{ "id": "nexus-ext-1-1011-382565", "citation": "Res. 00184-2025 Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda", "section": "nexus_decisions", "doc_type": "court_decision", "title_es": "Límites de la garantía de no autoincriminación en el procedimiento administrativo disciplinario", "title_en": "Limits of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Administrative Disciplinary Proceedings", "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, mediante Resolución 00184-2025, rechaza un recurso de casación interpuesto contra una sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo. La controversia se centra en una alegada violación del principio de no autoincriminación durante un procedimiento disciplinario seguido contra un funcionario del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje (INA). El demandante argumentó que su derecho fue vulnerado al no ser advertido, en la audiencia oral, de que su testimonio podría incriminarlo. El Tribunal de Casación confirma el criterio de la instancia inferior, determinando que el recurso se limitó a reiterar argumentos sin combatir eficazmente las razones del fallo impugnado, lo que constituye una mera disconformidad impropia de la técnica casacional. Además, la Sala realiza una importante distinción dogmática: el derecho fundamental a no autoincriminarse, consagrado en el artículo 36 de la Constitución Política y en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, está reservado exclusivamente a la materia penal. Señala que, a pesar de la naturaleza sancionatoria común, el derecho administrativo disciplinario tiene finalidades y características distintas, como la búsqueda de la verdad real, por lo que esta garantía no se extrapola automáticamente a esta sede. En consecuencia, se declaran improcedentes los agravios y se confirma la corrección del fallo recurrido.", "summary_en": "The Administrative and Civil Treasury Cassation Court, through Resolution 00184-2025, dismisses a cassation appeal against a lower court ruling. The dispute concerns an alleged violation of the privilege against self-incrimination during disciplinary proceedings against an employee of the National Apprenticeship Institute (INA). The plaintiff argued his right was violated because he was not warned during the oral hearing that his testimony could incriminate him. The Cassation Court confirms the lower court's reasoning, finding that the appeal merely reiterated arguments without effectively challenging the impugned judgment, which constitutes a mere disagreement unsuitable for the cassation remedy. Furthermore, the Court draws an important legal distinction: the fundamental right against self-incrimination, enshrined in Article 36 of the Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights, is exclusively reserved for criminal matters. It clarifies that despite sharing a punitive nature, administrative disciplinary law has different purposes and characteristics, such as the search for material truth; therefore, this criminal guarantee does not automatically apply in administrative proceedings. Consequently, the grievances are deemed inadmissible and the appealed ruling is upheld.", "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda", "date": "2025", "year": "2025", "topic_ids": [ "_off-topic" ], "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic", "es_concept_hints": [ "recurso de casación", "no autoincriminación", "Órgano Director", "traslado de cargos", "verdad real", "control de convencionalidad", "patrocinio letrado" ], "concept_anchors": [ { "article": "Art. 36", "law": "Constitución Política" }, { "article": "Art. 8.2 inciso g", "law": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos" }, { "article": "Art. 214", "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública" }, { "article": "Art. 180", "law": "Código Procesal Penal" } ], "keywords_es": [ "casación", "procedimiento administrativo disciplinario", "no autoincriminación", "derecho administrativo sancionador", "técnica casacional", "verdad real", "indefensión", "Corte IDH", "Sala Constitucional", "patrocinio letrado" ], "keywords_en": [ "cassation", "administrative disciplinary procedure", "self-incrimination", "punitive administrative law", "cassation technique", "material truth", "defenselessness", "Inter-American Court", "Constitutional Chamber", "legal representation" ], "excerpt_es": "En esa inteligencia y atendiendo la jurisprudencia constitucional precitada, si la persona investigada en sede administrativa se ha colocado voluntariamente en determinada situación, como ocurre en la especie con el reconocimiento voluntario de los hechos intimados sumado a los otros señalados en este recurso, ello no implica que se hubiese colocado en situación de indefensión, habida cuenta que se le hizo de conocimiento la posibilidad de contar con un patrocinio letrado en su defensa durante el procedimiento disciplinario. En esa virtud, el reparo deviene improcedente.", "excerpt_en": "In this understanding, and following the constitutional precedent cited, if the person investigated in an administrative proceeding has voluntarily placed themselves in a certain situation, as occurred in this case with the voluntary acknowledgment of the alleged facts in addition to the other points raised in this appeal, this does not imply that they were placed in a situation of defenselessness, given that they were made aware of the possibility of having legal representation in their defense during the disciplinary proceeding. Therefore, the objection becomes inadmissible.", "outcome": { "label_en": "Denied", "label_es": "Sin lugar", "summary_en": "The Cassation Court denies the cassation appeal filed by the plaintiff, upholding the lower court's ruling which dismissed the lawsuit for violation of the privilege against self-incrimination in a disciplinary proceeding.", "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Casación rechaza el recurso de casación interpuesto por el demandante, confirmando la sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo que desestimó la demanda por violación al principio de no autoincriminación en un procedimiento disciplinario." }, "pull_quotes": [ { "context": "Considerando VI de la resolución", "quote_en": "Notwithstanding the above, this Court considers it pertinent to recall that, as stated by the Constitutional Chamber in the judgment cited by the lower court, the progress in the interpretation and judicial application of disciplinary administrative law has made it possible to distinguish it and, to that extent, establish important nuances in its relationship with criminal law. Such is the case of the right against self-incrimination, specific to the latter field, which is deemed inapplicable, in its radical dimension, in punitive administrative matters.", "quote_es": "Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, esta Sala considera pertinente recordar que, tal y como lo expone la Sala Constitucional en su sentencia citada por el A Quo, el avance en la interpretación y aplicación judicial del derecho administrativo disciplinario ha permitido deslindarlo y establecer, en esa medida, importantes matices en su relación con el derecho penal. Tal es el caso del derecho a no auto incriminación, propio de esta última materia, que se estima inaplicable, en esa dimensión radical, en la materia administrativa sancionatoria." }, { "context": "Considerando VI de la resolución", "quote_en": "That is to say, as provided for at both the conventional and constitutional levels, this right has been reserved for criminal matters, and the punitive nature that this branch of law may share with the disciplinary administrative branch does not imply automatically extrapolating it to the latter.", "quote_es": "Es decir, según se encuentra dispuesto tanto a nivel convencional como constitucional, este derecho ha sido reservado a la materia penal, sin que la naturaleza sancionatoria que puede compartir esta rama del Derecho con la rama administrativa disciplinaria, implique extrapolarlo automáticamente a esta última." } ], "cites": [], "cited_by": [], "references": { "internal": [], "external": [] }, "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/ext-1-1011-382565", "tier": 2, "_editorial_citation_count": 0, "regulations_by_article": null, "amendments_by_article": null, "dictamen_by_article": null, "concordancias_by_article": null, "afectaciones_by_article": null, "resoluciones_by_article": null, "cited_by_votos": [], "cited_norms": [], "cited_norms_inverted": [ { "doc_id": "norm-13231", "norm_num": "6227", "norm_name": "Ley General de la Administración Pública", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "02/05/1978" }, { "doc_id": "norm-41297", "norm_num": "7594", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Penal — Acción penal en delitos ambientales", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "10/04/1996" }, { "doc_id": "norm-57436", "norm_num": "8508", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "28/04/2006" }, { "doc_id": "norm-81360", "norm_num": "9342", "norm_name": "Código Procesal Civil — Inversión de la Carga de la Prueba en Materia Ambiental", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "norm_fecha": "03/02/2016" } ], "sentencias_relacionadas": [], "temas_y_subtemas": [], "cascade_only": false, "amendment_count": 0, "body_es_text": "\"VI.- Resolución del planteamiento recursivo. Para resolver el tema litigioso ahora impugnado, el Tribunal Contencioso consideró, entre otros puntos de interés, lo siguiente: «VI) EN CUANTO A LA SUPUESTA VIOLACIÓN AL PRINCIPIO DE AUTOINCRIMINACIÓN Y DEL CONTROL DE CONVENCIONALIDAD Y CONSTITUCIONALIDAD. El abogado director del demandante, en fase de conclusiones alegó violación a la autoincriminación del demandante, citando la resolución de la Sala Constitucional N° 6007-2017 de las 9:45 hrs. del 28 de abril de 2017 y la Sentencia de la Corte Interamericana de los Derechos Humanos en el Caso Baena Vrs Panamá, toda vez que indicó que no se le advirtió en la audiencia oral y privada que su testimonio podría incriminarlo. En relación al antecedente citado, por el representante del demandante, este Tribunal observa que el voto N° 20176007 de la Sala Constitucional, fue dictado en un proceso de recurso de amparo, en donde la Sala no observó que la solicitud de información se le haya prevenido al tutelado de su derecho de abstenerse de declarar contra sí mismo, elemento que resulta necesario cuando se realiza una investigación disciplinaria formalmente establecida y que pueda implicar una sanción en su perjuicio. De la propia resolución de la Sala Constitucional, citada como jurisprudencia por la parte demandante, observa esta Cámara que se cita, a otra resolución de este mismo Tribunal Constitucional en el considerando II, y que consiste en la resolución N° 2014020284 de las nueve horas cinco minutos del once de diciembre de dos mil catorce; que en lo conducente dispone: \"II.- RESPECTO AL ÁMBITO DE COMPETENCIA DE ESTA SALA ANTE REPROCHES POR LESIÓN AL DEBIDO PROCESO Y AL DERECHO DE DEFENSA. (…) La necesidad de señalar con claridad los casos en que el análisis de vulneraciones al debido proceso corresponde a la jurisdicción ordinaria o a la jurisdicción constitucional llevó al Tribunal Constitucional Español a hacer precisiones que esta Sala ha incorporado a su línea jurisprudencial y que pueden encontrarse en el voto 2001-01545 en los siguientes términos: (…) Como la jurisprudencia de este T.C. ha señalado en abundantes ocasiones, la indefensión no se produce si la situación en que el ciudadano se ha visto colocado se debió a una actitud voluntariamente adoptada por él o si le fuera imputable por falta de la necesaria diligencia. La conclusión que hay que sacar de ello es doble: por una parte que no toda infracción de normas procesales se convierte por sí sola en indefensión jurídico-constitucional y por ende en violación de lo ordenado por el art. 24 de la C, y, por otra parte, que la calificación de la indefensión con relevancia en el orden constitucional ha de llevarse a cabo con la introducción de factores diferentes del mero respeto o, a la inversa, de la infracción de las normas procesales y del rigor formal del procedimiento (STC.48/84 del 4 de abril)…”. De esta forma, como se desprende de la resolución parcialmente transcrita, no toda infracción a las normas procesales se convierte, per se, en una violación de relevancia constitucional al debido proceso. Dicho lo anterior considera esta Cámara que al demandante, tal y como consta en los hechos probados con base la prueba documental, se encontraba debidamente informado, con la notificación del traslado de cargos, por parte del Órgano Director del Procedimiento Administrativo, según consta en el auto de las 9:45 hrs. del 4 de octubre de 2017, sobre la posibilidad de contar con patrocinio letrado. Así, vemos como en la parte dispositiva de esa resolución se le indicó en lo conducente: \"POR TANTO // El Órgano Director, resuelve: // I. Iniciar procedimiento disciplinario en contra del funcionario LUIS FERNANDO VANEGAS RODRÍGUEZ, cédula de identidad N*503060916, Formador para el Trabajo 1A, en el Centro Regional Polivalente de Liberia y conforme a las disposiciones de los artículos 74 y siguientes del Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje cuya finalidad es verificar la verdad real de los hechos expuestos y determinar si resulta procedente imponer las medidas sancionatorias previstas en los artículos 47 y 49 del Reglamento Autónomo antes citado, en relación con el artículo 23 del Reglamento de Fondos Rotativos de Trabajo Caja Chica y Viáticos, por la supuesta infracción a los artículos 43 incisos 27) y 18) y 45 inciso 16), ambos del Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, en concordancia con el artículo 14 del Reglamento de Fondos Rotativos de Trabajo, Caja Chica y Viáticos del INA, en relación con el siguiente hecho: (…) Que a la audiencia citada anteriormente deberá comparecer personalmente y no por medio de apoderado, sin perjuicio de que se haga acompañar de los abogados, técnicos o especialistas de su elección; y que una vez notificado este acto, su ausencia injustificada a la audiencia no impedirá que esta se lleve a cabo en la fecha y hora señalada, aún sin su presencia, sin que ello signifique la aceptación tácita de los hechos.// (...)\".- Es claro para esta Cámara que el demandante había sido instruido a comparecer ante el órgano director con patrocinio letrado. Sin embargo, a pesar de esa advertencia, estando debidamente notificada esa resolución, el demandante de mutuo propio, remitió vía correo electrónico a la encargada del órgano director en fecha 9 de octubre de 2017, el siguiente texto: \"Buenos días doña Mariela disculpe la molestia, le escribo de acuerdo a la notificación que me entregaron el día de hoy, todo esto viene por motivo de que en la casa se metieron a robar y tenía una gran porción de dinero dinero (sic) de perecedero el cual fue robada no obstante estoy ala (sic) orden y que se haga lo que tiene que hacerse según los procedimientos administrativos y disciplinarios. (Expediente administrativo. Tal y como ya indicó la Sala Constitucional en el voto supracitado la indefensión no se produce si la situación en la que el ciudadano se ha visto colocado se debió a una actitud voluntariamente adoptada por él, como claramente se desprende al haber enviado un correo aceptando los hechos endilgados en el traslado de cargos de previo a la realización de la audiencia oral y privada. Luego, de igual forma un mes después de haber enviado el correo electrónico aceptando los hechos, compareció el día 9 de noviembre de 2017, directamente ante el órgano director del procedimiento, sin patrocinio letrado, a pesar de habérsele comunicado la posibilidad de hacerse acompañar de un abogado y estar advertido previamente, tal y como consta en autos, sin embargo, -y si bien el órgano director- no le indicó durante la audiencia de abstenerse de declarar o de contar con un patrocinio letrado, el demandante de mutuo propio procedió a reiterar, lo manifestado previamente -en su correo electrónico del 9 de octubre de 2017; aspecto que a consideración de esta Cámara, hace inocuo el supuesto quebranto ocurrido debido a la actitud voluntaria asumida por el demandante al reconocer la falta de liquidación de los fondos -según la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional reseñada- lo cual ocurrió previo a la propia audiencia oral y privada. Luego, este Colegio por otra parte reprocha que si bien el abogado director refirió una sentencia de la Corte Interamericana de los Derechos Humanos, como el caso Baena vrs Panamá, no concretó al caso la procedencia de la misma para analizar los diversos aristas, mas sin embargo, de un análisis de esta sentencia observa esta Cámara que refiere a un caso diverso, en razón de un despido ocurrido con la aplicación de una normativa aplicada retroactivamente, situación diversa a este caso, en donde luego se analizará la pre-existencia de normativa para la utilización de fondos de la caja chica de la institución.». Inicialmente, quien recurre asocia lo anteriormente transcrito a la vulneración del artículo 7 constitucional sobre el control de convencionalidad, para lo cual, cita la sentencia del caso tramitado y resuelto ante la Corte IDH en el caso Baena Ricardo y otros contra Panamá; sin embargo, al respecto su embate en sede casacional se agota en una reiteración de su teoría del caso, y omite combatir con rigor la deficiencia argumentativa evidenciada por el A Quo, sea la falta de una indicación concreta sobre el apartado de la sentencia del Tribunal interamericano de protección de Derechos Humanos, sumado a una tesis sobre la aplicabilidad de ese asunto al presente caso. Por el contrario, el recurso se limita a reconocer que el mismo es distinto y a insistir en su referencia al principio de no auto incriminación; no obstante, se reitera el incumplimiento de señalar el pasaje de la sentencia internacional y un razonamiento que permita ajustar aquel fallo a este caso. Lo mismo ocurre con la sentencia número 6007 del año 2017 de la Sala Constitucional, a cuyo respecto, su argumento se agota en una reiteración de su teoría de caso relativa a la falta de prevención sobre su no auto incriminación, pero omite cuestionar importantes argumentos expuestos por el Tribunal, por ejemplo, que no constituye indefensión si la situación en que el ciudadano se ha colocado obedece a una actitud voluntariamente adoptada, y cómo, a partir de ese razonamiento, de raigambre en la Sala Constitucional, implica que no toda infracción a las disposiciones procesales se convierte por sí misma en una vulneración al debido proceso. En ese sentido, el argumento se limita a una reiteración de argumentos propios, equivalente a una mera inconformidad con lo resuelto por el Tribunal Contencioso, razón que por sí sola implica el rechazo del embate así formulado. Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, esta Sala considera pertinente recordar que, tal y como lo expone la Sala Constitucional en su sentencia citada por el A Quo, el avance en la interpretación y aplicación judicial del derecho administrativo disciplinario ha permitido deslindarlo y establecer, en esa medida, importantes matices en su relación con el derecho penal. Tal es el caso del derecho a no auto incriminación, propio de esta última materia, que se estima inaplicable, en esa dimensión radical, en la materia administrativa sancionatoria. En ese sentido, el artículo 36 de la Constitución Política dispone: «Artículo 36. En materia penal nadie está obligado a declarar contra sí mismo, ni contra su cónyuge, ascendientes, descendientes o parientes colaterales hasta el tercer grado inclusive de consanguinidad o afinidad.». Por su parte, el artículo 8.2 inciso g) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos establece: «Artículo 8. Garantías Judiciales (…) 2. Toda persona inculpada de delito tiene derecho a que se presuma su inocencia mientras no se establezca legalmente su culpabilidad. Durante el proceso, toda persona tiene derecho, en plena igualdad, a las siguientes garantías mínimas: (…) g) Derecho a no ser obligado a declarar contra sí mismo ni a declararse culpable…». Es decir, según se encuentra dispuesto tanto a nivel convencional como constitucional, este derecho ha sido reservado a la materia penal, sin que la naturaleza sancionatoria que puede compartir esta rama del Derecho con la rama administrativa disciplinaria, implique extrapolarlo automáticamente a esta última. Al respecto, debe considerarse que las dimensiones y consecuencias en tales ámbitos de responsabilidad revisten diferencias considerables y evidentes. Sumado a ello, la abstención de declarar por parte de una persona imputada en un proceso penal, implica siempre la obligación del órgano encargado de la persecución penal, de recabar toda la prueba pertinente para formular, de ser el caso, la acusación correspondiente, debidamente fundamentada, según lo dispone el artículo 180 del Código Procesal Penal. Sin embargo, en materia administrativa se carece de esa figura acusatoria; de tal forma, en la persona del Órgano Director únicamente recae la obligación de tramitar el procedimiento para asegurar el mejor cumplimiento posible de los fines de la Administración, con el objetivo primordial de verificar la verdad real de los hechos que han de servir de motivo al acto final, ello, conforme los artículos 214 y siguientes de la LGAP. Esto implica para este Órgano la obligación de recibir toda la prueba que conduzca objetivamente a esa finalidad señalada en el canon 214 ibid, y por ello, la declaración del investigado se convierte en un insumo más encaminado a esa finalidad de averiguación de la verdad real de los hechos. En esa inteligencia y atendiendo la jurisprudencia constitucional precitada, si la persona investigada en sede administrativa se ha colocado voluntariamente en determinada situación, como ocurre en la especie con el reconocimiento voluntario de los hechos intimados sumado a los otros señalados en este recurso, ello no implica que se hubiese colocado en situación de indefensión, habida cuenta que se le hizo de conocimiento la posibilidad de contar con un patrocinio letrado en su defensa durante el procedimiento disciplinario. En esa virtud, el reparo deviene improcedente\".", "body_en_text": "VI.- Resolution of the appeal. To resolve the litigious issue now challenged, the Contentious-Administrative Court considered, among other points of interest, the following: «VI) REGARDING THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-INCRIMINATION AND OF CONVENTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY CONTROL. The plaintiff's legal counsel, in the closing arguments phase, alleged a violation of the plaintiff's self-incrimination, citing Constitutional Chamber resolution No. 6007-2017 of 9:45 a.m. on April 28, 2017, and the Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of Baena v. Panama, since he indicated that the plaintiff was not warned in the oral and private hearing that his testimony could incriminate him. In relation to the precedent cited by the plaintiff's representative, this Court observes that Constitutional Chamber vote No. 20176007 was issued in an amparo appeal process, where the Chamber did not observe that the request for information had warned the protected party of his right to abstain from testifying against himself, an element that is necessary when a formally established disciplinary investigation is carried out and that could entail a sanction to his detriment. From the Constitutional Chamber's own resolution, cited as jurisprudence by the plaintiff, this Chamber observes that another resolution of this same Constitutional Court is cited in Considerando II, consisting of resolution No. 2014020284 of nine hours five minutes on December eleventh, two thousand fourteen; which, in its relevant part, provides: \"II.- REGARDING THE SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF THIS CHAMBER IN THE FACE OF REPROACHES FOR INJURY TO DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT OF DEFENSE. (…) The need to clearly indicate the cases in which the analysis of violations of due process corresponds to the ordinary jurisdiction or to the constitutional jurisdiction led the Spanish Constitutional Court to make clarifications that this Chamber has incorporated into its jurisprudential line and which can be found in vote 2001-01545 in the following terms: (…) As the jurisprudence of this Constitutional Court has abundantly indicated, defenselessness (indefensión) does not occur if the situation in which the citizen has been placed was due to an attitude voluntarily adopted by him or if it were attributable to him due to a lack of necessary diligence. The conclusion to be drawn from this is twofold: on the one hand, not every violation of procedural rules automatically becomes juridical-constitutional defenselessness and therefore a violation of what is ordered by art. 24 of the Constitution, and, on the other hand, the classification of defenselessness with relevance in the constitutional order must be carried out by introducing factors different from the mere observance or, conversely, the violation of procedural rules and the formal rigor of the procedure (STC.48/84 of April 4)…”. In this way, as is clear from the partially transcribed resolution, not every violation of procedural rules becomes, per se, a violation of constitutional relevance to due process. Having said the above, this Chamber considers that the plaintiff, as recorded in the proven facts based on documentary evidence, was duly informed, with the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) by the Directing Body of the Administrative Procedure (Órgano Director del Procedimiento Administrativo), as recorded in the order of 9:45 a.m. on October 4, 2017, of the possibility of having legal counsel. Thus, we see how the operative part of that resolution indicated to him, in its relevant part: \"THEREFORE // The Directing Body resolves: // I. To initiate disciplinary proceedings against the official LUIS FERNANDO VANEGAS RODRÍGUEZ, identification number N*503060916, Job Trainer 1A, at the Regional Multipurpose Center of Liberia and in accordance with the provisions of articles 74 and following of the Autonomous Service Regulations of the National Learning Institute whose purpose is to verify the real truth of the facts exposed and determine if it is appropriate to impose the punitive measures provided for in articles 47 and 49 of the aforementioned Autonomous Regulations, in relation to article 23 of the Regulations for Revolving Work Funds, Petty Cash and Per Diems, for the alleged violation of articles 43 subsections 27) and 18) and 45 subsection 16), both of the Autonomous Service Regulations of the National Learning Institute, in accordance with article 14 of the Regulations for Revolving Work Funds, Petty Cash and Per Diems of INA, in relation to the following fact: (…) That at the aforementioned hearing you must appear personally and not through a representative, without prejudice to being accompanied by lawyers, technicians, or specialists of your choice; and that once this act is notified, your unjustified absence from the hearing will not prevent it from being held on the date and time indicated, even without your presence, without this signifying tacit acceptance of the facts.// (...)\".- It is clear to this Chamber that the plaintiff had been instructed to appear before the Directing Body with legal counsel. However, despite that warning, that resolution being duly notified, the plaintiff, of his own volition, sent the following text via email to the person in charge of the Directing Body on October 9, 2017: \"Good morning Mrs. Mariela, sorry for the bother, I am writing according to the notification I was handed today, all of this comes because my house was broken into and I had a large portion of perishable money (sic) which was stolen, however I am at your disposal and let what must be done be done according to administrative and disciplinary procedures. (Administrative file). As the Constitutional Chamber has already indicated in the aforementioned vote, defenselessness does not occur if the situation in which the citizen has been placed was due to an attitude voluntarily adopted by him, as is clearly evident from having sent an email accepting the facts alleged in the statement of charges prior to the holding of the oral and private hearing. Then, likewise, a month after having sent the email accepting the facts, he appeared on November 9, 2017, directly before the Directing Body of the procedure, without legal counsel, despite having been informed of the possibility of being accompanied by a lawyer and having been previously warned, as recorded in the file, however, -and even if the Directing Body- did not instruct him during the hearing to abstain from testifying or to have legal counsel, the plaintiff, of his own volition, proceeded to reiterate what was previously stated -in his email of October 9, 2017; an aspect that, in this Chamber's consideration, renders the alleged breach that occurred moot due to the voluntary attitude assumed by the plaintiff in acknowledging the failure to liquidate the funds -according to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber reviewed- which occurred prior to the oral and private hearing itself. Then, this Panel, on the other hand, reproaches that although the legal counsel referred to a judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, such as the Baena v. Panama case, he did not specify to the case the applicability of the same to analyze the various aspects, moreover, from an analysis of this judgment, this Chamber observes that it refers to a different case, due to a dismissal that occurred with the application of a regulation applied retroactively, a situation different from this case, where the pre-existence of regulations for the use of petty cash funds of the institution will later be analyzed.». Initially, the appellant associates the foregoing transcription with the violation of Article 7 of the Constitution regarding conventionality control, for which purpose, he cites the judgment of the case processed and resolved before the Inter-American Court in the Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama; however, in this regard, his attack in cassation is exhausted in a reiteration of his theory of the case, and he omits to rigorously combat the argumentative deficiency evidenced by the A Quo, that is, the lack of a concrete indication of the section of the judgment of the Inter-American Court for the protection of Human Rights, added to a thesis on the applicability of that matter to the present case. On the contrary, the appeal is limited to recognizing that it is different and to insisting on its reference to the principle of non-self-incrimination; however, the failure to point out the passage of the international judgment and a reasoning that would allow adjusting that ruling to this case is reiterated. The same occurs with judgment number 6007 of 2017 of the Constitutional Chamber, regarding which, his argument is exhausted in a reiteration of his theory of the case relative to the lack of warning about his non-self-incrimination, but he omits to question important arguments set forth by the Court, for example, that it does not constitute defenselessness if the situation in which the citizen has been placed obeys a voluntarily adopted attitude, and how, based on that reasoning, deeply rooted in the Constitutional Chamber, it implies that not every violation of procedural provisions becomes by itself a violation of due process. In that sense, the argument is limited to a reiteration of his own arguments, equivalent to mere disagreement with what was resolved by the Contentious-Administrative Court, a reason that in itself implies the rejection of the challenge thus formulated. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Chamber considers it pertinent to recall that, just as the Constitutional Chamber states in its judgment cited by the A Quo, the progress in the interpretation and judicial application of disciplinary administrative law has allowed it to be distinguished and, to that extent, important nuances to be established in its relationship with criminal law. Such is the case of the right against self-incrimination, typical of this latter area, which is considered inapplicable, in that radical dimension, in the administrative sanctioning matter. In that sense, Article 36 of the Political Constitution provides: «Article 36. In criminal matters, no one is obliged to testify against himself, or against his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or collateral relatives up to the third degree inclusive of consanguinity or affinity.». For its part, Article 8.2 subsection g) of the American Convention on Human Rights establishes: «Article 8. Judicial Guarantees (…) 2. Every person accused of a crime has the right to be presumed innocent until his guilt is legally established. During the process, every person has the right, in full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: (…) g) Right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty…». That is, as is provided both at the conventional and constitutional level, this right has been reserved for criminal matters, without the sanctioning nature that this branch of Law may share with the disciplinary administrative branch implying its automatic extrapolation to the latter. In this regard, it must be considered that the dimensions and consequences in such areas of responsibility involve considerable and evident differences. Added to this, the abstention from testifying by a person accused in a criminal process always implies the obligation of the body in charge of criminal prosecution to collect all pertinent evidence to formulate, if applicable, the corresponding accusation, duly grounded, as provided in Article 180 of the Criminal Procedural Code. However, in administrative matters, this accusatory figure is lacking; in this way, the Directing Body is solely responsible for processing the procedure to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration's purposes, with the primary objective of verifying the real truth of the facts that must serve as grounds for the final act, in accordance with articles 214 and following of the LGAP. This implies for this Body the obligation to receive all the evidence that objectively leads to that purpose indicated in canon 214 ibid, and therefore, the statement of the investigated person becomes one more input aimed at that purpose of ascertaining the real truth of the facts. In this understanding and in accordance with the aforementioned constitutional jurisprudence, if the person investigated in an administrative setting has voluntarily placed himself in a particular situation, as occurs in this case with the voluntary acknowledgment of the facts charged combined with the other points indicated in this appeal, this does not imply that he had been placed in a situation of defenselessness, given that he was made aware of the possibility of having legal counsel in his defense during the disciplinary procedure. By virtue of that, the objection becomes improper.\n\nFrom the very resolution of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), cited as case law by the plaintiff, this Chamber observes that another resolution of this same Constitutional Court is cited in recital (considerando) II, consisting of resolution No. 2014020284 of nine hours five minutes of December eleventh, two thousand fourteen; which, in its relevant parts, provides: \"II.- REGARDING THE SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF THIS CHAMBER IN THE FACE OF ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO DEFENSE. (...) The need to clearly indicate the cases in which the analysis of violations of due process corresponds to ordinary jurisdiction or to constitutional jurisdiction led the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional Español) to make clarifications that this Chamber has incorporated into its jurisprudential line and that can be found in vote 2001-01545 in the following terms: (...) As the case law of this Constitutional Court has indicated on abundant occasions, defenselessness (indefensión) does not occur if the situation in which the citizen has been placed was due to an attitude voluntarily adopted by him or if it were attributable to him due to lack of the necessary diligence. The conclusion to be drawn from this is twofold: on the one hand, that not every violation (infracción) of procedural norms becomes by itself defenselessness (indefensión) of a legal-constitutional nature and therefore a violation of what is ordered by Article 24 of the Constitution, and, on the other hand, that the classification of defenselessness (indefensión) with relevance in the constitutional order must be carried out with the introduction of factors different from the mere respect or, conversely, the violation of procedural norms and the formal rigor of the procedure (STC.48/84 of April 4)…\". In this way, as can be deduced from the partially transcribed resolution, not every violation of procedural norms becomes, per se, a violation of constitutional relevance to due process. Having said the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the plaintiff, as stated in the proven facts based on documentary evidence, was duly informed, with the notification of the statement of objections (traslado de cargos), by the Directing Body of the Administrative Procedure (Órgano Director del Procedimiento Administrativo), as recorded in the order of 9:45 a.m. on October 4, 2017, about the possibility of having legal counsel. Thus, we see how in the operative part of that resolution he was indicated, in its relevant parts: \"THEREFORE (Por tanto) // The Directing Body (Órgano Director), resolves: // I.\n\nInitiate disciplinary proceedings against the official LUIS FERNANDO VANEGAS RODRÍGUEZ, identity card N*503060916, Job Trainer 1A, at the Liberia Regional Polytechnic Center, and in accordance with the provisions of articles 74 and following of the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, the purpose of which is to verify the real truth of the facts presented and to determine whether it is appropriate to impose the disciplinary measures provided for in articles 47 and 49 of the aforementioned Reglamento Autónomo, in relation to article 23 of the Reglamento de Fondos Rotativos de Trabajo Caja Chica y Viáticos, for the alleged violation of articles 43 subsections 27) and 18) and 45 subsection 16), both of the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, in conjunction with article 14 of the Reglamento de Fondos Rotativos de Trabajo, Caja Chica y Viáticos of INA, in relation to the following fact: (...) That the summoned party must appear personally at the aforementioned hearing and not through a legal representative, without prejudice to being accompanied by lawyers, technicians, or specialists of their choice; and that once this act is notified, their unjustified absence from the hearing will not prevent it from taking place on the designated date and time, even without their presence, and this shall not imply tacit acceptance of the facts.// (...)\".- It is clear to this Chamber that the plaintiff had been instructed to appear before the directing body with legal counsel. However, despite that warning, having been duly notified of that resolution, the plaintiff, of his own accord, sent the following text via email to the person in charge of the directing body on October 9, 2017: \"Good morning Mrs. Mariela, sorry to bother you, I am writing in accordance with the notification I was given today, all this comes because my house was broken into and I had a large portion of money money (sic) for perishable goods which was stolen however I am at your service and let what must be done be done according to the administrative and disciplinary procedures. (Administrative file. As the Sala Constitucional already indicated in the aforementioned vote, defenselessness does not arise if the situation in which the citizen has been placed is due to an attitude voluntarily adopted by him, as clearly follows from having sent an email accepting the facts attributed in the statement of charges prior to the holding of the oral and private hearing.\n\nLater, likewise, one month after having sent the email accepting the facts, he appeared on November 9, 2017, directly before the directing body of the procedure, without legal representation, despite having been informed of the possibility of being accompanied by a lawyer and having been previously warned, as recorded in the case file; however, —and although the directing body— did not indicate to him during the hearing that he should abstain from testifying or that he should have legal counsel, the plaintiff, of his own volition, proceeded to reiterate what he had previously stated —in his email of October 9, 2017; an aspect which, in the consideration of this Chamber, renders moot the alleged breach that occurred due to the voluntary attitude adopted by the plaintiff in acknowledging the failure to liquidate the funds —according to the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional cited— which occurred prior to the oral and private hearing itself. Furthermore, this Chamber on the other hand reproaches that although the directing attorney referred to a judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, specifically the Baena v. Panama case, he did not concretely apply its relevance to the case to analyze the various aspects; nonetheless, from an analysis of this judgment, this Chamber observes that it refers to a different case, based on a dismissal that occurred with the retroactive application of a regulation, a situation different from this case, where the pre-existence of regulations for the use of the institution's petty cash (caja chica) funds will later be analyzed.\" Initially, the appellant associates the foregoing transcription with a violation of Article 7 of the Constitution regarding conventionality control, for which purpose he cites the judgment of the case processed and resolved before the IACHR Court in the case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama; however, in this regard, his challenge in cassation is exhausted in a reiteration of his theory of the case, and he omits to rigorously combat the argumentative deficiency identified by the A Quo, that is, the lack of a concrete indication regarding the specific section of the judgment of the Inter-American Court for the protection of Human Rights, in addition to a thesis on the applicability of that matter to the present case. On the contrary, the appeal is limited to recognizing that it is different and to insisting on its reference to the principle against self-incrimination (no auto incriminación); nevertheless, the failure to point out the passage of the international judgment and a reasoning that would allow that decision to be adjusted to this case is reiterated. The same occurs with judgment number 6007 of the year 2017 of the Sala Constitucional, in respect of which his argument is exhausted in a reiteration of his theory of the case concerning the lack of warning about his non-self-incrimination, but he omits to question important arguments presented by the Court, for example, that it does not constitute a lack of defense (indefensión) if the situation in which the citizen has placed himself is due to a voluntarily adopted attitude, and how, based on that reasoning, rooted in the Sala Constitucional, it implies that not every violation of procedural provisions becomes, by itself, a violation of due process (debido proceso).\n\nIn that regard, the argument is limited to a reiteration of its own arguments, equivalent to a mere disagreement with what was decided by the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, a reason that by itself implies the rejection of the challenge as formulated. Without prejudice to the foregoing, this Chamber considers it pertinent to recall that, as set forth by the Constitutional Chamber in its judgment cited by the *A Quo*, the advancement in the judicial interpretation and application of disciplinary administrative law has made it possible to separate it and to establish, to that extent, important nuances in its relationship with criminal law. Such is the case of the right against self-incrimination, which is characteristic of the latter field and is deemed inapplicable, in that radical dimension, in sanctioning administrative matters. In that sense, Article 36 of the Political Constitution provides: \"**Article 36.** In criminal matters, no one is obligated to testify against himself, or against his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or collateral relatives up to the third degree inclusive of consanguinity or affinity.\" For its part, Article 8.2(g) of the American Convention on Human Rights establishes: \"*Article 8. Judicial Guarantees* (…) *2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been legally established. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees:* (…) *g) the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty*…\" That is to say, as stipulated both at the conventional and constitutional levels, this right has been reserved for criminal matters, without the sanctioning nature that this branch of law may share with the disciplinary administrative branch implying that it should be automatically extrapolated to the latter. In this respect, it must be considered that the dimensions and consequences in such areas of liability have considerable and evident differences. Added to this, the abstention from testifying by a person accused in a criminal proceeding always implies the obligation of the body in charge of criminal prosecution to gather all pertinent evidence to formulate, if applicable, the corresponding accusation, duly substantiated, as provided for in Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, in administrative matters, that accusatory figure is lacking; thus, the Directing Body (Órgano Director) solely bears the obligation to process the procedure to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration's purposes, with the primary objective of verifying the real truth of the facts that are to serve as the basis for the final act, in accordance with Articles 214 and following of the LGAP.\n\nThis implies for this Body the obligation to receive all evidence that objectively leads to that purpose indicated in canon 214 ibid, and therefore, the statement of the investigated person becomes an input more aimed at that purpose of ascertaining the real truth of the facts. In this understanding and in accordance with the aforementioned constitutional jurisprudence, if the person investigated in administrative proceedings has voluntarily placed themselves in a certain situation, as occurs in the present case with the voluntary acknowledgment of the charged facts added to the others indicated in this appeal, this does not imply that they were placed in a situation of defenselessness, given that they were made aware of the possibility of having legal counsel in their defense during the disciplinary procedure. By virtue of that, the objection becomes inadmissible.\"\n\nFrom the very decision of the Constitutional Chamber, cited as case law by the plaintiff, this Chamber observes that another decision of this same Constitutional Court is cited in Considerando II, consisting of resolution No. 2014020284 of nine hours five minutes of December eleventh, two thousand fourteen; which, in the relevant part, provides: \"II.- REGARDING THE SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF THIS CHAMBER IN THE FACE OF REPROACHES FOR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT OF DEFENSE. (...) The need to clearly indicate the cases in which the analysis of violations of due process corresponds to the ordinary jurisdiction or to the constitutional jurisdiction led the Spanish Constitutional Court to make clarifications that this Chamber has incorporated into its jurisprudential line and which can be found in Voto 2001-01545 in the following terms: (...) As the jurisprudence of this Constitutional Court has indicated on abundant occasions, defenselessness (indefensión) does not occur if the situation in which the citizen has been placed was due to an attitude voluntarily adopted by him or if it was attributable to him for lack of the necessary diligence. The conclusion that must be drawn from this is twofold: on the one hand, that not every violation of procedural norms by itself constitutes juridical-constitutional defenselessness and therefore a violation of what is ordered by Art. 24 of the Constitution, and, on the other hand, that the classification of defenselessness with relevance in the constitutional order must be carried out with the introduction of factors different from the mere respect for, or conversely, the violation of procedural norms and the formal rigor of the procedure (STC.48/84 of April 4)…\". In this way, as is clear from the partially transcribed decision, not every violation of procedural norms becomes, per se, a violation of due process of constitutional relevance. Having said the above, this Chamber considers that the plaintiff, as recorded in the proven facts based on documentary evidence, was duly informed, with the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) by the Directing Body of the Administrative Procedure, as recorded in the order of 9:45 hrs. on October 4, 2017, about the possibility of having legal representation. Thus, we see how in the operative part of that resolution, in the relevant part, he was told: \"THEREFORE // The Directing Body, resolves: // I.\n\nInitiate disciplinary proceedings against the official LUIS FERNANDO VANEGAS RODRÍGUEZ, identity card number N*503060916, Formador para el Trabajo 1A, at the Centro Regional Polivalente de Liberia and in accordance with the provisions of articles 74 and following of the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios of the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, the purpose of which is to verify the real truth of the facts presented and to determine whether it is appropriate to impose the disciplinary measures provided for in articles 47 and 49 of the aforementioned Reglamento Autónomo, in relation to article 23 of the Reglamento de Fondos Rotativos de Trabajo Caja Chica y Viáticos, for the alleged violation of articles 43 subsections 27) and 18) and 45 subsection 16), both of the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicios of the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, in conjunction with article 14 of the Reglamento de Fondos Rotativos de Trabajo, Caja Chica y Viáticos of the INA, in connection with the following fact: That the aforementioned hearing must be attended personally and not through an attorney-in-fact, without prejudice to being accompanied by lawyers, technicians, or specialists of his choice; and that once this act is notified, his unjustified absence from the hearing will not prevent it from taking place on the scheduled date and time, even without his presence, without this implying tacit acceptance of the facts.// (...)\".- It is clear to this Chamber that the plaintiff had been instructed to appear before the directing body with legal counsel. However, despite that warning, having been duly notified of that decision, the plaintiff, of his own accord, sent via email to the person in charge of the directing body on October 9, 2017, the following text: \"Good morning Mrs. Mariela, sorry for the bother, I am writing to you in accordance with the notification I received today, all of this is because my house was broken into and I had a large portion of perishable money money (sic) which was stolen, nevertheless I am at your service (sic) and let what has to be done be done according to the administrative and disciplinary procedures. (Administrative file. As the Sala Constitucional already indicated in the aforementioned vote, defenselessness (indefensión) does not occur if the situation in which the citizen has been placed was due to an attitude voluntarily adopted by him, as is clearly evident from having sent an email accepting the facts attributed to him in the notification of charges prior to the holding of the oral and private hearing.\n\nLater, likewise one month after having sent the email accepting the facts, he appeared on November 9, 2017, directly before the directing body of the proceeding, without legal counsel, despite having been informed of the possibility of being accompanied by a lawyer and having been previously warned, as stated in the case file; however, —and although the directing body— did not indicate to him during the hearing that he should abstain from testifying or have legal counsel, the plaintiff on his own accord proceeded to reiterate what he had previously stated —in his email of October 9, 2017; an aspect which, in this Chamber's consideration, renders moot the alleged breach that occurred due to the voluntary attitude assumed by the plaintiff in acknowledging the failure to liquidate the funds —according to the reviewed jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional— which occurred prior to the oral and private hearing itself. Then, this Court, on the other hand, reproaches that although the directing lawyer referred to a judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, namely the Baena v. Panama case, he did not specify its applicability to the case in order to analyze the various aspects; nonetheless, from an analysis of this judgment, this Chamber observes that it refers to a different case, relating to a dismissal that occurred with the application of a retroactively applied regulation, a situation different from this case, where the pre-existence of regulations for the use of the institution's petty cash (caja chica) funds will be analyzed later.\n\n» Initially, the appellant associates the foregoing transcribed text with the violation of Article 7 of the Constitution regarding conventionality control, for which purpose he cites the judgment of the case processed and resolved before the Inter-American Court in the case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama; however, in this regard, his challenge at the cassation level is exhausted in a reiteration of his case theory, and he omits rigorously combating the argumentative deficiency evidenced by the A Quo, that is, the lack of a specific indication of the section of the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in addition to a thesis on the applicability of that matter to the present case. On the contrary, the appeal is limited to recognizing that it is different and to insisting on its reference to the principle against self-incrimination; nevertheless, the failure to identify the passage of the international ruling and a reasoning that would allow adapting that decision to this case is reiterated. The same occurs with judgment number 6007 of the year 2017 of the Sala Constitucional, regarding which his argument is exhausted in a reiteration of his case theory concerning the lack of warning about his non-self-incrimination, but he omits to question important arguments presented by the Tribunal, for example, that it does not constitute defenselessness if the situation in which the citizen has placed himself is due to a voluntarily adopted attitude, and how, based on that reasoning, deeply rooted in the Sala Constitucional, it implies that not every violation of procedural provisions by itself becomes a violation of due process.\n\nIn that regard, the argument is limited to a reiteration of its own arguments, equivalent to a mere disagreement with what was resolved by the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, a reason which in itself implies the rejection of the challenge as formulated. Without prejudice to the foregoing, this Chamber considers it pertinent to recall that, as set forth by the Constitutional Chamber in its judgment cited by the *A Quo*, the progress in the judicial interpretation and application of disciplinary administrative law has allowed it to be distinguished from criminal law and, to that extent, to establish important nuances in their relationship. Such is the case of the right against self-incrimination (derecho a no auto incriminación), characteristic of the latter subject matter, which is deemed inapplicable, in that radical dimension, in sanctioning administrative matters. In that sense, Article 36 of the Political Constitution provides: “***Article 36.** In criminal matters, no one is obliged to testify against himself, or against his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or collateral relatives up to the third degree inclusive of consanguinity or affinity.*” For its part, Article 8.2(g) of the American Convention on Human Rights establishes: “*Article 8. Judicial Guarantees (…) 2. Every person accused of a crime has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been legally established. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: (…) g) the right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to plead guilty…*” That is to say, as established both at the conventional and constitutional levels, this right has been reserved for criminal matters, without the sanctioning nature that this branch of law may share with the disciplinary administrative branch implying that it should be automatically extrapolated to the latter. In this regard, it must be considered that the dimensions and consequences in those spheres of liability entail considerable and evident differences. In addition to this, the refusal to testify by a person charged in a criminal proceeding always implies the obligation of the body responsible for criminal prosecution to gather all pertinent evidence to formulate, if applicable, the corresponding duly substantiated accusation, as provided in Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, in administrative matters, that accusatory figure is absent; thus, the obligation solely falls upon the Directing Body (Órgano Director) to process the procedure to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration’s purposes, with the primary objective of verifying the real truth of the facts that are to serve as the basis for the final act, in accordance with Articles 214 and following of the LGAP.\n\nThis implies for this Body the obligation to receive all evidence that objectively leads to that purpose indicated in canon 214 *ibid*, and therefore, the statement of the investigated person becomes an input more directed toward that purpose of ascertaining the real truth of the facts. In that understanding and in accordance with the aforementioned constitutional jurisprudence, if the person investigated in an administrative venue has voluntarily placed themselves in a certain situation, as occurs in this case with the voluntary acknowledgment of the facts charged together with the other elements indicated in this appeal, this does not imply that they were placed in a situation of defenselessness, given that they were informed of the possibility of having legal representation in their defense during the disciplinary proceeding. By virtue of that, the objection becomes inadmissible.\"" }