{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-0034-78678", "citation": "Res. 00211-2005 Sala Primera de la Corte", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Banco Central no responde civilmente por incumplimiento de banco autorizado en giro de divisas", "title_en": "Central Bank not civilly liable for authorized bank's failure to transfer foreign currency", "summary_es": "La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en resolución de las 09:40 horas del 7 de abril de 2005, declaró sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por Embotelladora Tica S.A. contra el Banco Central de Costa Rica. La actora reclamaba la responsabilidad civil extracontractual de la Administración por la supuesta omisión en sus deberes de fiscalización y control sobre el Banco Germano, entidad que no remitió divisas para el pago de importaciones. La Sala realizó un exhaustivo análisis de la evolución del régimen de responsabilidad objetiva del Estado, con fundamento constitucional (artículos 9, 11, 33, 41, 45 y 50 de la Constitución Política) y legal (Ley General de la Administración Pública), distinguiendo entre funcionamiento normal y anormal, y la antijuricidad como presupuesto. Determinó que la inacción alegada no fue la causa adecuada, próxima y directa del daño, pues el perjuicio derivó exclusivamente del incumplimiento del Banco Germano, hecho ajeno al ente fiscalizador. Concluyó que extender la responsabilidad al Banco Central implicaría un sobredimensionamiento de sus obligaciones, por lo que confirmó la ausencia de responsabilidad civil, con costas a cargo del recurrente.", "summary_en": "The First Chamber of the Supreme Court, in its ruling of April 7, 2005, dismissed the cassation appeal filed by Embotelladora Tica S.A. against the Central Bank of Costa Rica. The plaintiff sought non-contractual civil liability of the Administration for an alleged failure to supervise Banco Germano, which did not remit foreign currency for import payments. The Chamber conducted a thorough analysis of the evolution of the State's objective liability regime, grounded in constitutional (Articles 9, 11, 33, 41, 45, and 50) and statutory law (General Public Administration Law), distinguishing between normal and abnormal operation and unlawfulness as a prerequisite. It found that the alleged omission was not the adequate, proximate, and direct cause of the damage, as the injury stemmed solely from Banco Germano's breach, an act unrelated to the supervisory entity. Imposing liability on the Central Bank would overextend its duties; thus, no civil liability existed, with costs imposed on the appellant.", "court_or_agency": "Sala Primera de la Corte", "date": "2005", "year": "2005", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "responsabilidad civil extracontractual", "funcionamiento anormal", "nexo causal", "antijuricidad", "culpa in ommittendo", "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "Sala Primera de la Corte" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 41", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 190", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 191", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 109", "law": "Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica" }, { "article": "Art. 611", "law": "Código Procesal Civil" } ], "keywords_es": [ "responsabilidad civil extracontractual", "Administración Pública", "Banco Central", "omisión fiscalizadora", "nexo causal", "funcionamiento anormal", "antijuricidad", "casación", "divisas", "Banco Germano" ], "keywords_en": [ "non-contractual civil liability", "public administration", "Central Bank", "supervisory omission", "causal link", "abnormal operation", "unlawfulness", "cassation", "foreign currency", "Banco Germano" ], "excerpt_es": "En el caso bajo estudio, la inacción del Banco Central alegada no es causa apta, suficiente o adecuada en la lesión que acusa el recurrente, es decir, no fue el funcionamiento omiso del banco en cuestión, el hecho que provocó, per se, la lesión al patrimonio de la empresa actora, sino que el perjuicio sufrido obedece a la falta de pago en que incurrió el Banco Germano respecto de las divisas extranjeras que debían ser utilizadas en la cancelación de obligaciones contraídas con Eastman Chemical International Ltd., hecho único e independiente el cual, no se pueden extraer tales consecuencias para el Banco Central, en tanto la causa del daño fue constituida por un hecho ajeno y externo sobre el que, no guarda ninguna relación. Cabe recordar que una acción es considerada la causa generadora del daño, en la medida que el hecho particular haya potenciado la concreción del menoscabo que se reclama, de modo que éste último surja como una consecuencia inmediata y directa de aquél. Adicionalmente, conforme será objeto de análisis en el considerando siguiente, el numeral 109 de la derogada Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica refleja estos principios referidos, en cuanto atribuye a los bancos autorizados la responsabilidad por el incumplimiento de obligaciones como las que fueron desatendidas en este caso, y que fueron las que provocaron el efecto lesivo en detrimento de la empresa casacionista. Desde este plano, es evidente que no corresponde al Banco Central responsabilidad alguna por el no pago de las divisas en que incurrió en Banco Germano, en tanto no basta con que se invoque una acción u omisión de la Administración para atribuirle la responsabilidad por los daños padecidos, sino que ese funcionamiento público debe haber sido la causa que desencadenó la lesión, situación que no se ha acreditado en el particular.", "excerpt_en": "In the case under review, the alleged inaction of the Central Bank is not an apt, sufficient, or adequate cause of the injury claimed by the appellant; that is, it was not the omission of the bank in question that, per se, caused the damage to the plaintiff company's assets. Rather, the harm suffered resulted from the non-payment by Banco Germano of the foreign currency that was to be used to settle obligations with Eastman Chemical International Ltd., a single and independent event from which no consequences can be drawn for the Central Bank, given that the cause of the damage was an extraneous and external act unrelated to it. It bears recalling that an action is considered the cause of damage insofar as that particular act enabled the materialization of the claimed loss, such that the latter emerges as an immediate and direct consequence of the former. Additionally, as will be analyzed below, Article 109 of the repealed Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica reflects these principles by attributing liability to authorized banks for non-performance of obligations, such as those breached in this case, which caused the harmful effect to the detriment of the appellant company. From this standpoint, it is evident that the Central Bank bears no liability for the non-payment of the foreign currency by Banco Germano, since merely invoking an action or omission of the Administration does not suffice to attribute liability for the damages suffered; rather, that public operation must have been the cause that triggered the injury, a circumstance not proven in this case.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The cassation appeal is denied, confirming that the Central Bank is not civilly liable for Banco Germano's failure to transfer foreign currency, as there is no adequate causal link between the supervisory omission and the damage.", "summary_es": "Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación, confirmando que el Banco Central no es civilmente responsable por el incumplimiento del Banco Germano en el giro de divisas, al no existir nexo causal adecuado entre la omisión fiscalizadora y el daño." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando IV", "quote_en": "The objective nature of the Administration's non-contractual civil liability was clearly defined in Resolution No. 132 of this Chamber at 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991, for a fact after the entry into force of the General Public Administration Law, which stated: \"VI. Our General Public Administration Law No. 6227 ... thereby establishes the direct liability of the State without the need to previously prove that the damage was caused by the fault of the official or the Administration, requiring for indemnification that the damage suffered be effective, assessable, and individualized ...\"", "quote_es": "El carácter objetivo de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual de la Administración, fue definido con claridad en la sentencia de esta Sala N° 132 de las 15 horas del 14 de agosto de 1991, para un hecho posterior a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en la que dijo: \"VI. Nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública Nº 6227 ... para establecer así la responsabilidad directa del Estado sin necesidad de probar previamente que el daño se produjo por culpa del funcionario o de la Administración, exigiendo para la procedencia de la indemnización que el daño sufrido sea efectivo, evaluable e individualizable ...\"" }, { "context": "Considerando VI", "quote_en": "Abnormality and illegality, therefore, should not be adopted as equivalent concepts, not even with respect to the hypothesis of conduct that, although proper or in accordance with the aforementioned rules, produces a harmful result ...", "quote_es": "Anormalidad e ilicitud, no deben por tanto adoptarse como conceptos equivalentes, ni siquiera en lo que corresponde a la hipótesis de aquel funcionamiento que siendo debido o conforme con las reglas antedichas, produce un resultado dañoso ..." }, { "context": "Considerando X", "quote_en": "It is evident that the alleged inactivity was not the adequate, proximate, and direct cause of the injury.", "quote_es": "Es evidente que la supuesta inactividad no fue causa adecuada, próxima y directa de la lesión." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-0034-78678", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-12443", "norm_num": "7130", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Civil", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "16/08/1989" }, { "doc_id": "norm-13231", "norm_num": "6227", "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978" }, { "doc_id": "norm-40928", "norm_num": "7558", "norm_name": "Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "03/11/1995" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "\"III.- Evolución e independencia del régimen de responsabilidad de la Administración Pública. Antes de cualquier otra consideración sobre la responsabilidad que se reclama, es pertinente hacer algunas observaciones sobre el tema. Desde que el Estado es persona sometida al Derecho y parte esencial del engranaje democrático, es responsable. En abandono ha quedado aquella inmunidad absoluta de quien ejerce el poder. La conocida expresión del “ Estado soy yo”, fue pulverizada con la reelaboración del sistema político moderno, en tanto sojuzga con el bloque de legalidad a todo aquel que ostenta posición de poder público, y le otorga como contrapartida, responsabilidad por su conducta antijurídica. El deber de reparación que hoy se impone al Estado y a la Administración por los daños que cause, es principio inclaudicable de cualquier estructura constitucional. Es verdad que para la concreción de tal instituto, hubo necesidad inicialmente de echar mano al régimen jurídico común (Código Civil). Sin embargo, avanzado el presente siglo en sus primeros pasos, puede afirmarse como superado el régimen exclusivamente subjetivo de la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública. Atrás han quedado los esfuerzos de una interpretación ampliativa, que con loable tesón (pero con débil resultado técnico-jurídico), buscaba el acomodo de la responsabilidad aquiliana de la autoridad pública en los conceptos de culpa y dolo. Desde la segunda mitad del siglo XIX (1873), quedó claro en el régimen jurídico francés, que las normas del Código Civil no se avienen a este particular espectro de conductas públicas, pues desde un inicio resulta insuficiente su perspectiva bidireccional en el fenómeno de la lesión extracontractual. El desprendimiento (que no abandono) del régimen jurídico común, fue tan claro como necesario. La estructura normativa civil no daba ni da explicación suficiente y satisfactoria al compromiso del patrimonio público por virtud de una conducta individualizada o global (conjunta), de aquél o aquellos que, en el anonimato de la organización, integran y ejercitan la función pública; en tales supuestos, las más de las veces resulta inviable la tradicional figura de la culpa in eligendo o bien in vigilando. Esto dio pie, entre otras cosas, a la construcción de las faltas de y del servicio, para ingresar con posterioridad en el cúmulo de ellas, lo que amplió aún más la distancia ya creada con el origen común de la reparación civil en este campo. Es a través del cúmulo de faltas, que se logra enlazar la conducta del funcionario o servidor con la responsabilidad directa y solidaria de la Administración, aún y cuando se trate de una ilicitud o anormalidad íntegra del sujeto que actúa en ejercicio de sus funciones (ello ha permitido la creación de la falta impura, elaborada bajo el enfoque del sujeto “activo” o productor del daño y su conexión con la autoridad pública). Las particularidades de un régimen propio quedan sentadas luego, cuando se compromete al órgano o ente público en aquellos supuestos en los que el titular directo en la causación del daño, viene representado por un sujeto físico o jurídico, en calidad de “tercero”, vinculado tan sólo al ente por medio de circunstancias o instrumentos públicos que le permiten o facilitan la producción del hecho dañoso (aspecto que se cubre con el desarrollo de la figura del nexo de ocasionalidad causal). A dicha interrelación se aproxima con iguales resultados (solidaridad en la obligación indemnizatoria), aunque no con identidad sustancial de la figura, la hipótesis de la responsabilidad de la Administración ocasionada a tercero por acción u omisión del co-contratista de aquélla (la transferencia de la actividad o servicio público a un tercero, se ha dicho, no enerva la responsabilidad del órgano o ente como titular originario). Frente a tal estado de cosas, no fue difícil prever y formular el extraordinario salto cualitativo en esta materia, que permitió alcanzar la responsabilidad de la Administración y del Estado frente a conductas tanto administrativas como de orden legislativo, que aunque conformes con las normas jurídicas de rango superior (y por tanto válidas), producen una lesión en la esfera jurídica de la persona, ya sea directa o colateral, en su origen o en su resultado (responsabilidad por conducta lícita y normal, así como por actuación legislativa). De esta evolución e independencia de la materia ha dado cuenta ya esta misma Sala, al señalar lo siguiente: \"... V.- Los conceptos de responsabilidad de la Administración Pública y del deber de indemnizar han evolucionado mucho en el derecho occidental. En la antigüedad no se concebía la responsabilidad estatal proveniente del daño o el perjuicio que la actividad de la Administración o de sus agentes pudiera producir a los administrados. Más tarde, se admitió, en ciertos casos, la responsabilidad de los funcionarios y se reconocieron algunos derechos al individuo, frente al Estado. Luego aparecieron las teorías de los actos de gestión y actos de autoridad. En los primeros, las actividades caen en la esfera del derecho privado por existir una igualdad de derecho entre las partes; los otros se refieren a las actividades regladas por el derecho público, donde hay una desigualdad de derechos que caen en el dominio de las relaciones de poder, para determinar así que, si el acto perjudicial es un acto de autoridad, entonces el Estado no es responsable, porque las decisiones nacen de su soberanía y no de un derecho de carácter patrimonial. Posteriormente fueron abandonadas estas teorías, para entrarse a analizar la responsabilidad del Estado, merced a lo cual se llegó a la conclusión de que todo acto administrativo puede entrañar una responsabilidad estatal, pero ella se subordinó a la existencia de una falta de servicio. Se estableció que existía falta de servicio si al cumplirse la función se causaba un daño. Ello aún cuando el funcionario ejerciera su labor como tal, si al hacerlo, actuó con negligencia, o incurriendo en omisiones, o errores vinculados al servicio, o cuando no se cumplía la función debiendo realizarse, o se efectuaba en forma tardía. Quedó establecida además, la falta del funcionario o falta personal, que es aquélla en que se incurre cuando éste se extralimita en sus atribuciones. Luego se aceptó que ambas faltas podían coexistir, y aunque diferentes, podían concurrir a la producción de un daño si la falta personal estaba ligada a la ejecución de un servicio público. Por último, se arriba a la última etapa de la evolución para reconocer la responsabilidad de la Administración por razón del simple funcionamiento del servicio, sin necesidad de probar la culpa del funcionario encargado de su prestación ...” Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. 263 de las 15:30 hrs. del 22 de agosto de 1990. IV.- Responsabilidad Objetiva. La responsabilidad civil extracontractual de la Administración Pública, se enmarca, por tanto, dentro de un régimen objetivo, que engloba en su fundamento tanto la teoría del riesgo, cuanto el equilibrio en la ecuación patrimonial. Con ello se procura esencialmente, la reparación indemnizatoria a quien ha sufrido una lesión atribuible a la organización pública como centro de autoridad. Este criterio finalista produce a su vez, una transformación plena en el eje central de la responsabilidad misma, pues abandona la observación analítica del sujeto productor del daño y la calificación de su conducta, para ubicarse en la posición de la víctima, que menguada en su situación jurídica, queda eximida en la comprobación de cualquier parámetro subjetivo del agente público actuante (salvo en lo que a su responsabilidad personal se refiere). Esto ocasiona, sin duda, un giro copernical en el enfoque mismo de su fundamento, ya que habrá responsabilidad de la Administración siempre que la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar el daño, ya sea este de naturaleza patrimonial o extrapatrimonial. A partir de allí, es patente la reversión de los componentes y efectos del instituto en pleno. Tanto los presupuestos esenciales como la carga de la prueba, adquieren un nuevo matiz, que libera al afectado no solo de amarras sustanciales sino también procesales, y coloca a la Administración en la obligada descarga frente a los cargos y hechos que se le imputan. En todo caso, el carácter objetivo de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual de la Administración, fue definido con claridad en la sentencia de esta Sala N° 132 de las 15 horas del 14 de agosto de 1991, para un hecho posterior a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en la que dijo: \"VI. Nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública Nº 6227 de 2 de mayo de 1978, vigente desde el 26 de abril de 1979, conforme lo señala la sentencia de esta Sala Nº 81 del año 1984, al resolver la polémica sobre su vigencia, en el Título Sétimo del Libro Primero recogió los principios más modernos, fundados en la doctrina y jurisprudencia más autorizada, sobre la responsabilidad extracontractual de la Administración, para establecer así la responsabilidad directa del Estado sin necesidad de probar previamente que el daño se produjo por culpa del funcionario o de la Administración, exigiendo para la procedencia de la indemnización que el daño sufrido sea efectivo, evaluable e individualizable en relación con una persona o grupo -artículo 196-. Estableció que la Administración sería responsable por todos los daños que causara su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero -artículo 190-; y la obligación de reparar todo daño causado a los derechos subjetivos ajenos por faltas de sus servidores cometidas durante el desempeño de los deberes del cargo o con ocasión del mismo, utilizando las oportunidades o medios que ofrece, aún cuando sea para fines o actividades o actos extraños a dicha misión -artículo 191-...\". (Lo subrayado no es del original). En este mismo sentido, pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras, las sentencias de esta Sala números 138 de las 15:05 hrs. del 23 de agosto; 192 de las 14:15 hrs. del 6 de noviembre, ambas de 1991; 48 de las 14:10 hrs. del 29 de mayo de 1996 y 55 de las 14:30 hrs. del 4 de julio de 1997.) A la luz de lo dispuesto en dichos precedentes, y como bien lo dispuso del A-quo, nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, a partir de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, adopta el sistema de responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración Pública. Por ello, no es necesaria la existencia -y, por ende, su demostración-, del dolo o la culpa o, en general, una falta subjetiva imputable a los servidores o funcionarios públicos para que surja el deber de resarcir los daños y perjuicios causados por su funcionamiento. Además establece, en forma taxativa, como causas eximentes de esa responsabilidad, la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima y el hecho de un tercero, correspondiéndole a la Administración acreditar su existencia, lo cual no sucedió en el sub-júdice. (sentencia de SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. 025-F-99, a las catorce horas quince minutos del veintidós de enero de mil novecientos noventa y nueve). (En igual sentido puede verse las sentencias de esta misma Sala N°. 589-F-99 de 14:20 hrs del 1º octubre de 1999 y N° 252-F-01, de las 16 horas 15 minutos del 28 de marzo del 2001) V.- Fundamento Constitucional de la Responsabilidad Objetiva. Esa evolución del instituto de comentario, que desemboca en la responsabilidad objetiva indicada, encuentra asidero pleno en la normativa constitucional vigente (numerales 9, 11, 33, 41, 45 y 50 de la Constitución Política), de la que se obtienen reglas y principios claros acerca de lo que puede denominarse el derecho de resarcibilidad plena del daño. Este axioma jurídico quedó claramente plasmado, con fundamentación expresa, clara y profunda, en la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional. N° 5207-2004, de las 14 horas y 55 minutos del 18 de mayo del 2004, que literalmente indicó: “Nuestra Constitución Política no consagra explícitamente el principio de la responsabilidad patrimonial de las administraciones públicas por las lesiones antijurídicas que, en el ejercicio de la función administrativa, le causen a los administrados. Empero, este principio se encuentra implícitamente contenido en el Derecho de la Constitución, siendo que puede ser inferido a partir de una interpretación sistemática y contextual de varios preceptos, principios y valores constitucionales. En efecto, el artículo 9°, párrafo 1°, de la Carta Política dispone que “El Gobierno de la República es (…) responsable (…)”, con lo cual se da por sentada la responsabilidad del ente público mayor o Estado y sus diversos órganos –Poder Legislativo, Ejecutivo y Judicial-. El ordinal 11°, de su parte, establece en su párrafo primero la “(…) responsabilidad penal (…)” de los funcionarios públicos y el segundo párrafo nos refiere la “(…) responsabilidad personal para los funcionarios en el cumplimiento de sus deberes (…)”. El artículo 34 de la Constitución Política ampara los “derechos patrimoniales adquiridos” y las “situaciones jurídicas consolidadas”, los cuales solo pueden ser, efectiva y realmente, amparados con un sistema de responsabilidad administrativa de amplio espectro sin zonas inmunes o exentas cuando sean vulnerados por las administraciones públicas en el despliegue de su giro o desempeño público. El numeral 41 ibidem, estatuye que “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales (…)”, este precepto impone el deber al autor y responsable del daño de resarcir las lesiones antijurídicas efectivamente sufridas por los administrados como consecuencia del ejercicio de la función administrativa a través de conductas positivas por acción o negativas por omisión de los entes públicos, con lo cual se convierte en la piedra angular a nivel constitucional para el desarrollo legislativo de un sistema de responsabilidad objetiva y directa en el cual el resarcimiento no depende del reproche moral y subjetivo a la conducta del funcionario público por dolo o culpa, sino, única y exclusivamente, por habérsele inflingido o recibido, efectivamente, “(…) injurias o daños (…) en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales (…)”, esto es, una lesión antijurídica que no tiene el deber de soportar y, por consiguiente, debe serle resarcida. El numeral 41 de la Constitución Política establece un derecho fundamental resarcitorio a favor del administrado que haya sufrido una lesión antijurídica por un ente –a través de su funcionamiento normal o anormal o su conducta lícita o ilícita- y la obligación correlativa , de éste de resarcirla o repararla de forma integral, el acceso a la jurisdicción previsto en este mismo precepto constitucional, se convierte, así en un derecho instrumental para asegurar, forzosamente, el goce y ejercicio del derecho resarcitorio del damnificado cuando el sujeto obligado a la reparación incumpla voluntariamente con la obligación referida. El artículo 45 de la Carta Magna acoge el principio de la intangibilidad del patrimonio al disponer que “La propiedad es inviolable; a nadie puede privarse de la suya si no es por interés público legalmente comprobado, previa indemnización conforme a la ley (…)”, se reconoce, de esta forma, por el texto fundamental que los sacrificios especiales o las cargas singulares que el administrado no tiene el deber de soportar o tolerar, aunque devengan de una actividad lícita –como el ejercicio de la potestad expropiatoria- deben resarcirse. El artículo 49, párrafo 1°, de la Constitución Política en cuanto, de forma implícita, reconoce la personalidad jurídica y, por consiguiente, la posibilidad de demandar en estrados judiciales a los entes públicos, cuando incumplan con sus obligaciones constituye un claro basamento de la responsabilidad administrativa. De su parte el párrafo in fine del ordinal 49 ya citado dispone que “La ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados”, siendo que una de las principales formas de garantía de éstos lo constituye un régimen de responsabilidad administrativa objetivo, directo, amplio y acabado. El párrafo final del artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, en materia del daño ambiental, establece que “La ley determinará las responsabilidad y las sanciones correspondientes”, régimen de responsabilidad del que, obviamente, no pueden abstraerse los entes públicos de carácter económico (denominados empresas públicas-ente público) y empresas públicas (llamadas también empresas públicas-ente de Derecho privado) cuando contaminan al desplegar una actividad industrial, comercial o de servicios y, en general, el Estado cuando incumple sus obligaciones de defensa y preservación del medio ambiente a través de una deficiente actividad de fiscalización o de control de las actividades públicas y privadas actual o potencialmente contaminantes. En la hipótesis de los miembros de las Juntas Directivas de las Instituciones Autónomas, el artículo 188 de la norma fundamental dispone que “Sus directores responden por su gestión”. En lo que se refiere al Poder Ejecutivo, el Título X del texto constitucional contiene un Capítulo V cuyo epígrafe es “Responsabilidades de quienes ejercen el Poder Ejecutivo”, siendo que el artículo 148 consagra la responsabilidad del Presidente por el “uso que hiciera de aquellas atribuciones que según esta Constitución le corresponden en forma exclusiva”, la conjunta de éste con el respectivo Ministro del sector “respecto al ejercicio de las atribuciones que esta Constitución les otorga a ambos” –la cual es especificada por el artículo 149 ibidem- y la del Consejo de Gobierno por los acuerdo que adopte. El principio de responsabilidad administrativa de los entes públicos y de sus funcionarios resulta complementado con la consagración constitucional del principio de igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas (artículos 18 y 33) que impide imponerle a los administrados una carga o sacrificio singular o especial que no tienen el deber de soportar y el principio de la solidaridad social (artículo 74), de acuerdo con el cual si la función administrativa es ejercida y desplegada en beneficio de la colectividad, es ésta la que debe soportar las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a uno o varios administrados e injustamente soportadas por éstos. Finalmente, es menester tomar en consideración que la Constitución Política recoge un derecho fundamental innominado o atípico que es el de los administrados al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, el que se infiere claramente de la relación de los numerales, interpretados, a contrario sensu, 140, inciso 8°, 139, inciso 4° y 191 de la Ley fundamental en cuanto recogen, respectivamente, los parámetros deontológicos de la función administrativa tales como el “buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas”, “buena marcha del Gobierno” y “eficiencia de la administración”. Este derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos le impone a los entes públicos actuar en el ejercicio de sus competencias y la prestación de los servicios públicos de forma eficiente y eficaz y, desde luego, la obligación correlativa de reparar los daños y perjuicios causados cuando se vulnere esa garantía constitucional. De esta forma, queda en evidencia que el constituyente originario recogió de forma implícita el principio de la responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas, el que, como tal, debe servir a todos los poderes públicos y operadores del Derecho como parámetro para interpretar, aplicar, integrar y delimitar el entero ordenamiento jurídico. Bajo esta inteligencia, un corolario fundamental del principio constitucional de la responsabilidad administrativa lo constituye la imposibilidad para el legislador ordinario de eximir o exonerar de responsabilidad a algún ente público por alguna lesión antijurídica que le cause su funcionamiento normal o anormal o su conducta lícita o ilícita a la esfera patrimonial y extramatrimonial de los administrados.” VI.- Parámetros de Imputación Legal. El concepto de funcionamiento anormal y su distinción con figuras afines. Las particularidades propias de la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública, generadas a través de su evolución gradual, así como el carácter objetivo alcanzado (todo ello con claro fundamento constitucional), no puede interpretarse tampoco como un deber resarcitorio, irrestricto y permanente, aplicable siempre y para todas las hipótesis de lesión. Sería inaudito un régimen de tal naturaleza y materialmente insoportable para cualquier Estado con recursos financieros limitados. Por ello se ha acudido a criterios de imputación que de alguna forma dimensionan (siempre dentro de la objetividad dicha) ese deber indemnizatorio originado por la conducta pública. De esta manera, el numeral 190 de nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública refiere a “funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal”, de donde la legitimidad o su antítesis, hace referencia básicamente a las conductas jurídicas de la Administración, mientras que lo normal o anormal, apunta, ante todo (pero no en exclusiva), a la conducta material de la Administración, representada entre otras, por la actividad prestacional que se atribuye al Estado como parte de la categoría social que también se le asigna en procura del bienestar general del colectivo. Nótese como el artículo 194 de la indicada ley, hace referencia a los “actos lícitos”, bajo la concepción de actividad jurídica, distinguiéndolos en la misma norma, de lo que califica como “funcionamiento normal”, entendido como actividad material. De esta manera, la anormalidad atiende a aquellas conductas administrativas, que en sí mismas, se apartan de la buena administración (conforme al concepto utilizado por la propia Ley General en el artículo 102 inciso d., que entre otras cosas incluye la eficacia y la eficiencia) o de la organización, de las reglas técnicas o de la pericia y el prudente quehacer en el despliegue de sus actuaciones, con efecto lesivo para la persona. Esto permite señalar que la anormalidad puede manifestarse a través de un mal funcionamiento; un funcionamiento tardío, o una ausencia total de funcionamiento. Anormalidad e ilicitud, no deben por tanto adoptarse como conceptos equivalentes, ni siquiera en lo que corresponde a la hipótesis de aquel funcionamiento que siendo debido o conforme con las reglas antedichas, produce un resultado dañoso (denominado por algún sector doctrinal como “funcionamiento anormal por resultado”), pues en tal caso, lo que opera es una responsabilidad por funcionamiento normal con efecto o resultado lesivo, indemnizable, claro está, siempre que se cubran los requisitos preestablecidos expresamente por el propio Ordenamiento Jurídico (véase el mismo artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Tampoco debe confundirse esta “anormalidad” del funcionamiento y la “ilegitimidad” de éste, con la antijuricidad genérica y de base, imprescindible en toda reparación civil. En efecto, la responsabilidad civil nace de la antijuricidad, que a su vez se constituye en su fundamento (derivado algunas veces de una norma positiva, mientras que en otras, del principio básico traducido en el deber de no dañar a otro), y que para esta materia particular se concreta en la inexistencia de ese deber para soportar el daño. Así las cosas, si no existe el deber de sobrellevar la lesión (entendida como la consecuencia final ablativa de la conducta pública), es porque la Administración debía evitarla, o, en caso contrario y bajo ciertas circunstancias, asumir las consecuencias reparadoras de aquella que no pudo impedir, bien por imprevisible, bien por inevitable. Se produce entonces, el incumpliendo al deber de indemnidad patrimonial de la persona, y en ese tanto, habrá que reputar la lesión a la esfera jurídica de la víctima como antijurídica, y por ende, de obligada reparación. De esta manera, puede afirmarse que sólo es indemnizable la lesión que confrontada con la globalidad del Ordenamiento, pueda reputarse como antijurídica en su base, pues lo contrario sería afirmar la compensación por acción dañosa frente a un menoscabo que el Ordenamiento no reprocha y que, por el contrario, tolera y conciente como normal y justificado. Ha de reiterarse entonces, que para la existencia en Derecho de una reparación debida, debe existir antijuricidad antecedente y de base, lo que en modo alguno apunta a la naturaleza (legítima o ilegítima) de la conducta desplegada por el agente productor del daño, ni por el resultado que produce dicha acción u omisión. En efecto, aún en los supuestos de funcionamiento legítimo y normal, en los que no existe ilicitud en el comportamiento, se produce una consecuencia dañosa, que con determinadas características (intensidad excepcional o pequeña proporción de afectados), se reputa como de obligada reparación, lo cual dice de su antijuricidad, tanto así, que con la lesión misma surge la obligación civil y su consecuente derecho de accionar. Se puede sostener entonces, que la antijuricidad de base, a la que se hace referencia como sustrato y presupuesto global e imprescindible para la responsabilidad, es cosa distinta e independiente del parámetro de imputación utilizada por el Sistema Jurídico, pues aún en el evento de un régimen objetivo (que excluya los elementos subjetivos de la culpa y dolo, para dar paso a una simple transferencia económica dirigida a restaurar el desequilibrio producido en la igualdad de las cargas públicas), hay antijuricidad, en la medida en que la norma declara la obligación existente bajo el presupuesto implícito de una lesión contraria a Derecho, que no debe ser soportada por la víctima. Esa reiterada antijuricidad estará siempre presente en el daño indemnizable, bien sea por funcionamiento normal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo. VII.- La omisión como criterio de anormalidad e ilicitud. La obligatoriedad indemnizatoria frente a los daños y perjuicios causados por inacción. En el presente caso, se reclama por la omisión del Estado en el ejercicio de sus potestades de fiscalización o tutela, y por la desinformación que generó en los usuarios del Banco Germano, que de haber sabido, no hubiesen requerido sus servicios. Ello obliga a establecer si dicha inactividad se corresponde con un funcionamiento anormal o ilegítimo de la Administración, a tenor de lo preceptuado por el numeral 190 de la citada Ley General de la Administración Pública, para lo cual es primaria la necesidad de analizar tales conceptos. En la actualidad es pacíficamente aceptado que la conducta administrativa abarca no solo el comportamiento activo de la Administración (y dentro de él, el acto administrativo) sino además, la conducta omisiva, ese “no hacer” que se ha dado en llamar inactividad de la Administración, tanto en su vertiente formal (en la medida en que se revierte en un acto presunto por silencio administrativo) como material (referida básicamente al ámbito prestacional de la organización administrativa). De esta manera, ha de entenderse la inactividad material administrativa como aquella derivada de la omisión en el cumplimiento de una obligación jurídica preestablecida, que se produce cuando, fuera de un procedimiento administrativo, la Administración incumple, por omisión, una obligación impuesta por el ordenamiento jurídico o por cualquier otro mecanismo de autovinculación (como es el caso de un acto propio o de los instrumentos consensuales), con lesión directa de un interés legítimo o de un derecho subjetivo, ya sea que altere o no una relación jurídico-administrativa preexistente. Más simple, hay inactividad de este tipo cuando existiendo para el ente u órgano público una obligación de dar o hacer impuesta por el ordenamiento jurídico o por una previa decisión suya, fuera de un procedimiento administrativo, no se despliega la debida actividad fáctica o jurídica que lleve a buen término la función otorgada, con detrimento de los derechos o intereses de uno o varios sujetos pasivos, ya sean privados o públicos, individuales o colectivos. Se trata de esa “culpa in ommittendo” en la que se incumple por inacción el deber funcional de actuar. De más está decir, que la indolencia administrativa puede producir (y de hecho produce) más graves lesiones que la propia actuación limitativa del órgano o ente público. De ahí que, ha de afirmarse de manera contundente (con fundamento y de acuerdo con lo dicho en considerandos anteriores) que la Administración Pública también es responsable por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados con su inactividad administrativa. Esa pasividad frente al cumplimiento de obligaciones preexistentes se enmarca, para efectos de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, como funcionamiento anormal de la Administración (en tanto se corresponda con una actividad material debida) y con una conducta ilegítima, que para este caso pueden ser concurrente, en la medida en que el incumplimiento de lo debido no sólo atenta contra las reglas de buena administración, sino que infringe la juricidad en tanto incumple las potestades administrativas funcionales que dimanan del propio Ordenamiento Jurídico. Esto es tanto más acentuado cuanto de servicios públicos se trata, pues el incumplimiento de una actividad u obra de titularidad pública, las más de las veces, también de interés general, potencia el nivel de riesgo inherente al servicio y agudiza la afectación del colectivo, con eventual lesión directa de particulares situaciones subjetivas. VIII.- El nexo causal como presupuesto de responsabilidad. La diversa tipología de las causas. Establecida en términos generales, que la anormalidad e ilicitud del comportamiento omisivo puede producir la responsabilidad civil de la Administración, resta por establecer si esa patológica inacción administrativa fue o no causa de la lesión reclamada, y en concreto, de las pérdidas financieras solicitadas por Embotelladora Tica S.A., pues para la estimación de la demanda resulta imprescindible comprobar la existencia del nexo causal, en su tradicional noción de causa-efecto. Al respecto cabe recordar que en la producción del daño, suelen concurrir con frecuencia múltiples factores, dentro de los cuales es preciso determinar aquellos que directa o indirectamente son causa eficiente y adecuada del mal causado (sobre la causa próxima, adecuada y eficiente, puede consultarse la sentencia ya citada de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. N° 252-F-01, de las 16 horas 15 minutos del 28 de marzo del 2001). En esa confluencia de elementos fácticos o jurídicos que rodean la situación dañosa, habrá necesidad de establecer la acción u omisión apta que provocó la consecuencia; desplazando aquéllas que no han tenido ninguna influencia en el resultado (causas extrañas), de las que, de no haber tenido lugar, hubiesen evitado el menoscabo. Se trata de una especie de prognosis objetiva, a través de la cual se pueda afirmar que con tal acción u omisión es lógico o probable que se produzca el daño específico. Bajo esta inteligencia, la inacción que acusa el recurrente como productora de la responsabilidad administrativa del Banco Central por motivos de anormalidad e ilicitud, consiste en la supuesta falta de fiscalización adecuada y el incumplimiento en el ejercicio de sus deberes y atribuciones legales, de fiscalización y control, en virtud de los cuales, estima, debió haber comunicado mediante los mecanismos pertinentes, la situación financiera del Banco Germano, acción que de haberse generado, resalta, hubiera llevado a que su representada no hubiera realizado las transacciones reclamadas con dicha entidad financiera y con ello, se hubiera evitado la lesión que padeció. Dentro de un análisis del nexo de causalidad que debe asociar la conducta de la Administración al efecto lesivo a los derechos o intereses del particular, en el marco explicitado en los considerandos precedentes, es de estimar si esta conducta administrativa (omisiva en la especie), puede considerarse como la causa adecuada que produjo por consecuencia y efecto derivado, el daño que se reclama. En el caso bajo estudio, la inacción del Banco Central alegada no es causa apta, suficiente o adecuada en la lesión que acusa el recurrente, es decir, no fue el funcionamiento omiso del banco en cuestión, el hecho que provocó, per se, la lesión al patrimonio de la empresa actora, sino que el perjuicio sufrido obedece a la falta de pago en que incurrió el Banco Germano respecto de las divisas extranjeras que debían ser utilizadas en la cancelación de obligaciones contraídas con Eastman Chemical International Ltd., hecho único e independiente el cual, no se pueden extraer tales consecuencias para el Banco Central, en tanto la causa del daño fue constituida por un hecho ajeno y externo sobre el que, no guarda ninguna relación. Cabe recordar que una acción es considerada la causa generadora del daño, en la medida que el hecho particular haya potenciado la concreción del menoscabo que se reclama, de modo que éste último surja como una consecuencia inmediata y directa de aquél. Adicionalmente, conforme será objeto de análisis en el considerando siguiente, el numeral 109 de la derogada Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica refleja estos principios referidos, en cuanto atribuye a los bancos autorizados la responsabilidad por el incumplimiento de obligaciones como las que fueron desatendidas en este caso, y que fueron las que provocaron el efecto lesivo en detrimento de la empresa casacionista. Desde este plano, es evidente que no corresponde al Banco Central responsabilidad alguna por el no pago de las divisas en que incurrió en Banco Germano, en tanto no basta con que se invoque una acción u omisión de la Administración para atribuirle la responsabilidad por los daños padecidos, sino que ese funcionamiento público debe haber sido la causa que desencadenó la lesión, situación que no se ha acreditado en el particular. IX.- La existencia de la anormalidad mencionada, depende en gran medida de los elementos de prueba traídos al proceso, y en ese tanto se hace necesario examinar en un primer plano, los agravios relativos al acervo probatorio y su repercusión en el cuadro fáctico del presente asunto. El cargo esgrimido como violación indirecta, corresponde propiamente a un error de derecho en la ponderación de algunos documentos, pues se reclama que los elementos mencionados no fueron apreciados en su conjunto, conforme a las reglas de “la sana crítica, la lógica y la razón” (folio 663), y que no se les otorgó el valor que les correspondía, como instrumentos públicos. Con ello, afirma el recurrente, se quebrantaron los numerales 330, 369, 370 de Código Procesal Civil y como normas de fondo, los artículos 190 y 191 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Sin embargo, el recurso ha de ser desestimado en este aspecto, pues los argumentos que ahora se esgrimen y el desconocimiento de la documentación que se aduce, son aspectos novedosos en la contienda bajo estudio, cuando lo cierto es que los hechos probados de la sentencia de primera instancia, fueron respaldados por el tribunal en forma íntegra, sin que en su momento oportuno (con la apelación) se hiciera referencia alguna sobre ese extremo. Al haberse consentido, cabe aplicar la regla del numeral 608 del Código Procesal, y rechazar el cargo por no haber sido oportunamente alegado. X.- Para el análisis de la situación planteada se ha de tomar en consideración el artículo 106 de la derogada Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica (N°1552 de 23 de abril de 1953) que disponía: “Los bancos autorizados para operar con divisas extranjeras harán todas las operaciones de compra y venta de las mismas por cuenta exclusiva del Banco Central y de absoluto acuerdo con las disposiciones, resoluciones y recomendaciones que reciban de la Junta. En consecuencia, los bancos podrán traspasar en cualquier momento al Banco Central las divisas que hubieren comprado y éste podrá, en todo tiempo, requerir a los bancos que efectúen el traspaso a su favor de las divisas compradas.” Por su parte, el numeral 109 ibídem enunciaba los supuestos de responsabilidad a cargo del banco autorizado o del Banco Central, al señalar: “Correrán por cuenta de los bancos autorizados los riesgos inherentes al incumplimiento de las letras por ellos adquiridas y de los contratos correspondientes, así como el riesgo de que sus depósitos en divisas no fueren reembolsados por su corresponsales y cualesquiera otros riesgos típicamente comerciales o bancarios, que afectaran las divisas que hubieren comprado, las hubieren traspasado al Banco Central o no. Correrán por cuenta del Banco Central los mismos riesgos en relación con sus propias compras y tenencias de monedas extranjeras, y además, los riesgos correspondientes a las eventuales modificaciones de los valores externos legales de las monedas, sobre todas las reservas monetarias internacionales de propiedad del Sistema Bancario Nacional cuyos resultados financieros sean de ganancia o de pérdida, le corresponderán íntegramente para los fines establecidos en el artículo 14 de la presente ley.” (el subrayado no es del original). En el subjudice, la actora solicitó al Banco Germano la autorización y otorgamiento de divisas para el pago de importaciones de materia prima, por un monto total de $148.488,00 para ser girados a la orden de Eastman Chemical Internacional Ltda.. Dicha entidad bancaria extendió dos cheques identificados con los números 2994 y 0639, fechados 30 de julio y 3 de septiembre, ambos de 1991, por $ 59.395,20 y $29.697,60, los cuales no fueron enviados al proveedor. Acorde con lo expuesto, fue el Banco Germano quien, en exclusiva, incumplió con su obligación de remitir el dinero al destinatario, lo cual imposibilitó ejecutar la transacción. Como se ve, dicho incumplimiento no es imputable al Banco Central, sobre la base de una supuesta falta al deber de tutela o fiscalización. En efecto, se acusa inercia y omisión del Banco Central como ente fiscalizador. Asimismo negligencia en la fiscalización, pues en criterio del recurrente, el Banco Central tenía conocimiento del irregular e ilegal funcionamiento del Banco Germano. Aún dejando de lado la ausencia de elementos probatorios que permitan sostener las afirmaciones indicadas, es lo cierto que no encontrarían tampoco asidero alguno en la lesión alegada por la actora, pues se parte de la proyectada información al público sobre la situación financiera del Banco Germano, para sostener una conducta probable e hipotética del inversionista. La lesión reclamada provendría, en ese tanto, de una conducta indirecta y de segundo orden del ente público accionado, que no alcanza a comprometer el patrimonio estatal. Salvo que se quiera extender la potestad fiscalizadora del banco rector, a cada acto concreto y específico de su agente autorizado, lo cual es, a todas luces, un sobredimensionamiento de sus obligaciones, que no se ajusta por demás, a la correcta interpretación de las diferentes normas legales que cita el recurrente como infringidas, y en particular, de los incisos 1, 2 y 11 del artículo 125 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central. Ni la falta de información y prevención a los inversionistas, ni la negligencia en la fiscalización o el actuar tardío del Banco Central, según lo alega el apoderado de la actora, encuentran esa necesaria conexión con el incumplimiento en la expedición de los cheques. Es evidente que la supuesta inactividad no fue causa adecuada, próxima y directa de la lesión. Como lo señaló esta misma Sala en casos muy similares al presente, el Banco Central no participó ni directa ni indirectamente en la adquisición de las divisas, que por demás, nunca se concretó (sentencias N° 946 de las 16 horas 20 minutos del 28 de noviembre del 2001 y la N° 143-F-03 de las 11 horas 15 minutos del 19 de marzo del 2003). En ese tanto, es clara la ausencia de responsabilidad civil de la Administración y al disponerlo así, los juzgadores de instancia, no infringieron las diferentes normas de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central ni del sistema Bancario Nacional, arriba señaladas, ni los numerales 190 y 191 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. En lo que se refiere a los montos adeudados por el Banco Germano a la firma recurrente, se omite pronunciamiento, por no constituir parte de los agravios formulados, en tanto el presente reclamo versa con exclusividad, sobre la exigencia de responsabilidad administrativa por conducta ilícita y anormal del Banco Central, derivada de la inercia de la AGEF (folio 633) aunado al hecho de en las instancias previas ya se ha resuelto a favor del casacionista sobre este extremo. XI. En mérito de lo expuesto, corresponde declarar sin lugar el presente recurso de casación por razones de fondo, con sus costas a cargo del recurrente (artículo 611 del Código Procesal Civil).\"", "body_en_text": "III. Evolution and independence of the Public Administration liability regime. Before any other consideration regarding the liability claimed, it is pertinent to make some observations on the subject. Since the State is a person subject to the Law and an essential part of the democratic machinery, it is liable. That absolute immunity of those who exercise power has been abandoned. The well-known expression \"the State is me\" was pulverized with the re-elaboration of the modern political system, as it subjects everyone holding a position of public power to the block of legality, and grants them, as a counterpart, liability for their unlawful conduct. The duty of reparation imposed today on the State and the Administration for the damages they cause is an unyielding principle of any constitutional structure. It is true that for the realization of such an institute, it was initially necessary to resort to the common legal regime (Civil Code). However, as this century advanced in its early steps, it can be affirmed that the exclusively subjective regime of Public Administration liability has been superseded. Left behind are the efforts of an expansive interpretation, which with laudable tenacity (but with a weak technical-legal result), sought to accommodate the Aquilian liability of the public authority within the concepts of fault (culpa) and intent (dolo). Since the second half of the 19th century (1873), it was clear in the French legal regime that the rules of the Civil Code are not suitable for this particular spectrum of public conduct, since its bidirectional perspective on the phenomenon of non-contractual injury is insufficient from the outset. The detachment (not abandonment) from the common legal regime was as clear as it was necessary. The civil normative structure did not provide, nor does it provide, a sufficient and satisfactory explanation for the commitment of public assets by virtue of individualized or global (joint) conduct, of that or those who, in the anonymity of the organization, integrate and exercise the public function; in such cases, the traditional figure of fault in eligendo or fault in vigilando is most often unviable. This gave rise, among other things, to the construction of faults of and of the service, later incorporating into the accumulation of these, which further widened the distance already created from the common origin of civil reparation in this field. It is through the accumulation of faults that the conduct of the official or servant is linked with the direct and joint and several liability (responsabilidad directa y solidaria) of the Administration, even when it involves an entirely wrongful act or abnormality of the subject acting in the exercise of their functions (this has allowed the creation of the impure fault, developed under the approach of the \"active\" subject or producer of the damage and their connection with the public authority). The particularities of a proper regime are then established when the public organ or entity is compromised in those cases in which the direct holder in the causation of the damage is represented by a physical or legal subject, in the capacity of a \"third party,\" linked only to the entity through circumstances or public instruments that allow or facilitate the production of the harmful event (an aspect covered by the development of the figure of the nexus of occasional causality (nexo de ocasionalidad causal)). This interrelation is approached with equal results (joint and several liability in the indemnity obligation), although not with substantial identity of the figure, by the hypothesis of the Administration's liability caused to a third party by the action or omission of its co-contractor (the transfer of the public activity or service to a third party, it has been said, does not extinguish the liability of the organ or entity as the original holder). Faced with such a state of affairs, it was not difficult to foresee and formulate the extraordinary qualitative leap in this matter, which allowed for achieving the liability of the Administration and the State for conduct, both administrative and legislative in nature, which, although compliant with higher-ranking legal norms (and therefore valid), produce an injury in the legal sphere of the person, whether direct or collateral, in its origin or in its result (liability for lawful and normal conduct, as well as for legislative activity). This evolution and independence of the matter has already been accounted for by this same Chamber, when stating the following: \"... V.- The concepts of Public Administration liability and the duty to indemnify have evolved greatly in Western law. In antiquity, state liability arising from damage or harm that the activity of the Administration or its agents could cause to administered persons was inconceivable. Later, the liability of officials was admitted in certain cases, and some rights were recognized for the individual against the State. Then the theories of acts of management (actos de gestión) and acts of authority (actos de autoridad) appeared. In the former, the activities fall within the sphere of private law because there is equality of rights between the parties; the others refer to activities regulated by public law, where there is an inequality of rights that fall within the domain of power relations, to determine thus that, if the harmful act is an act of authority, then the State is not liable, because the decisions arise from its sovereignty and not from a right of a patrimonial nature. Subsequently, these theories were abandoned, to analyze the liability of the State, by virtue of which the conclusion was reached that any administrative act can entail state liability, but it was subordinated to the existence of a fault of the service (falta de servicio). It was established that a fault of the service existed if damage was caused while fulfilling the function. This even when the official performed their work as such, if in doing so, they acted with negligence, or incurring in omissions, or errors linked to the service, or when the function was not fulfilled when it should have been, or was performed belatedly. Also established was the fault of the official or personal fault (falta personal), which is that incurred when the official exceeds their attributions. Later it was accepted that both faults could coexist, and although different, could concur in the production of damage if the personal fault was linked to the execution of a public service. Finally, the last stage of evolution is reached to recognize the Administration's liability by reason of the simple functioning of the service, without needing to prove the fault of the official responsible for its provision ...\" Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. 263 at 3:30 p.m. on August 22, 1990. IV.- Strict Liability (Responsabilidad Objetiva). The non-contractual civil liability of the Public Administration is framed, therefore, within a strict liability regime, which encompasses in its foundation both the theory of risk and the balance in the patrimonial equation. This essentially seeks the indemnifying reparation to whoever has suffered an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority. This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a complete transformation in the central axis of the liability itself, because it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except regarding their personal liability). This undoubtedly causes a Copernican shift in the very approach to its foundation, since the Administration shall be liable whenever the victim does not have the duty to bear the damage, whether it is of a patrimonial or extra-patrimonial nature. From there, the reversal of the components and effects of the institute as a whole is evident. Both the essential prerequisites and the burden of proof acquire a new nuance, which frees the affected party not only from substantial but also procedural ties, and places the Administration in the obligatory discharge against the charges and facts imputed to it. In any case, the strict liability nature of the non-contractual civil liability of the Administration was clearly defined in the judgment of this Chamber No. 132 at 3 p.m. on August 14, 1991, for an event subsequent to the entry into force of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, in which it stated: \"VI. Our Ley General de la Administración Pública No. 6227 of May 2, 1978, in force since April 26, 1979, as indicated by the judgment of this Chamber No. 81 of the year 1984, when resolving the controversy over its validity, in Title Seven of the First Book incorporated the most modern principles, based on the most authoritative doctrine and jurisprudence, on the non-contractual liability of the Administration, to thus establish the direct liability of the State without needing to previously prove that the damage was produced by the fault of the official or the Administration, demanding for the admissibility of the indemnification that the damage suffered be effective, assessable and individualizable in relation to a person or group -Article 196-. It established that the Administration would be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim or act of a third party -Article 190-; and the obligation to repair all damage caused to the subjective rights of others by faults of its servants committed during the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof, using the opportunities or means it offers, even when it is for purposes or activities or acts foreign to said mission -Article 191-...\". (The underlining is not from the original). In this same sense, among many others, the judgments of this Chamber numbers 138 at 3:05 p.m. on August 23; 192 at 2:15 p.m. on November 6, both of 1991; 48 at 2:10 p.m. on May 29, 1996 and 55 at 2:30 p.m. on July 4, 1997 can be consulted.) In light of the provisions in said precedents, and as the A-quo well provided, our legal system, starting from the Ley General de la Administración Pública, adopts the system of strict liability of the Public Administration. Therefore, the existence -and, consequently, its demonstration- of intent (dolo) or fault (culpa) or, in general, a subjective fault attributable to the public servants or officials is not necessary for the duty to compensate the damages caused by its functioning to arise. It also establishes, exhaustively, as exempting causes of such liability, force majeure, victim's fault, and the act of a third party, with the Administration being responsible for proving their existence, which did not happen in the sub-judice case. (judgment of SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. 025-F-99, at two-fifteen in the afternoon on January twenty-second, nineteen hundred and ninety-nine). (In the same sense, see judgments of this same Chamber No. 589-F-99 at 2:20 p.m. on October 1, 1999 and No. 252-F-01, at four-fifteen in the afternoon on March 28, 2001) V.- Constitutional Basis of Strict Liability. This evolution of the institute of commentary, which leads to the indicated strict liability, finds full foundation in the current constitutional norms (articles 9, 11, 33, 41, 45 and 50 of the Political Constitution), from which clear rules and principles are obtained regarding what can be called the right to full compensability (resarcibilidad plena) of damage. This legal axiom was clearly embodied, with express, clear and profound reasoning, in the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 5207-2004, at 2 hours and 55 minutes on May 18, 2004, which literally indicated: “Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful lesions that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the administered persons. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of various precepts, principles and constitutional values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that “The Government of the Republic is (…) responsible (…)”, thereby taking for granted the liability of the greater public entity or State and its various organs –Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers-. Article 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the “(…) criminal liability (…)” of public officials and the second paragraph refers us to the “(…) personal liability for officials in the fulfillment of their duties (…)”. Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects “acquired patrimonial rights” and “consolidated legal situations”, which can only be, effectively and really, protected with a broad-spectrum administrative liability system without immune or exempt zones when they are infringed upon by public administrations in the deployment of their public activity or performance. Article 41 ibidem, stipulates that “By having recourse to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property or moral interests (…)”, this precept imposes the duty on the author and person liable for the damage to compensate the unlawful lesions effectively suffered by the administered persons as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conducts by action or negative by omission of the public entities, thereby becoming the constitutional cornerstone for the legislative development of a system of strict and direct liability in which the compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach to the conduct of the public official for intent (dolo) or fault (culpa), but, solely and exclusively, for having been inflicted or received, effectively, “(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property or moral interests (…)”, that is, an unlawful lesion that they do not have the duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. Article 41 of the Political Constitution establishes a fundamental compensatory right in favor of the administered person who has suffered an unlawful lesion by an entity –through its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct- and the correlative obligation of the latter to compensate or repair it fully, access to the jurisdiction provided for in this same constitutional precept thus becomes an instrumental right to ensure, forcibly, the enjoyment and exercise of the victim's compensatory right when the subject obliged to repair voluntarily fails to comply with the referred obligation. Article 45 of the Magna Carta embraces the principle of the inviolability of property by providing that “Property is inviolable; no one may be deprived of what is theirs except in the publicly certified interest and upon prior indemnification in accordance with the law (…)”, thus recognizing through the fundamental text that special sacrifices or singular burdens that the administered person does not have the duty to bear or tolerate, even if they stem from a lawful activity –such as the exercise of expropriation power- must be compensated. Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution insofar as it implicitly recognizes legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in court, when they fail to comply with their obligations, constitutes a clear basis for administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of the aforementioned Article 49 provides that “The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the administered persons”, one of the main forms of guaranteeing these being an objective, direct, broad and complete administrative liability regime. The final paragraph of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, regarding environmental damage, establishes that “The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions”, a liability regime from which, obviously, the economic public entities (called public companies-public entity) and public companies (also called public companies-private law entity) cannot be exempted when they pollute by deploying an industrial, commercial or service activity and, in general, the State when it fails to comply with its obligations to defend and preserve the environment through deficient oversight or control activity of public and private activities that are actually or potentially polluting. In the hypothesis of members of the Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions, Article 188 of the fundamental norm provides that “Their directors are liable for their management”. Regarding the Executive Power, Title X of the constitutional text contains a Chapter V whose heading is “Liabilities of those who exercise the Executive Power”, with Article 148 enshrining the liability of the President for the “use they make of those attributions which according to this Constitution correspond to them exclusively”, the joint liability of the latter with the respective Minister of the sector “regarding the exercise of the attributions that this Constitution grants to both” –which is specified by Article 149 ibidem- and that of the Council of Government for the agreements it adopts. The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33) which prevents imposing on administered persons a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they do not have the duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful lesions caused to one or more administered persons and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to consider that the Political Constitution includes an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered persons to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of articles, interpreted a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4 and 191 of the fundamental Law insofar as they include, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the “proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies”, “good running of the Government” and “efficiency of the administration”. This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. Thus, it becomes evident that the original constituent implicitly incorporated the principle of liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter to interpret, apply, integrate and delimit the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful lesion caused to the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere of the administered persons by its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct.” VI.- Parameters of Legal Imputation. The concept of abnormal functioning and its distinction from related figures. The particularities inherent to the liability of the Public Administration, generated through its gradual evolution, as well as the strict liability nature achieved (all with clear constitutional basis), cannot be interpreted either as an unrestricted and permanent compensatory duty, applicable always and for all hypotheses of injury. A regime of such nature would be unheard of and materially unbearable for any State with limited financial resources. Therefore, imputation criteria have been used that somehow dimension (always within said objectivity) that indemnity duty originated by public conduct. Thus, article 190 of our Ley General de la Administración Pública refers to “legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning”, where legitimacy or its antithesis basically refers to the juridical conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented among others, by the service-providing activity attributed to the State as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the collective. Note how Article 194 of the indicated law refers to “lawful acts”, under the conception of juridical activity, distinguishing them in the same norm from what it qualifies as “normal functioning”, understood as material activity. In this way, abnormality attends to those administrative conducts, which in themselves, depart from good administration (in accordance with the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes efficacy and efficiency) or from the organization, from the technical rules or from the expertise and prudent task in the deployment of its actions, with harmful effect for the person. This allows pointing out that abnormality can manifest itself through malfunctioning; belated functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Abnormality and illegality must not, therefore, be adopted as equivalent concepts, not even in what corresponds to the hypothesis of that functioning which, being due or compliant with the aforesaid rules, produces a harmful result (called by some doctrinal sector “abnormal functioning by result”), because in such a case, what operates is a liability for normal functioning with harmful effect or result, indemnifiable, of course, provided that the requirements pre-established expressly by the Legal System itself are met (see the same Article 194 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). Neither should this “abnormality” of the functioning and the “illegitimacy” thereof be confused with the generic and base unlawfulness (antijuricidad), essential in any civil reparation. Indeed, civil liability arises from unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive norm, while at other times, from the basic principle translated into the duty not to harm another), and which for this particular matter is specified in the non-existence of that duty to bear the damage. Thus, if there is no duty to endure the lesion (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration had to avoid it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent, whether due to being unforeseeable or unavoidable. The breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person occurs then, and to that extent, the lesion to the legal sphere of the victim must be deemed as unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory reparation. In this way, it can be affirmed that only the lesion that, confronted with the whole of the Legal System, can be deemed as unlawful in its basis is indemnifiable, because the contrary would be affirming compensation for harmful action against a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified. It must be reiterated then, that for the existence in Law of a due reparation, there must be antecedent and base unlawfulness, which in no way points to the nature (legitimate or illegitimate) of the conduct displayed by the agent producing the damage, nor to the result produced by said action or omission. Indeed, even in the cases of legitimate and normal functioning, in which there is no illegality in the behavior, a harmful consequence is produced, which with certain characteristics (exceptional intensity or small proportion of affected persons), is deemed as of obligatory reparation, which speaks of its unlawfulness, so much so, that with the lesion itself arises the civil obligation and its consequent right to sue. It can be sustained then, that the base unlawfulness, referred to as the substrate and global and indispensable prerequisite for liability, is something different and independent from the imputation parameter used by the Legal System, because even in the event of a strict liability regime (which excludes the subjective elements of fault (culpa) and intent (dolo), to give way to a simple economic transfer aimed at restoring the imbalance produced in the equality of public burdens), there is unlawfulness, insofar as the norm declares the existing obligation under the implicit presupposition of a lesion contrary to Law, which must not be borne by the victim. That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in the indemnifiable damage, whether by normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning. VII.- Omission as a criterion of abnormality and illegality. The compulsory indemnity against damages caused by inaction. In the present case, a claim is made for the omission of the State in the exercise of its powers of oversight or tutelage, and for the misinformation it generated among the users of the Banco Germano, who, had they known, would not have required its services. This obliges establishing whether said inactivity corresponds to an abnormal or illegitimate functioning of the Administration, in accordance with the provisions of Article 190 of the cited Ley General de la Administración Pública, for which it is primary to analyze such concepts. Currently, it is peacefully accepted that administrative conduct encompasses not only the active behavior of the Administration (and within it, the administrative act) but also, the omissive conduct, that \"not doing\" that has come to be called inactivity of the Administration, both in its formal aspect (insofar as it reverses into a presumed act by administrative silence) and material (referring basically to the service-provision sphere of the administrative organization). In this way, material administrative inactivity must be understood as that derived from the omission in the fulfillment of a pre-established legal obligation, which occurs when, outside of an administrative procedure, the Administration breaches, by omission, an obligation imposed by the legal system or by any other self-binding mechanism (such is the case of a self-initiated act or consensual instruments), with direct injury to a legitimate interest or a subjective right, whether it alters a pre-existing legal-administrative relationship or not. More simply, there is inactivity of this type when, having for the public entity or organ an obligation to give or do imposed by the legal system or by a prior decision of its own, outside of an administrative procedure, the due factual or juridical activity that brings the granted function to fruition is not deployed, to the detriment of the rights or interests of one or several passive subjects, whether private or public, individual or collective. This concerns that \"culpa in ommittendo\" in which the functional duty to act is breached by inaction. Needless to say, administrative indolence can produce (and indeed produces) more serious lesions than the limiting action itself of the public organ or entity. Hence, it must be affied emphatically (with foundation and in accordance with what was said in previous considerandos) that the Public Administration is also liable for the damages caused by its administrative inactivity.\n\nThat passivity in the face of compliance with pre-existing obligations is framed, for purposes of non-contractual civil liability, as abnormal functioning of the Administration (insofar as it corresponds to a required material activity) and as illegitimate conduct, which in this case may be concurrent, to the extent that the failure to do what is required not only undermines the rules of good administration but also infringes legality by breaching the functional administrative powers that emanate from the Legal System itself. This is all the more pronounced when public services are involved, since the failure to carry out a publicly owned activity or work, most often also of general interest, increases the level of risk inherent in the service and intensifies the impact on the community, with potential direct harm to individual subjective situations.\n\nVIII.- The causal link (nexo causal) as a prerequisite for liability. The diverse typology of causes. Having established in general terms that the abnormality and illegality of the omissive conduct may give rise to the Administration's civil liability, it remains to be determined whether that pathological administrative inaction was or was not the cause of the injury claimed, and specifically, of the financial losses sought by Embotelladora Tica S.A., since, for the claim to be upheld, it is essential to verify the existence of the causal link (nexo causal), in its traditional notion of cause and effect. In this regard, it is worth recalling that in the production of damage, multiple factors often concur, among which it is necessary to identify those that are directly or indirectly the efficient and adequate cause of the harm caused (on the proximate, adequate, and efficient cause, see the previously cited judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 252-F-01, of 4:15 p.m. on March 28, 2001). In that confluence of factual or legal elements surrounding the harmful situation, it will be necessary to establish the apt action or omission that caused the consequence, setting aside those that had no influence on the result (extraneous causes) from those which, had they not occurred, would have prevented the harm. This involves a kind of objective prognosis, through which it can be affirmed that with such action or omission, it is logical or probable that the specific damage will occur. Under this reasoning, the inaction that the appellant claims as producing the Central Bank's administrative liability on grounds of abnormality and illegality consists of the alleged lack of adequate supervision and the failure to exercise its legal duties and powers of oversight and control, by virtue of which, it believes, it should have communicated the financial situation of Banco Germano through the appropriate mechanisms, an action which, had it been taken, it emphasizes, would have led to its represented party not carrying out the claimed transactions with that financial entity and thereby would have avoided the injury it suffered. Within an analysis of the causal link (nexo de causalidad) that must connect the Administration's conduct to the harmful effect on the rights or interests of the individual, within the framework set forth in the preceding recitals, it must be assessed whether this administrative conduct (omissive in this case) can be considered the adequate cause that produced the claimed damage as a consequence and derived effect. In the case under study, the alleged inaction of the Central Bank is not an apt, sufficient, or adequate cause of the injury claimed by the appellant; that is, it was not the omissive functioning of the bank in question, the act that caused, per se, the injury to the plaintiff company's assets. Rather, the harm suffered was due to the failure of Banco Germano to pay the foreign currency that was to be used to settle obligations contracted with Eastman Chemical International Ltd., a unique and independent fact from which such consequences cannot be drawn for the Central Bank, as the cause of the damage was constituted by an extraneous and external fact with which it has no relationship. It is worth recalling that an action is considered the generating cause of the damage, to the extent that the particular fact enhanced the materialization of the harm claimed, such that the latter arises as an immediate and direct consequence of the former. Additionally, as will be analyzed in the following recital, Article 109 of the repealed Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica reflects these referred principles, insofar as it attributes to authorized banks liability for the breach of obligations such as those disregarded in this case, and which were what caused the harmful effect to the detriment of the cassation appellant company. From this standpoint, it is evident that the Central Bank bears no liability whatsoever for the non-payment of the foreign currency incurred by Banco Germano, as it is not sufficient to invoke an action or omission of the Administration to attribute liability for the damages suffered; rather, that public functioning must have been the cause that triggered the injury, a situation that has not been proven in this particular case.\n\nIX.- The existence of the aforementioned abnormality largely depends on the evidentiary elements brought to the proceedings, and to that extent, it is necessary to examine, on a first level, the grievances relating to the evidentiary body and their impact on the factual framework of this matter. The charge raised as an indirect violation properly corresponds to an error of law in the weighing of certain documents, since it is claimed that the mentioned elements were not assessed as a whole, in accordance with the rules of \"sound criticism, logic, and reason\" (folio 663), and that they were not given the value they deserved, as public instruments. Thereby, the appellant asserts, Articles 330, 369, and 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) were violated, and as substantive rules, Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). However, the appeal must be dismissed in this aspect, because the arguments now raised and the alleged disregard of the documentation are novel aspects in the dispute under study, when the fact is that the proven facts of the first-instance judgment were fully endorsed by the court, without any reference having been made to that point at the appropriate time (with the appeal). Having been consented to, the rule of Article 608 of the Procedural Code (Código Procesal) applies, and the charge must be rejected for not having been timely raised.\n\nX.- For the analysis of the situation raised, Article 106 of the repealed Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica (No. 1552 of April 23, 1953) must be taken into consideration, which provided: \"Banks authorized to deal in foreign currency shall carry out all purchase and sale operations of the same for the exclusive account of the Central Bank and in absolute accordance with the provisions, resolutions, and recommendations they receive from the Board. Consequently, the banks may transfer at any time to the Central Bank the foreign currency they have purchased, and the latter may, at any time, require the banks to transfer the purchased foreign currency in its favor.\" In turn, Article 109 ibidem set forth the cases of liability borne by the authorized bank or the Central Bank, stating: \"The risks inherent in the non-payment of the bills acquired by the authorized banks and the corresponding contracts shall be borne by the authorized banks, as well as the risk that their foreign currency deposits may not be reimbursed by their correspondents and any other typically commercial or banking risks that affect the foreign currency they have purchased, whether or not they have transferred it to the Central Bank. The same risks in relation to its own purchases and holdings of foreign currencies shall be borne by the Central Bank, and additionally, the risks corresponding to eventual modifications of the legal external values of the currencies, over all the international monetary reserves owned by the National Banking System (Sistema Bancario Nacional), the financial results of which, whether gain or loss, shall correspond entirely to it for the purposes established in Article 14 of this law.\" (underlining is not from the original). In the sub judice, the plaintiff requested from Banco Germano the authorization and granting of foreign currency for the payment of raw material imports, for a total amount of $148,488.00 to be drawn to the order of Eastman Chemical Internacional Ltda. This banking entity issued two checks identified with numbers 2994 and 0639, dated July 30 and September 3, both of 1991, for $59,395.20 and $29,697.60, which were not sent to the supplier. In accordance with the foregoing, it was Banco Germano that, exclusively, breached its obligation to remit the money to the recipient, which made it impossible to execute the transaction. As can be seen, said breach is not attributable to the Central Bank, on the basis of an alleged failure in the duty of supervision or oversight. Indeed, inertia and omission on the part of the Central Bank as the oversight body are alleged. Likewise, negligence in supervision, since in the appellant's view, the Central Bank was aware of the irregular and illegal functioning of Banco Germano. Even setting aside the absence of evidentiary elements to support the stated assertions, it is true that they would not find any basis in the injury alleged by the plaintiff either, since it starts from the projected information to the public about the financial situation of Banco Germano, to support a probable and hypothetical conduct of the investor. The claimed injury would therefore stem from an indirect and second-order conduct of the sued public entity, which does not reach the point of compromising state assets. Unless one wishes to extend the oversight power of the central bank to each concrete and specific act of its authorized agent, which is, clearly, an over-dimensioning of its obligations, which does not conform, moreover, to the correct interpretation of the various legal provisions cited by the appellant as infringed, and in particular, of subsections 1, 2, and 11 of Article 125 of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central. Neither the lack of information and warning to investors, nor the negligence in supervision or the late action of the Central Bank, as alleged by the plaintiff's attorney, find that necessary connection with the breach in the issuance of the checks. It is evident that the alleged inactivity was not the adequate, proximate, and direct cause of the injury. As this same Chamber noted in cases very similar to the present one, the Central Bank did not participate directly or indirectly in the acquisition of the foreign currency, which, moreover, was never completed (judgments No. 946 of 4:20 p.m. on November 28, 2001, and No. 143-F-03 of 11:15 a.m. on March 19, 2003). To that extent, the absence of civil liability on the part of the Administration is clear, and in so deciding, the lower court judges did not infringe the various provisions of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central or of the National Banking System (Sistema Bancario Nacional), referred to above, nor Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Regarding the amounts owed by Banco Germano to the appellant company, no pronouncement is made, as they do not form part of the grievances formulated, since the present claim deals exclusively with the demand for administrative liability for illicit and abnormal conduct by the Central Bank, derived from the inaction of the AGEF (folio 633), coupled with the fact that in the prior instances, a decision has already been made in favor of the cassation appellant on this point.\n\nXI. By virtue of the foregoing, the present cassation appeal on substantive grounds must be dismissed, with costs to be borne by the appellant (Article 611 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil)).\n\nIndeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution provides that “The Government of the Republic is (…) responsible (…)”, thereby taking for granted the liability of the major public entity or State and its various organs –the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches. Article 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the “(…) criminal liability (…)” of public officials and the second paragraph refers to the “(…) personal liability for officials in the performance of their duties (…)”. Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects “acquired patrimonial rights” and “consolidated legal situations,” which can only be effectively and really protected with a broad-spectrum system of administrative liability without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their public activity or performance. Article 41 ibidem stipulates that “Resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (…)”, this precept imposes a duty on the author and party responsible for the damage to compensate the unlawful injuries actually suffered by the administered as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conduct by action or negative conduct by omission of public entities, thereby becoming the constitutional cornerstone for the legislative development of a system of objective and direct liability in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the public official’s conduct for willful misconduct (dolo) or fault (culpa), but rather, solely and exclusively, on having been inflicted or actually received “(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property, or moral interests (…)”, that is, an unlawful injury that they are not obligated to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. Article 41 of the Political Constitution establishes a fundamental compensatory right in favor of the administered who has suffered an unlawful injury by an entity –through its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct– and the correlative obligation of the latter to compensate or repair it integrally; access to jurisdiction, provided for in this same constitutional precept, thus becomes an instrumental right to compulsorily ensure the enjoyment and exercise of the injured party’s compensatory right when the party obligated to provide reparation voluntarily fails to comply with that obligation. Article 45 of the Magna Carta embraces the principle of the inviolability of property by providing that “Property is inviolable; no one may be deprived of what is theirs except for legally proven public interest, with prior compensation according to law (…)”, thus recognizing, through the fundamental text, that special sacrifices or singular burdens that the administered is not obligated to bear or tolerate, even if they result from lawful activity –such as the exercise of the expropriation power– must be compensated. Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, to the extent that it implicitly recognizes legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in court when they fail to comply with their obligations, constitutes a clear foundation of administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of the aforementioned Article 49 provides that “The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the administered,” with one of the principal forms of guarantee for these being an objective, direct, broad, and complete regime of administrative liability. The final paragraph of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, regarding environmental damage, establishes that “The law shall determine the corresponding liabilities and sanctions,” a liability regime from which, obviously, public economic entities (referred to as public enterprises-public entity (empresas públicas-ente público)) and public enterprises (also called public enterprises-entity under private law (empresas públicas-ente de Derecho privado)) cannot exempt themselves when they pollute by deploying an industrial, commercial, or service activity, and, in general, the State when it fails to comply with its obligations to defend and preserve the environment through deficient oversight or control of public and private activities that are actually or potentially polluting. In the case of the members of the Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions, Article 188 of the fundamental norm provides that “Their directors are liable for their management.” With respect to the Executive Branch, Title X of the constitutional text contains a Chapter V whose heading is “Responsibilities of those who exercise the Executive Branch,” with Article 148 enshrining the liability of the President for “the use made of those powers which, according to this Constitution, correspond to him exclusively,” the joint liability of the latter with the respective Minister of the sector “with respect to the exercise of the powers that this Constitution grants to both” –which is specified by Article 149 ibidem– and the liability of the Government Council for the agreements it adopts. The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33), which prevents imposing on the administered a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they are not obligated to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or more administered and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration that the Political Constitution enshrines an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is the right of the administered to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the interrelation of Articles 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the fundamental Law, interpreted a contrario sensu, insofar as they respectively set forth the deontological parameters of the administrative function, such as the “proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies,” “proper running of the Government,” and “efficiency of the administration.” This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when this constitutional guarantee is violated. Thus, it is clear that the original constituent implicitly enshrined the principle of the liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal order. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury caused by its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct to the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere of the administered.”\n\n**VI.- Legal Imputation Parameters. The concept of abnormal functioning and its distinction from related concepts.** The particularities inherent to the liability of the Public Administration, generated through its gradual evolution, as well as the objective character it has attained (all with a clear constitutional basis), cannot be interpreted either as an unrestricted and permanent compensatory duty, applicable always and for all cases of injury. A regime of such a nature would be unheard of and materially unbearable for any State with limited financial resources. For this reason, recourse has been made to imputation criteria that in some way dimension (always within the stated objectivity) that duty to compensate originating from public conduct. Thus, Article 190 of our General Law of Public Administration refers to “lawful or unlawful, normal or abnormal functioning,” where lawfulness, or its antithesis, basically refers to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented, among other things, by the service-provision activity attributed to the State as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the community. Note how Article 194 of the indicated law refers to “lawful acts (actos lícitos),” under the conception of legal activity, distinguishing them in the same rule from what it qualifies as “normal functioning (funcionamiento normal),” understood as material activity. In this way, abnormality refers to those administrative conducts, that in themselves, depart from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, technical rules, or skill and prudent conduct in the deployment of its actions, with a harmful effect on the person. This allows us to point out that abnormality can manifest itself through malfunctioning; delayed functioning, or a total absence of functioning. **Abnormality and unlawfulness should not, therefore, be adopted as equivalent concepts**, not even with respect to the case of that functioning which, while being due or in accordance with the aforementioned rules, produces a harmful result (referred to by some doctrinal sector as “abnormal functioning by result (funcionamiento anormal por resultado)”), because in such a case, what operates is liability for **normal functioning with a harmful effect or result**, compensable, of course, provided that the requirements expressly pre-established by the Legal Order itself are met (see the same Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration). Neither should this “abnormality (anormalidad)” of functioning and the “illegitimacy (ilegitimidad)” thereof be confused with the generic and basic unlawfulness, essential in all civil reparation. Indeed, civil liability arises from unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive norm, while at other times, from the basic principle translated as the duty not to harm another (el deber de no dañar a otro)), and which for this particular matter materializes in the nonexistence of that duty to bear the damage. Thus, if there is no duty to endure the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent, either because it was unforeseeable or unavoidable. The breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person then occurs, and to that extent, the injury to the victim’s legal sphere must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory reparation. In this way, it can be affirmed that only an injury that, when confronted with the entirety of the Legal Order, can be deemed unlawful in its base is compensable, because the opposite would be to affirm compensation for harmful action against a detriment that the Legal Order does not reproach and which, on the contrary, tolerates and accepts as normal and justified. It must be reiterated then, that for the existence in Law of a due reparation, there must be antecedent and basic unlawfulness, which in no way points to the nature (lawful or unlawful) of the conduct deployed by the agent producing the damage, nor to the result produced by that action or omission. Indeed, even in cases of lawful and normal functioning, where there is no unlawfulness in the behavior, a harmful consequence occurs, which with certain characteristics (exceptional intensity or small proportion of affected persons), is deemed of obligatory reparation, which speaks of its unlawfulness, so much so that with the injury itself, the civil obligation arises and its consequent right to bring an action. It can be sustained then, that the basic unlawfulness, referred to as the substratum and global and indispensable presupposition for liability, is something distinct and independent from the imputation parameter used by the Legal System, because even in the event of an objective regime (which excludes the subjective elements of fault (culpa) and willful misconduct (dolo), to give way to a simple economic transfer aimed at restoring the imbalance produced in the equality of public burdens), there is unlawfulness, to the extent that the norm declares the existing obligation under the implicit presupposition of an injury contrary to Law, which should not be borne by the victim. This reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in compensable damage, whether from normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful functioning.\n\n**VII.- Omission as a criterion of abnormality and unlawfulness. The obligation to compensate for damages and losses caused by inaction.** In the present case, a claim is made for the State’s omission in the exercise of its oversight or supervisory powers (potestades de fiscalización o tutela), and for the misinformation it generated among the users of Banco Germano, who, had they known, would not have required its services. This obliges us to establish whether said inactivity corresponds to abnormal or unlawful functioning of the Administration, pursuant to Article 190 of the aforementioned General Law of Public Administration, for which it is primarily necessary to analyze such concepts. At present, it is peacefully accepted that administrative conduct encompasses not only the active conduct of the Administration (and within it, the administrative act) but also, omissive conduct, that “not doing” which has come to be called inactivity of the Administration (inactividad de la Administración), both in its formal aspect (to the extent that it results in a deemed act due to administrative silence) and material (referring basically to the service-provision sphere of the administrative organization). In this way, material administrative inactivity must be understood as that derived from the omission in fulfilling a pre-established legal obligation, which occurs when, outside an administrative procedure, the Administration fails, by omission, to fulfill an obligation imposed by the legal order or by any other mechanism of self-binding (such as a previous act of its own or consensual instruments), with direct injury to a legitimate interest or a subjective right, whether or not it alters a pre-existing legal-administrative relationship. More simply, **there is inactivity of this type when, there being for the public entity or organ an obligation to give or to do imposed by the legal order or by its own prior decision, outside an administrative procedure, the due factual or legal activity is not deployed to bring the granted function to fruition, to the detriment of the rights or interests of one or several passive subjects, whether private or public, individual or collective**. This is that “culpa in ommittendo” in which the functional duty to act is breached through inaction. It goes without saying that administrative indolence can produce (and in fact does produce) more serious injuries than the restrictive action itself of the public organ or entity. Hence, it must be firmly affirmed (on the basis of and in accordance with what was stated in previous considerandos) that the Public Administration is also liable for the damages and losses caused by its administrative inactivity. That passivity in the face of fulfilling pre-existing obligations is framed, for purposes of non-contractual civil liability, as abnormal functioning (funcionamiento anormal) of the Administration (insofar as it corresponds to a due material activity) and as unlawful conduct (conducta ilegítima), which in this case may be concurrent, to the extent that the breach of duty not only violates the rules of good administration, but also infringes legality insofar as it fails to comply with the functional administrative powers emanating from the Legal Order itself. This is even more accentuated when public services are involved, because the failure to fulfill a publicly-owned activity or work, most of the time also of general interest, enhances the inherent risk level of the service and sharpens the impact on the community, with potential direct injury to particular subjective situations.\n\n**VIII.- The causal link as a prerequisite for liability. The diverse typology of causes.** Having established in general terms that the abnormality and unlawfulness of omissive conduct can give rise to the civil liability of the Administration, it remains to establish whether that pathological administrative inaction was or was not the cause of the injury claimed, and specifically, of the financial losses sought by Embotelladora Tica S.A., because for the estimation of the claim, it is essential to verify the existence of the causal link, in its traditional notion of cause-effect. In this regard, it is worth recalling that in the production of damage, multiple factors frequently concur, among which it is necessary to determine those that are directly or indirectly the efficient (eficiente) and adequate (adecuada) cause of the harm caused (regarding the proximate, adequate, and efficient cause, consult the already cited judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 252-F-01, of 16 hours 15 minutes of March 28, 2001). In that confluence of factual or legal elements surrounding the harmful situation, it will be necessary to establish the apt action or omission that provoked the consequence; displacing those that have had no influence on the result (extraneous causes), from those which, had they not occurred, would have avoided the detriment. This is a kind of objective prognosis, through which it can be stated that with such action or omission, it is logical or probable that the specific damage would occur. Under this understanding, the inaction that the appellant accuses as producing the administrative liability of the Central Bank on grounds of abnormality and unlawfulness consists of the alleged lack of adequate oversight and the failure to exercise its legal duties and powers of supervision and control, by virtue of which, it believes, it should have communicated, through the pertinent mechanisms, the financial situation of Banco Germano, an action which, had it been generated, it emphasizes, would have led to its represented party not having carried out the claimed transactions with that financial entity and thereby, the injury it suffered would have been avoided. Within an analysis of the causal link that must associate the Administration’s conduct with the harmful effect on the rights or interests of the individual, within the framework explained in the preceding considerandos, it must be assessed whether this administrative conduct (omissive in the case) can be considered the adequate cause that produced, as a derived consequence and effect, the damage claimed. In the case under study, the alleged inaction of the Central Bank is not an apt, sufficient, or adequate cause in the injury that the appellant claims, that is, the omissive functioning of the bank in question was not the fact that provoked, per se, the injury to the plaintiff company’s assets, but rather the harm suffered is due to the default in payment incurred by Banco Germano regarding the foreign currencies that were to be used in canceling obligations contracted with Eastman Chemical International Ltd., a unique and independent fact from which such consequences cannot be drawn for the Central Bank, as the cause of the damage was constituted by an extraneous and external fact with which it has no relation whatsoever. It is worth remembering that an action is considered the generating cause of damage, to the extent that the particular fact has potentiated the materialization of the detriment claimed, so that the latter arises as an immediate and direct consequence of the former. Additionally, as will be analyzed in the following considerando, Article 109 of the repealed Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica reflects these referred principles, insofar as it attributes to authorized banks the liability for the default of obligations such as those that were unmet in this case, and which were those that provoked the harmful effect to the detriment of the cassation appellant company. From this standpoint, it is evident that the Central Bank bears no liability whatsoever for the non-payment of the foreign currencies incurred by Banco Germano, since it is not enough to invoke an action or omission of the Administration to attribute liability for the damages suffered to it, but rather that public functioning must have been the cause that triggered the injury, a situation that has not been proven in this particular case.\n\n**IX.-** The existence of the aforementioned abnormality depends largely on the evidence elements brought to the proceedings, and to that extent, it is necessary to examine, in the first place, the grievances relative to the body of evidence and its repercussion on the factual framework of this matter. The charge asserted as an indirect violation corresponds properly to an error of law in the weighing of some documents, as it is claimed that the mentioned elements were not assessed as a whole, according to the rules of “sound judgment, logic and reason” (folio 663), and that they were not given the value they deserved, as public instruments. Thus, the appellant affirms that Articles 330, 369, 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure were violated, and as substantive norms, Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration. However, the appeal must be dismissed on this point, because the arguments now advanced and the disregard for the documentation alleged are novel aspects in the dispute under study, when the truth is that the proven facts of the first-instance judgment were fully upheld by the tribunal, without any reference being made to that point at the opportune time (with the appeal). Having been acquiesced to, the rule of Article 608 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies, and the charge must be rejected for not having been timely alleged.\n\n**X.-** For the analysis of the situation raised, consideration must be given to Article 106 of the repealed Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (No. 1552 of April 23, 1953), which provided: “Banks authorized to operate in foreign currencies shall carry out all purchase and sale operations thereof exclusively on behalf of the Central Bank and in absolute agreement with the provisions, resolutions, and recommendations received from the Board.\n\nConsequently, banks may transfer at any time to the Central Bank the foreign currency they have purchased, and the latter may, at any time, require banks to transfer to it the foreign currency purchased.\" For its part, section 109 of the same law set forth the cases of liability borne by the authorized bank or the Central Bank, stating: \"*The risks inherent in the default of the bills acquired by them and of the corresponding contracts shall be borne by the authorized banks, as well as the risk that their foreign currency deposits may not be reimbursed by their correspondents and any other typically commercial or banking risks, affecting the foreign currency they have purchased, whether or not they have transferred it to the Central Bank. The same risks in relation to its own purchases and holdings of foreign currencies, and additionally, the risks corresponding to eventual modifications of the legal external values of currencies, on all international monetary reserves owned by the National Banking System, whose financial results, whether gains or losses, shall correspond entirely to it for the purposes established in Article 14 of this law, shall be borne by the Central Bank.*\" (underlining not in the original). In the case at hand, the plaintiff requested from Banco Germano the authorization and granting of foreign currency for the payment of raw material imports, for a total amount of $148,488.00 to be drawn to the order of Eastman Chemical Internacional Ltda.. Said banking entity issued two checks identified with numbers 2994 and 0639, dated July 30 and September 3, both of 1991, for $59,395.20 and $29,697.60, which were not sent to the supplier. In accordance with the foregoing, it was Banco Germano that, exclusively, breached its obligation to remit the money to the recipient, which made it impossible to execute the transaction. As can be seen, said breach is not attributable to the Central Bank, on the basis of an alleged failure in the duty of oversight or supervision. Indeed, inertia and omission on the part of the Central Bank as a supervisory entity are alleged. Likewise, negligence in supervision, since in the appellant's view, the Central Bank was aware of the irregular and illegal operation of Banco Germano. Even setting aside the lack of evidentiary elements to support the indicated affirmations, the truth is that they would also find no basis whatsoever in the injury alleged by the plaintiff, since it is based on the projected information to the public about the financial situation of Banco Germano, to sustain a probable and hypothetical conduct of the investor. The claimed injury would thus arise from an indirect and second-order conduct of the sued public entity, which does not reach the point of compromising state assets. Unless one wishes to extend the supervisory power of the central bank to each concrete and specific act of its authorized agent, which is, by all accounts, an over-dimensioning of its obligations, which furthermore does not conform to the correct interpretation of the different legal norms that the appellant cites as infringed, and in particular, of subsections 1, 2, and 11 of Article 125 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank.\n\nNeither the lack of information and warning to investors, nor the negligence in supervision or the belated action of the Central Bank, as alleged by the plaintiff's attorney, find that necessary connection to the breach in the issuance of the checks. It is evident that the alleged inactivity was not an *adequate*, *proximate*, and *direct* cause of the injury. As this same Chamber indicated in cases very similar to the present one, the Central Bank did not participate directly or indirectly in the acquisition of the foreign currency, which moreover, was never completed (judgments N° 946 of 4:20 p.m. on November 28, 2001, and N° 143-F-03 of 11:15 a.m. on March 19, 2003). In that respect, the absence of civil liability on the part of the Administration is clear, and by so deciding, the lower court judges did not infringe the different norms of the Organic Law of the Central Bank or of the National Banking System, mentioned above, nor sections 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration. As for the amounts owed by Banco Germano to the appellant company, a pronouncement is omitted, as it does not form part of the grievances asserted, given that the present claim deals exclusively with the demand for administrative liability for the illicit and abnormal conduct of the Central Bank, derived from the inertia of the AGEF (folio 633), in addition to the fact that in the prior instances, a ruling has already been made in favor of the cassation appellant on this point. **XI.** In light of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare this appeal in cassation on substantive grounds without merit, with costs to be borne by the appellant (Article 611 of the Civil Procedure Code).\"\n\nIn any event, the strict liability (carácter objetivo) nature of the Administration's non-contractual civil liability was clearly defined in the judgment of this Chamber No. 132 of 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991, for an event subsequent to the entry into force of the General Law of the Public Administration, in which it stated:\n\n   \"**VI.** Our General Law of the Public Administration No. 6227 of May 2, 1978, in force since April 26, 1979, as indicated by the judgment of this Chamber No. 81 of 1984, resolving the controversy over its validity, in Title Seven of Book One, incorporated the most modern principles, based on the most authoritative doctrine and jurisprudence, regarding the non-contractual liability of the Administration, **thereby establishing the direct liability of the State without the need to first prove that the damage was caused by the fault of the official or the Administration**, requiring for the indemnity to proceed that the damage suffered be effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group—Article 196. **It established that the Administration would be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party**—Article 190; and the obligation to repair all damage caused to the subjective rights of others by faults of its servants committed during the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof, using the opportunities or means it offers, even when for purposes or activities or acts unrelated to such mission—Article 191...\". (The underlining is not from the original).\n\n  In this same vein, one may consult, among many others, the judgments of this Chamber numbers 138 of 3:05 p.m. on August 23; 192 of 2:15 p.m. on November 6, both from 1991; 48 of 2:10 p.m. on May 29, 1996, and 55 of 2:30 p.m. on July 4, 1997.)\n\n  In light of the provisions set forth in said precedents, and as the lower court (A-quo) properly held, our legal system, as of the General Law of the Public Administration, adopts the system of strict liability of the Public Administration.\n\n  Therefore, the existence—and, consequently, its demonstration—of intent (dolo) or fault (culpa) or, in general, a subjective fault attributable to public servants or officials is not necessary for the duty to compensate for the damages caused by its functioning to arise.\n\n  Furthermore, it establishes, in an exhaustive manner, as exonerating causes of that liability, force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim (culpa de la víctima), and the act of a third party (hecho de un tercero), with the Administration bearing the burden of proving their existence, which did not occur in the sub-judice case. (judgment of the FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.\n\n   025-F-99, at two fifteen p.m. on January twenty-second, nineteen ninety-nine). (In the same sense, see the judgments of this same Chamber No. 589-F-99 of 2:20 p.m. on October 1, 1999, and No. 252-F-01, at four fifteen p.m. on March 28, 2001.) **V.- Constitutional Foundation of Strict Liability.** This evolution of the institute under discussion, which culminates in the indicated strict liability, finds full support in the current constitutional provisions (numerals 9, 11, 33, 41, 45, and 50 of the Political Constitution), from which clear rules and principles are obtained regarding what may be called the *right to full compensability of damage*. This legal axiom was clearly reflected, with express, clear, and profound reasoning, in the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber. No. 5207-2004, at 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004, which literally stated: “Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of the patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries (lesiones antijurídicas) that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the administered. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, being inferable from a\n\n  systematic and contextual interpretation of several constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that “The Government of the Republic is (…) responsible (…)”, thus taking for granted the liability of the larger public entity or State and its various organs—Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches. Article 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the “(…) criminal liability (…)” of public officials and the second paragraph refers to the “(…) personal liability for officials in the fulfillment of their duties (…)”. Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects “acquired patrimonial rights” and “consolidated legal situations”, which can only be effectively and truly protected with a broad-spectrum system of administrative liability without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their ordinary course of business or public performance. Numeral 41 ibidem states that “Resorting to the\n\n  laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests (…)”, this precept imposes the duty on the author and party responsible for the damage to compensate for the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by the administered as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conduct by action or negative conduct by omission of public entities, thereby becoming the cornerstone at the constitutional level for the legislative development of a system of strict and direct liability in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the conduct of the public official for intent (dolo) or fault (culpa), but rather, solely and exclusively, on having\n\n  inflicted or received, effectively, “(…) injuries or damages (…) to their person, property, or moral interests (…)”, that is, an unlawful injury that they have no duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. Numeral 41 of the Political Constitution establishes a fundamental compensatory right in favor of the administered who has suffered an unlawful injury by an entity—through its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct—and the correlative obligation of said entity to compensate or repair it fully; the access to jurisdiction provided for in this same constitutional precept thus becomes an instrumental right to necessarily ensure the enjoyment and exercise of the compensatory right of the injured party when the party obligated to make reparation voluntarily fails to comply with the aforementioned obligation.\n\n  Article 45 of the Magna Carta embraces the principle of the inviolability of property by providing that “Property is inviolable; no one may be deprived of their own except for legally proven public interest, upon prior indemnification in accordance with the law (…)”, thus recognizing, through the fundamental text, that special sacrifices or singular burdens that the administered has no duty to bear or tolerate, even if they arise from lawful activity—such as the exercise of the expropriation power—must be\n\n  compensated. Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, insofar as it implicitly recognizes legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in court when they fail to comply with their obligations, constitutes a clear foundation of administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of the aforementioned Article 49 provides that “The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered”, one of the main forms of guarantee of these being a strict, direct, broad, and complete system of administrative liability. The final paragraph of Article 50 of the Political Constitution, regarding environmental damage, establishes that “The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions”, a liability regime from which, obviously, public entities of an economic nature (called public companies-public entity)\n\n  and public companies (also called public companies-entity of private law)\n\n  cannot be excluded when they pollute by deploying an industrial, commercial, or service activity, and, in general, the State when it fails to comply with its obligations to defend and preserve the environment through deficient oversight or control of public and private activities that are actually or potentially polluting. In the hypothesis of the members of the Boards of Directors of Autonomous Institutions, Article 188 of the fundamental norm\n\n  provides that “Their directors are liable for their management”. With respect to the Executive Branch, Title X of the constitutional text contains a Chapter V whose heading is “Responsibilities of Those Who Exercise Executive Power”, Article 148 enshrining the liability of the President for the “use he made of those powers that according to this Constitution correspond to him exclusively”, the joint liability of the latter with the respective Minister of the sector\n\n  “with respect to the exercise of the powers that this Constitution grants to both of them”—which is specified by Article 149 ibidem—and the liability of the Government Council for the agreements it adopts. The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in the bearing of public burdens (Articles 18 and 33) which prevents imposing on the administered a singular or special burden or sacrifice they have no duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or several administered and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration that the Political Constitution includes an innominate or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of numerals, interpreted *a contrario sensu*, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the fundamental Law insofar as they include, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the “proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies”, “proper running of the Government”, and\n\n  “efficiency of the administration”. This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services in an efficient and effective manner and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages caused when this constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly incorporated the principle of the liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury caused to the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere of the administered by its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct.” **VI.- Legal Attribution Parameters. The concept of abnormal functioning and its distinction from related concepts.** The particularities of the liability of the Public Administration, generated through its gradual evolution, as well as the strict liability nature achieved (all with a clear constitutional foundation), cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted and permanent compensatory duty, applicable always and for all hypotheses of injury.\n\n  A regime of such nature would be unheard of and materially unbearable for any State with limited financial resources. Therefore, attribution criteria have been used that in some way dimension (always within the aforementioned objectivity) that duty to compensate caused by public conduct.\n\n  In this manner, numeral 190 of our General Law of the Public Administration refers to “legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning”, whereby legitimacy or its antithesis refers basically to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented, among others, by the service-provision activity attributed to the State as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the community. Note how Article 194 of the indicated law refers to “*lawful acts*”, under the conception of legal activity, distinguishing them in the same rule from what it qualifies as “*normal functioning*”, understood as material activity.\n\n  In this way, *abnormality* refers to those administrative conducts, which in themselves, deviate from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, the technical rules, or the expertise and prudent course of action in the deployment of its actions, with an injurious effect on the person. This allows pointing out that abnormality can manifest through poor functioning; delayed functioning; or a total absence of functioning. **Abnormality and unlawfulness should therefore not be adopted as equivalent concepts**, not even regarding the hypothesis of that functioning which, being due or in accordance with the aforementioned rules, produces a harmful result (referred to by some doctrinal sector as “*abnormal functioning by result*”), since in such a case, what operates is a liability for **normal functioning with an injurious effect or result**, compensable, of course, provided that the requirements pre-established expressly by the Legal System itself are met (see the same Article 194 of the General Law of the Public Administration). Nor should this “*abnormality*” of functioning and the “*illegitimacy*” thereof be confused with the generic and fundamental unlawfulness (antijuricidad), essential in all civil reparation. Indeed, civil liability arises from unlawfulness, which in turn constitutes its foundation (derived sometimes from a positive norm, while in others, from the basic principle translated into *the duty not to harm another*), and which for this particular matter is specified in the non-existence of that duty to bear the damage.\n\n  Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, assumed the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent, be it because it was unforeseeable or unavoidable. There occurs, then, *the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person*,\n\n  and to that extent, the injury to the victim's legal sphere must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory reparation. Thus, it can be affirmed that only the injury that, when confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be deemed unlawful in its basis is compensable, because the opposite would be to affirm compensation for harmful action against a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and condones as normal and justified.\n\n  It must be reiterated, then, that for the existence in Law of a due reparation, there must be antecedent and fundamental unlawfulness, which in no way points to the nature (legitimate or illegitimate) of the conduct deployed by the agent producing the damage, nor to the result produced by such action or omission.\n\n  Indeed, even in cases of legitimate and normal functioning, in which there is no unlawfulness in the behavior, a harmful consequence occurs, which, with certain characteristics (exceptional intensity or a small proportion of affected individuals), is deemed of obligatory reparation, which speaks to its unlawfulness, so much so that with the injury itself, the civil obligation and its consequent right to bring action arise.\n\n  It can be sustained, then, that the fundamental unlawfulness, referred to as the substratum and the global and indispensable prerequisite for liability, is something distinct and independent from the attribution parameter used by the Legal System, since even in the event of a strict liability regime (which excludes the subjective elements of fault (culpa) and intent (dolo), to give way to a simple economic transfer aimed at restoring the imbalance produced in the equality of public burdens), there is unlawfulness, to the extent that the norm declares the existing obligation under the implicit presupposition of an injury contrary to Law, which must not be borne by the victim. That reiterated unlawfulness will always be present in compensable damage, whether from normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning.\n\n  **VII.- Omission as a criterion of abnormality and unlawfulness. The obligatoriness to compensate for damages caused by inaction.** In the present case, a claim is made for the omission of the State in the exercise of its oversight or tutelage powers, and for the misinformation it generated among the users of Banco Germano, who, had they known, would not have required its services. This makes it necessary to establish whether said inactivity corresponds to abnormal or illegitimate functioning of the Administration, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 190 of the aforementioned General Law of the Public Administration, for which the primary need is to analyze such concepts. Currently, it is peacefully accepted that administrative conduct encompasses not only the active behavior of the Administration (and within it, the administrative act) but also omissive conduct, that “not doing” which has come to be called *inactivity of the Administration*, both in its formal aspect (insofar as it results in a presumed act due to administrative silence) and material aspect (basically referring to the service-provision sphere of the administrative organization). In this manner, material administrative inactivity must be understood as that derived from the omission in complying with a pre-established legal obligation, which occurs when, outside of an administrative procedure, the Administration breaches, by omission, an obligation imposed by the legal system or by any other self-binding mechanism (such as its own act or consensual instruments), with direct injury to a legitimate interest or a subjective right, whether or not it alters a pre-existing legal-administrative relationship. More simply, **there is inactivity of this type when, an obligation to give or do imposed by the legal system or by a prior decision thereof existing for the public entity or organ, outside of an administrative procedure,**\n\n**  the due factual or legal activity to bring the granted function to a successful conclusion is not deployed, to the detriment of the rights or interests of one or several passive subjects, whether private or public, individual or collective**.\n\n  It deals with that “culpa in ommittendo” in which the functional duty to act is breached by inaction. It goes without saying that administrative indolence can produce (and in fact does produce) more serious injuries than the limiting action itself of the public organ or entity. Hence, it must be forcefully affirmed (with foundation and in accordance with what was said in previous considerandos) that the Public Administration is also liable for the damages caused by its administrative inactivity. That passivity in the face of the fulfillment of pre-existing obligations is framed, for the purposes of non-contractual civil liability, as *abnormal functioning* of the Administration (insofar as it corresponds to a due material activity) and as *illegitimate conduct*, which for this case may be concurrent, to the extent that the breach of what is due not only violates the rules of good administration, but also infringes upon legality insofar as it breaches the functional administrative powers emanating from the Legal System itself. This is all the more accentuated when it comes to public services, since the breach of a publicly-owned activity or work, most often also of general interest, increases the inherent risk level of the service and sharpens the impact on the community, with the potential direct injury to particular subjective situations.\n\n  **VIII.- The causal link as a prerequisite for liability. The diverse typology of causes.** Having established in general terms that the abnormality and unlawfulness of omissive behavior can give rise to the civil liability of the Administration, it remains to be established whether that pathological administrative inaction was or was not the cause of the claimed injury, and specifically, of the financial losses claimed by Embotelladora Tica S.A., since for the claim to be upheld, it is essential to verify the existence of the causal link (nexo causal), in its traditional notion of cause-effect. In this regard, it is worth remembering that in the production of damage, multiple factors frequently concur, within which it is necessary to determine those that directly or indirectly are the ***efficient*** and ***adequate*** cause of the harm caused (regarding the proximate, adequate, and efficient cause, see the already cited judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. No. 252-F-01, at four fifteen p.m. on March 28, 2001). In that confluence of factual or legal elements surrounding the harmful situation, there will be a need to establish the suitable action or omission that caused the consequence; displacing those that have had no influence on the result (extraneous causes), from those that, had they not taken place, would have avoided the detriment.\n\nIt is a kind of objective prognosis, through which it can be affirmed that with such action or omission it is logical or probable that the specific harm will occur. Under this reasoning, the inaction that the appellant accuses as producing the administrative liability of the Central Bank for reasons of abnormality and unlawfulness consists of the alleged lack of adequate oversight and the failure to exercise its legal duties and powers of oversight and control, by virtue of which, it contends, it should have communicated, through the relevant mechanisms, the financial situation of Banco Germano, an action which, had it occurred, it emphasizes, would have led its client not to have carried out the transactions claimed with that financial institution and thereby, the injury it suffered would have been avoided. Within an analysis of the causal link that must associate the conduct of the Administration with the harmful effect on the rights or interests of the individual, within the framework explained in the preceding recitals, it must be assessed whether this administrative conduct (omissive in this case) can be considered the adequate cause that produced, as a derived consequence and effect, the harm claimed. In the case under study, the alleged inaction of the Central Bank is not an apt, sufficient, or adequate cause of the injury the appellant claims, that is, the omissive functioning of the bank in question was not the fact that caused, per se, the injury to the plaintiff company's assets; rather, the harm suffered is due to the failure to pay by Banco Germano regarding the foreign currency that was to be used in the settlement of obligations contracted with Eastman Chemical International Ltd., a single and independent event from which such consequences cannot be attributed to the Central Bank, since the cause of the harm was constituted by an external and unrelated fact over which it has no relationship. It should be remembered that an action is considered the generating cause of harm to the extent that the particular fact potentiated the materialization of the impairment claimed, such that the latter arises as an immediate and direct consequence of the former. Additionally, as will be analyzed in the following recital, Article 109 of the repealed Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica reflects these referenced principles, insofar as it attributes to authorized banks liability for the breach of obligations such as those that were neglected in this case, and which were what caused the harmful effect to the detriment of the cassation appellant company. From this standpoint, it is evident that no liability whatsoever corresponds to the Central Bank for the non-payment of the foreign currency incurred by Banco Germano, since it is not enough to invoke an action or omission of the Administration to attribute liability for the harm suffered; rather, that public functioning must have been the cause that triggered the injury, a situation that has not been proven in this particular case.\n\n**IX.-** The existence of the aforementioned abnormality depends to a large extent on the evidentiary elements brought to the proceedings, and to that extent it is necessary to examine, on a first level, the grievances related to the body of evidence and its impact on the factual framework of this matter. The charge wielded as an indirect violation corresponds properly to an error of law in the weighing of some documents, since it is claimed that the mentioned elements were not assessed as a whole, in accordance with the rules of \"sound criticism, logic, and reason\" (folio 663), and that they were not given the value they deserved, as public instruments. Thereby, the appellant affirms, Articles 330, 369, and 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure were violated, and as substantive norms, Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration. However, the appeal must be dismissed in this aspect, since the arguments now wielded and the disregard of the documentation alleged are novel aspects in the dispute under study, when the truth is that the proven facts of the first-instance judgment were fully upheld by the tribunal, without any reference having been made to that point at the appropriate time (with the appeal). Having been consented to, it is appropriate to apply the rule of Article 608 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and reject the charge for not having been timely raised.\n\n**X.-** For the analysis of the situation raised, Article 106 of the repealed Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (No. 1552 of April 23, 1953) must be taken into consideration, which provided: \"Banks authorized to operate with foreign currency shall carry out all purchase and sale operations thereof exclusively on behalf of the Central Bank and in absolute accordance with the provisions, resolutions, and recommendations they receive from the Board. Consequently, the banks may transfer at any time to the Central Bank the foreign currency they have purchased, and the latter may, at any time, require the banks to effect the transfer in its favor of the purchased foreign currency.\" For its part, Article 109 ibidem stated the assumptions of liability at the charge of the authorized bank or the Central Bank, by stating: \"The risks inherent in the non-performance of the bills acquired by them and of the corresponding contracts shall be borne by the authorized banks, as well as the risk that their foreign currency deposits may not be reimbursed by their correspondents and any other typically commercial or banking risks that may affect the foreign currency they have purchased, whether they have transferred it to the Central Bank or not. The same risks shall be borne by the Central Bank in relation to its own purchases and holdings of foreign currencies, and furthermore, the risks corresponding to any modifications of the legal external values of the currencies, over all international monetary reserves owned by the National Banking System whose financial results, whether gain or loss, shall correspond to it entirely for the purposes established in Article 14 of this law.\" (underlining is not from the original). In the case at hand, the plaintiff requested from Banco Germano the authorization and granting of foreign currency for the payment of raw material imports, for a total amount of $148,488.00 to be drawn to the order of Eastman Chemical Internacional Ltda. Said banking entity issued two checks identified with numbers 2994 and 0639, dated July 30 and September 3, both of 1991, for $59,395.20 and $29,697.60, which were not sent to the supplier. In accordance with the foregoing, it was Banco Germano that, exclusively, breached its obligation to remit the money to the recipient, which made it impossible to execute the transaction. As can be seen, said breach is not attributable to the Central Bank, on the basis of an alleged failure in the duty of protection or oversight. Indeed, inertia and omission are accused against the Central Bank as the oversight body. Likewise, negligence in oversight is alleged, since in the appellant's view, the Central Bank was aware of the irregular and illegal functioning of Banco Germano. Even leaving aside the lack of evidentiary elements that would allow the indicated affirmations to be sustained, the truth is that they would also find no basis whatsoever in the injury alleged by the plaintiff, since it starts from the projected information to the public regarding the financial situation of Banco Germano, to sustain a probable and hypothetical conduct of the investor. The injury claimed would stem, to that extent, from an indirect and second-order conduct of the sued public entity, which does not reach the point of compromising state assets. Unless one wishes to extend the oversight power of the governing bank to each concrete and specific act of its authorized agent, which is, by all accounts, an over-dimensioning of its obligations, which does not conform, moreover, to the correct interpretation of the different legal norms that the appellant cites as infringed, and in particular, subsections 1, 2, and 11 of Article 125 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank. Neither the lack of information and warning to investors, nor the negligence in oversight or the late action of the Central Bank, as alleged by the plaintiff's attorney, finds that necessary connection with the breach in the issuance of the checks. It is evident that the alleged inactivity was not an adequate, proximate, and direct cause of the injury. As this same Chamber indicated in cases very similar to this one, the Central Bank participated neither directly nor indirectly in the acquisition of the foreign currency, which, moreover, was never consummated (judgments No. 946 of 16 hours 20 minutes of November 28, 2001 and No. 143-F-03 of 11 hours 15 minutes of March 19, 2003). To that extent, the absence of civil liability of the Administration is clear, and by so ruling, the lower-court judges did not infringe the different norms of the Organic Law of the Central Bank or of the National Banking System, indicated above, nor Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration. Regarding the amounts owed by Banco Germano to the appellant firm, a pronouncement is omitted, as it does not form part of the grievances formulated, since the present claim deals exclusively with the demand for administrative liability for the unlawful and abnormal conduct of the Central Bank, derived from the inertia of the AGEF (folio 633) coupled with the fact that in the previous instances this point has already been resolved in favor of the cassation appellant.\n\n**XI.** By virtue of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare this cassation appeal on substantive grounds without merit, with costs to be borne by the appellant (Article 611 of the Code of Civil Procedure).\"" }