Art. 96 párrafo 2 Código Penal",
    "extra petita",
    "casación penal",
    "responsabilidad civil ex delicto",
    "derogación implícita"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "civil damages action",
    "criminal statute of limitations",
    "Article 871 Civil Code",
    "Article 96(2) Criminal Code",
    "extra petita",
    "criminal cassation",
    "civil liability arising from crime",
    "implied repeal"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Conforme con las razones expuestas, se estima que el recurrente lleva razón, no por los argumentos que él invoca, ni en cuanto a la aplicación de normas del Código de Comercio respecto a la prescripción de obligaciones procedentes de cheques, sino fundamentalmente porque si bien existe una norma del Código Civil que establece en el numeral 871 que “Las acciones civiles procedentes de delito o cuasidelito prescribirán junto con el delito o cuasidelito de que proceden”, es lo cierto que el problema no es tanto de constitucionalidad sino de la existencia de una norma posterior como lo es el numeral 96 párrafo segundo del Código Penal que de modo diverso reguló la cuestión aquí debatida. Por otro lado debe considerarse que en lo que si lleva razón el quejoso es en cuanto a que si ninguna de las partes alegó la prescripción de la acción civil, extremo que en efecto se constata en el acta de debate al folio 103 frente y vuelto, no tenía porqué el tribunal pronunciarse sobre ese extremo, por lo que incurrió en un vicio de extra petita.",
  "excerpt_en": "In accordance with the reasons set forth, it is held that the appellant is correct, not because of the arguments he invokes, nor concerning the application of provisions of the Commercial Code regarding the statute of limitations for obligations arising from checks, but fundamentally because although there is a provision of the Civil Code that establishes in Article 871 that “Civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime shall prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise,” the truth is that the issue is not so much one of constitutionality but rather the existence of a later provision, namely Article 96, second paragraph, of the Criminal Code, which differently regulated the matter here debated. On the other hand, it must be considered that the appellant is correct in that, since neither party raised the statute of limitations on the civil action, a point which is indeed verified in the trial record at folio 103 front and back, the court had no reason to rule on that point, and therefore committed an extra petita defect.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Granted",
    "label_es": "Con lugar",
    "summary_en": "The civil plaintiff's appeal is granted; the declaration that the civil action is time-barred is reversed, and the matter is referred to civil jurisdiction for the damages claim.",
    "summary_es": "Se declara con lugar el recurso de la actora civil, se anula la declaratoria de prescripción de la acción civil y se remite a la vía civil para la reclamación indemnizatoria."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Cita del Art. 96 párrafo 2 del Código Penal",
      "quote_en": "The extinguishment of the criminal action and the penalty shall not affect the obligation to repair the harm caused, nor shall it prevent the confiscation of the instruments of the crime.",
      "quote_es": "La extinción de la acción penal y de la pena no producirá efectos con respecto a la obligación de reparar el daño causado, ni impedirá el decomiso de los instrumentos del delito."
    },
    {
      "context": "Ratio decidendi",
      "quote_en": "the issue is not so much one of constitutionality but rather the existence of a later provision, namely Article 96, second paragraph, of the Criminal Code, which differently regulated the matter here debated.",
      "quote_es": "el problema no es tanto de constitucionalidad sino de la existencia de una norma posterior como lo es el numeral 96 párrafo segundo del Código Penal que de modo diverso reguló la cuestión aquí debatida."
    },
    {
      "context": "Ratio decidendi sobre el vicio procesal",
      "quote_en": "since neither party raised the statute of limitations on the civil action, a point which is indeed verified in the trial record at folio 103 front and back, the court had no reason to rule on that point, and therefore committed an extra petita defect.",
      "quote_es": "si ninguna de las partes alegó la prescripción de la acción civil, extremo que en efecto se constata en el acta de debate al folio 103 frente y vuelto, no tenía porqué el tribunal pronunciarse sobre ese extremo, por lo que incurrió en un vicio de extra petita."
    }
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  "body_es_text": "\"El tema propuesto por el recurrente para su análisis no ha sido de todo pacífico en doctrina ni tampoco en la jurisprudencia. Para algunos si la acción penal ha prescrito, igual suerte ha de correr la acción civil resarcitoria. Así lo considera por ejemplo- [Nombre1] cuando expone: “ El Código Penal indica, como acabamos de ver, que las obligaciones correspondientes a la reparación civil se extinguen por los medios y en la forma determinada por el Código Civil. Dentro de los modos de extinción se encuentra la prescripción. Remitiéndonos al código civil ( sic) el artículo 868 nos dice que “Todo derecho y su correspondiente acción se prescriben en diez años. Esta regla admite las excepciones que prescriben los artículos siguientes y las demás expresamente establecidas por la ley, cuando determinados casos exigen para la prescripción más o menos tiempo”. Las excepciones de los artículos siguientes son las que señalan los numerales 869 y870 que establecen una prescripción de tres y un año respectivamente. El artículo 871 de gran interés para nosotros, dice así: “Las acciones civiles procedentes de delito o cuasidelito se prescriben junto con el delito o cuasidelto de que proceden”. Este artículo es el aplicable para efectos de la prescripción de la acción de resarcimiento, y no el 868 de la prescripción decenal. Ello por lógica aplicación del aforismo latino “ leges generales non debent etendi at leges, quae habent suam particularem provisionem (las leyes generales no deben extenderse a los casos que tienen sus especiales disposiciones. En efecto, existiendo la norma del 871, especifica para el caso, esa debe ser la norma aplicable y no la del 868”… Según lo que hasta ahora hemos dicho, cuando comienza la prescripción de la acción penal, comienza la de la acción civil de resarcimiento; cuando se interrumpe la acción penal, se interrumpe la acción civil ex delicto, cuando se suspende la una, se suspende, también, la otra”. (véase al respecto: [Nombre2], [Nombre3]: La Responsabilidad Civil Derivada del Hecho Punible. San José Costa Rica. Editorial Juricentro 1984. pp 167- 168). Como vemos, para algunos declarada la prescripción de la acción penal igual suerte corre la acción civil, más sin embargo, ello a tenor del numeral 871 del Código Civil, pero para otros, en realidad este numeral quedó derogado implícitamente por el numeral 96 párrafo segundo del Código Penal, (cf. Por [Nombre4], Código Penal. Investigaciones Jurídicas. p. 60). La jurisprudencia también ha sido divergente sobre este tema. Así la Sala Tercera con ocasión de una consulta que se hizo sobre la constitucionalidad del artículo 871 del Código Civil, al estimar –en resumen- que la solución debería ser distinta a la señalada en esa norma cuando se trata de la responsabilidad proveniente de un delito pues “Por el contrario, el principio de igualdad también deriva la necesidad de tratamiento diferenciado ante situaciones distintas, en consecuencia, la solución debiera ser inversa a la señalada en el numeral 871 del Código Civil, porque el plazo para reclamar los daños y perjuicios debiera ser mayor cuando el hecho es constitutivo de delito , por tratarse de una conducta más grave, y por lesionarse bienes jurídicamente tutelados por el derecho penal, que por lo general son los más importantes en la comunidad, de acuerdo con una escala de valores reflejada en una concreta política criminal… Los anteriores razonamientos nos hacen cuestionarnos la constitucionalidad del artículo 871 del Código Civil , y por esas dudas nos permitimos hacer la consulta ante la Sala Constitucional, para lo que en derecho corresponda. En suma, esa consulta de la Sala de Casación respecto a la constitucionalidad del numeral 871 del Código Civil, tenía como propósito aclarar posibles roces con el principio de igualdad “…el hecho de que se otorgue mayor plazo para solicitar una indemnización pecuniaria frente a acciones civiles que ocasionen daños y perjuicios, y que el plazo se reduzca frente a acciones delictivas, que ocasionan lesiones de mayor entidad que las primeras”. ( Sala Tercera de la Corte V- 297 A- de las 14:55 horas del 9 de julio de 1993. Una transcripción de todos los aspectos de esa consulta puede leerse en: ESTRADA VENEGAS, Ingrid: Jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera sobre la Acción Civil Resarcitoria. Primera edición. San José Costa Rica. Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. 1997. Páginas 129 a 132). Al resolver la indicada consulta dijo la Sala Constitucional -entre otras razones – lo siguiente: “ …en el caso del delito existe un interés eminentemente público, en el otro (caso de lesión meramente civil) el interés es básicamente privado. De allí que si, aun mediando ese interés publico en tratándose de un delito, la acción penal prescribe, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 82 del Código Penal, lo lógico, al contrario de lo expresado en la consulta, es que prescriba junto con aquélla la civil, puesto que esta es, en relación con la primera, meramente secundaria, y por ello, sería un contrasentido si por el hecho principal, que es el delito, ya no se pueda perseguir a un sujeto, cuando ese interés es meramente privado en tanto en otro es público. De modo que, si de conformidad con el propio ordenamiento penal, determinados delitos prescriben en un lapso menor a los diez años, mal haría el legislador si otorgara una mayor tutela jurídica al interés puramente privado del damnificado por el delito que al interés público principal y ampliara el plazo de prescripción de la acción civil, por ejemplo, a diez años, de manera que aún cuando no procediera penalmente la imposición de ninguna sanción el ofendido pudiera cobrar lo daños y perjuicios derivados de una acción delictiva” . ( Sala Constitucional Voto 5029-93 de las 14:36 horas del 13 de octubre de 1993. Para una lectura completa del voto puede consultarse: ESTRADA VENEGAS, Ingrid. Op. Cit. páginas 133 y 134). De modo tal, que podemos apreciar que la discusión gira en torno a considerar si a pesar de una sentencia declarativa de la prescripción en sede penal, y que trae aparejada la declaratoria del sobreseimiento por extinción de la acción penal, ese aspecto, sea la prescripción, también opera respecto a la pretensión civil. A raíz de la consulta indicada por la Sala Tercera existe un precedente jurisprudencial de esa misma Sala penal que indicó: “ Este vicio no se extiende ni efecta la decisión civil con relación a los hechos por uso de documento falso en concurso material con estafa, que el tribunal tuvo por acreditados y prescritos, puesto que precisamente tal condición, alegada oportunamente por la defensa de [Nombre5].(…) la de la prescripción, hace que cualquier enmienda de la cuestión de la falta de fundamentación de la cuestión sobre la responsabilidad sea estéril, en tanto también estaría prescrita. En efecto, a tenor del artículo 871 del Código Civil (que por especialidad se sobrepone al 207 de la Ley General de Administración Pública, en tanto aquél versa sobre la responsabilidad derivada de un hecho delictivo) establece que “Las acciones civiles procedentes de delito o cuasidelito prescriben junto con el delito o cuasidelito del que proceden”. ( Sala Tercera de la Corte V- 565- F de las 16:15 horas del 12 de diciembre de 1994). En un voto mucho más reciente expreso la misma Sala Tercera de Casación: “…lleva razón el adherente en el sentido de que el fallo no se pronunció sobre las pretensiones resarcitorias. Sin embargo, el asunto carece de interés, pues al dictarse la prescripción de las acciones penales, de conformidad con el articulo 871 del Código Civil (cuya legitimidad fue ratificada por la Sala Constitucional mediante voto 5029 de 14:36 horas del 13 de octubre de 1993), también prescribieron las acciones civiles emergentes de aquél hecho presuntamente punible, de modo tal que el punto echado de menos era irrelevante…”. (Sala Tercera de la Corte N- 85-99 de las 9:40 horas del 21 de enero de 1999. En similar sentido véase Sala Tercera voto 891- 99 de las 9:15 horas del 19 de julio de 1999). Vemos que en realidad la jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera Penal, se ajusta a lo que ya había resuelto la Sala Constitucional al considerar que el numeral 871 del Código Civil era constitucional, y sobre todo por la obligatoriedad de los precedentes conforme al numeral 13 de la Ley de Jurisdiccional Constitucional. Sin embargo, es preciso indicar que para otros en realidad no es posible que si se declara la prescripción de la acción penal, necesariamente la pretensión civil deba correr igual suerte, pues se dice que existe una norma posterior al numeral 871 del Código Civil, como lo es el 96 párrafo segundo del Código Penal, el cual establece que “ La extinción de la acción penal y de la pena no producirá efectos con respecto a la obligación de reparar el daño causado, ni impedirá el decomiso de los instrumentos del delito”, de modo tal que el problema no es de constitucionalidad sino de la existencia de una norma posterior que regula de modo diverso la cuestión y que como tal –al ser posterior y estar al mismo nivel de las fuentes del derecho- debe prevalecer. En este último sentido se ha dicho: “ La Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia dispuso que al prescribir la acción penal lo propio ocurriría con la demanda civil, lo que contraría el articulo 96 párrafo segundo del Código Penal. Afirmamos lo anterior porque la prescripción es una causa de extinción de la acción penal. Además el Código Penal es una ley especial y posterior al Código Civil, con lo cual queda claro cual era la legislación aplicable al caso. El problema no es si el artículo 871 es constitucional o no. Lo importante es que hay una norma posterior y especial que la dejó sin efecto. Entendemos entonces que la prescripción de la acción penal, causa de extinción de la acción penal, no produce efectos sobre la obligación de indemnizar”. (véase al respecto: [Nombre6]: La Prescripción de la Acción Penal en la Nueva Legislación Procesal Costarricense. San José Costa Rica. Editorial Jurídica Continental. 2000. Página 100). Conforme con las razones expuestas, se estima que el recurrente lleva razón, no por los argumentos que él invoca, ni en cuanto a la aplicación de normas del Código de Comercio respecto a la prescripción de obligaciones procedentes de cheques, sino fundamentalmente porque si bien existe una norma del Código Civil que establece en el numeral 871 que “Las acciones civiles procedentes de delito o cuasidelito prescribirán junto con el delito o cuasidelito de que proceden”, es lo cierto que el problema no es tanto de constitucionalidad sino de la existencia de una norma posterior como lo es el numeral 96 párrafo segundo del Código Penal que de modo diverso reguló la cuestión aquí debatida. Por otro lado debe considerarse que en lo que si lleva razón el quejoso es en cuanto a que si ninguna de las partes alegó la prescripción de la acción civil, extremo que en efecto se constata en el acta de debate al folio 103 frente y vuelto, no tenía porqué el tribunal pronunciarse sobre ese extremo, por lo que incurrió en un vicio de extra petita. La misma jurisprudencia de este Tribunal se ha pronunciado en los sentidos ya indicados, al expresarse lo siguiente: “ Respecto de la pretensión civil el fallo se mantiene, por no haber sido opuesta la excepción de prescripción en este aspecto, por lo que se considera renunciada, de conformidad con el artículo 851 del Código Civil, que indica: “La renuncia de la prescripción puede ser tácita , y resulta de no oponer la excepción antes de la sentencia firme…”. La prescripción no es declarable de oficio, por lo que al no haber sido alegada, la sentencia en el aspecto civil debe mantenerse” (Tribunal de Casación Penal 492 F- 98 de las 10:20 horas del 13 de julio de 1998). En este mismo voto con relación a la prescripción del aspecto civil se dijo también que: “ La resolución de la Sala Constitucional analiza la consulta realizada por la Sala de Casación Penal, en la que se cuestiona la constitucionalidad del artículo 871 del Código Civil, que establece que las acciones civiles procedentes de delito o cuasidelito se prescriben junto con el delito o cuasidelito de que proceden, por establecer para casos de delitos un plazo menor de prescripción que el que señala la norma general del Código Civil, de diez años. La Sala Constitucional se refirió en el fallo a ese único aspecto, y consideró que el artículo 871 del Código Civil no era inconstitucional. No examina la sentencia 5029 – 93 lo referente a si la prescripción del aspecto civil se dictara( sic) o no de oficio, puesto que no fue objeto de la consulta. Además el artículo 96 párrafo segundo del Código Penal establece con claridad: “La extinción de la acción penal y de la pena no producirá efecto respecto de la obligación de reparar el daño causado, no impedirá el decomiso de los instrumentos del delito”. Por su parte, el Código de Procedimientos Penales, el artículo 11 señala, refiriéndose a la acción civil resarcitoria “ni la ulterior extinción de la pretensión penal impedirá que la Sala de Casación decida sobre la acción civil”. Analizada toda la normativa anterior, y la resolución de la Sala Constitucional, en forma armónica se concluye que lo que prescribe junto con el delito es la posibilidad de accionar civilmente dentro del proceso penal, pero una vez en curso ambas acciones , cada una se regirá por sus normas particulares, en lo que se refiere a la declaratoria de la prescripción”. (Tribunal de Casación Penal 492 – F- 98 de las 10:20 horas del 13 de julio de 1998). Por las razones expuestas se declara con lugar el recurso de la actora civil, y anula la sentencia en el punto objeto de recurso relacionado con la declaratoria de la prescripción de la acción civil incoada por [Nombre7] contra [Nombre8] [Nombre9], y se remite a la parte a la vía civil correspondiente para que –si a bien lo tiene- reclame la indemnización correspondiente en esa sede.\"",
  "body_en_text": "\"The issue raised by the appellant for analysis has not been entirely settled in doctrine, nor in case law. For some, if the criminal action has prescribed, the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) must suffer the same fate. This is the view of, for example, [Nombre1] when he states: “The Penal Code indicates, as we have just seen, that the obligations corresponding to civil reparation are extinguished by the means and in the manner determined by the Civil Code. Among the modes of extinction is prescription. If we refer to the civil code (sic) Article 868 tells us that 'Every right and its corresponding action shall prescribe in ten years. This rule admits the exceptions prescribed in the following articles and others expressly established by law, when specific cases require more or less time for prescription.' The exceptions in the following articles are those indicated in numerals 869 and 870, which establish a prescription of three and one year respectively. Article 871, of great interest to us, states: 'Civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime (delito o cuasidelito) shall prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise.' This article is the one applicable for the purposes of prescription of the action for damages (acción de resarcimiento), and not Article 868 on decennial prescription. This follows from the logical application of the Latin maxim 'leges generales non debent etendi at leges, quae habent suam particularem provisionem' (general laws must not be extended to cases that have their own special provisions). Indeed, since the rule of Article 871 exists, specific for the case, that must be the applicable rule and not that of Article 868.”… According to what we have said so far, when the prescription of the criminal action begins, that of the civil action for damages (acción civil de resarcimiento) begins; when the criminal action is interrupted, the civil action ex delicto is interrupted; when one is suspended, the other is also suspended.” (see on this: [Nombre2], [Nombre3]: La Responsabilidad Civil Derivada del Hecho Punible. San José Costa Rica. Editorial Juricentro 1984. pp 167- 168). As we can see, for some, once the prescription of the criminal action is declared, the civil action suffers the same fate, but this is under the terms of numeral 871 of the Civil Code; however, for others, this numeral was actually impliedly repealed by numeral 96, second paragraph (párrafo segundo) of the Penal Code (cf. by [Nombre4], Código Penal. Investigaciones Jurídicas. p. 60). Case law has also been divergent on this topic. Thus, the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera), on the occasion of a consultation made regarding the constitutionality of Article 871 of the Civil Code, considered—in summary—that the solution should be different from that indicated in that rule when dealing with liability arising from a crime, since “On the contrary, the principle of equality also derives the need for differentiated treatment in different situations; consequently, the solution should be the inverse of that indicated in numeral 871 of the Civil Code, because the term to claim damages should be longer when the act constitutes a crime, since it involves more serious conduct, and because it harms legal interests protected by criminal law, which are generally the most important in the community, according to a scale of values reflected in a specific criminal policy… The foregoing reasoning leads us to question the constitutionality of Article 871 of the Civil Code, and because of these doubts, we take the liberty of making this consultation before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), for whatever is appropriate in law.” In sum, that consultation by the Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación) regarding the constitutionality of numeral 871 of the Civil Code had the purpose of clarifying possible conflicts with the principle of equality: “…the fact that a longer period is granted to request pecuniary compensation for civil actions that cause damages, and that the period is reduced for criminal actions, which cause injuries of greater magnitude than the former.” (Third Chamber of the Court V- 297 A- of 14:55 hours on July 9, 1993. A transcription of all aspects of that consultation can be read in: ESTRADA VENEGAS, Ingrid: Jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera sobre la Acción Civil Resarcitoria. First edition. San José Costa Rica. Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. 1997. Pages 129 to 132). In resolving the indicated consultation, the Constitutional Chamber stated—among other reasons—the following: “…in the case of a crime, there is an eminently public interest, while in the other (case of purely civil injury) the interest is basically private. Hence, if, even with that public interest involved in a crime, the criminal action prescribes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 82 of the Penal Code, the logical conclusion, contrary to what was expressed in the consultation, is that the civil action prescribes along with it, since the latter is, in relation to the former, merely secondary, and therefore, it would be a contradiction if, because of the principal fact, which is the crime, a person can no longer be pursued, when that interest is merely private while in the other it is public. Thus, if in accordance with the criminal legal system itself, certain crimes prescribe in a period of less than ten years, the legislator would do a poor job if it granted greater legal protection to the purely private interest of the party injured by the crime than to the principal public interest and extended the prescription period for the civil action, for example, to ten years, so that even when no criminal sanction could be imposed, the offended party could collect the damages arising from a criminal action.” (Constitutional Chamber Voto 5029-93 of 14:36 hours on October 13, 1993. For a complete reading of the vote, consult: ESTRADA VENEGAS, Ingrid. Op. Cit. pages 133 and 134). So, we can see that the discussion revolves around considering whether, despite a declaratory judgment of prescription in the criminal court, which brings with it a declaration of dismissal (sobreseimiento) due to extinction of the criminal action, that aspect, namely prescription, also operates with respect to the civil claim (pretensión civil). Following the consultation indicated by the Third Chamber, there is a case law precedent from that same Criminal Chamber which indicated: “This defect does not extend to or affect the civil decision regarding the facts for use of a false document in material concurrence (concurso material) with fraud (estafa), which the court deemed proven and prescribed, since precisely that condition, timely alleged by the defense of [Nombre5] (…) that of prescription, makes any amendment to the issue of the lack of substantiation of the question of liability sterile, insofar as it would also be prescribed. Indeed, under the terms of Article 871 of the Civil Code (which, by specialty, overrides Article 207 of the Ley General de Administración Pública, insofar as the former deals with liability derived from a criminal act), it establishes that 'Civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime shall prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise'.\" (Third Chamber of the Court V- 565- F of 16:15 hours on December 12, 1994). In a much more recent vote, the same Third Chamber of Cassation expressed: “…the adherer is correct in the sense that the judgment did not rule on the claims for damages. However, the matter lacks interest, since upon decreeing the prescription of the criminal actions, in accordance with Article 871 of the Civil Code (whose legitimacy was ratified by the Constitutional Chamber through vote 5029 of 14:36 hours on October 13, 1993), the civil actions arising from that allegedly punishable act also prescribed, so the point that was missed was irrelevant…” (Third Chamber of the Court N- 85-99 of 9:40 hours on January 21, 1999. In a similar sense, see Third Chamber voto 891- 99 of 9:15 hours on July 19, 1999). We see that, in reality, the case law of the Third Criminal Chamber conforms to what the Constitutional Chamber had already resolved when it considered that numeral 871 of the Civil Code was constitutional, and above all due to the binding nature of precedents in accordance with numeral 13 of the Ley de Jurisdiccional Constitucional. However, it is necessary to point out that for others, it is actually not possible that if the prescription of the criminal action is declared, the civil claim must necessarily suffer the same fate, since it is said that there is a rule subsequent to numeral 871 of the Civil Code, namely numeral 96, second paragraph, of the Penal Code, which establishes that \"The extinction of the criminal action and the penalty shall not produce effects with respect to the obligation to repair the damage caused, nor shall it prevent the confiscation (decomiso) of the instruments of the crime,\" so the problem is not one of constitutionality but of the existence of a subsequent rule that regulates the matter in a different way and which, as such—being subsequent and at the same level of the sources of law—must prevail. In this latter sense, it has been said: “The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice ordered that when the criminal action prescribes, the same would occur with the civil lawsuit, which contradicts Article 96, second paragraph, of the Penal Code. We affirm the foregoing because prescription is a cause of extinction of the criminal action. Furthermore, the Penal Code is a special law and subsequent to the Civil Code, which makes it clear what the applicable legislation was in the case. The problem is not whether Article 871 is constitutional or not. The important thing is that there is a subsequent and special rule that rendered it ineffective. We therefore understand that the prescription of the criminal action, a cause of extinction of the criminal action, does not produce effects on the obligation to indemnify.” (see on this: [Nombre6]: La Prescripción de la Acción Penal en la Nueva Legislación Procesal Costarricense. San José Costa Rica. Editorial Jurídica Continental. 2000. Page 100). In accordance with the reasons set forth, it is considered that the appellant is correct, not because of the arguments he invokes, nor regarding the application of norms of the Commercial Code concerning the prescription of obligations arising from checks, but fundamentally because, although there is a norm of the Civil Code that establishes in numeral 871 that \"Civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime shall prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise,\" the truth is that the problem is not so much one of constitutionality but of the existence of a subsequent rule, such as numeral 96, second paragraph, of the Penal Code, which differently regulated the matter discussed here. On the other hand, it must be considered that the complainant is correct in that if neither party alleged the prescription of the civil action, an extreme point that is indeed verified in the trial hearing record on folio 103 front and back, the court had no reason to rule on that point, and therefore it committed a defect of extra petita. The case law of this Court itself has also pronounced itself in the senses already indicated, stating the following: “With respect to the civil claim, the judgment is upheld, because the defense of prescription was not raised in this aspect, and therefore it is considered waived, in accordance with Article 851 of the Civil Code, which indicates: 'The waiver of prescription may be tacit, and results from not raising the defense before a final judgment...' Prescription is not declarable ex officio, and therefore, since it was not alleged, the judgment in the civil aspect must be upheld.” (Tribunal de Casación Penal 492 F- 98 of 10:20 hours on July 13, 1998). In this same vote, with regard to the prescription of the civil aspect, it was also stated that: “The resolution of the Constitutional Chamber analyzes the consultation made by the Criminal Cassation Chamber, in which the constitutionality of Article 871 of the Civil Code is questioned, which establishes that civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise, because it establishes, for cases of crimes, a shorter prescription period than that indicated by the general rule of the Civil Code, of ten years. The Constitutional Chamber in its judgment referred to that single aspect and considered that Article 871 of the Civil Code was not unconstitutional. Judgment 5029 – 93 does not examine whether the prescription of the civil aspect is declared ex officio or not, since it was not the object of the consultation. Furthermore, Article 96, second paragraph, of the Penal Code clearly establishes: 'The extinction of the criminal action and the penalty shall not produce any effect regarding the obligation to repair the damage caused, nor shall it prevent the confiscation of the instruments of the crime.' For its part, the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 11, states, referring to the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria): 'nor shall the subsequent extinction of the criminal claim prevent the Cassation Chamber from deciding on the civil action.' Having analyzed all the foregoing regulations and the resolution of the Constitutional Chamber in a harmonious manner, it is concluded that what prescribes along with the crime is the possibility of bringing a civil action within the criminal process, but once both actions are underway, each shall be governed by its own particular rules, with respect to the declaration of prescription.” (Tribunal de Casación Penal 492 – F- 98 of 10:20 hours on July 13, 1998). For the reasons stated, the appeal of the civil plaintiff (actora civil) is granted, and the judgment is annulled on the point under appeal related to the declaration of prescription of the civil action initiated by [Nombre7] against [Nombre8] [Nombre9], and the party is referred to the corresponding civil venue so that—if she deems it appropriate—she may claim the corresponding compensation in that forum.\"\n\nThe issue raised by the appellant for analysis has not been entirely settled in doctrine or in case law. For some, if the criminal action has prescribed, the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) must suffer the same fate. This is the view, for example, of [Nombre1] when he states: *“The Penal Code indicates, as we have just seen, that the obligations corresponding to civil reparation are extinguished by the means and in the manner determined by the Civil Code. Among the modes of extinction is prescription (prescripción). Referring to the civil code (sic), Article 868 tells us that 'Every right and its corresponding action shall prescribe in ten years. This rule admits the exceptions set forth in the following articles and others expressly established by law, when specific cases require more or less time for prescription.' The exceptions in the following articles are those indicated in numerals 869 and 870, which establish a prescription of three and one year, respectively. Article 871, of great interest to us, states: ‘Civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime (delito o cuasidelito) shall prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise.’ This article is the one applicable for the purposes of the prescription of the action for damages, and not Article 868 on the ten-year prescription. This is by logical application of the Latin aphorism 'leges generales non debent etendi at leges, quae habent suam particularem provisionem' (general laws should not be extended to cases that have their own special provisions). In effect, since the rule of Article 871 exists, specific to the case, that must be the applicable rule and not that of Article 868… According to what we have said so far, when the prescription of the criminal action begins, that of the civil action ex delicto begins; when the criminal action is interrupted, the civil action ex delicto is interrupted; when one is suspended, the other is also suspended.”* (see on this point: [Nombre2], [Nombre3]: La Responsabilidad Civil Derivada del Hecho Punible. San José Costa Rica. Editorial Juricentro 1984. pp 167-168). As we can see, for some, once the prescription of the criminal action is declared, the civil action meets the same fate; however, this is according to the terms of Article 871 of the Civil Code, but for others, in reality this numeral was implicitly repealed by paragraph two of Article 96 of the Penal Code (cf. Por [Nombre4], Código Penal. Investigaciones Jurídicas. p. 60). Case law has also been divergent on this issue. Thus, the Sala Tercera, on the occasion of a consultation made regarding the constitutionality of Article 871 of the Civil Code, upon considering – in summary – that the solution should be different from that indicated in that rule when dealing with liability arising from a crime because *“On the contrary, the principle of equality also derives the need for differentiated treatment in different situations; consequently, the solution should be the inverse of that indicated in Article 871 of the Civil Code, because the period for claiming damages should be longer when the act constitutes a crime, as it is a more serious conduct, and because it harms legally protected interests under criminal law, which are generally the most important in the community, according to a scale of values reflected in a specific criminal policy… The foregoing reasoning leads us to question the constitutionality of Article 871 of the Civil Code, and because of these doubts, we take the liberty of making this consultation before the Sala Constitucional, for whatever is legally appropriate.”* In short, that consultation by the Sala de Casación regarding the constitutionality of Article 871 of the Civil Code was intended to clarify possible conflicts with the principle of equality *“…the fact that a longer period is granted to request pecuniary compensation for civil actions that cause damages, and that the period is reduced for criminal actions that cause more serious harm than the former.”* (Sala Tercera de la Corte V- 297 A- of 14:55 hours on July 9, 1993. A transcription of all aspects of that consultation can be read in: ESTRADA VENEGAS, Ingrid: Jurisprudencia de la Sala Tercera sobre la Acción Civil Resarcitoria. First edition. San José Costa Rica. Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. 1997. Pages 129 to 132). Upon resolving the indicated consultation, the Sala Constitucional stated – among other reasons – the following: *“…in the case of a crime, there is an eminently public interest; in the other* (case of merely civil injury) *the interest is basically private. Hence, if, even with that public interest in the case of a crime, the criminal action prescribes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 82 of the Penal Code, it is logical, contrary to what was expressed in the consultation, that the civil action prescribes together with the former, since the latter is, in relation to the former, merely secondary, and therefore, it would be a contradiction if for the principal act, which is the crime, a person can no longer be pursued, whereas that interest is merely private in one case and public in another. Thus, if, in accordance with the criminal law itself, certain crimes prescribe in a period of less than ten years, the legislator would do poorly if it granted greater legal protection to the purely private interest of the person injured by the crime than to the principal public interest and extended the prescription period of the civil action, for example, to ten years, so that even when no penal sanction could be imposed, the offended party could collect the damages arising from a criminal action.”* (Sala Constitucional Voto 5029-93 of 14:36 hours on October 13, 1993. For a complete reading of the vote, see: ESTRADA VENEGAS, Ingrid. Op. Cit. pages 133 and 134). Thus, we can see that the discussion revolves around considering whether, despite a judgment declaring prescription (prescripción) in the criminal venue, and which brings with it a declaration of dismissal due to the extinction of the criminal action, that aspect, i.e., prescription, also operates with respect to the civil claim.\n\nAs a result of the consultation indicated by the Sala Tercera, there is a jurisprudential precedent from that same criminal chamber that indicated: *“This defect does not extend to or affect the civil decision regarding the acts of use of a false document in material concurrence with fraud, which the court deemed proven and prescribed, since precisely that condition, opportunely alleged by the defense of [Nombre5]... that of prescription, makes any amendment to the issue of the lack of substantiation of the question of liability sterile, insofar as it would also be prescribed. In effect, according to Article 871 of the Civil Code (which, by specialty, supersedes Article 207 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, insofar as the former deals with liability derived from a criminal act) establishes that ‘Civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime (delito o cuasidelito) shall prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise.’”* (Sala Tercera de la Corte V- 565- F of 16:15 hours on December 12, 1994). In a much more recent vote, the same Sala Tercera de Casación stated: *“…the adherent is correct in the sense that the judgment did not rule on the claims for damages. However, the matter lacks interest, since upon decreeing the prescription of the criminal actions, in accordance with Article 871 of the Civil Code (whose legitimacy was ratified by the Sala Constitucional through vote 5029 of 14:36 hours on October 13, 1993), the civil actions arising from that allegedly punishable act also prescribed, such that the missing point was irrelevant…”* (Sala Tercera de la Corte N- 85-99 of 9:40 hours on January 21, 1999. In a similar sense see Sala Tercera vote 891-99 of 9:15 hours on July 19, 1999). We see that in reality, the case law of the Sala Tercera Penal conforms to what the Sala Constitucional had already resolved by considering that Article 871 of the Civil Code was constitutional, and above all due to the binding nature of precedents pursuant to Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.\n\nHowever, it is necessary to indicate that for others, in reality it is not possible that if the prescription of the criminal action is declared, the civil claim must necessarily meet the same fate, since it is said that there is a norm subsequent to Article 871 of the Civil Code, namely paragraph two of Article 96 of the Penal Code, which establishes that “*The extinction of the criminal action and the penalty shall not have any effect with respect to the obligation to repair the damage caused, nor shall it prevent the confiscation of the instruments of the crime”*, such that the problem is not one of constitutionality but of the existence of a subsequent norm that regulates the matter in a different manner and which, as such – being subsequent and at the same level of the sources of law – must prevail. In this latter sense, it has been stated: *“The Sala Constitucional of the Supreme Court of Justice ruled that upon the criminal action prescribing, the same would occur with the civil claim, which contradicts Article 96, paragraph two, of the Penal Code. We affirm the foregoing because prescription is a cause for the extinction of the criminal action. Furthermore, the Penal Code is a special law and subsequent to the Civil Code, thereby making clear which legislation was applicable to the case. The problem is not whether Article 871 is constitutional or not. What is important is that there is a subsequent and special norm that rendered it ineffective. We understand, then, that the prescription of the criminal action, a cause for the extinction of the criminal action, has no effect on the obligation to compensate.”* (see on this point: [Nombre6]: La Prescripción de la Acción Penal en la Nueva Legislación Procesal Costarricense. San José Costa Rica. Editorial Jurídica Continental. 2000. Page 100). In accordance with the reasons set forth, it is considered that the appellant is correct, not because of the arguments he invokes, nor regarding the application of rules of the Commercial Code concerning the prescription of obligations arising from checks, but fundamentally because, although there is a rule in the Civil Code that establishes in Article 871 that *“Civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime shall prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise,”* the truth is that the problem is not so much one of constitutionality but of the existence of a subsequent norm, namely paragraph two of Article 96 of the Penal Code, which regulated the matter debated here in a different manner. On the other hand, it must be considered that the complainant is correct in that, if neither party alleged the prescription of the civil action, an extreme that is indeed verified in the hearing record on page 103 front and back, the court had no reason to rule on that extreme, and therefore incurred a defect of extra petita. The very case law of this Court has ruled in the senses already indicated, by expressing the following: *“Regarding the civil claim, the judgment stands, as the exception of prescription was not raised in this aspect, and is therefore considered waived, in accordance with Article 851 of the Civil Code, which indicates: 'The waiver of prescription may be tacit, and results from failing to raise the exception before a final judgment…' Prescription is not declarable ex officio, and therefore, since it was not alleged, the judgment in the civil aspect must stand.”* (Tribunal de Casación Penal 492 F-98 of 10:20 hours on July 13, 1998). In this same vote, in relation to the prescription of the civil aspect, it was also stated that: *“The resolution of the Sala Constitucional analyzes the consultation made by the Sala de Casación Penal, in which the constitutionality of Article 871 of the Civil Code is questioned, which establishes that civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise, for establishing for cases of crimes a shorter prescription period than that indicated by the general rule of the Civil Code, of ten years.* The Sala Constitucional referred in its ruling to that single aspect, and considered that Article 871 of the Civil Code was not unconstitutional. Judgment 5029 – 93 does not examine the matter of whether the prescription of the civil aspect was decreed (sic) ex officio or not, since it was not the subject of the consultation. Furthermore, paragraph two of Article 96 of the Penal Code clearly establishes: **“The extinction of the criminal action and the penalty shall not have any effect with respect to the obligation to repair the damage caused, nor shall it prevent the confiscation of the instruments of the crime.”** For its part, the Code of Criminal Procedure, in Article 11, states, referring to the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria), **“nor shall the subsequent extinction of the criminal claim prevent the Sala de Casación from deciding on the civil action.”** Having analyzed all the foregoing regulations, and the resolution of the Sala Constitucional, in a harmonious manner it is concluded that what prescribes together with the crime is the possibility of bringing a civil action within the criminal process, but once both actions are underway, each shall be governed by its own specific rules, with respect to the declaration of prescription.”* (Tribunal de Casación Penal 492 – F-98 of 10:20 hours on July 13, 1998). For the reasons set forth, the appeal of the civil plaintiff is granted, and the judgment is annulled on the point subject to appeal related to the declaration of the prescription of the civil action filed by [Nombre7] against [Nombre8] [Nombre9], and the party is referred to the corresponding civil venue so that – if it sees fit – it may claim the corresponding compensation in that forum.\""
}