{
  "id": "nexus-ext-1-1011-376492",
  "citation": "Res. 00076-2025 Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Cambio de criterio sobre impugnación ex post de cláusulas penales y preclusión",
  "title_en": "Change of jurisprudential criteria on ex post challenge of penalty clauses and preclusion",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda confirma en casación la sentencia que rechazó la demanda de una contratista que impugnaba la cláusula penal de un contrato público con la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. La actora alegaba nulidad absoluta por falta de estudios técnicos previos. El órgano judicial introduce un cambio de línea jurisprudencial y establece que la impugnación de las multas del cartel está sujeta a preclusión: al no haber objetado el cartel durante la licitación (artículo 81 LCA, artículo 47 RLCA), la contratista aceptó la cláusula, la cual adquirió fuerza de ley entre las partes (artículo 1022 del Código Civil). Intentar anularla después del incumplimiento comprobado atenta contra la buena fe contractual y vacía de contenido las cláusulas penales. Se rechazan los agravios sustantivos y se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación.",
  "summary_en": "The Court of Cassation for Administrative and Civil Tax Matters confirms the lower court's rejection of a contractor's claim challenging a penalty clause in a public contract with the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. The claimant argued absolute nullity due to lack of prior technical studies. Establishing a shift in case law, the court holds that challenges to bid penalties are subject to preclusion: by failing to contest the bid terms during the procurement process (Article 81 of the Public Procurement Law, Article 47 of its Regulation), the contractor accepted the clause, which became binding as law between the parties (Article 1022 of the Civil Code). Seeking to annul the clause after a proven breach violates contractual good faith and renders penalty clauses meaningless. The substantive grounds are dismissed, and the appeal is denied.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda",
  "date": "29/05/2025",
  "year": "2025",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "preclusión",
    "recurso de objeción",
    "pliego cartelario",
    "buena fe contractual",
    "nulidad absoluta",
    "cláusula penal",
    "estudios técnicos previos",
    "fuerza de ley del contrato"
  ],
  "article_citations": [
    {
      "law": "Código Civil",
      "article": "1022",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Ley 30",
      "article": "1022",
      "doc_id": "norm-15437",
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    },
    {
      "law": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
      "article": "47",
      "doc_id": "norm-58314",
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    },
    {
      "law": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411",
      "article": "47",
      "doc_id": "norm-58314",
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    },
    {
      "law": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
      "article": "178",
      "doc_id": "norm-58314",
      "source": "metadata"
    },
    {
      "law": "Decreto Ejecutivo 33411",
      "article": "178",
      "doc_id": "norm-58314",
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    {
      "law": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
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    },
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      "law": "Ley 7494",
      "article": "81",
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    },
    {
      "law": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa",
      "article": "82",
      "doc_id": "norm-24284",
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    {
      "law": "Ley 7494",
      "article": "82",
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  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "cláusula penal",
    "cartel de licitación",
    "buena fe contractual",
    "preclusión",
    "nulidad absoluta",
    "estudios técnicos previos",
    "impugnación ex post",
    "fuerza de ley del contrato",
    "recurso de objeción",
    "incumplimiento contractual"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "penalty clause",
    "bid terms",
    "contractual good faith",
    "preclusion",
    "absolute nullity",
    "prior technical study",
    "ex post challenge",
    "contract as law between parties",
    "objection remedy",
    "breach of contract"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Bajo tales consideraciones, el presunto vicio de nulidad absoluta endilgado al cartel (inexistencia de estudios técnicos objetivos previos que justificaran el porcentaje de la cláusula penal) no puede ser revisado en esta vía judicial, por haber precluido la oportunidad para alegarlo y demostrarlo, de conformidad con el artículo 47 del RLCA y el artículo 1022 del Código Civil. Así las cosas, este Órgano Casacional comparte el criterio del Tribunal Contencioso y, por ende, estima que las normas antes mencionadas fueron interpretadas y aplicadas de manera correcta en el fallo impugnado, por lo que no es de recibo el segundo agravio sustantivo.",
  "excerpt_en": "Under these considerations, the alleged defect of absolute nullity attributed to the bid (absence of prior objective technical studies justifying the percentage of the penalty clause) cannot be reviewed in this judicial proceeding, as the opportunity to raise and prove it has been precluded, pursuant to Article 47 of the Regulation to the Public Procurement Law and Article 1022 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, this Court of Cassation agrees with the lower court's criteria and thus finds that the aforementioned provisions were correctly interpreted and applied in the appealed judgment; therefore, the second substantive ground for appeal is dismissed.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Denied",
    "label_es": "Sin lugar",
    "summary_en": "The substantive grounds for cassation are dismissed, upholding the lower court's ruling that the challenge to the penalty clause was precluded and its application was therefore lawful.",
    "summary_es": "Se rechazan los agravios sustantivos del recurso de casación, confirmando la sentencia que consideró precluida la impugnación de la cláusula penal y en consecuencia válida su aplicación."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "This Chamber does not share the appellant's reasoning that the Administration may assess whether it suffered damage only upon the individual application of the penalty clause.",
      "quote_es": "No comparte esta Cámara el razonamiento de la casacionista al indicar que es con la aplicación individual de la cláusula penal cuando la Administración puede valorar si se concretó un daño en su contra."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "In no way could the plaintiff benefit from its own fraud.",
      "quote_es": "De ninguna manera la actora podría obtener beneficio de su propio dolo."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando IV",
      "quote_en": "The alleged absolute nullity defect attributed to the bid terms (lack of prior objective technical studies justifying the percentage of the penalty clause) cannot be reviewed in this judicial proceeding, as the opportunity to raise and prove it has been precluded, pursuant to Article 47 of the RLCA and Article 1022 of the Civil Code.",
      "quote_es": "el presunto vicio de nulidad absoluta endilgado al cartel (inexistencia de estudios técnicos objetivos previos que justificaran el porcentaje de la cláusula penal) no puede ser revisado en esta vía judicial, por haber precluido la oportunidad para alegarlo y demostrarlo, de conformidad con el artículo 47 del RLCA y el artículo 1022 del Código Civil."
    }
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  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [
    {
      "Subtemas": [
        {
          "id": 1,
          "nombre": "Cambio de criterio jurisprudencial sobre la impugnación \"ex post\" de cláusulas penales"
        },
        {
          "id": 2,
          "nombre": "Prevalencia del principio de buena fe y fuerza de ley del contrato"
        }
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      "nombre": "Contratación administrativa"
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    {
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        {
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          "nombre": "Cambio de criterio jurisprudencial sobre su impugnación \"ex post\" y prevalencia del principio de buena fe y fuerza de ley al contrato"
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  "body_es_text": "\"IV.- En vista de que los dos agravios sustantivos del recurso están estrechamente relacionados, en aras de evitar confusiones y reiteraciones innecesarias, esta Cámara procederá a resolverlos de manera conjunta. Es importante indicar que, en anteriores asuntos, tanto la Sala Primera como este Tribunal de Casación, dispusieron la nulidad de las cláusulas penales incluidas en diversas contrataciones públicas, por no haberse demostrado en los procesos judiciales correspondientes que aquellas fueron diseñadas y estipuladas con base en estudios técnicos previos que, para fijar su contenido, hayan valorado las particularidades del contrato concreto que se tratare. Aunado a ello, en esos antecedentes jurisprudenciales, la nulidad fue decretada aun en los casos en que la parte contratista no objetó el cartel de licitación en el plazo conferido para tal efecto durante la fase de formación del contrato, señalándose que tal objeción no era requisito previo indispensable para poder impugnar, en la vía judicial, la cláusula penal y su consecuente aplicación. Es decir, la posibilidad de plantear objeción a la cláusula penal no precluía en caso de que la parte interesada no manifestara su inconformidad de manera oportuna dentro del procedimiento de contratación administrativa. No obstante, la Sala Primera y este Tribunal de Casación, con su actual integración, y luego de una nueva valoración del tema y de las distintas aristas que lo componen, dispusieron variar su criterio sobre dicho tema y, por ende, sobre la línea jurisprudencial antes referida. Así se puede observar en las recientes Resoluciones N° 104-F-TC-2024 de las 13 horas y 36 minutos del 14 de agosto de 2024 y la N° 137-F-TC-2024 de las 14 horas 54 minutos del 24 de octubre de 2024, ambas del Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, en las que consta el nuevo criterio que a continuación se expondrá. Se resuelven los dos agravios sustantivos planteados en el recurso: Este Colegio estima que no lleva razón la casacionista, por lo que ambos motivos deberán ser rechazados, ya que la sentencia impugnada, según los fragmentos transcritos en el considerando anterior, el criterio del Tribunal es conforme a derecho y al mérito de los autos, ya que valoró adecuadamente las piezas del expediente administrativo que interesan al objeto de la presente causa. En primer lugar, la casacionista indica que las normas reglamentarias no pueden anteponerse a las normas legales, no obstante, tal alegato no es de recibo para fundamentar su teoría del caso, pues, debe tenerse en cuenta que la facultad reconocida al oferente para impugnar el cartel se encuentra expresamente regulada en una norma legal, sea el artículo 81 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (en adelante LCA), el cual prevé un recurso de objeción, que debe interponerse dentro del primer tercio del plazo para presentar ofertas. Según el precepto 82 ibídem, ese recurso procede cuando el oferente potencial -o su representante- considere que ha habido vicios de procedimiento, se ha incurrido en alguna violación de los principios fundamentales de la contratación o se ha quebrantado, de alguna forma, el ordenamiento regulador de la materia. Es evidente que los motivos de nulidad de las cláusulas penales alegados en la demanda -y en el recurso de casación-, están dentro de las causales o motivos de objeción establecidos en las normas de LCA antes mencionadas. Aunado a lo anterior, el numeral 178 del RLCA desarrolla los diferentes requisitos formales y de legitimación atinentes a la impugnación, y, en concreto, el precepto 47, regula el caso de la objeción a las multas establecidas en el cartel indicando: “…Una vez en firme el cartel, se entenderá que el monto de la multa es definitivo por lo que no se admitirán reclamos posteriores”. Según interpreta la casacionista, la preclusión dispuesta por la norma reglamentaria en cuanto a la oportunidad de objetar las multas previstas en el cartel, no le resulta oponible a la nulidad absoluta dispuesta por la LGAP, en el caso de los actos administrativos carentes de alguno de sus elementos constitutivos (en este caso, al acto de imposición de una cláusula penal establecida sin estudios técnicos previos), porque este último cuerpo legal ostenta mayor jerarquía normativa. No obstante, sobre el particular, debe acotarse que, aceptados los términos del cartel por parte del oferente (incluidas las disposiciones de las Condiciones Generales referentes a la cláusula penal), y una vez suscrito el contrato respectivo con la Administración, el contenido de ese contrato tiene fuerza de ley entre partes, como consecuencia del principio de relatividad de los contratos (numeral 1022 del Código Civil). Consecuentemente, la obligatoriedad de la aplicación de la cláusula penal deriva del contrato mismo, que ha sido aceptado libre y voluntariamente por las partes, adquiriendo fuerza de ley entre ellas. Dicho contrato no está bajo el supuesto de un contrato de adhesión, donde la parte actora se vio obligada a aceptar las condiciones cartelarias impuestas por la Administración, sino que la propia legislación le reconocía el derecho de objetar el pliego cartelario en caso de estimarlo disconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico o contrarios a sus intereses y derechos fundamentales, justamente de cara a la conformación de la voluntad contractual de las partes y a la fuerza de ley que alcanzarían las cláusulas contractuales libremente convenidas por ellas. Por lo anterior, la preclusión que se deriva del artículo 47 del RLCA en cuanto a la impugnación de las multas establecidas en el cartel, deviene razonable y congruente con la finalidad de la norma legal que contempla el recurso de oposición contra el pliego cartelario (81 de la LCA), pues, es la antesala a la conformación definitiva de la voluntad de las partes contratantes, quienes, al no hacer uso de esa potestad, manifiestan su libre aceptación de las condiciones de la contratación, que, en caso de resultar adjudicadas, tendrán fuerza de ley para ambas. Tal disposición también es consecuente con el principio de buena fe contractual, en el tanto, se reitera, al no estarse ante un contrato de adhesión, la legislación le ofrece al oferente la oportunidad de impugnar el cartel, para así advertir puntual y oportunamente a la Administración contratante sobre los vicios procedimentales o de fondo que pudiere adolecer el pliego cartelario, todo ello con miras a conformar la voluntad contractual y el consentimiento de los términos del contrato, de manera que, es lógico que en caso de no ejercerse tal facultad de objeción, el oferente manifiesta su conformidad con el contenido del cartel, el que tendrá carácter de contrato vinculante entre las partes, tanto en sus obligaciones como en sus derechos. Así las cosas, ante un cartel cuyas condiciones se estimen contrarias a los derechos e intereses del oferente, o disconformes con el ordenamiento jurídico, en este caso en lo referido a las multas y tratándose de materia sancionatoria, la lógica dicta que razonablemente el oferente interesado debe abogar por sus propios intereses, procurando el saneamiento de los vicios acusados o el mejoramiento de las condiciones que le resulten perjudiciales, todo ello de previo a que el contenido del pliego cartelario alcance firmeza. No comparte esta Cámara el razonamiento de la casacionista al indicar que es con la aplicación individual de la cláusula penal cuando la Administración puede valorar si se concretó un daño en su contra. Debe tenerse en cuenta que la LCA y su Reglamento (RLCA) disponen en qué casos se debe aplicar la cláusula penal, cuáles son los plazos de impugnación, quiénes son los legitimados para interponerla, y bajo qué supuestos. Además, resulta abiertamente contrario al derecho y a la buena fe contractual el hecho de que sea hasta una vez consumado y demostrado el incumplimiento de la contratista, cuando ésta pretenda ejercer su facultad de impugnación contra el cartel, como medio para abstraerse de las consecuencias sancionatorias y pecuniarias de su incumplimiento, y como mecanismo para obligar a la Administración a recurrir a otras vías procesales más engorrosas para intentar resarcirse de los daños y perjuicios sufridos como consecuencia de la inobservancia de las obligaciones por parte de la contratista, lo cual implicaría vaciar de contenido y funcionalidad a las cláusulas penales de los contratos suscritos con la Administración, pues, permitiría a los oferentes incumplir con sus obligaciones contractuales de manera deliberada, evadiendo las consecuencias estipuladas por ambas partes, simplemente planteando una demanda orientada a anular las cláusulas penales pactadas voluntariamente y las sanciones que se comprometió a soportar en caso de incumplimiento, lo cual generaría un desequilibrio contractual sobrevenido en detrimento de la Administración contratante, afectando el interés público. De ninguna manera la actora podría obtener beneficio de su propio dolo. Como se dijo en párrafos precedentes, no se trata de un contrato de adhesión, que la actora se vio obligada a suscribir sin posibilidad de protestar; sino que, desde la fase de formación del contrato, tuvo conocimiento pleno del cartel que le serviría de base a la contratación y desde entonces pudo vislumbrar los defectos procesales y sustantivos de éste, y las eventuales consecuencias que podría acarrear la cláusula penal a sus intereses en el futuro -en caso de resultar adjudicada, como en efecto lo fue-. Sin embargo, este órgano Casacional aprecia que fue hasta que se dio el incumplimiento comprobado de la contratista, y la consecuente aplicación de la cláusula penal prevista en el contrato, cuando ésta decide impugnar dicha cláusula para eximirse de sus efectos jurídicos y patrimoniales. Por otra parte, no hay que perder de vista que los vicios alegados contra la cláusula penal, no son sobrevinientes a la ejecución del contrato, sino que pudieron haber sido advertidos por la oferente (actora) desde que tuvo conocimiento del cartel que regiría su oferta y su eventual contratación con la Administración, y pudo gestionar la rectificación pertinente, no obstante no lo hizo sino hasta que se vio inmersa en una sanción a causa de su incumplimiento. Bajo tales consideraciones, el presunto vicio de nulidad absoluta endilgado al cartel (inexistencia de estudios técnicos objetivos previos que justificaran el porcentaje de la cláusula penal) no puede ser revisado en esta vía judicial, por haber precluido la oportunidad para alegarlo y demostrarlo, de conformidad con el artículo 47 del RLCA y el artículo 1022 del Código Civil. Así las cosas, este Órgano Casacional comparte el criterio del Tribunal Contencioso y, por ende, estima que las normas antes mencionadas fueron interpretadas y aplicadas de manera correcta en el fallo impugnado, por lo que no es de recibo el segundo agravio sustantivo. De igual manera, tampoco se observa la indebida valoración probatoria que alega la casacionista, ya que en la sentencia sí se tuvo en cuenta la inexistencia de un estudio técnico específico para la licitación abreviada de marras, no obstante, consideró suficiente la existencia de las condiciones generales establecidas en las “Condiciones generales para la contratación administrativa institucional de bienes y servicios desarrollados por todas las unidades desconcentradas y no desconcentradas de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social”, de manera que se tuvo por demostrado que la actora estuvo conforme con tales lineamientos, pues, al presentar su oferta manifestó expresamente que entendía y aceptaba que las ofertas debían ser presentadas de acuerdo con lo indicado en el cartel y en lo no previsto regía dicho documento de condiciones generales (Hecho Probado N° 3 de la sentencia impugnada), aunado a que, como ya se indicó, la actora no demostró haber planteado el recurso de objeción al cartel establecido en el ordenamiento jurídico (Hecho No Probado N° 1), de manera que tal inercia deliberada, tiene como consecuencia legal la preclusión de la posibilidad de impugnar los términos de las cláusulas penales del contrato y la obligatoriedad de las condiciones y sanciones ahí estipuladas; por lo que también corresponde rechazar el primer agravio del recurso. Además, en vista de que la actora no refuta el incumplimiento que le fuera endilgado por la Administración contratante (ejecución tardía en la entrega) y que se tuvo por acreditado en los Hechos Probados N° 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 y 12 de la sentencia impugnada, se concluye que la aplicación de la cláusula penal en este caso concreto resulta conforme a derecho y al mérito de los autos. En consecuencia, se rechazan los dos agravios sustantivos planteados por la casacionista\".",
  "body_en_text": "IV.- Given that the two substantive grievances of the appeal are closely related, in order to avoid confusion and unnecessary repetition, this Chamber will proceed to resolve them jointly. It is important to note that, in previous matters, both the First Chamber (Sala Primera) and this Court of Cassation ordered the nullity of penalty clauses (cláusulas penales) included in various public contracts, because it had not been demonstrated in the corresponding judicial proceedings that those clauses were designed and stipulated based on prior technical studies that, in order to establish their content, had assessed the particularities of the specific contract in question. In addition, in those jurisprudential precedents, nullity was decreed even in cases where the contractor did not object to the bidding terms (cartel de licitación) within the deadline granted for that purpose during the contract formation phase, noting that such an objection was not an indispensable prerequisite for being able to challenge, through judicial channels, the penalty clause and its consequent application. That is, the possibility of raising an objection to the penalty clause did not preclude (precluir) even if the interested party did not express its disagreement in a timely manner within the administrative contracting procedure. However, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) and this Court of Cassation, with their current composition, and after a new assessment of the issue and the different facets that comprise it, decided to change their criterion on that issue and, therefore, on the aforementioned jurisprudential line. This can be observed in the recent Resolutions No. 104-F-TC-2024 of 13 hours and 36 minutes of August 14, 2024, and No. 137-F-TC-2024 of 14 hours 54 minutes of October 24, 2024, both from the Court of Cassation of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Matters (Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), in which the new criterion is stated, which will be set forth below. The two substantive grievances raised in the appeal are resolved: This Court considers that the appellant in cassation is incorrect; therefore, both grounds must be rejected, as the challenged judgment, according to the fragments transcribed in the preceding recital (considerando), shows that the lower Court's criterion is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case record (mérito de los autos), given that it appropriately assessed the pieces of the administrative file relevant to the object of the present case. Firstly, the appellant in cassation argues that regulatory provisions cannot take precedence over legal provisions; however, such an argument is not acceptable to support her theory of the case, because it must be taken into account that the power recognized to the bidder to challenge the bidding terms is expressly regulated in a legal provision, namely Article 81 of the Public Administration Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa, hereinafter LCA), which provides for an objection remedy (recurso de objeción), to be filed within the first third of the deadline for submitting bids. According to precept 82 ibidem, this remedy is appropriate when the potential bidder—or its representative—considers that there have been procedural defects, a violation of the fundamental principles of contracting has occurred, or the regulatory framework for the matter has been breached in some way. It is evident that the grounds for nullity of the penalty clauses alleged in the lawsuit—and in the cassation appeal—fall within the causes or grounds for objection established in the aforementioned LCA provisions. In addition to the foregoing, Article 178 of the RLCA develops the different formal and standing requirements pertaining to the challenge, and, specifically, precept 47 regulates the case of objection to the fines established in the bidding terms, stating: “…Once the bidding terms become final, it shall be understood that the amount of the fine is definitive and therefore no subsequent claims shall be admitted.” According to the appellant in cassation's interpretation, the preclusion (preclusión) established by the regulatory provision regarding the opportunity to object to the fines set forth in the bidding terms is not opposable to her regarding the absolute nullity established by the General Law on Public Administration (LGAP), in the case of administrative acts lacking any of their constitutive elements (in this case, the act of imposing a penalty clause established without prior technical studies), because the latter legal body holds higher normative hierarchy. However, on this point, it must be noted that, once the terms of the bidding document have been accepted by the bidder (including the provisions of the General Conditions regarding the penalty clause), and once the respective contract with the Administration has been signed, the content of that contract has the force of law between the parties, as a consequence of the principle of privity of contracts (Article 1022 of the Civil Code). Consequently, the mandatory application of the penalty clause derives from the contract itself, which has been freely and voluntarily accepted by the parties, thereby acquiring the force of law between them. Said contract does not fall under the assumption of a contract of adhesion, where the plaintiff was forced to accept the bidding conditions imposed by the Administration; rather, the legislation itself recognized her right to object to the bid specifications (pliego cartelario) should she deem them inconsistent with the legal system or contrary to her fundamental interests and rights, precisely with a view to shaping the contractual will of the parties and the force of law that the contractual clauses freely agreed upon by them would achieve. For the foregoing reasons, the preclusion derived from Article 47 of the RLCA regarding the challenge of the fines established in the bidding terms becomes reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the legal provision that contemplates the remedy of opposition against the bid specifications (Article 81 of the LCA), as it is the prelude to the definitive formation of the will of the contracting parties, who, by not making use of that power, express their free acceptance of the contracting conditions, which, in the event of being awarded the contract, shall have the force of law for both. Such a provision is also consistent with the principle of contractual good faith, insofar as, it is reiterated, since this is not a contract of adhesion, the legislation offers the bidder the opportunity to challenge the bidding terms, in order to promptly and specifically warn the contracting Administration about the procedural or substantive defects that the bid specifications may suffer, all with the aim of shaping the contractual will and consent to the contract terms; thus, it is logical that if such power of objection is not exercised, the bidder expresses her conformity with the content of the bidding terms, which shall have the character of a binding contract between the parties, both in its obligations and in its rights. That being the case, when faced with bidding terms whose conditions are deemed contrary to the rights and interests of the bidder, or inconsistent with the legal system—in this case, regarding fines and dealing with sanctioning matters—logic dictates that the interested bidder should reasonably advocate for her own interests, seeking the remediation of the alleged defects or the improvement of conditions that are detrimental to her, all prior to the content of the bid specifications becoming final. This Chamber does not share the appellant in cassation's reasoning when she indicates that it is only upon the individual application of the penalty clause that the Administration can assess whether it has suffered damage. It must be borne in mind that the LCA and its Regulations (RLCA) establish in which cases the penalty clause must be applied, what the challenge deadlines are, who has standing to file such challenges, and under what circumstances. Moreover, it is overtly contrary to law and contractual good faith for a contractor, only once her breach has been consummated and proven, to then seek to exercise her power to challenge the bidding terms, as a means to evade the sanctioning and pecuniary consequences of her breach, and as a mechanism to force the Administration to resort to other, more cumbersome procedural avenues to attempt to obtain compensation for the damages and losses suffered as a result of the contractor's non-observance of obligations. This would imply emptying the penalty clauses (cláusulas penales) in contracts signed with the Administration of their content and functionality, as it would allow bidders to deliberately breach their contractual obligations, evading the consequences stipulated by both parties, simply by filing a lawsuit aimed at annulling the penalty clauses voluntarily agreed upon and the sanctions she undertook to accept in case of breach, which would generate a supervening contractual imbalance to the detriment of the contracting Administration, affecting the public interest. In no way could the plaintiff derive benefit from her own fraud (dolo). As stated in previous paragraphs, this is not a contract of adhesion that the plaintiff was forced to sign without the possibility of protesting; rather, from the contract formation phase, she had full knowledge of the bidding terms that would serve as the basis for the procurement and could, from that point on, discern its procedural and substantive defects, and the eventual consequences that the penalty clause could entail for her interests in the future—should she be awarded the contract, as indeed she was. However, this Cassation Body observes that it was only when the contractor's proven breach occurred, and the consequent application of the penalty clause provided for in the contract, that she decided to challenge said clause in order to exempt herself from its legal and patrimonial effects. Furthermore, one must not lose sight of the fact that the defects alleged against the penalty clause are not supervening upon the execution of the contract; rather, they could have been noticed by the bidder (plaintiff) from the moment she became aware of the bidding terms that would govern her bid and her eventual contracting with the Administration, and she could have managed the pertinent rectification; nevertheless, she did not do so until she found herself subject to a sanction due to her breach. Under such considerations, the alleged defect of absolute nullity attributed to the bidding terms (the nonexistence of prior objective technical studies justifying the percentage of the penalty clause) cannot be reviewed in this judicial venue, as the opportunity to allege and demonstrate it has precluded, in accordance with Article 47 of the RLCA and Article 1022 of the Civil Code. That being so, this Cassation Body shares the criterion of the Contentious-Administrative Court and, therefore, considers that the aforementioned provisions were interpreted and applied correctly in the challenged judgment, and thus the second substantive grievance is not admissible. Likewise, the improper evaluation of evidence alleged by the appellant in cassation is also not observed, since the judgment did take into account the non-existence of a specific technical study for the abbreviated tender (licitación abreviada) in question; however, it deemed sufficient the existence of the general conditions established in the “General conditions for institutional administrative procurement of goods and services developed by all decentralized and non-decentralized units of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund” (“Condiciones generales para la contratación administrativa institucional de bienes y servicios desarrollados por todas las unidades desconcentradas y no desconcentradas de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social”). Thus, it was considered proven that the plaintiff agreed with such guidelines, as, upon submitting her bid, she expressly stated that she understood and accepted that the bids had to be submitted in accordance with what was indicated in the bidding terms and that, in matters not provided for therein, said document of general conditions governed (Proven Fact No. 3 of the challenged judgment). Added to this, as already indicated, the plaintiff did not demonstrate having filed the objection remedy against the bidding terms established in the legal system (Unproven Fact No. 1). Consequently, such deliberate inaction has the legal consequence of precluding the possibility of challenging the terms of the contract's penalty clauses and the mandatory nature of the conditions and sanctions stipulated therein; therefore, the first grievance of the appeal must also be rejected. Furthermore, given that the plaintiff does not refute the breach attributed to her by the contracting Administration (late delivery execution) and that this was considered accredited in Proven Facts No. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the challenged judgment, it is concluded that the application of the penalty clause in this specific case is in accordance with law and the merits of the case record. Consequently, the two substantive grievances raised by the appellant in cassation are rejected.\n\nAs can be observed in the recent Resolutions No. 104-F-TC-2024 of 13:36 on August 14, 2024, and No. 137-F-TC-2024 of 14:54 on October 24, 2024, both from the Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, which contain the new criterion that will be set forth below. The two substantive grievances raised in the appeal are resolved: This Court considers that the appellant is not correct, and therefore both grounds must be rejected, since the contested judgment, according to the fragments transcribed in the preceding recital, the Court's criterion is in accordance with the law and the merit of the case file, as it adequately assessed the pieces of the administrative file relevant to the subject matter of this case. First, the appellant indicates that regulatory norms cannot take precedence over legal norms; however, such an argument is not admissible to support her case theory, since it must be taken into account that the power recognized to the bidder to challenge the bidding documents is expressly regulated in a legal norm, namely Article 81 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa (hereinafter LCA), which provides for an objection appeal (recurso de objeción), which must be filed within the first third of the period for submitting bids. According to Article 82 ibidem, this appeal is appropriate when the potential bidder—or their representative—considers that there have been procedural defects, a violation of the fundamental principles of contracting has occurred, or the regulatory framework for the matter has been breached in some way. It is evident that the grounds for nullity of the penalty clauses (cláusulas penales) alleged in the lawsuit—and in the cassation appeal—fall within the grounds or reasons for objection established in the aforementioned LCA norms. In addition to the foregoing, Article 178 of the RLCA develops the different formal and standing requirements concerning the challenge, and, specifically, Article 47 regulates the case of objection to the fines established in the bidding documents, indicating: “…Once the bidding documents are final, the fine amount shall be considered definitive, and no subsequent claims will be admitted.” As interpreted by the appellant, the preclusion ordered by the regulatory norm regarding the opportunity to object to the fines set forth in the bidding documents is not opposable to the absolute nullity ordered by the LGAP in the case of administrative acts lacking any of their constituent elements (in this case, the act of imposing a penalty clause established without prior technical studies), because this latter legal body holds greater normative hierarchy. However, on this point, it must be noted that, once the terms of the bidding documents are accepted by the bidder (including the General Conditions provisions regarding the penalty clause), and once the respective contract with the Administration is signed, the content of that contract has the force of law between the parties, as a consequence of the principle of privity of contracts (Article 1022 of the Civil Code). Consequently, the binding nature of the application of the penalty clause derives from the contract itself, which has been freely and voluntarily accepted by the parties, acquiring the force of law between them. Said contract is not under the assumption of an adhesion contract (contrato de adhesión), where the plaintiff was forced to accept the bidding document conditions imposed by the Administration; rather, the legislation itself recognized her right to object to the set of bidding documents if she deemed them inconsistent with the legal system or contrary to her fundamental interests and rights, precisely with a view to the formation of the parties' contractual will and the force of law that the contractual clauses freely agreed upon by them would attain.\n\nTherefore, the preclusion derived from article 47 of the RLCA regarding the challenge of the fines established in the tender specifications is reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the legal provision that provides for the objection (recurso de oposición) against the tender document (pliego cartelario) (article 81 of the LCA), since it is the prelude to the definitive formation of the will of the contracting parties, who, by not exercising that power, express their free acceptance of the contracting conditions, which, should they be awarded the contract, will have the force of law for both. This provision is also consistent with the principle of contractual good faith, inasmuch as, it is reiterated, since this is not an adhesion contract (contrato de adhesión), the legislation offers the bidder the opportunity to challenge the tender specifications, in order to promptly and timely notify the contracting Administration of any procedural or substantive defects that the tender document may suffer from, all with a view to forming the contractual will and consent regarding the terms of the contract, so that it is logical that if such objection power is not exercised, the bidder expresses its conformity with the content of the tender specifications, which will then have the character of a binding contract between the parties, both in its obligations and in its rights. Thus, faced with tender specifications whose conditions are deemed contrary to the bidder's rights and interests, or inconsistent with the legal system, in this case with regard to fines and dealing with sanctioning matters, logic dictates that the interested bidder should reasonably advocate for its own interests, seeking the correction of the alleged defects or the improvement of conditions that are detrimental to it, all prior to the content of the tender document becoming final. This Chamber does not share the reasoning of the appellant (casacionista) in stating that it is with the individual application of the penal clause (cláusula penal) when the Administration can assess whether damage was caused against it. It must be taken into account that the LCA and its Regulations (RLCA) stipulate in which cases the penal clause must be applied, what the deadlines for challenge are, who has standing to file it, and under what circumstances. Furthermore, it is openly contrary to the law and contractual good faith for a contractor, only once the breach has been consummated and proven, to attempt to exercise its power of challenge against the tender specifications as a means of avoiding the sanctioning and pecuniary consequences of its breach, and as a mechanism to force the Administration to resort to more cumbersome procedural avenues to try to obtain redress for the damages suffered as a result of the contractor's failure to observe its obligations, which would imply emptying the penal clauses of content and functionality from contracts entered into with the Administration, since it would allow bidders to deliberately fail to comply with their contractual obligations, evading the consequences stipulated by both parties, simply by filing a lawsuit aimed at annulling the voluntarily agreed-upon penal clauses and the sanctions they committed to bear in case of breach, which would generate a subsequent contractual imbalance to the detriment of the contracting Administration, affecting the public interest. In no way could the plaintiff obtain benefit from its own fraud (dolo). As stated in the preceding paragraphs, this is not an adhesion contract that the plaintiff was forced to sign without the possibility of protesting; rather, from the contract formation phase, it had full knowledge of the tender specifications that would serve as the basis for the procurement and from that moment could discern its procedural and substantive defects, and the eventual consequences that the penal clause could bring upon its interests in the future—should it be awarded the contract, as indeed it was.\n\nHowever, this Cassation Body finds that it was only upon the proven breach by the contractor, and the consequent application of the penalty clause (cláusula penal) provided for in the contract, that the latter decided to challenge said clause in order to exempt itself from its legal and patrimonial effects. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that the defects alleged against the penalty clause are not supervening upon the execution of the contract, but rather could have been noticed by the bidder (plaintiff) from the moment it became aware of the tender specifications (cartel) that would govern its bid and its eventual contracting with the Administration, and it could have requested the pertinent rectification; however, it did not do so until it found itself subject to a sanction due to its breach. Under such considerations, the alleged defect of absolute nullity attributed to the tender specifications (lack of prior objective technical studies justifying the percentage of the penalty clause) cannot be reviewed in this judicial venue, as the opportunity to allege and prove it has expired (precluido), in accordance with Article 47 of the RLCA and Article 1022 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). This being the case, this Cassation Body agrees with the criterion of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal and, therefore, considers that the aforementioned rules were interpreted and applied correctly in the contested judgment, so the second substantive grievance is not admissible. Likewise, no improper evidentiary assessment as alleged by the appellant in cassation is observed, since the judgment did take into account the lack of a specific technical study for the abbreviated bidding process in question; however, it considered sufficient the existence of the general conditions established in the “General Conditions for Institutional Administrative Contracting of Goods and Services Developed by All Deconcentrated and Non-Deconcentrated Units of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social)”, such that it was deemed proven that the plaintiff was in agreement with such guidelines, because, upon submitting its bid, it expressly stated that it understood and accepted that the bids were to be submitted in accordance with what was indicated in the tender specifications and, in matters not provided for, governed by said document of general conditions (Proven Fact No. 3 of the contested judgment), in addition to the fact that, as already indicated, the plaintiff did not prove having filed the objection to the tender specifications (recurso de objeción al cartel) established in the legal system (Unproven Fact No. 1), such that this deliberate inaction has the legal consequence of barring (preclusión) the possibility of challenging the terms of the contractual penalty clauses and the mandatory nature of the conditions and sanctions stipulated therein; therefore, the first grievance of the appeal must also be rejected. Moreover, in view of the fact that the plaintiff does not refute the breach attributed to it by the contracting Administration (late delivery execution) and which was deemed accredited in Proven Facts No. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the contested judgment, it is concluded that the application of the penalty clause in this specific case is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case file.\n\nConsequently, the two substantive grievances raised by the appellant are rejected\".\n\nIV.- In view of the fact that the two substantive grievances of the appeal are closely related, for the sake of avoiding confusion and unnecessary reiteration, this Chamber will proceed to resolve them jointly. It is important to indicate that, in previous matters, both the First Chamber and this Court of Cassation ordered the nullity of penalty clauses (cláusulas penales) included in various public contracts, because it had not been demonstrated in the corresponding judicial processes that those clauses were designed and stipulated based on prior technical studies that, to determine their content, had evaluated the particularities of the specific contract in question. Added to this, in those jurisprudential precedents, nullity was decreed even in cases where the contractor party did not object to the bidding terms (cartel de licitación) within the period granted for that purpose during the contract formation phase, it being noted that such objection was not an indispensable prerequisite to be able to challenge, through judicial means, the penalty clause and its consequent application. That is, the possibility of raising an objection to the penalty clause did not preclude the interested party from not expressing their disagreement in a timely manner within the administrative procurement procedure. However, the First Chamber and this Court of Cassation, with their current composition, and after a new assessment of the issue and the various aspects that comprise it, resolved to vary their criterion on said matter and, therefore, on the jurisprudential line referenced above. This can be observed in the recent Resolutions No. 104-F-TC-2024 of 13 hours 36 minutes on August 14, 2024, and No. 137-F-TC-2024 of 14 hours 54 minutes on October 24, 2024, both from the Court of Cassation for Contentious-Administrative and Civil Tax Matters, in which the new criterion is recorded, which will be set forth below. The two substantive grievances raised in the appeal are resolved: This Court considers that the appellant is not correct, so both grounds must be rejected, given that the contested judgment, according to the fragments transcribed in the preceding considering clause, the Court's criterion is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case file, since it adequately weighed the pieces of the administrative file relevant to the purpose of this case. In the first place, the appellant indicates that regulatory norms cannot be placed before legal norms; however, such an allegation is not acceptable to support her case theory, since it must be taken into account that the power recognized to the bidder to challenge the bidding terms is expressly regulated in a legal norm, namely Article 81 of the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa, hereinafter LCA), which provides for an objection appeal (recurso de objeción), which must be filed within the first third of the period for submitting bids. According to precept 82 ibidem, this appeal is appropriate when the potential bidder—or their representative—considers that there have been procedural defects, a violation of the fundamental principles of public procurement has been incurred, or the regulatory framework of the matter has been breached in some way. It is evident that the grounds for nullity of the penalty clauses alleged in the lawsuit—and in the cassation appeal—are within the grounds or reasons for objection established in the aforementioned LCA norms.\n\nIn addition to the foregoing, Article 178 of the RLCA sets forth the various formal and standing requirements related to the challenge, and, specifically, Article 47 regulates the case of objection to the fines established in the tender specifications, stating: “…Once the tender specifications become final, the fine amount shall be deemed definitive and no subsequent claims shall be accepted.” According to the interpretation of the Court of Cassation, the preclusion established by the regulatory provision regarding the opportunity to object to the fines provided for in the tender specifications is not opposable to the absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) established by the LGAP, in the case of administrative acts lacking any of their constituent elements (in this case, the act of imposing a penalty clause established without prior technical studies), because this latter legal body holds greater normative hierarchy. However, on this matter, it must be noted that, once the terms of the tender specifications are accepted by the offeror (including the provisions of the General Conditions referring to the penalty clause), and once the respective contract is signed with the Administration, the content of that contract has the force of law between the parties, as a consequence of the principle of privity of contracts (Article 1022 of the Civil Code). Consequently, the binding nature of the penalty clause derives from the contract itself, which has been freely and voluntarily accepted by the parties, acquiring the force of law between them. Said contract is not under the assumption of an adhesion contract (contrato de adhesión), where the plaintiff was forced to accept the tender conditions imposed by the Administration; rather, the legislation itself recognized their right to object to the tender document if deemed non-compliant with the legal system or contrary to their interests and fundamental rights, precisely in view of the formation of the contractual will of the parties and the force of law that the contractual clauses freely agreed upon by them would attain. Therefore, the preclusion arising from Article 47 of the RLCA regarding the challenge of the fines established in the tender specifications becomes reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the legal rule that provides for the objection appeal (recurso de oposición) against the tender document (Article 81 of the LCA), as it is the prelude to the definitive formation of the will of the contracting parties, who, by not using that power, manifest their free acceptance of the contracting conditions, which, should they be awarded, will have the force of law for both. This provision is also consistent with the principle of contractual good faith, insofar as, it is reiterated, not being in the presence of an adhesion contract, the legislation offers the offeror the opportunity to challenge the tender specifications, in order to timely and specifically warn the contracting Administration about any procedural or substantive defects the tender document may suffer from, all with a view to forming the contractual will and consent to the terms of the contract, so that it is logical that if such right of objection is not exercised, the offeror expresses their conformity with the content of the tender specifications, which will have the character of a binding contract between the parties, both in their obligations and in their rights.\n\nThis being the case, when faced with a bid document whose conditions are deemed contrary to the rights and interests of the bidder, or inconsistent with the legal system, in this instance regarding fines and dealing with sanctioning matters, logic dictates that the interested bidder should reasonably advocate for its own interests, seeking to cure the alleged defects or improve the conditions that are detrimental to it, all before the content of the bid document becomes final. This Chamber does not share the cassation appellant's reasoning in stating that it is upon the individual application of the penalty clause when the Administration can assess whether harm to it has materialized. It must be borne in mind that the LCA and its Regulations (RLCA) establish in which cases the penalty clause must be applied, what the challenge periods are, who has standing to file such a challenge, and under what circumstances. Furthermore, it is openly contrary to the law and contractual good faith for a contractor, only once its breach has been consummated and demonstrated, to seek to exercise its right to challenge the bid document as a means of evading the sanctioning and pecuniary consequences of its breach, and as a mechanism to force the Administration to resort to more cumbersome procedural avenues to try to recover the damages (daños y perjuicios) suffered as a result of the contractor's non-observance of its obligations. This would effectively empty the penalty clauses of the contracts signed with the Administration of their content and functionality, since it would allow bidders to deliberately breach their contractual obligations, evading the consequences stipulated by both parties, simply by filing a lawsuit aimed at annulling the voluntarily agreed penalty clauses and the sanctions they undertook to bear in the event of a breach. This would generate a supervening contractual imbalance to the detriment of the contracting Administration, affecting the public interest. In no way could the plaintiff obtain benefit from its own misconduct (dolo). As stated in preceding paragraphs, this is not a contract of adhesion that the plaintiff was forced to sign without the possibility of protest; rather, from the contract formation phase, it had full knowledge of the bid document that would serve as the basis for the procurement and could, from that point on, discern the procedural and substantive defects of said document, and the eventual consequences the penalty clause could bring upon its interests in the future — should it be awarded the contract, as indeed it was. However, this Cassation Body finds that it was only when the contractor's verified breach occurred, and the consequent application of the penalty clause provided for in the contract, that it decided to challenge said clause to exempt itself from its legal and patrimonial effects. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the defects alleged against the penalty clause are not supervening to the execution of the contract; rather, they could have been noticed by the bidder (plaintiff) from the moment it had knowledge of the bid document that would govern its offer and its eventual procurement with the Administration. It could have managed the pertinent rectification, yet it did not do so until it found itself subject to a sanction due to its breach. Under such considerations, the alleged defect of absolute nullity attributed to the bid document (the nonexistence of prior objective technical studies justifying the penalty clause's percentage) cannot be reviewed in this judicial venue, as the opportunity to plead and prove it has been foreclosed, in accordance with article 47 of the RLCA and article 1022 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). This being the case, this Cassation Body shares the criterion of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal and, therefore, finds that the aforementioned rules were interpreted and applied correctly in the challenged ruling, and thus the second substantive grievance is not admissible.\n\nLikewise, the improper evidentiary assessment alleged by the appellant in cassation is also not observed, since the judgment did take into account the absence of a specific technical study for the abbreviated tender (licitación abreviada) in question; however, it considered the existence of the general conditions established in the “General Conditions for Institutional Administrative Procurement of Goods and Services Developed by All Deconcentrated and Non-Deconcentrated Units of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social)” to be sufficient, such that it was held as proven that the plaintiff agreed with those guidelines, given that, upon submitting its offer, it expressly stated that it understood and accepted that offers were to be submitted in accordance with what was indicated in the bidding terms (cartel) and, in matters not provided for, that document of general conditions would govern (Proven Fact No. 3 of the contested judgment), coupled with the fact that, as already indicated, the plaintiff did not prove having filed the objection to the bidding terms (recurso de objeción al cartel) established in the legal system (Unproven Fact No. 1), such that such deliberate inaction has the legal consequence of the preclusion of the possibility of challenging the terms of the penalty clauses and the mandatory nature of the conditions and sanctions stipulated therein; therefore, the first grievance of the appeal must also be dismissed. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the plaintiff does not refute the breach attributed to it by the contracting Administration (late execution of delivery) and which was held as accredited in Proven Facts No. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the contested judgment, it is concluded that the application of the penalty clause in this specific case is in accordance with law and the merits of the case file. Consequently, the two substantive grievances raised by the appellant in cassation are dismissed.”"
}